Mich. Comp. Laws § 600

Under MCL 600.2912b(l), the term “person” includes a duly appointed personal representative acting in a representative capacity, so a successor personal representative may rely on a predecessor's notice of intent.

Braverman v. Garden City Hospital · filed 2007-09-28(l)

Eather, we conclude that the term “person” in MCL 600.2912b(l) includes a person acting in a representative capacity and includes the duly appointed personal representative of an estate, whoever that person may be at any given time.

Section 2912b(4) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to state specified information, including the alleged breach and proximate cause; a notice specifically identifying failure to evaluate, monitor, and treat thrombocytopenia as causing death was sufficient.

Jackson v. Detroit Medical Center · filed 2008-04-08(4)

MCL 600.2912b(4) sets forth the minimal information to be contained in the notice given to the health professional or facility, which includes the facts, standard of care, action that should have been taken, breach, proximate cause, and names of those being notified. ... Thus, there is no merit to defendants’ claim that plaintiffs notices of intent failed to assert that defendants’ failure to properly evaluate and treat the decedent’s low blood-platelet level was a proximate cause of the decedent’s death. To the contrary, the December 16, 2004, notice of intent specifically provided notice that plaintiff viewed defendants’ alleged failure to evaluate, monitor, and treat the decedent’s thrombocytopenia as a cause of her death.

Section 2912b(4)(e) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to state how the alleged breach proximately caused the claimed injury.

Boodt v. Borgess Medical Center · filed 2008-07-02(4)(e)

In particular, it requires a “statement” describing the “manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.” MCL 600.2912b(4)(e).

Section 600.5856(c) tolls the medical-malpractice limitations period for a timely notice of intent despite defects, while §§ 600.2301 and 600.2912b govern good-faith correction of notice defects and the shortened 154-day filing period for inadequate responses.

Bush v. Shabahang · filed 2009-07-29(c)

We hold that pursuant to MCL 600.5856(c), as amended by 2004 PA 87, effective April 22, 2004, when an NOI is timely, the statute of limitations is tolled despite defects contained therein. Moreover, in light of the legislative clarification of § 5856(c), we hold that the purpose of the NOI statute is better served by allowing for defects in NOIs to be addressed in light of § 2301, which permits “amendment” or “disregard” of “any error or defect” where the substantial rights of the parties are not affected, as long as the cure is in the furtherance of justice and on terms that are just. A cure is in the furtherance of justice when a party makes a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of § 2912b. Finally, we hold that a plaintiff may take advantage of the 154-day waiting period provided in § 2912b (8) where a defendant fails to make a good-faith attempt to reply to the plaintiffs NOI in compliance with the statutory content requirements.

Section 2912b requires a medical-malpractice claimant to wait the statutory notice period before filing, but premature filing calls for dismissal without prejudice rather than dismissal with prejudice.

Ellout v. Detroit Medical Center · filed 2009-10-08(1)

Although Bush involved a question regarding a defective NOI rather than premature filing, the result is the same, because the NOI statute does not set forth an express penalty for premature filing. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Coulbeck with prejudice because the proper sanction for plaintiffs premature filing against Coulbeck was dismissal without prejudice.

Section 2912b requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to provide specified information, including how the alleged breach proximately caused the claimed injury, and the notice is read as a whole for sufficiently particularized good-faith notice.

Decker v. Rochowiak · filed 2010-03-30(4)(e)

A medical malpractice action cannot be filed until a plaintiff complies with MCL 600.2912b, which provides: ... (4) The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following: ... (e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice. ... The NOI, examined as a whole, must advise “potential malpractice defendants of the basis of the claims against them.” ... Rather, the plaintiff must “make good-faith averments that provide details that are responsive to the information sought by the statute and that are as particularized as is consistent with the early notice stage of the proceedings.” ... The notice must be read in its entirety. Boodt, 481 Mich at 560. We conclude that the NOI, read as a whole and in conjunction with the underlying facts, clearly describes the manner in which the alleged breaches of the standard of care by the Carson City defendants and the Spectrum defendants were the proximate cause of Eric’s injuries.

Section 2912b(4) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to identify the applicable standard of care, how it was breached, and what actions should have been taken to comply.

Esselman v. Garden City Hospital · filed 2010-04-23(4)

MCL 600.2912b(4) sets forth the requirements with which a NOI must comply. The statute requires, inter alia, that the NOI contain the applicable standard of care, the manner in which the standard of care was breached, and the actions that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of care. Id.

Section 2912b requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to give the defendant an advance notice of intent containing specified information, but no particular format is required.

Hoffman v. Barrett · filed 2010-06-03(2912b)(1)

Under MCL 600.2912b, commencement of a medical malpractice claim requires a plaintiff to provide an advance “notice of intent” to the intended defendant; that notice must provide certain specific pieces of information, although no particular format is required.

Section 2301 permits a court to cure or disregard defects in a medical-malpractice notice of intent when no substantial right is affected and the plaintiff made a good-faith attempt to comply with the notice requirements.

Swanson v. Port Huron Hospital · filed 2010-06-24

On remand in this case, this Court must reexamine the notice of intent in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush and MCL 600.2301. ... Thus, because defendants here are health care providers, like the Bush defendants, no substantial rights are implicated. ... Thus, looking at Swanson’s notice as a whole and comparing its defects to those in Bush, we conclude that her notice of intent was a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of MCL 600.2912b. Therefore, dismissal of her claims was not warranted.

Section 2912b requires at least 182 days of written notice before a medical-malpractice action, but does not bar tolling from a second notice when the first notice did not toll the limitations period; the no-suit periods may be aggregated, and perfect notice is not required.

Hoffman v. Boonsiri · filed 2010-09-14(1), (6)

However, as long as an initial notice did not toll the limitations period, the tolling triggered by a second notice does not violate MCL 600.2912b(6). ... In other words, perfect notice is not required. ... Nothing in the applicable statutes precludes the aggregation of the no-suit/waiting periods involved in providing notice. ... Plaintiff gave written notice not less than 182 days before she commenced the action.

A notice of intent that entirely omits a defendant does not toll the medical-malpractice limitations period as to that defendant and cannot be cured by later adding the defendant.

Griesbach v. Ross · filed 2010-11-23

Here, the NOI was not defective because of an omission of required allegations; rather, it was fatally deficient because it did not name a party. Unlike the defendants in Bush, the substantial rights of defendant Ross, a health-care professional, were implicated. Defendant Ross was never in a position to evaluate the claim against him, unlike the defendants in Bush, because he never received timely notice of a claim pending against him. Thus, the complete failure to serve defendant Ross with an NOI cannot be considered a mere defect, subject to cure.

Section 2912b requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to identify the parties the plaintiff intends to sue; it does not require naming a nondefendant provider whose alleged malpractice supports vicarious-liability claims against a named facility.

Wood v. Zvi Kennet Dmd Msc · filed 2016-03-17(4)(f)

It is clear from a plain reading of MCL 600.2912b that a plaintiff must give notice to all parties it intends to commence a medical malpractice lawsuit against and name those parties in the notice, in addition to the other required elements listed in section (4). Thus, a plain reading of the statute requires that only named defendants of the lawsuit be named in the NOI.

