Mich. Comp. Laws § 600

Subsection 600.4545(1) authorizes a quo-warranto action for material fraud or error in a qualifying election, meaning fraud or error that might have affected the election’s outcome.

Bailey v. County of Antrim · filed 2022-04-21(1)

MCL 600.4545(1) provides for an action in the nature of quo warranto “whenever it appears that material fraud or error has been committed at any election in such county at which there has been submitted any constitutional amendment, question, or proposition to the electors of the state or any county, township, or municipality thereof.”

Section 600.3238 permits a foreclosure-sale purchaser to inspect the property after proper notice.

1373 Moulin LLC v. Deana Wolf · filed 2022-05-26

Thus, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is permitted to inspect the property if the purchaser provides the proper notice.

Section 600.3336 permits a court to equalize an unequal partition by awarding compensation according to the equities of the case.

Ali v. Ali · filed 2022-05-12

When it appears to the court ordering partition that partition cannot be made equally between the parties without prejudice to the rights and interests of some of the parties the court may adjudge that 1 party compensate another in such a way as to equalize the partition according to the equities of the case.

MCL 600.5855 tolls a limitations period for a fraudulently concealed claim only when the defendant uses an affirmative act or misrepresentation to prevent discovery and the plaintiff exercises due diligence; absent those circumstances, it does not toll the six-year contract period in MCL 600.5807(9), and the common-law discovery rule cannot supply tolling.

Buck v. Heritage Place Condominiums LLC · filed 2022-09-15(5855)

In summary, the undisputed evidence established (1) agents of Heritage Place did not engage in affirmative acts or misrepresentation after July 2007, and (2) Harriet failed to exercise diligence to discover the breach-of-contract claim. Therefore, MCL 600.5855 did not toll the statute of limitations. Because there was no factual dispute the statute of limitations was expired on the breach-of-contract action under MCL 600.5807(9) when the complaint was filed, the trial court erred by failing to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Section 5855 tolls a limitations period for two years when a defendant fraudulently conceals a claim, but the plaintiff must plead and prove affirmative acts or misrepresentations designed to prevent discovery.

Balsamo v. D'Anna · filed 2023-05-18

MCL 600.5855 permits the tolling of a statutory limitations period for two years if the defendant has fraudulently concealed the existence of a claim: ... To invoke tolling under the fraudulent-concealment statute, a “plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment” and “prove that the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to prevent subsequent discovery.” ... Consequently, Balsamo failed to plead a claim of fraudulent concealment that would have tolled the applicable statutes of limitations for his claims.

Michigan's limitations provisions impose three-year periods on conversion and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and a six-year period on breach-of-contract claims, measure accrual from the underlying wrong or the beneficiary's knowledge of the breach, and allow two-year tolling for fraudulent concealment only when affirmative acts or misrepresentations prevented discovery.

Main Street Lofts Condominium Association v. Parodi · filed 2023-11-21600.5805(2), 600.5827, 600.5805(10), 600.5807(9), and 600.5855

“Conversion is subject to the three-year limitations period in MCL 600.5805(2). “Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitations runs from the time the claim accrues,” and unless otherwise provided by statute, “the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827. ... Breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a three-year limitations period, and the claim accrues “when the beneficiary knew or should have known of the breach.” Prentis Family Foundation v Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 47; 698 NW2d 900 (2005), citing MCL 600.5805(10). Breach of contract is subject to a six-year limitations period. MCL 600.5807(9). ... “This statutory section permits the tolling of a statutory limitations period for two years if the defendant has fraudulently concealed the existence of a claim.” Mays v Snyder, 323 Mich App 1, 39; 916 NW2d 227 (2018). ... “For the fraudulent-concealment exception to apply, a plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment and prove that the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to prevent subsequent discovery.” Id. at 39 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 600.5851(2) makes insanity tolling a fact question when evidence could show mental derangement prevented comprehension of legal rights; the court also held that § 600.5833's warranty discovery rule does not apply to a sudden-injury products-liability claim and § 600.5855 does not toll limitations without pleaded affirmative concealment.

Wendel v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2024-09-05600.5851(1)-(3), 600.5833, 600.5855

The trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that Wendel did not qualify as insane under the tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(2), so summary disposition was improper, as was the denial of Wendel’s motion for leave to amend her complaint. However, the trial court was otherwise correct in finding that Wendel’s claim for breach of warranty accrued at the time of the accident and was not subject to the discovery rule. Lastly, Wendel did not plead allegations sufficient to sustain her argument for tolling of the statute of limitations because of fraudulent concealment.

Section 5855 permits an otherwise time-barred claim to be filed within two years after discovery, but fraudulent concealment requires pleaded affirmative acts or misrepresentations designed to prevent discovery; mere silence is insufficient.

Wyrick v. Dan J Castro Md · filed 2024-11-07

the plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment ... must prove that the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to prevent subsequent discovery. ... As previously discussed, MCL 600.5855 required plaintiff to file her complaint within two years after her symptoms failed to improve and she treated with other specialists. Because she failed to do so, her complaint was untimely.

Section 600.5855 codifies a fraudulent-concealment exception that tolls the Court of Claims Act’s statutory notice period, including § 600.6431, when the exception applies.

20250110_C367598_30_367598.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-01-10

MCL 600.5855 codifies the fraudulent-concealment exception to the Court of Claims Act’s statutory notice requirement and provides for the tolling of notice periods and statutory limitations periods, such as MCL 600.6431, when the fraudulent-concealment exception applies. ... If these allegations are true, the fraudulent-concealment exception applies to the claims, MCL 600.5855 would toll the statutory notice period, and the McCormicks properly brought a claim against defendant within two years of May 12, 2022.

Michigan's medical-malpractice limitations provisions impose a two-year limitations period, require at least 182 days of written notice before suit, and toll the limitations period when a timely notice is filed on the final day; the plaintiff must then wait the entire 182-day notice period before filing.

Ghaleb v. Md · filed 2022-11-105805(8), 2912b(1), 5856(c)

MCL 600.2912b(1) states: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.”

MCL 600.5838a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the claim could not have been discovered more than six months before suit and bars the action when the plaintiff fails to investigate facts arousing suspicion.

Estate of Carla Clemons v. Legacy Dmc · filed 2023-08-17(2)

Under MCL 600.5838a(2), plaintiff has the burden of proving that he should not have discovered his claim against Dr. Haapaniemi more than six months before he filed his complaint. Yet plaintiff does not point to a single step he took to investigate whether he had a possible cause of action against Dr. Haapaniemi after receiving Dr. Perard’s affidavit on October 22, 2019. Due to plaintiff’s failure to point to any evidence suggesting that he diligently investigated whether he had a possible cause of action against Dr. Haapaniemi, his claim is untimely under the second “aspect” of the objective discovery rule as well.

For medical-malpractice claims, MCL 600.5805(8) sets a two-year limitations period, MCL 600.2912b(1) requires a 182-day notice period, and MCL 600.5856(c) tolls the limitations period during the applicable notice period.

Estate of Brenda Davis v. Sparrow Hospital · filed 2023-09-14(8), (1), (c)

Under the Revised Judicature Act of 1961, MCL 600.101 et seq., the statutory limitations period for medical-malpractice claims is two years. MCL 600.5805(8). MCL 600.2912b(1) requires that, not less than 182 days before a malpractice complaint is filed, a plaintiff must serve an NOI on the defendants. The NOI tolls the two-year statutory limitations period “if during that period a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose . . . .” MCL 600.5856(c). Moreover, “the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given.” Id. ... Just as in Carter, plaintiff’s statutory deadline in this case was set to expire after the emergency period. However, our Supreme Court excluded this period even for those whose deadlines did not expire within the emergency period. Moreover, the entirety of the emergency period was excluded from calculating the two-year statutory limitations period under MCR 1.108. When plaintiff served the NOI on June 12, 2020, there were 73 days remaining until the two-year statutory period of limitations expired on August 24, 2020. The entire 102 days between March 10, 2020 and June 12, 2020, were tolled despite serving the NOI. This meant that plaintiff had a total of 175 days remaining in the statutory period of limitations. The 182-day waiting period for the NOI expired on December 11, 2020, at which point the remaining 175-day statutory period of limitations began to run. Accordingly, plaintiff had until June 4, 2021, to file the complaint. Plaintiff filed said complaint on May 20, 2021, which made the complaint timely.

Section 2912b(1) requires at least 182 days’ written notice before a medical-malpractice action and tolls the limitations period through the notice period.

Cook v. Munson Medical Center Inc · filed 2024-06-27(2912b)(1); (5838a)(1); (5838a)(2)

A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice action is required to provide the defendant with written notice of their intent to file a claim at least 182 days before commencing the action. MCL 600.2912b(1). If a plaintiff provides the defendant with written notice of their intent to file a claim before the limitations period expires, and the limitations period would otherwise expire during the 182-day notice period, then the limitations period will be tolled until the 182-day notice period ... expires.

Section 5852 provides a two-year wrongful-death saving period after letters of authority issue, but it is not a statute of limitations or repose and is not tolled by service of a medical-malpractice notice of intent.

Poniewierski v. William Beaumont Hospital Royal Oak · filed 2022-12-015852(1), (2), and (4)

If § 5852 is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of repose, then service of the NOI tolls neither the two-year saving period, MCL 600.5852(1), nor the three-year ceiling, MCL 600.5852(4).

MCL 600.2922(2) requires a wrongful-death action to be brought by the estate’s personal representative, while MCL 600.5852 sets the applicable saving period; a later appointment under MCL 700.3701 can relate back to a timely, estate-benefiting filing and cure the initial lack of standing.

