Mich. Comp. Laws § 600

Under § 600.2919a(1), treble damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees for statutory conversion are awarded in the trial court's discretion.

Hoffman MacHinery Corp v. Reid MacHinery Inc · filed 2025-12-16(1)

Therefore, because we are compelled to follow Aroma Wines I, we hold that the award of damages under MCL 600.2919a falls under the discretion of the trial court.

The court must decide whether the force used was unreasonable, and must dismiss with prejudice when the force was a degree a reasonable person would consider appropriate to prevent or respond to a felony, without considering whether the defendant knew the plaintiff's conduct would constitute a felony.

Chorazyczewski v. Costco Wholesale Corp. · filed 2015-10-02§ 600.2955b(1), (2)(b)

In a suit of this nature, it is the province of the court — not a jury — to determine whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at § 600.2955b(2)(b). The law provides that the court “shall dismiss” the plaintiffs action with prejudice if “the court finds that the particular defendant ... [ujsed a degree of force that a reasonable person would believe to have been appropriate to prevent or respond to the commission of a felony.” Id. at §§ 600.2955b(l), (2)(b). In making this inquiry, the court “shall not consider the fact that the defendant may not have known that the plaintiffs actions or attempted actions would be the commission of a felony.” Id. at 600.2955b(2)(b).

Section 600.6094(4) requires a school-district treasurer to certify an unsatisfied judgment to taxing authorities so district residents can be assessed.

K.S. v. Detroit Public Schools · filed 2015-12-21(4)

Under Michigan law, if a judgment creditor has an unsatisfied judgment against a school district, the treasurer of the school district must take steps to certify that judgment to taxing authorities, so that the residents of the district can be assessed.

The court held that the defendants were justified in seizing the arrestees' vehicles under Michigan's nuisance-abatement statutes.

Emanuel v. Wayne County, MI · filed 2016-06-20

Given the lack of evidence that similar arrests were anything but proper, the defendants were justified in seizing the vehicles of the arrestees pursuant to the provisions of Michigan’s nuisance-abatement statutes.

Section 600.2948(3) makes a manufacturer liable for failure to warn only if the plaintiff proves that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk based on reasonably available scientific, technical, or medical information when the product left its control.

Avendt v. Covidien Inc. · filed 2017-07-05600.2948(3)

In a product liability action brought against a manufacturer or seller for harm allegedly caused by a failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions, a manufacturer or seller is not liable unless the plaintiff proves that the manufacturer knew or should have known about the risk of harm based on the scientific, technical, or medical information reasonably available at the time the specific unit of the product left the control of the manufacturer.

Section 600.5805(13) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on products-liability claims.

Stephenson v. C. R. Bard, Inc. · filed 2018-01-31§ 600.5805(13)

Under Michigan law, all products liability claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(13).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for statutory and common-law conversion claims.

Fakhreddine v. Eric R. Sabree, Wayne County Treasurer · filed 2024-09-04§ 600.5805(2)

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ conversion claims are time barred because limitations period for both statutory and common law conversion in Michigan is three years. See Tillman v. Great Lakes Truck Ctr., Inc., 277 Mich. App. 47, 49 (2007); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2).

For a § 1983 claim, Michigan’s three-year personal-injury limitations period applies instead of the special criminal-sexual-assault limitations periods.

Cargill v. Monroe County Jail · filed 2024-10-03600.5805(2), 600.5805(6), 600.5851b

State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims raised in lawsuits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... For such actions in Michigan, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); see also Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). ... Michigan’s special statutes of limitations for criminal sexual assault, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.5805(6), 600.5851b, do not apply to § 1983 claims.

Section 600.2946a directs the court to apply the noneconomic-damages cap after the jury itemizes and awards damages, rather than deciding awardable damages before trial.

Kaiser v. Jayco, Inc. · filed 2022-03-22600.2946a(2)

By its plain language, section 2946a indicates that the court should determine the application of the damages cap after the jury has rendered its award: ... The court shall adjust an award of noneconomic loss to conform to the limitations under subsection (1).

The 14-day objection deadline for a state tax-refund garnishment does not eliminate the debtor’s remaining legal or equitable interest in the refund because the statutory scheme contemplates later objections or bankruptcy notices.

Joshua Aaron Newberry · filed 2019-08-09600.4061a(2)

Because MCL § 600.4061a and MCR 3.101(K)(1) envision the possibility of an objection to a tax refund garnishment after the expiration of the 14-day objection period, the expiration of the 14-day objection period cannot give RPM an unconditional right to the tax refund or cause Debtor to lose all legal or equitable right in the tax refund.

The Michigan tax-refund garnishment statute does not make the creditor's right to the refund unconditional or eliminate the debtor's remaining legal or equitable interest merely because the 14-day objection period expired.

Joshua Aaron Newberry · filed 2019-08-15600.4061a

Based on its review of the statutes, this Court finds that Debtor’s failure to object to the writ of garnishment within the 14-day objection period in MCL § 600.4061a did not entirely divest Debtor of any interest in the tax refund at issue. The 14-day objection period contained in MCL § 600.4061a mirrors the 14-day objection period contained in Michigan Court Rule 3.101, the court rule governing garnishments generally.

Michigan's civil remedy for embezzlement is provided through statutory conversion, so an embezzlement claim is subsumed by a claim under § 600.2919a.

Akno 1010 Market Street St. Louis Missouri LLC v. Pourtaghi · filed 2019-08-21§ 600.2919a

Because, under Michigan law, embezzlement claims are subsumed by those for statutory conversion, Akno’s embezzlement claim will be dismissed.

Section 600.2919a(1) authorizes treble damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees for statutory conversion, and subsection (2) makes that remedy cumulative of other remedies.

Nedschroef Detroit Corp. v. Bemas Enterprises LLC · filed 2015-05-22600.2919a(1), (2)

As the Court has found that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their statutory conversion claim, it also concludes that they are entitled to treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.

Section 600.2919a does not define the elements of embezzling or converting property; those elements come from other Michigan law.

Bruinsma v. Wigger (In re Wigger) · filed 2018-12-04§ 600.2919a(1)(a)

those are supplied by reference to other aspects of Michigan law.

Statutory conversion has the same elements as common-law conversion, with the added element that the property was converted to the defendant's own use.

Prime Rate Premium Finance Corp. v. Larson · filed 2016-12-27600.2919a(1)(a)

Statutory conversion is the same as common law conversion, with the ... added element that the property must have been converted to a defendant’s own use.

A finding of statutory conversion under Michigan law does not require proof of wrongful intent.

Hagan v. Baird · filed 2018-01-19600.2919a(1)(a)

Accordingly, Pamela's use of the money after it was deposited in the Arvest account did not constitute conversion.

Michigan's forcible-ejection statute allows treble actual damages or $200, whichever is greater, plus possession, and an unlawful lockout may satisfy its force requirement.

Estate of Kimberly Ann Nickerson, Wayne County Probate Court Number 17-827514-DE, by Molly Brown, Personal Representativ · filed 2019-12-17§ 600.2918(1)

Any person who is ejected or put out of any lands or tenements in a forcible and unlawful manner, or being out is afterwards held and kept out, by force, is entitled to recover 3 times the amount of his or her actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, in addition to recovering possession. ... The Court disagrees under the facts and circumstances presented here. ... Under the facts and circumstances presented here, the Court finds that Defendant fails to satisfy its summary judgment burden with respect to Count V.

Section 600.837 excludes probate judges from the definition of county-paid probate-court employees, so service as a probate judge does not count as County employment.

Szymanski v. Evans · filed 2020-03-10§ 600.837(2), (10)

“‘county-paid employees of the probate court’ means persons employed in the probate court in a county who receive any compensation as a direct result of an annual budget appropriation approved by the county board of commissioners of that county, but does not include a judge of the probate court.” ... Accordingly, the legislature had never attempted to designate probate judges as County employees in the first place.

Section 600.5856(b) tolls limitations only when jurisdiction over the defendant was otherwise acquired, and a limited appearance that preserves improper service does not satisfy that requirement.

Johnson 561762 v. Miller · filed 2020-09-24600.5856(b)

In the instant case, neither the Court’s orders nor the limited appearances of Defendants through counsel for purposes of mediation waived service of process. Indeed, this Court’s order referring the case to mediation expressly preserved the defense of improper service. Plaintiff therefore is not entitled to tolling under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5856(b), and his complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.

The statute's alcohol-related defense applies only when the plaintiff's impairment was at least 50 percent of the cause of the event producing the injury or death, considering all proximate causes rather than only the single most immediate cause.

Jones v. Kent, County of · filed 2020-11-05600.2955a(1)

What all this means for the present case is that there may have been more than one cause of Jones’ death. Alcohol withdrawal was clearly one cause, but Beebe and Beebe II instruct that the Court does not look at the single most immediate and direct cause, it looks at all the proximate causes (including the conduct of Defendants, if applicable) and determines whether Jones’ impairment was 50 percent or more the cause of the event resulting in his death.

The statute provides an absolute defense when alcohol or controlled-substance impairment made the injured or deceased person at least 50% responsible for the event, but its application here was barred by a factual dispute over impairment.

Jones v. Kent, County of · filed 2022-04-29600.2955a(1), 600.2955a(2)(b)

Thus, there is a factual dispute about the extent of Jones’s impairment, which precludes the application of Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2555a to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 600.2955a makes impaired ability from alcohol or a controlled substance an absolute defense when that impairment causes the person to be at least 50% responsible for the accident.

Odisho v. Yacouba · filed 2022-07-11§ 600.2955a

As Defendants have not offered evidence regarding Mr. Wardia’s impairment consistent with the facts, the Court cannot conclude that § 600.2955a provides an absolute defense in this action.

The statute gives state judges an adjudicatory role: they evaluate petitions and evidence, hold hearings, make findings, and issue written personal protection orders.

Lindke v. Lane · filed 2021-03-03600.2950a(1), (7), (11), and (12)

The statute directs judges to entertain claims brought by petitioners (and does not permit judges to initiate protection proceedings themselves), to evaluate evidence presented by the petitioners, to hold hearings if requested by a respondent, to make findings, and to issue written orders.

Michigan's wrongful-death statute requires the lawsuit to be brought by the personal representative of the decedent's estate.