Section 2912b(2) requires mailing the notice of intent to the health professional's or facility's last known professional business or residential address, and proof of mailing is prima facie evidence of compliance.

Sanders v. McLaren-macomb · filed 2018-02-27(2)

The notice of intent to file a claim required under subsection (1) shall be mailed to the last known professional business address or residential address of the health professional or health facility who is the subject of the claim.

Subsections (1) and (2) require a medical-malpractice notice of intent to be given to the defendant health professional or facility, and the notice must be directed to that defendant's qualifying address to be effective.

Estate of Sandra D Marquardt v. Vellaiah Durai Umashankar Md · filed 2019-11-26(1), (2)

Subsection (1) makes it clear that a plaintiff cannot commence an action unless he or she first gives the party against whom relief is sought (the health professional or health facility) written notice. Subsection (2) makes it clear that the plaintiff can mail the NOI to either the last known professional business address or residential address of the responding party. The parallel construction of the two provisions makes it clear that the written notice in subsection (1) must be sent to subject party of the notice. That is, if the responding party is a health professional, the NOI must be sent to the professional business or residential address of that professional. If neither address “can reasonably be ascertained,” then the NOI can be sent to the healthcare facility where the care rendered by that professional was rendered. However, in order to effectuate the required notice, the NOI must be directed to or addressed to the defendant professional to whom the NOI is intended to provide notice.

The notice-of-intent requirement applies before a medical-malpractice action begins, so an existing defendant need not receive a new notice when the plaintiff later adds a new theory of causation.

Kostadinovski v. Md · filed 2023-07-06(1), (3), and (6)

We hold that the NOI requirement of MCL 600.2912b does not apply to an already-existing defendant after a medical malpractice action has commenced.

Subsection (2) permits a medical-malpractice notice of intent to be mailed to the facility where the treatment occurred when the health professional’s last known business or residential address cannot reasonably be ascertained.

20250214_C365904_44_365904.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-02-14(2)

Considering the facts of this case, we find that plaintiff complied with MCL 600.2912b because the Chelsea Hospital address was defendant’s last known business address at the time of the mailing of the NOI. Regardless, even if this Court found that the Chelsea Hospital address was not defendant’s last known address at that time, we would nonetheless find that defendant complied with MCL 600.2912b, consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that statute in DeCosta, because defendant’s residential and business addresses were not reasonably ascertainable at the time of the mailing of the NOI where defendant’s address did not appear in any of plaintiff’s medical records and where the information available to the public suggested a long list of potential business addresses for defendant, all but one of which were incorrect, according to defendant. As such, subsection (2) of the statute permitted plaintiff to mail the NOI to the place where the treatment occurred, Chelsea Hospital.

Section 2925a preserves contribution claims except where the tort-reform statutes prevent a person from being held liable beyond that person's pro-rata share; in those circumstances, contribution claims are no longer viable.

Kokx v. Bylenga · filed 2000-09-19(2)

Therefore, we hold that to the extent that the statutes enacted as part of the Legislature’s 1995 tort reform do not allow a person to be held responsible for paying damages beyond the person’s pro-rata share of responsibility as determined under § 6304, claims for contribution are no longer viable. Thus, the circuit court did not err in granting Miller Canfield summary disposition of defendants’ contribution claim.

Section 2169(1)(a) requires a party to timely challenge an opposing medical-malpractice expert’s basic qualifications, while § 2955(1) assigns reliability determinations to the trial court and does not authorize a party to admit treatise evidence.

Greathouse v. Rhodes · filed 2000-10-182169(1)(a); 2955(1)

Given the fundamental role standard of care experts have in medical malpractice litigation, and particularly where § 2169 is identified in the statutes requiring both parties to list an expert at the commencement of the litigation, we hold that a party’s failure to challenge an expert’s basic qualifications under subsection 2169(l)(a) within a reasonable time after learning the expert’s identity results in forfeiture of the issue. ... The plain language of the statute establishes the Legislature’s intent to assign the trial court the role of determining, pursuant to the Daubert criteria, whether proposed scientific opinion is sufficiently reliable for jury consideration. ... We therefore conclude that a party may not use subsection 2955(1) as a basis to admit treatise evidence at trial, and a party’s attempt to establish the reliability of its experts before the jury must be accomplished through, and in a manner consistent with, the rules of evidence.

An expert testifying about the standard of care for a general practitioner must meet the statutory general-practitioner qualifications, and the affidavit of merit must be signed by a health professional reasonably believed to qualify.

Decker v. Flood · filed 2002-01-10(1)(c)

Applying the ordinary meaning of general practitioner as one who does not limit his practice to any particular branch of medicine, Dr. Gallagher clearly does not satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2169 and, therefore, would not be qualified to offer expert testimony on the standard of practice of a general practitioner, such as defendant Dr. Flood.

Section 2169 requires a medical-malpractice expert to match the defendant physician’s specialty involved in the alleged malpractice, rather than every specialty in which the physician is board certified.

Tate v. Detroit Receiving Hospital · filed 2002-04-04(1)(a)

Thus, where a defendant physician has several board certifications and the alleged malpractice involves only one of these specialties, § 2169 requires an expert witness to possess the same specialty as that engaged in by the defendant physician during the course of the alleged malpractice.

In a medical-malpractice action, § 2169(1)(a)'s expert-witness specialty and board-certification requirements apply to the physicians whose negligence underlies a hospital's vicarious liability, even when those physicians are not named parties of record.

Nippa v. Botsford General Hospital · filed 2002-09-10(1)(a)

Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s claim that the word “party” in MCL 600.2169 should be interpreted to refer only to named parties of record, where such a construction would not further the purpose of the statute or the object it seeks to accomplish.

For medical-malpractice standard-of-care testimony against a general practitioner, a family practitioner and a general practitioner are physicians engaged in the same type of medical practice, so a family practitioner who practiced general medicine during the relevant year is qualified under § 600.2169(1)(c).

Robins v. Garg · filed 2006-06-12(1)(c)

For purposes of satisfying the requirements of MCL 600.2169, therefore, we hold that a family practitioner and a general practitioner are physicians engaged in the same type of medical practice. The terms “family practitioner” and “general practitioner” have become interchangeable. Accordingly, because Dr. Werlinsky was engaged in general practice medicine, as a family practitioner, for the year preceding the date of the alleged malpractice, we conclude that he was qualified under MCL 600.2169(l)(c), and that plaintiff’s affidavit of merit complied with MCL 600.2912d(l).

Section 2169(1) does not apply its physician-specific subsections (a) and (c) to nonphysician defendants; subsection (b) governs instead, and binding precedent may disqualify an expert from a different health profession.

Brown v. Hayes · filed 2006-06-12(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c)

Nonetheless, we must follow McElhaney. MCR 7.215(J)(1). Therefore, we conclude that Smith is not engaged in the “same health profession” as defendants and is, therefore, not qualified to give expert testimony under § 2169(l)(b).