Estate of Christopher P Eversole v. Nash · filed 2024-06-13

Thus, the requirement within MCL 600.5852, that the two-year period commences once letters of authority are granted, will have been complied with when acting under the legal fiction provided by the relation-back provision of MCL 700.3701.

The notice-tolling provision in MCL 600.5856 does not extend the wrongful-death savings period in MCL 600.5852, although it may toll the underlying medical-malpractice limitations period.

Estate of Maurice Ernest v. Paul W Brown Jr Md · filed 2025-03-20

In Waltz, our Supreme Court held that MCL 600.5856 does not toll the time frame provided in MCL 600.5852. Waltz, 469 Mich at 650-651. It reasoned that MCL 600.5856 applies to a “period of limitations[,]” and MCL 600.5852 “clearly provides that it is an exception to the limitation period,” not a limitation period itself. Waltz, 469 Mich at 651. Thus, while MCL 600.5856 may serve to toll the two-year statute of limitations for the underlying medical-malpractice claim, it does not toll the two-year exception to the statute of limitations under MCL 600.5852.

Section 600.2912(b)(7) requires a health professional to respond to a notice of intent within 154 days and describe how the professional or facility complied with the applicable standard of care; the statute's remedy for a deficient response is a shortened waiting period for filing suit.

Nusbaum v. Enlighten Family Chiropractic, LLC · filed 2023-01-19(b)(7)

MCL § 600.2912(b)(7) requires a health professional to furnish a response to the NOI within 154 days of receipt and the response must describe “the manner in which it is claimed by the health professional or health facility that there was compliance with the applicable standard of practice or care.” ... Even if Defendants’ response did violate MCL § 600.2912(b)(7), the sole remedy prescribed by statute for such conduct is to allow Plaintiff to file their suit early—before the normal 182 day waiting period.

Section 308a(1) permits a Headlee Amendment action to be commenced in either the Court of Appeals or the proper county circuit court, but it does not extend jurisdiction to challenges to special assessments.

Michigan Health & Wellness Center LLC v. Charter Twp of Royal Oak · filed 2023-03-02(1)

MCL 600.308a(1)5 further states: “[a]n action under section 32 of article 9 of the state constitution of 1963 may be commenced in the court of appeals, or in the circuit court in the county in which venue is proper, at the option of the party commencing the action.” However, neither the Headlee Amendment nor its jurisdictional statute extends jurisdiction to challenges of special assessments. Michigan’s Adventure, 287 Mich App at 155.

The statute creates an absolute defense when intoxication-related impairment made the injured person at least 50% responsible, and otherwise reduces damages by the person’s percentage of fault; the defense was unavailable because impairment was not established.

Estate of Omari Bell v. Knapp · filed 2023-03-09(1)

Additionally, defendant’s proffer that the decedent is more than 50% at fault for the accident because of his intoxication was not established by the toxicology report. The medical examiner did not opine that the decedent was impaired at the time of the accident, and the toxicology report did not positively detect any compounds, contrary to Officer Lena Wileczek’s testimony. Thus, MCL 600.2955a(1)7 did not serve as a basis to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.

MCL 600.2819 places the duty to pay the judgment creditor upon the judgment debtor when encumbered real property is conveyed, sold under an executory contract, or refinanced; it does not require the purchaser, title insurer, or escrow agent to make the payment.

Larson Real Estate Ventures LLC v. Abbott Park Inc · filed 2023-03-16

As in Thomas, in this case, under MCL 600.2819, only the judgment debtor, Parks, was obligated to pay Larson, the judgment creditor, at the time the Magnolia property sold; no other person or entity was required to pay Larson, the judgment creditor.

Section 600.2912d(1) requires a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, signed by a qualifying health professional.

Conway v. Do · filed 2023-03-23(1)

To properly commence a medical malpractice suit, a plaintiff is required to file both a complaint and an affidavit of merit.

Section 600.6304(5) requires a court to reduce a medical-malpractice damages award exceeding the applicable § 1483 limit after the verdict and bars informing the jury about those limits.

Estate of Bimla Nayyar v. Oakwood Healthcare Inc · filed 2023-03-23(5)

Importantly, the jury is not permitted to be advised of those limitations.

Section 1482(1)(a) applies after the verdict in a medical-malpractice case and caps recoverable past medical expenses at actual damages, including amounts paid and amounts the plaintiff remains liable to pay, while excluding contractual discounts, price reductions, and write-offs.

Estate of Edith Grimes v. Beaumont Health · filed 2025-10-28(1)(a)

The statute limits recoverable past medical damages to “actual damages for medical care,” MCL 600.1482(1)(a), and defines the term as “[t]he dollar amount actually paid for past medical expenses or rehabilitation service expenses by or on behalf of the individual whose medical care is at issue,” MCL 600.1482(2)(a)(i), and, “[a]ny remaining dollar amount that the plaintiff is liable to pay for the medical care,” MCL 600.1482(2)(a)(ii). ... MCL 600.1482(1)(a) governs the post-verdict phase of medical malpractice cases, granting courts the authority to modify jury awards for damages.

Subsection (7) requires a court that issues or refuses a personal protection order to immediately state in writing the specific reasons for its decision.

Pc v. Jls · filed 2023-04-06(7)

The statute requires the trial court to state the “specific reasons” for denying the petition, MCL 600.2950a(7), and an explanation more detailed than simply “insufficient” is needed to satisfy the statute and aid appellate review.

Section 2919a does not authorize statutory-conversion relief for an interest in real property, so a claim based on converting such an interest fails as a matter of law.

Hartwick v. De Luna · filed 2023-04-20(1)(a)

The trial court erred by finding that defendant converted plaintiff’s equitable interest in realty under the land contract. ... Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law, as an action for conversion cannot lie for real property.

MCL 600.5838b bars a legal-malpractice action six years after the act or omission underlying the claim, but a tolling agreement covering all applicable statutes of limitation can toll the statute of repose.

New Products Corporation v. Butzel Long · filed 2023-05-18

The parties agreed to toll “[a]ll applicable Statutes of Limitation,” and we conclude that the statute of repose fits within the term “Statutes of Limitation” as it is used in this agreement. First, the contract specifically says that it tolls all statutes of limitations, and this implies that the parties intended for a broad interpretation of the term. Second, the statute of repose is a statute that imposes a limitation on the timeframe within which an action may be commenced.

For a medical-malpractice affidavit of merit, the signer must be a health professional the attorney reasonably believes qualifies under § 2169, and a podiatrist is not in the same health profession as a physician’s assistant.

Jordan v. Brian G Kissel Dpm · filed 2023-05-18(2912d)(1); (2169)(1)(b)

Plaintiff argues that her AOM satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2912d(1) because her attorney reasonably believed that her expert—a podiatrist named Dr. Pamela Karman, D.P.M.—was qualified to testify as an expert regarding Lamm’s standard of care under MCL 600.2169(1)(b), regardless of whether Dr. Karman was actually qualified to do so. ... We agree with Lamm, however, that any such belief by plaintiff’s attorney was unreasonable in light of Wolford. ... On the basis of Wolford, it is plain that a podiatrist is not “in the same health profession” as a physician’s assistant for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1)(b). Accordingly, plaintiff’s attorney’s belief that Dr. Karman was qualified to testify as an expert regarding Lamm’s standard of care was unreasonable.

Section 600.2912d(1) requires an affidavit of merit to be signed by a physician whom counsel reasonably believes specializes in the same specialty as the defendant or the defendant’s agent.

Estate of Troy Michael Shafer v. Daryl T Parker Md · filed 2026-03-23(1)

The AOM must be “signed by a physician who counsel reasonably believes specializes in the same specialty” as defendants or defendants’ agents. Grossman v Brown, 470 Mich 593, 596; 685 NW2d 198 (2004); MCL 600.2912d(1); MCL 600.2169. Here, plaintiff’s original AOM was insufficient in regard to a nursing malpractice claim; the original AOM was signed by a doctor of internal medicine, who would not qualify as an expert in nursing.

MCL 600.2912d(1) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, but failure to do so does not prevent commencement or tolling of the action; it may still support dismissal on grounds other than the statute of limitations.

Ottgen v. Md · filed 2023-07-14(1)

Filing an AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1) is not required to commence a medical malpractice action and toll the statutory limitations period. Instead, the normal tolling rules apply to medical malpractice actions, and tolling occurs upon the filing of a timely served complaint. Nevertheless, failure to comply with MCL 600.2912d(1) can still be a basis for dismissal of a case—just not on statute-of-limitations grounds.

Section 600.2163a requires courts to permit a testifying witness to have a support person or support dog and requires specified protective courtroom arrangements when, on a pretrial motion, the court finds them necessary for the witness's welfare.

People of Michigan v. Lake · filed 2023-07-27(1)(g)(i), (2)(a), (4), (5), (18), and (19)

In this case, the victim qualified as a witness for the purposes of MCL 600.2163a because she was seven years old at the time of the trial, and she alleged that defendant had sexually assaulted her. See MCL 600.2163a(1)(g)(i) and (2)(a). Because of this, the prosecution filed a pretrial motion to close the courtroom doors, seat defendant further away from the victim while she testified, and use a podium in front of the witness stand, and it filed its notice of intent to use a support dog and its handler during the victim’s testimony as it was required to do. See MCL 600.2163a(5). Defendant explicitly consented to all of the courtroom arrangements and the support dog and, based on the parties’ stipulation, the trial court necessarily found that such courtroom arrangements were necessary to protect the victim’s welfare while she testified. See MCL 600.2163a(18). In utilizing special courtroom arrangements and the support dog, the trial court adhered to all of the statutory requirements. See MCL 600.2163a(4), (5), (18), and (19).

