Statute Annotations › Michigan › Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b

Possession of firearm during commission of felony: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Michigan
Case notes
652
Cited in passing
3,210
Citing cases indexed
3,919
Case dates
1978–2026
Screened through
2026-06-24
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-02
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

3,862 citing cases reviewed of 3,919 in the citation index: 652 interpreted the section (annotated below), 3,210 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-24 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1979-11-13 Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge upheld separate felony-firearm convictions and cumulative punishment, displacing contrary intermediate-court rules. Source
  • 1981-03-10 People v. Sawyer held that repeat-offender enhancement needs a prior conviction before the later offense and that § 750.227b does not itself authorize consecutive felony-firearm terms. Source
  • 1982-12-23 People v. Lewis held that acquittal on the predicate felony does not defeat a felony-firearm conviction. Source
  • 1985-11-22 People v. Morton allowed separate felony-firearm counts for separate felonies in a single transaction, rejecting the one-count rule in Adams. Source
  • 1986-12-30 People v. Sturgis allowed cumulative concealed-weapon and felony-firearm convictions when another felony serves as the predicate. Source
  • 1991-03-28 1990 PA 321 added §§ 750.223 and 750.230 to the predicate-felony exceptions; the official history records its effective date. Source
  • 2000-12-12 People v. Clark confined consecutive felony-firearm sentencing to the specific predicate felony. Source
  • 2015-07-01 2015 PA 26 narrowed the firearm definition in § 750.222 to explosive-powered weapons and added § 750.227b(2) for pneumatic guns used in furtherance of a felony; moving the unchanged consecutive-sentence rule from (2) to (3) did not change that rule. Source
  • 2017-07-25 People v. Wilson overruled Stewart's separate-incidents requirement for prior felony-firearm convictions. Source
  • 2018-06-12 People v. Washington treated a Public Health Code drug-house offense punishable in state prison as a predicate felony despite its misdemeanor label. Source
  • 2024-10-07 People v. Adelanwa reaffirmed Lewis's controlling 1982 rule that a predicate-felony conviction is unnecessary, contrary to one 2020 intermediate-court note. Source

Separate offense, sentence enhancement, and double jeopardy

Section 750.227b does not violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy.

People v. Hutcherson · filed 1980-01-10

Next, defendant claims that his conviction under the felony-firearm statute is invalid because the statute violates his constitutional right against double jeopardy. This claim was recently settled and has been rejected by the Michigan Supreme Court in Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich 374; 280 NW2d 793 (1979).
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Section 750.227b(1) authorizes cumulative punishment for felony-firearm and felon in possession because felon in possession is not one of the statute's enumerated exceptions.

Cistrunk v. Campbell · filed 2020-01-23(1)

The Michigan Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for the offenses of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony such that Petitioner’s convictions for both of those offenses do not violate double jeopardy protections.
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Section 750.227b(1) permits an additional felony-firearm sentence for a felon-in-possession conviction because felon-in-possession is not one of the statute’s four enumerated exceptions.

People v. Cain · filed 2012-12-20(1)

The offense of felon-in-possession is not one of the four exceptions specifically listed in the felony-firearm statute. See MCL 750.227b. Therefore, pursuant to clearly established precedent, defendant’s convictions for felon-in-possession and felony-firearm did not violate his double jeopardy rights.
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Law changed since Michigan Supreme Court's 1979 Wayne County Prosecutor decision reinstated separate felony-firearm convictions and cumulative sentences, ending this contrary intermediate-court rule.

Section 750.227b operates as a sentence-enhancement provision rather than as a separate felony statute.

People v. McDowell · filed 1978-09-20(1), (2)

Rather than strike down the statute in its entirety, we construe it to be inoperable only as a separate distinct felony statute. We view it rather as a sentence enhancement or sentence augmenting statute.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 750.227b operates as a sentence-enhancement provision rather than as a separate felony, so it authorizes an augmented sentence for the underlying felony but not a separate felony-firearm conviction.

People v. Moore · filed 1978-12-05(1), (2)

In view of the opinion of Judge BASHARA expressed in People v McDowell, 85 Mich App 697; 272 NW2d 576 (1978), and that of Judge BRENNAN in People v Blount, 87 Mich App 501; 275 NW2d 21 (1978), we set aside the conviction for felony firearm. However, the defendant's sentence as an augmentation of the penalty for the underlying felony is upheld.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A felony-firearm conviction is constitutionally invalid when paired with an armed-robbery conviction because armed robbery is a necessarily included offense of felony-firearm.

People v. Berry · filed 1978-09-20

However, we do not believe defendant's conviction under the felony-firearm statute is constitutionally valid. ... Though we find the robbery armed charge a necessarily included offense of the felony-firearm charge, we choose to vacate the conviction under the felony-firearm statute and affirm the robbery armed conviction.
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Section 750.227b does not violate federal or state double jeopardy protections when applied alongside a conviction for assault with intent to rob while armed.

People v. Mitchell · filed 1978-09-20

We reject defendant's claim that the felony-firearm statute is an unconstitutional violation of the Federal and state double jeopardy clauses as applied to him in this case for the reasons set forth in People v Walter Johnson.
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Section 750.227b permits cumulative punishment for both the underlying felony and possessing a firearm during that felony without violating double jeopardy.

People v. Dillon · filed 1978-12-08

In the present case the Legislature clearly intended that a defendant who possesses a firearm during the course of a felony be punished for both the felony and the possession of the firearm. This intent is evidenced by the consecutive sentencing requirement and the mandatory two-year sentence for the possession of the firearm. Although the statutory goal might better have been accomplished by enacting a sentence-enhancement scheme similar to that of the habitual offender act, MCL 769.10-769.13; MSA 28.1082-28.1085, the failure to draft the felony-firearm statute in such a manner does not render it constitutionally infirm. See Gore v United States, 357 US 386, 392-393; 78 S Ct 1280; 2 L Ed 2d 1405 (1958). Therefore, we concur with other panels of this Court and uphold the validity of the felony-firearm statute.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction alongside an armed robbery conviction arising from the same criminal transaction without violating double jeopardy.

People v. Carter · filed 1979-01-03

Defendant also claims that it is a violation of double jeopardy, US Const, Am V, Const 1963, art 1, § 15, to convict him of both armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), as a result of one criminal transaction. For the reasons stated in Judge BEASLEY's opinion in People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich App 654; 272 NW2d 605 (1978), we conclude that these convictions did not violate the double jeopardy clause.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 750.227b operates as a sentence-enhancement measure imposing a mandatory minimum term for the underlying felony, rather than as a separate offense, and does not violate Michigan Constitution article 4, section 25 because it is complete in itself and does not amend another statute by reference.

People v. Blount · filed 1978-12-05

It is clear that the felony-firearm statute does not fall within "the mischief designed to be remedied by" the constitutional provision. The statute in question is complete within itself, requires reference to no other statute for its meaning, nor does it alter or amend another statute by reference to the other statute's title. Therefore, the felony-firearm statute is not violative of Michigan Const 1963, art 4, § 25. ... In light of the above we construe that portion of the statute inoperable to the effect that it delineates possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as a separate and distinct offense. We view and uphold the statute as a sentence enhancement and sentence augmenting measure designed to set forth a mandatory minimum term of incarceration on the underlying felony.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 750.227b cannot be applied in addition to a conviction for a firearm-related underlying felony without violating double jeopardy.

People v. Chamblis · filed 1978-12-08

On November 8, 1977, defendant pled guilty to the crime of assault with intent to rob being armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and possession of a firearm in commission of or attempted commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). ... We wish to call to the attention of the litigants, the bench and bar that in this opinion we do not rule on the constitutionality of the felony-firearm act itself, but, rather, hold that the double jeopardy provision of the Michigan Constitution and the Constitution of the United States prevents application of the act under the facts of this case. We leave to a later date the issue of the constitutionality of the felony-firearm act when the underlying felony is not firearm related, such as a violation of the controlled substances act or the criminal sexual conduct act.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 750.227b augments the sentence for the underlying felony but does not permit a separate felony-firearm conviction in addition to the conviction for that felony.

People v. Noel · filed 1979-03-06

We have held in People v Blount, 87 Mich App 501; 275 NW2d 21 (1978), that the rule against double jeopardy prohibits separate convictions on both felony firearm and the underlying felony. In accordance with that opinion we set aside the two convictions for felony firearm. However the defendant's sentence as an augmentation of the penalty for the underlying felony is upheld.
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Section 750.227b creates a separate felony for carrying or possessing a firearm during a felony or attempted felony and requires its sentence to be imposed cumulatively, consecutively, and before the sentence for the underlying offense.

Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge · filed 1979-11-13(1), (2)

The statute decrees that any person carrying or possessing a firearm during a felony or attempted felony "is guilty of a felony" and shall be imprisoned for two years. This two-year sentence must be imposed "in addition to" the sentence for the felony or attempted felony and must be served "consecutively" to and "preceding" the sentence for that crime.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 750.227b creates a separate felony offense, but applying it to convict and punish a person for both felony-firearm and the underlying felony based on the same occurrence violates double jeopardy.

People v. Harris · filed 1979-01-23

The above language is language commonly used to create a separate felony offense. ... However, application of such statute to accomplish a double conviction and a double punishment based upon the same occurrence violates constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
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Section 750.227b applies to armed robbery and permits a separate felony-firearm conviction and mandatory minimum punishment without violating double jeopardy.

People v. Gary Hughes · filed 1978-09-20(1)

The statute applies by its terms to all felonies except those explicitly excluded. ... "Felony" includes robbery armed. MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. By this statute the Legislature has attempted to make certainty of minimal punishment the standard where firearms are involved in the commission of felonies. The minimal punishment purpose applies with equal force to robbery armed crimes as to other crimes. As it cannot be doubted that the Legislature could have amended the robbery armed statute to add as a proviso that there be a minimal punishment where the dangerous weapon is a firearm, without offending the double jeopardy clause, see Gore v United States, supra , there is no double jeopardy impediment to its attainment of the same goal by separate statute. Since the Legislature intended the type of result obtained in the instant case, the convictions do not violate double jeopardy protection.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 750.227b requires its felony-firearm sentence to precede and run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony, but convictions for both offenses violate double jeopardy because the underlying felony is necessarily included in felony-firearm.

Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge · filed 1978-09-20(2)

Along these lines, and in light of our holding that convictions on both felony-firearm and the underlying felony violate double jeopardy, we acknowledge that the intent of the Legislature to impose consecutive and multiple punishments will be frustrated.
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Law changed since Michigan Supreme Court's 1986 Sturgis decision allowed cumulative concealed-weapon and felony-firearm convictions when another felony supports the felony-firearm count.

Section 750.227b does not authorize convictions for both felony-firearm and carrying a concealed weapon based on the same possession of a firearm, even when another felony supports the felony-firearm conviction.

People v. Carter · filed 1980-04-21(1)

The felony-firearm statute expressly provides that one element of the crime of felony-firearm is the commission or attempted commission of any felony other than carrying a concealed weapon or unlawful possession of a weapon. ... Because the Legislature has not clearly authorized separate convictions for both carrying a concealed weapon and felony-firearm based on one possession of a firearm, one of the convictions and its attendant punishment cannot stand.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction alongside an armed-robbery conviction without violating double-jeopardy protections.

People v. Williams · filed 1980-07-02

Defendant first contends that his conviction for felony-firearm is violative of double jeopardy protections. This issue has been resolved against defendant's position in Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich 374; 280 NW2d 793 (1979), app dis sub nom Brintley v Michigan, 444 US 948; 100 S Ct 418; 62 L Ed 2d 317 (1979). ... Accordingly, we affirm defendant's felony-firearm conviction, as well as one count of armed robbery, and the sentences imposed thereupon.
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Section 750.227b allows a felony-firearm conviction together with an armed-robbery conviction without violating double-jeopardy protections.

People v. Casey · filed 1980-12-16

Defendant’s final claim that convictions for both felony-firearm and armed robbery violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy has been decided adversely to his position.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction in addition to a conviction for the underlying felony without violating double jeopardy.

People v. Berry · filed 1980-11-24

It is argued that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside defendant Berry’s convictions of felony firearm on the theory that her convictions of the underlying felonies and felony firearm constituted double jeopardy. We agree.
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Section 750.227b allows a felony-firearm conviction alongside a conviction for the underlying assault without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.

People v. Larry Smith · filed 1981-05-06

On January 23, 1979, defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). ... Defendant concedes that his final contention, that his convictions of both felony-firearm and assault for only one assault violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, has been resolved to the contrary.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction in addition to a felonious-assault conviction without violating double jeopardy.

People v. Owens · filed 1981-08-18

On May 3, 1978, defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). ... Defendant argues that his conviction for both possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and felonious assault violates his constitutional right not to be twice placed in jeopardy. We consider the decision of the Supreme Court in Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich 374; 280 NW2d 793 (1979), dispositive of this issue. Conviction on both counts does not place the defendant in double jeopardy.
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Section 750.227b creates a separate crime distinct from the underlying felony and requires cumulative punishment.

People v. Carmouche · filed 1982-01-06

In enacting the felony-firearm statute, the Legislature intended to create a separate crime distinct from the underlying felony and intended that cumulative punishment should be imposed.
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A felony-firearm conviction and a short-barreled-shotgun possession conviction cannot both stand when the felony-firearm proofs necessarily establish the possession charge and both convictions rest on a single act.

People v. Bonner · filed 1982-05-04

The factual proofs of felony-firearm in this case necessarily proved the charge of possession of a short-barreled shotgun in this case. Since the convictions are based on proof of a single act, the multiple convictions cannot be allowed to stand.
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Section 750.227b creates a separate offense whose sentence is cumulative to, not a substitute for, sentences for other offenses.

People v. Lewis · filed 1983-10-12

Felony-firearm is a separate and distinct offense from other simultaneous charges. ... Its sentence is intended to be cumulative to, and not a substitute for, sentences for other offenses.
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Law changed since Michigan Supreme Court's 1985 Morton decision allowed a separate felony-firearm conviction for each separate felony committed with a firearm during one transaction.

Section 750.227b permits only one felony-firearm conviction when a defendant engages in a single criminal transaction, regardless of how many firearms the defendant carries or possesses or how many felonies the defendant commits or attempts.

People v. Haggart · filed 1985-05-06(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the language of the felony-firearm statute is ambiguous and the rule of lenity must therefore be applied. We conclude that, where a defendant engages in a single criminal transaction, the felony-firearm statute supports only a single conviction regardless of the number of firearms carried or possessed by the defendant and regardless of the number of felonies committed or attempted by the defendant.
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Section 750.227b permits a separate felony-firearm conviction for each separate felony committed by a person possessing a firearm, including separate felonies committed during a single transaction.