Section 2169(1) requires a medical-malpractice expert testifying about the appropriate standard of practice or care to match the defendant's most relevant specialty or subspecialty, applicable board certification or certificate of special qualifications, and practice or teaching requirements.

Woodard v. University of Mich Medical Ctr · filed 2006-07-31(1)(a), (1)(b)

Because an expert witness is not required to testify regarding an inappropriate or irrelevant standard of medical practice or care, § 2169(1) should not be understood to require such witness to specialize in specialties and possess board certificates that are not relevant to the standard of medical practice or care about which the witness is to testify.

Section 2957(2) allows a party, within 91 days after a nonparty is identified, to obtain leave to file and serve an amended pleading against that nonparty, but the court held that the conflicting procedural court rule prevails.

Staff v. Johnson · filed 2000-11-16(2)

Review of the court rule and the statute reveals a conflict. The statute sets forth a general procedure for providing notice to a nonparty. MCL 600.2957(2); MSA 27A.2957(2) provides that upon motion of a party within ninety-one days of identification, the court shall grant leave to file and serve an amended pleading. The statute fails to place any time restrictions on the filing of the motion to add a nonparty. ... The construction of MCL 600.2957; MSA 27A.2957 urged by plaintiff would require that a trial court add a party on motion alone without regard to the statutory notice provisions of MCL 600.2912b(3); MSA 27A.2912(2)(3) or court rule notice provisions regarding adding a nonparty and could cause the parties to use the unrestricted statute as a means of strategy for delay or settlement. We cannot impose the overstrict construction urged by plaintiff. Herrick, supra. Furthermore, our Supreme Court recognized the need for court rules to govern the procedural notice and statute of limitations issues. Accordingly, the conflict between the court rules and the statute is resolved in favor of the court rules because it involves a matter of procedure. McDougal, supra-, Strong, supra.

Section 5838 makes the last day of professional service on the matters underlying the malpractice claim the accrual date, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the claim or suffers damages.

Ohio Farmers Insurance v. Shamie · filed 2000-12-28(1)

Because § 5838 governs accrual of plaintiff’s accounting malpractice claim against defendants, the date when plaintiff suffered damages is irrelevant to the accrual of the claim. Instead, plaintiff’s claim accrued when defendants discontinued professional accounting services with regard to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose. MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838.

For nonmedical malpractice by a state-licensed professional, § 5838(1)'s last-treatment rule delays accrual until the professional stops serving the plaintiff concerning the broad matters underlying the claim.

Levy v. Martin · filed 2001-01-03(1)

This statute constituted not only a codification, but also an expansion of the common-law last treatment rule. ... Using the same reasoning, it is clear here that plaintiffs, rather than receiving professional advice for a specific problem, were receiving generalized tax preparation services from defendants. These continuing services, just like the continuous eye examinations in Morgan, to be consistent with the Morgan approach, must be held to constitute ““the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose.””

Section 600.5838a(1) provides that a medical-malpractice claim accrues when the act or omission underlying the claim occurs.

Watts v. HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEMS · filed 2008-02-01(1)

Pursuant to MCL 600.5838a(1), a claim for medical malpractice “accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice.”

A legal-malpractice claim accrues when the attorney stops serving the plaintiff on the matter underlying the claim; later work on a separate remedial matter does not extend that accrual date.

Rhodes v. John F Schaefer Pllc · filed 2015-11-12(1)

Thus, the December 17, 2010 judgment of divorce constituted the ultimate judgment of divorce that concluded the matter, and plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date that the amended judgment of divorce was entered. See MCL 600.5838(1).

Section 2912e(1) makes a defendant's timely affidavit-of-meritorious-defense filing mandatory, but the requirement is not jurisdictional and the statute does not mandate default or preclusion as the remedy for noncompliance.

Wilhelm v. Mustafa · filed 2001-02-14(1)

We acknowledge that the use of the word “shall” indicates that the requirements of § 2912e are mandatory. ... Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction, and defendant’s failure to timely file his affidavit of meritorious defense did not affect the court’s power to hear the case. ... While the requirement that a defendant file an affidavit of meritorious defense is mandatory, the statute is silent with regard to the remedy for noncompliance. There is nothing in the statute itself to indicate that default is the mandatory, or even appropriate, remedy when a defendant fails to file an affidavit of meritorious defense. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was not compelled by the statute to enter a default against defendant for his failure to timely file an affidavit of meritorious defense.

A defendant entitled to governmental immunity does not lose that immunity for failing to file an affidavit of meritorious defense under § 600.2912e(1).

McLAIN v. LANSING FIRE DEPARTMENT · filed 2015-03-03(1)

Because governmental employees are immune from breaches of the standard of ordinary care, the affidavit of merit requirements of MCL 600.2912e are not relevant to a defendant otherwise entitled to governmental immunity, and we therefore conclude that such a defendant may not lose the benefit of that immunity merely by failing to timely file the affidavit of meritorious defense.

Section 600.2955a(1) provides an absolute defense only when the plaintiff's alcohol-related impairment was the one cause of the particular accident or event that resulted in the injury at issue; it did not bar this medical-malpractice action because the alleged malpractice caused distinct injuries and could also have been a proximate cause.

Beebe v. Hartman · filed 2010-11-09(1)

In sum, we hold that the applicable “accident or event” under MCL 600.2955a(l) was defendants’ alleged medical malpractice. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there was more than one cause that resulted in the pain and the contracture of the toes in plaintiffs right foot. Therefore, MCL 600.2955a(l) does not apply to the facts of this case.

Section 600.2955a(1) provides an absolute impairment defense, but it does not apply when the defendant allegedly caused or created the injured person's impairment.

Piccalo v. Nix · filed 2001-07-31(1)

While the statute itself provides that the defense of impairment is “absolute” and applies “in an action for the death of an individual or for injury to a person or property,” we decline to apply the statute in this personal injury action where defendant allegedly created the condition of impairment of both driver Burnham and plaintiff as well as other party attendees. It would be absurd to allow the defense of impairment to an individual who caused or created the impairment of the injured person. Albright, supra. Accordingly, defendant’s contention that the statute applies in the present case is without merit.

The statute's intoxication defense cannot be resolved without factual findings on whether the plaintiff's ability to function was impaired by intoxicating liquor and whether the plaintiff was more than 50% responsible for the accident.

Rhoda v. Peter E O'Dovero Inc · filed 2016-03-242955a

Finally, Marquette Mountain asserts that Rhoda was intoxicated when he rode the defective rail and that his intoxication serves as an absolute defense pursuant to MCL 600.2955a. The Mountain takes issue with the trial court’s failure to grant summary disposition on this ground. The trial court determined that “insufficient evidence” supported that Rhoda’s accident resulted from “an impaired ability to function due to the influence of intoxicating liquor[.]” Id. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that fact questions regarding both Rhoda’s impaired ability to function and whether he was more than 50% the cause of the accident render summary disposition inappropriate.

Section 600.2955a(1) provides an intoxication defense when the injured person had an impaired ability to function and was at least 50% responsible for the accident.