Section 600.2163a applies only to specified prosecutions and proceedings under the Michigan Penal Code or Code of Criminal Procedure involving crimes against certain vulnerable persons, and does not apply to judicial tenure commission proceedings or its witness interviews.

In Re Tracy E. Green, Judge · filed 2023-07-31(2)

And MCL 600.2163a is applicable only to certain prosecutions and proceedings under the Michigan Penal Code or Code of Criminal Procedure for crimes against persons under the age of 16, persons with a developmental disability, or vulnerable adults. MCL 600.2163a(2). JTC proceedings are not among any of those proceedings, so the statute does not apply to the JTC or interviews of potential witnesses that it might conduct.

Section 2918(2)(c) treats changing locks without immediately providing keys as unlawful interference with a tenant’s possessory interest; a holdover occupant can qualify as a tenant and must be removed through judicial process.

McMahan v. James a Kurish · filed 2023-08-31(2)(c)

We conclude—viewing the contents of the home, the well-kept state of the home, the auction receipt, April’s testimony about seasonal occupancy, and Deroshia together—that the trial court did not err by concluding that April was a tenant for purposes of MCL 600.2918(2). The terms of sale explicitly indicated that an “[o]ccupant[]” was to be treated as a holdover tenant, and Deroshia indicates that holdover tenants can obtain relief under the anti-lockout statute. See id.

Subsection (a) does not abrogate the common-law rule that releasing an agent also releases the principal when the principal's liability is based on respondeat superior.

Malone v. McRell · filed 2023-10-26(a)

Similar to subsection (b), subsection (a) of MCL 600.2925d does not abrogate the common-law rule that the release of an agent acts as a release of the principal.

The medical-malpractice fraudulent-concealment exception requires the plaintiff to plead and prove affirmative acts or misrepresentations designed to prevent discovery; otherwise, the ordinary two-year limitations period applies.

McLeod v. Southeastern Mich Colon & Rectal Surgery Pllc · filed 2023-11-215838a(2)(a), (3); 5805(6)

For this provision to apply, “the plaintiff must plead in the complaint the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment,” and “must prove that the defendant committed affirmative acts or misrepresentations that were designed to prevent subsequent discovery.” ... But regardless of how one looks at the evidence here, the fact remains that Dr. Adeyemo’s involvement in Mr. McLeod’s treatment and his potential liability for Mr. McLeod’s injuries were obvious from the very beginning. Plaintiffs could have discovered the claim against Dr. Adeyemo as early as January 2017. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ second complaint is barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims, MCL 600.5805(6).

Section 600.2163a defines qualifying witnesses and requires courts to permit them to use a support person or courtroom support dog and handler, but it does not contemplate stuffed animals and preserves other lawful witness protections.

People of Michigan v. Parsons · filed 2023-11-21(1)(g), (4), (22)

The court must permit a witness who is called upon to testify to have a support person sit with, accompany, or be in close proximity to the witness during his or her testimony.

MCL 600.2163a requires the court to follow its accommodation procedure before allowing a witness to testify by special means, and it requires that the defendant be able to hear the testimony and consult with counsel.

People of Michigan v. Bringard · filed 2024-08-29(21)

MCL 600.2163a provides a procedure for determining if a witness may be permitted to testify with special accommodations, such as in a different location via closed-circuit television. See MCL 600.2163a(19)(a). Defendant is correct insofar as he contends that the trial court did not analyze this statute before granting special accommodations to ET. But this was because defendant’s trial counsel stipulated to ET’s special accommodations prior to trial. Defendant rightly points out that, if his trial counsel had not so stipulated, then the trial court would have had comply with MCL 600.2163a before granting ET any special accommodations. ... The statute provides that a defendant must be able to hear the testimony and consult with his or her attorney. MCL 600.2163a(21).

Section 4431 permits damages and costs in an action for mandamus even without issuance of the writ, but damages remain tied to a meritorious mandamus claim and its good-faith exception applies to public officers who acted erroneously.

20231207_C363697_43_363697.Opn.Ord.Pdf · filed 2023-12-07

Here, under its plain terms, the statutory provision at issue, MCL 600.4431, does not limit damages awards to plaintiffs who successfully obtain a writ of mandamus. MCL 600.4431 provides: “Damages and costs may be awarded in an action for mandamus. No damages may be allowed in mandamus against a public officer who, in good faith, acted erroneously.” We agree with CB that nothing in the statute’s plain language limits its application to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Instead, MCL 600.4431 language provides that damages are permitted “in an action for mandamus.” Nothing about this language limits damages to a successful action for mandamus, which is to say, the issuance of a writ is not a precondition to damages.

Section 2922(1) allows a wrongful-death action when a person's death is caused by another's wrongful act, neglect, or fault and the decedent could have maintained an action and recovered damages if death had not occurred.

Estate of William Howard McDuffie-connor v. Neal · filed 2024-02-08(1)

The elements of wrongful death thus are (1) a death, (2) caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or fault of another, (3) that had the death not occurred a cause of action could have been filed against the responsible party and damages recovered.

Section 600.2939(3) makes a note void when all or any part of its consideration is for reimbursing or repaying money knowingly lent or advanced for gaming or betting, even if only part of the money was used for gambling.

20240215_C366503_39_366503.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-02-15(3)

Therefore, even if only a portion of the money given as consideration was used for gambling, it is void under MCL 600.2939(3).

Section 600.5807(8) gives a 10-year limitations period only for actions on specified instruments involving listed public or quasi-public entities, while § 600.2919a(1) permits, but does not require, treble damages and attorney fees for statutory conversion, with those remedies decided by the trier of fact.

Wood Kull Herschfus Obee & Kull Pc v. Knightsbridge Charities Inc · filed 2024-03-21(8); (1); (1)(a)

This action does not involve a bond, note, or similar instrument creating an obligation. And it does not involve an instrument issued by an entities enumerated in MCL 600.5807(8). That statute of limitations is not implicated in this case. ... MCL 600.2919(a)(1) permits the award of attorney fees and costs, but it does not require them; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the postjudgment motion for attorney fees and costs when the jury did not award them. ... Thus, under the language in MCL 600.2912a(1) [sic: MCL 600.2919a(1)], treble damages and attorney fees are discretionary. ... Thus, an award of attorney fees and costs under MCL 600.2919a is permissive, not mandatory, and to be decided by the trier of fact.

Section 600.1721 requires the court to order indemnification only when the alleged misconduct caused an actual loss or injury.

Baum v. Baum · filed 2024-04-11

The first sentence of MCL 600.1721 plainly provides that the court is to order indemnification “[i]f the alleged misconduct has caused an actual loss or injury[.]” The use of “if” sets up a condition that must be satisfied in order for the remainder of the provision to take effect.

For claims arising from criminal sexual conduct occurring after the statute's passage, subsection (1)(b) starts the limitations period when a minor victim discovers or should reasonably discover both the injury and causal relationship, but it does not revive an already-expired limitations period.

McLain v. Lobert · filed 2024-07-10(1)(b)

We hold that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) creates a discovery rule for measuring the accrual date for the limitations period for claims of criminal sexual conduct occurring after its passage. Further, we hold that the discovery rule in MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) does not apply retroactively to revive limitations periods that have already expired.

Section 2163a applies to criminal cases involving specified sexual-abuse offenses, and its definitions and disclosure restrictions do not establish that DHHS possesses CAC recordings in a child-protective proceeding when the recordings were made by the CAC.

In Re Johnson Minors · filed 2026-03-09(1)(b), (1)(e), (2), (15)

By its express terms, MCL 600.2163a applies to criminal cases involving charges of criminal sexual conduct, child abuse, and child sexually abusive activity. See MCL 600.2163a(2). Child protective proceedings are not criminal proceedings. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 107; 499 NW2d 752 (1993); MCL 712A.1(2). Moreover, the video recordings in this case were not taken by the “custodian of the videorecorded statement,” i.e., the DHHS or law enforcement—the statements were taken and recorded by the CAC. Accordingly, MCL 600.2163a does not establish that the DHHS had possession of the CAC recordings.

Section 600.2163a limits release of videorecorded child-abuse statements to specified statutory circumstances and bars their disclosure through other statutes or civil discovery, while allowing a transcript to be produced.

Sanchez v. Healey · filed 2024-08-01(11), (13), (15)

The statute’s language is unambiguous; videorecorded statements taken in prosecutions and proceedings referenced in subsection (2), under the authority of subsection (5), may only be released by the custodian under the circumstances identified in subsection (8), i.e., “to a law enforcement agency, an agency authorized to prosecute the criminal case to which the videorecorded statement relates, or an entity that is part of county protocols established under section 8 of the child protection law, 1975 PA 238, MCL 722.628.” Further, subsection (15) clearly prohibits disclosure of such statements through discovery–“[a] videorecorded statement is exempt from disclosure under the freedom of information act, . . . is not subject to release under another statute, and is not subject to disclosure under the Michigan court rules governing discovery.”

MCL 600.5851 applies only when a condition of mental derangement prevents a person from comprehending rights they are otherwise bound to know, and a judicial declaration of insanity is irrelevant; its one-year relief is a grace period rather than tolling.

Groulx v. Iqbal · filed 2024-11-18(2)

This subsection clearly provides that a judicial declaration of insanity is irrelevant, and the touchstone is whether the person actually cannot comprehend their rights because of “a condition of mental derangement.”

Section 5807(5)'s 10-year limitation applies to actions enforcing a covenant in a deed or mortgage, not to mortgage-foreclosure actions.

