Mich. Comp. Laws § 600

Section 600.5838(1) makes a legal-malpractice claim accrue when the attorney stops serving the plaintiff professionally on the matter giving rise to the claim.

Iafrate v. Warner Norcross & Judd, LLP · filed 2023-06-23(1)

First, as to Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim in Count I of their Complaint, which, as discussed above, can be based only on WNJ’s alleged actions in negotiating and drafting the ESOP documents in 2013, and in particular the Warrants, the Court finds that that claim is time-barred. A legal malpractice claim accrues at the time an attorney discontinues serving the plaintiff in a professional capacity “as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose….” MCL 600.5838(1) (emphasis added); see Voutsaras v. Bossenbrook, No. 345493, 2020 WL 908495, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2020) (finding legal malpractice claim accrued when client executed documents setting up trust (even though client did not pick up her file until months later) and noting that there is no evidence demonstrating that attorney’s representation continued past that date). Thus, Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim against WNJ accrued no later than December 6, 2013 and should have been brought by December 6, 2015. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Complaint in this matter filed on June 28, 2018 was untimely.

Section 600.5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when the plaintiff learns facts from which she can infer, without speculation or conjecture, that an earlier professional may have committed malpractice.

Baase v. East Michigan Physicians Organization Plc · filed 2025-12-18(2)

A plaintiff “should have discovered” her claim, within the meaning of MCL 600.5838a(2), when she “learned facts from which she could have inferred, without speculation or conjecture, that an earlier professional might have committed malpractice.” Id. at 341. In other words, a plaintiff is aware of the existence of a claim when she has knowledge of a causal relationship between an injury and a doctor’s conduct.

Section 600.4011 authorizes garnishment of an obligation owed to a judgment debtor, but it does not reach commissions that were not fixed or due when the writ was served.

Royal York of Plymouth Ass'n v. Coldwell Banker Schweitzer Real Estate Services · filed 1993-09-07(1)(b)

Pursuant to MCL 600.4011(1); MSA 27A.4011(1), the circuit court has the power to apply the following property or obligations to the satisfaction of an outstanding judgment: ... (b) An obligation owed to the person against whom the claim is asserted if the obligor is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state. [Emphasis added.] ... However, even as amended, we expressly hold that the statute and the court rule do not obligate a garnishee defendant to pay real estate commissions for sales of property that have not yet become fixed or due because closing has not taken place.

Section 600.4011(1)(b) permits garnishment of an obligation owed to the judgment debtor, reaching the debtor’s assets or obligations rather than the garnishee’s own assets.

Fifth Third Bank v. Triangle Associates Inc · filed 2015-10-29(1)(b)

Although the funds in the Bentwaters Account belonged to Fifth Third Bank upon deposit, the fact remains that, in a garnishment action, it is the defendant’s assets that are subject to garnishment, not the garnishee’s assets. See MCL 600.4011(1)(b); MCR 3.101(J)(1).

Section 600.1629(1)(a) permits a tort action to be brought in a county where the allegedly defective product was manufactured or designed.

Vermilya v. Carter Crompton Site Development Contractors, Inc · filed 1993-09-08(1)(a)

In Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 377; 483 NW2d 844 (1992), our Supreme Court recently interpreted the requirement of MCL 600.1629(l)(a); MSA 27A.1629(l)(a) that an action be brought in a county "in which all or a part of the cause of action arose” to include a county in which a product was manufactured or designed defectively. Because defendant in this case manufactured or designed the allegedly defective goal in Genesee County, venue was proper in Genesee County.

For medical-malpractice venue, the “original injury” is the physical harm resulting from the alleged malpractice, occurring where treatment in reliance on the malpractice causes that harm.

Taha v. Basha Diagnostics, PC · filed 2007-08-15(1)(a)(i)

The “original injury” for purposes of MCL 600.1629(l)(a) was the physical harm to plaintiff that occurred as a result of defendants’ alleged misinterpretation of the x-ray. This harm did not occur until plaintiff received treatment from Dr. Sinan, who relied on defendants’ alleged error. Venue was proper in Wayne County, where plaintiff suffered an “original injury” that resulted from defendants’ allegedly negligent services.

Section 600.1641(1) makes venue proper in any county where a joined cause of action could have been commenced and tried, while subsection (2) requires tort-venue rules only when a joined claim seeks damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death.

Provider Creditors Committee v. United American Health Care Corporation · filed 2007-08-29(1), (2)

MCL 600.1641(1) provides: “Except as provided in subsection (2), if causes of action are joined, whether properly or not, venue is proper in any county in which either cause of action, if sued upon separately, could have been commenced and tried, subject to separation and change as provided by court rule.” (Emphasis added.) ... We hold that MCL 600.1641(1) governs in the determination of the proper venue for this action because plaintiffs complaint joined causes of action by asserting multiple claims against defendants.

Section 308a(3) requires a taxpayer action to be commenced within one year after accrual, and a Headlee Amendment tax-increase challenge accrues when the increase becomes effective, not when an individual taxpayer later pays the tax.

Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v. Wayne County · filed 1994-02-08(3)

A taxpayer shall not bring or maintain an action under this section unless the action is commenced within 1 year after the cause of action accrued. [MCL 600.308a(3); MSA 27A.308(1)(3).] ... Here, the action that § 31 of the Headlee Amendment allegedly prohibited was the county’s increase of an existing tax, without voter approval. That increase took effect on April 1, 1981. As affected taxpayers, plaintiffs had standing to challenge the increase on its effective date. Because plaintiffs could then commence an action, their cause of action accrued at that moment. ... However, the plain wording of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment describes discrete actions —the imposition of a new tax, or the increase of an existing tax—and indicates that the cause of action has fully accrued when the unconstitutional action, with its clearly established consequences, occurs, without regard to when any individual taxpayer suffers monetary injury. ... Although Durant addressed the one-year limitation in the context of an alleged violation of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment, we find its analysis to be equally applicable to an alleged violation of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment.

Section 5805(1) gives personal-injury actions a three-year limitations period, and days during the COVID-19 state of emergency were excluded when computing the filing deadline.

20230126_C360772_36_360772.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-01-26(1)

The period of limitations for personal-injury actions is three years, MCL 600.5805(1), and so, under normal circumstances, plaintiff’s complaint would have been untimely. ... Accordingly, under AO 2020-3 and MCR 1.108(1), any day falling during the state of emergency does not count toward determining the last day of a statutory limitations period. ... And applying the administrative orders in this case, we conclude that plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed.

Section 600.715(1) makes even the slightest transaction of business in Michigan sufficient to establish a corporation’s limited personal jurisdiction when the action arises from that transaction.

Salzeider Inc v. Easy Street Spartan 8411 LLC · filed 2023-10-26(1)

The phrase, “transaction of any business” in MCL 600.715(1) is not defined by statute. ... Our Legislature’s use of the word “any” to define the amount of business that must be transacted establishes that even the slightest transaction is sufficient to bring a corporation within Michigan’s long-arm jurisdiction. ... Easy Street was certainly involved in a “business” activity when it negotiated the sale of property in Illinois with parties located in Michigan, all in a purported attempt to realize a profit from the transaction. Moreover, Easy Street “transacted” that business in Michigan when it solicited Leeds’s interest in purchasing the property, negotiated the purchase of the property with parties physically present in Michigan, received money pursuant to that transaction from a business and bank account located in Michigan, and eventually brought the negotiations to a terminal point when the deal did not close.

Section 600.6419(1)(a) gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state that are ex contractu or ex delicto, while § 600.6419a gives it concurrent jurisdiction over ancillary equitable or declaratory relief.

Oakland County v. Department of Human Services · filed 2010-09-146419(1)(a); 6419a

We conclude that the Court of Claims had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs ex contractu claim seeking a refund of the monies withheld by defendant. MCL 600.6419(l)(a). We further conclude that the Court of Claims had concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs ancillary demand for declaratory relief. MCL 600.6419a.

Section 600.6419 gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state and its agencies, while section 600.6419a gives it concurrent jurisdiction over ancillary equitable or declaratory relief; jurisdiction turns on the claim's actual nature.

AFSCME Council 25 v. State Employees' Retirement System · filed 2011-08-25(1)(a)

The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine “all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.” MCL 600.6419(1)(a); ... The Court of Claims also has concurrent jurisdiction over “any demand for equitable relief and any demand for a declaratory judgment when ancillary to a claim filed” pursuant to MCL 600.6419. MCL 600.6419a. ... The determination whether the Court of Claims possesses jurisdiction is governed by the actual nature of the claim, not how the parties phrase the request for relief or the characterization of the nature of the relief. ... In light of the present reduction in compensation, defendants’ jurisdictional challenge claiming that plaintiffs are raising a *8hypothetical scenario regarding events that may occur upon their retirement fails.

MCL 600.6419a gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction over declaratory and equitable claims against the state when the same suit also seeks money damages, so the entire mixed action belongs there.

Silverman v. University of Michigan Board of Regents · filed 1994-05-17

By enacting 1984 PA 212, however, the Legislature authorized the Court of Claims to exercise jurisdiction over claims for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, provided that the plaintiff’s suit also seeks money damages from the state or one of its agencies. A complaint seeking only money damages against the state must be filed in the Court of Claims. A complaint seeking only equitable or declaratory relief must be filed in circuit court. A complaint seeking money damages from the state as well as equitable or declaratory relief against the state may only be filed in the Court of Claims, because that is the sole forum that is capable of deciding the whole case.8 MCL 600.6419a; MSA 27A.6419(1).

Section 6419(1)(a) gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over contract- or tort-based claims against the state, including complaints seeking only declaratory relief.

Parkwood Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. State Housing Development Authority · filed 2003-07-09(1)(a)

The plain language of § 6419(l)(a), the primary source of jurisdiction for the Court of Claims, does not refer to claims for money damages or to claims for declaratory relief. Rather, in broad language, this provision grants the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction of “all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state . . . .” Because the present case involves a contract-based claim for declaratory relief against a state agency, we conclude that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the plain language § 6419(l)(a).

MCL 600.6419(1)(a) gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over contract- or tort-based complaints against the state or a state agency even when they seek only declaratory relief.

Parkwood Ltd Dividend Housing Assn v. State Housing Develop Auth · filed 2003-07-09(1)(a)

Today we hold that pursuant to the plain language of § 6419(1)(a), the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints based on contract or tort that seek solely declaratory relief against the state or any state agency.

Section 600.605 gives circuit courts original jurisdiction over civil claims and remedies unless another court has exclusive jurisdiction, and § 600.6419a preserves that jurisdiction for declaratory and equitable-relief claims even when the Court of Claims has jurisdiction.

Behnke, Inc. v. State · filed 2008-02-21

The claims sought declaratory or equitable relief not arising out of either contract or tort. Under MCL 600.605, “Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.” Further, the remedies plaintiffs seek are fully within the scope of the circuit court’s jurisdiction as provided by MCL 600.4401(1) (an action for mandamus against a state officer shall be commenced in the court of appeals, or in the circuit court in the county in which venue is proper), and MCR 3.305(A)(1) (an action for mandamus against a state officer may be brought in the Court of Appeals or the circuit court). Even assuming that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction, MCL 600.6419a provides that “jurisdiction conferred by this section [to the court of claims] is not intended to be exclusive of the jurisdiction of the circuit court over demands for declaratory and equitable relief conferred by section 605.” Because the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is not exclusive of the jurisdiction of the circuit court over actions for declaratory or equitable relief, MCL 600.6419a, it can be assumed that the Legislature intended that the circuit court retain original jurisdiction over such claims as provided by MCL 600.605.