Estate of Jacob Chubb v. Daimler Trucks N.A., LLC · filed 2021-03-15(2)

requires a lawsuit to be brought by a personal representative of a decedent’s estate.

Subsection (2) requires a wrongful-death action to be brought by and in the name of the deceased's personal representative.

DeJong v. B F Goodrich, Inc. · filed 1980-03-05(2)

Under the wrongful death statute, however, actions for wrongful death must be brought by and in the name of the personal representatives of the deceased. MCL 600.2922(2). It is clear, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in determining that the complaint should be dismissed.

Section 5852 gives a personal representative up to two years after letters of authority issue to sue, subject to a three-year ceiling after the limitations period expires; the notice tolling provision does not extend that saving period.

Ousley v. McLaren · filed 2005-01-20

Like the plaintiff in Waltz, Ousley filed his claim after the expiration of the saving or extension period, and the issuing of the notice of intent to file a claim did not toll that limitation. Thus, assuming Waltz applies retroactively, we are bound to hold that Ousley’s claim is time-barred, and the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary disposition.

Michigan's wrongful-death savings statute permits a successor personal representative to file a surviving medical-malpractice action within two years after the successor's letters of authority are issued, subject to the three-year outer limit after the original limitations period expired.

Estate of Stephen Stiles v. Md · filed 2017-06-13

The Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the applicable version of MCL 600.5852 in Eggleston v Bio-Med Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29; 658 NW2d 139 (2003). ... The Supreme Court held: ... The language adopted by the Legislature clearly allows an action to be brought within two years after letters of authority are issued to the personal representative. The statute does not provide that the two-year period is measured from the date letters of authority are issued to the initial personal representative. ... Plaintiff was “the personal representative” of the estate and filed the complaint “within 2 years after letters of authority [were] issued,” and “within 3 years after the period of limitations had run.” MCL 600.5852. The action was therefore timely. [Id. at 33.] ... This case is no different than Eggleston. A successor personal representative was appointed on December 10, 2014. That personal representative had two years after her letters of authority issued or three years after the original limitations period ran to file the medical malpractice complaint. The three-year period ended May 31, 2016. Esch had until that date to file the medical malpractice action. She did so. The claim was timely and summary disposition would be improper.

Michigan’s general three-year personal-injury limitations period covers ELCRA, negligence, and Child Protection Law claims, and those claims accrue when the underlying wrong occurs, not when resulting damage occurs.

Forrester v. Clarenceville School District · filed 2021-05-06600.5805(2), 600.5827

By comparison, Plaintiffs’ state claims, which are governed by Michigan’s accrual rules, rely solely on the standard rule of accrual; the discovery rule does not apply. Michigan’s general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2), covers ELCRA, negligence, and Child Protection Law claims, and accrual for the general personal injury statute of limitations is governed by Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5827: [T]he claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.

MCL 600.5827 makes a claim accrue when the wrong is done and, absent an express statutory exception, bars a broad common-law discovery rule from tolling accrual.

Est of Margarette F Eby v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co · filed 2007-07-25

We hold that the plain language of MCL 600.5827 precludes the use of a broad common-law discovery rule to toll the accrual date of claims to which this statute applies. Here, the wrong was done when Eby was raped and murdered in 1986. MCL 600.5827 was in effect at that time. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims accrued at the time of Eby’s death.

Section 600.5827 provides that a claim accrues when the plaintiff is harmed by the defendant’s act, regardless of when the resulting damage is quantified.

Frank v. Linkner · filed 2015-04-07

Consequently, the general statute of limitations provision, MCL 600.5827, applies, Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 12; 506 NW2d 816 (1993), and under that provision a claim accrues “at the time of the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” The term, “wrong,” refers to the date on which the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s act, not the date on which the defendant acted. Id. at 12.

The MPLS treats PLC programming as a product or product design, so a defective-programming claim must proceed as product liability rather than common-law negligence.

Holbrook v. Prodomax Automation Ltd. · filed 2021-09-20

Since the PLC programming is either a product itself or a component of the 100 line, also a product, the PLC programming constitutes a product under the MPLS. ... Therefore, he could only prosecute the PLC programming’s purportedly defective design through a product liability claim; he cannot assert a claim for common law negligence here.

Section 600.2950(14)'s 14-day deadline for scheduling a hearing on a motion to modify or rescind an ex parte personal protection order is directory, so missing the deadline does not automatically terminate the order.

Visser v. Visser · filed 2012-12-18(14)

MCL 600.2950(14) provides, in relevant part, that “the court shall schedule a hearing on the motion to modify or rescind the ex parte personal protection order within 14 days after the filing of the motion to modify or rescind.” See also MCR 3.707(A)(2). However, the stated time for performance set forth in a statute should be viewed as directory, rather than mandatory, when there is no language precluding or terminating performance after the specified time. ... In this case, neither the statute nor the court rule contains any provision suggesting that the failure to hold a timely hearing on a motion to terminate a PPO results in the automatic termination of the PPO.

Section 600.2950a(10) prescribes the contents of a personal protection order but does not govern entering the order into the LEIN.

Rudd v. Norton Shores, City of · filed 2022-03-16(10)

But that statute simply prescribes the contents of a PPO. It does not purport to govern the entry of a PPO into the LEIN.

Section 2950a(1) allows a human stalking victim, or a legally recognized representative acting for that victim, to petition for a personal protection order; a corporation cannot petition on its own behalf.

Patterson v. Beverwyk · filed 2017-08-10(1)

Again, only an "individual" may petition a trial court for a PPO under MCL 600.2950a or be a "victim" under the stalking statutes that are incorporated by reference in MCL 600.2950a, and we conclude that Woodward, a corporation, is not an individual for purposes of MCL 600.2950a and the stalking statutes.

Michigan's domestic PPO statute permits a person to seek an order against someone with whom they share a child and requires the court to issue it when reasonable cause shows that the restrained person may commit a listed act.

Lindke v. Tomlinson · filed 2022-04-12§ 600.2950(1), (4)

The statute also directs that, “if the court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1)” the court “shall issue a personal protection order under this section.” § 600.2950(4).

Section 600.2950a(1) lets an individual ask the family division of circuit court for a personal protection order barring conduct prohibited by specified Michigan stalking statutes.

Lindke v. Lane · filed 2023-05-24(1)

The PPO Statute authorizes “an individual” to “petition the family division of circuit court to enter a personal protection order to restrain or enjoin an individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section 411h, 411i, or 411s of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, [Mich. Comp. Laws §§] 750.411h, 750.411i, and 750.411s.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2950a(1).

Section 600.2950a requires a designated law-enforcement agency to enter a PPO into LEIN, and that entry makes the PPO immediately enforceable statewide, so entering it constitutes enforcement of the statute.

Lindke v. Lane · filed 2024-06-28600.2950a(17), (21)

Indeed, the PPO Statute, itself, identifies the entry of PPOs into the LEIN system as one step in the process through which the statute is administered and enforced. As explained above, the PPO Statute requires law enforcement agencies to enter PPOs into the LEIN system and then provides that once a PPO is so entered, it may be immediately enforced by any law enforcement agency in the State (so long as the agency verifies the PPO’s existence in the LEIN system).

Section 600.2950a authorizes a circuit court to issue a nondomestic personal protection order without notice when delaying notice would cause immediate and irreparable injury or precipitate adverse action.

Booth v. Fink · filed 2024-08-14600.2950a(1), 600.2950a(10), 600.2950a(12), 600.2950a(17)

A court can issue a PPO without notice to the individual to be enjoined if the petitioner can show that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will precipitate adverse action before a personal protection order can be issued.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2950a(12).

MCL 600.2950a requires the court to consider testimony, documents, and other proffered evidence when deciding whether reasonable cause supports a PPO; the court is not limited to the petition's four corners.

Lamkin v. Engram · filed 2012-03-15

Again, a petitioner seeking a PPO bears the burden of proving reasonable cause for the issuance of a PPO. Kampf, 237 Mich App at 385-386. When making that determination, the circuit court is not limited to the four corners of the petition itself; rather, it must consider the testimony, documents, and other evidence proffered to determine whether a respondent engaged in harassing conduct. MCL 600.2950a. Nothing in the statute or court rule suggests that the circuit court is limited to considering the incidents alleged in the PPO petition.

Section 600.2950a(2)(a) lets a sexual-assault victim obtain a personal protection order against the person convicted of assaulting the victim, without separately proving a present need for protection; the trial court retains discretion over the order’s scope and duration.

IME v. DBS · filed 2014-08-14(2)(a)

Under MCL 600.2950a(2)(a), the Legislature placed the burden on the petitioner (in relevant part) to demonstrate that the person to be restrained has been convicted of sexually assaulting the petitioner. ... By contrast, to establish the right to a PPO under MCL 600.2950a(2)(a), in relevant part, the petitioner must establish that a jury has already found beyond a reasonable doubt that the person to be restrained sexually assaulted the petitioner. ... When considered in full context, meeting the qualifications for a PPO under MCL 600.2950a(2)(a) is more onerous than meeting the qualifications for one under MCL 600.2950(4) and MCL 600.2950a(1).

Section 600.2950a(1) requires proof of stalking before issuing a PPO, subsection (3) authorizes restraints on specified contacts without requiring stalking to prove a violation, and subsection (23) permits criminal-contempt prosecution for refusing or failing to comply.

in Re Daniel Alexander Rastelli · filed 2014-12-16(1), (3), (23)

The PPO is expansive, incorporating additional elements beyond the statutory-based contact specifically enumerated. MCL 600.2950a(3) authorizes a court to “restrain or enjoin an individual” from engaging in the same prohibited forms of contact described in the PPO, which do not encompass the contact listed in MCL 750.411h(1)(e). Moreover, MCL 600.2950a(1) requires proof of stalking as a prerequisite to the issuance of a PPO—there is no similar requirement to prove a violation. Because the court had the authority to restrain the contact at issue and actually ordered respondent to refrain from the contact, the evidence that he engaged in the contact was sufficient to support his conviction.

Under MCL 600.2950a(1), a personal protection order may enjoin online postings only after a finding that the postings violate MCL 750.411s and a determination that the injunction will not restrict constitutionally protected speech.

