Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135

Section 500.3135 modifies common-law motor-vehicle negligence liability without violating Michigan’s requirement to reenact and publish affected statutory sections.

Advisory Opinion Re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294 · filed 1973-06-18(2)

The principal change in former law wrought by the no-fault act is the modification of the common-law liability for negligence in driving an automobile. ... A legislative modification of the common law can properly be enacted without reenactment and publication at length of provisions of earlier acts which assimilate or implement, but do not purport to state, the common law.

Section 500.3135 limits tort recovery against a motor-vehicle tortfeasor to noneconomic loss and economic loss beyond no-fault benefit limits.

Murray v. Ferris · filed 1977-03-02(1), (2)(c)

We have already determined that the plain language of the no-fault act provides that the injured party is restricted in his recovery only for noneconomic losses from the tortfeasor.

Section 500.3135 preserves tort recovery for qualifying noneconomic loss, which cannot be subtracted from personal injury protection benefits paid for different losses.

Workman v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange · filed 1979-01-04(1), (2)(b)

Accordingly, in light of § 3135, we construe § 3116 to mean that an insurance carrier paying personal injury protection benefits is entitled to reimbursement from the tort recovery of a person injured as a result of a motor vehicle accident only if, and to the extent that, the tort recovery includes damages for losses for which personal injury protection benefits were paid. Thus, since § 3135 abolishes tort remedy for losses covered under the personal injury protection insurance provisions of the act, an injured plaintiff should recover nothing for which the insurance carrier will have a right of reimbursement under § 3116.

Section 500.3135(2) abolishes motor vehicle tort liability, subject to exceptions, and thereby removes the tort liability needed for federal Medical Care Recovery Act recovery in cases within its scope.

United States v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1983-06-21(2)

Section 500.3135 of the act, with certain exceptions not applicable to these cases, abolishes “tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle.” Mich. Comp.Laws § 500.3135(2). ... Under Michigan’s no-fault act, in the context of this case, traditional principles of tort liability have been abolished. Therefore, the United States is not entitled to recover from any of the defendants under the MCRA.

Section 500.3135 does not permit an insurer that paid only economic benefits to recover noneconomic damages from a third-party motorist when no economic-loss exception applies.

Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Vancil · filed 1980-09-16(2)

In light of the basic limitation to noneconomic recovery of MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135, this suit evidently was brought to seek ... noneconomic reimbursement. Since plaintiff has not paid any noneconomic benefits to the injured worker, it may not recover any such funds.

Section 500.3135’s limits on motor vehicle tort recovery prevent a workers’ compensation carrier from obtaining reimbursement for economic-loss payments out of an injured employee’s third-party recovery for noneconomic loss.

Osterhart v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange · filed 1981-01-22(2)

Under the subsequently enacted no-fault act, however, the Legislature abolished tort liability for these same economic losses. We regard the no-fault act’s limitation on tort recovery as likewise limiting a workers’ compensation carrier’s standing under MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827).

Section 500.3135(2)(c) permits recovery of economic loss incurred beyond three years and loss exceeding the daily and monthly no-fault limits.

Bonsall v. American Motorists Insurance · filed 1981-09-22(2)(c)

Section 3135(2)(c) of the no-fault act allows recovery of damages for economic loss beyond three years and for loss in excess of the daily and monthly limitations. Since plaintiffs’ decedent would have been only 54 years of age three years after the accident, and since he earned approximately $21,000 a year at the time of his death, the settlement properly included compensation for these economic losses not covered by the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) permits tort recovery for work loss above no-fault benefit limits when the injured person cannot obtain those benefits from the insurer.

Argenta v. Shahan · filed 1984-06-19(2)(c)

MCL 500.3107(b); MSA 24.13107(b) contains an adjustable, monthly cap on the sum of benefits paid and the allowable income earned by an injured person for work during the same period. Plaintiff earned well in excess of this monthly cap and had no hope of obtaining work-loss benefits from his own carrier and, therefore, could recover damages for lost income in a tort action. MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c).

Section 3135 bars tort claims against a motorist who maintained the required no-fault security when no statutory exception applies, even if the injured nonresidents cannot receive personal protection insurance benefits.

Gersten v. Blackwell · filed 1981-11-17

The stipulated facts of the instant case indicate that the exceptions to the immunity from tort liability do not apply here. Since defendant maintained the requisite security, he is, pursuant to § 3135, relieved of all tort liability to plaintiffs arising from the accident.

Section 500.3135(2) grants tort immunity to an owner whose vehicle has the specified no-fault security, even if the vehicle was not required to carry that security because it was registered outside Michigan.

Berrien County Road Commission v. Jones · filed 1982-09-07(2)

It would be an absurd result indeed to hold that a vehicle which, except for its state of registration, would be required to obtain no-fault insurance, and whose owner had voluntarily obtained no-fault insurance, should be denied the protection of that coverage solely because the owner had done more in meeting the objectives of the laws of this state than he had to. ... We hold that defendants, having paid their dues in the risk-spreading system and being the owners or registrants of a motor vehicle as defined in the statute, are entitled to the immunity of § 3135(2) of the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) permits tort recovery for work loss above statutory limits but excludes loss of earning capacity.

Ouellette v. Kenealy · filed 1984-11-13(2)(c)

We affirm on the basis that damages for loss of earning capacity are not recoverable under the no-fault act. MCL 500.3135(2); MSA 24.13135(2) abolishes tort liability with certain exceptions. One exception is for damages for work loss as defined in §§ 3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly and 3-year limitations contained in those sections.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) permits recovery of allowable work loss beyond the statutory limits without requiring a serious impairment of body function.

Cochran v. Myers · filed 1985-11-04(2)(c)

However, MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c) provides that an injured party may receive damages for allowable work loss in excess of certain daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations without any reference to the type or extent of injury suffered. Thus, it is both legally and logically possible for a person to be entitled to work loss benefits without being entitled to noneconomic losses.

Section 500.3135 permits tort recovery for actual work loss above the statutory limits but does not permit damages for loss of earning capacity.

Ouellette v. Kenealy · filed 1985-12-10

It is apparent from the statutory language and the drafter’s comments to § 1(a)(5) of the umvara that economic damages, and damages for loss of earning capacity are economic damages, are recoverable in tort only, as provided in §§ 3107 and 3135, for "actual” work loss — actual "loss of income from work an injured person would have performed” if he had not been injured — when the loss of income exceeds the daily, monthly, and three-year limitations.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) permits recovery of excess work loss without satisfying the serious impairment threshold.

Clark v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n · filed 1986-04-08(2)(c)

The trial court also permitted plaintiff to amend the complaint to seek excess work loss, MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c), concluding that such damages may be recovered without meeting the no-fault threshold. Defendants cross-appeal from that determination and we affirm.

Section 500.3135 bars recovery of medical expenses from third-party motor vehicle tortfeasors, so a health plan with only subrogation rights cannot recover those expenses from the injured person’s tort settlement.

Steinmann v. Steinmann · filed 2003-10-16

Plaintiff and AAA contend that because plaintiff could not recover medical expenses from the third-party tortfeasors under MCL 500.3135, dchp is prohibited from recovering medical expenses from plaintiff’s settlement because a subrogee cannot acquire greater rights than the subrogor. We agree.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) permits third-party recovery of replacement-service expenses exceeding the no-fault daily and three-year limits because those expenses are allowable expenses.

Johnson v. Recca · filed 2011-04-05(3)(c)

In conclusion, because replacement-services expenses are “allowable expenses,” and because MCL 500.3135(3)(c) did not abolish tort liability for “[d]am-ages for allowable expenses... in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in [MCL 500.3107 to 500.3110],” we hold that damages for replacement-services expenses that are in excess of the daily and three-year limitations contained in MCL 500.3107(l)(c) may be recovered in a third-party action.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) does not allow replacement-services damages in a third-party tort action because replacement services are separate from the listed categories of recoverable damages.

Johnson v. Recca · filed 2012-07-30(3)(c)

Because “replacement services” is not among the categories listed in MCL 500.3135(3)(c), damages for replacement services are not recoverable in such an action.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) allows recovery from governmental entities for work loss and ordinary and necessary services exceeding personal protection insurance benefit limits when the claimant suffers bodily injury from a government vehicle accident.