People v. Morton · filed 1985-11-22(1)

Where, as here, the defendant is convicted of separate assaults, we perceive no reason why he may not also be convicted of separate counts of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b permits convictions for both felony-firearm and armed robbery without violating constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

People v. Seays · filed 1983-06-06

Defendant pled guilty in the Wayne County Circuit Court to armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). ... We also reject defendant's contention that convictions for both armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony is violative of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
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Section 750.227b permits a conviction for possessing a firearm during a felony alongside a conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct without violating double jeopardy.

People v. Bright · filed 1983-06-21

Defendant’s argument that the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy prevented his conviction of both first-degree criminal sexual conduct and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony is without merit.
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Convictions for both manslaughter and felony-firearm do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

People v. Audison · filed 1983-07-06

Finally, defendant argues that her convictions for both manslaughter and felony-firearm violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. We disagree.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 750.227b(1) permits only one felony-firearm conviction for a single continuous criminal transaction involving possession of one firearm, even if multiple felonies occur during the transaction.

People v. Adams · filed 1983-08-16(1)

However, we do not believe that the Legislature in authorizing such multiple punishment intended to authorize more than one felony-firearm conviction where there is but a single continuous criminal transaction involving possession of only a single firearm, notwithstanding that more than one felony may be committed during the course of that transaction.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction alongside a concealed-weapon conviction when the felony-firearm offense is based on a distinct felony.

People v. Peyton · filed 1988-03-09

In this case, we find no violation of the double jeopardy clause when defendant was charged and convicted of both carrying a concealed weapon and felony-firearm. The felony-firearm offense was based on the distinct felony of possession of cocaine.
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Section 750.227b permits separate convictions for felony-firearm and possession of a short-barreled shotgun when the shotgun-possession offense is not the predicate felony for the felony-firearm charge.

People v. Booker · filed 1994-12-20

The Legislature intended to authorize multiple convictions for felony-firearm and possession of a short-barreled shotgun where the possession offense did not serve as the underlying felony for the felony-firearm conviction.
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Section 750.227b(1) permits cumulative punishment for felony-firearm and felon in possession because felon in possession is not one of the statute’s four enumerated felony exceptions.

People v. Calloway · filed 2003-11-25(1)

Because the felon in possession charge is not one of the felony exceptions in the statute, it is clear that defendant could constitutionally be given cumulative punishments when charged and convicted of both felon in possession, MCL 750.224f, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b.
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Section 750.227b permits felon-in-possession to serve as the underlying felony and authorizes cumulative punishment for both felony-firearm and felon-in-possession without violating double jeopardy.

People of Michigan v. Angelo Weems · filed 2015-05-05(1), (2)

Subsection (2) of the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b, provides that “[a] term of imprisonment prescribed by this section is in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the felony, and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony.” (Emphasis added). Because felon-in-possession is a permissible underlying felony for purposes of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b(1), and because subsection (2) of the statute specifically provides for punishment of both crimes, indeed consecutively, the Legislature clearly expressed its intention to authorize multiple punishments for the two firearm offenses.
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Section 750.227b permits cumulative punishment for felony-firearm and felon-in-possession because felon-in-possession is not one of the statute's exceptions.

People of Michigan v. Robinson · filed 2016-09-13(1)

In People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448; 671 NW2d 733 (2003), our Supreme Court considered and unequivocally rejected the argument that sentences for both felon-in-possession and felony-firearm violate the protection against double jeopardy. Id. at 452. The Calloway Court reasoned: “Because the felon in possession charge is not one of the felony exceptions in the [felony-firearm] statute, it is clear that defendant could constitutionally be given cumulative punishments when charged and convicted of both felon in possession, MCL 750.224f, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b.” Id., citing People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 698; 575 NW2d 283 (1998). Nevertheless, defendant argues that “[i]f the Leglislature had in mind the felon in possession of a firearm statute when it drafted the felony firearm statute, it would have included the latter as one of the exceptions.” However, in People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163; 631 NW2d 755 (2001), this Court rejected a similar argument, holding that the Legislature could “have amended the felony-firearm statute to explicitly exclude the possibility of a conviction under the felony-firearm statute that was premised on MCL 750.224f.” Id. at 168. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish plain error affecting his substantial rights. See Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764.
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A conviction for felony-firearm under § 750.227b may be entered together with a conviction for felon in possession without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

People of Michigan v. Octavian Fly · filed 2016-11-03(1)

In his pro-se brief, Fly contends that his convictions of both felony-firearm and felon-in-possession violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Well-settled law is contrary to Fly’s argument, see People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163, 171; 631 NW2d 755 (2001), and we conclude his position is meritless.
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Section 750.227b(1) permits convictions and cumulative sentences for felony-firearm and felon-in-possession because felon-in-possession is not one of its four enumerated exceptions.

People of Michigan v. Troy · filed 2017-02-23(1)

In Calloway, our Supreme Court explained that, “with the exception of the four enumerated felonies [in MCL 750.227b], it was the Legislature’s intent to provide for an additional felony charge and sentence whenever a person possessing a firearm committed a felony other than those four explicitly enumerated in the felony-firearm statute.” Calloway, 469 Mich at 452 (quotation marks and citation omitted). ... Because the felon-in-possession statute is not one of the enumerated exceptions in MCL 750.227b, it is clear that a defendant can be convicted and sentenced under both statutes without infringing upon the defendant’s constitutional rights.
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Section 750.227b(1) permits an additional felony-firearm charge and cumulative punishment for a felon-in-possession offense because that offense is not one of the statute’s four enumerated exceptions.

People of Michigan v. Terell Mandel Ashford · filed 2018-01-04(1)

In Dillard, this Court concluded that a felon-in-possession charge does not constitute one of the specific exceptions to the felony-firearm statute; thus, “the Legislature clearly intended to permit a defendant charged with felon in possession to be properly charged with an additional felony-firearm count.” Dillard, 246 Mich App at 167-168. Where “a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the same conduct, . . . a court’s task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.” Mitchell, 456 Mich at 695, citing Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359, 368; 103 S Ct 673; 74 L Ed 2d 535 (1983). Therefore, there is no double jeopardy violation in defendant receiving separate punishments for felon-in-possession and felony-firearm stemming from the same criminal transaction.
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Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm while committing a new felony, and a felony-firearm conviction may stand alongside a felon-in-possession conviction without violating double jeopardy.

People of Michigan v. Thigpen · filed 2023-12-28

Specifically, the felon-in-possession statute (MCL 750.224f) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time he possessed a firearm, People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 267-268; 893 NW2d 140 (2016), whereas the felony-firearm statute (MCL 750.227b) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while he committed a new felony. Id. at 268-269. Consequently, defendant’s convictions and sentences for felon-in-possession and felony-firearm do not violate principles of double jeopardy.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction in addition to a felon-in-possession conviction without violating double jeopardy protections.

People of Michigan v. Segarra · filed 2025-07-30(1)

Accordingly, Segarra has failed to establish that his convictions of both felony-firearm and felon-in-possession violate his double jeopardy protections.
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Law changed since The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the lower-court double-jeopardy rulings on 1979-11-13 and reinstated separate felony-firearm convictions.

Section 750.227b does not permit a separate felony-firearm conviction alongside a conviction for the underlying felony under the double jeopardy rule applied by this court.

People v. Berry · filed 1979-03-06

We have held in People v Blount, 87 Mich App 501; 275 NW2d 21 (1978), that the rule against double jeopardy prohibits separate convictions on both felony-firearm and the underlying felony. In accordance with that opinion we set aside the two convictions for felony-firearm.
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A conviction under § 750.227b for possessing a firearm during a felony does not constitute double jeopardy.

People v. Fields · filed 1979-11-19

Finally, defendant contends that his conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony constitutes double jeopardy in violation of the United States and Michigan constitutions. This issue has been recently considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge, 406 Mich 374; 280 NW2d 793 (1979).
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Section 750.227b withstands a double-jeopardy challenge.

People v. Moncure · filed 1979-12-06

Defendant’s final assertion of error is that the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), is constitutionally infirm on grounds of double jeopardy. That claim was rejected and the statute upheld in Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge, 406 Mich 374; 280 NW2d 793 (1979). No more need be said on this issue.
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A felony-firearm conviction does not require a conviction on the underlying felony, so the jury may not be instructed that it must convict on that felony first.

People v. Eady · filed 1983-12-15

People v Lewis, supra, did not announce a new rule of law or abrogate existing standards. Rather, the Supreme Court applied in a felony-firearm context the rule of People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463; 295 NW2d 354 (1980), which permits inconsistent verdicts.
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Section 750.227b requires that the defendant committed or attempted an underlying felony, even if the defendant was not convicted of that felony. A felony-firearm conviction must be reversed when the jury’s finding on the underlying felony can no longer be relied upon.

People v. Burgess · filed 1984-08-20(1)

More importantly, the jury’s factual finding that the assault was committed may no longer be relied upon. Absent such a finding, the felony-firearm conviction must also be reversed.
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Possession during a felony

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Dickerson · filed 2016-05-05(1)

To be convicted of felony firearm, the prosecution must prove that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. ... This evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the kidnapping, which is a felony.
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Section 750.227b requires the defendant to possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Duren · filed 2016-05-10

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a felony.”
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MCL 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Dent · filed 2016-05-19

The elements of felony-firearm are that “the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). See also MCL 750.227b. Weighing the credibility of the witnesses is the jury’s duty, and this Court may not interfere with its assessment on appeal. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 404; 648 NW2d 648 (2002). We conclude that Adams’s testimony, if believed, was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a firearm while committing a felony.
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Subsection (1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony other than the four felonies enumerated in the statute.

People of Michigan v. Leavell · filed 2016-05-26(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of any felony other than those four enumerated in the statute. MCL 750.227b(1); People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... Further, because shooting the victim required the possession of a firearm, the evidence was also sufficient to support defendant’s felony-firearm conviction.
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A felony-firearm conviction requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Rogers · filed 2016-05-10

Third, we turn to defendant’s felony-firearm conviction. “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Avant, 235 Mich at 505. Again, the evidence included that defendant possessed a black .25 caliber pistol when he was assaulting Davis, Martin, and Lakiesha. Martin, Patricia, and Davis all testified that defendant stood up in the kitchen and pointed the weapon first at Martin and then at everyone else in the room. Although defendant testified that he was never in possession of a weapon, the trial court was entitled to believe the testimony of the other witnesses over his testimony. See People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 624; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Thus, defendant’s felony-firearm conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.
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Section 750.227b is satisfied by evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm and committed second-degree murder.

People of Michigan v. Smith · filed 2016-06-28

Defendant does not dispute that she was in possession of a firearm, and as stated above, there was sufficient evidence to prove that defendant committed second-degree murder. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s felony-firearm conviction.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Andrews · filed 2016-06-14(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 554; 675 NW2d 863 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As stated above, Segars testified that defendant brandished a pistol while demanding Segars’s belongings. Segars also testified that defendant fired the pistol as he was fleeing from the scene. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to prove that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony.
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Michigan's felony-firearm statute does not require the jury to find that the defendant discharged a firearm at or toward a victim.

People of Michigan v. Booker · filed 2016-06-30

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, felony-firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm. None of these offenses required the jury to find that defendant discharged a firearm at or toward any of the victims.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and constructive possession is sufficient when the firearm's location is known and reasonably accessible to the defendant.

People of Michigan v. Bradley · filed 2016-07-12(1)

To succeed on a felony-firearm charge, the prosecution must prove that “defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or in the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 22; 871 NW2d 307 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Constructive possession is sufficient if there is circumstantial evidence that defendant “knowingly [had] the power and the intention at any given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons . . . .” Flick, 487 Mich at 14. More specifically, in the firearms context, the prosecution need only show “there is proximity to the article together with indicia of control.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, “a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 437, 439; 606 NW2d 645 (2000). ... Because the firearm and the marijuana were in close proximity to each other, it was reasonable for the fact-finder to infer that defendant had access to and control over the marijuana and the firearm, and that defendant possessed the firearm while committing the felony of possession with intent to deliver less than 5 kilograms of marijuana. See Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich at 440. Accordingly, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant constructively possessed a firearm and did so while committing a felony. Thus, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s felon-in-possession and felony-firearm convictions.
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Section 750.227b’s possession element may be satisfied by constructive possession when the defendant’s proximity to the firearm indicates control or the defendant knows its location and can easily access it.

People of Michigan v. Darren a Weddington · filed 2016-06-28

Accordingly, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of constructive possession of the firearm by defendant, given proximity to the weapon with indicia of control, or, stated otherwise, given defendant’s knowledge of the location of the firearm and its easy accessibility by defendant.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

People of Michigan v. Foley Jr · filed 2016-03-10

The evidence supporting defendant’s first-degree premeditated murder conviction also supports his felony-firearm conviction. For a conviction of felony-firearm, the prosecution must show that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony or the attempt to commit a felony. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 554; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). The homicide in this case was committed through the use of a firearm, as the victim’s cause of death was “multiple gunshot wounds.” Thus, the evidence was also sufficient to support the conclusion that defendant possessed a firearm, and indeed used it, during the commission of a felony.
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A felony-firearm conviction requires proof that the defendant committed or attempted a felony and possessed or carried a firearm in the process.

People of Michigan v. Liggion · filed 2016-04-26

Finally, there is also sufficient evidence in the record to support defendant’s two accompanying felony-firearm convictions. A conviction for felony-firearm requires the prosecution to show that the defendant (1) committed or attempted to commit a felony and (2) possessed or carried a firearm in the process. People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000); People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Here, there is sufficient evidence that defendant committed the predicate felonies of second-degree murder and assault with intent to do great bodily harm, and defendant admitted to police that he carried and used a gun at the time these crimes took place. Furthermore, both the murder and the assault were committed with a firearm. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for felony-firearm.
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Circumstantial evidence may establish possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt for a felony-firearm conviction.

People of Michigan v. Johnson · filed 2016-03-17

Second, Johnson contends that there was insufficient evidence of his possession of the shotgun to support his firearms-related convictions. Again, we disagree. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson possessed the shotgun.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires actual or constructive possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Liley · filed 2016-03-31(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a felony. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 53; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). “Possession may be actual or constructive and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 437; 606 NW2d 645, 648 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted). “[A] defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” Id. at 438. Here, there is direct evidence of both actual and constructive possession of a weapon by defendant during the commission of her felonious assault. Dalton testified that defendant had a firearm in a holster under her shirt and threatened Dalton with it. Dalton testified that defendant then proceeded to attack her with the weapon. In addition, defendant’s own statement to police established constructive possession. Defendant told police that she was going through her trunk while the weapon was in it and was threatening Dalton with it. This shows that defendant knew the location of the weapon and it was readily accessible to her. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be constructive when the firearm is proximate, subject to an indicia of the defendant’s control, and reasonably accessible.

