Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169

Section 600.2169’s expert witness qualification standards apply to medical malpractice cases filed on or after October 1, 1986.

Kelley v. Murray · filed 1989-03-20

The Legislature intended the act to be prospective, not retroactive, in application. Section three of the statute provides that the new standards "shall apply to cases filed on or after October 1, 1986.” It is undisputed that the complaint in the present case was filed before this date and therefore the act and its new standards were inapplicable.

Section 600.2169’s stricter expert witness qualifications do not apply to actions filed before its October 1, 1986 effective date.

Dunn v. Nundkumar · filed 1990-06-13

Plaintiff’s reference by analogy to MCL 600.2169; MSA 27A.2169 (effective October 1, 1986), which provides more stringent standards for qualification of expert witnesses than previously required, does not cure this failing, particularly where this statute does not apply to actions, such as this one, filed before its effective date.

The 1993 amendments to § 600.2169 apply only to cases filed on or after April 1, 1994.

Tobin v. Providence Hospital · filed 2001-04-05

Therefore, we hold that the act is to be applied prospectively only from April 1, 1994, and not retroactively for the six-month period from October 1, 1993, to April 1, 1994, or before October 1, 1993.

A party forfeits a challenge to an expert’s qualifications under § 600.2169(1)(a) by failing to raise it within a reasonable time after learning the expert’s identity.

Greathouse v. Rhodes · filed 2000-10-18(1)(a)

Given the fundamental role standard of care experts have in medical malpractice litigation, and particularly where § 2169 is identified in the statutes requiring both parties to list an expert at the commencement of the litigation, we hold that a party’s failure to challenge an expert’s basic qualifications under subsection 2169(l)(a) within a reasonable time after learning the expert’s identity results in forfeiture of the issue.

Section 600.2169(2)'s evaluation of an expert's qualifications applies to trial testimony, not to an affidavit of merit; subsection (1) supplies the qualifications relevant to the affidavit.

Sturgis Bank & Trust Co. v. Hillsdale Community Health Center · filed 2006-01-06(2)

We hold that § 2912d(l) implicates § 2169(1), but not § 2169(2).

Section 600.2169(1) requires a medical malpractice expert to be licensed and to have the required experience practicing or teaching in the relevant specialty; a physician assistant student did not qualify to sign the affidavit of merit.

Moffat v. Department of Corrections · filed 2014-12-18(1)

Here, plaintiff’s affidavit of merit was signed by a physician assistant student who could not provide a standard of care for the physicians named in plaintiff’s complaint. Further, there was no statement in the affidavit of merit that the expert was licensed, contravening MCL 600.2169(1).6 Finally, plaintiff’s affiant was required to have practiced for at least a year before the occurrence in the specialty that was the basis for the claim, or to have instructed students in the specialty. MCL 600.2169(1)(b) & (c). As a student at the time, plaintiff’s expert could not be qualified to submit an affidavit of merit.

Section 600.2169 requires an expert supporting a medical malpractice claim to practice or teach in the same health care profession as the provider accused of wrongdoing.

Md v. Hisham Dado Md · filed 2015-03-24

Pursuant to MCL 600.2912d, a medical malpractice action must be supported by an affidavit of merit “signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness” under MCL 600.2169. A medical malpractice plaintiff is “required to submit an affidavit of an expert practicing or teaching in the same health care profession as those accused of wrongdoing.” ... Thus, any claims based on the alleged medical negligence of an individual other than Dado, the nephrologist, including negligence of Davita’s agents and staff related to training, supervision, or failure to implement appropriate procedures for the administration of medical treatment, were not properly before the court because they were not supported by an affidavit of merit as required by MCL 600.2912d.

Section 600.2169(1) requires a medical malpractice expert testifying at trial to meet its listed qualifications; counsel’s reasonable belief about those qualifications does not suffice at trial.

Grossman v. Brown · filed 2004-07-20(1)

Thus, while at the affidavit-of-merit stage a plaintiff’s attorney need only “reasonably believe” the expert is qualified, at trial the standard is more demanding because the statute states that a witness “shall not give expert testimony” unless the expert “meets the [listed] criteria” in MCL 600.2169(1).

Section 600.2169(1)(b)(i) requires a medical malpractice expert to practice the defendant physician’s specialty, but does not require a matching subspecialty.

Hamilton v. Kuligowski · filed 2004-04-22(1)(b)(i)

We decline defendant’s invitation to graft a requirement for matching subspecialties onto the plain “specialty” language of MCL 600.2169(1).

The proper standard of care for purposes of § 600.2169(1)(a) is determined as a matter of law.

Jilek v. Stockson · filed 2010-07-29(1)(a)

The proper standard of care for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1)(a) is determined as a matter of law.

Section 600.2169 permits standard-of-care testimony from experts who satisfy its qualifications in subsections (a) and (b).

Joy a Jilek v. Carlin C Stockson Md · filed 2011-12-21(a)-(b)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendants’ two experts were qualified to provide “standard of care” testimony under MCL 600.2169 because they satisfied the specific qualifications of MCL 600.2169(a)-(b).

Section 600.2169(2) does not require a medical malpractice expert to be as knowledgeable as the defendant about the specific procedure when the expert otherwise meets its qualification criteria.