Hannay v. Department of Transportation · filed 2013-01-17(3)(c)

Accordingly, work-loss benefits and benefits for ordinary and necessary services that exceed the statutory personal protection insurance benefit maximum pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3) are awardable against governmental entities, and the trial court did not err by awarding those economic damages to plaintiff in this case.

Section 500.3135 applies to third-party motor vehicle tort actions against governmental entities and permits economic and noneconomic damages when its requirements are met.

Hannay v. Department of Transportation · filed 2014-12-19

We therefore hold that a plaintiff may bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements of MCL 500.3135 have been met.

Section 500.3135 permits third-party motor vehicle tort claims against governmental entities for economic and noneconomic damages when its requirements are met.

Hunter Jr v. Sisco · filed 2014-12-19

We therefore hold that a plaintiff may bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements of MCL 500.3135 have been met.

Section 500.3135(3) grants partial immunity from motor vehicle tort liability only when the vehicle has the security required by section 3101 in effect.

Estate of Christopher Groulx v. Bard Jr · filed 2015-04-23(3)

Because the partial immunity from tort liability established by MCL 500.3135(3) applies only to a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by MCL 500.3101 is in effect, and because the feller buncher was not covered by a no-fault policy, defendants were not entitled to the partial immunity established by MCL 500.3135(3).

Section 500.3135(3) abolishes tort liability arising from the use of a motor vehicle with security under section 500.3101, and that statutory bar need not be pleaded as an affirmative defense.

Dte Electric Company v. Theut Products Inc · filed 2015-09-29(3)

The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in favor of Theut since MCL 500.3135(3) precluded tort liability. MCL 500.3135(3) abolishes tort liability stemming from the ownership, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle in the state for which security was obtained under MCL 500.3101, with several exceptions that plaintiff does not claim apply in this case. ... The abolishment of tort liability under MCL 500.3135(3) is not an affirmative defense.

Section 500.3135 bars third-party economic and noneconomic damages when the injuries cause no economic loss above the statutory limit or beyond three years and no serious impairment of a body function or serious permanent disfigurement.

Saiyed v. Nair · filed 2018-05-22

Thus, although the jury must have believed that plaintiffs suffered minor injuries caused by defendants’ negligence, the jury also must have believed defendants’ evidence that any missed work during the first three years following the accident that exceeded the statutory limit was not due to those minor injuries, that the minor injuries would not have resulted in compensable economic damages after three years, and that the injuries did not result in a serious impairment of a body function or a serious permanent disfigurement. Having made those factual determinations, the jury properly found no cause of action because plaintiffs’ claims for economic and noneconomic damages pursuant to ... MCL 500.3135 were barred.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) does not support an excess wage loss claim when the claimant has not worked for years and presents no evidence of wage loss.

Marks v. City of Detroit · filed 2019-08-20(3)(c)

The city’s motion for partial summary disposition asserted that Marks could not establish an excess wage loss claim under MCL 500.3135(3)(c), as she had not been employed since 2011. Marks failed to present any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, summary disposition should have been granted as to this claim as well.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) allows a motor vehicle tort claim for work loss only to the extent it exceeds the limits of no-fault personal protection insurance, including its three-year limit.

NABOYCHIK v. United States · filed 2020-05-20(3)(c)

“[T]ort liability . . . is abolished except as to . . . [damages for] work loss . . . [in excess of] the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations” established for personal protection insurance. Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(3)(c). Thus, an individual injured in a car accident can bring a claim for lost wages against another driver, called a “third-party action,” only if the harmed individual has obtained the full amount of her insurance coverage and still has not been fully compensated. Hannay, 497 Mich. at 76. The damages sought must be “work loss” and must be sought after three years of insurance payments.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) permits recovery of work-loss damages beyond three years when an accident caused the injury and lost work, even if the injury does not meet the threshold for noneconomic damages.

Harkrader v. Hayes · filed 2020-10-29(3)(c)

To recover economic damages, plaintiff was only required to prove that she was injured and missed work for more than three years. Oullette, 424 Mich at 87; MCL 500.3135(3)(c). In other words, plaintiff only had to convince the jury that she was injured in the automobile accident. Oullette, 424 Mich at 87. In contrast, to be permitted to obtain noneconomic damages, plaintiff was required to prove a threshold injury, which required proof of “an objectively manifested impairment . . . .” McCormick, 487 Mich at 195.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) permits a third-party suit for work-loss damages exceeding applicable limits when the injured person dies; the cutoff for work-loss insurance benefits at death does not bar that suit.

Estate of Dennis Palomo v. Dean Transportation Inc · filed 2023-10-05(3)(c)

MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows a suit when the injured person has suffered death for work-loss damages amounts “in excess of any applicable limit.” The trial court erred by limiting plaintiff’s work-loss damages after applying a statute applicable to first-party actions against insurers when this case is a third-party action against another driver.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) incorporates the fee schedules in § 500.3157 through its reference to § 500.3107, limiting recoverable tort damages for allowable expenses.

Canty v. Mason · filed 2024-10-04(3)(c)

We must thus assume that when the Legislature crafted MCL 500.3135(3)(c), which expressly references MCL 500.3107, it knew quite well that MCL 500.3107 placed restrictions on the amount of recoverable allowable expenses through limitations and exceptions found in Chapter 31, including the fee schedules.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) permits recovery of excess economic damages without proof of a serious impairment of an important body function.

Kencaid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Company · filed 2025-03-11(3)(c)

Accordingly, plaintiff correctly asserts that nothing in the plain language of MCL 500.3135(3)(c) required her to prove that she sustained a serious impairment of an important body function in order to recover excess economic benefits.

Section 500.3135(3)(c) permits a third-party claim for economic damages only when the losses exceed applicable PIP coverage limits; replacement services beyond the three-year limit are not recoverable in that action.

Brown v. IFS International Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 2025-09-22(3)(c)

Consequently, to recover from Defendants, Brown must demonstrate that her claim for economic damages falls within an exception in the statute. ... Regardless, the Court finds that Brown would not exceed the Amerisure Policy limits as: (1) replacement services in excess of the three-year limitations are not recoverable in a third party action; (2) Brown was retired at the time of the accident and did not suffer any lost wages (ECF No. 22-3, PageID.527); and (3) Brown is entitled to PIP benefits under the Amerisure Policy issued to Triumph Charter which provides unlimited PIP coverage, including medical and attendant care expenses.

Section 500.3135 preserves tort liability against negligent defendants for economic loss exceeding no-fault benefit limits.

Hachem v. Progressive Marathon Insurance Company · filed 2026-03-11(3)(c)

For economic losses exceeding these statutory limits, MCL 500.3135(1); (3)(c) preserves tort liability against negligent defendants.

Section 500.3135(1) permits a court to decide as a matter of law that an injury meets the serious impairment of body function threshold when reasonable minds could not differ.

Cassidy v. McGovern · filed 1978-10-03(1)

Just as there is a class of cases, of which Vitale is representative, in which the trial court can rule as a matter of law that plaintiff's injury is so minor that it fails to reach the threshold, so there is a class of cases in which, as a matter of law, the threshold of serious impairment is reached by the very nature of the injury, i.e., reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether the threshold is met. In such a case, the trial judge should not give the issue to the jury for determination.

Section 500.3135(1) treats a spine injury as a serious impairment of body function when it causes substantial pain, arm dysfunction, reduced activity, and related depression, even if the injured person can still work and sometimes participate in recreation.

Pohl v. Gilbert · filed 1979-03-20(1)

A review of the entire evidence establishes that plaintiff suffered a spine sprain, with pain radiating into arms and legs. She has muscle spasms which, in a vicious cycle, are steadily increasing the pain. She has suffered loss of sensation, reduction of grip, and, intermittently, loss of use of the right arm. She has scoliosis. The pain associated with the injury is severe enough to cause her to take to bed intermittently, frequently seek out medical help, and to substantially reduce her physical and social activities. She suffers intermittent depression which makes her speak of suicide, caused by constriction of blood flow to the brain. We conclude that she suffered serious impairment of body function, and are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

Section 500.3135(1) does not treat an impairment as serious when it is neither severe nor long-term.