People of Michigan v. Blackmon · filed 2016-04-14

Defendant’s felony-firearm conviction was likewise not against the great weight of the evidence. To convict a defendant of felony-firearm, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). ... Consequently, the prosecution proved constructive possession because defendant had proximity to the firearms together with an indicia of control. Flick, 487 Mich at 14. The firearms were also reasonably accessible to defendant—had he chosen to do so, he could have merely turned and reentered the house, walked three or four steps, and taken the .38-caliber handgun from the coffee table, and the long guns were only slightly farther away in the same room. Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich at 437, 439.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Jamal Anthony Moore · filed 2015-01-27

Establishing felony-firearm requires: (1) that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). See also MCL 750.227b.
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Section 750.227b(1)'s possession requirement may be satisfied by circumstantial evidence that the defendant had at least joint control over the firearm's use.

People of Michigan v. Steven Joseph Rembish · filed 2015-01-08(1)

In addition, the fact that no direct evidence linking Rodea to the firing of the weapon was presented does not mean that he is entitled to relief. Enough circumstantial evidence was presented to show, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that he had at least joint control over its use. This was sufficient both to support the felony-firearm convictions, see People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011), and to support Rodea’s other convictions at the least as an aider and abettor, People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 6; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).
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Section 750.227b(1) permits felony-firearm possession to be proved constructively when the defendant knows the firearm’s location and it is reasonably accessible to him; ownership is unnecessary.

People of Michigan v. Mario Durrel Davis · filed 2015-02-05(1)

Felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm both require proof that defendant possessed a “firearm.” People v Peals, 476 Mich 636, 640; 720 NW2d 196 (2006).5 Defendant need not own the weapon to have possession of it. People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000). Possession of a weapon may be actual or constructive and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469-470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). “[A] person has constructive possession if there is proximity to the [firearm] together with indicia of control.” Id. at 470. Thus, “a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” Id. at 470-471.
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A felony-firearm conviction is supported when the underlying felony conviction is supported and the defendant does not dispute possessing a gun during the incident.

People of Michigan v. Travis Darnell Baker · filed 2015-02-10

Because defendant’s conviction of felonious assault was supported by the great weight of the evidence, and because defendant does not dispute that he possessed a gun at the time of the incident, defendant’s conviction of felony-firearm was also supported by the great weight of the evidence. See MCL 750.227b.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

People of Michigan v. Michael Andrew Jones · filed 2014-10-14

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Since Jones possessed a gun while committing assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, felonious assault, and discharging a firearm at a dwelling or occupied structure, each of which constitutes a felony, legally sufficient evidence was presented at trial for a jury to find Jones guilty of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and felon in possession of a firearm may serve as the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Terry Devon Williams · filed 2014-11-20(1)

A felony-firearm charge requires proof: (1) that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011); see also MCL 750.227b. A felon in possession of a firearm charge can constitute the underlying felony for a felony-firearm conviction. People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 451-452; 671 NW2d 733 (2003).
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A felony-firearm conviction requires commission or attempted commission of a felony while carrying or possessing a firearm; committing felonious assault with a gun satisfies those elements.

People of Michigan v. Eric Brooks · filed 2014-12-11

The elements of felony-firearm are (1) the commission or attempted commission of a felony while (2) carrying or possessing a firearm. People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000).
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The felony-firearm offense requires a finding that the defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony.

People v. Powell · filed 2013-11-19

Felony-firearm necessarily includes a finding that the defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony.
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Section 750.227b makes a person guilty of felony-firearm when the person possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony.

People v. Jackson · filed 2011-05-17

A person is guilty of felony-firearm if the person possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony. MCL 750.227b. ... In addition, the evidence that defendant was armed with a gun during these offenses supports his felony-firearm conviction.
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Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense.

Parker v. Renico · filed 2007-10-17

The elements of felony-firearm are that Parker possessed a firearm while committing, or while attempting to commit, a felony offense.
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Section 750.227b’s possession element is satisfied by constructive possession when the defendant knows where a firearm is and it is reasonably accessible to him.

People v. Johnson · filed 2011-06-14(1)

Thus, there was sufficient evidence that Johnson constructively possessed the rifles to support his felony-firearm conviction.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires only that a firearm be carried or possessed at the time of a felony; no nexus between the firearm and the felony is required.

People v. Elowe · filed 1978-09-20(1)

However, we hold that the statute, as written, was meant to apply to the situation at hand and that no nexus between the felony and firearm need be established.
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Section 750.227b is satisfied when a defendant possesses a firearm while committing the felony of possessing heroin.

People v. Lumpkin · filed 1978-09-20

The aforementioned exchange between defendant and the court clearly establishes that defendant was in possession of a firearm when he committed the felony of possessing heroin.
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Section 750.227b applies when a person possesses a firearm while committing a felony, including possession of heroin, and does not require use of the firearm or that the underlying felony generally endanger people.

People v. McGore · filed 1979-01-17

The statute does not require use of a weapon, only possession, and defendant did have a firearm in his possession when he committed the felony of possession of heroin.
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Section 750.227b applies to anyone who possesses a firearm while committing or attempting a felony, even if the person initially possessed the firearm lawfully.

People v. Abend · filed 1979-11-21

We disagree. Defendant’s position has no support in the statute or in relevant case law. On the contrary, the statute reflects exceedingly clear legislative intent to punish anyone who, at the time of commission or attempted commission of a felony, possesses a firearm whether the initial possession was legal or illegal.
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Section 750.227b applies when a defendant personally possesses a firearm during the felony even if the firearm belongs to the complainant; ownership is not required.

People v. Boswell · filed 1980-01-10

We also reject defendant’s argument that the felony-firearm statute is inapplicable when the firearm involved belonged to the complainant rather than defendant. ... Defendant was carrying the gun at the time he committed the robbery. The suggestion that conviction under the statute requires some incident of ownership of the firearm strains logic.
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Section 750.227b contains no explicit scienter requirement and does not require a nexus between the underlying felony and the firearm.

People v. Perry · filed 1982-08-26

There is no explicit scienter requirement in the felony-firearm statute and when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction. ... Furthermore, this Court has held that the statute does not require a nexus between the felony and the firearm.
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Section 750.227b(1) is satisfied when the evidence permits a fact-finder to conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing a delivery-of-heroin offense.

People v. Graham · filed 1983-03-03(1)

Our reading of the record convinces us that sufficient evidence was presented by the prosecutor to justify a fact-finder in reasonably concluding that defendant possessed a firearm while committing the principal offense of delivery of heroin. At trial, defendant conceded that he pointed a handgun at complainant; however, he claimed that he set the weapon down before he delivered the two packets of heroin to complainant. Since complainant testified that defendant held the handgun throughout the transaction, a question of fact was raised for the fact-finder, which was decided adversely to defendant. We conclude that the trial judge’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction when the evidence shows that the defendant personally possessed a firearm during the underlying felony.

People v. Robbins · filed 1984-01-03

Moreover, because the testimony of one of the Hamlin Road witnesses showed that defendant personally possessed a firearm during the kidnapping, sufficient evidence was presented to sustain defendant’s conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
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Section 750.227b is satisfied when firearm possession occurs during a continuous transaction carrying through on the underlying felony, even if that felony was technically complete earlier.

People v. Poindexter · filed 1984-10-15

A person who has a firearm in his possession at the time he commits a felony is guilty under the felony-firearm statute. MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). ... We conclude that it was a continuous transaction, carrying through on his threats, and satisfied the felony-firearm statute.
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Section 750.227b applies when a defendant acquires a firearm during an underlying felony committed for the purpose of stealing the firearm, even though the defendant did not possess it when the felony began.

People v. White · filed 1985-05-21

In the instant case, the fact that defendant committed the breaking and entering for the purpose of stealing two shotguns did not lessen the danger to third persons that the guns might be used to effectuate an escape. We believe the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the felony-firearm statute would be furthered through its application to the facts before us. Defendant was therefore properly charged under the statute.
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Holding a pistol during a portion of a robbery provides sufficient evidence for a felony-firearm conviction, even when an accomplice held the pistol during most of the robbery.

People v. Young · filed 1985-10-08

Defendant held the pistol during a portion of the robbery and, therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict him of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b covers both actual physical possession of a firearm during a felony and constructive possession when the firearm is available and accessible to the person during the felony.

People v. Terry · filed 1983-04-06

As used in the felony-firearm statute, we find that the terms "carry” and "possess” were meant to describe the actual physical possession of a firearm during a felony as well as a person’s having a firearm available and accessible to him during the felony.
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Section 750.227b applies when a defendant possesses a firearm while committing a felony, including when the firearm is used as a striking instrument to accomplish the felony.

People v. Glenn · filed 1982-10-20

Accordingly, based on the foregoing cases, we conclude that the trial court herein erred in dismissing the felony-firearm charge. When a defendant has a firearm in his possession while committing a felony or where, as here, he uses the firearm as a striking instrument to accomplish the felony, his conduct falls within the ambit of the ... statute which prohibits the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
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Section 750.227b permits a finding of felony-firearm possession when a firearm was at the defendant’s disposal during the felony, and access is not measured solely at the time of arrest.

People v. Becoats · filed 1989-09-21

We agree with the circuit court that defendant’s access to the weapon should not be determined solely by reference to his arrest. ... Given the above-discussed facts, we agree with the circuit court that defendant, who was apparently selling cocaine from his home, could be found to have possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony by having a firearm at his disposal should he need it.
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Section 750.227b permits a jury to find that a defendant possessed a firearm during a felony based on a victim's testimony that she felt what she believed was the tip of a gun.

People v. Perry · filed 1988-11-07

Defendant next claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felony-firearm. Defendant argues that the victim's testimony that she felt what she believed to be the tip of a gun was insufficient to demonstrate that a firearm (i.e., a weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled) was used in the commission of a felony. We believe that, given the legislative purpose behind that statute, the victim's testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony.
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Section 750.227b is sufficiently supported when testimony shows that the defendant committed the underlying felonies while knowingly possessing a firearm.

People v. Coddington · filed 1991-04-16

In any event, defendant was properly bound over on the four underlying offenses and sufficient evidence was presented to properly bind him over on four counts of felony-firearm on the basis of testimony that he committed the offenses while knowingly in possession of a firearm.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed or carried a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People v. Buck · filed 1991-12-08

Conviction of felony-firearm requires proof that the defendant possessed or carried a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a felony.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires possession, rather than use, of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

People v. Beard · filed 1988-09-19(1)

It is possession, not use, of a firearm during the commission of a felony that satisfies the requirements of the statute.
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Section 750.227b(1)'s possession element is not established merely because a defendant is present in an apartment where a firearm is found.

People v. Wolfe · filed 1992-10-09(1)

We conclude that Wolfe's presence in the apartment alone is insufficient proof of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires that a firearm be accessible and available to the defendant when the felony is committed; evidence tying the defendant to a locked container holding the gun can create a jury question on possession.

People v. Williams · filed 1993-03-02(1)

A person has "possession” of a weapon when it is "accessible and available ... at the time [the crime is committed].” ... Here, the presence of defendant’s bankbooks inside the locked box created a question of fact regarding whether the contents of the safe, including the gun, were accessible to him at the time he possessed the controlled substances found in his home. We find that the trial court properly refused to take this issue away from the jury.
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Section 750.227b's possession element may be established by evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant held a firearm and that the firearm was accessible and available during the felony.

People v. Daniel · filed 1994-09-20

Because the rifle was seen pointing out the window and defendant was discovered underneath the window, a reasonable inference could be drawn that defendant was the person holding the rifle before the raid. The fact that the gun was lying closer to Peter Daniel does not negate the inference that defendant was in possession of the rifle. Clearly, the rifle was accessible and available to defendant at the time the crime was committed.
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A felony-firearm conviction under § 750.227b may be sustained by circumstantial evidence identifying the defendant as the robber and linking him to the firearm used in the underlying felonies.

People v. Godbold · filed 1998-09-29

Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797, assault with intent to rob while armed, M.C.L. § 750.89; M.S.A. § 28.284, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; M.S.A. § 28.424(2). ... Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's identity as the robber and the trial court's verdict. Defendant matched the general description given of the robber (tall and slim), defendant was seen on a cold March night without a jacket coming from behind a building where the robber's jacket, weapon, and Gray's wallet were thereafter found, and defendant's voice was immediately identified by Gray and Parker as that of the robber when the police found defendant. Because the building was surrounded by an open field, the jury could infer that if there had been another person fleeing, the person could easily have been seen. Defendant was identified by the complainants in court and in the parking lot where the offense occurred. This evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn from it, was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions of armed robbery, People v. Turner, 213 Mich.App. 558, 569, 540 N.W.2d 728 (1995), assault with intent to rob while armed, People v. Cotton, 191 Mich.App. 377, 391, 478 N.W.2d 681 (1991), and felony-firearm, People v. Davis, 216 Mich.App.47, 53, 549 N.W.2d 1 (1996).
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Section 750.227b’s possession element is not met by a firearm at the defendant’s home when the defendant is far away, because constructive possession requires ready accessibility.

People v. Williams · filed 1995-08-11

Punishing a defendant for possession of a firearm that is not accessible or at his disposal, as opposed to being under less immediate dominion or control, does not fulfill the purpose of the felony-firearm statute. ... Such accessibility does not exist where, as here, a defendant is far away from the location of the firearm.
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Section 750.227b requires the defendant to possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People v. Davis · filed 1996-06-11

Defendant appeals as of right his convictions by a jury of assault with intent to inflict great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). ... The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a felony. ... This testimony was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find all the elements of assault with intent to commit murder and felony-firearm established beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People v. Avant · filed 1999-08-09

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.
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Section 750.227b(1) permits first-degree home invasion to serve as the predicate felony when the offender steals and thereby possesses a firearm during the home invasion.

People v. Shipley · filed 2003-06-13(1)

As a result, first-degree home invasion, where there is a larceny of a firearm during a residential breaking and entering, can be the predicate felony for a felony-firearm conviction.
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Section 750.227b punishes possessing a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People v. Libbett · filed 2002-08-23

MCL 750.227b punishes a person for possessing a firearm during the commission of or the attempt to commit a felony.
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Section 750.227b(1) makes a person guilty of felony-firearm when the person possesses a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

People v. Osantowski · filed 2007-07-10(1)

An individual is guilty of felony-firearm when he or she possesses a firearm when committing or attempting to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b(l). The term “firearm” is defined as “a weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled by an explosive, or by gas or air.” MCL 750.222(d). There is no question that the guns themselves were relevant and admissible with regard to the felony-firearm charge, because evidence was presented that the firearms in defendant’s possession were those he was convicted of illegally receiving and concealing.
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Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People v. Taylor · filed 2007-08-29

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot and killed La-sater, and that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime.
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Section 750.227b(1) is satisfied when a defendant constructively possesses a reasonably accessible firearm while possessing drugs that constitute the underlying felony.