Buchanan v. Crisler · filed 2018-02-22(1)

In sum, to enjoin an individual from posting a message in violation of MCL 750.411s, there must first be a finding that a prior posting violates that statute. This inquiry requires the trial court to make a factual determination regarding the elements of MCL 750.411s, focusing on the actor's intent in posting the message and the effect of the conduct arising from the message. If it is determined that the actor has violated MCL 750.411s, the trial court should then consider the nature of the postings that will be restricted to ensure that constitutionally protected speech will not be inhibited by enjoining an individual's *902online postings.7 MCL 750.411s(6). While the government has an interest in preventing the harassment of private individuals in relation to private matters, MCL 750.411s may not be employed to prevent speech relating to public figures on matters of public concern. Consequently, when it is asserted that the postings involve a matter of public concern, the court must consider the content, form, and context of the online postings to determine whether they involve constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern. If the court determines that constitutionally protected speech will not be inhibited, posting a message in violation of MCL 750.411s may be enjoined under MCL 600.2950a(1).

Section 600.2950a(1) permits a PPO based on alleged stalking or prohibited conduct only when the conduct is not constitutionally protected speech.

TM v. MZ · filed 2018-10-23(1)

Therefore, in order to warrant a PPO pursuant to MCL 600.2950a(1), the trial court had to find that respondent’s postings—his speech—were not constitutionally protected.

Section 600.2950(2) gives the trial court discretion whether to prohibit a concealed-pistol-license holder from possessing a firearm when carrying a weapon is required as a condition of employment.

Jh v. Jph · filed 2020-01-14(2)

MCL 600.2950(2) provides, in relevant part, “[i]f the respondent is a person who is issued a license to carry a concealed weapon and is required to carry a weapon as a condition of his or her employment, . . . the petitioner shall notify the court of the respondent’s occupation before issuance of the personal protection order. This subsection does not apply to a petitioner who does not know the respondent’s occupation.” This Court has held that this statute “is a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power because it allows the trial court to ‘make a judgment’ regarding whether and to what extent the PPO should include a restriction on the right to bear arms.” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 441; 857 NW2d 667 (2014), citing Kampf, 237 Mich App at 383 n 3. Here, the trial court committed a plain legal error when it stated that it was statutorily bound to prohibit respondent from possession a firearm, and therefore reverse its determination on this issue. Indeed, whether respondent should be prohibited from possessing a firearm upon the issuance of a PPO against him is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, as he had been issued a CPL, and was required to carry a weapon as a condition of his employment. Id.

Section 2950a(1) permits an initial personal protection order when the petition alleges adequate facts constituting stalking or conduct prohibited by the referenced statutes; those facts need not yet be proved.

Sla v. Sz · filed 2020-06-04(1)

A PPO may be granted under MCL 600.2950a(1) if a “petition alleges facts that constitute stalking as defined in [MCL 750.411h] or [MCL 750.411i], or conduct that is prohibited under [MCL 750.411s].” Thus, for the initial grant of a PPO, the inquiry is whether adequate facts are alleged, not proved.

MCL 600.2950 governs domestic-relationship personal protection orders, and it does not require such an order to reference MCL 750.411s.

In Re Dpdf · filed 2022-05-19

The domestic-relationship PPO in this case was governed by MCL 600.2950, which does not contain references to MCL 750.411s. Further, neither the original, nor the subsequent PPOs in this case referenced MCL 750.411s. We conclude there was no error, let alone plain error, in the trial court’s failure to address MCL 750.411s.

Section 600.2950a requires a court issuing a nondomestic personal protection order to find a course of conduct consisting of at least two separate acts; a single incident is insufficient.

Cnn v. Seb · filed 2023-01-12(1)

To enter a PPO under MCL 600.2950a, the court must find that the respondent engaged in a “course of conduct” “composed of a series of 2 or more separate” acts. MCL 750.411h(1)(a). And to meet the requirement of “harassment” under the statute, the court must find “repeated or continuing unconsented contact.” MCL 750.411h(10(c). See also Hayford, 279 Mich App at 330. The court misstated the legal requirement for securing a PPO by characterizing a “single incident” as sufficient.

Section 2950(1) authorizes a domestic-relationship PPO against specified relationships, including a current or former dating relationship, and § 2950(30)(a) defines a dating relationship as frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by an expectation of affectional involvement, excluding casual or ordinary social relationships.

Ck v. Am · filed 2023-06-22(1), (30)(a)

MCL 600.2950 governs PPOs involving current or former spouses, individuals in dating relationships, and housemates, while MCL 600.2950a, the nondomestic PPO statute, addresses stalking behavior or conduct that is not limited to certain existing relationships. ... MCL 600.2950(30)(a) defines “dating relationship” as “frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional involvement.” The statute further states that a dating relationship does not include “a casual relationship or an ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in a business or social context.” MCL 600.2950(30)(a). ... While the PPO was later terminated, the Macomb Circuit Court necessarily relied on the existence of a dating relationship to issue the PPO because a domestic relationship PPO is only applicable in cases involving “a spouse, a former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had a child in common, an individual with whom he or she has or has had a dating relationship, or an individual residing or having resided in the same household as the petitioner . . . .” MCL 600.2950(1). None of the other enumerated relationships, other than a “dating relationship,” are applicable.

Section 2950a(7) requires a judge issuing an ex parte nondomestic personal protection order to provide written reasons for issuing it.

Dwj v. Clb · filed 2023-11-02(7)

Respondent also argued that the court erred by denying his motion to terminate the PPO because the judge who issued the ex parte PPO did not provide any written reasons for its issuance, as required by MCR 3.705(A)(2) and MCL 600.2950a(7). We agree that the PPO was not in conformity with MCL 600.2950a(7).

Section 600.2950a(1) permits a trial court to enter a personal protection order restraining or enjoining conduct prohibited by Michigan Penal Code §§ 411h, 411i, or 411s.

Ag v. Oej · filed 2024-06-13(1)

The trial court issued a PPO under MCL 600.2950a(1), which allows a trial court to “enter a personal protection order to restrain or enjoin an individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section 411h, 411i, or 411s of the Michigan penal code.” MCL 600.2950a(1).

Section 2950a permits a personal protection order based on continuing unconsented contact during one prolonged encounter, even though a single isolated incident is insufficient.

Sf v. Eb · filed 2025-06-16

This Court has held that a single incident does not suffice under MCL 600.2950a. CNN v SEB, 345 Mich App 151, 161-162; 4 NW3d 759 (2023). ... This Court did not expressly address the possibility of “continuing” conduct, but the latter observation suggests the possibility that a single encounter can constitute harassment if it is of a lengthy duration and a respondent commits multiple improper acts within that encounter. Respondent’s behavior at the courthouse, as outlined by petitioner and acknowledged by the trial court, represents a case of persistent, unconsented contact. ... Hence, regardless of whether respondent engaged in two or more acts, he participated in ongoing unconsented contact which clearly exceeded what is constitutionally protected. In conclusion, the record plainly reveals that respondent’s conduct was harassment of petitioner that continued over a period of time. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by issuing the original PPO.

Section 600.2950a(1) permits an individual to seek a nondomestic personal protection order against stalking or specified related conduct, but requires the petition to allege facts constituting that conduct; a criminal charge or conviction is unnecessary.

Hac v. Er · filed 2025-08-11(1)

MCL 600.2950a is “the nondomestic PPO statute pertinent here, [and] addresses stalking behavior or conduct that is not limited to certain existing relationships.” ... MCL 600.2950a(1) governs PPOs involving stalking and states, in relevant part: [A]n individual may petition the family division of circuit court to enter a personal protection order to restrain or enjoin an individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section 411h, 411i, or 411s of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h, 750.411i, and 750.411s. A court shall not grant relief under this subsection unless the petition alleges facts that constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct that is prohibited under section 411s, of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h, 750.411i, and 750.411s. Relief may be sought and granted under this subsection whether or not the individual to be restrained or enjoined has been charged or convicted under section 411h, 411i, or 411s of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h, 750.411i, and 750.411s, for the alleged violation.

Section 2950a(26) permits a court issuing a personal-protection order to restrain the respondent from purchasing or possessing a firearm.

Mmh v. Scc · filed 2025-10-23(26)

MCL 600.2950a(26) provides that, when issuing a PPO, a trial court may restrain the respondent from “[p]urchasing or possessing a firearm.” As respondent acknowledges on appeal, this provision permits a trial court to restrain an individual from purchasing or possessing a firearm. It was not outside the range of principled outcomes for the trial court to prohibit respondent from possessing firearms after she sent a significant number of offensive messages to petitioner over several months, resulting in petitioner fearing respondent.

Subsection 12 permits an ex parte personal protection order only when specific facts show that delaying notice will cause immediate and irreparable harm or that notice will trigger adverse action before the order can be issued.

Djh v. Gmb · filed 2026-04-09(12)

MCL 600.2950a(12) (emphasis added) only authorizes a PPO to be entered ex parte where a party provides “. . . specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written motion, or affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will precipitate adverse action before a personal protection order can be issued.” DJH’s petition checked the box indicating that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage” would result from any delay flowing from giving notice to GMB, but, the petition alleged no facts to support this assertion. ... Because DJH failed to show that he would sustain immediate and irreparable injury if notice was given to GMB, the trial court abused its discretion in entering the PPO ex parte.

Sections 600.2922b and 600.2922c protect a person who uses deadly force in defense of another and permit fees for someone sued over allegedly using that force, even if the force is inaccurate.

Blowers v. Battle Creek, City of · filed 2022-07-13§ 600.2922b; § 600.2922c

That argument is flawed because the statute also applies when an individual acts “in defense of another individual.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922b. Plaintiff also argues that there is no evidence that bullets fired by Hatch or Herson struck Blowers. But the statute applies to those who “use” deadly force. It does not require that such force be accurate. And more broadly, recovery of fees and expenses applies to those who are “sued for civil damages for allegedly using deadly force,” which is the case here. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922c (emphasis added).

MCL 600.5855 does not extend claims against corporate officers or directors when the claims are governed by the period of repose in § 541a(4).