Albro v. Drayer · filed 2014-01-28(2)

Admission of expert testimony simply does not depend on an expert’s being exactly as knowledgeable as a defendant in a medical malpractice action. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that defendant’s experts were, at a minimum, sufficiently knowledgeable, trained, or educated to form an expert opinion under MRE 702. Likewise, none of the considerations under MCL 600.2169(2) demand that the experts be excluded.

Section 600.2169(2) allows a medical malpractice expert to qualify based on experience and training.

Estate of Bobbie Jean Wilson-White v. St John MacOmb Hospital · filed 2015-02-19(2)

Daubert, MRE 702, and MCL 600.2169(2) expressly contemplate that an expert may be qualified on the basis of his experience and training.

Section 600.2169(2) requires a court to consider a medical malpractice expert’s training and experience when deciding whether the expert may testify about the standard of care.

Walworth v. Metropolitan Hospital · filed 2016-07-28(2)

Consequently, the trial court properly considered Dr. Kitain’s lack the education, professional training, and experience when deciding that Dr. Kitain could not reliably testify regarding the standard of care requisite for performing a canaloplasty.

Section 600.2169 excludes standard of care opinions from an expert who is not qualified to testify about the physicians at issue.

Auld II v. McLaren Regional Medical Center · filed 2019-02-26

To the extent Dr. Vascik gave any opinion testimony regarding what tests he would order under certain presenting conditions, such testimony is irrelevant and inadmissible here, as it is undisputed that he is not qualified under MCL 600.2169 to render standard of care opinions regarding emergency room physicians.

Section 600.2169(1) requires a medical malpractice expert to match the specialty the defendant practiced during the alleged malpractice and meet the statute’s practice requirements.

Higgins v. Md · filed 2019-07-30(1)

In sum, with neuroradiology as the one most relevant specialty, the plaintiffs’ experts satisfy the requirements in MCL 600.2169(1), so they are qualified under that statute to offer opinion testimony on the appropriate standard of care.

When a defendant physician is a specialist, a plaintiff’s expert must have specialized in the same specialty to testify about the standard of care.

Estate of Patricia a Watland v. Ali J Manns Rn · filed 2017-12-26(1)(a)

In fact, under MCL 600.2169(1)(a), he was not qualified to offer standard of care testimony.

A standard-of-care expert must match the defendant physician’s specialty most relevant to the alleged malpractice.

Estate of Anthony Norczyk v. Dds · filed 2018-10-16(1)(a)

In sum, we agree with the trial court’s determination that Furman’s affidavit of merit submitted on behalf of plaintiff satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2912d and MCL 600.2169, where the one most relevant specialty was cardiology, not interventional cardiology.

An interventional radiologist’s affidavit of merit satisfies Section 600.2169’s specialty matching requirement for a malpractice claim based on another interventional radiologist’s conduct.

Sunderlik v. Thomas E Barbieri Md · filed 2019-03-21(1)(b)(i)

In addition, it is undisputed that Dr. Link was an interventional radiologist like Dr. Barbieri. Thus, the affidavit of merit fulfilled the requirements of MCL 600.2912d(1) as read in conjunction with MCL 600.2169, and the trial court did not err by declining to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires a medical malpractice expert to match the specialty the defendant physician was practicing during the alleged malpractice; here, interpreting a cranial CT scan made neuroradiology the most relevant specialty.

Estate of Linda Horn v. Michael J Swofford Do · filed 2020-10-22(1)(a)

And therefore Dr. Swofford was acting or practicing as a “specialist” or “subspecialist” in neuroradiology, at least for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1) as interpreted by Woodard. Although Dr. Swofford was also practicing diagnostic radiology when he interpreted Horn’s CT scan considering that diagnostic radiologists are credentialed to interpret neuroimages, neuroradiology was the one most relevant specialty.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires an expert testifying against a specialist to specialize in the same area.

Gaskin v. Cynthia Rider Dmd · filed 2018-05-10(1)(a)

In sum, plaintiff’s affidavit of merit was signed by an expert who was a general dentist, not an expert in oral and maxillofacial surgery, and so could not satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2169.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) matches an expert’s specialty to the defendant’s general board certification; a surgical critical care subspecialty does not defeat a match in general surgery.

20241212_C357931_69_357931O.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-12-12(1)(a)

Thus, the “specialties” matched for purposes of satisfying MCL 600.2169(1) under Stokes, and the trial court’s order must therefore be vacated on that basis.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires an expert to match the defendant physician’s relevant general board specialty; additional subspecialties do not disqualify the expert.

Estate of Zuhair Khosho v. Ascension MacOmb Oakland Hospital · filed 2025-10-29(1)(b)

Although Stokes was not yet released when the trial court made its decision, the court correctly decided that Dr. Venkatasubramanian met the criteria of MCL 600.2169(1)(b). To the extent Dr. Venkatasubramanian has additional subspecialties, those are not relevant because both she and Dr. Belkin only share neurology as a specialty.

Section 600.2169(1) requires a medical malpractice expert to match the physician’s relevant general board specialty, without requiring a matching subspecialty.

Selliman v. Jeffrey J Colton Md · filed 2024-07-25(1)

The “matching” required by MCL 600.2169(1) is limited to general board specialties and does not require precise matching of subspecialties.

Section 600.2169(1) requires a medical malpractice expert to match the defendant physician’s relevant general board specialty; it does not require matching subspecialties.

Estate of Linda Horn v. Michael J Swofford Do · filed 2024-07-25(1)

The “matching” required by MCL 600.2169(1) is limited to general board specialties and does not require precise matching of subspecialties.