Hermann v. Haney · filed 1980-07-01(1)

Where neither severe nor long-term, e.g., Vitale, supra, an impairment is not to be considered serious within the meaning of MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.1315(1).

Section 500.3135(1) does not require a serious impairment of body function to be permanent, and an instruction defining serious impairment as more than ordinary severity misstates the statutory standard.

Karas v. White · filed 1980-08-18(1)

Plaintiff alleges first that the court erred in instructing that "serious impairment means impairment of more than ordinary severity”. ... We agree. ... For. purposes of retrial, we note that a refusal to instruct that serious impairment of body function need not be permanent is error.

Section 500.3135(1) imposes no minimum duration for serious impairment of body function; a temporary injury that greatly reduces use of an arm and shoulder during recovery can satisfy the threshold.

Burk v. Warren · filed 1981-04-21(1)

Any effort to impose time requirements in the area of serious impairment of body function amounts to a judicial engrafting of an additional requirement onto a plainly worded statute. This we cannot do. ... For the duration of his convalescence, Burk’s use of his arm and shoulder was greatly reduced. This, in turn, limited his mobility. These factors amount to a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law.

Section 500.3135(1) does not make a broken clavicle a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law in every case; the threshold depends on the facts.

Range v. Gorosh · filed 1982-11-02(1)

Rather, we decline to make a general unvarying rule holding that a broken clavicle is a serious impairment of body function. We will be constrained to review each case on its facts to determine whether all reasonable persons would find as did a trial judge.

Section 500.3135 treats an undisputed leg injury that seriously limits walking as a serious impairment of body function, which the court decides as a matter of law.

LaHoussse v. Hess · filed 1983-04-18

Because no factual dispute existed as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, whether those injuries constituted a "serious impairment of body function" is a question of law. An "impairment of body function" is an impairment of an important body function. Cassidy v McGovern, supra, p 505. Plaintiff suffered an injury to her left leg interfering with her ability to walk. As the Court said in Cassidy, supra, p 505, "[w]alking is an important body function". Moreover, we find that, as a matter of law, plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of her ability to walk. She was hospitalized for five days with her left leg in traction. For three months afterwards, she was unable to move herself about without the aid of a wheelchair, a walker or crutches. The trial court erred, therefore, by submitting the "serious impairment" question to the jury.

Section 500.3135 permits nonintentional tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by motor vehicle use only if the injured person suffers death, serious impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement; pain and discomfort that do not significantly affect normal living do not meet the serious impairment threshold.

McDonald v. Oberlin · filed 1983-07-07

Following adoption of the Michigan automobile no-fault insurance law, a person remains subject to nonintentional tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. ... Additionally, plaintiff was not confined to bed and was able to function normally and engage in her normal activities. Plaintiff was not incapacitated by her discomfort, nor did it interfere with her normal lifestyle. Reviewing the record, we find that the trial court properly concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to meet the minimum threshold requirement.

Section 500.3135’s serious impairment threshold is not met when injuries do not affect an important body function or interfere with normal daily life.

Jakubiec v. Kumbier · filed 1984-04-10

It is undisputed that plaintiff’s injuries have proven to be irritating and troublesome. But they do not appear to have affected plaintiff in going about her normal daily life. At no time has plaintiff been incapacitated by the accident. ... Clearly, the injuries have not interfered with her normal life style.

Section 500.3135 permits a court to decide the serious-impairment threshold as a matter of law when a factual dispute about the injuries does not affect whether the threshold is met.

Williams v. McGowan · filed 1984-06-18

Although a dispute exists between the parties as to the various injuries suffered by plaintiff, the record is clear that, considering the injuries in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the injuries do not reach the threshold required under MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. Accordingly, the factual dispute in this case is not a dispute material to the determination of whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of a body function. Therefore, the trial court was free to rule as a matter of law whether the threshold requirements of MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 had been met.

Section 500.3135(1)'s serious-impairment threshold is not met by a fractured clavicle that immobilizes an arm for about one month and heals without lasting effects.

Burk v. Warren · filed 1984-07-31(1)

The trial court in. this case found that plaintiff fractured his right clavicle. ... Plaintiff’s arm was immobilized for a short period of time, about one month. This disrupted his sporting activities, was inconvenient and deterred plaintiff from normal activities for the month plaintiff wore the brace cast (not plaster). He had a full recovery. ... This Court disagrees with the conclusion made by the trial court on the legal issue of serious impairment of body function. This Court does not believe that the threshold has been reached in this case.

When the nature and extent of an injury are undisputed, the serious impairment of body function threshold under § 500.3135 is decided as a matter of law, and the trial court’s ruling is affirmed unless clearly erroneous.

Kelleher v. Kuchta · filed 1984-10-01

This case arises as a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), that where there exists no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, the trial court shall rule as a matter of law whether there has been a "serious impairment of body function". MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. ... We believe that an appropriate standard is that unless the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous we should affirm the findings of the trial court. In this case, we do not find that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous.

Section 500.3135 treats serious impairment of body function as a threshold for noneconomic damages, allowing recovery for pain, suffering, and other effects after the impairment is no longer serious.

Byer v. Smith · filed 1984-11-19(1), (2)(b)

Recognizing the force of the defendant’s argument, we believe that while Michigan’s unique "serious impairment of body function” terminology could, on that basis, be construed as a continuing limitation, it is more likely that the Legislature had no such larger purpose in mind and did not intend to enact a limitation on tort liability that functions other than, as under the model acts and other state acts, as a threshold.

Section 500.3135(1) does not treat a healed rib fracture and a clavicle fracture causing minimal restriction on arm use as a serious impairment of a body function.

Wolkow v. Eubank · filed 1984-11-07(1)

On the basis of this evidence, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff had failed to allege a serious impairment of a body function and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Although this is a close question, we agree with the trial court and therefore affirm its judgment.

Section 500.3135(1) permits recovery for a mental injury resulting in physical symptoms if the injury seriously impairs a body function.

Luce v. Gerow · filed 1979-04-16(1)

We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the Legislature did not intend to exclude the possibility of recovering for mental injuries resulting in physical symptoms by using the term "body function” in § 3135(1).

Section 500.3135 does not require expert testimony to prove serious impairment of a bodily function.

Echols v. Rule · filed 1981-04-10

We agree that proof of serious impairment of a bodily function does not necessarily require expert testimony. We find no such requirement in the statute or case law. To the extent that the trial court so held, we reverse its holding.

Section 500.3135(1) requires the court to decide whether an injury seriously impairs a body function when there is no factual dispute material to that determination.

Cassidy v. McGovern · filed 1982-12-23(1)

We hold that when there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, the question of serious impairment of body function shall be decided as a matter of law by the court. Likewise, if there is a factual dispute as to the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the threshold requirement of MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 has been met.

Section 500.3135 makes serious impairment of body function an essential element of a motor vehicle tort claim for noneconomic loss, so that claim cannot accrue before the impairment occurs.

Mielke v. Waterman · filed 1985-08-19

Serious impairment of body function is a threshold established by MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 for tort liability caused by ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. ... A cause of action for damages for noneconomic losses from a serious impairment of body function cannot have accrued before the alleged serious impairment occurred.

Section 500.3135’s serious-impairment threshold is not met by a residual 5% to 10% limitation in neck motion when there is no motor dysfunction.

Mills v. Jolliff · filed 1985-09-30

We agree that plaintiffs have failed to meet the threshold requirement of serious impairment of body function. The limitation in Mills’s range of cervical movement, while initially 30% to 40%, was reduced to 5% to 10%, according to the testimony of her own doctor. Plaintiffs’ evidence also showed that Mills suffers from no motor dysfunction and that her muscles are neurologically sound and in order.

Section 500.3135 permits a negligence claim for noneconomic loss when six fractured ribs constitute a serious impairment of body function.

Esparaza v. Manning · filed 1986-01-21

We thus hold that the trial court did not err as a matter of law in concluding that plaintiff met the threshold requirement of serious impairment of body function and should be allowed to proceed to trial on her negligence claim.