Cannon v. Lafler · filed 2007-09-19(1)

Constructive possession of a firearm exists “if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” Id. For many of the same reasons that a rational jury could find that Cannon constructively possessed the cocaine and marijuana found at the Boxwood address, it could find that he possessed the guns found in the bedroom there and that he possessed them at the same time that he possessed the drugs in the detached garage.
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Section 750.227b(1) makes it felony-firearm to carry or possess a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and eyewitness testimony that the defendant displayed a handgun can establish possession.

People of Michigan v. Jermial Ali Redding · filed 2015-03-17(1)

Further, a person is guilty of felony-firearm if he or she “carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony.” MCL 750.227b(1). “The felony-firearm statute applies whenever a person carries or has a firearm in his possession when committing or attempting to commit a felony.” People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 62; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). ... Jones clearly stated that during the robbery, defendant lifted his shirt, exposing the handle and trigger of a black handgun. Jones also explained that she was familiar with what a gun looks like because she had seen them before. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, Jones’s testimony was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that he, indeed, possessed a firearm. Therefore, defendant’s convictions were appropriate.
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Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and constructive possession is sufficient when the defendant knows the firearm’s location and it is reasonably accessible.

People of Michigan v. Talisha Moore · filed 2015-03-24

A defendant need only constructively possess a firearm to establish the possession element of the crime. People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). A defendant constructively possesses a firearm when the defendant knows the location of the firearm and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). ... Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that Moore constructively possessed the firearm while manufacturing and possessing the marijuana.
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Section 750.227b(1) permits felon-in-possession to serve as the predicate felony, and its firearm-possession element may be proved by constructive possession.

People of Michigan v. Loree Keith Williams · filed 2015-05-21(1)

Moreover, a violation of MCL 750.224f may serve as the underlying predicate felony under MCL 750.227b, which prohibits persons from carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. See People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448; 671 NW2d 733 (2003). For both crimes, actual possession is not required; it is sufficient to establish that the defendant had constructive possession. Minch, 493 Mich at 91; People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). ... When this testimony and evidence is considered along with the stipulation to Williams’ prior felony conviction, a reasonable jury could find that the prosecution had proved that Williams actually or constructively possessed a firearm in violation of both statutes.
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Section 750.227b requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of another felony.

People of Michigan v. Paul Peter Gross · filed 2015-04-16

For purposes of felony-firearm, the prosecution also must show that the firearm was carried or possessed during the commission or attempted commission of another felony. ... In any event, it is clear that the possession of the gun in this case occurred during the commission of another felony, and that, given defendant’s stipulation at trial, he was ineligible to possess a firearm.
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Section 750.227b(1) makes it felony-firearm to possess a firearm during the commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Raphael Cordero Campbell · filed 2015-08-20(1)

A defendant “is guilty of felony-firearm if the [defendant] possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 588; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). Both armed robbery and carjacking are felonies, and, again, the victim testified that defendant possessed a firearm while committing both armed robbery and carjacking. Accordingly, the trial court rightly held that defendant committed felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and testimony that the defendant threw a handgun into nearby bushes can sufficiently establish possession.

People of Michigan v. Scott Anthony Morris · filed 2015-06-16

Felony-firearm requires: (1) that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011); see also MCL 750.227b. ... Lewis’s testimony that defendant threw an object later determined to be a handgun into the bushes was sufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant possessed a firearm.
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Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction based on constructive possession when a firearm is sufficiently proximate and reasonably accessible during the commission of the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Michael D King · filed 2015-06-16

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... To prove that a defendant possessed a firearm while possessing a controlled substance, the prosecution must show the weapon’s “proximity and reasonable accessibility” to the defendant on the date of offense. ... Here, as in Burgenmeyer, the drugs and the guns were found in the same room, separated by no more than a few feet. Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant possessed the guns while committing the felony of possession with intent to deliver less than five kilograms of marijuana.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony, but the prosecution need not introduce the weapon into evidence.

People of Michigan v. Michael McCarthy · filed 2015-06-18

The elements of felony-firearm require proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. Kanaan, 278 Mich App at 619. The prosecution need not actually introduce the weapon into evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of felony-firearm. People v Hayden, 132 Mich App 273, 296; 348 NW2d 672 (1984).
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Section 750.227b requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Terrance Lavelle Hutchinson · filed 2015-07-30

For a conviction of felony-firearm, the prosecution must show that defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony or the attempt to commit a felony. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 554; 675 NW2d 863 (2003).
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Section 750.227b makes a person guilty of felony-firearm when the person possesses or uses a firearm during the commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Anttonio Jamele Rollins · filed 2015-09-10

A defendant “is guilty of felony-firearm if the [defendant] possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony.”...Additionally, by using a firearm to commit AWIM, which is a felony, MCL 750.83, defendant was guilty of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b(1) does not require physical possession of the firearm; constructive, knowing possession is sufficient.

People of Michigan v. Wayne Lewis Davis · filed 2015-07-28(1)

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver under 50 grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii), carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during a felony (felony firearm), third offense, MCL 750.227b(1). ... Defendant need not have actually physically possessed the drugs and guns to be guilty of possessing them because possession can be either actual or constructive. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence produced at trial showed that defendant at least constructively, and knowingly, possessed the drugs and gun, i.e., that he had the right to exercise control over the drugs and guns and knew they were present.
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Section 750.227b’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the firearm’s location is known and the firearm is reasonably accessible to the defendant.

People of Michigan v. Khalil El-Rashad Bey · filed 2015-11-19

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence solely with respect to the “possession” element of the two firearm offenses. MCL 750.224f; MCL 750.227b; M Crim JI 11.38a; M Crim JI 11.34; People v Perkins, 473 Mich 626, 630-632; 703 NW2d 448 (2005); People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... Put another way, a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant. ... In other words, there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant constructively possessed the firearms.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Jerome L Knight · filed 2015-09-24(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.”
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Section 750.227b(1) requires the prosecution to establish that the defendant possessed a firearm at the same time as the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Ronald Parker Wilson · filed 2015-11-17(1)

To establish felony-firearm, the prosecution had to establish that Ronald possessed a firearm at the same time. See People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Ronald admits that he possessed a firearm and that he shot it toward the victims.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and a qualifying underlying felony may support the conviction.

People of Michigan v. Quarawn Rashaud Camp · filed 2015-11-19(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a felony.” People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 53; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). There is no dispute that defendant carried and had in his possession a firearm during the incident. Because the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of AWIRA, which is a felony not excluded under MCL 750.227b(1), we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed or carried a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and possession may be actual or constructive and proved circumstantially.

People of Michigan v. Darrin Crawford · filed 2015-10-13(1)

In order to achieve a conviction of felony-firearm, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed or carried a firearm while he was committing or attempting to commit a felony. People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000), citing MCL 750.227b. Possession of the firearm “may be actual or constructive and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 437. Constructive possession of a firearm is found to exist if there is “proximity” to the weapon “together with indicia of control.” Id. at 438. While mere proximity to a weapon is insufficient, constructive possession of a firearm exists when a defendant knows the location of the weapon and it is reasonably accessible to him. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 520; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). ... In total, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that defendant possessed the .380 caliber gun.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Joshua Martez Brown · filed 2015-10-27

A felony-firearm conviction requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 698; 575 NW2d 283 (1998).
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Section 750.227b(1) requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and felon in possession of a firearm may serve as the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Ronald Kareem Seabrooks · filed 2015-11-24(1)

Finally, Miller was convicted of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, which requires the possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempted commission of a felony. A charge of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, can constitute the underlying felony for felony-firearm. People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 452; 671 NW2d 733 (2003). Sufficient evidence was adduced to sustain this conviction premised on the testimony that Miller had an assault rifle during the events while committing many felonies, including felon in possession of a firearm.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Dontay Jamarr Robinson-Powell · filed 2016-01-21(1)

To convict defendant of felony-firearm, the prosecution was required to prove that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or his attempt to commit, a felony. ... However, Detroit Police Officer LaMar Penn testified that he confiscated heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and a handgun directly from defendant. ... Accordingly, based on the record, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions.
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Felony-firearm requires that the defendant possess a firearm during the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony.

People of Michigan v. Donald Eric Brezzell · filed 2015-11-12

Felony-firearm requires “ ‘that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.’ ” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011), quoting People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Curtis Lamont Woods · filed 2016-01-19

A rational jury could also have concluded that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of felony-firearm. “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). ... Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

People of Michigan v. Lamar Latieff Walker II · filed 2016-02-04

For a conviction of felony-firearm, the prosecution must show that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of ... a felony or the attempt to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b; People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 554; 675 NW2d 863 (2003).
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Section 750.227b(1) requires a person to carry or possess a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

People of Michigan v. Anthony Daniel Walker · filed 2016-01-07(1)

Defendant was also convicted of felony firearm. MCL 750.227b(1). A person is guilty of felony firearm when they carry or possess a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b(1). By definition, defendant must have been found to be carrying a firearm during the commission of the crimes charged. Therefore, it is clear that the jury found that defendant had a firearm. The trial court did not error in assessing defendant fifteen points under OV 1 and five points under OV 2.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed or carried a firearm while committing a felony.

People of Michigan v. Larry West · filed 2016-01-14(1)

Even if defendant had been entitled to possess a firearm, which as a convicted felon he was not, MCL 750.227f, the district court could still bind him over on the felony-firearm charges if plaintiff presented evidence that defendant possessed or carried a firearm while committing a felony. MCL 750.227b; People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 62; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). Plaintiff presented evidence at the preliminary examination that a handgun was in close proximity to defendant when he was arrested, and that crack cocaine was found in defendant’s kitchen and heroin in the wall. Possession of even a small amount of a controlled substance is a felony. See MCL 333.7403(2)(iv). Plaintiff’s evidence with respect to each element of the felony-firearm charges (possession of a firearm and commission of a felony) established probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that defendant had committed it. MCL 766.13; MRE 6.110(E). Therefore, defendant’s bindover was proper, regardless whether Street showed that defendant had the right to possess a firearm.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be established through dominion and control or the right to exert control coupled with knowledge of the firearm's presence and character.

People of Michigan v. Kaycee Smith · filed 2016-01-26(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... A demonstration of dominion and control, or the right to exert control, over something with the knowledge of its presence and character is sufficient to establish possession. ... Thus, sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the jury’s determination that defendant possessed or controlled the drugs and firearm.
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MCL 750.227b prohibits actual or constructive possession of a firearm at the time the underlying felony is committed, rather than at the time of arrest.

People of Michigan v. Cavasseaire Tidell Dykes · filed 2016-02-23

However, our Supreme Court reversed this decision in People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438-439; 606 NW2d 645 (2000), holding that the felony firearm statute prohibits actual or constructive possession of a firearm at the time the felony offense was committed, not at the time of arrest. Applying Burgenmeyer to the instant case, the proper question is whether defendant possessed a firearm at the time he committed the felony offenses. The complainant’s testimony, in addition to the discovery by police officers of a handgun during defendant’s arrest, was sufficient evidence that defendant possessed a gun during the commission of first-degree home invasion and unlawful imprisonment. In addition, the police officer’s testimony that the gun was found near defendant during their search of the complainant’s residence also established constructive possession.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires a two-year sentence when a person possesses a firearm while committing or attempting to commit any felony not expressly excepted; use of the firearm is unnecessary.

People of Michigan v. Misko · filed 2016-05-19(1)

A two-year sentence for a conviction of felony-firearm is mandated by statute. MCL 750.227b(1). ... “The felony-firearm statute applies whenever a person carries or has a firearm in his possession when committing or attempting to commit a felony.” People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 62; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). ... A defendant need not use a firearm during the commission of a felony; the possession of a firearm is sufficient to meet the requirements of MCL 750.227b. People v Beard, 171 Mich App 538, 546; 431 NW2d 232 (1988). ... MCL 750.227b(1), the felony-firearm statute, excepts from its coverage certain enumerated felonies, none of which are at issue here.
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Section 750.227b’s possession-during-a-felony requirement is satisfied when a defendant takes a firearm during flight while the underlying robbery remains active.

People of Michigan v. English · filed 2016-08-16

Aside from this fact, McDonald’s testimony established that Weatherford and defendant “shared” the gun, defendant inferentially knew that Weatherford possessed the gun during the larceny, and he clearly knew about the gun after Weatherford used it during Mensah’s pursuit. Mensah’s testimony established that defendant accepted the gun from Weatherford while they were still fleeing from Mensah and while the robbery was still “active.” Accordingly, evidence established that defendant possessed the firearm during the commission of a felony.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and evidence of possessing a firearm while committing second-degree murder or felon-in-possession is sufficient.

People of Michigan v. Evans · filed 2016-09-27(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). There was evidence that defendant possessed a firearm when he shot and killed the victim, which constituted second-degree murder. There was also evidence that he possessed a firearm while being a felon in possession of a firearm. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s felon-in-possession and felony-firearm convictions, and defendant fails to establish plain error affecting his substantial rights.
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Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be proved through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.

People of Michigan v. Lewis · filed 2016-07-26

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... While witnesses did not observe defendant with a gun at the scene, photographs of defendant on his cellular telephone demonstrate he had access to weapons. ... Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that sufficient evidence was adduced to sustain defendant’s convictions.
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Felony-firearm requires that, when committing or attempting the predicate felony, the defendant knowingly carry or possess a firearm.

People v. Traver · filed 2016-08-02

(4) Second, that at the time the defendant committed [or attempted to commit] that crime [he / she] knowingly carried or possessed a firearm. ... By failing to provide the jury with the model instruction, the trial court violated MCR 2.512(D)(2), as the instruction requested by the prosecutor was applicable and accurate.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and possession may be established through circumstantial evidence.

People of Michigan v. Antrell Vonique Brown · filed 2016-08-09

To succeed on a charge of felony-firearm, the prosecution must prove that “defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or in the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 22; 871 NW2d 307 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Possession of a firearm “may be actual or constructive and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich at 437. ... Accordingly, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-finder could have concluded that defendant actually possessed a firearm and did so while committing a felony. Gaines, 306 Mich App at 296. Therefore, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the elements of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b(1) is satisfied by evidence permitting a rational fact-finder to infer that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony.