When a physician has multiple board certifications, § 600.2169 requires the expert witness to match the specialty involved in the alleged malpractice, not every specialty the physician holds.

Tate v. Detroit Receiving Hospital · filed 2002-04-04(1)(a)

Thus, where a defendant physician has several board certifications and the alleged malpractice involves only one of these specialties, § 2169 requires an expert witness to possess the same specialty as that engaged in by the defendant physician during the course of the alleged malpractice.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) governs challenges to the qualifications of standard-of-care witnesses based on whether they share the defendant physician’s board-certified specialty.

Greathouse v. Rhodes · filed 2001-12-14(1)(a)

We hold that this case implicates § 2169 because plaintiff challenges the qualifications of Dr. Rhodes’ “standard of care” witnesses because they are not board certified in the same specialty.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires an expert testifying against a board-certified specialist to be board certified in the same specialty.

Kirkaldy v. Rim · filed 2002-09-10(1)(a)

Further, if the defendant is board certified in a specialty, the expert must be board certified in that same specialty. MCL 600.2169(l)(a). Here, in order to qualify as an expert witness, plaintiffs’ expert would need to be a board-certified neurologist because the defendant doctors are both board-certified neurologists. That is clearly not the case because plaintiffs’ expert was identified as a board-certified neurosurgeon, and plaintiffs do not contest this fact.

Section 600.2169 requires an expert testifying about a board-certified physician’s standard of care to be board-certified in the same specialty.

Wlosinski v. Cohn · filed 2006-03-15(1)(a)

We also note that neither Dr. Greenberg nor Dr. Evan Morton was qualified to testify against Dr. Cohn regarding the standard of care because they were not board-certified in the same specialty as Dr. Cohn. MCL 600.2169. Their evidence should be limited accordingly.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires an expert to have matching board certification when a hospital is sued for the alleged negligence of a board-certified physician, even if that physician is not named as a defendant.

Nippa v. Botsford General Hospital · filed 2002-09-10(1)(a)

Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's claim that the word "party" in M.C.L. § 600.2169 should be interpreted to refer only to named parties of record, where such a construction would not further the purpose of the statute or the object it seeks to accomplish.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires the physician signing an affidavit of merit against a hospital to have the same specialty or board certification as the hospital agents alleged to have been negligent.

Nippa v. Botsford General Hospital · filed 2003-08-20(1)(a)

Therefore, the term "party" under M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) encompasses the agents for whose alleged negligent acts the hospital may still be liable. A plaintiff must submit with a medical-malpractice complaint against an institutional defendant an affidavit of merit from a physician who specializes or is board-certified in the same specialty as that of the institutional defendant's agents involved in the alleged negligent conduct.

When a medical malpractice defendant is board certified in a specialty, the plaintiff’s standard of care expert must be board certified in the same specialty.

Geralds v. Munson Healthcare · filed 2004-01-08(1)(a)

Under MCL 600.2169(l)(a), then, if the party against whom testimony is offered is a board certified specialist, the expert witness must be board certified in the same specialty. Therefore, because Swetnam was board certified in emergency medicine, the affidavit of merit accompanying plaintiff’s complaint was required to be signed by a physician who was also board certified in emergency medicine.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires a standard-of-care expert to share the defendant physician’s board certification, even when both physicians hold the same subspecialty certificate.

Halloran v. Bhan · filed 2004-07-20(1)(a)

We hold that MCL 600.2169(1)(a) requires that the proposed expert witness must have the same board certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered.

A resident practicing in a specialty who can potentially become board certified is treated as a specialist when determining the qualifications required of a medical malpractice expert.

Gonzalez v. St John Hospital & Medical Center · filed 2007-08-29(1)(a)

Because Vashi clearly meets Woodard’s definition of “specialist,” he does not fall under MCL 600.2169(l)(c), but rather MCL 600.2169(l)(a).

Section 600.2169 requires an expert to match the specialty the defendant practiced during the alleged malpractice; an additional, unrelated board certification does not disqualify the expert.

Hoffman v. Barrett · filed 2010-06-03(1)(a)

The mere fact that defendant has a specialty that plaintiffs expert lacks does not automatically disqualify plaintiffs expert from properly signing plaintiffs affidavit of merit.

Section 600.2169 requires an expert to match the defendant physician’s specialty and board certification in the specialty involved in the alleged malpractice.

Hoffman v. Barrett · filed 2012-03-08(1)(a)

The mere fact that defendant has a specialty that plaintiffs expert lacks does not automatically disqualify plaintiffs expert from properly signing plaintiffs affidavit of merit. ... Therefore, plaintiffs expert was qualified to sign the affidavit of merit.

An expert testifying about the standard of care for a board-certified specialist must have held the same board certification when the alleged malpractice occurred.

Rock v. Crocker · filed 2014-11-18(1)(a)

In accordance with the plain language of the statute, its most recent amendment, the relevant caselaw, and common sense, we hold that, under MCL 600.2169(1)(a), an expert witness seeking to offer standard-of-care testimony against or on behalf of a board-certified specialist must himself have been board certified in the same specialty at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action.

Section 600.2169 treats a field as a medical specialty only if board certification in it was possible at the time of the alleged malpractice; urogynecology did not qualify before 2013.