Section 500.3135(1) leaves the serious impairment of body function threshold to the trier of fact whenever reasonable minds could differ, even if the facts about the injuries are undisputed.

DiFranco v. Pickard · filed 1986-12-23(1)

The question whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function must be submitted to the trier of fact whenever the evidence would cause reasonable minds to differ as to the answer. This is true even where there is no material factual dispute as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries.

Section 500.3135(1) permits a court to resolve the serious impairment of body function threshold when reasonable minds could not differ that the injury was not serious.

Johnston v. Thorsby · filed 1987-05-22(1)

We find that reasonable minds could not differ regarding whether these facts indicated that plaintiff had sustained a serious impairment of body function as a result of the auto accident. Plaintiff’s wait of two years before seeking treatment of the shoulder and her doctor’s diagnosis that her shoulder had by that time healed indicate that plaintiff’s injury, if caused by the accident, was not a serious impairment of body function.

Section 500.3135’s serious-impairment threshold was not met where the plaintiff had no work or activity restrictions and missed no work or school.

Denson v. Garrison · filed 1985-09-04(1)

While defendant did not introduce medical testimony of his own, a fair reading of the plaintiffs physician’s reports and plaintiff’s own testimony leads us to conclude, as did the trial court, that the plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of body function. The doctor placed no work or activity restrictions upon plaintiff, and she testified in her deposition that she never missed any work or school and that she never claimed to the MESC that she was unable to work during that period following the accident when she was receiving unemployment benefits.

Section 500.3135(1) makes serious impairment of body function a prerequisite to a motor vehicle noneconomic loss claim, so the claim does not accrue until the impairment manifests.

Horan v. Brown · filed 1986-01-22(1)

Under the no-fault act, a prerequisite for maintaining a suit for noneconomic loss arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle is that the injured person suffer death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1). ... Therefore, all of the elements of plaintiffs cause of action in this case did not occur until her injuries manifested themselves in a serious impairment of body function.

Section 500.3135(1)'s serious impairment threshold does not toll the limitations period for a known automobile injury until the plaintiff learns the injury exceeds that threshold.

Gagliardi v. Flack · filed 1989-09-05(1)

We expressly disagree with Mielke and Horan on this issue and conclude that it would be unwise public policy to apply a tolling doctrine to no-fault liability claims. The indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or should have known of his or her likelihood of prevailing before a jury on the threshold issue is a standard too indefinite and uncertain to be administered.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) requires the trial court to make findings about factual disputes concerning the nature and extent of the injuries before deciding serious impairment of body function as a matter of law.

May v. Sommerfield · filed 2000-03-22(2)(a)

Given the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3135(2)(a); MSA 24.13135(2)(a), we conclude that a trial court cannot determine whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law without first making the factual findings required under MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i) or (ii); MSA 24.13135(2)(a)(i) or (ii).

A femur fracture that prevents walking for three months can be a serious impairment of body function even if the person later recovers well.

Kern v. Blethen-Coluni · filed 2000-06-22(7)

The present case similarly involves a serious femur fracture and plaintiff's inability to walk for three months. Walking is an important body function. Although plaintiff had a good recovery, "an injury need not be permanent to be serious." Cassidy, supra at 505, 330 N.W.2d 22. In light of the seriousness of the initial injury, the treatment required, and the duration of disability, we hold that plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of body function.

Section 500.3135(7) permits a temporary hand impairment to meet the serious-impairment threshold when it significantly affects the injured person’s general ability to work and carry out normal activities.

Straub v. Collette · filed 2003-11-10(7)

And so, we conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff suffered “serious impairment of body function” as defined by MCL 500.3135(7).

Section 500.3135(7) requires a claimant injured in successive accidents to prove that a prior impairment was temporary before using the pre-impairment lifestyle as the normal-life baseline, and to show that the later accident exacerbated the impairment or prolonged recovery enough to meet the serious-impairment threshold.

Benefiel v. AUTO-OWNERS INS. CO. · filed 2008-12-12(7)

Therefore, the plaintiff must prove that his preexisting impairment is temporary in order to have his pre- impairment lifestyle considered as his “normal life.” It follows that, in this situation, the plaintiff must show either that his preexisting impairment was exacerbated or that his 2 recovery was prolonged as a result of the subsequent accident for which he seeks noneconomic damages.

Section 500.3135(7)’s serious-impairment threshold cannot be decided as a matter of law when a genuine factual dispute remains about the nature and extent of the person’s injuries.

Chouman v. Home Owners Insurance · filed 2011-08-02(7)

The trier of fact need not accept her conclusions, of course, but because there is a genuine question of fact regarding the nature and extent of Chouman’s injuries, the threshold question of whether she suffered a “serious impairment of body function” may not be decided as a matter of law.

Section 500.3135 requires a plaintiff seeking excess tort damages under the governmental motor vehicle exception to show a serious impairment of body function.

Hunter v. Sisco · filed 2013-04-02

A plaintiff making a tort claim for excess damages under the motor vehicle exception must, as a threshold, show a serious impairment of body function as set forth in the no-fault act, MCL 500.3135.

Section 500.3135 requires a threshold injury before a plaintiff may recover pain and suffering damages in a motor vehicle tort action.

Joel a Peterson v. Mount Morris Board of Eduaction · filed 2015-04-23

Under Hannay, Peterson is entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering proximately caused by the accident, provided that Peterson demonstrates he has sustained a threshold injury as defined by MCL 500.3135.

Section 500.3135(1) imposes no minimum duration for an impairment to qualify as a serious impairment of body function.

Jackson v. Berens · filed 2016-10-11(1)

However, this was erroneous because there is no temporal requirement for how long an impairment must last to satisfy MCL 500.3135(1).

Section 500.3135(1) allows a third-party claim for noneconomic loss when evidence could support a finding that a motor vehicle accident seriously impaired an important body function.

Poulsen v. Visser · filed 2017-06-08(1)

The No-Fault Act, MCL 500.3101 et seq, limits third party tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by “ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle” to situations in which “the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1). ... Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that he suffered a threshold injury, a serious impairment of an important body function, to assert a third party tort claim against Visser.

Section 500.3135 imposes no temporal requirement for a serious impairment of body function, so later MRI findings and medical records may raise a factual question about an impairment caused by an accident.

Hawamada v. Kineish · filed 2017-04-25(5)

Additionally, the plain language of MCL 500.3135 does not include a temporal requirement. Together, the objective MRIs and medical records offered by plaintiffs relate the findings and subjective complaints to the accident.

A material factual dispute over the nature and extent of an injury prevents deciding the serious impairment of body function threshold as a matter of law.

Johnson v. Glosson · filed 2017-11-16(5)

As discussed below, when giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to plaintiff, the record demonstrates that “there appears to be a genuine dispute whether [all of] the objectively manifested abnormalities” in plaintiff’s shoulder, spine, and neck are degenerative or traumatic in nature. Chouman, 293 Mich App at 444. Therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered a serious impairment of a body function.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) leaves the serious-impairment question to the trier of fact when a material dispute about the nature and extent of the injuries precludes deciding it as a matter of law.

Sevic v. Board of Education Lansing School District · filed 2018-02-13(2)(a)

Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that questions of fact existed regarding the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, the trial court properly declined to determine, as a matter of law pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(a), whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function and declined to grant plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict.

Section 500.3135(5)’s serious-impairment threshold may be met when an injury reduces how often a person can perform normal activities, even if the person can still perform them.

Taylor v. Hanni · filed 2018-08-30(5)

While plaintiff apparently is able to do all the activities she did before the accident, there is evidence that she cannot engage in these activities as often as before. Thus, the evidence can be viewed as establishing that “at least some of plaintiff’s capacity to live in [her prior] manner was affected.” Id. at 218; see also id. at 203 (“[T]here is no quantitative minimum as to the percentage of a person’s normal manner of living that must be affected.”). Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s general ability to lead her normal life was affected by her injuries, and we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants.

Section 500.3135(5) permits a serious-impairment finding when an injury temporarily affects a person’s ability to live normally, and attendant care covered by PIP remains relevant to that inquiry.