Zaitona v. Arch Mortgage Assurance Company · filed 2024-11-19(5)

MCL 600.5807(5), on the other hand, would only apply if defendant sought to enforce a covenant in the mortgage. “The remedy for breach of a covenant is damages or an injunction,” not foreclosure. Cramer v Metro Sav & L Ass’n, 401 Mich 252, 261; 258 NW2d 20 (1977). Defendant is therefore correct—the statute of limitations applicable to defendant’s claim to foreclose its mortgage on the property is MCL 600.5803, not MCL 600.5807(5).

Section 2922(1) permits a wrongful-death damages action when a death is caused by another’s wrongful act, neglect, or fault and the decedent could have maintained the underlying action if death had not occurred; limitations on the underlying claim apply to the wrongful-death action.

20241127_C365607_49_365607.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-11-27(1)

In Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75, 88; 746 NW2d 847 (2008), our Supreme Court acknowledged Michigan caselaw stating that the WDA “is essentially a ‘filter’ through which the underlying claim may proceed.” The Wesche Court further stated, “[b]ecause an underlying claim ‘survives by law’ and must be prosecuted under the wrongful-death act, this Court has held that any statutory or common-law limitations on the underlying claim apply to a wrongful-death action.” Id. at 89. ... Similarly, in the instant case, because the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in SWM’s favor on the basis of the exclusive-remedy provision of the WDCA, the trial court likewise properly dismissed plaintiffs’ WDA claim premised on the WDCA.

Subsection 4963(2) applies to tort actions, and an anti-lockout claim seeking damages for an unlawful eviction falls within that category.

20241218_C365793_46_365793.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-12-18(2)

Plaintiff contends that the provisions of MCR 2.403(N) did not apply to her case because (1) this is a civil case, not a tort action within the meaning of MCL 600.4963(2), and (2) the case evaluators did not consider her summary. We disagree. First, we note that plaintiff admitted in her response to defendant’s motion for mandatory dismissal that her action was a tort action and that “MCL 600.4963 applies to Plaintiff’s claims[.]” But plaintiff maintained that MCL 600.4963 only applied if the case proceeds to trial. ... Plaintiff’s anti-lockout statutory claim alleges that defendant changed the locks on the property, interfered with plaintiff’s possessory interest, and deprived her of her personal property. ... In Elia Cos, LLC v Univ of Michigan Regents, 335 Mich App 439, 451; 966 NW2d 755 (2021), vacated on other grounds 511 Mich 66; 993 NW2d 392 (2023), this Court concluded that a claim under the anti-lockout statute, MCL 600.2918, sounded in tort. Id. at 450-452. It is clear from plaintiff’s complaint that she seeks damages for defendant’s alleged tortious conduct for ejecting her from the subject property “in a forcible and unlawful manner[.]” We conclude plaintiff’s case is a “tort case” for purposes of MCR 2.403(K)(4) and thus MCR 2.403(N) applied.

Section 2912c requires dismissal without prejudice when a defendant files an unopposed affidavit certifying noninvolvement in the alleged medical-malpractice occurrence, permits opposition and discovery concerning involvement within 90 days, and requires a dismissal request to be made by motion under the applicable court rules.

20241230_C367213_51_367213.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-12-30(1)-(2)

MCL 600.2192c(1) does not lay out a specific procedure for a defendant who has filed an affidavit of noninvolvement to seek dismissal, and the statute states dismissal is mandatory.7 However, MCR 2.116(B)(1) states “[a] request for dismissal without prejudice under MCL 600.2912c must be made by motion under MCR 2.116 and MCR 2.119.” Because MCR 2.116(B)(1) lays out a more specific directive for how dismissal under MCL 600.2912c is to be sought, the court rule controls.

Section 600.2950a(1) authorizes a non-domestic stalking personal protection order only when the petitioner alleges facts constituting stalking under the specified stalking statutes; without such prohibited conduct, the court lacks authority to issue the order.

20250116_C367676_35_367676.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-01-16(1)

For a court to issue a PPO pursuant to MCL 600.2950a(1), a petitioner must allege facts that constitute stalking as defined by MCL 750.411h, MCL 750.411i, or MCL 750.411s. See MCL 600.2950a(1).

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages, costs, and attorney fees for property stolen, embezzled, or converted, but a statutory-conversion claim based on a contract requires a separate legal duty beyond the contract.

Nameth v. Soviar · filed 2025-06-13(1)(a)

Statutory conversion, however, is a tort claim. Aroma Wines, 497 Mich at 361 (“[T]he tort established in MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) is not the same as common-law conversion.”). ... When such a separate and distinct duty cannot be discerned from the record, a plaintiff’s statutory conversion claim will fail. ... Because Nameth did not establish that there was a duty separate and distinct from the duty arising from the alleged oral contract, an essential element of her tort claim was unproven.

Section 2955b bars a bodily-injury claim only when the injury happens in the course of committing or fleeing from a felony; a mere causal connection to the felony is insufficient.

Choate v. Hurley Medical Center · filed 2025-09-15(1)

Accordingly, for MCL 600.2955b to bar a complaint, the plaintiff’s bodily injury must have happened in the course of committing, or fleeing from, a felonious act.

Section 600.2950 permits a court to issue a personal protection order when reasonable cause exists to believe the respondent may commit a listed act, based on offered evidence and prior listed acts; proof of a criminal charge or conviction is not required.

Pm v. Bab · filed 2025-09-22(1), (4), (4)(a), (4)(b)

If the trial court “determines that there is reasonable cause to believe” that the respondent may commit any of the acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1), the trial court shall issue a PPO. MCL 600.2950(4). ... In determining whether to issue a PPO pursuant to MCL 600.2950, a trial court shall consider “[t]estimony, documents, or other evidence offered[,]” MCL 600.2950(4)(a), and “ [w]hether the individual to be restrained or enjoined has previously committed or threatened to commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1),” MCL 600.2950(4)(b).

Section 600.2950 requires reasonable cause to believe the respondent may commit a listed prohibited act, while subsection (12) permits an ex parte order only when specific facts show immediate and irreparable harm from delaying notice.

Bmfc v. Msc · filed 2026-03-09(1), (4), and (12)

Notably, a petitioner is not required to show that the respondent “actually committed one of the acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1), only that there was reasonable cause to believe that he may commit one of the acts.” SP, 339 Mich App at 187. ... The court did not conclude, however, that the emotional abuse and the other evidence BMFC presented satisfied one or more of the factors set forth in MCL 600.2950(1). “[T]he court must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent before issuing a PPO.” Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377, 386; 603 NW2d 295 (1999).

Section 2950(1)(l) permits a personal protection order for conduct causing a reasonable apprehension of violence, and subsection (4) does not require multiple incidents or a continuity of purpose to establish reasonable cause.

Tat-E v. We IV · filed 2026-06-16(1)(l), (4)

Respondent incorrectly suggests that MCL 600.2950(4) requires that petitioner show at least two instances of respondent harassing or threatening petitioner that show a “continuity of purpose.” Although these are the elements of stalking and aggravated stalking under MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411i, respondent erroneously applies these requirements to all conduct under MCL 600.2950(1). No such requirement exists. Thus, petitioner was not required to show an additional instance of harassment or threatening conduct other than the slashing of the truck tires, nor was she required to show respondent’s conduct demonstrated “continuity of purpose.”

Section 1721 authorizes a compensatory civil-contempt sanction for actual losses and bars a separate damages action after such a sanction, with the sanction potentially measured in part by attorney fees.

Alpena Co Board of County Road Commissioners v. Tadajewski · filed 2025-10-29

Section 1721 bars a party from recovering damages in a separate action once a compensatory sanction has been imposed, thereby preventing a double recovery. But the very fact that what would otherwise be recovered twice is damages underscores that a compensatory contempt award is itself a form of damages. The award here was therefore a form of damages—measured in part by plaintiff’s attorney fees—not an award of attorney fees as such.

Section 2948(2) bars liability for failing to warn about a material risk that is or should be obvious to a reasonably prudent product user or is common knowledge to similarly situated persons.

Estate of Mary T Syron v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2025-11-072948(2)

MCL 600.2948, in Chapter 29 of the Revised Judicature Act, “governs a defendant’s duty to warn of an obvious danger in a products-liability action.” ... In this case, lamentably, decedents drowned after the subject vehicle, mistakenly left in “Drive,” became submerged in a pond. However, pursuant to the statute and applicable precedent, defendant did not maintain a duty to warn because it is common knowledge that a vehicle in “Drive” will move absent intervention, and the unintended movement may result in harm to the vehicle’s occupants. ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that defendant owed no duty to further warn plaintiff that the failure to shift the vehicle into “Park” before getting out of the vehicle posed a material risk.

Section 600.5827 makes a fraud claim accrue when the underlying wrong is done, regardless of when the resulting damage occurs.

Mauro v. Marrocco · filed 2025-11-19

Fraud claims accrue “at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827; Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 231; 661 NW2d 557 (2003). “The wrong is done when the plaintiff is harmed rather-than when the defendant acted.” Boyle, 468 Mich at 231 n 5. Consequently, the relevant inquiry is not when defendants allegedly decided to refuse plaintiffs as members of the Club Golf entities, but when plaintiffs were harmed. Review of the 2011 case shows that plaintiffs knew they had not been made members of the Club Golf entities and could have joined their fraud claims as of the date of the original counterclaims and third-party complaint on April 27, 2011.

Michigan's PPO statutes allow a court to issue or continue a PPO based on stalking-related conduct without requiring exact incident dates or a criminal charge or conviction, and require the court to consider the proffered evidence and prior prohibited acts.