MCL 600.6419 grants the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims against the state and its subdivisions, but does not prevent the Legislature from granting the court additional jurisdiction over other actions.

River Investment Group LLC v. Casab · filed 2010-08-10(1)

MCL 600.6419 confers jurisdiction over claims against the state and its subunits in the Court of Claims. ... MCL 600.6437 authorizes the Court of Claims to “order entry of judgment against” the state and its subunits. However, nothing in either statute states that the Court of Claims may not exercise jurisdiction over any other case, if the Legislature were to grant it additional jurisdiction.

Section 600.6419 gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state and its departments or officers, while school districts and other listed local governmental instrumentalities are outside that jurisdiction.

Bassett v. State Court Administrator · filed 2017-06-15(1)(a), (7)

Beginning with the DPS defendants, plaintiff is mistaken in her contention that they are state actors for purpose of jurisdiction in the Court of Claims. In accordance with MCL 600.6401 et seq., the Court of Claims retains exclusive jurisdiction over tort-based and contract-based claims pending against the state. Parkwood Ltd Dividend Housing Ass’n v State Housing Dev Auth, 468 Mich 763, 773-775; 664 NW2d 185 (2003). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the DPS defendants do not fall within the purview of the Court of Claims. As recognized in Doan v Kellogg Community College, 80 Mich App 316, 320; 263 NW2d 357 (1977), citing the statutory definitions of a “political subdivision” and the “state” in MCL 691.1401, “[c]ertain governmental instrumentalities are never within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. These include: counties, cities, villages, townships and school districts. Their exclusion from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is provided by legislative enactment.” As such, the dismissal of the DPS defendants by the Court of Claims for lack of jurisdiction was not in error.

Section 6419 gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief against the state and its departments or officers, and that jurisdiction is exclusive except for limited statutory exceptions.

Bassett v. State Court Administrator · filed 2017-06-15(1)(a), (1), (7)

Under the Court of Claims Act, it appears the Court of Claims has jurisdiction: ... With limited exceptions, MCL 600.6419(1) provides, “the jurisdiction of the court of claims . . . is exclusive.” ... The terms “the state or any of its departments or officers” are defined to mean: ... It is undisputed that the MSP and SCAO are state agencies or departments. ... As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the state defendants from the Wayne Circuit Court litigation.

The amended Court of Claims jurisdiction statute gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction over Headlee Amendment claims notwithstanding the more specific venue and jurisdiction provision in MCL 600.308a(1), which the Legislature implicitly repealed.

Telford v. State of Michigan · filed 2019-02-26(1)(a)

We conclude that, notwithstanding the specificity of MCL 600.308a(1), our reluctance to find a repeal by implication, and the lack of any mention of the Headlee Amendment in 2013 PA 164 or its legislative analyses, the Legislature did intend to repeal MCL 600.308a(1).

Section 6304 does not permit the factfinder to determine or apportion the fault of tortfeasors who settled and were released; the relevant fault allocation is among parties to the action.

Department of Transportation v. Thrasher · filed 1994-08-02(1), (2), and (5)

Subsections (1) and (2) of § 6304 are almost identical to the ucfa and HB 5154, with one very important omission: they do not include a reference to released parties. ... § 6304 as enacted only refers to "the total fault of all of the parties regarding each claim as to each plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant." ... However, § 6304 as adopted, does not. ... The mdot is not entitled to have the factfinder determine the fault of settling tortfeasors.

MCL 600.2925d does not abrogate the common-law rule that releasing an agent discharges the principal from vicarious liability.

Larkin v. Otsego Memorial Hospital Ass'n · filed 1994-11-07

Because four justices concurred that MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) does not abrogate the common-law rule in question, Theophelis is binding with regard to that point of law.

Section 2925a governs contribution claims, which are distinct from contractual indemnification and do not apply when liability rests on indemnification.

Hertz Corp. v. Volvo Truck Corp. · filed 1995-04-21(7)

Hertz’ contribution claim under MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1) was not the basis of the trial court’s judgment. Rather, the trial court based liability on indemnification principles. Contribution and indemnification are separate and distinct claims. Because Hertz is entitled to contractual indemnification, contribution principles are inapplicable. See MCL 600.2925a(7); MSA 27A.2925(1)(7).

Section 600.5852 permits a personal representative to commence a surviving action within two years after letters of authority are issued, subject to a three-year outer limit after the limitations period expires, but suspension of the representative’s letters for failure to file an estate accounting does not toll the limitations period.

Turner v. Mercy Hospitals & Health Services · filed 1995-04-28

The gravamen of this case is whether the period of limitation in MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852 is tolled while the letters of authority of the personal representative of the decedent’s estate are suspended because of the personal representative’s apparent negligence. We hold that the limitation period is not tolled.

MCL 600.5838a(2) requires a medical-malpractice action to be brought within six years of the act or omission underlying the claim, subject only to the minority-saving exceptions expressly stated in the statute; MCL 600.5852 does not toll or create an exception to that repose period.

Burton v. Macha · filed 2014-01-28(2)

Regardless of which period of limitations applies in a given case, however, a plaintiff must bring his or her medical-malpractice action within six years of “the date of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim.” MCL 600.5838a(2). The only exceptions to the running of this six-year statute of repose are those created by the minority saving provisions of MCL 600.5851(7) and (8)—the only two exceptions specifically mentioned in the statute.4 See MCL 600.5838a(2).

Section 5805(4) sets a two-year limitation period for an action charging malpractice.

LOCAL 1064, RWDSU AFL-CIO v. Ernst & Young · filed 1995-07-25(4)

For the reasons stated in Nat’l Sand, Inc v Nagel Construction, Inc, 182 Mich App 327, 332-337; 451 NW2d 618 (1990), we conclude that § 5805 prescribes the limitation periods for traditional common-law torts, regardless of whether the damages sought are for pecuniary or physical injury. ... Consequently, we hold that the relevant statute of limitations is MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4).

MCL 600.308a(3)'s one-year limitation and MCL 600.6452(1)'s three-year limitation do not apply to a suit under the second sentence of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment.

Wayne County Chief Executive v. Governor · filed 1998-09-10(3) and (1)

We therefore hold that the periods of limitation set forth at MCL 600.308a(3); MSA 27A.308(1)(3) and MCL 600.6452(1); MSA 27A.6452(1) are inapplicable to a suit brought pursuant to the second sentence of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment.

Under § 600.5838a(1), a medical-malpractice claim accrues when the act or omission underlying it occurs, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it; a continuing physician-patient relationship alone does not extend accrual.

McKiney v. Clayman · filed 1999-12-01(1)

This unambiguous language reflects the Legislature’s desire to focus the accrual date of medical malpractice claims on the occasion of the act or omission complained of, and the Legislature’s clear rejection of the notion that the existence of a continuing physician-patient relationship by itself could extend the accrual date beyond the specific, allegedly negligent act or omission charged.

Section 5856 tolls the limitations period only when the plaintiff files the complaint and also completes one of the statute’s specified steps, such as service, acquiring jurisdiction, or placing the summons and complaint with an officer for immediate service.

Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc · filed 2003-07-01

We hold that the unambiguous language of MCL 600.5805 and MCL 600.5856 provides that the mere filing of a complaint is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. In order to toll the limitations period, one must also comply with the requirements of § 5856.

MCL 600.5805(6) gives medical-malpractice actions a two-year limitations period, measured under MCL 600.5838a from the act or omission regardless of when discovered.

Sanders v. Perfecting Church · filed 2013-07-16(6) and (1)

The period of limitations for a medical malpractice action is ordinarily two years, MCL 600.5805(6), from “the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the *10plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim,” MCL 600.5838a(l). In this case, the alleged malpractice occurred on July 8, 2007. Plaintiff filed her original complaint on July 7, 2010, which was one year after the two-year period of limitations had run. MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838a(l). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion because permitting plaintiff to amend the complaint to include the expired medical malpractice claim would have been futile.

Section 600.5838b bars a legal-malpractice action after the earlier of the applicable limitations period or six years after the act or omission underlying the claim.

Jones v. Manville · filed 2016-03-22(1)(a), (1)(b)

We find it unnecessary to engage in an effort to discern the proper construction of MCL 600.5838 in relationship to MCL 600.5838b, which apparently has not yet been the subject of any published opinion, because Jones’s legal malpractice action is time-barred no matter what construction is employed. First, Jones’s suit was not filed within six years after the date of the act or omission that served as the basis of his legal malpractice claim. MCL 600.5838b(1)(b). Second, assuming the general applicability of the six-month discovery provision contained in MCL 600.5838(2) relative to a legal malpractice action, it did not save Jones’s suit, given that Jones discovered or should have discovered the existence of his claim years earlier, considering the openly-ascertainable nature of the claimed malpractice. Third, and finally, Jones’s legal malpractice action was not filed within the two-year statute of limitations. MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838b(1)(a).

Section 5805(6) requires medical-malpractice claims to be filed within two years.

Estate of Eric Gerrity v. Women's & Children's Health Services · filed 2016-11-08(6)

Plaintiffs were therefore required to file their medical malpractice claim within two years of Eric’s death. MCL 600.5805(6). Their failure to do so warranted dismissal.

The two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims bars claims that sound in medical malpractice; a claim sounding in ordinary negligence is not barred by that period.

Trowell v. Providence Hospital and Medical Centers Inc · filed 2018-07-23(8)

With the exception of Trowell’s claim regarding the second time the aide dropped her, the allegations in Trowell’s complaint sounded in medical malpractice and thus were time-barred because the allegations involved matters of medical judgment in the course of Providence Hospital’s professional relationship with Trowell and a jury was not likely to possess the knowledge and experience necessary to reach an informed decision as to those matters.

The six-year limitations period for fraud claims applies to a rescission claim, which accrues when the underlying wrong occurs; here, the claim accrued when the alleged misrepresentation was made in 2006.

Maurer v. Fremont Insurance Company · filed 2018-09-18

Generally, a claim “accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827. ... We conclude that Fremont’s claim for rescission accrued in 2006 when Mr. Maurer submitted the application containing the misrepresentation. ... Thus, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Fremont counterclaim for rescission was untimely and that plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition.

Subsection (a) tolls a limitations period when the complaint is filed if the summons and complaint are timely served under the Supreme Court rules.

Olin v. Mercy Health Hackley Campus · filed 2019-05-21(a)

MCL 600.5856 provides the substantive rule for tolling statutory periods of limitations or repose: ... MCL 600.5856(a) applies in this case to toll the applicable period of limitations pending proper service.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a two-year limitations period on medical-malpractice claims, while § 600.5838a(1) makes such a claim accrue at the underlying act or omission regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it.