People v. Bass · filed 2016-09-13(1)

As we have previously explained, there was sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to infer that defendant committed both first-degree murder and felony murder, both of which are felonies. From the evidence that the victim’s cause of death was a gunshot to the back of the head, it is reasonable to infer that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of those felonies. Ergo, there was sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to find defendant guilty of felony-firearm.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires a defendant to carry or possess a firearm while committing or attempting another felony, and carrying means intentional control or dominion over the weapon.

People of Michigan v. Thornhill · filed 2016-09-13(1)

The offense of felony-firearm requires that defendant carry or possess a firearm while committing or attempting to commit another felony. MCL 750.227b(1). “Carrying” is similar to possession and denotes intentional control or dominion over the weapon. People v Butler, 413 Mich 377, 390 n 11; 319 NW2d 540 (1982). ... This evidence, if believed, was sufficient to prove that defendant carried or possessed a gun and used it to assault Holmes with the intent to murder her.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed or carried a gun, and evidence that the defendants intentionally fired guns at the victim was sufficient to meet that requirement.

People of Michigan v. Ray-El · filed 2016-08-11(1)

The charges of felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm both require evidence that the defendant possessed or carried a gun. MCL 750.224f(1), (2); MCL 750.227b(1). ... Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Smith and Ray-El in fact possessed firearms, shot at Banks, and did so with the requisite intent. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to support their convictions and the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for a directed verdict.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

People of Michigan v. Griffin · filed 2016-10-06

To be guilty of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, “one must carry or possess the firearm, and must do so when committing or attempting to commit a felony.” People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000). Defendant admitted to possessing and firing a firearm during the incident at issue, sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to conclude that defendant carried or possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, defendant admitted to firing the weapon at Hassel and Wright, which formed the basis for his convictions for AWIGBH and felonious assault. Those crimes are felonies. MCL 750.226; MCL 750.84. Thus, sufficient evidence was presented to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed or carried a firearm when committing a felony. Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich at 438. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction for felony-firearm was supported by sufficient evidence. Stevens, 306 Mich App at 628.
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MCL 750.227b does not contain an element of premeditation.

People of Michigan v. Ruckes · filed 2016-10-20

The trial court assessed 50 points for OV 6, concluding that defendant “had premeditated intent to kill,” MCL 777.36(1)(a), but this fact was not admitted by defendant or necessarily found by the jury, given that defendant was convicted of AWIM, MCL 750.83, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, none of which contain an element of premeditation.
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Felony-firearm requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Anderson · filed 2016-11-10(1)

Finally, the elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of or the attempt to commit a felony.
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Section 750.227b(1) permits felony-firearm possession to be proved constructively when the circumstances show that the defendant knew the firearm’s location and it was reasonably accessible to him.

People of Michigan v. Davis · filed 2016-10-11(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... Defendant only argues that he did not possess the firearms for the purposes of either conviction. Actual possession is not required to be convicted of a possessory crime; instead, a person may be convicted on a finding that the person was in constructive possession of the items in issue. ... In other words, “a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” ... Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the two guns.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires the defendant to carry or possess a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and actual possession may be proved by evidence that the defendant discarded the firearm while fleeing.

People of Michigan v. Allen · filed 2016-11-15(1)

Defendant’s conviction of felony-firearm required the jury to find that defendant “carrie[d] or ha[d] in his . . . possession a firearm” when he committed or attempted to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b(1). ... This evidence, and the reasonable inferences flowing from it, provided sufficient evidence for rational jurors to find that defendant was in actual physical possession of the Ruger handgun prior to discarding it. ... His convictions for CCW, felon-in-possession, and felony-firearm were thus properly supported.
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony.

People of Michigan v. Keathley-Mitchell · filed 2016-12-08

“ ‘The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.’ ” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011) (citation omitted). ... Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s felony-firearm conviction.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that a defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and unequivocal eyewitness testimony that the defendant possessed and fired a handgun can be sufficient.

People of Michigan v. White · filed 2017-01-26(1)

For a conviction of felony-firearm, the prosecution must show that defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony or the attempt to commit a felony. ... Therefore, the only question for our purposes is whether there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant possessed a handgun at the time of the incident at the car wash. ... She clearly testified that she saw defendant with a black handgun and saw him fire it wildly. This was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant indeed possessed a gun.
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Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive.

People of Michigan v. Mendoza · filed 2017-01-19

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... Possession of a firearm can be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive. “[A] person has constructive possession if there is proximity to the article together with indicia of control. Put another way, a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” Possession can be proved by circumstantial or direct evidence and is a factual question for the trier of fact. ... Overall, there was sufficient evidence to establish Charity’s identity as a person who had constructive possession of the guns, ecstasy, and marijuana found in the home and that she committed the underlying felonies while possessing the firearms.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and constructive possession can satisfy the possession element.

People of Michigan v. Anderson · filed 2017-02-23(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are that the (1) defendant possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission or attempted commission of any felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). See MCL 750.227b. Felon-in-possession may constitute the underlying felony for felony-firearm. See People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163, 168-169; 631 NW2d 755 (2001). ... Given that there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant’s constructive possession of the firearms and to support a felony conviction for felon-in-possession, it also follows that the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to establish that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony. See MCL 750.227b(1).
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Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and possession may be established with circumstantial evidence.

People of Michigan v. Felton · filed 2017-04-20(1)

To succeed on a felony-firearm charge, the prosecution must prove that “defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or in the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Bosca, 310 Mich App 1, 22; 871 NW2d 307 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Possession of a firearm “may be actual or constructive and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich at 437. Sufficient evidence existed for a rational fact-finder to conclude the prosecution proved the elements of felony-firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed earlier in Part I(A), the prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational fact-finder to infer that defendant was in possession of a firearm. Furthermore, the predicate offense was felon-in-possession, which is a felony. See MCL 750.224f(5) (providing felon-in-possession is a felony). Accordingly, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-finder could have concluded that defendant actually possessed a firearm and did so while committing a felony. See Bosca, 310 Mich App at 22. Therefore, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support the elements of felony-firearm.
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MCL 750.227b requires the defendant to possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Adams · filed 2017-04-06

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.”
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Section 750.227b requires the defendant to possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Beach · filed 2017-04-18(1)

Defendant incorrectly asserts that because the jury acquitted him of felony-firearm, insufficient evidence existed to convict him of armed robbery. In so doing, he points out that the trial court instructed the jury that defendant could be convicted of armed robbery if the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he possessed a weapon designed to be dangerous. We conclude that the jury’s verdict was not inconsistent. “ ‘The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.’ ” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011) (citation omitted). Possession of a firearm is not an element of armed robbery. Therefore, even considering the trial court’s specific instruction to the jury that it must find defendant possessed a dangerous weapon during the robbery, the jury could have believed, based on viewing the surveillance video and listening to testimony, that defendant did not possess a firearm, but did possess some other type of dangerous weapon. Regardless, “consistency in jury verdicts in criminal cases is not necessary.” People v Russell, 297 Mich App 707, 723; 825 NW2d 623 (2012). Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of armed robbery.
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Section 750.227b(1) requires a defendant to possess a firearm while committing or attempting the predicate felony, so acquiring a firearm only after a breaking and entering is complete does not support felony-firearm based on that predicate.

People of Michigan v. Miller · filed 2017-05-16(1)

In case no. 2015-012098-FH, the factual basis supporting defendant’s guilty plea for the felony-firearm charge was inadequate because defendant only admitted obtaining the firearms after he completed the breaking and entering of the shooting range.
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Notes 1–150 of 652, oldest cases first.