Wassmann v. Richard D Bates Md · filed 2016-02-18(1)(a)

Dr. Schuchman could not become board certified in urogynecology at the relevant time because a board certification in urogynecology did not exist at the time of the injury that is the basis of the claim. In other words, the specialty or subspecialty of urogynecology simply did not exist for the purpose of MCL 600.2169 prior to 2013.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires a medical malpractice expert to match the defendant physician’s specialty most relevant to the alleged malpractice, including board certification when the defendant is board certified in that specialty.

Estate of Luella Ehrlinger v. Phillip a Dean Md · filed 2015-10-15(1)(a)

Thus, the resolution of this issue turns on which standard of care was most relevant to Dean’s alleged malpractice. ... Thus, at the least, plaintiff could have a reasonable belief that the most relevant standard of care was that of a general surgeon, not a colorectal surgeon, relative to these remaining allegations.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires an expert testifying against a board-certified specialist to have held matching board certification when the alleged malpractice occurred, even if it has lapsed by the time of testimony.

Rock v. Crocker · filed 2016-06-06(1)(a)

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue and hold that the board-certification requirement applies at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action, not the time of testimony.

When a defendant physician is board-certified in the relevant specialty, an expert offering standard-of-care testimony must be board-certified in that same specialty.

Rushlow v. Bodell · filed 2021-04-29(1)(a)

It is undisputed that plaintiff’s affiant, Dr. Coats, was board-certified in a different specialty than defendant. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Dr. Coats satisfied the statutory requirements of MCL 600.2169 because Dr. Coats was not board-certified in general surgery.

An expert offering standard-of-care testimony against a board-certified specialist must have been board-certified in the same specialty when the alleged malpractice occurred.

Khzouz v. Md · filed 2018-03-13(1)(a)

Under MCL 600.2169(1)(a), an expert witness may only offer testimony regarding the applicable standard of care for a specialist if the proposed expert was board-certified in the same specialty “at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action.” Rock, 499 Mich at 262. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to establish that Dr. Pappas’s testimony concerning the applicable standard of care in this matter was substantively admissible, and it thus cannot be considered for purposes of this analysis.

A standard-of-care expert must specialize in the specialty the defendant physician practiced at the time of the alleged malpractice, including when the defendant was a resident on rotation.

Estate of Lamarr Green v. Md · filed 2023-05-25(1)(a)

Dr. Nirgiotis was not a specialist in surgical critical care and was, therefore, not qualified under MCL 600.2169(1)(a) to testify about the standard of care applicable to Dr. Abbassi.

A standard-of-care expert must share the defendant physician’s board certification in the specialty most relevant to the alleged malpractice; lack of that certification does not disqualify testimony against a physician who is not board-certified.

Estate of Douglas Widmar v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2023-11-09(1)(a)

Although Dr. Salzman specializes in surgical critical care, because Drs. Frikker and Villalba are board-certified in surgical critical care, and Dr. Salzman is not, Dr. Salzman is not qualified under MCL 600.2169(1)(a) to testify regarding the standard of care applicable to Drs. Frikker and Villalba.

Section 600.2169 bars standard of care testimony by experts who are not board-certified in the defendant physician’s specialty.

Jim P. Benge, M.D. and Kelsey-Seybold Medical Group PLLC v. Williams · filed 2015-01-30

We also note that neither Dr. Greenberg nor Dr. Evan Morton was qual- ified to testify against Dr. Cohn regarding the standard of care because they were not [***14] board-certified in the same specialty as Dr. Cohn. MCL 600.2169. Their evidence should be limited accordingly.

An expert testifying about a nurse midwife’s standard of care must practice or teach in the same health profession; an obstetrician/gynecologist does not qualify.

McElhaney v. Harper-Hutzel Hospital · filed 2006-03-31(1)(b)

Consequently, we conclude that because nurse midwives are separately licensed professionals who practice nursing with specialty certification in the practice of nurse midwifery, obstetricians/gynecologists may not testify about their standard of practice or care.

Section 600.2169(1)(c) does not qualify a dentist whose practice is limited to root canals to testify about a general practitioner's standard of care.

Decker v. Flood · filed 2002-01-10(1)(c)

Applying the ordinary meaning of general practitioner as one who does not limit his practice to any particular branch of medicine, Dr. Gallagher clearly does not satisfy the requirements of M.C.L. § 600.2169 and, therefore, would not be qualified to offer expert testimony on the standard of practice of a general practitioner, such as defendant Dr. Flood.

Section 600.2169(1)(c) treats family practitioners and general practitioners as engaged in the same type of medical practice when determining whether an expert may testify about the standard of care.

Robins v. Garg · filed 2006-06-12(1)(c)

For purposes of satisfying the requirements of MCL 600.2169, therefore, we hold that a family practitioner and a general practitioner are physicians engaged in the same type of medical practice.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires an expert to have the same professional license as the defendant to qualify as practicing in the same health profession.

Brown v. Hayes · filed 2006-06-12(1)(b)

Therefore, we conclude that Smith is not engaged in the “same health profession” as defendants and is, therefore, not qualified to give expert testimony under § 2169(l)(b).

A standard of care expert must have devoted a majority of professional time in the preceding year to practicing or teaching the defendant’s health profession; ophthalmology and optometry are different professions.

Bates v. Gilbert · filed 2007-07-25(1)(b)(i)-(ii)

We hold that under the clear language of MCL 600.2912d(1) and MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i)-(ii), plaintiff’s counsel must have reasonably believed that the expert selected by the plaintiff to address the applicable standard of practice or care in the affidavit of merit devoted a majority of his or her professional time during the year before the alleged malpractice to practicing or teaching the same health profession as defendant Gilbert.