Estate of Aaron Reid v. Walker · filed 2017-02-07(1)

It is an absolute defense in an action for the death of an individual or for injury to a person or property that the individual upon whose death or injury the action is based had an impaired ability to function due to the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and as a result of that impaired ability, the individual was 50% or more the cause of the accident or event that resulted in the death or injury.

Section 600.2955a(1) precludes liability when an intoxicated individual is 50% or more at fault for an accident.

Estate of Aaron Reid v. Walker · filed 2017-02-07(1)

MCL 600.2955a(1) also precludes liability if an individual is intoxicated and 50% or more at fault for an accident.

Section 2955a makes impaired intoxication an absolute defense when it caused the injured person to be 50% or more at fault, reduces damages by the person's fault when below 50%, and presumes impaired ability to function under the specified alcohol standard.

Estes v. Green · filed 2018-07-05(1), (2)(b)

If the individual described in this subsection was less than 50% the cause of the accident or event, an award of damages shall be reduced by that percentage.

Section 600.2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff claiming loss of an opportunity to survive or obtain a better result to prove that the lost opportunity was greater than 50 percent.

Dykes v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2001-09-06(2)

Thus, to recover for the loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result, a plaintiff must show that had the defendant not been negligent, there was a greater than fifty percent chance of survival or of a better result.

In a medical-malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove that an injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.

Walker v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2018-10-18(2)

In a medical malpractice action, it is plaintiff’s burden to prove that he “suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” MCL 600.2912a(2).

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence; absolute certainty is unnecessary.

Estate of Henry Gerow Jr v. Ronald L Thies Jr Md · filed 2020-07-02(2)

Aside from the caselaw, the governing statute, MCL 600.2912a(2), provides the applicable standard: “In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” (Emphasis added.) Dr. Eckstein’s inability to “say for certain” what a chest x-ray would have shown is legally meaningless.

Section 600.2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s negligence more probably than not proximately caused the injury.

SELLERS v. United State of America · filed 2022-03-15(2)

Additionally, under MCL 600.2912a(2), a plaintiff in a malpractice action is required to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence standard. See MCL 600.2912a(2) (“In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.”).

In a medical-malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove that the injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, and recovery for a lost opportunity to survive or achieve a better result requires an opportunity greater than 50%.

Estate of Jay R Wesenick v. Md · filed 2022-07-14(2)

MCL 600.2912a(2) states: In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants. In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%. ... This evidence suffices to create a material question of fact regarding proximate cause. Accordingly, summary disposition was precluded.

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.

Sawyer v. M Mikael Getachew Md · filed 2025-03-21(2)

Regarding the proximate-cause element, our Legislature has stated, “the plaintiff has the burden ... of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” MCL 600.2912a(2).

Section 2912e requires a defendant to timely file an affidavit of meritorious defense, but it neither requires nor prohibits a default for a late filing, leaving the court discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy.

Kowalski v. Fiutowski · filed 2001-10-31

The language of MCL 600.2912e unambiguously does not require or recommend any particular sanction. That does not mean, however, that no remedy is available. ... Because MCL 600.2912e provides no remedy, this Court may infer one. ... We therefore hold that MCL 600.2912e neither prohibits nor requires a default when the defendant fails to timely file its affidavit of meritorious defense.

Section 600.2912e requires a medical-malpractice defendant to file an affidavit of meritorious defense, but failure to file it does not mandate default or preclude the defendant from presenting a defense.

Costa v. Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc · filed 2004-11-10

This Court has more than once rejected similar assertions that a medical malpractice defendant’s failure to file an affidavit of meritorious defense pursuant to MCL 600.2912e mandates a default or other preclusion of the defendant from presenting a defense, and plaintiffs ... present no authority to the contrary. ... Here, the trial court gave Schultz and Farenger additional time to file their affidavits, and we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 2912e does not require a defendant asserting governmental immunity to file an affidavit of meritorious defense unless an order denies immunity; the filing obligation is stayed during an appeal of that order.

Costa v. Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc · filed 2006-06-28(1)

In light of our interpretation today of the relevant statutes, and in view of these court rules, we hold that where a defendant has asserted the defense of governmental immunity, that defendant is not obligated to comply with the affidavit of meritorious defense requirement of MCL 600.2912e, unless an order has been entered denying governmental immunity to the defendant.

Section 600.2955a makes intoxication an absolute bar to recovery when it is at least 50% the cause of the injury, and otherwise reduces damages by the intoxication percentage rather than applying ordinary comparative negligence.

Wysocki v. Kivi · filed 2002-02-05(1)

The fifty percent limit is rationally related to the government interest of placing responsibility for tortious conduct by intoxicated or drug-affected persons directly on them. We conclude that the intoxication statute is not violative of due process and, therefore, that jury instructions based on the statute, rather than comparative negligence, were similarly not violative of due process.

Subsection 2163a(13) requires a case-specific finding that the child witness cannot testify understandably despite available protections, while subsection (14) preserves confrontation safeguards.

People v. Pesquera · filed 2001-03-22(13), (14)

Subsection 13 sets forth the broad outline of the minimum, level of psychological or emotional trauma that must be found. ... We hold that the standards set forth in this subsection clearly satisfy constitutional standards.

The wrongful-death saving provision gives only one two-year period, beginning when the probate court first issues letters of authority, and a successor personal representative does not receive a new two-year period.

Eggleston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc · filed 2002-03-06

The plain language of MCL 600.5852 states that “the personal representative of the deceased” may commence an action “at any time within 2 years after the letters of authority are issued.” ... Absent language to that effect, we are bound to construe the saving provision strictly: the two-year limitation period begins when the probate court issues the letters of authority to the personal representative, regardless of whether the court later appoints one or more successor personal representatives.

Section 5852 incorporates the six-month medical-malpractice discovery period as the applicable period of limitation, allowing a personal representative to use the statute's saving period subject to its time limits.

Miller v. Mercy Memorial Hospital · filed 2002-06-04

Following these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the six-month discovery rule is a “period of limitation” within the meaning of the saving statute. The plain language of § 5838a(2) provides two distinct periods of limitation: two years after the accrual of the cause of action, and six months after the existence of the claim was or should have been discovered by the medical malpractice claimant. MCL 600.5852, simply refers to “the” period of limitation. The provision does not limit or qualify which period of limitation applies, the two-year period of limitation rooted in § 5805(5), or the six-month discovery period found in § 5838a(2). As a saving statute, § 5852 applies to whatever period of limitation is or may be applicable in a given case, be it a professional malpractice claim or a breach of contract action.

Section 600.5852 allows a personal representative to commence a surviving action within two years after letters of authority are issued to that personal representative, including a successor personal representative, subject to the statute's three-year outer limit.

Eggleston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc · filed 2003-03-26

The statute simply provides that an action may be commenced by the personal representative “at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run.” Id. The language adopted by the Legislature clearly allows an action to be brought within two years after letters of authority are issued to the personal representative. The statute does not provide that the two-year period is measured from the date letters of authority are issued to the initial personal representative.