3,210 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

People of Michigan v. Washington, the supplied opinion is Judge Swartzle’s partial dissent. It disputes the majority’s reading of § 750.227b and does not establish the court’s holding. opinion →
People v. Heiler, the statute appears only in the procedural account identifying one of the charges; the court decided whether the prosecutor could withdraw a plea bargain and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Drake Johnson, the opinion is expressly a dissent. It proposes, rather than establishes as the court’s holding, that applying § 750.227b alongside armed robbery on these facts violates double jeopardy. opinion →
People v. Thomas, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm charge, and the two-year sentence is reported as procedural history. The court sets aside that conviction because the defendant never pleaded to the charge, a plea-procedure ruling that does not interpret or apply any requirement of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Smith, the statute appears only in the procedural account of the charges and was not among the issues the appellate court decided; the opinion does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Joeseype Johnson, the dissent cites § 750.227b only to note a collateral sentencing consequence of redefining felonious assault; the case decides the elements of assault and does not construe or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Chapa, the statute appears only in a footnote as one example of crimes carrying a legislatively required minimum prison term; the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b, and instead decided that a local heroin-sentencing policy improperly displaced individualized judicial discretion. opinion →
People v. Vinson, the court merely identifies and affirms the § 750.227b conviction without interpreting the statute or analyzing its requirements or application; the opinion’s reasoning concerns the requested felonious-assault instruction. opinion →
People v. Earl Jones, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis for a felony-firearm charge that the prosecutor agreed to dismiss; the court did not interpret or apply it. opinion →
People v. Hill, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply it, and instead decides a jury-instruction issue concerning second-degree murder. opinion →
People v. Baker, the opinion mentions the statute only while reporting Richardson's convictions and does not interpret or apply any statutory requirement. opinion →
People v. Cain, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court decides solely whether an improper communication with the jury warranted a new trial and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Knight, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the firearm offense to which the defendant pleaded and does not interpret or apply the statute; the court's holding concerns withdrawal of a nolo contendere plea. opinion →
People v. Allen, the court summarily rejected unspecified felony-firearm contentions without explaining what § 750.227b means or requires; the concurrence's additional discussion merely reports an earlier Supreme Court holding while distinguishing the murder and armed-robbery double-jeopardy issue. opinion →
People v. Vincent, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify one of the charges and convictions; the court's holding concerns impeachment with a foreign conviction under MRE 609, not the firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Briggs, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in describing the firearm charge that was dismissed as part of the plea bargain; the court did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Beck, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant's conviction and sentence; the appellate court reverses based on improperly admitted rebuttal evidence and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Giombetti, the majority mentions § 750.227b only while reporting the defendants' convictions and does not interpret or apply any requirement of the statute; the separate opinion merely states a desired disposition by reference to other cases. opinion →
People v. Brown, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only as one of the charges against defendant, on which the jury acquitted him, and does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving the appeal. opinion →
People v. Ware, the court discussed the felony-firearm charge only to explain why the acquittal was rationally consistent with the felonious-assault conviction, and it expressly declined to decide whether the statute requires proof that the firearm was operable. opinion →
People v. Gordon, the statute is cited only in the procedural background to identify the felony-firearm charge and conviction; the sole appellate issue concerns the jury instruction for an unproduced res gestae witness, and the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Morris, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the charges, conviction, plea discussions, and sentence; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Williams, the court mentioned § 750.227b only as the felony-firearm charge underlying an inconsistent-verdict analysis; it decided whether the separate felonious-assault conviction could stand, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
Sours v. State, the Missouri Supreme Court did not construe § 750.227b; the statute appears only in Judge Rendlen's dissent as an analogy to Missouri's armed-criminal-action statute and in discussion of decisions by other courts. opinion →
People v. Jenkins, the opinion mentions the statute only to identify one of defendant's convictions; the sole appellate issue is ineffective assistance of counsel, and the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Aaron, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm conviction; the court rejects a general sufficiency challenge to the paired convictions without construing § 750.227b, identifying its elements, or separately applying any statutory requirement. opinion →
People v. Vaughn, the court cited § 750.227b only while explaining that the jury's acquittal on felony-firearm did not make its felonious-assault conviction fatally inconsistent; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. MacK, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify one of defendant's convictions; the court reverses on Fourth Amendment standing grounds and does not interpret or apply the firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Jackson, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm offense of conviction; the appellate court does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Coleman, the statute appears only in the opening description of defendants' convictions; the court's analysis and holding concern probable cause for a search warrant based on tracking-dog information, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Secrest, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the offenses of conviction; the appellate court decided a Fourth Amendment question about the seizure of photographs and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Handley, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the felony-firearm charge and conviction; the court decided the appeal on an unrelated jury-instruction issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Ideis, the opinion mentions the statute only in recounting the felony-firearm charge, its dismissal and reinstatement, the conviction, and the mandatory sentence. The appellate court reverses because of an erroneous intent instruction for felonious assault and does not decide what MCL 750.227b means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Gibson, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify one of defendant’s plea-based convictions. The appellate court decides jail-credit entitlement under MCL 769.11b and does not construe or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. McIntosh, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty; the appellate issue and decision concern the defendant's absence from an in-chambers presentencing conference, not the statute's meaning or application. opinion →
People v. Henry, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in reporting defendant's conviction and mandatory sentence; the appellate court construed and applied other law concerning witness endorsement and impeachment, not this statute. opinion →
People v. MacLin, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing Harvey's firearm conviction and the trial court's dismissal; the appellate court does not review, adopt, or otherwise decide any issue concerning § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Peete, the court cites and summarizes § 750.227b only as a contrast while deciding whether the criminal-sexual-conduct statute permits cumulative convictions; it does not decide any issue concerning § 750.227b itself. opinion →
People v. Whigham, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court's analysis and holding concern impeachment with prior convictions under MRE 609, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Braddock, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting the defendant's conviction and sentence; it decides the felonious-assault instruction and allocution issues without interpreting or applying the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Buckner, the statute is cited only to identify one of the charges underlying the probation revocation; the court decides the evidentiary requirements for revoking probation and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Thompson, the statute appears only in the description of the charges and sentence; the court decided whether an unrelated receiving-and-concealing count was improperly joined, not any issue about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Dean, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's conviction and sentence in the procedural history; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Nabers, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the offense of conviction; the appellate court did not interpret its elements, scope, or application. opinion →
People v. Stoker, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court reverses on an unrelated evidentiary issue and expressly declines to decide the other issues. opinion →
People v. Elder, the statute appears only in the dissent's description of People v Mitchell as an analogy for a different statute's plea consequences; this court did not decide what § 750.227b means or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Brown, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in a quotation from People v Peete comparing the felony-firearm statute with the criminal-sexual-conduct statute. The court uses that comparison to decide whether multiple convictions and punishments are permitted under the CSC statute; it does not decide a question about § 750.227b itself. opinion →
People v. Woodruff, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history as one of the charges against the defendant; the appellate court decides issues under the 180-day rule and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. McMaster, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the charges, convictions, and sentence; the appellate court's analysis and holding concern the intent instruction for felonious assault, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Triplett, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b, and its analysis and holding concern other issues. opinion →
People v. Jones, the statute appears only in a dissent's description of the charges and mandatory sentence while discussing whether the plea court adequately advised the defendant; the court did not construe or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Ritsema, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and mandatory sentence; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute, and instead resolves unrelated competency, evidentiary, intent, and jury-instruction issues. opinion →
People v. Clark, the statute appears only in the opening procedural-history statement identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Terrell, the statute appears only in the procedural description of the offenses of conviction; the appellate issues concern prosecutorial argument and self-defense instructions, and the court does not interpret or decide any question about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Casey, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying one of the defendant’s convictions; the court decided the legality of reverse-writ detention and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Seaton, the statute appears only in describing a felony-firearm charge in another matter whose consolidation was upheld; the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b itself. opinion →
People v. Lasenby, the statute appears only in the procedural history of the felony-firearm charge and acquittal; the court resolved whether the separate assault conviction could stand despite allegedly inconsistent verdicts under People v Vaughn, without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Clark, the court did not decide what § 750.227b means or whether it applied to defendant; it merely directed the lower court on remand to consider defendant’s unadopted argument under People v Johnson. opinion →
People v. Hunter, the court cited § 750.227b only in a hypothetical example of how the probation-violation notice could have been drafted; it decided the adequacy and harmlessness of notice, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Anderson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in describing the offenses of conviction and sentence; the court's holding concerns the requirement of an offense-specific presentence report, not the meaning or application of the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Bouknight, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only as a contrast while deciding whether the criminal-sexual-conduct statute permits cumulative convictions; its statement about felony-firearm merely reports the Michigan Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wayne County Prosecutor and does not decide an issue under § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. King, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting defendant's convictions and sentences; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding the appellate issues. opinion →
People v. Eichenberg, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the charges and defendant’s conditional guilty plea; the appellate issues and holdings concern the seizure of evidence and the sufficiency of intent evidence under § 750.211, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Edwards, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when listing defendant's conviction; the court decides entrapment and sufficiency issues concerning the marijuana delivery and does not interpret or apply the firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Brady Smith, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the felony-firearm conviction and later affirms that conviction without analyzing the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application; the issues actually decided concern other legal questions. opinion →
People v. Wilder, the concurrence mentions the felony-firearm statute only as an example of a predicate-based offense and refers to its construction in an earlier case; this Court's decision concerns felony murder, armed robbery, and double jeopardy, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Blondell Smith, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm charge; the court decided the retroactivity of the rule allowing inconsistent jury verdicts and did not construe or apply any requirement of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Humble, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the felony-firearm charge and the jury’s acquittal; the sole appellate issue concerned similar-acts evidence, and the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Goldsmith, the statute appears only in a citation identifying one of the offenses of conviction; the court decides whether the jury instruction was coercive and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Meriweather, the opinion merely identifies the felony-firearm conviction and its two-year sentence; the appellate issue and holding concern compliance with the guilty-plea court rule, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Johnson, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the original charges, of which the defendant was acquitted; the court neither interprets nor applies the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Bostic, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant's conviction and sentence; the appellate court addressed unrelated evidentiary issues and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Meyers, section 750.227b appears only in the procedural background as one of the charged offenses; the court dismissed the charges for a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Dean, the statute appears only in the procedural account of defendant’s convictions and sentences; the appellate court neither interprets nor applies § 750.227b, and all issues decided concern the confession, identification, and alibi instruction. opinion →
People v. Hamp, the opinion cites the statute only while recounting defendant's conviction and sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue concerning its requirements, scope, or application. opinion →
People v. Carey, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the charge and the trial court's disposition. The appellate court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b; it decided unrelated issues concerning jurisdiction, closing argument, juror qualifications, search, and arrest. opinion →
People v. Stubbs, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reciting the charges below; the court decides whether felonious assault was properly instructed as a lesser included offense of armed robbery and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. DeLeon, section 750.227b appears only as a comparator in the defendant's cruel-or-unusual-punishment argument; the court decided the constitutionality of the controlled-substance sentencing provisions and did not construe or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Haisha, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm conviction and sentence in the procedural history; none of the appellate issues construes or applies the statute. opinion →
People v. Taylor, the court mentions § 750.227b only in recounting the defendant's conviction and sentence; it does not decide any issue about the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Broach, the statute appears only in the description of the charges. The court decided a Fourth Amendment suppression issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Broadnax, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it reverses on an unconstitutional jury instruction without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
People v. King, the opinion merely identifies the felony-firearm conviction and sentence under § 750.227b; it decides whether the plea court had to advise King about the sentencing consequences of Proposal B, not what § 750.227b means or requires. opinion →
People v. Lockett, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm count to which defendant pleaded guilty; the sole appellate issue and the court's holding concern whether the plea-taking procedure adequately advised defendant of his confrontation right, so the court did not decide anything about the statute. opinion →
People v. Hollie, the court cited subsection (2) only while recounting Mitchell as background to the plea-advisement issue; Hollie involved heroin possession and a consecutive sentence under MCL 768.7a, so the court did not decide any issue under § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Kohler, the statute is cited only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply it, and instead reverses on unrelated jury-instruction issues. opinion →
People v. Lamarr Johnson, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty; the court's ruling concerns plea procedure and Proposal B, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Mallory, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the offenses to which defendant pleaded guilty; the court reversed because the plea rested on an illusory habitual-offender bargain and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Smith, the statute appears only in the procedural background identifying one of the defendant's convictions; the court decided a jury voir dire issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Mroue, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court reverses because of self-defense and manslaughter jury-instruction errors and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Taylor, the court merely identifies the § 750.227b conviction in the procedural background. It expressly states that the sole issue is whether armed robbery under a different statute has a mandatory minimum sentence, and it does not construe or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Bazzi, the opinion cites the statute only while recounting the charges and does not interpret its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Jackson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history describing the felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any issue. opinion →
People v. Woeltje, the court decided a guilty-plea advisement issue: silence about consecutive sentencing did not make the pleas involuntary. It treated the felony-firearm sentence as background and did not construe or resolve any disputed question about § 750.227b itself. opinion →
People v. Hooks, the statute is cited only while reporting the defendant's convictions; the court did not interpret or apply it, and instead decided whether the trial court had to conduct a sua sponte hearing on the voluntariness of the defendant's statement. opinion →
People v. Sanders, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm charge to which defendant pleaded guilty; the court decided whether the presentence request to withdraw the pleas should have been granted, not the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Sexton, the opinion mentions the statute only in describing defendant's conviction and sentence; the court decides unrelated sentencing-conference and allocution claims and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
In the Matter of Wilson, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the offenses alleged in the prosecutor's juvenile petition; the court did not interpret or apply it, and instead decided juvenile-waiver and plea-acceptance issues. opinion →
People v. Johnny Johnson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting the charges, conviction, and sentence; it decides no issue about the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Peete, the statute appears only in procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court did not interpret or apply it. opinion →
People v. Rogers, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the felony-firearm charge. The court's decision concerns whether failure to advise a guilty-plea defendant that probation was unavailable under GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(f) requires reversal, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Jeffrey Johnson, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b or decide any issue concerning it. opinion →
People v. Green, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the felony-firearm charge and acquittal; the appellate court decided self-defense and sentencing issues, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Williams, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the charges and later the jury's firearm conviction; the court decides whether the defendant's requested accessory-after-the-fact instruction effectively amended the information under MCL 767.76, not any issue about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Matulonis, the court mentions § 750.227b only to report defendant's conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Wagner, the statute appears only in the opening procedural history to identify one of defendant's convictions; the court decided search-and-seizure, confession-suppression, and jury-waiver issues without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Hawkins, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history identifying the felony-firearm charge and the jury's acquittal; the appellate court neither construes nor applies the statute. opinion →
People v. Heath, the statute is cited only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history; the court's holding concerns whether bank robbery has a mandatory minimum sentence for purposes of the plea-taking rule. opinion →
People v. Marshall, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the felony-firearm conviction; the sole appellate issue concerns lesser-offense jury instructions for armed robbery, and the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Rowe, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting the defendant's convictions; the appellate holding concerns compliance with the jury-waiver statute, MCL 763.3, and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Jones, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the charge, verdict, and mandatory sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Gibson, the opinion cites MCL 750.227b only to identify one of defendant's convictions in the procedural history; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Myshock, the statute appears only in the procedural-history description of defendant’s conviction; the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b, and instead decided search-and-seizure and evidentiary issues. opinion →
People v. Meeks, the court mentions § 750.227b only while recounting and distinguishing Mitchell. Its decision addresses whether the defendant had to be advised that a different statute, MCL 768.7a, made his new sentence consecutive to the sentence he was serving when he escaped; it does not decide an issue about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Greene, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history to identify one offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty. The court does not interpret the statute or decide what it requires, whom it covers, or how it applies; its analysis instead addresses plea-rule compliance, the presentence report, and competency. opinion →
People v. Shively, the opinion merely identifies felony-firearm as one of defendant's convictions and as a conviction in the procedural history of People v Rogers; the court's holding concerns the plea rule and failure to advise that armed robbery was nonprobationable, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Johnson, the statute is mentioned only in procedural history identifying a felony-firearm charge that was dismissed before trial; the appellate court did not interpret or apply it. opinion →
People v. Turner, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history identifying a conviction; the court decided an evidentiary issue concerning identification testimony and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Kaigler, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the charges and sentence; the appellate issues concern the controlled-substances statutes and the sentencing conference, and the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Brownlee, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant’s felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history; the sole appellate issue concerns the sentencing court’s response to objections to the presentence report, and the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Weston, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the felony-firearm charge; the court reports that charge's dismissal and decides the separate preliminary-examination timing issue under other statutes. opinion →
People v. Bennett, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and does not interpret or apply the statute; the appeal is decided on the notice-of-alibi statute. opinion →
People v. Johnson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the charges, guilty plea, and sentence; the court decides issues concerning plea advice under a different statute and remand for an ineffective-assistance claim, without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Brown, the court decided what the guilty-plea court rule required the trial judge to disclose, not the meaning, elements, coverage, or application of MCL 750.227b; the statute identifies the conviction and its sentencing consequences only as background to that procedural issue. opinion →
People v. Hartford, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the firearm charge and conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b, and none of the issues decided concerns that statute. opinion →
People v. Porter, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's convictions and does not interpret or apply the statute; the court's analysis concerns trial clothing and unrelated issues. opinion →
People v. Secrest, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the statutory basis for the firearm charge; the court decided a state constitutional search-and-seizure issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Waters, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm charges and convictions; the appellate issues and holdings concern premeditation and deliberation for first-degree murder, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Burns, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence in the procedural history; the appellate court addresses ineffective assistance, hearsay, and prosecutorial comments without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