Rp v. Tv · filed 2026-03-062950(1)(j), 2950(4), 2950a(1), 2950a(3)

Under MCL 600.2950(1)(j), an individual may petition the trial court to enter a PPO to restrain or enjoin an individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under MCL 750.411h. ... A trial court may issue a PPO prohibiting a respondent from entering particular premises, contacting the petitioner, or approaching, following, or appearing within the sight of the petitioner. ... When a respondent moves to terminate a PPO, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that continuation is warranted. ... The trial court must consider the testimony, documents, and other evidence proffered, as well as whether the respondent had previously engaged in the types of acts prohibited in PPOs. MCL 600.2950(4). ... A trial court does not need to determine exactly when the incidents at issue occurred to grant a PPO under MCL 600.2950a. ... Yet, MCL 600.2950a(1) explicitly allows a trial court to grant a PPO “whether or not the individual to be restrained . . . has been charged or convicted” of stalking.

Subsection 2912b(9) permits a claimant to commence a medical-malpractice action before the 182-day notice period expires only when the recipient informs the claimant in writing that it does not intend to settle within that period; a response merely denying liability does not trigger the exception.

Estate of Glenn Steven Brooker v. Trinity Health Michigan · filed 2026-03-19(9)

MCL 600.2912b(9) provides an exception shortening the standard 182-day notice period for medical malpractice actions: ... Accordingly, defendants’ February 2023 response, merely denying liability, did not constitute written notice of an intent to waive the 182-day notice waiting period under MCL 600.2912b(9).

When a complaint pleads more than one cause of action and at least one is tort-based or seeks specified damages, § 600.1641(2) mandates applying the tort-venue rules in § 600.1629; under those rules, original injury means the plaintiff’s first actual injury, and venue may lie where the plaintiff resides or does business.

Department of Health and Human Services v Nrk Rx, Inc · filed 2026-06-08(1641)(2); (1629)(1)(b)(i)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that MCL 600.1641(2) compels the application of MCL 600.1629 under these facts. ... We accordingly hold that the “county in which the original injury occurred” was Ingham County, and because that is where DHHS “resides, has a place of business, or conducts business,” venue is proper there under MCL 600.1629(1)(b)(i).

Section 600.2961 requires commissions due at termination to be paid within 45 days and does not require bad faith to determine double damages for an intentional failure to pay.

Paragon 28 Inc v. Buck · filed 2026-06-12(4), (5)(b)

All commissions that are due at the time of termination of a contract between a sales representative and principal shall be paid within 45 days after the date of termination. ... Further, a showing of bad faith is not required when determining damages for the intentional failure to pay under MCL 600.2961(5)(b).

Section 600.2961(6) requires reasonable attorney fees and court costs for the party that fully prevails on a claim brought under the statute.

Paragon 28 Inc v. Buck · filed 2026-06-12(6)

the court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and court costs.

Section 600.308a does not extend jurisdiction to Headlee Amendment challenges concerning special assessments.

Michigan's Adventure, Inc. v. Dalton Township · filed 2010-01-14

However, neither the Headlee Amendment nor the statute extends jurisdiction to special assessment disputes and, generally, special assessments are not taxes for the purposes of constitutional tax limitations.

Section 600.308a(3) requires a taxpayer action to be commenced within one year after accrual, and a Headlee challenge to a tax increase accrues when the increase takes effect.

Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v. Wayne County · filed 1994-02-08(3)

Here, the action that § 31 of the Headlee Amendment allegedly prohibited was the county’s increase of an existing tax, without voter approval. That increase took effect on April 1, 1981. As affected taxpayers, plaintiffs had standing to challenge the increase on its effective date. Because plaintiffs could then commence an action, their cause of action accrued at that moment.

Section 600.1307a(1)(e) restores a former felon’s eligibility to serve as a juror once the felony sentence is completed.

Froede v. Holland Ladder & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1994-10-03(1)(e)

Because she was no longer "under sentence” at the time she was selected as a juror in March 1991, she was not disqualified per se from jury service.

Section 600.867(1) stays probate-court proceedings in pursuance of an appealed judgment or order for 21 days after the appeal and notice are filed, but does not bar separate proceedings that are not in furtherance of the appealed order.

in Re Kapp Estate · filed 2018-10-18(1)

With that in mind, we conclude that in the 21 days following appellants’ claim of appeal the probate court did not conduct proceedings that were in furtherance of its decision to deny an appointment of a personal representative. ... These actions were not barred by MCL 600.867(1).

Section 1324(2) permits jury panels drawn from any court in the county to be used in another court of record when the jurors are otherwise eligible to serve there; § 1307a requires jurors to be electors in the county.

People v. Morgan · filed 1985-07-16(2)

Chapter 13 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.1301, et seq.; MSA 27A.1301, et seq., establishes a system for selecting jury lists, jury panels, and jurors. Section 1324(2) of the act, MCL 600.1324(2); MSA 27A.1324(2), provides that jury panels or parts of jury panels drawn from any court in the county may be used in any court of record, if jurors on the panel or part of the panel are "otherwise eligible to serve as jurors in this particular court”. Section 1307a, MCL 600.1307a; MSA 27A.1307(1), lists the qualifications for jurors. That section states that, to qualify as a juror, a person shall be an elector in the county for which the person is selected. The trial court brought in jurors from the 67th Judicial District, which is within Genesee County. Pursuant to § 1307a, these prospective jurors were qualified to serve in the Genesee County Circuit Court. The trial court did not violate any of the rules governing jury selection. Even if defendant had shown a violation of these rules, defendant has failed to show any prejudice as required by MCL 600.1354; MSA 27A.1354.

Section 6419 gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over claims for money damages against the state and its instrumentalities, while related equitable relief may remain within circuit-court jurisdiction.

Pc & S, Pc v. Wayne Co Dss · filed 1988-02-16(1)(a), (4), and 6419a

This exclusive jurisdiction encompasses all claims against the state and its instrumentalities for money damages.

Section 6419(1)(a) gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for money damages against the state or its instrumentalities.

Pomann, Callanan & Sofen, PC v. Wayne County Department of Social Services · filed 1988-02-16(1)(a)

This exclusive jurisdiction encompasses all claims against the state and its instrumentalities for money damages.

Section 600.8202(2) requires 36th District judges’ combined state and supplemental salary to equal 88% of a Supreme Court justice’s salary, while supplemental pay for other district judges is discretionary; the resulting disparity violates equal protection.

77th District Judge v. State · filed 1989-03-08(2)

In the thirty-sixth district each district judge shall receive an additional salary which, when added to the annual salary paid by the state under subsection (1), equals 88% of the annual salary of a justice of the supreme court. ... The claimed disparity in salaries stems from the mandate in the above statute that the 36th District judges’ aggregate of base and supplemental salary must equal the statutory ceiling of eighty-eight percent of the salary of a Supreme Court justice, but that the other district judges receive an amount somewhere between the state-provided ninety percent of the base salary of a circuit judge and the statutory ceiling, depending on discretionary determinations of the district control unit (as to the amount of the supplemental salary) and the Legislature (as to the appropriation of a reimbursement to the district control unit). ... We hold that the statutory disparity in treatment as to the compensation, retirement funding obligations, and retirement benefits violates equal protection.

The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state for money damages, but equitable or declaratory relief falls within its concurrent jurisdiction only when ancillary to such a damages claim; without an ancillary damages claim, the circuit court has jurisdiction.

AMAC v. Michigan · filed 1989-12-27(1)(a); 6419a

Under MCL 600.6419(1)(a); MSA 27A.6419(1)(a), the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to "hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies." This section has been interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to actions for money damages. ... In 1984, the Court of Claims Act was amended to add MCL 600.6419a; MSA 27A.6419(1), which provides that the Court of Claims also has jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court over any action for equitable or declaratory relief ancillary to a claim filed pursuant to MCL 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419 (i.e., ancillary to a claim for money damages). If no such ancillary claim exists, then the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over equitable claims.

Section 6419a gives the Court of Claims concurrent jurisdiction over equitable or declaratory relief only when that relief is ancillary to a claim for money damages; without an ancillary damages claim, jurisdiction over the equitable action remains in circuit court.

AuSable Manistee Action Council, Inc. v. State · filed 1989-12-27

In 1984, the Court of Claims Act was amended to add MCL 600.6419a; MSA 27A.6419(1), which provides that the Court of Claims also has jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court over any action for equitable or declaratory relief ancillary to a claim filed pursuant to MCL 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419 (i.e., ancillary to a claim for money damages). If no such ancillary claim exists, then the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over equitable claims. ... In the instant case, there was no ancillary claim for money damages. Therefore, under the clear language of MCL 600.6419a; MSA 27A.6419(1), we believe that the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs action.

Section 600.6419 gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over contract claims against the state and its agencies, but not exclusive jurisdiction over demands for declaratory and equitable relief.

Mooahesh v. Department of Treasury · filed 1992-08-176419

The Court of Claims plainly has exclusive jurisdiction over contract claims against the state and its agencies. It does not have exclusive jurisdiction over demands for declaratory and equitable relief (although, of course, it does have ancillary jurisdiction when applicable).

Section 600.2163 requires the court to examine a child under ten and determine that the child has sufficient intelligence and sense of obligation to tell the truth before admitting the child to testify.

People v. Jehnsen · filed 1990-04-16

The testimony of a witness under ten years of age is governed by MCL 600.2163; MSA 27A.2163, which provides, in pertinent part: ... Whenever a child under the age of 10 years is produced as a witness, the court shall by an examination made by itself publicly, or separate and apart, ascertain to its own satisfaction whether such child has sufficient intelligence and sense of obligation to tell the truth to be safely admitted to testify. The purpose of this statute is to insure that a child under the age of ten years has sufficient intelligence and a sense of obligation to testify truthfully.