Section 5852 allows a personal representative to commence a surviving action within two years after letters of authority are issued, but no later than three years after the limitations period has run; the letters are issued when signed by the probate judge.

Lentini v. Urbancic · filed 2004-06-22

We hold that the trial court correctly decided that the letters of authority are “issued” on the date they are signed by the probate judge and not on the date they are certified or the date they are mailed to the fiduciary.

Section 5852 permits a successor personal representative to file a surviving action within two years after the issuance of the successor’s letters of authority, subject to the statute’s three-year outer limit.

Braverman v. Garden City Hospital · filed 2006-11-14

Plaintiff timely filed this action within two years of the issuance of his letters of authority as successor personal representative, which satisfies MCL 600.5852. Eggleston, supra.

Section 5852 gives a personal representative two years after letters of authority are issued to commence a surviving action, subject to the statute's three-year ceiling after the limitations period has run.

Carmichael v. Henry Ford Hospital · filed 2007-11-27

But because the clear language of § 5852, as construed in Eggleston, does not contemplate any qualifications on which “letters of authority” or which “personal representative” may receive the benefit of the wrongful death saving period, the plain statutory language indicates that the issuance of letters of authority to the same individual commences the running of a new wrongful death saving period.

MCL 600.5852 permits a wrongful-death personal representative to use its saving period to toll the Court of Claims statutory notice period, provided the provision’s conditions are met.

Estate of Hana St Juliana v. State Police · filed 2025-07-17(1), (4)

Applying the legal principles established by this Court in Mays to the current matter, the underlying rationale is applicable to the wrongful-death savings provision articulated in MCL 600.5852. This provision is intended to safeguard plaintiffs’ rights in wrongful-death actions, particularly when confronting statutory deadlines. Further, in accordance with the recognized methods of statutory interpretation set forth in Mays, and in light of the Legislature’s clear intent to implement the wrongful-death savings provision in conjunction with the COCA, we conclude that this provision not only extends the filing timeframe but also tolls the statutory notice period albeit any tolling is contingent upon meeting the specific conditions specified within the provision.

Subsection (1) must be construed under the proper rules of statutory construction rather than rejected under the discarded “absurd result” rule.

Piccalo v. Nix · filed 2002-05-03(1)

On remand, the Court of Appeals shall construe M.C.L. § 600.2955a(1) consistent with the principles articulated in McIntire and Gilbert.

MCL 600.2912a's statutory standards of care for general practitioners and specialists do not apply to nurses; nurses are governed by the common-law standard of care.

Cox v. Flint Board of Hospital Managers · filed 2002-07-25(a), (b)

Further, we hold that MCL 600.2912a, by its plain language, does not apply to nurses. Instead, nurses are held to the common-law standard of care, i.e., the skill and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by practitioners of the same profession in the same or similar communities.

After an initial notice of intent to sue for medical malpractice, a claimant may not tack on or add another 182-day notice period, even when the later notice adds a theory of liability against an already named defendant.

Ashby v. Byrnes · filed 2002-09-10600.2912b(6)

After the initial notice is given to a health professional or health facility under this section, the tacldng or addition of successive 182-day periods is not allowed, irrespective of how many additional notices are subsequently filed for that claim and irrespective of the number of health professionals or health facilities notified. ... However, although we recognize that subsection 2912b(6) specifically proscribes only the tacking or addition of “successive” periods, the overall intent of the language of the statute is clearly that only “the initial notice” results in a tolling of the limitation period “irrespective of how many additional notices are subsequently filed.” ... By its terms, the statute would clearly apply to an additional notice that added other “health professionals or health facilities” to a claim originally noticed against an individual “health professional or health facility.” If that is the case, which it clearly is, we cannot construe the statute to be inapplicable when a notice merely alleges additional theories of liability against an already named defendant.

Section 2912a(2) permits recovery for loss of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result only when the lost opportunity exceeds 50%.

Fulton v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2002-09-20(2)

Consequently, we conclude that MCL 600.2912a(2) requires a plaintiff to show that the loss of the opportunity to survive or achieve a better result exceeds fifty percent.

In a medical-malpractice action, § 2912a(2) bars recovery for loss of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%; under Fulton, the lost opportunity is calculated by subtracting the opportunity without negligence from the opportunity with negligence.

Ensink v. Mecosta County General Hospital · filed 2004-09-01(2)

Nevertheless, we find the Fulton dissent’s interpretation of the plain language of § 2912a(2) to be a more accurate rendition of the legislative intent. The statute demands that a medical malpractice plaintiff demonstrate that his opportunity to survive or achieve a better result was greater than fifty percent. MCL 600.2912a(2). ... However, we are bound by our previous decision in Fulton. Applying the Fulton majority’s analysis, Dr. Levine’s testimony does not clearly establish that plaintiff lost an opportunity to achieve a better result greater than fifty percent. If plaintiff had a twenty percent chance of complete recovery without t-PA, under the Fulton majority’s interpretation, that “without negligence” percentage should be subtracted from the anticipated improvement with t-PA because that would be the opportunity to achieve a better result that was lost. ... Because that is less than fifty percent, pursuant to the Fulton majority’s interpretation of MCL 600.2912a(2), the trial court should have granted summary disposition to defendants for failure to satisfy § 2912a(2).

Section 2912a(2) bars recovery for loss of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%.

Estate of Sandra Peetz v. Henry Ford MacOmb Hospital · filed 2015-10-08(2)

Finally, plaintiff failed to present expert testimony establishing that there was a 50% or greater chance of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result had Dr. Hans ordered a CT scan immediately after the second surgery. See Taylor, 286 Mich App at 502. ... Dr. Flye failed to unequivocally state that there was a greater than 50% chance that Peetz had an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result had a CT scan been performed immediately after the second surgery. See MCL 600.2912a(2).

Section 2912a(2) requires a plaintiff claiming loss of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result to show that the opportunity was greater than 50 percent.

Estate of Sandra Peetz v. Henry Ford MacOmb Hospital · filed 2015-10-08(2)

Plaintiff was only required to show that Peetz’s opportunity to survive or achieve a better result was greater than 50%, not that it was more likely than not that Peetz would have made a full recovery.

Section 2912a(2) bars recovery for loss of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%.

Tondreau v. Henry Ford MacOmb Hospital · filed 2016-07-29(2)

The testimony of plaintiff’s experts also failed to establish that there was a 50% or greater chance of an opportunity to survive or achieve a better result, as required by MCL 600.2912a(2), had Hans ordered the CT scan immediately after the second surgery.

Section 600.2907a creates a cause of action for recording an encumbrance without lawful cause and with intent to harass or intimidate; a good-faith lien claim supported by probable cause does not satisfy that basis for liability.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Lagoons Forest Condominium Ass'n · filed 2014-05-15

The third count of plaintiffs complaint sought damages under MCL 600.2907a, which establishes a cause of action for “[a] person who violates [MCL 565.25] by encumbering property through the recording of a document without lawful cause with the intent to harass or intimidate any person .. . .” ... However, because we held that defendant did properly have a claim to association assess*271ments against Fannie Mae, it cannot be said that defendant “filed an invalid lien with the intent to cause [Fannie Mae] injury.” ... Further, even if defendant did not partially prevail on its claim for association assessments, defendant’s “claim under the [lien] was asserted in good faith upon probable cause or was prompted by a reasonable belief that [it] had rights in the real estate in question.”