People v. Armstrong, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court decides a plea-advisement issue concerning Proposal B and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Marlin Smith, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when listing the defendant's convictions and does not interpret or apply the statute; the appellate analysis concerns intent for assault with intent to murder and the guilty-but-mentally-ill standard. opinion →
People v. Nickson, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the firearm charge; the court does not interpret its terms or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Wilson, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm conviction in the case's procedural history; the court does not interpret its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Whetstone, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence below; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Gilbert, section 750.227b appears only in a dissenting footnote as an analogy supporting the constitutionality of a different statute; the court did not decide any issue about the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Turner, the opinion cites the statute only in reporting Dana Turner's felony-firearm conviction and does not interpret, analyze, or apply any requirement of the statute. opinion →
People v. Duby, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Shabazz, the opinion mentions § 750.227b as the basis for the felony-firearm conviction and states that it mandates consecutive sentencing, but the appellate court decided only that the plea-taking court rule did not require advice about that sentencing consequence; it did not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
People v. McShan, the opinion cites § 750.227b only in its procedural-history description of defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court decides issues concerning impeachment, ineffective assistance, production of a res gestae witness, and felonious-assault intent without interpreting or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Carpenter, the statute is cited only in the procedural description of defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court decides search-and-seizure and impeachment issues without construing or applying MCL 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Campbell, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the defendants’ charges, convictions, and sentences; it reverses on the separate-trials issue and does not construe or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Hardin, the statute appears only in the procedural-history list of defendant's convictions; the court reversed based on coercive jury instructions and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Freeman, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm charge; the court decides whether the prosecution complied with the separate 180-day rule and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Tucker, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting defendant's conviction and sentence. The court reverses because the plea judge failed to advise defendant that armed robbery was nonprobationable and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Handley, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the firearm-possession charge; the court decides a jury-instruction and preservation issue, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Kiser, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Killebrew, the statute appears only in the factual history as one of the charges against Briggs; the court decided plea- and sentence-bargaining issues and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Knight, the statute appears only to identify the felony-firearm charge on which defendant was acquitted. The court resolved the claimed inconsistency by examining what was required for the separate second-degree-murder conviction under aiding-and-abetting law, without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Davis, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while listing the charged offenses and later affirms the corresponding conviction without interpreting or applying any requirement of the statute; its substantive double-jeopardy analysis concerns other weapons offenses. opinion →
People v. Woods, the statute appears only in the factual and procedural history describing Alexander's charges and conviction; the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Nelson, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute, and the issues it decides concern felony murder, assistance of counsel, and the voluntariness of a confession. opinion →
People v. McKeever, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the trial court's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Squire, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting the defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and does not interpret or apply any statutory requirement. opinion →
People v. Johnson, the statute appears only in the procedural-history description of defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court addresses evidentiary, ineffective-assistance, and jury-instruction issues without interpreting or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Harman, the dissent cites § 750.227b only as a comparison point when assessing the proportionality of a different statute's mandatory life sentence; the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Meyers, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm charge in the case's procedural history; the appellate court does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Kim, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when reciting defendant's convictions; the sole appellate issue concerns due diligence in producing an out-of-state witness, so the court does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. McConnell, the opinion mentions MCL 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm convictions and sentences; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Price, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history as one of the original charges that the prosecutor agreed to dismiss; the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Anthony Woods 2, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court decides only whether the evidence sufficiently established malice for felony murder and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Partee, the opinion cites MCL 750.227b only while reporting the defendant's conviction and sentence as procedural history; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Beam, the statute appears only in the opinion's recitation of the charges and is not interpreted or applied in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. George, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while identifying the convictions and sentences below; it reverses on unrelated witness-production and prosecutorial-misconduct grounds and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Nelson, the court decided that the pre-Sawyer plea bargain was not illusory, and expressly declined to decide whether Sawyer's felony-firearm sentencing rule applied to these facts; the remaining reference to felony-firearm and double jeopardy is only a passing citation. opinion →
People v. Price, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the charges in People v Williams, which it cites for a rule about effectively amending an information; it does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Hayes, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in its opening procedural history when listing the charges and does not interpret or apply the statute; the appellate issues concern identification evidence, juror contact, and defendants’ absence from a post-trial hearing. opinion →
People v. JACQUELINE BROWN, the opinion cites the statute only while reporting the codefendant’s conviction as procedural history; the appellate court neither interprets nor applies the statute. opinion →
People v. Jones, the statute appears only in the description of defendant's convictions; the sole appellate issue concerns giving the jury a copy of the information, so the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Vaughn, the opinion mentions MCL 750.227b only in describing defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Love, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court addressed spousal privilege, the sufficiency of the kidnapping evidence, and allocution, without deciding anything about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Dupree, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court does not interpret or apply it. opinion →
People v. Pureifoy, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting that defendant was charged with felony-firearm and acquitted; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Carter, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the felony-firearm charge, conviction, and sentence; the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b in deciding any issue. opinion →
People v. Burks, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and reports the related sentencing history; the court decides no issue about the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Kinard, the opinion identifies § 750.227b only as the offense of conviction. Its ruling concerns competency, the trial court’s delayed announcement of the firearm-charge verdict, double jeopardy, and the guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict; it does not construe the statute or decide what it requires, covers, or means. opinion →
People v. Monroe, the statute identifies the dismissed charge, but the court decided only that selective prosecution had not denied equal protection. Its later description of People v Glenn merely reports that case's statutory holding and does not independently construe or apply § 750.227b here. opinion →
People v. John, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the court decides the appeal on sanity and double-jeopardy grounds without interpreting or applying the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. King, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the charges and felony-firearm conviction; it reverses on an unrelated witness-privilege issue and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Martin, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction in its procedural background; it reverses for instructional error concerning homicide offenses and does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Wakeford, the statute appears only in procedural history describing Wakeford's felony-firearm conviction and sentence, and the court expressly states that this conviction was not involved in the appeal. opinion →
People v. Paige, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction and does not interpret or apply the statute; the court's analysis concerns collateral estoppel, aiding-and-abetting liability, evidence, and jury instructions. opinion →
People v. Whetstone, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify the defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence. The court’s analysis and holding concern the separate felony-murder statute, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Wilki, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the felony-firearm charge on which the jury did not reach a verdict and which the prosecutor later abandoned; the court decided identification-procedure issues and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Evans, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting the plea and sentence; its analysis concerns plea-advisement requirements and the sentencing language of the separate assault statute, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Lee, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant’s conviction; the court decided only whether compelling him to stand trial in jail clothing violated due process and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Cohens, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and later procedural history; the court's decision concerns resentencing for the murder convictions and does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Pointer, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant’s conviction and sentence; the appellate court addresses unrelated identification and evidentiary issues and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Tyson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify one of the defendant's convictions and does not interpret or apply the statute; the appeal instead resolves unrelated claims concerning double jeopardy, a continuance, prosecutorial misconduct, and admission of a statement. opinion →
People v. Pixler, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reciting the charges, conviction, and sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Burwick, the statute appears only in the procedural account of defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the appellate issues and analysis concern alibi references and jury instructions, and the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Parker, the statute is cited only in the procedural account of the charge; although the court rejects challenges to the felony-firearm jury instruction and a double-jeopardy claim, it does not interpret or apply any requirement of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Lobaito, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting the defendant’s convictions and sentences; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Simmons, the opinion mentions MCL 750.227b only while reporting Simmons's felony-firearm conviction and consecutive two-year sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any issue on appeal. opinion →
People v. Wise, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the procedural history that the felony-firearm count was dismissed on the prosecution’s motion; the appellate court did not decide what § 750.227b means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Davis, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant’s felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history; the court decides only whether defendant had to be present when the trial court recorded supplemental findings and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Lakeman, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm charge and conviction; it decides the availability and application of voluntary intoxication to felonious assault, not the meaning or application of the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Kincaid, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in its opening description of the charges and convictions; the appellate court does not interpret the statute or decide any issue concerning its requirements, scope, or application. opinion →
People v. Blackburn, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the charges and convictions; the appellate court reverses on evidentiary and Miranda issues without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
People v. Tait, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court decided evidentiary and confrontation issues and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Lawless, the court reviewed an unpreserved felony-firearm instruction only for manifest injustice. It discussed another decision's interpretation of the statute but did not adopt that interpretation or decide the statutory question; it held only that the instruction did not warrant reversal on these facts. opinion →
People v. Williams, the statute is cited only in the opening procedural history to identify defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court decides evidentiary issues and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Waterman, the statute is cited only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court decided whether Proposal B repealed the separate parole statute known as the lifer law and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Robideau, the court merely listed Robideau's felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history. The double-jeopardy issue it decided concerned first-degree criminal sexual conduct and the armed-robbery or kidnapping predicate, not § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Edwards, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Denton, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when identifying the defendant’s conviction and sentence; its analysis concerns diminished capacity and does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Martin, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the original felony-firearm charge; the court does not interpret or apply it, and the appeal concerns parole eligibility for the life sentence imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. opinion →
People v. Jones, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the charges and verdict; the court decides an instructional-error issue concerning involuntary manslaughter and does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Lindsey, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting the charges and sentence; the appellate issues concern resentencing after appeal, reinstatement of the original murder charge, and the factual basis for the plea, not the meaning or application of the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Morris, the opinion cites the statute only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and does not interpret, construe, or substantively apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Cousins, the statute appears only in the opening list of the defendant's convictions; the court analyzes other offenses and decides nothing about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of MCL 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Pollard, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the charged offenses; the court's analysis concerns criminal sexual conduct and aiding and abetting, and it does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Gjidoda, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and mandatory two-year sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any issue. opinion →
People v. Goad, the statute is cited only to identify one of Gillen's charges; the court's decision concerns jury instructions about the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Wesley, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting the defendants’ convictions and in a bare footnote; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Hardin, the statute appears only in descriptions of the charges, verdict, and sentence; the court's sole issue and analysis concern supplemental instructions to a deadlocked jury, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Hollis, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when reciting the felony-firearm charge and conviction; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Margoes, the statute appears only in the procedural account of defendant's conviction and sentence; the court addressed the validity of his jury-trial waiver and did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Michael Fuqua, the statute is cited only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction in the procedural background; the court does not interpret or apply any requirement of the statute. opinion →
People v. Vicuna, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting the felony-firearm charge and mandatory sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Bowman, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court’s holding concerns the competency-dismissal deadline under the Mental Health Code, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Conte, the court limited its review to the admissibility of inculpatory statements induced by promises of leniency; section 750.227b appears only in the factual and procedural background as one of the charges and was not construed or applied. opinion →
People v. Shipp, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify a firearm charge of which the defendant was acquitted; the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Johnson, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the felony-firearm conviction; the court decides retroactivity and other trial-error issues without construing or applying any requirement of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Malloy, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate issue and holding concern the admission of other-acts evidence, not the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Philip Drake, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reciting the offenses of conviction and does not interpret or apply any requirement of the statute. opinion →
People v. Morgan, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's conviction and mandatory consecutive sentence; the appellate court decides unrelated counsel-substitution and jury-selection issues and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Holliday, the statute appears only in the opening procedural history identifying the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b in resolving any issue. opinion →
People v. Hill, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and related procedural history; the sole appellate issue concerns the separate 180-day rule, and the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Williams, the opinion cites the statute only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction in the procedural background; the court decides sentencing-articulation and speedy-trial issues without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Shue, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Taylor, the opinion cites § 750.227b only in its factual and procedural history to identify the firearm charge and the resulting conviction that was later dismissed on double-jeopardy grounds; the court decides an evidentiary issue concerning use of a prior conviction and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Guy Taylor, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting felony-firearm charges, convictions, sentences, and a dismissed charge; the court's holding concerns the intent required for assault with intent to murder under § 750.83, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Teske, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history as the dismissed felony-firearm charge; the appellate court decides only whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying youthful-trainee status and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Frank Johnson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute, and none of the appellate issues concerns it. opinion →
People v. Murray, the opinion mentions the statute only while reporting defendant’s conviction and does not interpret or apply any requirement of the statute; the appellate issues concern identification procedure and sentencing discretion. opinion →
People v. Mrozek, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court's holding concerns whether the plea bargain was illusory and the guilty plea involuntary, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Anderson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting the defendant's conviction and sentence; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding the evidentiary issue on appeal. opinion →
People v. Horne, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm charge; the court decides whether good cause permitted delayed preliminary examinations under MCL 766.7, not any issue about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Smith, the statute appears only to identify defendant’s felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history; the court neither construed the statute nor decided any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Sutherland, the statute is mentioned only while reciting the convictions and is not interpreted or applied in resolving the evidentiary issues on appeal. opinion →
People v. Norman, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while describing defendant’s convictions and the trial court’s sentence; the appellate court decides unrelated presentence-report and sentencing-guidelines issues and does not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Wolak, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify the felony-firearm charge; the court decided the separate 180-day-rule issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, section 750.227b appears only in a footnote listing other jurisdictions' recidivist authorities. The Pennsylvania court construed Pennsylvania sentencing provisions and did not interpret or apply the Michigan statute. opinion →
People v. Adams, the opinion mentions the statute only when reporting the conviction and sentence; the appeal concerns the legality of the arrest and admissibility of statements, and the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Smith, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction and reports the associated sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Martin, the opinion cites the statute only while reporting Martin's and King's felony-firearm convictions and sentences; it does not interpret or apply any requirement of the statute. opinion →
People v. Bladel, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the statutory basis for a firearm charge in the procedural history; the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Humphrey, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis for a felony-firearm charge; the appellate court did not interpret or apply it. opinion →
People v. Jones, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when reporting the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Barkley, the statute appears only in procedural history reporting defendant's acquittal of felony-firearm; the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b, and instead addressed armed robbery instructions, prosecutorial argument, and sentencing. opinion →
Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the citation for Wilson’s felony-firearm conviction; the court decides jurisdiction and the validity of his jury-trial waiver, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Miller, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting defendant's conviction and sentencing; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding the sentencing issues on appeal. opinion →
People v. Smith, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any issue. opinion →
People v. Peter Williams, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in describing the charges, guilty plea, and sentence; the appellate holding concerns whether the plea agreement regarding a possible habitual-offender charge was illusory, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Love, the statute appears only to identify the felony-firearm conviction in the case background and a corresponding footnote. The court reversed that conviction because admitting the spouse's testimony violated the separate spousal-privilege statute, MCL 600.2162; it did not interpret or apply MCL 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Cochran, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when listing the offenses to which the defendant pleaded guilty and does not interpret or apply the statute; the court's analysis concerns youthful-trainee procedure and the factual basis for assault with intent to murder. opinion →
People v. Slocum, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history as one of the charges on which defendant was bound over; the court decides only whether a prior attempted-felony conviction supports a habitual-offender information and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Willhite, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the appeal challenges the habitual-offender sentence, and the court does not construe or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Trevino, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting the trial court's felony-firearm conviction and mandatory sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Buckles, the statute is cited only in the opening procedural history to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court decides right-to-counsel and sentencing-guideline issues without interpreting or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Sovoda, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting Sovoda's felony-firearm conviction and sentence in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply the statute, and the appellate issues concern the vehicle stop, evidence, and Holmes's sentence. opinion →
People v. Ceteways, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting defendant’s conviction and mandatory two-year felony-firearm sentence. The appellate court addresses counsel, plea withdrawal, and the armed-robbery sentence, without deciding what § 750.227b means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Bennett, the statute appears only in the opening procedural history identifying defendant's firearm conviction; the court decides hearsay and missing-witness issues and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Leroy, the court cites § 750.227b only as a passing contrast while deciding whether the 180-day rule applies to habitual-offender informations; it does not construe or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Belanger, the court recites the statute’s basic offense only to explain why admitting a prior felony-firearm conviction would disclose an unspecified underlying felony. Its holding concerns impeachment under MRE 609 and the balance between prejudice and probative value, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Jackson, the statute appears only in the opening procedural history listing Hicks' convictions; the appellate court does not interpret or apply it. opinion →
People v. Crawford, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting defendant's felony-firearm convictions and sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Sutton, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the felony-firearm charge; the court decided sentencing-vindictiveness, presentence-report, and appellate-counsel issues without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Harris, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the firearm charge filed against defendant. The appellate court does not interpret or apply that statute; it instead decides whether the evidence supported bindover for involuntary manslaughter. opinion →