Carlomusto v. John M Colasanti Dds Pc · filed 2021-08-12(8); (1)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim is two years. MCL 600.5805(8). Pursuant to MCL 600.5838a(1), “a claim based on the medical malpractice of a person or entity . . . accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” Defendants assert Dr. Colasanti last treated plaintiff in November 2016, and plaintiff has not disputed this. Plaintiff filed her complaint in July 2019—more than two years after Dr. Colasanti last treated her. Plaintiff’s claim was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, summary disposition of the breach-of-contract claim in defendants’ favor was appropriate pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Section 600.2912(1) covers a person holding himself or herself out as a member of a state-licensed profession, and section 600.5805(8) imposes a two-year limitations period on malpractice claims, including professional veterinary-malpractice claims.

Sovereign O'Dell v. Dvm · filed 2022-05-19(2912)(1); (5805)(8)

“A civil action for malpractice may be maintained against any person professing or holding himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession.” MCL 600.2912(1). ... For an action charging malpractice, the period of limitations is two years. MCL 600.5805(8). Thus, regardless of whether plaintiff raised a claim alleging medical malpractice or general professional malpractice, the period of limitations is the same, two years.

The cited medical-malpractice limitations provisions require filing within two years of the malpractice act or omission, regardless of when the claim is discovered, and bar an action filed outside the prescribed period.

Roche v. Jeffrey D Mendelson Md · filed 2022-07-28

The period of limitations for medical malpractice actions is controlled by statute. Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp Corp, 466 Mich 196, 199; 644 NW2d 730 (2002). The general limitation period for a malpractice action is two years. MCL 600.5805(8). A medical malpractice claim “accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” MCL 600.5838a(1). A medical malpractice action that is not commenced within the statutorily prescribed time limits is “barred.” MCL 600.5838a(2).

Section 308a(3) requires a taxpayer's Headlee Amendment action to begin within one year after accrual; a refund claim accrues when the tax is due or paid, while the provision does not bar prospective injunctive relief against future unconstitutional taxes.

Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v. Wayne County · filed 1995-08-22(3)

The circuit court ruled that the plaintiff’s suit is barred by the limitation period contained in MCL 600.308a(3); MSA 27A.308(1)(3). ... Suffice it to say that § 308a(3) does not prevent a taxpayer from seeking to enjoin a governmental unit from imposing on him in the future taxes that violate the Headlee Amendment. To hold otherwise would truncate the constitutional right. ... For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the Headlee Amendment claim of this taxpayer accrued at the time he paid the tax in question.

MCL 600.308a(3) bars a plaintiff from asserting a Headlee Amendment violation more than one year after the violation occurred.

Kowalski v. City of Livonia · filed 2005-10-26(3)

However, given the fact that a plaintiff may only claim a Headlee violation within one year after its occurrence, MCL 600.308a(3), *521it would distort the purpose of the limitations period if we scanned the entire life of the cable fund searching for a surplus year.

The one-year limitations period for a Headlee Amendment tax challenge by a person who does not pay the tax directly begins when the alleged offending tax resolution or imposition is enacted.

Morgan v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 2005-10-26(3)

In Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation [TACT] v Wayne Co, 450 Mich 119, 124-125 n 7; 537 NW2d 596 (1995), our Supreme Court held that individuals who do not pay a tax directly may still challenge whether the tax violates the Headlee Amendment. Const 1963, art 9, § 32. However, the Court noted that the one-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.308a(3), would apply to such a plaintiff and would begin running at the time the offending tax resolution was enacted. ... Following the example in TACT, plaintiffs Headlee claim accrued when defendant first imposed the “franchise fee” on Comcast — July 10,2001. Because plaintiff failed to bring her Headlee claim within one year from that date, the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

Subsection 308a(1) permits an action to enforce the Headlee Amendment to be brought in the Court of Appeals or a circuit court.

Indian River Trading Post v. Township of Tuscarora · filed 2018-02-27(1)

Notably, an action to enforce the Headlee Amendment may be brought in the Court of Appeals or in the circuit courts. Const 1963, Art 9, § 32; MCL 600.308a(1); Wayne Co Chief Executive v Governor, 230 Mich App 258, 269-270; 583 NW2d 512 (1998).

Section 2919a provides treble damages when a person is damaged by another's knowing purchase, receipt, or concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property.

Hovanesian v. Nam · filed 1995-09-01

On plaintiffs conversion claim, we find the statute inapplicable. It provides for treble damages if a party is damaged because of another person’s buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property when the person buying receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted. [MCL 600.2919a; MSA 27A.2919(1).] At the time defendant retained plaintiffs security deposit, he did not know that he had wrongfully retained it. Moreover, the act of retaining the security deposit did not amount to buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled or converted property.

Section 2919a permits treble actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees for a person damaged by another who knowingly buys, receives, or aids in concealing stolen, embezzled, or converted property, but it does not apply to the person who committed the underlying theft, embezzlement, or conversion.

Marshall Lasser, PC v. George · filed 2002-09-24

By its clear language, section 2919a does not apply. The actions proscribed — buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment — all occur after the property has been stolen, embezzled, or converted by the principal. In other words, the statute is not designed to provide a remedy against the individual who has actually stolen, embezzled, or converted the property. Indeed, the statute carefully compartmentalizes the actions of those assisting and the actions of the principal.

Section 2919a(1) permits, but does not require, a court to award treble actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees for qualifying theft, embezzlement, or conversion.

in Re Geraldine M Benjamin Trust · filed 2020-04-30(1)

This statute uses the permissive word “may” rather than a mandatory word such as “shall,” which denotes that the probate court has discretion rather than an affirmative duty to award treble damages to a party.

Section 5852's two-year savings period begins when the plaintiff is appointed temporary personal representative and given letters of authority.

Lindsey v. Harper Hospital · filed 1995-09-15

Given the changes in § 5852 and the Revised Probate Code since Szydelko was decided in 1932, we do not believe Szydelko to be controlling in the instant case. Rather, we believe a complete and harmonious reading of the current statutes requires us to hold that here the two-year limitation period contained in § 5852 began to run from the time that plaintiff was appointed temporary personal representative and given letters of authority.

Section 6421 requires a joined Court of Claims claim to be tried and decided by the judge, even when the related circuit-court action is tried to a jury, so the jury cannot exercise jurisdiction over the claim against the state.

Lumley v. U of M Bd of Regents · filed 1996-01-12

The combining of the Court of Claims action with the circuit court action for trial pursuant to MCL 600.6421; MSA 27A.6421 did not permit the circuit court, or any jury empaneled by it, to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim against the state.

Section 600.2925a(3) permits a contribution claim after settlement when the settlement extinguishes the contributor’s liability, the contributor received notice and an opportunity to participate, and the settlement was made in good faith.

Carissimi v. Jonas · filed 1997-01-02(3)

Because the settlement extinguished Mr. Carissimi’s liability, he was on notice of the settlement, it appears he had every opportunity to participate in the settlement, and the settlement was made in good *552faith, the contribution action is not forestalled by the settlement.

MCL 600.2925d protects a settling tortfeasor from contribution claims when the settlement is made in good faith, and good faith concerns the parties’ negotiations and intent rather than whether the settlement approximates proportional liability.

Miller v. Riverwood Recreation Center, Inc · filed 1996-04-29

Instead of concentrating on whether the settlement amount is reasonably related to the settling defendant’s proportional liability as compared to other tortfeasors, we conclude that "good faith” should be analyzed with respect to the settling parties’ negotiations and intent. ... We see no reason to conclude that the Legislature meant something different in requiring a "good faith” settlement agreement in § 2925d.

Section 2301 requires courts to disregard any procedural error or defect that does not affect the parties’ substantial rights, including a premature medical-malpractice filing.

Furr v. McLeod · filed 2014-04-10

The second sentence of the statute does not speak of amending an error or defect; rather, it mandates the outright disregard of any error or defect if to do so would not affect the substantial rights of the parties. ... Filing a medical malpractice complaint prematurely under MCL 600.2912b falls under the broad umbrella of “any error or defect in the proceedings” — it constitutes a statutory, procedural defect or error.

Section 600.2301 permits amendment only in a pending action or proceeding and does not allow amendment when the claim was time-barred at the outset.

Driver v. Naini · filed 2011-08-01

Service of the NOI on CCA could not, then, have been part of any “proceeding” against CCA because plaintiffs claim was already time-barred when he sent the NOI. A proceeding cannot be pending if it was time-barred at the outset. Therefore, MCL 600.2301 is inapplicable because there was no action or proceeding pending against CCA in this case.

Section 2301 lets a court amend any process, pleading, or proceeding on just terms and requires it to disregard harmless errors or defects that do not affect substantial rights.

Zwiers v. Growney · filed 2009-10-22

Pursuant to MCL 600.2301 and its interpretation by the Bush Court, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. We hold that the error or procedural defect in filing the complaint and affidavit of merit one day before the 182-day notice period elapsed did not affect defendants’ substantial rights, was a simple mistake made in good faith in an effort to comply with MCL 600.2912b(l), and did not defeat the legislative purpose behind enactment of the NOI statute. Therefore, reversal is necessary to further justice.

Section 600.2912b(1) imposes a mandatory 182-day presuit notice period for medical-malpractice actions; noncompliance supports dismissal without prejudice but does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Neal v. Oakwood Hospital Corp. · filed 1998-03-10(1)

In this case, we conclude that § 2912b(l) does not change the manner in which or how a civil action is commenced in medical malpractice cases. Rather, § 2912b(l) imposes a temporal requirement with which a plaintiff must comply before the plaintiff can commence a civil action in accordance with MCR 2.101(B). ... We hold, albeit on different grounds, that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs complaint without prejudice.

MCL 600.2912b requires 182 days’ notice before a medical-malpractice action, while MCL 600.5856(d) tolls the limitations period during that notice period; the tolling exclusion for pre-October 1, 1993 claims cannot be applied if it destroys an accrued claim.

Morrison v. Dickinson · filed 1996-08-12(2912b)(1), (5856)(d), (5805)(4)

Reading the notice provision and the tolling provision together, it is clear that the Legislature intended to toll the limitation period set forth in MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) during the pendency of the notice period.

Section 5856(d) tolls the limitations period for the full applicable 182-day medical-malpractice notice period, rather than only the shorter no-suit interval.

Omelenchuk v. City of Warren · filed 2000-03-28(d)

With those concerns in mind, we conclude and hold that the preferred construction is that the limitation period is tolled for the full one hundred eighty-two days.

Section 5856(d) tolls only an applicable statute of limitations or repose during the medical-malpractice notice period; it does not toll the additional wrongful-death filing period under § 5852.

Waltz v. Wyse · filed 2004-04-14(d)

Section 5852 is a saving provision designed “to preserve actions that survive death in order that the representative of the estate may have a reasonable time to pursue such actions.” ... It is not a “statute of limitations” or a “statute of repose.” Thus, the notice tolling provision, § 5856(d)—which explicitly applies only to “the statute of limitations or repose”—does not operate to toll the additional period permitted under § 5852 for filing wrongful death actions.

The statute requires a plaintiff to wait the full 182-day notice period before filing a medical-malpractice complaint, unless the defendant provides the written settlement-rejection notice that permits earlier filing.

Goodfellow v. Lam · filed 2020-06-11(1), (9)

Defendants never directly—or impliedly—advised plaintiff that they wanted to waive the 182-day notice period. Furthermore, defendants did not “do nothing at all” because they responded to plaintiff’s NOI in compliance with MCL 600.2912b(7). Plaintiff fails to provide any support for his argument that reasonable reliance on his part should accelerate the 182-day notice period absent a writing demonstrating defendants’ intent not to settle. See MCL 600.2912b(9).