Section 600.2907a(2) makes it a felony to violate MCL 565.25 by recording a document that encumbers property without lawful cause and with intent to harass or intimidate.

People v. Johnson-E1 · filed 2013-03-07(2)

MCL 600.2907a(2) creates criminal liability for a person who unlawfully encumbers real property as follows: “A person who violates [MCL 565.25] by encumbering property through the recording of a document without lawful cause with the intent to harass or intimidate any person is guilty of a felony[.]” This is the criminal version of a slander-of-title tort.

Section 600.2907a(2) makes it a felony to encumber property by recording a document without lawful cause with intent to harass or intimidate, and its penalty is a freestanding provision within the Revised Judicature Act that does not violate the Title-Object Clause.

People v. Cynar · filed 2002-09-24(2)

However, by its own terms, MCL 600.2907a(2) proscribes “encumbering property through the recording of a document without lawful cause with the intent to harass or intimidate any person . . . .” Although MCL 565.25 supplements MCL 600.2907a by providing additional detail regarding the entry of liens, we believe that the proscribing language of MCL 600.2907a(2) is sufficient to qualify as a freestanding provision of the rja. Accordingly, providing a penalty for the proscribed conduct was within the scope of the title of the rja.

Subsection (a) tolls the limitations period when the complaint is properly filed and the summons and complaint are served, even if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Hoekstra v. Bose · filed 2002-10-18(a)

We find nothing in MCL 600.5856(a) requiring the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. According to the plain language of the Legislature, under subsection a, only proper filing and service of the complaint and summons are required to commence tolling.

Section 5856(a) tolls the limitations period when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served, even if the affidavit is defective until its validity is successfully challenged in later judicial proceedings.

Glisson v. Gerrity · filed 2007-09-21(a)

As Kirkaldy states, “[u]nder MCL 600.5856(a) and MCL 600.2912d, the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on the defendant.”

Section 600.5856(a) tolls the limitations period at filing only when the summons and complaint are served within the time set by the Supreme Court rules.

Sarafa v. Shiri Levy Md · filed 2016-08-02(a)

Since we conclude that the trial court’s order was not proper under the nunc pro tunc doctrine and plaintiff did not serve the summons on the defendant within the 60 day extension, the statute of limitations was not tolled at the time plaintiff filed the complaint.

Section 600.5856 tolls a limitations period only when one of its specified events occurs; filing a complaint alone is insufficient, timely service is required under subsection (a), subsection (b) concerns acquiring jurisdiction by means other than service, and subsection (c) applies only to the specified medical-malpractice notice period.

Foltz v. Fox · filed 2017-07-18(a), (b), and (c)

Thus, under the law applicable to this suit, the filing of plaintiff’s initial complaint alone was not enough to toll the statute of limitations. Gladych, 468 Mich at 605. Rather, plaintiff also had to meet one of the tolling provisions of MCL 600.5856 to stop the statute from running. Id. Under the current version of MCL 600.5856(a), for the filing of a complaint to toll a statute of limitations at the moment it is filed, the complaint must also be “served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules.” MCL 600.5856(a).

Section 2725(2) permits a probate court to cancel a notice of lis pendens when the plaintiff does not commence or prosecute the action in good faith.

in Re Therese M Cardinal Trust and Marvin a Cardinal Trust · filed 2017-09-12(2)

MCL 600.2725(2) gives a probate court discretion to “direct that a notice of the pendency of an action be canceled” “[i]f a plaintiff filing the notice” “does not commence or prosecute the action in good faith.” The probate court did not abuse its discretion when it canceled Poe’s lis pendens and notice of lis pendens pursuant to MCL 600.2725.

The statute provides an absolute defense when an impaired person's impairment caused that person to be at least 50% responsible for the accident or event causing the injury; the court held that an intoxicated plaintiff's choices to consume alcohol, ride with an intoxicated driver, and ride without proper seating or restraints supported that level of causation.

Piccalo v. Nix · filed 2002-11-13(1)

Given this broad definition, there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that plaintiff was fifty percent, or more, the cause of the “event” that resulted in the injury. Plaintiff, who was over eighteen years of age but under the legal drinking age of twenty-one, elected to consume alcohol and become intoxicated. Plaintiff freely chose to accept a ride home from an intoxicated driver. Plaintiff also chose to ride in an automobile that did not have proper seating or restraints in the rear compartment and was filled with unrestrained materials including a tire and several tools. Under these circumstances, defendant was entitled to the absolute defense of impairment, and the judgment of no cause of action must be affirmed.

Section 2950a treats actual notice of a personal protection order as distinct from being served with the order; actual notice is not equivalent to service.

People v. Threatt · filed 2003-03-07(8)(g), (10)

MCL 600.2950a(8)(g), and (10) refer to “receiv[ing] actual notice” and “befing] served” in the alternative. These references indicate that, under MCL 600.2950a, “actual notice” is not the equivalent of service.

Section 2925d does not eliminate the common-law setoff rule in joint-and-several-liability cases; a settlement for the same injury reduces the later judgment to prevent double recovery.

Markley v. Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc · filed 2003-04-18

Considering the general nature and tone of tort reform legislation, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to allow recovery greater than the actual loss in joint and several liability cases when it deleted the relevant portion of § 2925d, but instead intended that common-law principles limiting a recovery to the actual loss would remain intact. ... We find that the principle of one recovery and the common-law rule of setoff, in the context of joint and several liability cases, continue to be the law in Michigan.

Section 2912d(1) requires an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional whom counsel reasonably believes is qualified under section 2169, even if that belief later proves mistaken.

Watts v. Canady · filed 2003-01-232912d(1)

We note, however, that the Legislature set a lower threshold for evaluating the adequacy of an affidavit of merit. An affidavit, is sufficient if counsel reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believed that the affiant was qualified under MCL 600.2169.

Section 2912d requires the affidavit of merit to accompany a medical-malpractice complaint, and a late affidavit without the statutory extension does not timely commence the action.

VandenBerg v. VandenBerg · filed 2002-11-01(1), (2)

Here, plaintiff filed the affidavit of merit beyond the period set by the applicable statute of limitations, but failed to move for an extension. Accordingly, plaintiffs suit was not timely commenced and the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendants.

For a medical-malpractice claim involving a registered nurse, the expert establishing the applicable standard of care must have spent most of the preceding year practicing or teaching the health profession of registered nursing.

Khalil v. Eric Y Hsu Md · filed 2026-02-02(1)(b)

MCL 600.2169(1)(b) is not limited to physicians, and it “must be considered to apply generally to all malpractice actions, including those initiated against nonphysicians.” ... Consequently, to establish the standard of care applicable to a registered nurse, a plaintiff’s proposed expert witness must have devoted a majority of his or her professional time ... in the preceding year to the active clinical practice of, or the instruction of students in, the health profession of a registered nurse.