Section 308a(3) imposes a one-year limitations period on taxpayers’ Headlee Amendment enforcement suits, and that period is valid.

Durant v. Department of Education · filed 1990-11-05(3)

Our Legislature has limited the taxpayers’ right to bring such actions by enacting a one-year period of limitation. MCL 60Q.308a(3); MSA 27A.308(1)(3). ... The question then becomes whether the one-year period of limitation constitutes an impermissible infringement on the rights guaranteed under the Headlee Amendment. We conclude that it does not. ... A one-year period of limitation does not curtail or place undue burdens on a taxpayer’s exercise of rights granted by the Headlee Amendment. ... Such assistance is permissible.

Section 600.6419a gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction over declaratory and equitable claims when ancillary to a claim for money damages against the state; a combined suit must be filed there.

Silverman v. University of Michigan Board of Regents · filed 1994-05-17

By enacting 1984 PA 212, however, the Legislature authorized the Court of Claims to exercise jurisdiction over claims for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, provided that the plaintiff’s suit also seeks money damages from the state or one of its agencies. A complaint seeking only money damages against the state must be filed in the Court of Claims. A complaint seeking only equitable or declaratory relief must be filed in circuit court. A complaint seeking money damages from the state as well as equitable or declaratory relief against the state may only be filed in the Court of Claims, because that is the sole forum that is capable of deciding the whole case.

Section 600.2925a creates an independent contribution cause of action, but contribution requires at least two persons jointly and severally liable in tort for the same injury.

Berry v. City of Belleville · filed 1989-07-18

We agree that the Michigan statute authorizing contribution, MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1), established a substantive cause of action independent of the underlying suit which gave rise to it and unaffected by the governmental immunity statute.

Section 600.5714(1)(f) preserves a mortgagor’s ability to raise foreclosure-procedure defects in a post-redemption summary-eviction proceeding, so the court held that the same defects do not eliminate standing in a plaintiff-filed action.

Ahmad v. Wells Fargo Bank NA · filed 2012-03-19600.5714(1)(f)

it should not deprive a mortgagor of standing if she takes the role of plaintiff and asserts claims based on the very same defects.

Section 600.3240 provides a one-year redemption period after foreclosure by advertisement, reduced to thirty days when residential property is abandoned as determined under § 3241a.

Gitler v. Oakland County Register of Deeds · filed 1989-11-07(7), (8)

Unless otherwise provided in MCL 600.3240; MSA 27A.3240, the redemption period for property foreclosed after advertisement sale is one year. MCL 600.3240(8); MSA 27A.3240(8). MCL 600.3240(7); MSA 27A.3240(7), however, provides that, if property is abandoned as determined pursuant to § 3241a, the redemption period shall be thirty days. ... Even if plaintiff is a mortgagee, the facts of this case reveal that, within fifteen days after receipt of the affidavit of vacancy from plaintiff, both John and Patricia Leonowicz gave the required notice pursuant to § 3241a(c) stating that the premises were not abandoned. Plaintiff has therefore failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for presumptive abandonment.

Michigan’s foreclosure-redemption provisions allow redemption by timely payment; failure to redeem extinguishes the mortgagor’s property rights and bars a claim to obtain clean title, but does not bar independent tort claims.

Estate of Ronald Boik v. Labree Homes LLC · filed 2022-03-17

After Labree purchased the condo property at the sheriff’s sale, plaintiff could have redeemed the property by paying the requisite amount within the prescribed time limit. See MCL 600.3240. ... In other words, a mortgagor’s failure to tender the redemption amount effectively bars him or her from bringing a claim to acquire clean title to the property because the mortgagor no longer has any rights in or to the property. It does not follow, however, that plaintiff’s failure to redeem the property in this case barred her tort claims. Those tort claims were not dependent on plaintiff retaining rights in and to the property. Stated differently, that plaintiff has no rights in and to the property is irrelevant to whether she has standing to bring tort claims against defendants. Thus, to the extent that the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s tort claims “based upon the failure to tender the amounts due for redemption,” that decision was error.

Noncompliance with § 600.3204 makes a foreclosure voidable only upon a showing that the borrower was prejudiced.

Collins v. Citimortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-09-25§ 600.3204

Moreover, even if CitiMortgage failed to comply with § 600.3204, the foreclosure would not be set aside. Instead it would be voidable upon a showing of prejudice to Collins.

Under the pre-2011 foreclosure-by-advertisement statute, a borrower seeking loan-modification negotiations had to contact a listed housing counselor, and contacting the lender through an attorney did not satisfy that requirement or trigger the 90-day foreclosure delay in § 600.3205a(1)(e).

Robert Goss, Jr. v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group · filed 2013-12-20600.3205b(1)

By contacting Trott through his attorney, Goss did not meet his section 600.3205b(1) obligation to contact Trott through a housing counselor. Hence, the foreclosure sale did not violate Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(1)(e).

Section 600.3204(1)(d) permits foreclosure by advertisement by a party with the required ownership or servicing interest, and the court held Deutsche Bank qualified because it was the mortgagee of record after MERS assigned the mortgage to it.

Vanderhoof v. Deutsche Bank National Trust · filed 2014-01-17600.3204(1)(d)

Thus, after MERS assigned the mortgage in 2010, Deutsche Bank had standing to foreclose on the property as mortgagee of record.

Michigan's statutory conversion provision does not require proof that the defendant intended to violate another person's property rights or knowingly did so.

McCallum v. Pixley (In re Pixley) · filed 2014-01-24Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a(1)(a)

The Court concludes that Pixley’s liability for conversion under the Michigan conversion statute — specifically, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a(l)(a) — did not require an allegation or proof that Pix-ley intended to violate McCallum’s property rights, or that he knowingly did so.

Section 600.3240(13) generally gives a mortgagor of residential property foreclosed by advertisement a one-year statutory redemption period.

Kloss v. RBS Citizens, N.A. · filed 2014-02-06600.3240(13)

Michigan law grants a mortgagor of residential property that has been foreclosed by advertisement a statutory redemption period of one year.

Under §§ 600.3240(1) and (8), a residential-property mortgagor has six months after the sheriff’s sale to redeem, and after that period expires the mortgagor forfeits the property interest.

Jarbo v. The Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2014-10-03§ 600.3240(1), (8); § 600.3236

Michigan law explicitly provides that mortgagors of residential properties have six months from the date of the sheriff’s sale to redeem the property. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3240(1), (8). When the six-month period expires, the mortgagor forfeits any right, title, or interest he or she had in the property. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3236; Piotrowski v. State Land Office Bd., 4 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Mich. 1942).

The conversion remedy in § 600.2919a applies only to personal property, not real property.

TTOD Liquidation, Inc. v. Lim (In re DOTT Acquisition, LLC) · filed 2014-02-13§ 600.2919a(1)(a)-(b)

To the extent that the Trustee’s reference to the July 15, 2010 transfers includes the Real Property, the statute cited by the Trustee does not apply, because it only applies to personal property.

Section 600.2947(4) generally shields a manufacturer or seller from failure-to-warn liability when a product is provided for use by a sophisticated user, unless a state or federal statute or regulation requires a warning.

Stults v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. · filed 2014-07-11§ 600.2947(4)

Except to the extent a state or federal statute or regulation requires a manufacturer to warn, a manufacturer or seller is not liable in a product liability action for failure to provide an adequate warning if the product is provided for use by a sophisticated user.

After a foreclosure sale, the mortgagor must redeem within the statutory period; otherwise the deed becomes operative and the mortgagor’s rights in the property are extinguished, leaving no standing to challenge the sale, and a mortgagee likewise cannot revive the extinguished mortgage after the redemption period.

Onewest Bank Fsb v. Estate of Anna I Madison · filed 2015-03-19

Pursuant to MCL 600.3240, after a sheriff’s sale is completed, a mortgagor may redeem the property by paying the requisite amount within the prescribed time limit, which here was six months. “Unless the premises described in such deed shall be redeemed within the time limited for such redemption as hereinafter provided, such deed shall thereupon become operative, and shall vest in the grantee therein named, his heirs or assigns, all the right, title, and interest which the mortgagor had at the time of the execution of the mortgage, or at any time thereafter . . . .” MCL 600.3236. If a mortgagor fails to avail him or herself of the right of redemption, all the mortgagor’s rights in and to the property are extinguished. ... By analogy, the holder of any mortgage interest would likewise lack standing to set aside a foreclosure sale, considering that the mortgagee’s mortgage interest, just as a mortgagor’s property interest, has been extinguished by the time the redemption period expires.

MCL 600.3240(8) provides a six-month redemption period; a plaintiff who does not redeem within that period loses all rights in the property and standing to challenge the foreclosure.

Estate of Oscar L Batchelor v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions Inc · filed 2015-05-07(8)

A plaintiff who fails to bring an action challenging a foreclosure within the statutory redemption period specified by MCL 600.3240 does not have standing to bring suit, because “[i]f a mortgagor fails to avail him or herself of the right of redemption, all the mortgagor’s rights in and to the property are extinguished.”

Section 3241a applies when a party seeks to shorten the mortgage-foreclosure redemption period for abandoned property; it is not implicated when the redemption period was neither shortened nor targeted for shortening.