Section 2912b(1) requires written notice at least 182 days before a medical-malpractice action is commenced, and that notice period continues to run during the COVID-19 state of emergency.

Armijo v. Bronson Methodist Hospital · filed 2023-01-19(1)

The amended administrative order’s clarification plainly indicated that a statutory period, such as the 182-day notice period specified in MCL 600.2912b(1) which had to elapse before the commencement of a medical malpractice action, continued to run during the state of emergency.

Section 5856(c), together with § 2912b, tolls the medical-malpractice limitations period for 182 days when notice of intent is sent if the limitations period would otherwise expire during the notice period.

20230202_C358487_54_358487.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-02-02(c)

Under MCL 600.5856(c) and MCL 600.2912b(1) and (2), the statute of limitations is tolled for 182 days at the time the NOI is sent if the statue of limitations would otherwise expire during that period.

Section 600.2912b(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to give the prospective defendant at least 182 days' notice of intent to sue; the 182-day period is a waiting period before suit, not a deadline for giving notice.

Hubbard v. Np · filed 2023-03-02(1)

The statute requires a prospective plaintiff to notify a prospective defendant in a medical malpractice action of the plaintiff’s intent to file suit “not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.” MCL 600.2912b(1); Haksluoto, 500 Mich at 307. This provision does not require that notice be given within a certain time period following accrual of the cause of action; rather, the 182 days is a waiting period that must elapse before one may file suit.

Section 2912a(2) requires a present injury and does not recognize a reduced chance of survival alone as a cognizable injury.

Edry v. Adelman · filed 2010-07-22(2)

First, plaintiff cannot pursue a claim based solely on her decreased odds of survival because that alone does not create a basis for relief under MCL 600.2912a(2). Defendant’s expert did testify that the delay decreased *643plaintiffs odds of surviving five years, but he did not testify that any present injury arose from that reduction in her survival chance. This Court has held that a reduced chance of survival alone is not a cognizable injury under MCL 600.2912a(2).

The first sentence of subsection 2912a(2) is satisfied when the alleged breach of the standard of care more probably than not proximately caused physical injury, making the claim one of traditional malpractice rather than a lost-opportunity claim.

Compton v. Pass · filed 2009-10-23(2)

The Court of Appeals erred in analyzing this case under the lost-opportunity standard set forth in MCL 600.2912a(2). ... We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to allow a fact-finder to find that the alleged breach of the standard of care caused the plaintiff to suffer physical injury (including the removal of additional lymph nodes, axillary cording, and lymphedema) that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendants. As a result, the requirements of the first sentence of MCR 600.2912a(2) are satisfied, and this is a claim of traditional malpractice.

Section 600.2912a(2)'s 1994 amendment limiting loss-of-opportunity claims did not apply retroactively to a cause of action arising before April 1, 1994.

Blair v. Hutzel Hospital · filed 1996-09-04(2)

This cause of action arose after the Supreme Court decision in Falcon v Memorial Hosp, 436 Mich 443; 462 NW2d 44 (1990), and before the April 1, 1994, legislative change to Falcon brought about by MCL 600.2912a(2); MSA 27A.2912(1)(2). That statute does not control, and has no relevance to, the issues in this case. The Legislature did not attempt to make its statutory rescission of Falcon retroactive, and plaintiffs cause of action is therefore governed by Falcon and its progeny.

Section 2912a(2) permits recovery for loss of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result when, absent the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff had a greater-than-50-percent chance of survival or a better result; the lost opportunity itself need not exceed 50 percent.

Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System · filed 2000-10-31(2)

Therefore, we agree with plaintiffs that MCL 600.2912a(2); MSA 27A.2912(1)(2) requires plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions seeking recovery for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result to show that, had the defendant not been negligent, there was a greater than fifty percent chance of survival or a better result.

Section 2912a(2) allows recovery only for injuries already suffered, so a living plaintiff cannot recover for a decreased opportunity to survive based on reduced chances of long-term survival.

Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System · filed 2001-07-24(2)

In light of the plain language of MCL 600.2912a(2), which allows recovery only for injuries that have already been suffered, we conclude that a living plaintiff may not recover for loss of an opportunity to survive on the basis of a decrease in her chances of long-term survival.

MCL 600.2912a(2)'s greater-than-50-percent burden applies to loss-of-opportunity medical-malpractice claims, not traditional malpractice claims alleging that negligence directly caused a physical injury.

Velez v. Tuma · filed 2009-04-16(2)

In summary, defendant was not entitled to JNOV on the ground that plaintiff did not sufficiently establish proximate causation. This was not a “lost opportunity” medical malpractice action; thus, Fulton and its progeny are not applicable to this case. The burden of proof set forth in the second sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2), as analyzed by Fulton, does not apply here. In light of the evidence presented, the jury could have concluded that plaintiff suffered a physical “injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant,” and would not have occurred absent that negligence. MCL 600.2912a(2); Stone, supra at 163 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.). Thus, this issue is without merit.

Section 600.2912a(2)'s second sentence defines the injury a plaintiff must show in a lost-opportunity medical-malpractice claim, including the statute's greater-than-50-percent threshold.

Lanigan v. Huron Valley Hospital, Inc · filed 2009-03-03(2)

With respect to lost-opportunity claims, the second sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2) expounds on the “injury” that plaintiff must show.

Section 600.2912a(2)'s lost-opportunity burden does not apply when a plaintiff pleads a traditional medical-malpractice claim alleging that negligence caused a concrete physical injury.

Taylor v. Kent Radiology, PC · filed 2009-12-22(2)

Plaintiffs did not plead a claim for a lost opportunity to achieve a better result. Therefore, the second sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2) did not apply to plaintiffs’ malpractice claim.

Under § 600.2912a(2), traditional medical-malpractice claims require proof that negligence more probably than not proximately caused the injury, while the greater-than-50% limitation applies only to pleaded loss-of-opportunity claims.

O’neal v. St John Hospital & Medical Center · filed 2010-07-31(2)

We emphasize that we hold that the second sentence of § 2912a(2) applies only to medical malpractice cases that plead loss of opportunity and not to those that plead traditional medical malpractice; we do not address the scope, extent, or nature of loss-of-opportunity claims as that issue is not before us.

Section 2912a(2) bars recovery for loss of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%.

Estate of Sandra Peetz v. Henry Ford MacOmb Hospital · filed 2016-07-29(2)

The testimony of plaintiff’s experts also failed to establish that there was a 50% or greater chance of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result, as required by MCL 600.2912a(2), had Hans ordered the CT scan immediately after the second surgery. ... Therefore, plaintiff failed to overcome the MCL 600.2912a(2) bar to recovery when the opportunity to survive was 50% or less.

Section 1354(1) permits a jury-array objection made during voir dire to be timely when, despite reasonable diligence, the grounds for the objection could not have been discovered earlier.

People v. Hubbard · filed 1996-09-04(1)

The record establishes that the circuit court possessed no data from which defendant could ascertain the minority representation on the source list or in the venire. Absent such data, defendant could not ascertain whether there was a need to challenge the juror allocation process before defendant actually viewed the array. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the trial court’s determination that defendant’s challenge could not have been made earlier than during voir dire and that defendant’s objection was timely made within the meaning of MCL 600.1354; MSA 27A.1354.

Section 600.2421d does not apply to a limited-jurisdiction local school board, particularly where no presiding officer found the board’s position frivolous or awarded fees.

Widdoes v. Detroit Public Schools · filed 1996-09-27

A local school board with limited jurisdiction does not appear to be a state agency for purposes of MCL 600.2421d; MSA 27A.2421(4). ... Here, no presiding officer found respondent’s position to be frivolous. Nor did a presiding officer award costs and fees; therefore, there was no appeal of such an award. Therefore, none of these statutes apply in the present circumstances. In any event, respondent’s position does not meet the statutory definition of “frivolous” as evidenced by our remand of this matter to the State Tenure Commission for further consideration. We accordingly reverse the circuit court’s award of attorney fees to petitioner.

Section 600.2421d authorizes a court to award costs and fees only on judicial review of a presiding officer’s final action concerning fees in a contested case under MCL 24.325; it does not authorize an award when no such fee determination exists.

Ayotte v. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-04-22

The plain language of MCL 600.2421d provides for “judicial review of the final action of a presiding officer in a contested case pursuant to [MCL 24.325].” MCL 24.325 provides judicial review of a final action taken by the presiding officer under MCL 24.323 in regard to costs and fees. The trial court clearly erred by relying on MCL 600.2421d to award attorney fees.

Section 600.2163a’s developmental-disability definition requires the disability to be attributable to or closely associated with mental retardation and to have existed before the person’s eighteenth birthday.

People v. Burton · filed 1996-12-09(1)(a)

Although this issue presents a close question, we conclude that the trial court misapplied the statute because the victim does not fit within the statutory definition of developmental disability. Our focus in reaching this conclusion is on the statute’s requirement that the disability be either directly attributable to, or closely associated with, mental retardation and that the disability must have existed before the victim’s eighteenth birthday.

Section 6097(1) permits a municipality's legislative body to issue certificates of indebtedness or bonds to raise money to pay a judgment, subject to contrary legal limitations, including the constitutional tax-rate limitation.

Sessa v. MacOmb County · filed 1997-02-25(1)

Because the bonds that were issued were limited tax obligation bonds, we may dispose of the frivolous contention made by plaintiffs that such limitation is ineffectual by virtue of § 6097(1) of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.6097(1); MSA 27A.6097(1). RJA § 6097(1) provides generally that if a judgment is rendered against any municipality (as after a suit by bondholders following a default), the legislative body of that municipality may issue certificates of indebtedness or bonds of that municipality for the purpose of raising money to pay the judgment. This argument fails for two reasons. One, if such bonds would cause the municipality to exceed its authorized rate of taxation, Const 1963, art 9, § 31 would preclude issuance of such bonds without prior approval by the electorate. Indeed, RJA § 6097, as amended by 1984 PA 393, effectively incorporates this constitutional limitation by explicitly stating that such authorization grants permission to issue such bonds “unless otherwise provided.”

MCL 600.6013 provides pre- and postjudgment interest for civil actions at law, but this equitable Headlee action was outside that provision; MCL 600.6455's Court of Claims interest rule likewise did not apply.

Durant v. State of Michigan · filed 1997-07-31

This action is not the type of civil action at law covered by MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013, which provides for pre- and postjudgment interest. Money judgments against the state in the Court of Claims are subject to posfjudgment interest, MCL 600.6455; MSA 27A.6455, but this case was not, and under art 9, § 32, could not be filed in the Court of Claims. Given that the voters have left it to the Court to develop the proper remedy, we believe that this case is closer to an equitable action than an action at law. In equitable actions, an award of interest is discretionary.

The wrongful-death savings provision gives a personal representative up to three years after the underlying limitation period expires, and it does not incorporate the separate six-month medical-malpractice discovery period.