Baks v. Moroun · filed 1998-04-13

Notwithstanding that plaintiffs’ § 489 claims are subject to the limitation period contained in § 541a(4), plaintiffs argue that, because M. J. Moroun fraudulently concealed his usurpation of corporate opportunities and other wrongs, the fraudulent concealment statute, MCL 600.5855; MSA 27A.5855, applies to preserve their shareholder derivative or oppressed minority shareholder claims. Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the fraudulent concealment statute is not applicable if a claim brought against a corporate officer or director is based on conduct that is governed by the period of repose contained in § 541a(4).

Under the medical-malpractice statute of repose, a fiduciary’s intentional failure to disclose known, pertinent information that would alert the plaintiff to a possible claim constitutes fraudulent concealment and can invoke the statutory exception.

Estate of John a Doyle v. Covenant Medical Center Inc · filed 2016-03-03(2)(a)

Consistent with the purpose of the fraudulent-concealment exception to MCL 600.5838a, the intentional failure to disclose known, pertinent information, in order to deprive plaintiff of the ability to realize that he or she has a potential cause of action constitutes fraudulent concealment. ... Fraudulent conduct refers to acts taken—or in the case of an affirmative duty to disclose, the intentional failure to act—so as to prevent the plaintiff from discovering the existence of a possible cause of action.

Section 600.5855 requires both the underlying fraud and a separate affirmative act or misrepresentation designed to prevent discovery; it imposes no requirement that the concealment occur after the fraud.

Estate of Diane C Gualdoni v. Inglin · filed 2016-10-18

MCL 600.5855 also requires reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff; in particular, if the plaintiff could have discovered that liability existed, the statute does not operate to toll the limitations period.

Section 600.5855 tolls the applicable limitations period when a defendant fraudulently conceals the existence of a claim, but it does not create a cause of action and requires affirmative acts or misrepresentations designed to prevent discovery; mere silence is insufficient.

MacKenzie v. White · filed 2020-01-02

MCL 600.5855 plainly does not constitute or create a cause of action. Rather, MCL 600.5855 operates to toll the applicable statute of limitations “when a party conceals the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action.” Sills v Oakland Gen Hosp, 220 Mich App 303, 310; 559 NW2d 348 (1997). “The plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment.” Id. “The plaintiff must prove that the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to prevent subsequent discovery. Mere silence is insufficient.” Id.

Section 5855 gives a claimant two years after discovering a fraudulently concealed claim or liable person to sue, but it does not apply when the claimant already knows of a possible cause of action.

20250115_C365154_66_365154.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-01-15

This statute does not apply when the plaintiff is “aware of a ‘possible cause of action.’ ” Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 643; 692 NW2d 398 (2004), quoting Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 23-24; 506 NW2d 816 (1993). ... Accordingly, Coleman cannot avail herself of MCL 600.5855.

Under MCL 600.5838(1), a legal-malpractice claim accrues when the attorney stops serving the client on the matter; the client can end the attorney’s authority without a formal court order, even if the attorney remains counsel of record.

Jones v. Cyril C Hall · filed 2024-08-22(1)

The mere fact that Hall remained listed as counsel of record in the district court action, where those proceedings remained stayed and Hall did not perform any services for plaintiff or provide any legal advice on any matters, does not change the outcome on this record; for purposes of the statute of limitations, an attorney is discharged when the client ends the attorney’s authority, and no additional court action is necessary to effectuate that discharge.

Section 600.5838b bars a legal-malpractice action against an attorney or law firm after the earlier of the applicable limitations period or six years after the act or omission; claims based on inadequate legal representation are subject to the malpractice period despite contract or emotional-distress labels.

Bishop & Heintz Pc v. Finch · filed 2016-07-125838b(1)-(2)

As indicated above, MCL 600.5838b(1) provides that a claim for legal malpractice cannot be filed after either (1) the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, i.e., two years as set forth in MCL 600.5805(6), or (2) six years after the act or omission that forms the basis of the claim, “whichever is earlier.” (Emphasis added.) Here, the two-year statute of limitations, not the six-year statute of repose, applies.

Section 600.5838(1) accrues a legal-malpractice claim when the professional stops serving the plaintiff on the matter giving rise to the claim; the fixed repose period can then bar later discovery.

Nortley v. Hurst · filed 2017-10-10(1)

A professional malpractice claim accrues when the professional stops serving the plaintiff in a professional capacity on the matter giving rise to the claim.

Section 600.5838b(1) imposes a six-year statute of repose that caps the time to bring a legal-malpractice claim, even when the claim is discovered later.

Nortley v. Hurst · filed 2017-10-10(1)

The statute setting the deadlines for bringing a legal malpractice claim makes clear that the six-year period of repose caps the time for bringing a claim within six months of discovery. See MCL 5838b(1).

The medical-malpractice statute of repose generally bars a claim more than six years after the act or omission, but continued reliance that may constitute a later breach can support a later accrual date.

Estate of Loren Alex Gallivan v. Dbmj Rehabilitation Services Pllc · filed 2017-11-02(2)

MCL 600.5838a(2), the applicable statute of repose provides that “an action involving a claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in section 5805 or . . . within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. However, except as otherwise provided in section 5851(7) or (8), the claim shall not be commenced later than 6 years after the date of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim.” ... Plaintiffs contend that in accord with Kincaid, they were able to surmount summary disposition upon showing that a question of fact existed as to whether defendants’ continued reliance on the NECC was unreasonable. We agree. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs’ failure to vet claim was not barred by the statute of repose.

In a product-liability action, a manufacturer or seller avoids liability for harm caused by product misuse only when the misuse was not reasonably foreseeable, so both misuse and unforeseeability must be established.

Thompson v. Ryobi Ltd. · filed 2023-02-13600.2947(2)

“A manufacturer or seller is not liable in a product liability action for harm caused by misuse of a product unless the misuse was reasonably foreseeable.” ... “So, to avoid liability on misuse grounds, we must resolve two legal questions in favor of the defendants: (1) that there was a misuse of the product, and (2) that such use was not reasonably foreseeable. See id.”

Section 600.2945 makes comparative negligence applicable to products-liability claims based on implied warranty, and applies to actions tried after the statute’s effective date.

Gagnon v. Dresser Industries Corp. · filed 1983-09-01

Plaintiff’s implied warranty theory is not contractual, but a products liability action as defined by MCL 600.2945; MSA 27A.2945. Recent authority indicates that under this statute comparative negligence applies "irrespective of the fact that a plaintiff is injured by the breach of an implied warranty”. ... Accordingly, given that plaintiff’s claim is not contractual in nature, ... comparative negligence was properly found applicable regardless of whether the claim is characterized as a products liability action for breach of implied warranty on the one hand, or a claim of inadequate safety devices on the other.

Section 2946(3) bars evidence of changes in a product’s design, warnings, or other safety measures made after the injury to prove liability, but it does not bar measures taken after sale and before the injury.

Downie v. Kent Products, Inc · filed 1985-01-14(3)

"Evidence of a change in the philosophy, theory, knowledge, technique, or procedures of or with regard to the manufacture, construction, design, formula, development of standards, preparation, processing, assembly, inspection, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging, or labeling made, learned, placed in use or discontinued after the event of death or injury to person or property shall not be admissible in a product liability action to prove liability." MCL 600.2946(3); MSA 27A.2946(3) (emphasis added). ... However, MCL 600.2946(3); MSA 27A.2946(3) commands a different result, in that it specifically refers to "the event of * * * injury" (emphasis added) as the relevant event. Since the statute does not conflict with the evidentiary rule, we read them together and conclude that only those remedial measures taken after the event of injury or death in question will be inadmissible.

Section 600.2947(2) makes a manufacturer or seller liable for harm from product misuse when the misuse was reasonably foreseeable, with misuse and foreseeability determined by the court.

Belleville v. Rockford Manufacturing Group, Inc. · filed 2001-10-19(2)

The second statute discusses when misuse is reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer: ... A manufacturer or seller is not liable in a product liability action for harm caused by misuse of a product unless the misuse was reasonably foreseeable. Whether there was misuse of a product and whether misuse was reasonably foreseeable are legal issues to be resolved by the court. ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs misuse of this wire draw machine was reasonably foreseeable to the Defendant.

MCL 600.2946a(3) creates two independent ways to avoid the products-liability damages limitation: a jury finding of gross negligence or a trial-court finding that the actual-knowledge provisions of § 2949a apply.

Rodriguez v. Ase Industries, Inc · filed 2007-08-15(3)

In other words, the statute clearly and unambiguously establishes two independent bases to avoid application of the damages limitation: if the trier of fact determines that the defendant was grossly negligent or if the trial court determines that the actual knowledge provisions of § 2949a apply. The determination of one cannot control the determination of the other.

Michigan Comp. Laws § 600.1307a(1)(e) disqualifies a person convicted of a felony from serving as a juror.

Jacobs v. Biden · filed 2023-10-30600.1307a(1)(e)

Regrettably, neither Michigan law nor federal law will allow him to sit on a jury as a convicted felon. ... the Michigan legislature amended Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1307a to provide, in relevant part, that ‘[t]o qualify as a juror a person shall … [n]ot have been convicted of a felony.’

Section 600.1307a(1)(e) disqualifies a prospective juror only if the person has been convicted of a felony; a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction, and an expunged conviction does not disqualify the person.

People of Michigan v. Kabongo · filed 2018-12-27(1)(e)

MCL 600.1307a(1)(e) requires that one be “convicted” of a “felony” to be disqualified as a juror. The statute does not address juvenile adjudications. Because a juvenile adjudication is different from a conviction, it would not have required dismissal under the plain language of MCL 600.1307a(1)(e).

Michigan’s cap on noneconomic damages for medical-malpractice actions does not cover Child Protection Law claims based on failure to report child abuse.

Tripp v. United States · filed 2024-05-22§ 600.1483(1), (3)

Accordingly, Michigan’s cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions does not apply to claims under the state’s Child Protection Law for failure to report child abuse.

Section 600.2162 does not apply when a spouse is not examined as a witness.

People v. Van Epps · filed 1975-03-10

We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that the outburst by defendant’s wife violated his rights under the spousal immunity statute, MCLA 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162. The wife here was not, in the words of the statute, "examined as a witness”.

Section 5861(2) applies the shorter of Michigan’s limitation period and the period prescribed by the law of the place where an out-of-state claim accrued, including that jurisdiction’s accrual rule.