Section 600.2169(1)(c) permits a board-certified family practitioner to testify about a general practitioner's standard of care if the expert also satisfies the statute's practice or teaching requirement.

Robins v. Garg · filed 2007-10-26(1)(c)

For purposes of satisfying the requirements of MCL 600.2169, therefore, we hold that an expert who is a board-certified family practitioner is qualified under MCL 600.2169(l)(c) to testify against a defendant doctor who is a general practitioner, as long as MCL 600.2169(l)(c)(i) or (ii) is also satisfied.

Section 600.2169 does not require an expert testifying about a physician’s assistant’s standard of care to share the supervising physician’s specialty; an expert qualifies under subsection (1)(b)(i) by devoting a majority of the preceding year to clinical practice as a physician’s assistant.

Wolford v. Duncan · filed 2008-07-17(1)

Thus, neither § 2169(1)(a) nor § 2169(1)(c) apply to defendant’s choice of an expert witness regarding the appropriate standard of care for Wilson; rather, the expert’s qualifications are governed by § 2169(1)(b), which applies to both physicians (specialists and general practitioners) and other health professionals.

A nurse practitioner who spent most of the year before the alleged malpractice practicing or teaching as a nurse practitioner does not satisfy the same-health-profession requirement to testify about a registered nurse’s standard of care.

Cox v. Eric J. Hartman, M.D., & Blue Water Obstetrics & Gynecology Prof'l Corp. · filed 2017-12-12(1)(b)

The health profession of nursing and the health profession of a nurse practitioner are different, as reflected in the fact that the former is practiced pursuant to a license while the latter is practiced pursuant to a registration or specialty certification. Because Beckmann did not spend the majority of her professional time in the year preceding the alleged malpractice practicing or teaching the health profession of nursing, as opposed to the health profession of a nurse practitioner, she did not satisfy the statutory criteria to testify concerning the standard of care applicable to McGregor, a registered nurse.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a standard of care expert to have spent a majority of the preceding year practicing or teaching in the same health profession as the defendant.

Angelina a Cox v. Eric J Hartman Md · filed 2017-12-12(1)(b)

The health profession of nursing and the health profession of a nurse practitioner are different, as reflected in the fact that the former is practiced pursuant to a license while the latter is practiced pursuant to a registration or specialty certification. Because Beckmann did not spend the majority of her professional time in the year preceding the alleged malpractice practicing or teaching the health profession of nursing, as opposed to the health profession of a nurse practitioner, she did not satisfy the statutory criteria to testify concerning the standard of care applicable to McGregor, a registered nurse.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a standard-of-care expert to have practiced or taught in the defendant’s health profession for a majority of the year before the alleged malpractice.

MIlline v. Macomb, County of · filed 2021-10-06(1)(b)

Dr. Elder is therefore not competent under the Malpractice Expert Statute to testify regarding the applicable standard of care for Olagbaiye.

When the defendant is a specialist, the expert must have devoted a majority of professional time during the preceding year to active clinical practice in the matching specialty; the expert need not also practice in the same health profession.

Crego v. Edward W Sparrow Hospital Assn · filed 2019-04-16(1)(b)(i)

Subsection (1)(b) does not require re-evaluation of whether there are matching credentials. Whether a defendant and a plaintiff’s expert practiced in the “same health profession,” as that terminology is used in Subsection (1)(b)(i), need only be resolved when a specialty, board certified or otherwise, is not implicated under the facts of a particular case.

Section 600.2169(1)(c) requires an expert testifying about a general practitioner’s standard of care to have devoted a majority of professional time during the preceding year to active clinical practice as a general practitioner.

Price v. Eleni Callis Dds · filed 2019-06-20(1)(c)

Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that as a matter of law, Dr. Dzingle was precluded from providing expert testimony establishing the standard of care applicable to defendants.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires an expert on a physician’s assistant’s standard of care to be in the same health profession; a podiatrist does not qualify.

Jordan v. Brian G Kissel Dpm · filed 2023-05-18(1)(b)

On the basis of Wolford, it is plain that a podiatrist is not “in the same health profession” as a physician’s assistant for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1)(b).

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires an expert testifying about a registered nurse’s standard of care to have spent a majority of professional time in the preceding year practicing or teaching nursing.

Gliniecki v. Ascension St John Hospital · filed 2022-05-26(1)(b)

For plaintiff to establish the standard of care and breach of that standard at trial, plaintiff would need to submit evidence from an RN—with a pertinent one-year history before the ablation—regarding the purported standard and breach. See MCL 600.2169(1).

Section 600.2169(1)(b)(i) does not apply its specialist requirement to nurse practitioners; a nurse practitioner expert must satisfy the same-health-profession practice requirement.

Leibinger v. Metropolitan Health Corporation · filed 2023-11-21(1)(b)(i)

We therefore hold that, under MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i), the phrase “if that party is a specialist, the active clinical practice of that specialty” does not apply to nurse practitioners because nurse practitioners are not “specialists” as defined by the statute.

An expert testifying about a registered nurse’s standard of care must have devoted a majority of the preceding year to practicing or teaching registered nursing.