Hollings v. Grange Insurance Company of Michigan · filed 2018-05-08(5)

There is no express temporal requirement in the McCormick test. McCormick, 487 Mich at 203. ... However, simply because the costs of attendant care would have been covered in plaintiff’s PIP claim does not mean that a trial court can refuse to consider the initial severity of plaintiff’s injuries when determining if plaintiff’s ability to lead his normal life was affected by his injuries.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) leaves the serious impairment threshold to the trier of fact when material facts about the nature and extent of the injury are disputed.

Washington v. City of Detroit · filed 2019-03-07(2)(a)(i)-(ii)

When there is no material factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injury, the court determines, as a matter of law, whether the serious impairment of body function threshold is met as a question of law. However where there are questions of fact regarding the nature and extent of those injuries, the issue is one for the trier of fact. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i)-(ii).

Section 500.3135(5) requires an impairment to affect some of a person’s ability to live normally; evidence that injuries prevent former recreational activities can create a fact question on that requirement.

Cheyne v. Mileena Boles · filed 2019-05-14(5)

“[T]he statute only requires that some of the person’s ability to live in his or her normal manner of living has been affected, not that some of the person’s normal manner of living has itself been affected.” Id. The effect on the person’s ability to live his or her normal life need not be permanent. Id. at 203. ... And when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accepting plaintiff’s testimony as true, plaintiff established a question of fact whether his injuries affected his general ability to lead his normal life.

A serious impairment meets the normal-life requirement when it affects some of a person’s ability to live in their normal manner.

Asraeel v. Farm Bureau General Insurance Co · filed 2019-10-01(5)

Only some of a person’s ability to live in their “normal manner of living” must be affected to meet the threshold requirements of MCL 500.3135.

Section 500.3135(5)’s serious-impairment threshold is a fact question when evidence suggests an accident injury materially limited important aspects of the injured person’s ordinary life.

Dean v. United States · filed 2020-06-22(5)

But her testimony is sufficient to suggest that important aspects of her daily life were compromised by the neurological damage that allegedly was caused by the accident injury, and the determination of how significant the impact of the compromise was on her customary manner of living is an inherently fact-intensive determination that must be left to the factfinder.

Section 500.3135(5) imposes no minimum duration or permanency requirement for a serious impairment of body function.

Smith v. Patsy Buerkel · filed 2021-04-29(5)

Again, there is no temporal requirement regarding how long the impairment must last and no requirement of permanency to meet the serious impairment threshold.

Section 500.3135(1) requires medical evidence linking a claimed serious impairment of body function to the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Kidd v. Liberty Mutual General Insurance Company · filed 2022-06-02(1)

As a general rule, a no-fault claim asserting a serious impairment of body function must be supported by medical evidence showing that the impairment was caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) prevents a court from deciding the serious-impairment threshold as a matter of law when material factual disputes exist about the nature and extent of the injuries.

Jones v. Smith · filed 2022-06-09(2)(a)

As will be discussed more fully below, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the nature and extent of his injuries. Therefore, the trial court erred when it made its decision as a matter of law. MCL 500.3135(a)(2).

Section 500.3135(1) requires evidence that the motor vehicle accident caused or aggravated the claimed impairment to recover noneconomic damages.

Barash v. Kolar · filed 2022-06-23(1)

Plaintiff did not provide any testimony to refute the opinions of defendants’ experts, and failed to introduce any evidence, which could attribute plaintiff’s impairments, new or exacerbated, to the accident.

Section 500.3135(5)(a) requires an impairment observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions; a doctor need not diagnose the underlying injury as serious or significant.

Cyars-Williams v. Skender · filed 2023-04-27(5)(a)

MCL 500.3135(5)(a), which defines what constitutes a “serious impairment of body function,” does not require Cyars-Williams’s doctors to diagnose her with a serious or significant brain injury, rather, she is only required to prove that any impairment is observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions.

Section 500.3135 does not exclude persistent soft tissue injuries from a serious impairment claim when the evidence creates a genuine factual dispute about whether the statutory threshold is met.

Harris v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2023-05-18(5)

However, neither the case law nor MCL 500.3135 render persistent “soft tissue” injuries nonrecoverable, and here, plaintiff met her burden of establishing the existence of genuine issues of disputed fact material to a determination of whether she suffered a serious impairment.

Section 500.3135(5) sets out three elements of a serious impairment of body function; that inquiry does not itself require a finding of causation.

Finley v. Mora · filed 2023-11-14(5)(a)–(c)

As explained, that inquiry has three elements—none of which requires a finding of causation. Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(5)(a)–(c).

A rotator cuff tear that significantly limits ordinary activities can satisfy the serious impairment threshold under § 500.3135(1), even if the impairment is temporary.

Denzer v. Trumbull Insurance Company · filed 2024-03-15(1)

Considering these facts, there is no question remaining that Plaintiff Denzer’s rotator cuff tear rises to the level of a “serious impairment of body function” under Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(1).

Section 500.3135(1) bars a claim for noneconomic damages when the claimant fails to establish a serious impairment of body function.

Nelson v. Wittkowski · filed 2024-07-02(1)

Because plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered a serious impairment of body function, she could not maintain her claims for noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(1).

Section 500.3135(1) requires evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the motor vehicle accident caused the claimed injury; timing alone and evidence that trauma can cause the condition do not establish causation.

Pawlowski v. Kosar · filed 2024-05-30(1)

Specifically, “[a] person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1). ... Viewing the transcripts and medical records in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff’s theory of causation is not sufficiently supported by scientific data or record evidence.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) directs the court to decide the serious-impairment threshold as a matter of law when there is no factual dispute about the injuries or the dispute is immaterial to that threshold.

Kallco v. Pugh · filed 2024-10-30(2)(a)

If there is no factual dispute over the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, or if the dispute is not material to determining whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function, the court should next determine whether the serious-impairment threshold has been crossed.

Section 500.3135(5)(a) requires an impairment supported by symptoms or conditions observable by someone other than the injured person; subjective complaints of pain alone do not establish it.

20241212_C368531_38_368531.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-12-12(5)(a)

An objectively manifested impairment is one evidenced by actual symptoms or conditions observable by someone other than the plaintiff.

Section 500.3135(5) does not automatically treat injuries to any particular body part as a serious impairment of body function.

20250124_C364544_88_364544.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-01-24(5)

The statute does not carve out any category of injuries according to body part that automatically qualify as a threshold injury.

Section 500.3135(1) requires a plaintiff seeking noneconomic damages to show that the motor vehicle accident caused the claimed impairment.

Mays v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2026-03-13(1)

In addition to showing the three prongs of the McCormick test, a plaintiff seeking recovery under MCL 500.3135 must show that the accident caused her injuries.

Section 500.3135(1)'s serious impairment threshold was not met by the plaintiff's broken arm on the proofs presented.

Farquhar v. Owens · filed 1986-02-18(1)

We hold that the proofs did not indicate a serious impairment of a body function and we affirm the trial court's entry of judgment of no cause of action and the denial of plaintiff Deborah Farquhar's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

A serious impairment of body function must affect the injured person’s general ability to lead a normal life; continuing most previous activities may fail that threshold.

Abou-Laila v. Smallpiece · filed 2022-10-12(5)

A “serious impairment of body function” means “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person's general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL § 500.3135(5); McCormick v. Carrier, 487 Mich. 180, 795 N.W.2d 517, 524 (2010). ... Based on Ayah Abou-Laila’s deposition testimony, the Court finds that she is unable to meet the third-prong of McCormick–an impairment which affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.

Section 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) requires physician testimony indicating that a closed-head injury may be a serious neurological injury; a diagnosis alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Churchman v. Richerson · filed 2000-06-02(2)(a)(ii)

Thus, to give effect to the phrase "serious neurological injury," we must conclude that the closed-head injury provision of § 3135 requires more than a diagnosis that a plaintiff has sustained a closed-head injury.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) allows a closed-head injury claim to reach a jury without the specified physician testimony when other evidence creates a material factual dispute about the injury.

Minter v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 2007-08-29(2)(a)

Therefore, the lack of medical testimony on point only precludes plaintiff from taking advantage of the automatic route to a jury issue, it does not necessarily preclude her from establishing a question for the jury by other means.