Szlinis v. Moulded Fiber Glass Companies, Inc. · filed 1977-12-05(2)

“Michigan’s borrowing statute, supra, which makes applicable the law of the forum or the law of the situs "whichever bars the claim” (emphasis supplied), requires us to examine not only the time period of the limitation statute but also the accrual time of the cause of action which triggers the running of the limitation period. ... We hold that plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date of death, and, following Parish, supra, we hold that it accrued where injury (death) and damage were suffered.”

For a contribution claim under MCL 117.14, MCL 600.2925c does not apply, MCL 600.5813 supplies a six-year period of limitations, and the claim accrues when the other municipality first fails to pay its share under MCL 600.5827.

Sylvan Township v. City of Chelsea · filed 2015-11-24

Nevertheless, a claim for contribution under MCL 117.14 does not fit within the traditional framework applied to an action for contribution by joint tort-feasors; the traditional claim involves two or more tort-feasors who caused an injury that resulted in an enforceable judgment. See MCL 600.2925c. Consequently, MCL 600.2925c does not on its face apply to a claim for contribution under MCL 117.14; because no specific period of limitations encompasses an action to enforce MCL 117.14, we conclude that the six-year period of limitations provided under MCL 600.5813 applies.

For a claim accruing outside Michigan, the applicable limitations period is whichever period prescribed by the place of accrual or Michigan law bars the claim.

Turner v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1978-02-23(2)

"The period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside of this state shall be either that prescribed by the law of the place where , the claim accrued or by the law of this state, whichever bars the claim.” ... Since the Georgia limitations period would bar the claim, under the borrowing statute the claim is barred in our courts as well.

Section 1326 requires grand-jury candidates to be drawn in the same manner and from the same source as petit-jury candidates, but it does not require a second blind draw of the final grand jurors and permits reasonable selection by the supervising judge.

People v. Edmond · filed 1978-10-101326

We hold, therefore, that MCL 600.1326; MSA 27A.1326 does not mandate that the Board randomly select the final 13 to 17 persons ultimately chosen to sit on the grand jury nor does it preclude reasonable selection by the supervising judge. The key number random selection from the voter registration lists is the blind selection contemplated by § 1326. A wheel within a wheel is not required.

Section 2925d(a) provides that a release given to one or more tortfeasors does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release terms provide otherwise.

Romska v. Opper · filed 1999-06-22(a)

The act specifies that such a release does not discharge all others ‘unless its terms so provide.’

Former § 2925(3) required the insured to be jointly or severally liable upon a judgment for the same wrong before an insurer could assert the insured’s contribution right.

Sinai Hospital v. Sivak · filed 1979-01-16(3)

We find the third reason advanced for the inapplicability of § 2925(3) determinative. The most significant difference between MCL 600.2925(3); *75MSA 27A.2925(3) and its successor MCL 600.2925a(6); MSA 27A.2925(1)(6) is the deletion of the words "upon a judgment” in the latter statute. Clearly, the statute in effect at the time the alleged tort was committed required that the insured be jointly or severally liable upon a judgment for the same wrong. We cannot ignore the explicit mandate of the statute. ... Because payment in the instant case was not based upon a judgment, § 2925(3) does not constitute an exception to the rule that suit be brought in the name of the real party in interest.

Section 600.2925a(5) bars contribution against a contributee who was neither joined in the action nor notified of its commencement, but permits a separate contribution action if the contributee received notice of the first action.

Danyo v. Great Lakes Steel Corp. · filed 1979-10-15(5)

The statute is properly construed as denying contribution against any contributee not made a party to the action nor notified of its commencement. Recovery of contribution may still be had in a separate action if the contributee was notified of the first action that resulted in a judgment against the tortfeasor seeking contribution.

Section 2925a(5) requires a potential contributee who cannot be added to the original action for lack of jurisdiction to receive notice of the action before the tortfeasor may seek contribution.

Thrifty Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc v. Department of Transportation · filed 1999-10-22(5)

Our interpretation of this provision is consistent with the entire statute, which emphasizes both notice and an opportunity to join the proceedings.

Section 2925 permits a contribution action without joining or notifying the alleged cotortfeasor, does not require a joint judgment, and requires the claim to be asserted within six months after payment of the common liability or more than the claimant's pro rata share.

Royal Indemnity Co. v. H S Watson Co. · filed 1979-11-062925(1), (4)

The effect of the lower court’s ruling is to create a requirement that in order to assert a right of contribution against a co-tortfeasor, it is necessary to either join that tortfeasor in the initial action or to "vouch in” that co-tortfeasor by notice of the asserted claims. We find no authority to that effect, and are persuaded that the teaching of Moyses v Spartan Asphalt Paving Co, 383 Mich 314; 174 NW2d 797 (1970), is to the contrary. ... In this cause the action for contribution against Honeywell was commenced within six months of the payment of the judgment against Jursik, and therefore is within the requirements of MCL 600.2925(4). The action is not barred by statute of limitations and Moyses, supra, has held that a joint judgment is not required to assert a right of contribution.

Section 2912a requires a plaintiff challenging a general practitioner's care to use an expert familiar with the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice for general practitioners, but it does not bar the defendant from presenting a specialist to testify that the conduct was proper even under the higher specialist standard.

Moore v. Foster · filed 1980-03-18(a)

Under the statute, the plaintiff could not have brought a specialist to testify on the defendant’s breach of the standard of care of a general practitioner unless he was familiar with that standard of care. See Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576, 593; 248 NW2d 171 (1976). That rule is designed to protect the defendant from being compared with the higher standard of care required from one who holds himself out as an expert in the field. However, we see nothing in this rule to preclude a defendant doctor from bringing a specialist to testify on his behalf that the conduct in question was proper even under the higher standard of care.

Section 2912a(b) provides that a medical practitioner warrants possessing the professional skill ordinarily possessed by medical practitioners, as reasonably implied in light of reasonably available facilities.

Cleveland v. Rizzo · filed 1980-08-28(b)

As plaintiff notes, a medical practitioner warrants that he possesses the professional skill ordinarily possessed by medical practitioners as reasonably implied in light of reasonably available facilities. MCL 600.2912a(b); MSA 27A.2912(l)(b). However, contrary to plaintiffs assertions, the allegedly objectionable instruction does not negate this concept.

For medical-malpractice claims, a podiatrist is treated as a general practitioner, so the applicable standard of care is the local community or a similar community standard rather than the nationwide specialist standard.

Jalaba v. Borovoy · filed 1994-06-20(a), (b)

We hold that the local standard of care is applicable to podiatrists in light of our finding that a podiatrist is not a specialist under MCL 600.2912a; MSA 27A.2912(1).

Section 600.2912a(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove the applicable community-based standard for a general practitioner, while a specialist is judged by the standard within the specialty; the court applied the community standard to interns and residents as nonspecialists.

Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hospitals · filed 1995-03-07(1)

Subject to subsection (2), in an action alleging malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that in light of the state of the art existing at the time of the alleged malpractice: ... (a) The defendant, if a general practitioner, failed to provide the plaintiff the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community, and that as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury. ... (b) The defendant, if a specialist, failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available under the circumstances, and as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury.

Section 2912a requires a local-community standard of care for general practitioners and a specialty standard, reasonably applied to available facilities, for specialists.

Jalaba v. Borovoy · filed 1994-06-20(a)-(b)

Restated, the applicable standard of care for general practitioners is that of the local community or a similar community, whereas the standard of care for specialists is nationwide. ... We hold that the local standard of care is applicable to podiatrists in light of our finding that a podiatrist is not a specialist under MCL 600.2912a; MSA 27A.2912(1).

For a general-practitioner malpractice claim, § 600.2912a does not require the expert to contact physicians in the relevant community to establish its standard of care or similarity to another community.

Turbin v. GRAESSER · filed 1995-11-03(1)(a)

An expert’s verbal communication with physicians in a community would certainly be relevant to determining whether the expert is familiar with the standard of care in that community or whether that community is similar to another community. However, MCL 600.2912a; MSA 27A.2912(1) does not require an expert to contact physicians in one area to determine the applicable standard of care in that community or to determine whether that community is similar to another community. Therefore, the fact that Dr. Macaluso did not verbally communicate with Lansing physicians to ascertain the standard of care for general practitioners in Lansing does not disqualify him from testifying regarding the applicable standard of care.

Section 2169 imposes substantive, legislatively prescribed qualifications for expert testimony in medical-malpractice actions against specialists and does not impermissibly infringe the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority.

McDougall v. Schanz · filed 1999-07-30

Applying the substance/procedure analysis set forth above, we conclude that § 2169 is an enactment of substantive law. It reflects wide-ranging and substantial policy considerations relating to medical malpractice actions against specialists.

The 1993 amendments to §§ 2169 and 2912a apply prospectively only from April 1, 1994, and therefore do not apply retroactively to cases filed before that effective date; under the pre-1993 version of § 2169, an expert could qualify through a related, relevant area of medicine.

Tobin v. Providence Hospital · filed 2001-04-05§ 2169(1)(a); § 2912a(1)(a)-(b)

Under the pre1993 amendments of § 2169, Dr. Brecher qualified as a specialist in “a related, relevant area of medicine.” ... It is the opinion of this Court that the clear intent of the Legislature should be honored. Therefore, we hold that the act is to be applied prospectively only from April 1, 1994, and not retroactively for the six-month period from October 1, 1993, to April 1, 1994, or before October 1, 1993. ... For the same reasons as set forth above, we conclude that the amended version of MCL 600.2912a; MSA 27A.2912(1) does not apply retroactively to this case.

MCL 600.2912d, together with MCL 600.2169, requires supportive expert testimony for a medical-malpractice action; factual disputes without an expert opinion are insufficient to initiate or maintain the action.

Mitchell v. Dougherty · filed 2002-05-14

The necessity of obtaining the testimony of an expert physician to support alie ... gations of medical malpractice is codified in MCL 600.2912d and MCL 600.2169, and factual disputes without an expert opinion are insufficient to initiate, let alone maintain, a medical malpractice action.

Section 2912a requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the defendant failed to meet the applicable standard of care and that the failure proximately caused an injury.