Khalil v. Eric Y Hsu Md · filed 2026-02-02(1)(b)

Under MCL 600.2169(1) and Cox, 322 Mich App at 301, plaintiff must offer the expert testimony of a registered nurse in order to establish the standard of care applicable to registered nurses and to establish a breach of that standard of care. Dr. Kaye is not a registered nurse. Accordingly, his opinion cannot be used to establish that the registered nurses breached their standard of care.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a proposed expert to have devoted a majority of professional time in the preceding year to practicing or teaching the defendant physician’s relevant specialty.

P Estate of Lamarr Green v. Md · filed 2023-05-25(1)(b)

That said, I agree with the majority that Dr. Nirgiotis is not qualified to offer testimony under § 2169(1)(b)’s majority-practice requirement as interpreted by Woodard.

Section 600.2169 requires a medical malpractice expert to practice or teach the specialty the defendant practiced during the alleged malpractice and to have devoted a majority of the preceding year to practicing or teaching that specialty.

Reeves v. Carson City Hospital · filed 2007-07-10(1)

Thus, plaintiffs would need a specialist in emergency medicine to satisfy MCL 600.2169; Dr. Davis, as a board-certified emergency medicine physician, would satisfy this requirement. However, the specialist must have also devoted the majority of his professional time during the preceding year to the active clinical practice of emergency medicine or the instruction of students. Because there is no information in the record regarding what comprised the majority of the expert’s professional time, a remand for a determination on this issue is necessary.

Section 600.2169(1)(b)(i) requires a medical malpractice expert to devote a majority of professional time to active clinical practice in the defendant physician's specialty, but does not require a matching subspecialty.

Hamilton v. Kuligowski · filed 2004-07-07(1)(b)(i)

Therefore, the record reflects that Dr. Markowitz devoted the majority of his professional time to the "active clinical practice" of defendant's internal medicine "specialty." The statute does not require more. We decline defendant's invitation to graft a requirement for matching subspecialties onto the plain "specialty" language of MCL 600.2169(1).

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a standard-of-care expert to have spent a majority of the year before the alleged malpractice practicing or teaching the defendant’s relevant specialty.

Hamilton v. Mark F Kuligowski Do · filed 2006-07-31(1)(b)

Therefore, in order to be qualified to testify under § 2169(1)(b), the plaintiff’s expert witness must have devoted a majority of his professional time during the year immediately preceding the date on which the alleged malpractice occurred to practicing or teaching the specialty that the defendant physician was practicing at the time of the alleged malpractice, i.e., the one most relevant specialty.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a proposed medical malpractice expert to have spent more than 50 percent of the preceding year's professional time practicing the relevant specialty.

Kiefer v. Markley · filed 2009-04-28(1)(b)

MCL 600.2169(1)(b), therefore, requires a proposed expert physician to spend greater than 50 percent of his or her professional time practicing the relevant specialty the year before the alleged malpractice.

A medical malpractice expert must have devoted a majority of professional time during the preceding year to active clinical practice in the defendant’s specialty.

Moquin v. Flint Childrens Center Pc · filed 2015-10-15(1)(b)(i)

Further, the affidavit establishes that Dr. Shulak met the requirements of 600.2169(1) because he spent a majority of his professional time practicing in the area of diagnostic radiology during the year preceding the alleged malpractice.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) counts shoulder and shoulder-and-elbow surgery toward an expert’s clinical practice of orthopedic surgery when determining whether that specialty occupied a majority of the expert’s professional time.

Langley v. Md · filed 2015-12-01(1)(b)

During the relevant timeframe, Dr. Rubinstein devoted a majority of his active clinical practice to the specialty of orthopedic surgery (defendant’s specialty), which encompassed shoulder and shoulder-and-elbow surgeries, and not the subspecialty of hand surgery, which solely encompassed hand, wrist, and forearm surgeries.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a standard of care expert to have spent more than half of the preceding year’s professional time practicing the defendant physician’s relevant specialty; splitting time equally between two specialties does not qualify.

Johnson v. Md · filed 2016-07-21(1)(b)

As strictly interpreted, Green is disqualified from offering expert testimony under MCL 600.2169(1) because he did not spend more than 50% of his professional time practicing the one most relevant specialty of general surgery.4 Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Green’s standard of care testimony.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) counts time spent in active clinical practice and qualified instruction together to determine whether an expert meets the majority-of-professional-time requirement.

Gay v. Select Specialty Hospital · filed 2012-01-31(1)(b)

Here, Boggs testified that she spent 50 percent of her professional time teaching at the hospital, which teaching — as already noted — she averred was for an accredited residency program. This, when coupled with her time engaged in the active clinical practice of nursing, clearly constitutes more than 50 percent of her professional time and, therefore, meets the professional-time requirement stated under MCL 600.2169(1) (b).

An expert meets the majority practice requirement when the expert’s actual clinical work during the preceding year was in the specialty the defendant practiced, regardless of how the expert described that work.

Estate of Linda Roberdeaux v. Evangelical Homes of Michigan · filed 2016-10-18(1)(b)

Because Dr. Voytas spent a majority of his professional time practicing in the specialty of internal medicine in the year preceding the alleged malpractice, Dr. Voytas was qualified under MCL 600.2169(1)(b).

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires an expert to spend a majority of professional time practicing or teaching the defendant’s relevant specialty; time in another specialty cannot be combined to meet that requirement.

Estate of Patricia E Leblanc v. Eugene J Agnone Md · filed 2017-07-06(1)(b)

It is thus improper to combine Dr. Sokol’s time spent in medical oncology with his time spent practicing internal medicine when considering whether he is qualified as an expert under MCL 600.2169(1)(b).