Willzor Capital Inc v. Gmac Mortgage Corporation · filed 2015-12-08

Finally, plaintiff calls attention to MCL 600.3241a, which concerns shortening the redemption period for abandoned property. It argues that defendants did not establish that the property was abandoned in order to shorten the redemption period. However, as defendants argue, that statute has no relationship to this case, because the redemption period was not shortened and there was no attempt to shorten it. Therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on MCL 600.3241a is baseless.

Former § 600.3240(13) authorized an immediate summary-possession action for alleged damage during the redemption period and provided that entry of a possession judgment extinguished redemption rights and vested full title in the purchaser.

Bank of America v. 5-3 Greenway Trust · filed 2015-12-22(13)

Finally, the fact that a circuit court has jurisdiction over quiet-title actions to determine interests in land does not mean that previously-entered, unchallenged, and valid possession judgments are irrelevant and have no bearing on the proper determination of title by the circuit court. This is made exceptionally clear in the context of former MCL 600.3240(13), which specifically provided that title vests with entry of a possession judgment. The circuit court was not entitled to disregard this statutory mandate when resolving the quiet-title dispute, considering that there was no jurisdictional problem that would have allowed a collateral attack.

The cited foreclosure statutes provide that a mortgagor may redeem after a sheriff's sale within the prescribed period, after which the former owner's property rights are extinguished absent equitable tolling for fraud or irregularity.

Cienna Brown v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank National Association · filed 2016-04-21

Under MCL 600.3240, “after a sheriff’s sale is completed, a mortgagor may redeem the property by paying the requisite amount within the prescribed time limit, which here was six months.” ... Accordingly, after the expiration of the period of redemption, the former owner of an interest no longer has standing to sue for claims involving the property. ... This rule can only be avoided by an equitable extension of the tolling period by a showing of fraud or irregularity.

Section 3252 requires foreclosure-sale surplus proceeds to be distributed to subsequent mortgagees or lienholders according to their respective property-interest priorities, with any remaining balance going to the mortgagor.

in Re $55,336.17 Surplus Funds · filed 2017-05-09

Therefore, we conclude that MCL 600.3252 requires the court to distribute surplus proceeds from a mortgage foreclosure sale by advertisement to any subsequent mortgagees or lienholders in accordance with their respective priorities under MCL 565.29 and related case law.

Section 3252 distinguishes a mortgagor’s demand for foreclosure-sale surplus from a subsequent mortgagee or lienholder’s claim, imposes no specific form or writing requirement for a demand, and allows a reasonable time to process a demand before a competing claim is filed.

Trustlink Equities LLC v. St Clair County Sheriff Sale Surplus · filed 2019-01-22

The statute does not contain any specific requirements regarding the form of a “demand” or the information that must appear in a “demand.” In fact, the statute does not even require that a “demand” be in writing. ... Because plaintiff conveyed to the Treasurer its assertion of its right to disbursement of the surplus funds, and because the statute contains no specific requirements for the form or content of a “demand,” we conclude that plaintiff filed a “demand” for purposes of MCL 600.3252.

Michigan’s loan-modification statutes require a lender to consider an eligible borrower for a modification before foreclosure by advertisement, but do not require the lender to modify the loan or provide damages; noncompliance is enforced by a borrower’s timely request to convert the foreclosure to a judicial foreclosure.

Dingman v. OneWest Bank, FSB · filed 2012-03-14(a), (c), (c)(8)

In Count I, plaintiffs claim a violation of Michigan’s loan modification statutes, M.C.L. 600.3205a, et seq. First, these statutes merely require a lender to consider a borrower for a loan modification prior to commencing foreclosure by advertisement. See M.C.L. 600.3205c. These statutes do not require a lender to modify a loan, nor do they give a plaintiff a cause of action for damages. ... Second, a failure to comply with these statutes would not invalidate a Sheriffs sale. The statutes include a specific enforcement mechanism that provides the borrowers with an opportunity to request judicial foreclosure if the foreclosing party does not comply with the loan modification provisions. M.C.L. § 600.3205c(8). However, plaintiffs have not requested a judicial foreclosure. Unless the borrower files a complaint seeking such relief, which plaintiffs have not done, nothing prevents the lender from foreclosing. Id.

Michigan’s foreclosure-by-advertisement statute imposes notice and loan-modification obligations only when the borrower takes the statutory action that triggers them.

Pettey v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-10-31

The district court concluded that CMI was not in violation of the notice or loan-modification requirements of Michigan’s foreclosure-by-advertisement statute because the Petteys had failed to take action under the statute that would have triggered CMI’s notice and loan-modification obligations. ... Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we are persuaded that the district court’s grant of CMI’s motion to dismiss and denial of the Petteys’ motion for reconsideration were proper for the reasons stated in the district court’s August 21, 2012, and September 7, 2012, opinions—with one caveat. ... Accordingly, apart from the subsequent change in Michigan law, we adopt the district court’s opinions and affirm those judgments.

A Michigan medical-malpractice plaintiff must provide notice of intent to sue and generally wait 182 days before filing a state-court complaint.

In re Wilson · filed 2014-05-30600.2912b(1)

Providing such notice is a prerequisite for filing a medical malpractice claim in Michigan.

Section 600.2919a permits treble damages for statutory conversion only upon proof of willful or wanton misconduct, and the award is discretionary with the jury.

Hunt v. Hadden · filed 2015-09-02600.2919a(1)

The plaintiffs therefore must establish their right to treble damages for statutory conversion with evidence that the defendants acted willfully or wantonly in converting the excess attorney’s fees.

Michigan’s repealed § 600.3205a(5) allowed a borrower to convert a foreclosure by advertisement to a judicial foreclosure for failure to properly pursue loan modification, but that remedy is unavailable under current law.

Jennifer Miller fka Jennifer Fosgitt v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2021-12-01600.3205a(5); 600.3101

Under a Michigan statute that was repealed before Miller defaulted, a borrower could obtain conversion of foreclosure by advertisement to a judicial foreclosure if the lender failed to properly engage in a loan modification process. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(5); Estate of Doreen Bessette v. Wilmington Trust N.A., 2016 WL 6947480 at *3, n.2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016). That remedy is not available under current law and was not available at the time of the foreclosure on Miller’s home. See id.; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3101.

Foreclosure by advertisement cannot proceed unless the mortgagor receives the statutorily required notices, but a bare allegation that notices were missing is insufficient when the foreclosure deed shows the notices were given.

Derbabian v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2014-10-17§ 600.3204(4)

Under Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.3204(4), foreclosure by advertisement cannot occur unless the mortgagor is provided certain notices. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4) (2011). However, the Derbabians do not allege what notices they were not given, and the bare assertion that the defendants failed to give “required notices” does not meet the minimal pleading standards of Rule 8. More importantly, the sheriff’s deed reflecting the foreclosure sale shows that the Derbabians were given the statutorily required notices.

Former MCL 600.3204(4)(d) applies only to covered principal-residence foreclosures and bars commencement when the borrower requests a meeting, provides requested documents, and the designated person fails to meet or negotiate; former MCL 600.3205c(5)'s disclosure duty presupposes the borrower first satisfied subsection (1).

Hill Jr v. US Bank Na · filed 2015-03-12(4)(d), (5)

[t]he mortgagor has requested a meeting under section 3205b with the person designated under section 3205a(1)(c), the mortgagor has provided documents if requested under section 3205b(2), and the person designated under section 3205a(1)(c) has not met or negotiated with the mortgagor under this chapter.

Section 600.3208 requires foreclosure notice to be published once a week for four successive weeks in a newspaper published in the county where the property is located and posted conspicuously on the property within fifteen days after first publication.

HARRIS v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Mortgage Pass-Throug · filed 2020-09-30600.3208

Michigan law requires the notice of foreclosure to be published for four successive weeks, at least once per week, in a newspaper published in the county where the premises to be sold are situated. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3208. Additionally, a notice of foreclosure must be posted “in a conspicuous place upon any part of the premises described in the notice” within fifteen days after the first publication of the notice.” Id.

Michigan’s foreclosure-by-advertisement statute permits foreclosure only after a default in a mortgage condition and requires a foreclosure notice, but it does not require a separate notice of default or a 30-day opportunity to cure.

Rau v. Calvert Investments LLC · filed 2019-11-27§ 600.3204; § 600.3212

As stated above, Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.3204 provides that a party may foreclose a mortgage by advertisement only if a “default in a condition of the mortgage has occurred.” ... Michigan’s current foreclosure-by-advertisement statute regulates only notices of foreclosure but does not require notices of default.

Michigan's foreclosure-by-advertisement statutes permit nonjudicial foreclosure after a mortgage default, prohibit simultaneously suing to recover the debt, require specified notices, and provide a redemption opportunity.

Bates v. Green Farms Condominium Ass'n · filed 2020-05-04§§ 600.3201–.3285; § 600.3204(1)(a)–(b); § 600.3208; § 600.3212; § 600.3240(1)

This law identifies “the circumstances that must exist before foreclosure by advertisement can occur, the procedure that the mortgagee must follow, and the mortgagor’s right of redemption.” ... Before a lender may foreclose, the borrower must have defaulted on “a condition of the mortgage.” ... And if a lender chooses to foreclose in this nonjudicial manner, the lender may not simultaneously file a suit to recover the debt. ... The lender must also periodically publish a notice in a local newspaper “that the mortgage will be foreclosed by a sale of the mortgaged premises,” and post the notice in a conspicuous place on the property. ... If the lender successfully sells the property, the defaulting borrower has a last chance to reclaim it by paying a specified amount within a specified time.

Former § 600.3205c's loan-modification protections did not apply when the foreclosure notice was published before the statute's effective date.

Teall v. One West Bank · filed 2015-02-19(7)

The statutory scheme that plaintiff relies upon for this claim was not effective when the foreclosure began.