Section 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) makes a closed-head injury a jury question when a qualified physician testifies under oath that the plaintiff may have a serious neurological injury.

Belknap v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. · filed 2008-04-01(2)(a)(ii)

Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(2)(a)(ii), this sworn testimony automatically created a question of fact for the jury.

Section 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) governs whether a closed-head injury claim reaches a jury under Michigan procedure, but in federal diversity court Rule 56 requires evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.

Shropshire v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. · filed 2008-12-18(2)(a)(ii)

We conclude that the Michigan provision at issue is procedural, and therefore a plaintiff is not entitled to argue her case to a jury merely because she has satisfied its requirements. Instead, plaintiff must produce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, as required by Rule 56(c).

Section 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) requires physician testimony indicating a potentially serious neurological injury to create a jury question under its closed-head-injury provision; a diagnosis of closed-head injury alone is insufficient.

Van Dyke v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2016-03-17(2)(a)(ii)

As discussed in Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 229; 611 NW2d 333 (2000), “to give effect to the phrase ‘serious neurological injury,’ we must conclude that the closed-head injury provision of § 3135 requires more than a diagnosis that a plaintiff has sustained a closed-head injury.” “[T]he plain language of the statute requires some indication by the doctor providing testimony that the injury sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” Id. at 230. The requisite testimony necessary to sustain plaintiff’s claim under MCL 500.3135(2)(ii) was never secured by plaintiff during discovery or the course of the litigation despite the opportunities provided through various orders issued by the trial court and the grant of several adjournments.

Section 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) creates a jury question for a closed-head injury only when a physician who regularly diagnoses or treats such injuries testifies under oath that there may be a serious neurological injury.

Seabolt v. Caparaotta · filed 2016-08-11(2)(a)(ii)

However, MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) provides that a question of fact is created if a licensed physician “who regularly diagnoses or treats closed-head injuries testifies under oath there may be a serious neurological injury.” (Emphasis added.) Pallas is an oncologist and he did not attest that he regularly diagnoses or treats closed head injuries. For that reason alone, Pallas’s affidavit, even if considered as part of the record, is legally insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

A closed-head injury report that does not indicate a possible serious neurological injury does not create a jury question under subsection (2)(a)(ii).

Sanders v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2017-07-20(2)(a)(ii)

Dr. Sewick’s report has the same infirmity: it does not satisfy the requirements of MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) to create a question of fact that Sarah suffered a “serious neurological injury” from a closed head injury as a result of the automobile accident that is a serious impairment of a body function.

A closed-head injury diagnosis in a medical record, without sworn physician testimony indicating a possible serious neurological injury, does not establish the factual dispute provided for by subsection (2)(a)(ii).

Aziz v. Jenna 1 Trucking Inc · filed 2019-06-20(2)(a)(ii)

Dr. Green’s diagnosis is noted in plaintiff’s medical record, but the record does not constitute testimony under oath as required under MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii). Moreover, Dr. Green’s diagnosis does not include any indication as to the severity of the closed-head injury. Therefore, as in Churchman, plaintiff has not raised a factual dispute as to the closed-head injury sufficient to meet the requirement under MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii).

A closed-head injury creates a question of fact for the jury under § 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) if a qualifying physician testifies under oath that there may be a serious neurological injury.

Orvis v. Moore · filed 2022-12-22(2)(a)(ii)

The plain language of MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii), however, provides: “for a closed-head injury, a question of fact for the jury is created if a licensed allopathic or osteopathic physician who regularly diagnoses or treats closed- head injuries testifies under oath that there may be a serious neurological injury.” In this case, no doctors testified under oath that there may be a serious neurological injury. Plaintiff, therefore, has not established the existence of a question of fact under this statutory provision.

Medical records do not satisfy subsection (2)(a)(ii)’s requirement of sworn physician testimony that a closed-head injury may be a serious neurological injury.

Klc v. Hussein-Afrah · filed 2024-04-11(2)(a)(ii)

And, in this case, plaintiffs’ response to Amazon’s motion for summary disposition included a plethora of medical records, which, first of all, does not constitute testimony under oath as required by MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii), and, second, only refer to a “mild traumatic brain injury” as to Joseph, but not even that diagnosis as to KLC—there was no diagnosis of a closed-head injury of any kind as to KLC.

Section 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) requires evidence of a serious neurological injury for its closed-head-injury provision; a conclusory statement that a plaintiff has post-concussion syndrome is insufficient.

20250113_C370762_55_370762.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-01-13(2)(a)(ii)

Consequently, because the affidavit does not show plaintiff suffered a “serious neurological injury,” and instead merely states, in a conclusory manner, that plaintiff suffers from post-concussion syndrome, it is insufficient to satisfy MCL 500.3135.

Subsection (2)(a)(ii) requires testimony under oath to invoke its closed-head injury exception; an IME report does not establish that requirement without a showing that it is sworn.

Burks v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp · filed 2026-04-09(2)(a)(ii)

MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii), however, expressly requires “testi[mony] under oath”; plaintiff fails to explain how the IME report here might satisfy that requirement.

For a claimed closed-head injury to create a question of fact, a qualifying physician must testify under oath that the person may have a serious neurological injury.

Sanders v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2017-07-20(2)(a)(ii)

Although Dr. Pappas is a DO, she did not testify under oath, and her report does not come close to establishing that Sarah suffered a “serious neurological injury,” MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii), in the automobile accident.

Section 500.3135 allows summary judgment when an alleged injury clearly falls below the serious impairment of body function threshold; whether an injury meets that threshold depends on the individual case.

Vitale v. Danylak · filed 1977-03-31

In holding that summary judgment is available where the alleged injuries fall below certain definitional limits we do not mean to impose any strict rules for formulation of those limitations. Terms such as "serious” do not easily lend themselves to a delineated set of guidelines. As stated by the Supreme Court, each case must be handled individually. We are confident that the trial bench can, as in all cases of summary judgment, exercise this procedure with care and concern for justice.

Section 500.3135 permits a trial court to explain the serious impairment of body function threshold to the jury when the explanation accurately conveys the statutory standard.

Stevens v. Hogue · filed 1978-08-08(1)

The court’s instruction in this case seems to us to be accurate, and fair to both sides. It informs the jury of an acceptable meaning of a somewhat nebulous phrase. ... We hold only that the trial court’s amplification in this case did not detract from the statute or invade the province of the jury.

Section 500.3135(1) permits summary judgment when the claimed injuries fall below the serious impairment threshold; discomfort from an accident alone does not meet that threshold.

Harris v. McVickers · filed 1979-02-06(1)

The controversy in the instant case is not what injuries were sustained but whether such injuries meet the requisite legal threshold necessary to permit a jury determination of the applicability of § 3135. ... There is no doubt that plaintiffs suffered discomfort due to the accident. However, the degree of injury in this case is insufficient to meet the minimum threshold requirement.

Section 500.3135(1)'s serious impairment threshold is a question of law when no reasonable jury could view the impairment as serious; the determination is made case by case.

Brooks v. Reed · filed 1979-10-16(1)

The question of serious impairment is one of law where it can be said with certainty that no reasonable jury could view a plaintiff's impairment as serious. Such question must be approached on a case-by-case basis.

Under § 500.3135(1), the serious-impairment threshold is for the jury when reasonable people could differ on whether the injury meets it.

Cassidy v. McGovern · filed 1980-06-04(1)

In the present case, liability was admitted; the sole issue submitted to the jury being whether serious impairment of body function had occurred. The jury rejected plaintiffs' position and found no serious impairment of body function, showing that reasonable men can differ. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict. From our review of the testimony offered by plaintiffs, we find that reasonable men can reach different conclusions. Thus, the trial court was correct in submitting this issue to the jury.

Section 500.3135 leaves serious impairment of a body function to the jury when a six-week arm cast substantially hinders ordinary child care and household tasks, even if the injured person can still perform them with difficulty.