Poffenbarger v. Kaplan · filed 1997-09-11

Our conclusion that the wrongful death savings provision does not incorporate the six-month statutory discovery rule for medical malpractice claims is supported by the plain language of MCL 600.5838a(2); MSA 27A.5838(1)(2), which provides that a plaintiff may bring a cause of action within the period prescribed in § 5805, which is a two-year period of limitation, or the periods prescribed in §§ 5851-5856, which includes the wrongful death savings provision, or within six months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the cause of action, which ever is later. This language states a choice among limitation periods in applicable cases but disallows the intexpretation urged by plaintiff.

The wrongful-death saving provision's two-year filing period is not tolled by filing a medical-malpractice notice of intent.

Farley v. Advanced Cardiovascular Health Specialists, PC · filed 2005-08-03

We hold that the filing of Farley’s notice of intent did not toll the two-year period in which to file suit under the wrongful death saving provision (MCL 600.5852).

Section 5852 gives a personal representative a two-year saving period after letters of authority, subject to a three-year ceiling measured from expiration of the underlying limitations period; the ceiling can shorten but not lengthen the two-year period.

Mazumder v. University of Michigan Board of Regents · filed 2006-05-11

We note that the three-year ceiling in this provision does not establish an independent period during which a personal representative may bring suit. Specifically, it does not authorize a personal representative to file suit at any time within three years after the period of limitations has run. Rather, the three-year ceiling limits the two-year saving period to those cases brought within three years of when the malpractice limitations period expired. As a result, while the three-year ceiling can shorten the two-year window during which a personal representative may file suit, it cannot lengthen it.

MCL 600.5852's three-year ceiling limits the two-year wrongful-death saving period; it is not an independent period allowing a personal representative to file suit within three years after the malpractice limitations period expires.

Johnson v. Hurley Medical Group, PC · filed 2006-06-22

We note that the three-year ceiling in this provision does not establish an independent period during which a personal representative may bring suit. Specifically, it does not authorize a personal representative to file suit at any time within three years after the period of limitations has run. Rather, the three-year ceiling limits the two-year saving period to those cases brought within three years of when the malpractice limitations period expired. As a result, while the three-year ceihng can shorten the two-year window during which a personal representative may file suit, it cannot lengthen it.

Section 5852's two-year wrongful-death saving period cannot be extended by judicial tolling based only on a plaintiff's reliance on the pre-Waltz understanding of the law.

Ward v. Siano · filed 2007-02-28

Therefore, we adopt the reasoning contained in Ward, conclude that judicial tolling should not operate to relieve wrongful death plaintiffs from complying with Waltz’s time restraints, and overrule those portions of Mazumder that conflict with this opinion.

Section 600.5852's wrongful-death saving period is tolled by a timely notice of intent when Waltz v. Wyse does not apply.

Hoffman v. Barrett · filed 2012-03-08

In this case, however, Waltz is not applicable. Hoffman I, 480 Mich at 981; Mullins II, 480 Mich at 948. Accordingly, as stated previously in Hoffman II, 288 Mich App at 542, plaintiffs filing of her notice of intent tolled the saving period and the filing of her complaint and AOM would have tolled the running of the additional time provided under the saving provision. Because there remained time within which plaintiff could refile her suit, the trial court properly dismissed the action without prejudice.

The wrongful-death statute permits a claim for an embryo or fetus's death and allows liability based on a wrongful act, neglect, or fault, including an omission; the statute's reference to § 2922a does not incorporate that section in its entirety.

Simpson v. Alex Pickens, Jr, & Associates, Md, Pc · filed 2015-06-16

This action was not brought pursuant to MCL 600.2922a and it need not be considered a statutory cause of action brought under MCL 600.2922a. Therefore, Simpson was not required to allege that defendants committed an affirmative or positive act that caused her decedent’s death in order to state a claim under MCL 600.2922. To the contrary, under the wrongful-death statute, MCL 600.2922(1), a cause of action may be brought when death “is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or fault of another . . . .”

The medical malpractice arbitration statute permits a claimant’s administrative costs to be paid by the respondent parties when the arbitration administration fund is unavailable, so repeal of the statute and related funding provisions does not invalidate compliant pre-repeal arbitration agreements if respondents pay the costs and the AAA administers the proceeding.

Cox v. D'Addario · filed 1997-11-06

We conclude that the arbitration agreements are enforceable because they were valid under the mmaa, neither the statute repealing the mmaa nor the statute terminating funding for the aaf expresses a legislative intent to abrogate or invalidate existing arbitration agreements, the repeal of the funding statute does not by implication mandate the invalidation of all unexecuted agreements because an alternative funding method is found in the mmaa, and the public policy of this state favors the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.

Section 593a(3)-(5) violates separation of powers by making the county the employer of court employees and giving the county shared or ultimate control over court personnel matters.

Mayor of Detroit v. State · filed 1998-06-08(3)-(5)

Subsection 593a(3) is an outright takeover of the court’s employees, making them employees of the county. ... Accordingly, we view subsection 593a(3) as a violation of the Separation of Powers Clause. ... We find subsection 593a(4) to be equally offensive to the doctrine of separation of powers. ... We now hold that the court’s inherent administrative powers include the authority to manage all personnel matters affecting employees working within its branch. ... While subsection 593a(4) offends the constitution by allowing the county to share the court’s inherent and exclusive authority over all personnel matters, subsection 593a(5) is inconsistent with the constitution because it divides the inherent managerial powers of the judiciary between the court and the county. ... For all these reasons, we hold that subsections 593a(3)-(5) violate the Separation of Powers Clause and must be stricken.

Section 593a(3)-(10) cannot make a local legislative funding unit the employer of judicial-branch court employees or give it primary employment authority because doing so violates separation of powers.

Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v. State · filed 1998-12-28(3)-(10)

We agree with plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals majority that subsection 593a(3) is not a sufficiently limited exercise by one branch of another branch’s power, and therefore that it impermissibly interferes with the judiciary’s inherent authority to manage its internal operations. Our reasoning applies not only to subsection 593a(3), but also to subsections 593a(4)-(10) which elaborate on subsection 593a(3).

Section 600.6013 permits prejudgment interest on attorney fees awarded under the slander-of-title statute when the fees compensate for litigation expenses and the filing was solely for slandering title.

B & B Investment Group v. Gitler · filed 1998-07-14

Because the instant statute is similar to the no-fault act in that it provides for attorney fees only in the limited circumstance where the claim of interest is filed solely for the purpose of slandering title, and because the trial court here expressly found that defendant acted with malicious intent, in wilful and wanton disregard of plaintiff’s rights, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest on its award of attorney fees under the statute.

Section 2925a(3)(c) bars a settling tortfeasor from recovering contribution when the other tortfeasor was not given a reasonable opportunity to participate in the settlement negotiations.

St Luke's Hospital v. Giertz · filed 1998-07-30(3)(c)

In Michigan, our Legislature has provided by statute that a claim for contribution will lie even though a party has settled the underlying complaint. However, it has provided potential contributees with significant protections against unfair settlements. MCL 600.2925a(3); MSA 27A.2925(1)(3) provides in relevant part: ... A tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor if any of the following circumstances exist: ... (c) The contributee was not given a reasonable opportunity to participate in the settlement negotiations. ... Therefore, while settlement of the underlying complaint is permitted before suit for both indemnification and contribution, the effect of affording the third-party defendant the opportunity to participate in the settlement of the underlying complaint is different. In an indemnification action, where the defendant in the underlying action is only passively at fault, failing to provide the third-party defendant with the opportunity to settle the underlying complaint only affects the burden of proof required in the subsequent suit. On the other hand, in a contribution action, where both parties are actively at fault, failing to provide the third-party defendant the opportunity to settle the underlying complaint precludes the claim for contribution altogether.

The preamendment section 2925d(b) requires reducing the actual damages award against a nonsettling tortfeasor by the settlement amount paid by another tortfeasor.

Cheron, Inc v. Don Jones, Inc · filed 2001-03-08(b)

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, § 2925d required that the actual damages award — not the amount of the claim as determined by plaintiff — be reduced by the settlement amount reached with the other tortfeasor. ... No error occurred.

Michigan's contribution statutes permit a tortfeasor who settles an underlying claim to seek contribution from other responsible tortfeasors even when liability is several rather than joint and several, subject to the statutory conditions.

Gerling Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v. Lawson · filed 2005-03-08

Contribution actions have not always solely been directed toward recovering monies that a “jointly and severally” liable tortfeasor was required to pay as the result of a verdict for which the tortfeasor was fully, although not solely, responsible. Rather, such actions have also been directed toward obtaining contribution from other responsible tortfeasors following a settlement. We find no basis in §§ 2956, 2957, or 6304 to conclude that a right to seek contribution in these circumstances has been precluded in cases in which liability among multiple tortfeasors is now “several” only rather than “joint and several.”

The medical-malpractice damages cap does not apply when the plaintiff has lost a bodily function of high importance; loss of a vital bodily function does not mean loss of a function necessary to life or merely pertaining to life.

Lewis v. Krogol · filed 1998-08-19(1)(g)

We conclude that the Legislature did not intend the phrase “loss of a vital bodily function” to mean loss of a function “necessary to life.” ... We also conclude that the Legislature did not intend the phrase “loss of a vital bodily function” to mean loss of a bodily function “pertaining to” life. ... We believe that the Legislature included the word “vital” to indicate the degree of importance that the lost bodily function must have in order for the exception to apply. ... Rather, we conclude that the Legislature included the term “vital” to restrict the exception to individuals who have lost bodily functions that are considered to have a high degree of importance.

MCL 600.1483(1) caps total recoverable noneconomic damages in a medical-malpractice action, including amounts recovered through settlements, and the cap must be applied before a codefendant's settlement is set off.

Velez v. Tuma · filed 2012-07-23(1)

Accordingly, we hold that where principles of joint and several liability apply in a medical malpractice case and a codefendant has settled a plaintiffs claim before trial, a circuit court must first apply to the jury’s verdict the noneconomic damages cap, as well as any other statutorily required adjustments, before reducing the award by the amount of the codefendant’s settlement.

Section 2920 permits a civil action to recover possession of unlawfully taken or detained tangible goods or chattels, but not a business or its goodwill, and the claimant must have a right to possess the property when the action begins.

Sparling Plastic Industries, Inc. v. Sparling · filed 1998-08-26(1)(c)

MCL 600.2920; MSA 27A.2920 applies only to tangible property. A party may not bring an action for replevin for a business or for the good will of a business. Powers v Fisher, 279 Mich 442, 449; 272 NW 737 (1937). Therefore appellants cannot recover under this section for the value of the business. Although this provision can be applied to the physical assets of the business, appellants were not in possession of the property at the time Sparling reentered the premises.

Section 600.2912d(1)(d) requires a medical-malpractice affidavit of merit to explain how the breach of the standard of care proximately caused the alleged injury, not merely assert that it did.

Ligons v. Crittenton Hospital · filed 2011-07-29(1)(d)

A statement answering how is precisely what MCL 600.2912d(1)(d) requires, and this case demonstrates the importance of that requirement.

Section 2912d(1) requires the plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, but noncompliance does not mandate dismissal because the statute does not state that an action may not be commenced without the affidavit.