The medical-malpractice noneconomic-damages cap applies using the amount in effect when judgment is entered; when past and future noneconomic damages together exceed the cap, future damages are reduced first, and prejudgment interest is allowed on the full cap when past damages exceed it.

Dawe v. Dr Reuven Bar-Levav & Associates, PC · filed 2010-08-12§ 600.1483(1), (4); § 600.6013(1), (8)

Therefore, the cap only applies to a judgment rendered after a verdict. The amount of the cap is the amount in effect on the date the judgment is entered. ... Hence, I construe MCL 600.1483(1) to reduce future noneconomic damages before past noneconomic damages. Where the jury finds that the plaintiff has past noneconomic damages in excess of the applicable cap, as is the case here, the plaintiff will be entitled to prejudgment interest on the full amount of the applicable cap under MCL 600.6013(1). However, where the past noneconomic damages do not rise to the level of the applicable cap, the plaintiff will only be entitled to interest on the actual amount of the past noneconomic damages found by the jury. ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred when it concluded that Dawe was only entitled to interest on a portion of the past noneconomic damages found by the jury. Therefore, we vacate the award of interest and remand this case to the trial court for recalculation of the interest.

The wrongful-death act governs noneconomic damages in a wrongful-death action arising from medical malpractice, so the medical-malpractice damages cap does not limit those damages.

Jenkins v. Patel · filed 2003-05-29(1), (3), and (6)

We hold that the wda controls where a death arises out of medical malpractice, and where a plaintiff seeks damages for wrongful death. Therefore, the damages cap is not implicated here and does not limit the noneconomic damages recoverable by plaintiff.

Section 1483(1) caps noneconomic damages in a wrongful-death action when the underlying claim is medical malpractice.

Jenkins v. Patel · filed 2004-07-26(1)

We conclude that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap does apply to wrongful death actions where the underlying claim is medical malpractice.

Section 5852 is a saving statute that preserves a surviving cause of action when the underlying limitations period expired before the personal representative filed suit; it does not itself govern the limitations period.

Lipman v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2003-07-01(5852)

We conclude, therefore, from the plain language of the statute and the holding in Miller, supra, that MCL 600.5852 is only applicable to circumstances where it is clear that the period of limitations expired before the personal representative filed the cause of action on behalf of the estate. ... We find that MCL 600.5852, because it is a saving statute and not a statute of limitations, is only applied to “extend” the period of limitations and “preserve” a cause of action when the period of limitations for the underlying claim expired before the personal representative filed suit.

The two-year saving period runs from the issuance of letters of authority to the personal representative, including a successor personal representative, subject to the statute’s three-year outer limit.

Estate of Dale v. Robinson · filed 2008-07-22

... As our Supreme Court recognized in Eggleston, MCL 600.5852 does not provide that the two-year saving period is measured from the date that letters of authority are issued to the initial personal representative; instead, the statute provides that the two-year period is measured from the date that letters of authority are issued to any personal representative, regardless of whether that person is the initial personal representative or a successor personal representative. Plaintiff was issued letters of authority on August 15, 2003, and filed her complaint seven days later, well within the two-year saving period. Thus, under Eggleston and MCL 600.5852, plaintiffs complaint was timely.

Section 2946a caps noneconomic damages in product-liability actions at $280,000, or $500,000 when the defect causes death or permanent loss of a vital bodily function, subject to annual adjustment tied to § 1483; the court upheld the limitation as constitutional.

Kenkel v. Stanley Works · filed 2003-07-01(1)

We decline to do so because we conclude that both Phillips and Zdrojewski were properly decided, that the analysis employed in those cases applies with equal force to MCL 600.2946a, and that MCL 600.2946a is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of encouraging the manufacture and distribution of products in Michigan and protecting those who place products into the stream of commerce from large damage awards in jury trials.

Section 600.2946a(3) permits a products-liability plaintiff to avoid the noneconomic-damages cap when the trier of fact finds by a preponderance of the evidence that death or permanent loss resulted from gross negligence.

Genaw v. Garage Equipment Supply, INC · filed 2022-05-272946a(3)

Therefore, in a products liability action, a plaintiff can avoid the damages cap if the trier of fact determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the death or loss was the result of defendant’s gross negligence. Id. Based on this statutory language, the Court finds that MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946a is another Michigan statute in which gross negligence survives under Jennings.

Section 2169(1)(a) requires an expert supporting a medical-malpractice claim against an institutional defendant to specialize or be board-certified in the same specialty as the defendant’s allegedly negligent physicians.

Nippa v. Botsford General Hospital · filed 2003-08-20(1)(a)

Therefore, the term “party” under MCL 600.2169(l)(a) encompasses the agents for whose alleged negligent acts the hospital may still be liable. A plaintiff must submit with a medical-malpractice complaint against an institutional defendant an affidavit of merit from a physician who specializes or is board-certified in the same specialty as that of the institutional defendant’s agents involved in the alleged negligent conduct.

Section 2169(1)(a) requires a medical-malpractice standard-of-care expert to be a specialist with the same board certification as the defendant physician when the defendant is board certified.

Halloran v. Bhan · filed 2004-07-20(1)(a)

We must now determine whether MCL 600.2169(l)(a) requires that an expert witness share the same board certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered. We hold that it does.

Section 2169(1) requires a medical-malpractice expert to match the defendant physician's most relevant specialty or subspecialty and, when applicable, board certification, and to have recently devoted a majority of professional time to practicing or teaching that specialty.

Hamilton v. Mark F Kuligowski Do · filed 2006-07-31(1)(a), (1)(b)

Therefore, it is clear that § 2169(1) only requires the plaintiffs expert to match one of the defendant physician’s specialties.

For expert testimony on the standard of care, § 600.2169 requires an expert to match the defendant's relevant specialty and satisfy the prior-year practice-or-instruction requirement; board certification is required only when the defendant is board certified.

Reeves v. Carson City Hospital · filed 2007-07-10(1)(a), (1)(b)

Nonetheless, because Dr. Squanda was practicing emergency medicine and one could potentially become certified in emergency medicine, the plaintiffs expert would be required to practice or teach emergency medicine. It is not a prerequisite that the expert be board-certified in emergency medicine, but nothing in the statute requires that the expert be a “specialist” only, as opposed to a board-certified specialist. In other words, if the defendant is board-certified, the expert must be board-certified, but if the defendant is merely a “specialist,” the expert must be at least a specialist.

Section 2169(1) requires medical-malpractice expert testimony to come from a licensed health professional whose specialty and recent practice or instruction match the defendant’s; a resident training in a specialty who could become board-certified is treated as a specialist rather than a general practitioner.

Gonzalez v. St John Hospital & Medical Center · filed 2007-08-29(1)

Under Woodard’s definition of specialist, any physician who can potentially become board-certified in a branch of medicine or surgery in which he or she practices is defined as a “specialist” for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1).