People v. Wilson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and reports the resulting sentence; it does not interpret or apply any statutory requirement. opinion →
People v. McFadden, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant's conviction in the procedural history; the court decides ineffective-assistance claims concerning identification evidence and witness impeachment, without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
People v. Wesley, the statute appears only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appeal and the court's analysis concern impeachment with a prior conviction under MRE 609, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Hughes, the statute appears only in the procedural account of defendant's convictions; the court does not interpret or apply it, and the issues on appeal concern jury instructions for the underlying assault offense and sentencing. opinion →
People v. Wigfall, the statute appears only in the opening procedural history identifying the defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court reverses for judicial misconduct and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Williams, the statute is cited only while reporting defendant’s convictions and sentences; the court addressed trial-management, prosecutorial-comment, and evidentiary issues without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Sowders, the opinion cites the statute only while reciting the charges and procedural history; it does not decide any issue about the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Broden, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying Murray's felony-firearm charge; the court's holding concerns whether referring to the sentencing guidelines satisfies the requirement to articulate reasons for a sentence, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Crook, the opinion merely identifies the felony-firearm conviction and notes in a footnote that its two-year sentence was mandatory; it does not decide any disputed question about § 750.227b's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Hedelsky, the opinion cites § 750.227b only in the procedural history to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court decides prosecutorial-misconduct and ineffective-assistance claims without construing or applying the statute. opinion →
In RE PEOPLE v. Burton, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting Burton's convictions and sentence; the court decided a jurisdictional issue concerning superintending control and did not interpret or apply the felony-firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Fairbanks, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm charge on which the defendant was acquitted. The appellate court reversed a conviction under a different statute because the trial court's findings did not support it; its criticism of the felony-firearm acquittal did not construe or decide the application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Lincoln, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history identifying the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty; the sole appellate issue concerns disciplinary credits and the habitual-offender statute, so the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, the statute appears only in the procedural background to identify the felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court decided the trial court's authority to resentence, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Fair, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and does not interpret or apply the statute; the appellate issues concern the adequacy of fact findings and admission of motive evidence. opinion →
People v. Garfield, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting the defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the appellate issues and analysis concern competency and self-defense, not the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Allen, the statute is cited only while recounting convictions in the procedural history of consolidated cases; the opinion addresses impeachment by prior convictions and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Burnett, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history; the appellate issues and analysis do not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. McKee, the opinion mentions § 750.227b(2) only while recounting Alexander-El’s sentences; the court’s holding concerns the separate consecutive-sentencing statute, MCL 768.7a, and does not construe or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Jackson, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the sole appellate issue concerns the reasonable-doubt instruction, and the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Roberson, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify defendant’s felony-firearm conviction in the procedural history and verdict; the appellate court does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. James Johnson, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify one offense of conviction in the procedural history; the appeal and the court's holdings concern sentencing severity and cruel or unusual punishment, not the statute's meaning or application. opinion →
People v. Hill, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting defendant's conviction and sentence and does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving either appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Drayton, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction and mandatory sentence in the procedural history; the appellate court decides sufficiency of the evidence for assault with intent to murder and a sentencing issue, without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Nelson, the opinion cites § 750.227b only when listing the defendant's convictions and does not interpret the statute or decide any issue concerning its requirements, scope, or application. opinion →
People v. Porter, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the appeal and the court's analysis concern the murder conviction and sentencing-guidelines issue, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Rader, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the charges and later convictions; it decides whether juvenile-court jurisdiction was properly waived and does not interpret or apply the firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Brooks, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction and mandatory sentence in the procedural history; the appellate court decides presentence-report and sentencing-guidelines issues without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
People v. Carson, section 750.227b appears only in the procedural history as one of the charges of which defendant was acquitted; the court decides the legality of the later mental-health commitment order and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Adams, the statute appears only in a dissenting footnote as an analogy about the deterrent effect of consecutive sentences; the court did not decide any issue concerning § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. DeWitt, the opinion cites § 750.227b only in procedural history to identify the felony-firearm conviction; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Calloway, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's conviction and sentence as procedural history; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Marshall, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the charges filed against defendant; the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b, and that charge was dismissed under the plea agreement. opinion →
People v. Dye, section 750.227b appears only in a footnote to the opening procedural history identifying the felony-firearm convictions; the court decided confrontation and evidentiary issues without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
People v. Reed, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify one of the defendant's convictions; it decides issues involving the habitual-offender statute and impeachment evidence, without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Minor, the statute appears only in procedural background identifying the firearm conviction; the court expressly states that only the armed-robbery conviction is at issue and decides only an evidentiary impeachment question. opinion →
People v. Chatfield, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant’s conviction; the court does not interpret or apply it, and the appeal addresses prosecutorial argument, jury instructions, and effective assistance of counsel. opinion →
People v. Williams, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting defendant's convictions and sentence; it does not decide the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Edwards, the statute appears only in the opening procedural history identifying defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court neither interprets its terms nor decides any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Phil Clark, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting the defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Johnson, the court mentions § 750.227b only in reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Wytcherly, the opinion identifies § 750.227b only as the statute underlying count II and resolves a jury-instruction issue under harmless-error review; it does not interpret the statute or independently decide its elements or scope. opinion →
People v. Daniels, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while listing the felony-firearm charge and related conviction and sentence in its procedural history; the appellate issues and analysis concern identification and criminal responsibility for the homicide, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Lester, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's conviction; it reverses on evidentiary grounds and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Williams, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of defendant's convictions; the court decided a Batson jury-selection issue and did not interpret or apply MCL 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Curry, the statute appears only in the description of defendant's convictions and sentences; the court addressed unrelated jury, instruction, prosecutorial-misconduct, and evidentiary issues and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Foster, the statute is cited only to identify one of defendant's convictions; the court reverses for prosecutorial misconduct without interpreting or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Ruffin, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court decides retrial and double-jeopardy issues without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Tinsley, the statute appears only in the description of defendant’s conviction; the appellate issue and analysis concern whether the facts supported armed robbery, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Couch, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when recounting the charges against the defendant; the court decides the separate common-law question governing a private citizen’s use of deadly force and does not interpret or apply the firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Montgomery, the statute is cited only to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction in the procedural background; the court addresses ex parte jury communication and the armed-robbery sentence, without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Tronti, the statute appears only in the procedural summary of defendant’s convictions; the sole appellate issue concerns criminal discovery and the work-product doctrine, so the court did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Moore, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm offense of conviction in the opinion's procedural history; the appellate court decided a jury-instruction issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Harmelin, the statute is cited only while recounting defendant's conviction and sentence; the court addresses search and seizure, suppression, self-incrimination, ineffective assistance, and punishment issues without interpreting or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Moore, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the basis for the felony-firearm charge; the court's decision concerns the legality of the second-degree-murder sentence and does not construe or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Newton, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying one of defendant’s convictions; the court decides ineffective-assistance and remand-hearing issues without construing or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Burton, the statute is cited only to identify one of the charges against defendant; the appellate court decided the admissibility of a purported will under the hearsay rules and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. England, section 750.227b is cited only to identify the felony-firearm conviction; the court resolved the appeal under the separate 180-day rule and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Watkins, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the defendants’ felony-firearm convictions; the court does not interpret or apply it. opinion →
People v. Gonzalez, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's conviction and sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements, scope, or application. opinion →
People v. Calhoun, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting defendant's conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute, and the appeal concerns a res gestae witness and ineffective assistance of counsel. opinion →
People v. Malone, the opinion cites § 750.227b only in the procedural background to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute, instead reversing on unrelated trial-error grounds. opinion →
People v. Wesley, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the offenses of conviction; the court decides an impeachment-evidence issue under MRE 609 and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Eilola, the court cited and summarized Honeycutt's treatment of the felony-firearm statute only as a comparison while deciding whether a first-degree retail-fraud sentence could be enhanced under the habitual-offender statutes; it did not decide an issue under § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Holland, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and mandatory sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute to decide any issue on appeal. opinion →
People v. Iacona, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis of a firearm charge dismissed under the plea agreement; the court decided sentencing issues and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Calloway, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting the defendant's convictions and does not decide anything about the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. McPeters, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying one of defendant's convictions. The court reversed on psychiatric-expert and due-process grounds and did not interpret or apply MCL 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Pouncey, the statute is cited only while recounting the defendant's convictions and sentence; the court does not interpret or apply it, and reverses on an unrelated jury-instruction issue. opinion →
People v. Dabish, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant’s conviction and sentence; it does not decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Adkins, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting the felony-firearm charge, conviction, and sentence; the court's holding concerns sentence credit under MCL 769.11b, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Benjamin, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty; the appellate court decided only the Recorder’s Court jurisdiction issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Mayfield, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court's holding concerns whether the fifty-year minimum sentence for second-degree murder was effectively life without parole, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Morrison, the opinion mentions MCL 750.227b only when identifying defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the court reverses based on the erroneous admission of a prior conviction for impeachment and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Neal, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b, and instead decides issues concerning the admissibility of defendant's statement and a directed-verdict motion. opinion →
King v. R G Industries, Inc, the opinion cites § 750.227b only in a string citation listing examples of Michigan statutes regulating firearms; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Yarbrough, the opinion mentions the statute only while recounting defendant's conviction and sentence; the appellate court's analysis concerns witness impeachment and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. MARK BROWN, the court decided that MCL 768.7b(1) required the manslaughter sentence to run consecutively to the prior sentences; § 750.227b(2) appeared only in a supplementary ‘See also’ citation and was not construed or independently applied. opinion →
People v. Heflin, the statute appears only in the factual and procedural history identifying the felony-firearm charge, conviction, and sentence; the court decided jury-instruction questions concerning involuntary manslaughter and self-defense, not § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Hicks, the statute appears only in the procedural recitation of Hicks's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the appellate court decides unrelated evidentiary, jury, and severance issues without interpreting or applying § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Anderson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in its procedural history to identify Anderson's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue concerning its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Strunk, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify defendant’s firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. James, the statute is cited only in procedural history identifying the offenses of conviction; the court decided issues concerning jury waiver, identification procedures, and admission of prior testimony, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Thomas, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the court reversed for ineffective assistance concerning suppression and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Harden, the court cited § 750.227b only as an example of another consecutive-sentencing statute to which its general analysis would apply; Harden was not sentenced under § 750.227b, and the court did not construe or apply that statute in deciding his case. opinion →
People v. Blasius, the statute appears only in the list of charges against the defendant; the court decides a Fourth Amendment exigent-circumstances issue and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Murph, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only when listing defendant's convictions and does not interpret the statute or decide any issue concerning its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Hoyt, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting the defendant’s convictions and does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding any issue on appeal. opinion →
People v. Szczesniak, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in recounting defendant’s plea and does not interpret or apply the statute; the appeal concerns sentencing-guidelines scoring and the effect of People v Moore. opinion →
People v. McReavy, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the offense of conviction; the court decided Fifth Amendment and evidentiary issues and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Potts, section 750.227b appears only in a footnote identifying an original firearm charge that was dismissed under the plea agreement; the court decided only which sentencing guidelines applied to the manslaughter sentence and did not interpret or apply this statute. opinion →
People v. Couch, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only in procedural history when reporting the charge against the defendant; the court did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Sutton, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the authority for Sutton's felony-firearm conviction; the court's decision concerns impeachment with postarrest silence and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Good, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify one of the charges against defendant; the appellate holding concerns suppression and voluntariness of his statement under MCL 764.27 and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Wright, the statute appears only in the opening procedural history as the citation for defendant's firearm conviction; the appellate court decides only issues concerning the admissibility of defendant's police statement and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Todd, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to report Todd's conviction and later refers generically to felony-firearm when recounting McClure's conviction and a plea offer; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements, scope, or application. opinion →
In Re McDaniel, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only to identify the felony-firearm count adjudicated below; the court's analysis and holding concern the applicability of the accessory statute, MCL 767.39, in juvenile proceedings, not the meaning or requirements of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Winans, the statute appears only in the description of defendant's firearm conviction; the court reversed on identification-evidence and ineffective-assistance grounds without deciding what § 750.227b means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Staffney, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's conviction; the appellate court decides unrelated procedural and constitutional issues and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
People v. Johnson, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the felony-firearm charge, conviction, and mandatory sentence; it does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Oswald, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the offenses of conviction; the court does not interpret its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
People v. Williams, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while reporting defendant's felony-firearm conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving any appellate issue. opinion →
People v. Moore, the statute is cited only to identify the felony-firearm conviction and sentence in the procedural background; the court decides whether the separate murder sentence complies with the life-expectancy rule, not what § 750.227b means or requires. opinion →
People v. Whiteside, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying a firearm charge dismissed under the plea bargain; the court did not interpret or apply the statute, and the appeal concerned sentence credit under other statutes. opinion →
People v. McCoy, the opinion cites § 750.227b only while recounting the firearm charge and felony-firearm conviction; the appellate issue and holding concern the timeliness and refiling of a juvenile-court waiver motion under MCR 5.950, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Bowman, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the offenses of conviction; the court decided an Interstate Agreement on Detainers jurisdiction issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Scarborough, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify defendant's firearm conviction and reports the corresponding sentence; the appeal and the court's analysis concern retroactive application of the controlled-substances sentencing provisions, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Cosby, the opinion merely reports defendant’s felony-firearm conviction and mandatory two-year sentence; the court decides only whether defendant was entitled to a special juvenile dispositional hearing and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Davis, the statute appears only in a footnote listing the charges against defendant; the appellate court decided a Fourth Amendment suppression issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Saunders, the statute appears only in procedural history identifying the felony-firearm conviction and sentence; the appellate court decides sufficiency of the evidence for murder and prosecutorial-misconduct issues, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Simon, section 750.227b is cited only in the opening procedural history to identify the felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court remands because the trial judge relied on extra-record knowledge and made inadequate factual findings, without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
People v. MacK, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying defendant’s felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not interpret the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
People v. Pouncey, the opinion mentions the statute only to identify the defendant's felony-firearm conviction and does not interpret or apply any statutory requirement. opinion →
People v. Sanders, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the defendant's conviction and sentence; it does not interpret or apply the statute in resolving the remanded jury-instruction issue. opinion →
People v. Smith, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify one of defendant's convictions; it decides a Fifth Amendment post-Miranda-silence issue and does not interpret or apply the firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Carter, the statute appears only in the procedural history identifying Carter's and a codefendant's felony-firearm convictions; the court decides the remedy and prejudice inquiry for an ineffective-assistance claim, not the meaning or application of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Shipe, the statute is cited only in a footnote reporting that the felony-firearm counts were dismissed after the preliminary examination because the bb gun was not shown to fit the description of a firearm; the appellate court did not review or adopt that ruling and instead decided a double-jeopardy issue under the bank-robbery statute. opinion →
People v. Bewersdorf, the court mentions § 750.227b only in a footnote contrasting its escalating penalties with the OUIL statute while deciding whether habitual-offender enhancement applies to OUIL felonies, and it expressly declines to approve the cited felony-firearm decision; it does not decide an issue under § 750.227b. opinion →
In Re Dana Jenkins, the statute appears only in the procedural and factual history identifying Jenkins' felony-firearm conviction and sentence. The court decided whether the trial court could resentence Jenkins on the armed-robbery conviction and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, the opinion mentions § 750.227b only while recounting the defendants' convictions and sentences; it does not interpret or apply the statute in deciding whether the trial court could resentence Jenkins. opinion →
People v. Banks, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing Banks' conviction and the charges against his codefendants; the court decided a Confrontation Clause issue and did not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Green, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the firearm charge in the procedural history; the dissent addresses prejudicial prearrest delay and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Watkins, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the defendants’ convictions and sentences below; the court did not decide what § 750.227b means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
People v. Cotton, the statute appears only in the procedural description of the firearm charge against Merlino; the court expressly states that only the assault and conspiracy charges are at issue and does not decide anything about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Deans, the court vacated the felony-firearm conviction because MCL 600.606 did not give the circuit court automatic jurisdiction over that nonenumerated charge; it did not interpret the meaning, elements, coverage, or requirements of § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Chambers, the statute appears only in a footnote listing the charges against the defendant; the court decided the applicability of Michigan's 180-day rule, not any question about § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. James, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the offenses of conviction; the court decides jury-waiver and witness-unavailability issues and does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Daniels, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b. opinion →
People v. Alvarado, the statute appears only in a footnote describing the convictions underlying defendant's probation violations; the court does not interpret or apply § 750.227b and instead decides whether separate sentences for the original offenses had to run consecutively under MCL 768.7b. opinion →
People v. Jones, the opinion cites § 750.227b only to identify one of the charges against defendant; the court’s analysis and remand concern the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, not the firearm statute. opinion →
People v. Butler, the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify defendant's felony-firearm conviction; the appellate court did not interpret its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
…and 2,810 more.

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