Craig v. Oakwood Hospital · filed 2004-07-23

These common-law elements have been codified in MCL 600.2912a, which ...

Under § 600.2169(1)(a), the applicable medical-malpractice standard of care is a legal question, and it is based on the one most relevant specialty being practiced.

Jilek v. Stockson · filed 2010-07-29(1)(a)

The proper standard of care for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1)(a) is determined as a matter of law. ... As a matter of law, the proper standard of care was that for emergency-medicine specialists.

Sections 2912a and 2169 allow the medical-malpractice standard of care to account for available facilities and permit standard-of-care expert testimony when the experts satisfy the statute’s listed qualifications.

Joy a Jilek v. Carlin C Stockson Md · filed 2011-12-212169(a)-(b); 2912a

Further, pursuant to MCL 600.2912a, the trial court properly allowed the jury to consider that standard of care in light of the facilities available to the defendant physician — an urgent care center, not an emergency medical facility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendants’ two experts were qualified to provide “standard of care” testimony under MCL 600.2169 because they satisfied the specific qualifications of MCL 600.2169(a)-(b).

Section 2912a(1)(b) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that a specialist failed to provide the recognized standard of care within the specialty, reasonably applied in light of available facilities, causing injury.

Joy a Jilek v. Carlin C Stockson Md · filed 2012-03-21(1)(b)

(2) As our citation in Locke indicates, MCL 600.2912a establishes the basis for determining the applicable “standard of care” in medical malpractice cases. It provides, in relevant part: ... (b) The defendant, if a specialist, failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available under the circumstances, and as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury.

Section 2912a(1)(b) requires a malpractice plaintiff to prove that a specialist failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care in the specialty, reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community.

Estate of Perry Pace v. Hurley Medical Center · filed 2017-01-26(1)(b)

In an action for medical malpractice, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that “[t]he defendant, if a specialist, failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community . . . .” MCL 600.2912a(1)(b).

Section 2912a(1)(a) requires proof of the recognized standard of care in the community where a general practitioner practices or in a similar community.

Kacmarsky v. Edward W Sparrow Hospital Association · filed 2017-10-24(1)(a)

In this case, plaintiff’s argument that the “local standard of care rule” is antiquated and does not apply lacks merit. MCL 600.2912a(1)(a) refers to the standard of care in “the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community,” and the Michigan Supreme Court has definitively stated that “the standard of care for general practitioners is that of the local community or similar communities,” Bahr, 448 Mich at 138. This Court is bound by these authorities.

Section 600.2912a(1)(b) requires a malpractice plaintiff suing a specialist to prove the recognized specialty standard of care as reasonably applied to available facilities.

Atakishiyev v. Md · filed 2017-09-19(1)(b)

To prove a malpractice claim against a specialist, the plaintiff must show that the defendant failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available under the circumstances, and as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury.

These Chapter 600 provisions set the community-based standard of care for specialists, require matching specialty board certification for standard-of-care experts, and require courts to assess scientific reliability under listed factors, although not every factor is relevant in every case and lack of supporting literature is not dispositive.

Khzouz v. Md · filed 2018-03-132912a(1)(b); 2169(1)(a); 2955(1)

Although this standard for specialists is sometimes referred to as a “national” standard of care, see, e.g., Jalaba v Borovoy, 206 Mich App 17, 22; 520 NW2d 349 (1994), that is a misnomer, Cox, 467 Mich at 17 n 17. ... Under the plain language of the statute, then, the standard of care for both general practitioners and specialists refers to the community. ... Under MCL 600.2169(1)(a), an expert witness may only offer testimony regarding the applicable standard of care for a specialist if the proposed expert was board-certified in the same specialty “at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action.” ... In concert, MRE 702 and MCL 600.2955(1) “govern the inquiry into whether expert evidence is scientifically reliable.” ... “[A]ll the factors in MCL 600.2955 may not be relevant in every case.” Elher, 499 Mich at 27.

For a malpractice claim against a general practitioner, the plaintiff must show that the expert is familiar with the standard of care in the defendant’s community or a similar community.

Johnson v. Dds · filed 2019-05-23(1)(a)

Although it is undoubtedly true that the “recognized standard of acceptable professional practice” to which dental patients are entitled does not vary based on their race or socioeconomic status, it was still plaintiff’s burden to show that her expert was familiar with the local standard of care applicable to the community in which Dr. Ziyadeh practiced, or to a similar community. MCL 600.2912a(1)(a). This plaintiff failed to do.

MCL 600.5855 permits a fraudulently concealed malpractice claim to be filed within two years after discovery or when it objectively should have been discovered, while MCL 600.2169(1)(c) requires an expert offering the standard of care against a general practitioner to have spent most of the preceding year in active general practice.

Price v. Eleni Callis Dds · filed 2019-06-20

Fraudulent concealment is an exception to that general rule, and, in relevant part, it allows a plaintiff to commence an action “at any time within 2 years after [the plaintiff] discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of the claim.” MCL 600.5855. ... Under MCL 600.5855, a plaintiff is charged with discovering any claim that ought to be discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence. ... MCL 600.5855 therefore begins to run when a reasonable person would objectively be “aware of an injury and its possible cause,” although the person must also “possess at least some minimum level of information that, when viewed in its totality, suggests a nexus between the injury and the negligent act.” ... Only at that point was there objective information to suggest that plaintiff might have a cause of action, and accordingly, plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence for the purpose of the fraudulent concealment statute. ... Expert testimony regarding the standard of care is governed by MCL 600.2169(1)(c), which provides, in pertinent part: ... (c) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a general practitioner, the expert witness during the year immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action, devoted a majority of his or her professional time to either or both of the following: ... (i) Active clinical practice as a general practitioner. ... Consequently, “during the year preceeding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action,” Dr. Dzingle did not devote a majority of his professional time to active clinical practice as a general practitioner. ... Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that as a matter of law, Dr. Dzingle was precluded from providing expert testimony establishing the standard of care applicable to defendants.

Section 2912a(1)(b) requires a malpractice plaintiff to prove that a specialist failed to provide the recognized specialty standard of care, reasonably applied to available facilities, and that the failure proximately caused an injury.

Webster v. Osguthorpe · filed 2023-12-21(1)(b)

In sum, Dr. Wolf’s testimony was sufficient to demonstrate that he was familiar with “the recognized standard of practice or care” within the specialty of oral surgery “as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community” as required by MCL 600.2912a(1)(b). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that plaintiff failed to present competent evidence of the applicable standard of care.

Section 2169(1) applies to standard-of-care testimony and does not prevent an expert from giving opinions on causation.

Estate of Ernestine Davis v. Ascension Providence Hospital · filed 2026-01-15(1)

Defendants argue that pursuant to MCL 600.2169(1)(a), Dr. Venkat’s testimony cannot be relied on for a theory of causation regarding Dr. Abbas’s conduct because Dr. Venkat and Dr. Abbas do not share the same specialty. This argument is without merit. MCL 600.2169(1) expressly applies to standard-of-care testimony. The statute does not prevent an expert from opining on subjects that do not involve the standard of care, such as causation. Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572, 578 n 6; 683 NW2d 129 (2004).

Section 4401(1) permits a mandamus action against a state officer to be commenced in the Court of Appeals or in a proper circuit court, at the plaintiff's option, and gives the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction.

Waterford School District v. State Board of Education · filed 1980-07-18(1)

We also conclude that the circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain mandamus actions against state officers. Prior to January 1, 1977, the effective date of 1976 PA 317, § 4401 of the Revised Judicature Act limited mandamus jurisdiction over state officers to the Court of Appeals. However, this section has since been amended to provide: "An action for mandamus against a state officer shall be commenced in the court of appeals, or in the circuit court in the county in which venue is proper or in Ingham county, at the option of the party commencing the action.” MCL 600.4401(1); MSA 27A.440KD. The amendment not only removed the prior grant of exclusivity, but affirmatively provided the circuit courts with jurisdiction over these actions.

Section 6419(1)(a) gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction over mandamus claims and other extraordinary-writ demands against the state, its departments, or officers, while subsection (6) preserves the circuit court’s jurisdiction over other categories of extraordinary writs.

O’connell v. Director of Elections · filed 2016-06-23(1)(a), (6)

We conclude that, to harmonize these conflicting provisions, § 6419(1)(a) should be read to expand the original jurisdiction of Court of Claims to include “any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its departments or officers . . . .,” such that the Court of Claims now possesses jurisdiction over mandamus claims that had previously been within the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to MCL 600.4401(1).

Section 600.2925a provides a general right to contribution in tort actions, including claims between joint intentional tortfeasors.

Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co. · filed 1996-12-23

In contrast to this federal holding, Michigan law does provide for a general right to contribution in tort actions. MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925Q). In Michigan, discrimination based on sex is a tort. ... Ultimately, the Court in Hunt, supra at 749, determined that the purpose of the contribution statute allowed a suit to proceed against joint intentional tortfeasors. ... Accordingly, because the union and defendant, if liable, are joint intentional tortfeasors, we conclude that the trial court properly allowed defendant to implead the union.

Section 2925a does not apply to breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligations, so an intentional tortfeasor sued for such a breach has no statutory right to contribution.

Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Newman · filed 1981-09-21(8)

The excerpt which governs contribution among joint tortfeasors states in part: ... "(8) This section does not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligations.” ... PlaintiiFs action against Newman is based upon his alleged breaches of duty making MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1) inapplicable. Because Newman does not have a statutory right to contribution, he must demonstrate a common- law right to contribution to avoid summary judgment.

Former § 600.2925 allows contribution among joint tortfeasors on a pro-rata basis and does not permit contribution to be determined according to each tortfeasor’s relative fault.

Conklin v. Shiawassee County Board of Road Commissioners · filed 1983-07-19

This Court has previously held that former MCL 600.2925; MSA 27A.2925 did not permit contribution to be determined in proportion to the relative fault of each tortfeasor. ... The case is remanded for trial between defendant and Beckman on the issue of whether they are joint tortfeasors. If so, defendant shall be entitled to recover contribution from Beckman on a pro-rata basis if it is established that defendant has paid plaintiff more than its pro-rata share. Defendant’s recovery shall not be based on the proportionate fault of each tortfeasor.