Earls v. Herrick · filed 1981-07-08

The orthopedic surgeon who set the arm was of the opinion that plaintiff had complete loss of use of her upper arm while it remained in the cast. While it is true plaintiff stated on cross-examination that she could still care for her child and do her household chores with the cast on, she also indicated that this was possible only with increased difficulty. It was a question for the jury as to whether this added difficulty was severe enough to allow the conclusion that there had been a serious impairment of a body function.

Section 500.3135 permits a jury to decide whether an injury is a serious impairment of body function when a material factual dispute exists about the nature and extent of the injury.

Galli v. Reutter · filed 1985-12-06

We find that regardless of which standard is applied in this case the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motions since there existed a factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries which was material to the determination of whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function.

Evidence of impaired back movement, medically observed muscle spasms, and limits on daily activities can suffice to defeat summary judgment under § 500.3135(1)'s serious-impairment threshold.

Harris v. Lemicex · filed 1986-04-23(1)

In determining whether the no-fault threshold standard of MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1) of a serious impairment of a body function has been met, where there is no material factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff's injury, the trial court can determine as a matter of law that there has been a serious impairment of a body function when it finds that the following three criteria have been met: (1) the body function which is impaired must be an important one; (2) the impairment must be serious; and (3) the injuries must be objectively manifested. ... Although we find that plaintiff's threshold showing of serious impairment of a body function was marginal, it was sufficient to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment in the instant case.

Section 500.3135(1) treats memory as an important body function and requires a jury to decide serious impairment when the nature and extent of an objectively manifested head injury are disputed.

Shaw v. Martin · filed 1986-10-06(1)

There is a dispute between the parties and their doctors as to the nature and extent of plaintiffs head injury. Plaintiffs neuropsychologist believes plaintiffs injury was objectively manifested by his tests, while the doctors employed by defendant do not. Therefore, the determination of serious impairment of body function regarding plaintiffs complaint of loss of memory must be made by the jury in this case, and the trial judge properly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this basis.

Section 500.3135(1) leaves the serious-impairment threshold to the jury when reasonable minds could differ about the nature, extent, or seriousness of the injury.

Beard v. City of Detroit · filed 1987-03-03(1)

The trial court in this case, by denying plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict, correctly concluded that there was a material factual dispute as to the nature and extent of plaintiffs injuries that raised issues for the jury to decide. As to plaintiffs physical injuries, his overall impairment was not so "serious” within the meaning of the word as used in the statute that all reasonable minds would have concluded that it was serious.

Section 500.3135 requires death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement before tort recovery; a jury verdict awarding damages after finding this threshold unmet is inconsistent.

Beasley v. Washington · filed 1988-07-05(1)

The no-fault act requires a plaintiff to establish a threshold of death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement before recovery is permitted, MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13155 . As the verdict form indicates, the jury found that plaintiffs had not established the threshold for recovery. Yet, despite the fact that the jury found no serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement, the jury proceeded to award damages. ... We conclude that this verdict was inconsistent.

Under the applicable version of § 500.3135(1), evidence of impaired back and jaw function can create a jury question on whether an injured person suffered a serious impairment of body function.

Paisley v. Waterford Roof Truss, Ltd. · filed 1997-07-11(1)

In the instant case, although a close question, it cannot be said with certainty that a reasonable juror would find plaintiffs injuries to his back and jaw to be so minor or of such a superficial nature that they do not constitute a “serious impairment of body function.” Rather, a rational fact-finder could conclude that plaintiffs injuries affected “the ability of his body, in whole or part, to function.” Accordingly, summary judgment cannot be granted to the defendant with respect to this issue.

A documented leg injury that prevents a person from doing prior work and family activities can present a jury question whether the injury affects the person’s general ability to lead a normal life.

Bradford v. Wurm · filed 2009-04-06(7)

The statute defines “serious impairment of body function” as “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(7). ... The defendants argue, however, that this impairment did not affect the plaintiffs general ability to lead his life. The Court finds, however, that fact issues exist in the record that preclude judgment on this point as a matter of law. The plaintiff testified that the injury has changed his life in two ways: it has interfered with his ability to play with his grandchildren and has prevented him from running his biological waste removal business.

A material factual dispute about the nature and extent of the injuries prevents a court from deciding serious impairment of body function as a question of law.

Donaldson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2015-02-12(2)(a)

Thus, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, there is a material factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered in the motor vehicle collision. See MCL 500.3135(2)(a). This material factual dispute precluded determination of the issue as a question of law whether plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of body function.

Medical and lay evidence can support a jury finding of serious impairment of body function under § 500.3135(1), permitting noneconomic damages.

Nolan v. Chapman · filed 2015-04-23(1)

Similarly, though there were factual disputes as to the extent of Lorri’s injuries,5 she possessed sufficient evidence, both medical and lay, from which a reasonable jury could find that she had suffered a “serious impairment of body function” under MCL 500.3135(1), thus providing for an award of noneconomic damages which, in his case evaluation summary, Chapman calculated to be $1,300,000.

Section 500.3135(2) leaves the serious-impairment threshold to the jury when a factual dispute about the nature and extent of the injuries is material to that determination.

Wilcox v. Beals · filed 2015-05-05(2)

In this case, there can be little argument that there was a “factual dispute concerning the nature and extent” of plaintiff’s injuries and that this factual dispute was “material to the determination whether [plaintiff] has suffered a serious impairment of body function.” The trial court properly concluded that the jury was to determine, based upon the court’s instructions, whether or not plaintiff’s injuries reached that threshold and so the opinion sought from Warnars was one that embraced an ultimate issue of fact for the jury.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) leaves serious impairment of body function to the jury when a factual dispute about the nature and extent of the injury is material to that determination.

Myrtle Flossie Moore v. Swafford · filed 2015-06-16(2)(a)(ii)

Rather, the record evidence showed that the factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injury was material to the determination of whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of a body function and the issue therefore was a question of fact for the jury.

Under § 500.3135(2)(a), whether an injury is a serious impairment of body function is a question of law when there is no material factual dispute about the injury.

Nelson v. Dubose · filed 2011-02-01(2)(a)

The question whether there is a serious impairment of body function is a question of law if there is no factual dispute about the injuries, or if any factual dispute is immaterial to the question.

Section 500.3135(2) leaves serious impairment of body function to the jury when a material factual dispute exists about the nature and extent of the injury.

Blackburn v. Bagley · filed 2017-10-19(2)

MCL 500.3135(2) makes clear that the court is not to resolve factual disputes and where such disputes exist, the serious impairment issue is one for the jury, not an issue of law for the court.

Under § 500.3135(2)(a), a jury decides the serious-impairment threshold when conflicting evidence about the nature and extent of hearing loss is material to that threshold.

Patrick v. Turkelson · filed 2018-01-16(2)(a)

Based on this conflicting evidence, there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the nature and extent of the impairment to Lindsey’s hearing and that was material to the threshold injury determination; thus, the trial court erred by ruling on this question as a matter of law and granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.

Section 500.3135 leaves the serious-impairment threshold to the jury when a material factual dispute concerns the nature and extent of the injured person’s injuries.

Williams v. Michigan · filed 2018-05-17(2)(a)

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the threshold issue could not be determined as a matter of law because there is a factual dispute over the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries that is material to the determination as to whether she suffered a serious impairment of an important body function under MCL 500.3135.

Section 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) leaves the serious-impairment threshold to the factfinder when a material dispute about the nature and extent of the injuries affects whether that threshold is met.

Thompson-Bey v. City of Detroit · filed 2018-09-18(2)(a)(ii)

Where the parties dispute the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries, and the factual dispute “is material to determining whether the threshold standards are met[,]” the trial court, and this Court, may not decide, as a question of law, whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of a body function. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii); McCormick, 487 Mich at 192-193.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) leaves the serious impairment of body function question to the jury when material facts about the nature and extent of the injuries are disputed.

Thompson v. Powell · filed 2018-12-27(2)(a)

A factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries exists, making the issue whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function a question for the jury rather than one to be decided by the trial court as a matter of law. MCL 500.3135(2)(a); Patrick, 322 Mich App at 607-608.

Section 500.3135(1) requires admissible evidence that a motor vehicle accident caused the claimed serious impairment or aggravated a preexisting condition; without it, summary disposition is proper.