Section 600.2169(1)(b)(i) requires a standard of care expert to have devoted a majority of professional time during the preceding year to active clinical practice in the defendant’s relevant specialty.

Estate of Luella Ehrlinger v. Phillip a Dean Md · filed 2018-01-09(1)(b)(i)

Accordingly, Dr. Silverman does not meet the active clinical practice requirement for the relevant standard of care (general surgery) under MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i).

An expert must spend a majority of professional time practicing or teaching the relevant specialty during the year before the alleged malpractice.

Marshall v. Daniel J Ryan Md Pc · filed 2017-12-26(1)(b)

Because Dr. Goren’s testimony established that he spent a majority his professional time in the practice or instruction of the relevant specialty during the year preceding the malpractice, which satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2169(1)(b), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motions to strike Dr. Goren’s testimony.

Section 600.2169(1) requires a standard-of-care expert to match the defendant’s specialty and meet its clinical practice or teaching requirement.

Anderson v. Jennifer L Tracy Rn · filed 2018-04-03(1)(a) and (b)

Dr. Phung and Dr. Starr were both residents practicing obstetrics and gynecology at the time of the alleged malpractice in this case, so obstetrics and gynecology was the relevant specialty applicable to an expert proposing to offer standard of care testimony regarding their conduct. At trial, Dr. Plourd testified that he was a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist who was actively working as a staff physician in obstetrics and gynecology at a hospital in California, a position which he had held since 2006. He was therefore qualified to offer expert testimony for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1)(a) and (b).

A standard-of-care expert must devote a majority of professional time in the preceding year to active clinical practice in the same profession and specialty; administrative scheduling does not qualify.

Estate of Gary McDonald v. West Branch Regional Medical Center · filed 2018-03-29(1)(b)(i)

Without any testimony or evidence as to whether she spent 48% or more of her time on overseeing technologists and, further, testimony or evidence indicating that this task was concerned with or based on the actual observation and treatment of disease in patients, plaintiff has failed to establish that Hanscom met the statutory requirements of MCL 600.2169(1).

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a standard-of-care expert to have spent a majority of the preceding year's professional time practicing or teaching the defendant physician's relevant specialty.

Estate of Aura Argentina Perez v. Henry Ford Health System · filed 2018-12-04(1)(b)

In summary, Dr. Venkatasubramanian did not meet the requirements set forth under MCL 600.2169(1) because she did not spend a majority of her professional time practicing or instructing students in general neurology; thus, she was not qualified to render standard of practice or care testimony against Dr. Feit.

Section 600.2169 requires a medical malpractice expert to match the defendant physician’s most relevant specialty and to have spent most of the preceding year practicing or teaching that specialty.

Strasser v. Oakwood Heritage Hospital · filed 2021-11-04(1)(a), (1)(b)

When the procedure to control plaintiff’s pain is viewed within the context of the underlying surgery, it becomes evident that the one most relevant specialty is anesthesiology and not pain medicine. Moreover, during the year immediately preceding the date of the alleged medical malpractice, Dr. Savala had not devoted the majority of his professional time to either the active clinical practice of anesthesiology or to the instruction of students in anesthesiology.

Teaching general osteopathic courses does not satisfy § 600.2169(1)(b)(ii)’s requirement that a standard-of-care expert teach in the defendant specialist’s specialty.

Howard-Reed v. Barry Braver Do · filed 2022-05-19(1)(b)(ii)

Therefore, the admissibility of Dr. Lam’s testimony depended on whether plaintiff could satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(ii) by demonstrating that during the year immediately preceding the alleged malpractice, Dr. Lam devoted a majority of her professional time to the instruction of students in family practice medicine. Plaintiff fails to do this.

Section 600.2169(1)(b)(ii) requires an expert to spend a majority of professional time teaching the defendant physician’s relevant specialty; teaching residents in that specialty does not suffice if the instruction is primarily in another specialty.

Fenwick v. Louis L Sobol Md · filed 2023-10-12(1)(b)(ii)

Thus, even if general otolaryngology residents were present and being instructed during most of Dr. Wenig’s practice, this instruction was primarily in head and neck oncology surgery, not general otolaryngology. Accordingly, Dr. Wenig’s affidavit does not establish that he is qualified as an expert under MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(ii).

When a defendant physician is a specialist, a standard-of-care expert must specialize in the same field.

Estate of Jacqueline Harris v. Beaumont Health · filed 2024-09-12(1)(a)

Further, as the caselaw cited above establishes, plaintiff had to prove the standard of care and whether it was breached by using an expert witness in the same specialty as Dr. Lennox.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a medical malpractice expert to devote a majority of professional time in the preceding year to qualifying clinical practice or teaching; 30% clinical work does not satisfy the clinical-practice requirement.

Estate of Jean Elaine Quick v. Spectrum Health Systems · filed 2022-06-16(1)(b)

Because she did not spend the majority of her professional time in 2016 (the year before Quick’s injury) on the “active clinical practice of the same health profession in which the party against whom” was licensed, she could not satisfy the requirements under MCL 600.2169(1)(b). The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding her as an expert witness.

Section 600.2169 sets substantive qualifications for expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases against specialists and remains valid despite its conflict with MRE 702.

McDougall v. Schanz · filed 1999-07-30

We conclude that MCL 600.2169; MSA 27A.2169 is an enactment of substantive law. As such, it does not impermissibly infringe this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority over “practice and procedure.”