Section 1 allows contribution when tortfeasors share liability for the same injury or wrongful death, even if the claims are brought by different plaintiffs or in different capacities; here, contribution was proper for loss of support, society, and companionship damages.

O'DOWD v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1984-12-03(1)

Section 1 of the contribution statute provides for contribution among tortfeasors "jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to a person or property or for the same wrongful death”. The statute does not in terms focus on the identity of the plaintiff, but rather on the nature of the injury suffered; section 1 says nothing about the capacity in which the plaintiff brought the action. We do not understand the phrase "to a person or property” as conditioning contribution among tortfea-sors on liability to the same plaintiff, but rather as providing that contribution is obtainable without regard to whether the defendants have been sued for injury to person, injury to property, or wrongful death. If the defendants are jointly or severally liable in tort for "the same injury to a person” or for "the same injury to * * * property” or for "the same wrongful death”, contribution pursuant to § 1 is obtainable.

The statute permits contribution only when the parties share common liability in tort as joint tortfeasors.

Almli v. Santora · filed 1986-08-18

Defendants argue that, since their cause of action against plaintiff parents is a statutory right of contribution, MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1), which is separate and independent from any cause of action in tort, the bar of parental immunity simply does not apply. ... As made clear in that case, however, the right of contribution assumes a common liability in tort among two or more tortfeasors. ... In order for defendants in this case to avoid the bar of parental immunity on the ground that they are proceeding with an action for contribution, there must exist a cause of action in tort on the part of the minor child against his parents. Since there is no such cause of action between Troy and his parents, plaintiff parents are not liable as joint tortfeasors and are thus not subject to an action in contribution on the part of the defendants.

Section 2925a permits contribution among joint tortfeasors but does not itself impose liability on the person from whom contribution is sought.

Zoll v. Brinkerhoff · filed 1988-07-19(1), (3), and (4)

The flaw in BrinkerhofFs argument is that the contribution statute does not establish liability. In other words, defendant tavern does not become a tortfeasor, against whom a contribution claim can be brought, unless it is liable on the underlying dramshop act theory. The sine qua non of the contribution statute is that the defendant from whom contribution is sought is a tortfeasor. The contribution act affords a defendant a procedure to gain contribution from a fellow tortfeasor. It does not establish liability in the first instance.

Section 600.2925a permits contribution when two or more persons share tort liability for the same injury, including liability arising from separate, independent, or concurrent acts and separate legal theories.

Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Petroleum Equipment, Inc. · filed 1991-06-182925a

MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1) provides a right to contribution where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property. Contribution is available whether the acts of the tortfeasors are separate, independent, or concurrent, and may include tortfeasors who are liable in tort on separate legal theories. ... All that is necessary is that the tortfeasors commonly share a burden of tort liability. Id.

Section 600.2925a permits contribution among tortfeasors without regard to whether the alleged tort is intentional, subject to the statute's specified exceptions.

Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co. · filed 1999-06-30(1)

As explained below, we are not persuaded by the union’s arguments, and we conclude, as did the trial court and the Court of Appeals, that the plain language of the contribution statute permits defendant to pursue a third-party claim against the union.

The statute permits contribution only when tortfeasors are jointly or severally liable for the same injury, but the 1995 tort reforms eliminate contribution in covered multi-fault actions by abolishing joint and several liability.

Gerling Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v. Lawson · filed 2003-02-20(1)

The 1995 tort reform legislation applies to contribution claims; thus, contribution claims based on tort involving the fault of more than one person are no longer viable because there is no joint liability in those circumstances.

Section 600.2114a requires only minimal notice in a pleading to invoke the application of another state's law, and asserting that law in the first responsive pleading satisfies the requirement.

Burnett v. MacKworth G Rees, Inc · filed 1981-09-21

Only minimal notice is required to fulfill the dictates of the statute. See Turner v Ford Motor Co, 81 Mich App 521, 527; 265 NW2d 400 (1978). In the instant case, Verson Allsteel asserted the application of Arkansas law in its first responsive pleading to plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 600.2114a allows a trial court to refuse an instruction on another state's law when the party relying on that law failed to provide reasonable notice.

Foehr v. Republic Automotive Parts, Inc · filed 1995-08-17

The court properly refused to instruct regarding Delaware law because that subject was not raised until the parties were discussing the proposed jury instructions. Pursuant to MCL 600.2114a; MSA 27A.2114(1), the trial court had the authority to refuse to instruct regarding Delaware law because reasonable notice was not provided to plaintiff.

Section 600.2114a allows a court to determine foreign law using any relevant material, including testimony, and makes the court's determination a question of law that is reviewable on appeal.

Gowda v. Gowda · filed 2020-05-14

Trial courts may take judicial notice of foreign law, MCL 600.2114a, and can even make rulings on foreign law based on testimony rather than actual citation to legal authority, but the trial court failed to do so here.

Section 600.2925b requires liability among joint tortfeasors to be apportioned pro rata according to their relative degrees of fault.

Secura Insurance v. Cincinnati Insurance · filed 1993-02-16(2925b)

Liability between joint tortfeasors is to be apportioned pro rata considering relative degrees of fault. MCL 600.2925b; MSA 27A.2925(2). However, without knowing the percentage of fault between Vanderkelen and Schaffnitt, we cannot determine the amount each party must contribute to the settlement.

In tort actions, the statutes require fault allocation for all persons, including nonparties, so parties may introduce evidence referring to a nonparty, but may not tell the jury about a settlement, its amount, or the nonparty’s dismissal.

Barnett v. Hidalgo · filed 2007-05-30

While the parties are not allowed to inform the jury about the existence of a settlement with a nonparty or its amount, or that the nonparty was dismissed, under MCL 600.2957 and 600.6304, the parties are permitted to introduce evidence referring to a nonparty. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs affidavits of merit referencing a settling defendant are admissible.

Section 5838(2) requires a medical-malpractice action to begin within six months after the claimant discovered or should have discovered the claim, whichever occurred first; the first inquiry is subjective and the second is objective.

Levinson v. Trotsky · filed 1993-04-05(2)

The express language of the statute of limitations makes this inquiry two-faceted: the court must determine whether plaintiff commenced the action within six months after (1) she discovered or (2) should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever was earlier. The standard to be applied to the first prong is necessarily subjective, i.e., the answer to this question lies in the mind of plaintiff: did she discover the claim? However, the standard to be applied to the second prong of the question is objective, i.e., would a reasonable person in plaintiffs circumstances have discovered the claim?

Section 5838a(2) gives a medical-malpractice plaintiff the later of the ordinary two-year limitations period or six months after discovering, or reasonably discovering, the claim when the injury is not immediately apparent.

Shawl v. Dhital · filed 1995-03-10(2)

However, in those cases in which an injury is not immediately apparent, MCL 600.5838a(2); MSA 27A.5838(1)(2) allows a plaintiff to commence an action within the two-year statutory period of limitation or "within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later.”

The six-month medical-malpractice discovery period begins when objective facts give the plaintiff knowledge of an injury and a possible causal link to the physician's act or omission; delayed diagnoses require a flexible, reasonableness-based assessment of the totality of available information.

Solowy v. Oakwood Hospital Corp. · filed 1997-04-29(2)

The six-month discovery rule period begins to run in medical malpractice cases when the plaintiff, on the basis of objective facts, is aware of a possible cause of action. This occurs when the plaintiff is aware of an injury and a possible causal link between the injury and an act or omission of the physician. When the cause of the plaintiffs injrny is difficult to determine because of a delay in diagnosis, the “possible cause of action” standard should be applied with a substantial degree of flexibility. In such cases, courts should be guided by the doctrine of reasonableness and the standard of due diligence, and must consider the totality of information available to the plaintiff concerning the injury and its possible causes.

Section 5827 generally sets accrual at the time the wrong underlying a claim was done and does not permit a broad common-law discovery rule to toll accrual unless the statute provides an exception.

Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Company · filed 2007-07-25

We hold that the plain language of MCL 600.5827 precludes the use of a broad common-law discovery rule to toll the accrual date of claims to which this statute applies.

The medical-malpractice discovery rule does not extend the limitations period when the plaintiff knew of the claim but later discovered only the wrongdoer’s identity.

Milostan v. Troy Internal Medicine · filed 2015-01-15(2)

Given the principle that the discovery rule applies to discovery of a claim, and not the discovery of a wrongdoer’s identity, it follows that the discovery rule found in MCL 600.5838a(2) does not apply to plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Fraser, meaning that her claims against Dr. Fraser are instead time barred by the general period of limitation applicable to medical malpractice claims.

Section 5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when a reasonable ordinary person should have discovered a possible cause of action, not merely when discovery was possible.

Jendrusina v. Mishra · filed 2016-08-04(2)

On the present facts, defendants have demonstrated that before the September 20, 2012 meeting with Tayeb, plaintiff could have discovered that he had a possible cause of action for malpractice. However, the statute triggers the six-month discovery period only when plaintiff should have discovered that he had a possible cause of action. Given the plain language of the statute, the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.

Section 5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when objective facts make the plaintiff aware of an injury and a possible causal link to the physician's act or omission, without requiring awareness of the injury's full extent.

Harris v. Jerel N Owens Dmd · filed 2016-09-15(2)

The six-month discovery rule period begins to run in medical malpractice cases when the plaintiff, on the basis of objective facts, is aware of a possible cause of action. This occurs when the plaintiff is aware of an injury and a possible causal link between the injury and an act or omission of the physician.

Subsection (2) uses a “should have discovered the existence of the claim” standard, rather than a standard based on what a plaintiff merely could have discovered.

Sciortino v. Do · filed 2017-08-29(2)

Significantly, MCL 600.5838a(2) expressly requires that a plaintiff “should have discovered the existence of the claim,” not that a plaintiff could have.

Section 5838a(2) permits a medical-malpractice action within six months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the claim when that period is later than the otherwise applicable limitations period.

Sciortino v. Do · filed 2017-08-29(2)

MCL 600.5838a(2) sets forth the applicable statute of limitation for plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim: ... Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an action involving a claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in [MCL 600.5805] or [MCL 600.5851 to MCL 600.5856], or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. [Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.] ... Accordingly, using an objective standard and duly considering the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that the record evidence confirms that plaintiff should have known of the potential existence of his claim more than six months before his notice of intent was filed in April 2014.