Bernardi v. Tonya Melynda Rock · filed 2020-06-18(1)

And because plaintiff otherwise failed to produce admissible evidence to create a material question of fact to demonstrate that his herniated disc or aggravation of his degenerative spinal conditions was causally related to the accident, the trial court properly granted defendant summary disposition.

Under § 500.3135(5), admissible evidence that raises a genuine factual dispute over whether a crash caused an objectively manifested impairment prevents summary disposition on that requirement.

Pelc v. North Star Ranch Inc · filed 2019-02-21(5)

Applying the analysis set forth in McCormick, we hold that plaintiffs established through admissible evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact whether James suffered objectively manifested impairments as required under MCL 500.3135(5).

Section 500.3135(2)(a) leaves the serious impairment threshold to the jury when a material factual dispute remains about the nature or extent of the injuries, including whether an impairment continued.

Ybarra v. Visintainer · filed 2019-11-21(2)(a)

This Court has concluded that, when a factual issue exists regarding the nature and the extent of an injury, particularly regarding whether objectively manifested abnormalities continued to be impairments, a directed verdict is improper and the claim should be submitted to the jury. ... Therefore, because questions remained regarding the extent and duration of plaintiff’s injuries and the impact, if any, those injuries continued to have on plaintiff’s life, the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and properly submitted the claim to the jury.

A material dispute over whether an injury is objectively manifested precludes summary disposition on the serious impairment of body function threshold.

White v. Joseph · filed 2020-03-19(5)

This factual dispute is material to determining whether the serious impairment of body function threshold is met because the conflicting medical evidence is relevant to determining whether plaintiff suffered an objectively manifested impairment. Therefore, because there is some question regarding the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries, and because the dispute is material to determining whether the serious impairment of body function threshold is met, the court should not have granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

Under § 500.3135(5), medical evidence of spinal impairment and limits on work and daily activities can create a factual dispute over serious impairment that precludes summary disposition.

Johnson v. Everest National Insurance Company · filed 2021-01-14(5)

Johnson’s MRI, for example, demonstrated that she has disc herniations in her lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine. ... Again, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, there is a question of fact about whether her impairments impact her ability to lead a normal life. We therefore conclude the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition on her claims.

Section 500.3135(1) requires a claimant seeking underinsured motorist benefits to show that a qualifying serious impairment was caused by the motor vehicle accident; a factual dispute over medical causation precludes summary disposition.

Whitney v. Grange Insurance Company of Michigan · filed 2022-11-10(1)

Under the no-fault act, that means a plaintiff must prove noneconomic loss caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, as well as a threshold injury of death, serious impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135(1); McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 192-193; 795 NW2d 517 (2010).

When a material factual dispute concerns the nature and extent of an injury, the factfinder decides whether it is a serious impairment of body function.

Rokosz v. Labean · filed 2021-08-19(2)(a)

Because defendant contests the nature and extent of the injuries, the question whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of a body function is one to be made by the factfinder. The court may dispose of the question as a matter of law only where there is no question of material fact.

A factual dispute over whether an accident caused a new impairment or aggravated a preexisting condition can preclude summary disposition on the objectively manifested impairment requirement.

Smith v. Auto Club Insurance Association · filed 2022-04-21(5)(a)

Because the trial court based its grant of summary disposition on improperly resolving questions of fact regarding causation to determine that plaintiff had not suffered an objectively manifested impairment as a result of the accident, the trial court’s ruling was erroneous.

Section 500.3135(5)(c) allows a jury to find that an impairment affects normal life when it limits some of the injured person’s ordinary activities.

Johnson v. Liberty Mutual General Insurance Company · filed 2022-03-10(5)(c)

Applying these principles to the instant case and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, a jury could reasonably conclude that the third McCormick prong was satisfied.

Section 500.3135(2) leaves the serious-impairment question to the jury when a material factual dispute exists over whether the impairment affected the injured person’s general ability to lead a normal life.

Kreft v. Ridgway · filed 2023-08-31(2)

We conclude that reasonable persons, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants as the nonmoving parties, could honestly reach different conclusions about whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function; specifically, whether the impairment affected his general ability to lead his normal life. Therefore, the issue was properly submitted to the jury for determination and the jury verdict in favor of defendants must be reinstated.

A genuine factual dispute over whether an impairment meets the serious-impairment threshold under § 500.3135(5) must be resolved by the factfinder.

Bingham v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2024-05-30(5)

When viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, a genuine issue of material fact existed whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of a serious impairment of body function. See MacDonald, 335 Mich App at 622. It is unnecessary for us to resolve whether plaintiff did in fact satisfy the three prongs of McCormick. Because reasonable minds may differ regarding whether plaintiff met the tort threshold, these conflicting facts are properly resolved by the trier of fact. As a result, summary disposition should not have been granted.

Section 500.3135(5)(c) sets no minimum duration for a serious impairment of body function; the jury may consider how long the impairment lasted in deciding whether it was serious.

20231130_C362389_52_362389.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-11-30(5)(c)

Yet, the jury was free to determine—after weighing the evidence and witness credibility— whether “weeks” was sufficient or was insufficient in this particular case.

Section 500.3135(1) permits a jury to decide whether a person has suffered a serious impairment of body function when medical evidence supports an objectively manifested impairment and limits on the person’s normal life.

Antton Brewer v. Adams · filed 2026-03-16(1)

Turning to the merits of defendant’s argument, the trial court did not err by finding that a question of fact existed regarding whether plaintiff suffered a threshold injury, as required under MCL 500.3135(1). ... Thus, a reasonable jury could find that the collision affected plaintiff’s ability to lead his normal life. Therefore, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the trial court did not err by finding that a genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiff suffered a threshold injury.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) leaves the serious-impairment question to the jury when a factual dispute about the nature and extent of the injuries is material to that determination.

Yvetta Turner v. Britain E Ward · filed 2025-02-21(2)(a)

Accordingly, MCL 500.3135(2)(a) precluded the trial court from deciding as a question of law whether Turner suffered a serious impairment of body function.

Section 500.3135(1) permits a noneconomic loss claim when evidence allows a jury to find that a motor vehicle accident aggravated a preexisting condition.

Maraldo v. United States · filed 2025-03-28(1)

Even if the evidence is not very strong, a reasonable jury could find, on this record, that the car accident aggravated Maraldo’s degenerative conditions.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) makes serious impairment a question of law when no factual dispute, or no material factual dispute, concerns the nature and extent of the injured person’s injuries.

Marshall v. Usaa Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2025-09-30(2)(a)

Although plaintiff contends that this issue presents a question of fact, MCL 500.3135 states that the issue of whether “the injured person has suffered serious impairment of body function” is a question of law if there is no factual dispute or no material factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) leaves the serious-impairment threshold for the jury when a material factual dispute concerns the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, including claimed ongoing impairments.

Sakarya v. Farm Bureau Insurance Company · filed 2025-12-18(2)(a)

Because there is a dispute regarding whether and to what extent, if at all, appellee is suffering present impairments, and will suffer impairments in the future, the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that the impairment threshold of MCL 500.3135(2)(a) is satisfied.

Section 500.3135(1) requires an objectively manifested serious impairment of an important body function; medically unsubstantiated pain and general pain and suffering do not meet that threshold.

Williams v. Payne · filed 1984-01-03(1)

Medically unsubstantiated pain will always be present in a tort action for pain and suffering. The Legislature could not intend so low a threshold for avoiding the no-fault act’s proscription against tort actions. General pain and suffering is not sufficient to meet the threshold.

Section 500.3135(1) requires a serious impairment of an important body function for noneconomic recovery; an objectively manifested permanent injury that does not significantly affect the person’s ability to live a normal life does not meet that threshold.

Sherrell v. Bugaski · filed 1984-09-21(1)

Nevertheless, as the trial court found, we cannot find this impairment "serious” within the meaning of the statute. The injury has not caused a significant impact on plaintiff’s ability to live a normal life. Plaintiff can walk, drive, and work and her doctors have never restricted her work or social activities. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish as a matter of law that she suffers serious impairment of body functions.