Vandenberg v. Vandenberg · filed 1998-09-08(1)

We agree with the trial court that subsection 1 of the statute plainly states the affidavit of merit must be filed with the complaint.1 However, the statute is silent regarding the consequence of not filing an affidavit of merit on time. ... While § 2912d states the affidavit of merit “shall” be filed with the complaint, it does not indicate the action may not be commenced without the affidavit. Accordingly, we do not believe § 2912d mandates dismissal for noncompliance.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, and without it the complaint does not commence the action for statute-of-limitations purposes; subsection (2) provides a twenty-eight-day extension when the affidavit cannot be filed with the complaint.

Scarsella v. Pollak · filed 1999-01-08(1), (2)

However, medical malpractice plaintiffs must file more than a complaint; they “shall file with the complaint an affidavit of merit . . . .” MCL 600.2912d(l); MSA 27A.2912(4)(1). See also MCR 2.112(L). Use of the word “shall” indicates that an affidavit accompanying the complaint is mandatory and imperative. ... We therefore conclude that, for statute of limitations purposes in a medical malpractice case, the mere tendering of a complaint without the required affidavit of merit is insufficient to commence the lawsuit.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint; if the affidavit is wholly omitted, the complaint is ineffective and does not toll the applicable period of limitation.

Scarsella v. Pollak · filed 2000-03-28(1)

Today, we address only the situation in which a medical malpractice plaintiff wholly omits to file the affidavit required by MCL 600.2912d(l); MSA 27A.2912(4)(1). In such an instance, the filing of the complaint is ineffective, and does not work a tolling of the applicable period of limitation.

Section 600.2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file with the complaint a properly sworn affidavit of merit signed by a health professional; without one, the complaint does not commence the action or toll the limitation period.

Holmes v. Michigan Capital Medical Center · filed 2000-12-08(1)

We first observe that the trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs December 1996 statement did not satisfy MCL 600.2912d(l); MSA 27A.2912(4)(1) because it did not constitute a proper affidavit of merit. The unambiguous statutory language demands that plaintiff or his attorney “shall file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional.” MCL 600.2912d(l); MSA 27A.2912(4)(1) (emphasis added). To constitute a valid affidavit, a document must be (1) a written or printed declaration or statement of facts, (2) made voluntarily, and (3) confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before a person having authority to administer such oath or affirmation.

Subsection (2) allows a court to grant an additional 28 days to file a medical-malpractice affidavit of merit only upon a showing of good cause; the extension is discretionary, and the limitations period is tolled when the court grants it.

Barlett v. North Ottawa Community Hospital · filed 2001-04-23(2)

The plain language of subsection 2912d(2) indicates that the granting of an additional twenty-eight-day period in which to file an affidavit of merit is not automatic. ... Instead, subsection 2912d(2) and Solowy indicate that the granting of a motion for additional time tolls the period of limitation.

MCL 600.2912d requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit signed by a professional qualified under MCL 600.2169, or whom counsel reasonably believes is so qualified; on these facts, a nonconforming filed affidavit warranted dismissal without prejudice.

Kirkaldy v. Rim · filed 2002-09-10

Under the requirements of MCL 600.2912d, a medical malpractice plaintiff must file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who meets the requirements for an expert witness under MCL 600.2169 or who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets those requirements. ... We conclude under the facts of this case that the trial court correctly determined that the proper sanction for plaintiffs’ nonconforming affidavit of merit was dismissal without prejudice.

Section 2912d requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint; filing a motion for the statutory 28-day good-cause extension does not itself toll the limitations period.

Young v. Sellers · filed 2003-03-07(1), (2)

The existing case law construing the statutory authority governing medical malpractice actions states that the failure to timely file a complaint and an affidavit of merit will not toll the applicable limitation period. ... To commence a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must file both a complaint and an affidavit of merit. ... Thus, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action who neglects to file both an affidavit of merit and a complaint within the period of limitation, regardless of the reason, is barred from proceeding with the claim. ... Although the Legislature provides an additional twenty-eight days to file an affidavit of merit for good cause, MCL 600.2912d(2), the mere filing of such a motion does not act to toll the period of limitation.

Subsection (1) requires an affidavit of merit accompanying a medical-malpractice complaint to address the defendant’s alleged breach and causation; a materially nonconforming affidavit does not satisfy the statute.

Mouradian v. Goldberg · filed 2003-07-01(1)

We conclude that because the affidavit does not contain the requisite statements concerning claims of Dr. Goldberg’s alleged malpractice in the second surgery, plaintiffs’ affidavit is “grossly nonconforming” with respect to this claim. We further find that because the affidavit is “grossly nonconforming” to the requirements of the statute, the statements of Dr. Siegel are insufficient to constitute an affidavit of merit within the meaning of the statute with respect to the claims against defendants for the second surgery. Thus, as a matter of law, plaintiffs’ complaint against defendants for the second surgery was not commenced because of their failure to file an affidavit of merit before the period of limitations expired on December 11, 2000, and summary disposition is appropriate.

Section 600.2912d requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional whom the attorney reasonably believes meets the expert-witness requirements, and an affidavit signed by a doctor with a different board certification is defective.

Geralds v. Munson Healthcare · filed 2004-01-08

Semantics aside, whether the adjective used is “defective” or “grossly nonconforming” or “inadequate,” in the case at bar, plaintiffs affidavit did not meet the standards contained in MCL 600.2912d(l) and failed to meet the express language of MCL 600.2169(1) because the affiant was a doctor with a different board certification than third-party defendant’s board certification. We hold that plaintiff’s affidavit was defective and did not constitute an effective affidavit for the purpose of MCL 600.2912d(1) and, therefore, plaintiff filed a complaint without an affidavit of merit sufficient to commence a medical malpractice action.

Section 600.2912d requires an affidavit of merit to deter frivolous medical-malpractice claims, but a clerical filing error does not defeat the claim when a timely valid affidavit existed and the defendant was not prejudiced.

Ward v. Rooney-Gandy · filed 2005-05-17

The requirement that a plaintiff file an affidavit of merit pursuant to MCL 600.2912d is to serve the purpose of deterring frivolous medical malpractice claims. ... We fail to see how allowing plaintiff to pursue his cause of action — in which an affidavit of merit was in fact procured and executed in a timely manner, and in which defendant eventually was served with the proper affidavit without incurring prejudice because of the time lag — detracts from the Legislature’s intent to preclude frivolous medical malpractice claims.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file a complaint with an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional whom counsel reasonably believes is qualified under § 2169; a defect in the affidavit does not eliminate the defendant’s duty to answer.

Saffian v. Simmons · filed 2005-09-28(1)

To commence a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must file both a complaint and an affidavit of merit. MCL 600.2912d(1). ... Likewise, the deficiency in the affidavit in this case did not relieve defendant of his duty to file an answer.

MCL 600.2912d(1) requires a plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit to commence a medical malpractice action; a notarized affidavit filed before the limitations period expires can toll the period unless the defendant moves for dismissal or shows prejudice.

Wood v. Bediako · filed 2006-10-26(1)

However, to commence a medical malpractice action, and thus toll the period of limitations, a plaintiff must file both a complaint and an affidavit of merit. MCR 2.112(L); MCL 600.2912d(l). If a complaint and an affidavit of merit are not filed, the period of limitations is not tolled. ... Hence, while the filing of a complaint without an affidavit of merit does not toll the period of limitations, and the subsequent filing of an affidavit after the limitations period has run does not relate back *565to the original filing, id. at 549-550, the subsequent filing of an affidavit before the limitations period has run will operate to toll the limitations period and commence the suit unless a defendant moves for dismissal or can demonstrate prejudice. Dorris, supra at 47; VandenBerg, supra at 502.

When an affidavit of merit is filed with a medical-malpractice complaint, the defendant must timely answer or otherwise respond; a unilateral belief that the affidavit does not comply with MCL 600.2912d is not good cause for failing to respond or to challenge a default.

Saffian v. Simmons · filed 2007-02-06(1)

We hold that, where an affidavit of merit is filed with a medical malpractice complaint, a defendant must timely answer or otherwise file some responsive pleading to the complaint, or else be subject to a default. A defendant’s unilateral belief that the affidavit of merit does not conform to the requirements of MCL 600.2912d does not constitute “good cause” for failing to respond timely to a medical malpractice complaint, and thus is not a proper basis to challenge the entry of a default.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, but a later filing before the limitations period expires can toll limitations and commence the action unless the defendant moves for dismissal or shows prejudice.

Wood v. Bediako · filed 2007-02-20(1)

To commence a medical malpractice action, and thus toll the period of limitations, a plaintiff must file both a complaint and an affidavit of merit. MCR 2.112(L); MCL 600.2912d(1). If a complaint and an affidavit of merit are not filed, the period of limitations is not tolled. Young v. Sellers, 254 Mich.App. 447, 450, 657 N.W.2d 555 (2002). ... Hence, while the filing of a complaint without an affidavit of merit does not toll the period of limitations, and the subsequent filing of an affidavit after the limitations period has run does not relate back to the original filing, id. at 549-550, 607 N.W.2d 711, the subsequent filing of an affidavit before the limitations period has run will operate to toll the limitations period and commence the suit unless a defendant moves for dismissal or can demonstrate prejudice. Dorris, supra at 47, 594 N.W.2d 455; VandenBerg, supra at 502, 586 N.W.2d 570.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file a conforming affidavit of merit with the complaint at commencement; a nonconforming affidavit makes the complaint insufficient to sustain the lawsuit and does not toll the limitations period, while subsection (2) provides a 28-day extension when an affidavit cannot accompany the complaint.

Potter v. McLeary · filed 2007-05-14(1), (2)

MCL 600.2912d(l) expressly requires that a plaintiff “shall” file an affidavit of merit with the complaint at the commencement of the lawsuit. The purpose of this requirement is “to ensure trustworthy medical expert testimony and to discourage frivolous lawsuits.” Nippa v Botsford Gen Hosp (On Remand), 257 Mich App 387, 394; 668 NW2d 628 (2003). To this end, a complaint filed without the requisite conforming affidavit is insufficient to sustain a lawsuit, and therefore, the period of limitations is not tolled under these circumstances. Scarsella II, supra at 553. Permitting the plaintiff to amend his nonconforming affidavits by providing the omitted and required statements on proximate cause, and then permitting the amended affidavits to relate back to the initial filing of the complaint, completely subverts the affidavit requirement established by MCL *227600.2912d(l), and renders superfluous the specific legislative remedy established in MCL 600.2912d(2) for circumstances where a conforming affidavit of merit cannot accompany the complaint.

Section 5856(a), read with § 2912d, tolls the limitations period when a medical-malpractice complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served; a later successful challenge to the affidavit requires dismissal without prejudice, leaving the plaintiff whatever limitations time remains to refile with a conforming affidavit.

Kirkaldy v. Rim · filed 2007-07-11(a)

We agree that Geralds and Mouradian are inconsistent with Scarsella and MCL 600.5856(a). Under MCL 600.5856(a) and MCL 600.2912d, the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on the defendant. ... Therefore, a complaint and affidavit of merit toll the period of limitations until the validity of the affidavit is successfully challenged in “subsequent judicial proceedings.” Only a successful challenge will cause the affidavit to lose its presumption of validity and cause the period of limitations to resume running. Thus, if the defendant believes that an affidavit is deficient, the defendant must challenge the affidavit. If that challenge is successful, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Scarsella, supra at 551-552. The plaintiff would then have whatever time remains in the period of limitations within which to file a complaint accompanied by a conforming affidavit of merit.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint.