Section 600.2301 permits amendment or disregard of defects only in a pending action or proceeding; it cannot cure a premature medical-malpractice complaint when the action never commenced or later became time-barred.

Furr v. Md · filed 2015-07-22

And MCL 600.2301 cannot save plaintiffs’ actions because MCL 600.2301 only applies to pending actions or proceedings and there never were pending actions in these cases. Plaintiffs’ complaints, filed before the NOI waiting period expired, could not commence an action. In addition, even assuming that a NOI does constitute part of a “proceeding,” as Bush held, and, accordingly, that there were pending proceedings at the time plaintiffs filed their NOIs, the proceedings were no longer pending when the trial courts ruled on defendants’ motions for summary disposition because the limitations periods had expired by that time. “A proceeding cannot be pending if it was time-barred . . . .” Driver, 490 Mich at 254. As a result, MCL 600.2301 is inapplicable.

Section 600.2301 permits a court to amend or disregard defects only in a pending action or proceeding; it cannot revive a medical-malpractice case filed before the notice period that never commenced.

Tyra v. Organ Procurement Agency of Michigan · filed 2015-07-22

And MCL 600.2301 cannot save plaintiffs’ actions because MCL 600.2301 only applies to pending actions or proceedings and there never were pending actions in these cases. Plaintiffs’ complaints, filed before the NOI waiting period expired, could not commence an action.

Section 2301 permits a court to amend or disregard procedural defects only while an action or proceeding is pending.

Zwiers v. Growney · filed 2016-01-14

Moreover, plaintiff’s underlying premise is faulty because MCL 600.2301 is not applicable to the circumstances of her case. MCL 600.2301 specifically states that it applies only to “any action or proceeding [that] is pending.”

Section 2301 permits a court to disregard or cure by amendment a defective notice of intent in a pending medical-malpractice action when the plaintiff made a good-faith attempt to satisfy the notice statute’s content requirements and the defect does not affect the parties’ substantial rights.

Kostadinovski v. Steven D Harrington Md · filed 2017-10-24

We conclude that Bush controls our analysis. If MCL 600.2301 is implicated and potentially applicable to save a medical malpractice action when an NOI is defective because of a failure to include negligence or causation theories required by MCL 600.2912b(4), then, by analogy, MCL 600.2301 must likewise be implicated and potentially applicable when an NOI is deemed defective because it no longer includes the negligence or causation theories required by MCL 600.2912b(4) and alleged in the complaint, due to a post-complaint change in the theories being advanced by a plaintiff as a result of information gleaned from discovery.

Section 600.3204(3) requires a recorded chain of title evidencing assignment of the mortgage to the foreclosing party before the foreclosure sale, and a chain recorded before the sale satisfies that requirement.

Wilson v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. · filed 2014-11-19§ 600.3204(3)

The plain and unambiguous language of the statute precludes us from accepting Wilson’s argument. Because HSBC had a properly recorded chain of title as of January 4, 2012, and the sheriff’s sale did not occur until January 17, 2012, HSBC complied with section 600.3204(3).

Section 600.3204(3) requires a record chain of title to the foreclosing entity, but an irregularity affecting the validity of a transfer does not destroy that chain.

Rishoi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. · filed 2013-12-173204(3)

Second, “an irregularity affecting the validity of a transfer” does not destroy the record chain of title required by MCL § 600.3204(3). Id.; see also Peterson v. Jacobs, 6 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Mich. 1932) (“[S]light and inconsequential irregularities in a foreclosure [do] not vitiate the sale[.]”).

Section 600.2920(b) bars a claim-and-delivery action by a person who lacked the right to possess the goods or chattels when the action began.

Rockwell Medical, Inc. v. Yocum · filed 2014-12-30§ 600.2920(b)

An action may not be maintained under this section by a person who, at the time the action is commenced, does not have a right to possession of the goods or chattels taken or detained.

For qualifying conversion of property, § 600.2919a(1)(a) allows treble damages, but whether to award them is left to the trier of fact’s discretion.

Tennille v. Western Union (Nelson) · filed 2015-05-01§ 600.2919a(1)(a)

An award of treble damages is discretionary under § 600.2919a, and it is left to the trier of fact to determine whether treble damages are warranted in any given case.

Treble damages for converting property are authorized but not automatic; the court may award them in its discretion based on what is fair under the circumstances.

In re Stewart · filed 2013-09-20§ 600.2919a(1)(a)

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a (2013). Trebling isn’t automatic; it is within the Court’s discretion based on what is fair under the circumstances.

Section 600.2919a authorizes discretionary treble damages for specified property theft, embezzlement, or conversion, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees, as an additional remedy rather than an automatic award.

Chudzinski v. Hanif (In re Hanif) · filed 2015-04-30§ 600.2919a(1)-(2)

An award of treble damages “ is within the Court’s discretion based on what is fair under the circumstances.”

A conversion claim under § 600.2919a must allege facts showing that the plaintiff converted the property for his own use; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

McCrea v. Blue Star Lodging, Inc. · filed 2022-02-28

Simply stating that Plaintiff “used the company credit card and purchased items for his own use” fails to allege sufficient facts that would support a conversion claim under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) makes treble conversion damages discretionary, while § 600.6013(8) supports prejudgment interest on the state-law conversion award.

MCPHERSON v. Suburban Ann Arbor, LLC · filed 2024-02-28600.2919a(1)(a); 600.6013(8)

Enhancing damages under these statutes is committed to the Court’s discretion. ... The plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment on her state law claims, which include the value of the converted property, set by the jury at $23,000. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6013(8).

Michigan’s conversion statute makes treble damages discretionary, and its authorization of treble damages in addition to other remedies does not make them mandatory.

McPherson v. Suburban Ann Arbor, LLC · filed 2025-04-21§ 600.2919a(1), (2)

While both statutes permit trial courts to award treble damages under certain circumstances, neither statute requires it. The permissive language in both statutes—“may assess,” “may recover”—instead allows the court to choose whether to grant treble damages even when the claimant meets the statutes’ other conditions.

Section 2919a makes treble damages punitive and leaves the decision whether to award them to the trier of fact.

Pantall Gallup LLC v. Alnouri · filed 2014-11-06(1)

Treble damages awarded under MCL 600.2919a are punitive in nature.

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits a court to award treble damages for property converted to the converter’s own use, but the award is discretionary rather than mandatory.

General Retirement System v. Dixon (In re Dixon) · filed 2015-07-28(1)(a)

This Court concludes the Aroma Wines decision and the cases which follow it are the current state of Michigan law and hold that an award of treble damages is discretionary. ... As stated above, the Court agrees the Debtor converted the Fraud Damages to his own use, so an award of treble damages is permitted under MCL 600.2919a.

Section 600.2919a(1) makes treble damages discretionary, leaving the award decision to the trier of fact.

Best Team Ever Inc v. Prentice · filed 2015-06-23(1)

The decision whether to award treble damages under MCL 600.2919a(1) is discretionary and, accordingly, is a question for the trier of fact.

Section 2919a(1)(a) requires proof that property was stolen, embezzled, or converted for the tortfeasor’s own use to establish statutory conversion and obtain treble damages.

Estate of Stanley Morris v. Morris · filed 2016-08-11(1)(a)

Statutory conversion is distinct from common-law conversion in that statutory conversion also requires proof that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted for the tortfeasor’s own use.

Section 2919a(1) permits, but does not require, an award of treble damages and attorney fees for statutory conversion.

Bahri v. Great Lakes Property & Investment Inc · filed 2020-02-20(1)

The plain statutory language and binding precedent of this Court dictate that treble damages under the conversion statute are discretionary, not mandatory.

Section 600.2919a makes treble damages permissive rather than mandatory, so whether to award them is for the factfinder.

Automation Guarding Systems, LLC v. Industrial Steel Guarding, LLC · filed 2023-09-07(1)

As courts in this District have previously noted, in Michigan an award of treble damages does not automatically flow from a finding of conversion. See, e.g., Hunt v. Hadden, 127 F. Supp. 3d 780, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (Lawson, J.). MCL § 600.2919a’s treble damages provision is punitive and “extend[s] beyond restoring” a plaintiff to her “original condition before the act of conversion.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The provision is permissive, not mandatory. See Aroma Wines & Equip., Inc. v. Columbian Distrib. Servs., Inc., 844 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Mich. App. 2013). Whether to award treble damages is therefore a question for the factfinder; the Court may not “simply order treble damages upon a finding of conversion.” Id.

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits statutory-conversion liability when a person converts entrusted property to their own use, even if the property was initially received lawfully; treble damages are discretionary rather than automatic after liability is proven.

Driver v. Corey · filed 2023-12-28(1)(a)

Here, because Bordeaux held the funds paid by Corbett and the Drivers in trust to be used for their respective construction projects, the trial court did not err by determining that she could be liable under MCL 600.2919a for misappropriating those funds and permitting the funds to be used for purposes other than the respective construction projects. ... However, a litigant is not automatically entitled to treble damages as a matter of right upon proving a violation of the statute. ... This was an error of law. Id. Hence, the damages award as to Bordeaux is vacated and we remand the matter for trial on the issue of treble damages.

Section 2919a permits a person damaged by embezzlement or conversion to recover treble actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney fees, and the decision whether to award treble damages is discretionary.

Master Beat Inc v. Skill · filed 2024-02-29(1)

MCL 600.2919a allows a plaintiff to recover treble damages in cases of embezzlement or conversion. ... Treble damages are “designed to penalize or punish dishonest defendants,” and the decision whether to award treble damages under MCL 600.2919a is discretionary.