Section 5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when an ordinary layperson should have linked known facts to a possible claim, not merely when the person could have done so.

Estate of Kelly M Bowman v. St John Hospital and Medical Center · filed 2019-08-13(2)

The limitations period provided by the discovery rule begins running when an ordinary layperson should have linked some knowledge actually in his or her possession to the possibility of a cause of action.

Section 600.5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when a patient should have discovered a possible claim; a definitive cancer diagnosis can mark that point when earlier information did not reveal possible malpractice.

Hutchinson v. Ingham County Health Department · filed 2019-05-09(2)

Therefore, on the basis of the record, it is not reasonable to conclude that plaintiff should have discovered her possible cause of action when she was informed of the necessity of a biopsy. ... Accordingly, we disagree with the trial court’s legal conclusion that plaintiff was aware of an injury in the form of breast cancer, and any possible causation relating to the alleged medical malpractice of defendants, before her definitive diagnosis of breast cancer. ... It was not until June 15, 2015, when plaintiff received a definitive diagnosis of cancer, that plaintiff discovered or should have discovered her possible cause of action, in that she became aware that she had breast cancer, and could have surmised that defendants were negligent in the treatment of the lump in her breast when she consulted with medical professionals at the Ingham County Health Department. Given that her notice of intent was mailed on December 4, 2015, her cause of action was timely filed.

Section 5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when the claimant has sufficient information to surmise negligence; a definitive cancer diagnosis can trigger that period.

Estate of Kelly M Bowman v. St John Hospital and Medical Center · filed 2019-08-13(2)

When Kelly’s lump was biopsied and she “received a definitive diagnosis of cancer,” she, like the plaintiff in Hutchinson, “could have surmised that defendants were negligent in the treatment of the lump on her breast” at the time she had consulted with them. ... At that point, she had sufficient information to trigger the running of the discovery rule period. ... Because Kelly’s notice of intent was served more than 6 months after April 29, 2015, the trial court erred by denying defendants’ motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). MCL 600.5805(8); MCL 600.5838a(2).

The six-month medical-malpractice discovery rule is not limited to the knowledge of the injured plaintiff-patient.

Anderson v. Jenny Shih Do · filed 2020-04-23(2)

Defendants argue that the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions only applies to the knowledge of a plaintiff-patient injured or damaged by the medical treatment. Nothing in the plain language of the statute limits its application so narrowly. ... The plain language of the statute does not endorse defendants’ interpretation.

For a medical-malpractice claim discovered more than two years after the alleged malpractice, the six-month discovery period runs from when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the claim, subject to the longer applicable limitations period.

Lonsway v. Yale University · filed 2021-02-11(2)

Because plaintiffs discovered their claim more than two years after the alleged malpractice occurred, the six-month discovery rule provides the applicable limitations period. That is, the action must be brought within six months after plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the existence of their claims. See MCL 600.5838a(2); Jendrusina, 316 Mich App at 635.

Section 5838a(2) permits a medical-malpractice action within six months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the claim, and requires diligence when facts arouse suspicion even if they do not yet compel an inference of malpractice.

Estate of Kelly M Bowman v. St John Hospital and Medical Center · filed 2021-07-30(2)

First, as in Gebhardt and in Solowy, a plaintiff “should have discovered” a possible cause of action when the available facts would let her infer malpractice. ... Second, as anticipated by Justice BOYLE’s partial concurrence in Moll, a plaintiff “should have discovered” a possible cause of action when the plaintiff knows facts that should arouse her suspicions and doesn’t diligently investigate.

Section 5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when the plaintiff discovers or, through reasonable diligence, should have discovered a possible cause of action.

Estate of Kelly M Bowman v. St John Hospital and Medical Center · filed 2021-07-30(2)

Under the common-law discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered a possible cause of action.

Section 600.5838a(2) allows a medical-malpractice action beyond the ordinary limitations period only if filed within six months after the claim is discovered or should have been discovered, while subsection (2)(a) requires fraudulent conduct to have prevented discovery and to be pleaded as affirmative acts or misrepresentations designed to do so.

Robertson v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2022-05-26(2), (2)(a)

But a medical malpractice action brought beyond the two-year limitations period is nonetheless timely if it was commenced “within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later.” MCL 600.5838a(2). ... In sum, plaintiff should have discovered a possible cause of action in January 2015, or at least well before his meeting with Dr. Siegel, because the recurrence of cancer was directly inconsistent with Dr. Les’s alleged statements following the July 2013 surgery that the cancer had been removed and should not return. ... MCL 600.5838a(2)(a) provides that the “period of limitations set forth in subsection (3)” apply “[i]f discovery of the existence of the claim was prevented by the fraudulent conduct of the health care professional against whom the claim is made . . . or of the health facility against whom the claim is made . . . .” For this provision to apply, “the plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment,” and “must prove that the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to prevent subsequent discovery.”

MCL 600.5838a(2) starts the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period when the plaintiff becomes aware of a potential claim, not when the plaintiff has enough medical records to prove it.

Lavalley v. St Mary Mercy Hospital · filed 2024-08-15(2)

Even if plaintiffs did not have complete medical records, the six-month period begins when a plaintiff becomes aware of a potential claim, not when the plaintiff has accumulated sufficient medical documentation to prove it.

Section 5838a makes a medical-malpractice claim accrue when the underlying act or omission occurs, while its six-month discovery rule can provide an alternate filing period after the claim is discovered.

Simmons v. Apex Drug Stores, Inc · filed 1993-08-16(1), (2)

MCL 600.5838a(l); MSA 27A.5838(1)(1) provides that a claim accrues "at the time of the act or omission which is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice.” Plaintiff, therefore, had either two years from the date on which his claim accrued (when the wrong drug was dispensed), December 10, 1988, or six months after he discovered the claim on February 8, 1989. Plaintiff filed suit on December 18, 1990, i.e., more than two years after December 10, 1988. His complaint was untimely.

Section 5838a(2) functions as both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose for medical-malpractice claims, while its fraudulent-conduct exception requires conduct that prevents discovery of the claim.

Sills v. Oakland General Hospital · filed 1997-02-25(2), (2)(a)

Here, MCL 600.5838a(2); MSA 27A.5838(1)(2) serves both functions: it prescribes the time limit in which a plaintiff who is injured within the statutory period must bring suit and also prevents a plaintiff from bringing suit if she sustained an injury outside the statutory period. Because the statute is both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, defendants were not obliged to refer specifically to their defense as a statute of repose. ... MCL 600.5838a(2); MSA 27A.5838(1) (2) thus acted as a statute of limitation in this case. ... MCL 600.5838a(2)(a); MSA 27A.5838(1)(2)(a) provides that the limitation period does not apply “[i]f discovery of the existence of the claim was prevented by the fraudulent conduct of the health care professional against whom the claim is made . . . or of the health facility against whom the claim is made . . . .”

Section 600.5838a(1) makes a medical-malpractice claim accrue when the underlying act or omission occurs, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers or learns of the claim.

Taylor v. Kurapati · filed 1999-10-08(1)

A medical malpractice claim accrues “at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” MCL 600.5838a(l); MSA 27A.5838(1)(1); Solowy, supra at 220.

For medical malpractice claims, accrual occurs when the specific act or omission forming the basis of the claim occurs; separate discrete acts or omissions causing one injury may have separate accrual dates.

Kincaid v. Cardwell · filed 2013-04-18(1)

Although the Legislature determined that the last-treatment rule should no longer govern the accrual of medical malpractice claims, it did not replace the last-treatment rule with a first-treatment rule; rather, the accrual date depends on the date of the specific act or omission that the plaintiff claims caused his or her injury. Similarly, while the Legislature referred to “the act or omission” that is the basis for “the claim,” MCL 600.5838a(1), the Legislature did not limit a plaintiff to asserting a single claim for medical malpractice for any given injury. Because a plaintiffs injury can be causally related to multiple acts or omissions, it is possible for the plaintiff to allege multiple claims of malpractice premised on discrete acts or omissions — even when those acts or omissions lead to a single injury — and those claims will have independent accrual dates determined by the date of the specific act or omission at issue.

Section 600.5838a provides that a medical-malpractice claim accrues when the underlying act or omission occurs, permits a later distinct breach to accrue separately, and imposes a six-month discovery period subject to a six-year repose limit.

Hoard v. Mark J Stevenson Dds · filed 2015-02-26(5838a)(1), (2)

Here, plaintiff alleged a change in her condition—that the lesions grew, became bilateral, and became soft, rather than hard. The failure to correct the original diagnosis, in light of these new facts, constituted a purported breach of the standard of care that was distinct from the initial diagnosis that the lesions were merely mandibular tori. ... Thus, plaintiff pled sufficient “facts that would establish that the continued adherence at the later point constituted a breach of the duty owed to the plaintiff” and that her claim should have withstood a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). See id. at 530-531. Under MCL 600.5838a(1), plaintiff should be able to pursue her malpractice claim against Dr. Stevenson for all dates after November 9, 2010.

A medical-malpractice claim accrues when the underlying act or omission occurs, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers or learns of the claim; a continuing physician-patient relationship alone does not extend accrual.

Penny Gamble v. David M Kolakowski Dds · filed 2016-04-21(5838a)(1)

A claim involving medical malpractice accrues “at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” MCL 600.5838a(1).

Section 600.5838a(1) makes a malpractice claim accrue when the act or omission causing the injury occurs, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the claim.

Richard a Krueger v. Spectrum Health Systems · filed 2016-09-27(1)

Accordingly, a claim based on allegations of medical malpractice “accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.”

Section 600.5838a(2) uses an objective should-have-discovered standard for the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period, not a merely possible-discovery standard.

Sciortino v. Do · filed 2017-08-29(2)

Therefore, the inquiry is not whether it was possible for a reasonable lay person to have discovered the existence of the claim; rather, the inquiry is whether it was probable that a reasonable lay person would have discovered the existence of the claim.

A medical-malpractice claim accrues when the act or omission underlying the claim occurs, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers or otherwise knows of the claim.

Hammoud v. Nephrology Consultants of Michigan · filed 2019-09-19(1)

Under MCL 600.5838a, a medical malpractice claim “accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.”