James v. Richards · filed 2007-07-30(1)

The statute at issue in this case, MCL 600.2912d(1), requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with his complaint.

For a medical-malpractice action, the affidavit of merit must state the applicable standard of care, its breach, the actions required for compliance, and how the breach proximately caused the injury; a defective affidavit does not properly commence the action and cannot be amended after filing to cure the defect.

Glisson v. Gerrity · filed 2007-06-21(1)

Similarly, in the present action, the affidavit of merit failed to refer to Dr. Gerrity and did not reflect that she had breached any standard of care with regard to Scott Glisson’s treatment. ... Thus, as a matter of law, the action against Dr. Gerrity was not properly commenced, and summary disposition was therefore appropriate.

MCL 600.2912d(1) requires an affidavit of merit to identify the standard of care, its breach, the corrective actions, and how the breach caused the injury, while MCL 600.2169(1)(b) requires a medical-malpractice expert to spend a majority of the preceding year practicing or teaching the relevant specialty.

Marshall v. Daniel J Ryan Md Pc · filed 2017-12-26600.2912d(1); 600.2169(1)(b)

Although the affidavit of merit is confusingly worded in many parts, and at times contains conclusory statements regarding the standard of care, the breach thereof, and causation, reading it as a whole presents sufficient specificity to satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2912d(1). ... “MCL 600.2169(1)(b), therefore, requires a proposed expert physician to spend greater than 50 percent of his or her professional time practicing [or teaching] the relevant specialty the year before the alleged malpractice.” ... Because Dr. Goren’s testimony established that he spent a majority his professional time in the practice or instruction of the relevant specialty during the year preceding the malpractice, which satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2169(1)(b), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motions to strike Dr. Goren’s testimony.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint.

James v. WA FOOTE MEMORIAL HOSP. · filed 2007-07-30(1)

The statute at issue in this case, MCL 600.2912d(1), requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with his complaint.

Section 2912d requires an affidavit of merit with the original medical-malpractice complaint, but does not require an amended or additional affidavit when new theories are added in an amended complaint after discovery.

King v. Reed · filed 2008-04-08(1)

Given the clear intent of MCL 600.2912d, as gleaned from the plain language of the statute itself and the fact that the affidavit of merit was filed before the commencement of discovery, we determine that MCL 600.2912d did not require plaintiff to file an amended or additional affidavit of merit when filing his amended complaint.

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint.

Hanna v. Dario Merlos Dds · filed 2012-04-13(1)

In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for entry of an order granting summary disposition to the defendant. The plaintiff failed to “file with the complaint an affidavit of merit . . .” as required by MCL 600.2912d(1).

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff’s attorney to reasonably believe that the health professional signing the affidavit of merit meets the expert-witness requirements.

Lohmann v. Family Doctor · filed 2015-02-17(2912d)(1)

Pursuant to MCL 600.2912d(1), a plaintiff’s attorney must only reasonably believe that the proposed expert meets the requirements for an expert witness. ... We conclude that plaintiff’s attorney did not have a reasonable belief that Gregalit met the requirements for an expert witness.

Section 2912d requires a medical-malpractice action to be supported by an affidavit of merit from a qualified health professional, including an expert practicing or teaching in the same health care profession as the person accused of wrongdoing.

Md v. Hisham Dado Md · filed 2015-03-24

Pursuant to MCL 600.2912d, a medical malpractice action must be supported by an affidavit of merit “signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness” under MCL 600.2169. A medical malpractice plaintiff is “required to submit an affidavit of an expert practicing or teaching in the same health care profession as those accused of wrongdoing.” ... Thus, any claims based on the alleged medical negligence of an individual other than Dado, the nephrologist, including negligence of Davita’s agents and staff related to training, supervision, or failure to implement appropriate procedures for the administration of medical treatment, were not properly before the court because they were not supported by an affidavit of merit as required by MCL 600.2912d.

Section 2912d(2) permits a medical-malpractice plaintiff, on a showing of good cause, an additional 28 days to file an affidavit of merit, and the 28-day period runs from the date the complaint is filed once the extension motion is granted.

Castro v. Goulet · filed 2015-08-20(2)

The trial court properly granted plaintiffs’ motion to extend the time in which to file their AOM, and plaintiffs properly complied with all of the timing requirements set forth in MCL 600.2912d. Consequently, plaintiffs’ action was timely commenced, and the trial court should not have granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the basis of it being untimely.

Section 2912d(2) gives a plaintiff an additional 28 days to file the affidavit of merit, measured from the date the complaint is filed even if the court grants the extension motion later.

Castro v. James Alan Goulet Md · filed 2015-08-20(2)

By statute and by precedent, the 28-day period must run from the date the complaint is filed, irrespective of when the motion is granted.

When a defendant fails to allow timely access to medical records, § 600.2912d(3) permits the plaintiff to file the required affidavit of merit within 91 days after filing the complaint, and the statute of limitations is tolled during that extension.

Wade v. Do · filed 2017-11-142912d(3)

Similarly, because there is no practical difference between the extension permitted under MCL 600.2912d(2) and the extension permitted under MCL 600.2912d(3), we conclude that the statute of limitations is tolled for the 91-day extension permitted under MCL 600.2912d(3).

Section 600.2912a defines the elements of a medical malpractice action but does not require proof that the defendant was “the proximate cause” of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Simms-Norman v. St John MacOmb Oakland Hospital · filed 2018-06-19

The statute defining the elements of a medical malpractice action does not contain the phrase “the proximate cause.” MCL 600.2912a.

Section 600.2912d does not require a plaintiff to identify the agent or employee who allegedly committed malpractice.

Estate of Joseph J Falarski v. Dept of Military & Veterans Affairs · filed 2019-03-14

More to the point, nothing in MCL 600.2912d requires the identification of the agent or employee who allegedly committed the act of malpractice.

Section 600.2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit that satisfies the applicable expert-witness requirements, including using a health professional qualified under § 600.2169.

Sunderlik v. Thomas E Barbieri Md · filed 2019-03-21(1)

Viewing this case through the lens that plaintiff alleged medical malpractice against Dr. Barbieri and WBH, not Karsten, we hold that the affidavit of merit submitted by plaintiff in support of his claim was sufficient under MCL 600.2912d. In the affidavit of merit, Dr. Link asserted that the standard of care required Dr. Barbieri to, among other things, ensure that all persons present during the arthrogram were using a strict sterile technique, and that breach of the standard of care caused plaintiff’s infection. In addition, it is undisputed that Dr. Link was an interventional radiologist like Dr. Barbieri. Thus, the affidavit of merit fulfilled the requirements of MCL 600.2912d(1) as read in conjunction with MCL 600.2169, and the trial court did not err by declining to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Section 600.2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff's attorney to reasonably believe that the expert signing the affidavit of merit meets the expert qualifications in § 600.2169; without that reasonable belief, the action must be dismissed.

Legion-London v. the Surgical Institute of Michigan · filed 2020-02-06(1)

Under MCL 600.2912d(1), a plaintiff’s attorney in a medical malpractice action is required to file “an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under [MCL 600.]2169.” ... Thus, pursuant to MCL 600.2912d(1), a plaintiff’s attorney must only reasonably believe that the proposed expert meets the requirements for an expert witness. ... If a plaintiff’s attorney did not possess a reasonable belief that the expert met the requirements under MCL 600.2169, the medical malpractice action must be dismissed.

Section 600.2912d requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, while allowing a good-cause extension of 28 days when it cannot accompany the complaint; filing without it does not commence the action or toll limitations.

Ottgen v. Md · filed 2021-05-20(2912d)(1)-(2)

MCL 600.2912d(1) provides the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action “shall file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiff's attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness.” ... The Scarsella Court’s mandate is clear: when a complaint is filed without an affidavit of merit, the lawsuit is not commenced and the statute of limitations is not tolled. ... With regard to the emergency motion to file a late affidavit of merit, MCL 600.2912d(2) provides a measure of relief when an affidavit of merit cannot be filed with the original complaint. This provision provides: “Upon motion of a party for good cause shown, the court in which the complaint is filed may grant the plaintiff . . . an additional 28 days in which to file the affidavit of merit.” MCL 600.2912d(2).

Section 2912d requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file a valid affidavit of merit with the complaint, subject to a good-cause extension of up to 28 days that runs from the complaint’s filing date.

Wilkerson v. Chelsea Chiropractic Center · filed 2023-08-24(1), (2)

MCL 600.2912d(1) requires a plaintiff to submit an affidavit of merit with the complaint for medical malpractice. ... By statute and by precedent, the 28-day period must run from the date the complaint is filed, irrespective of when the motion is granted. ... Further, plaintiff’s “declaration of merit” did not indicate that it was made before a person having the authority to administer an oath or affirmation to the party making the statement as required by MCL 600.2912d(1).

Section 2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff or attorney to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint; failure to do so makes the complaint insufficient and supports dismissal, though not on statute-of-limitations grounds.

Lamas-Navarro v. Spectrum Health · filed 2024-04-25(1)

Ottgen held that “medical malpractice plaintiffs must file an [AOM] along with their complaint under MCL 600.2912d(1)[.]” 511 Mich at 228. Therefore, a medical malpractice complaint filed without the required AOM is plainly insufficient. Here, it is undisputed plaintiff never filed the necessary AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1). Because plaintiff’s complaint lacked the AOM, it was insufficient, and, therefore, summary disposition was proper under MCL 2.116(C)(8).

At the time of this case, a medical-malpractice plaintiff had to file security for costs or an affidavit of meritorious claim before the defendant's obligation to answer or otherwise defend arose.

White v. Busuito · filed 1998-09-10

Giving the language contained in both §2912e(l) and MCR 2.108(A)(6) its plain and ordinary meaning, we conclude that a plaintiff’s filing of security for costs or an affidavit of meritorious claim is an absolute prerequisite to the defendant’s obligation to answer or otherwise defend the action.

Section 2912d requires the medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, but it does not mandate dismissal when the affidavit is filed late.

VandenBerg v. VandenBerg · filed 1998-12-10(1)

We agree with the trial court that subsection 1 of the statute plainly states the affidavit of merit must be filed with the complaint. ... Accordingly, we do not believe § 2912d mandates dismissal for noncompliance.

Section 2912b(4)(f) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to sue to name every health professional and facility being notified.

Rheaume v. Vandenberg · filed 1999-02-03(4)(f)

The Legislature’s use of the word “shall” in subsection 4 of § 2912b makes mandatory the inclusion of the “names of all health professionals” notified of an intention to sue. ... When understood in its plain and ordinary sense, the word “name” does not encompass the broad description of defendant Vandenberg that was included in the sixth paragraph of plaintiffs’ notice of intent to sue. ... Simply put, a description is not a name. ... By failing to include defendant Vandenberg’s “name” in their notice of intent to sue, plaintiffs failed to comply with a specific mandatory requirement of § 2912b(4).

Section 2912b requires a plaintiff to give every health professional and facility an NOI before commencing a medical-malpractice action, including a professional corporation vicariously liable for a licensed provider's professional services.