Section 600.2169(5)(a) does not apply to discovery in a nonmedical-malpractice case when the party is not seeking an expert’s tax returns to challenge the expert’s qualifications.

Micheli v. Michigan Automobile Ins Placement Facility · filed 2022-02-10(5)(a)

Conversely, MCL 600.2169(5)(a) is plainly inapplicable because this is not a medical malpractice claim, and plaintiff is not seeking nonparty-appellants’ tax returns to show that Dr. Kneiser is unqualified.

A standard-of-care expert must share the defendant specialist’s specialty and devote a majority of professional time in the preceding year to that specialty; overlapping subspecialty work does not count toward the majority.

Maxey v. Botsford General Hospital · filed 2022-02-17(1)

There is no indication that Dr. Pierce was certified in any specialty or subspecialty other than general neurology. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ expert had to have a specialty in general neurology and devote more than 50 percent of his or her professional time to general neurology. Overlap between general neurology and an expert’s subspecialties cannot count toward determining which specialty was each expert’s majority practice.

A standard-of-care expert testifying about a board-certified physician must be board-certified in the same specialty.

Elkadri v. Children's Hospital of Michigan · filed 2022-07-21(1)(a)

If the defendant is board-certified, the expert witness must be board-certified in the same specialty. MCL 600.2169(1)(a). Plaintiff acknowledged that his original expert witness, Dr. Lieberman, did not meet the statutory criteria, and therefore, was not qualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care for Dr. Clark and Dr. Ahmed.

Section 600.2169(2) permits a court to find experts unqualified to testify about a specialist’s likely treatment when they lack experience or training in that specialty.

Cook v. Sparrow Hospital · filed 2023-09-21(2)

Nothing in their affidavits or otherwise in the record suggests that either of these witnesses have any experience or training related to urology. Therefore, because the trial court is afforded broad discretion to determine whether a person is qualified to testify as an expert, the trial court did not err by concluding that they were not qualified to testify as experts regarding what a reasonable urologist would have done had the urologist been given the information withheld by defendant Bohr.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) permits an expert who devotes a majority of their time to active clinical practice or teaching in the same health profession; private practice is not required.

Estate of Mary Alexander v. Alice Doe Md · filed 2024-09-12(1)(b)

The Legislature has identified the relevant criteria that an expert in a medical malpractice case must meet, and engagement in private practice is not one of the criteria. See MCL 600.2169(1). The Legislature stated that the proposed expert need only devote a majority of his or her time to the active clinical practice or instruction of students in the same health profession.

Section 600.2169(2) requires courts to assess the qualifications of any medical malpractice expert, including one offering causation testimony, for the opinion the expert proposes to give.

Tad Roberts v. Bronson Healthcare · filed 2024-09-19(2)

We disagree because the record demonstrates that Dr. Duffy lacked the requisite qualifications under MCL 600.2169(2) to opine regarding a surgeon’s decision to perform surgery.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a standard of care expert to match the defendant’s specialty, regardless of subspecialty; subsection (2) requires the court to evaluate the expert’s qualifications under its listed factors.

Myers v. Board of Hospital Managers for City of Flint · filed 2024-11-19(1)(b), (2)

As the Michigan Supreme Court recently held in Stokes, whether Dr. Philp’s subspecialty and Dr. Hoesel’s subspecialty were matching is irrelevant to the issue whether Dr. Philp had a matching specialty pursuant to MCL 600.2169(1)(b). ... MCL 600.2169(2) requires, at minimum, that the court evaluate several enumerated factors.

Section 600.2169’s specialty requirement disqualifies an internal medicine doctor from serving as the expert for a nursing malpractice claim.

Estate of Troy Michael Shafer v. Daryl T Parker Md · filed 2026-03-23

Here, plaintiff’s original AOM was insufficient in regard to a nursing malpractice claim; the original AOM was signed by a doctor of internal medicine, who would not qualify as an expert in nursing.

Section 600.2169(2) does not disqualify a medical malpractice expert solely because the expert lacks recent experience performing the specific procedure at issue.

Wanda Hicks v. Ruiz · filed 2025-12-10(2)

As with the defendant’s experts in Albro, Dr. Mathew’s lack of recent experience personally performing the particular procedure at issue did not render him unqualified to offer an opinion regarding Dr. Ruiz’s compliance with the standard of care.

Section 600.2169(1) governs expert testimony about the standard of care but does not bar an expert from testifying about causation because the expert has a different specialty.

Estate of Ernestine Davis v. Ascension Providence Hospital · filed 2026-01-15(1)

MCL 600.2169(1) expressly applies to standard-of-care testimony. The statute does not prevent an expert from opining on subjects that do not involve the standard of care, such as causation.

Section 600.2169(4) makes it a misdemeanor for an expert witness to testify on a contingent fee basis in a medical malpractice action filed on or after October 1, 1986.

Dupree v. Malpractice Research, Inc · filed 1989-08-08(4)

Moreover, with the enactment of MCL 600.2169(4); MSA 27A.2169(4) the Legislature has now made it a misdemeanor for an expert witness to testify on a contingent fee basis in an action alleging medical malpractice. While this statute is not directly applicable to the present case since it applies only to Cases filed on or after October 1, 1986, § 2169(4) is nevertheless a clear expression of the public’s aversion to such arrangements as they provide an obvious incentive for the manufacture of favorable testimony.