Potter v. McLeary · filed 2009-07-31(1), (4)

We hold, on the basis of the plain language of the relevant statutes, that when claims alleged against a EC are predicated on its vicarious liability for a licensed health care provider rendering professional services, an NOI must be provided. ... The NOI provision, MCL 600.2912b, clearly states that a plaintiff must provide all health professionals and health facilities an NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action.

The physician-patient privilege protects an unknown patient's name and other privileged information from disclosure when the patient has not waived the privilege.

Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corp. · filed 1999-06-09

We hold that the names of unknown patients are protected by the physician-patient privilege, MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157, and that the defendant hospitals have a duty to refrain from disclosure. The language of MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157 is clear in its prohibition of disclosure of privileged information. Where a patient has neither voluntarily waived the privilege nor impliedly done so as specifically provided within § 2157, there are strong public policy reasons for applying the physician-patient privilege to disclosure of an unknown patient’s name. A patient who fears disclosure may be chilled from seeking medical assistance.

Section 2157 prohibits a physician from disclosing confidential information acquired while treating a patient without an applicable legal exception or the patient's express consent, including disclosure to a spouse.

Brandon v. Denise L Handelsman Do · filed 2016-02-23

There is no exception in MCL 600.2157 that allows a physician to disclose medically privileged information to a spouse, another loved one, an employer, or anyone else for that matter, without the patient’s express consent, regardless of the rationalization that might seem fitting. The words “shall not” are plain and unambiguous.

For a medical-malpractice claim accruing when the claimant is 13 or younger, § 5851(7) allows suit through the claimant’s fifteenth birthday, despite the six-year limit in § 5838a(2), which limits only the discovery rule.

Casey v. Henry Ford Health System · filed 1999-08-095838a(2); 5851(7)

Because plaintiff commenced this action more than six years after the claim accrued but before her son’s fifteenth birthday, at issue is whether subsection 5851(7) preserves this litigation despite its being commenced beyond the periods of limitation provided for in subsection 5838a(2). We conclude that it does. ... Subsection 5838a(2) incorporates by reference the limitations on actions for malpractice prescribed in §§ 5805 and 5851 and elsewhere and then announces the exception allowing actions up to six months after discovery of the basis for the claim. This is then followed by a separate sentence stating, “However, the claim shall not be commenced later than 6 years after the date of the act or omission which is the basis for the claim.” Although this sentence could plausibly be read as bearing on all statutory provisions that could allow for periods of limitation otherwise greater than six years, the context of this statement indicates that it is intended to act as a limitation on only the six-month discovery rule. ... The six-year rule, then, is sandwiched between a sentence introducing the six-month discovery rule and one exclusively clarifying that rule. This is a logical place to promulgate a limitation on the discovery rule, but a peculiar place to promulgate a limitation on the tolling provisions of § 5851. Because plaintiff in this case commenced action well before her son reached the age of fifteen, the trial court properly held that the action was not barred by the six-year limitation of subsection 5838a(2).

Section 5856(d) tolls the medical-malpractice limitations period only when the notice of intent complies with all requirements of § 2912b, and the defendant need not challenge the notice before suit is filed.

Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospital · filed 2002-04-24(d)

We hold that the statute of limitations cannot be tolled under MCL 600.5856(d) unless notice is given in compliance with all the provisions of MCL 600.2912b. We further hold that MCL 600.2912b places the burden of complying with the notice of intent requirements on the plaintiff and does not implicate a reciprocal duty on the part of the defendant to challenge any deficiencies in the notice before the complaint is filed. In addition, because MCL 600.5856(d) is a tolling provision and a plaintiff relies on a tolling provision to negate a statute of limitations defense raised by a defendant, a defendant does not need to assert the defense or challenge a plaintiff’s compliance with MCL 600.2912b, as required by MCL 600.5856(d), until the plaintiff files suit.

A minor who dies before reaching age eight does not continue to age for purposes of the statute's tenth-birthday deadline, so subsection 5851(7) does not govern the estate's action.

Vance v. Henry Ford Health System · filed 2007-01-17(7)

Because we “ ‘ “must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in [the] statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory,” ’ ” Vega, supra at 569 (citations omitted), we conclude that a person who died before his eighth birthday lacks the power, capacity, or ability to act, and, therefore, cannot effectively have a “tenth birthday.” In short, a deceased minor no longer continues to age for purposes of MCL 600.5851(7).

Section 2921 permits all actions and claims to survive a claimant’s death; a personal representative may file a surviving claim even if no action was pending before death.

Theisen v. Knake · filed 1999-10-01

In this case, the plain language of the statute states that “[a]ll actions and claims survive death.” It does not state that all pending actions and claims survive death. To read the term “pending” into the statute would amount to judicial construction where none is warranted.

Section 600.2163a requires courts to use specified protections for child witnesses and does not itself authorize witness screens, while preserving other lawful protections.

People v. Rose · filed 2010-07-01(15), (16), (17), (19)

As noted, MCL 600.2163a requires the trial court to employ very specific protections, and none of these protections includes the use of a witness screen. Thus, the trial court could not have properly relied on MCL 600.2163a. Nevertheless, the trial court’s erroneous reliance on MCL 600.2163a does not necessarily warrant relief. ... Accordingly, while trial courts may rely on MCL 600.2163a to afford witnesses certain protections, the existence of this statute does not preclude trial courts from using alternative procedures permitted by law or court rule to protect witnesses.

Section 2163a permits a witness to have a support person sit with, accompany, or remain near the witness during testimony, and defines a qualifying witness at the time of trial as a person under 15.

People v. Rockey · filed 1999-11-02(4); (1)(b)(i)

A “witness” who is called on to testify is permitted to have a support person sit with, accompany, or be in proximity to the witness during the witness’ testimony. MCL 600.2163a(4); MSA 27A.2163(1)(4). A “witness” under this statute at the time of the defendant’s trial refers to a person under the age of fifteen. MCL 600.2163a(l)(b)(£); MSA 27A.2163(l)(b)(i).

Subsection (4) permits a witness to be accompanied during testimony by a support person, but “person” does not include a dog.

People v. Johnson · filed 2016-04-19(4)

Because the term “person” is not defined in the statute, it must be interpreted on the basis of its ordinary meaning while keeping in mind the context in which it is used. ... Based on this definition—and a good deal of common sense—it is clear that a dog is not a “person” within the meaning of MCL 600.2163a(4). Dogs do not have rights and duties as do humans, and in fact are considered personal property. ... Therefore, MCL 600.2163a did not provide the trial court with the authority to allow Mr. Weeber to accompany the victim and the victim’s brother while they testified.

Section 600.2163a permits courts to use listed accommodations to protect vulnerable witnesses; failure to try closed-circuit television did not require reversal where other accommodations were attempted.

People of Michigan v. Beverly · filed 2016-09-20

MCL 600.2163a includes a list of accommodations that courts may use to protect the welfare of a vulnerable witness. It is clear that the trial court attempted some accommodations in this case. The victim was initially questioned outside the presence of the jury and there was a support person present for his mental well-being, yet he persisted in refusing to testify. The mere fact that the trial court did not attempt to glean testimony by closed circuit television does not amount to reversible error in this case.

Section 2163a(16) permits a court, on a party’s motion, to make special arrangements to protect a witness and requires consideration of listed factors; subsection (17) gives the court protective options but does not require broadcasting a minor’s testimony by closed-circuit television.

People of Michigan v. Lewis · filed 2017-05-18(16), (17)

MCL 600.2163a(16) allows the court, upon the motion of a party, to make special arrangements to protect the welfare of a witness. The factors for the court to consider are: ... In granting the prosecutor’s motion, the trial court noted that DL and EL were both very young and the testimony they were to give was very sensitive because they were going to be talking about the sexual assaults at issue. ... Under the circumstances, the trial court properly determined that special arrangements were needed to protect the child witnesses. ... MCL 600.2163a(17) does not require the trial court to broadcast the minor’s testimony by closed circuit television. The statute simply provides the court with options to protect a witness.

Section 2163a(16) requires the court to consider four listed factors when deciding whether courtroom closure is necessary to protect a witness’s welfare, but permits consideration of other relevant factors.

People of Michigan v. Brooks · filed 2018-02-15(16)

But MCL 600.2163a(16) requires the court to consider whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of the witness and, while the statute list four factors for the court to consider, it does not foreclose the court from considering other relevant factors.

Section 600.2163a's support-person protections apply only when the witness is a child, a developmentally disabled adult, or a vulnerable adult.

People of Michigan v. Shorter · filed 2018-06-07

However, by its terms, MCL 600.2163a limits this authority to cases in which the witness is either “a person under 16 years of age,” or “a person 16 years of age or older with a developmental disability,” or a “vulnerable adult.”

Section 2912b(1) requires objections to defects in a medical-malpractice notice of intent to be raised before the complaint is filed; otherwise, summary disposition based on those defects is improper.

Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospital · filed 2000-05-22(1)

Accordingly, we hold that any objections to a notice of intent under subsection 2912b(l) must be raised before the filing of the complaint. Summary disposition based on any alleged defect in the notice of intent not raised by the defendant before the filing of the complaint is not appropriate.

Section 2912b(4) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to state six listed items, but does not require the claimant's alleged standard of care to be accurate.

Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospital · filed 2002-11-13(4)(a)-(f)

We find the statute to be clear and unambiguous, requiring that the notice of intent must, at a minimum, “contain a statement” of the six enumerated items. ... The clear and unambiguous language of the statute requires that plaintiff’s notice “contain a statement of” the “applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.” ... The statute does not require that the claimant accurately or correctly state the standard of care nor does it declare the notice to be inadequate if the plaintiff is incorrect in stating the standard of care.

Section 2912b(2) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to be mailed to the health professional's or health facility's last known professional business or residential address; a good-faith effort, actual receipt, or lack of prejudice does not excuse noncompliance.

Fournier v. Mercy Community Health Care System-Port Huron · filed 2003-03-07(2)

The language of subsection 2912b(2) clearly requires that the notice “shall be mailed to the last known professional business address or residential address of the health professional or health facility who is the subject of the claim.”

Under § 600.2912b(1), “person” means the same human being in an individual or representative capacity, so a future personal representative may file the notice of intent before formal appointment and still satisfy the requirement that the person filing suit previously gave notice.

Halton v. Fawcett · filed 2004-02-19(1)

In sum, the word “person” refers to a human being, whether in their individual or representative capacity. Plaintiff is the same human being who is responsible for the notice of intent and the filing of the lawsuit. Therefore, the statutory requirement that the person who files the suit must have previously given notice of intent is satisfied. To impose a requirement that the appointment to the position of personal representative be made before the serving of the notice of intent would create a statutory requirement that simply does not exist and for which the courts have no authority to impose.

Section 600.2912b(4)(c) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to identify how the applicable standard of care was breached, including a claimed breach during anesthesia.

Gulley-Reaves v. Baciewicz · filed 2004-05-04(4)(c)

MCL 600.2912b(4)(c) provides that the notice of intent “shall” identify the manner in which the applicable standard of care was breached. In this case, plaintiff identified the breach of the standard of care in the surgical procedure. However, plaintiff’s notice of intent was silent with regard to any breach of the standard of care during the administration of anesthesia. Plaintiff did not minimally allege that the agents of the hospital that administered the anesthesia were at fault.