In a medical-malpractice action involving a physician’s assistant, the specialist and general-practitioner criteria apply only to physicians; the assistant’s expert witness qualifications are governed by subsection (1)(b), including practice or instruction in the same health profession.

Wolford v. Duncan · filed 2008-07-17(1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c)

Thus, neither § 2169(1)(a) nor § 2169(1)(c) apply to defendant’s choice of an expert witness regarding the appropriate standard of care for Wilson; rather, the expert’s qualifications are governed by § 2169(1)(b), which applies to both physicians (specialists and general practitioners) and other health professionals. Brown, supra at 500. During the year preceding the decedent’s death, Nelson devoted a majority of his professional time to active clinical practice as a physician’s assistant, the same health profession to which Wilson belongs. Accordingly, he was qualified as an expert witness pursuant to § 2169(1)(b)(i).

Section 2169 requires courts to evaluate specified qualifications for medical-malpractice expert witnesses, but it does not require an expert to have identical experience with the defendant or the exact procedure at issue.

Albro v. Drayer · filed 2014-01-28(1) and (2)

Clearly, none of defendant’s experts were as familiar with the Chrisman-Snook procedure as was defendant. However, all of defendant’s experts performed ankle reconstructions regularly and were experts in doing so. ... Admission of expert testimony simply does not depend on an expert’s being exactly as knowledgeable as a defendant in a medical malpractice action. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that defendant’s experts were, at a minimum, sufficiently knowledgeable, trained, or educated to form an expert opinion under MRE 702. Likewise, none of the considerations under MCL 600.2169(2) demand that the experts be excluded.

For medical-malpractice standard-of-care testimony against or on behalf of a board-certified specialist, the expert must have been board certified in the same specialty when the malpractice occurred.

Rock v. Crocker · filed 2014-11-18(1)(a)

In accordance with the plain language of the statute, its most recent amendment, the relevant caselaw, and common sense, we hold that, under MCL 600.2169(1)(a), an expert witness seeking to offer standard-of-care testimony against or on behalf of a board-certified specialist must himself have been board certified in the same specialty at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action.

Section 600.2169 requires a medical-malpractice expert to match the defendant’s specialty and board certification and to devote a majority of the preceding professional time to that specialty; shoulder surgery counts as orthopedic surgery, not hand surgery.

Langley v. Md · filed 2015-12-01(1)(a), (1)(b)

And “hand and upper extremity” surgery is simply not a specialty or subspecialty, at least for purposes of MCL 600.2169, given that no board certification recognized by ABOS is available for that category or branch of surgery. ... During the relevant timeframe, Dr. Rubinstein devoted a majority of his active clinical practice to the specialty of orthopedic surgery (defendant’s specialty), which encompassed shoulder and shoulder-and-elbow surgeries, and not the subspecialty of hand surgery, which solely encompassed hand, wrist, and forearm surgeries.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires a medical-malpractice expert's matching board certification at the time of the malpractice occurrence, not at the time of testimony.

Rock v. Crocker · filed 2016-06-06(1)(a)

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue and hold that the board-certification requirement applies at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action, not the time of testimony.

Section 2169(1)(a) requires an expert testifying against a specialist to specialize in the same area, and requires board certification in that specialty when the defendant is board certified.

Gaskin v. Cynthia Rider Dmd · filed 2018-05-10(1)(a)

Accordingly, Dr. Choby, in order to satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2169(1)(a), needed to specialize in the same area.

Section 2169(1)(a) requires a medical-malpractice expert to match the defendant physician's one most relevant specialty, and the relevant specialty here was cardiology rather than interventional cardiology.

Estate of Anthony Norczyk v. Dds · filed 2018-10-16(1)(a)

We conclude that the one most relevant specialty here is cardiology, not interventional cardiology, because the allegations of medical malpractice do not pertain to negligence in the performance of invasive procedures, but instead concern failures by Gencheff to act relative to Norczyk’s care and treatment, falling outside of and not encompassed by the performance of invasive procedures. ... In sum, we agree with the trial court’s determination that Furman’s affidavit of merit submitted on behalf of plaintiff satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2912d and MCL 600.2169, where the one most relevant specialty was cardiology, not interventional cardiology.

When the defendant is a specialist and the expert matches the defendant’s specialty credentials under subsection (1)(a), subsection (1)(b)(i) requires the expert to have practiced that specialty for a majority of the preceding year, without separately requiring practice in the same health profession.

Crego v. Edward W Sparrow Hospital Assn · filed 2019-04-16(1)(b)(i)

We conclude that both defendants and the trial court misconstrue the demands of Subsection (1)(b)(i) of MCL 600.2169. When examining Subsection (1)(b)(i) in context and together with Subsection (1)(a), it becomes evident that if matching credentials in satisfaction of Subsection (1)(a) are established, the very same question of matching credentials is not reexamined or revisited when analyzing compliance with Subsection (1)(b)(i).

Section 2169(1)(a) requires a medical-malpractice expert to match the defendant physician’s relevant specialty or subspecialty, including the branch of medicine the physician practiced during the alleged malpractice.

Estate of Linda Horn v. Michael J Swofford Do · filed 2020-10-22(1)(a)

In this case, Dr. Swofford was, in fact, practicing neuroradiology when he examined and interpreted neuroimages—the CT scan of Horn’s skull—and he potentially could obtain, as he had done in the past, board certification in neuroradiology. And therefore Dr. Swofford was acting or practicing as a “specialist” or “subspecialist” in neuroradiology, at least for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1) as interpreted by Woodard. Although Dr. Swofford was also practicing diagnostic radiology when he interpreted Horn’s CT scan considering that diagnostic radiologists are credentialed to interpret neuroimages, neuroradiology was the one most relevant specialty.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) bars an expert from offering an opinion against a physician unless the expert shares the physician's board certification.

Staples v. The United State of America · filed 2021-08-09(1)(a)

Further, Dr. Mostafa is a board-certified surgeon, but he is not board certified in gastroenterology (Mostafa Dep. at p. 6, PageID.717), and thus he may not offer opinion testimony that Dr. Schoenfeld, a board-certified gastroenterologist, breached the applicable standard of care with regard to the gastroenterology procedure. See Halloran v. Bhan, 470 Mich. 572, 577 (2004) (holding that “M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) requires that an expert witness share the same board certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered.”).

Subsection (2) requires courts to evaluate an expert’s education and training, specialization, clinical-practice experience, and the relevance of the testimony, and applies to any expert testimony requiring expertise in a medical-malpractice action, not only standard-of-care testimony.

Tad Roberts v. Bronson Healthcare · filed 2024-09-19(2)

Even though MCL 600.2169(1) is inapplicable, all expert testimony in a medical malpractice action is still subject to the requirements in MCL 600.2169(2), which provides: ... Unlike Subsection 2169(1), Subsection 2169(2) is not limited to “standard of practice or care” testimony. Rather, the subsection applies to any expert testifying about any issue that requires expert testimony in a medical malpractice action.

Section 600.2912b(1) requires 182 days’ written notice before a medical-malpractice action, and timely notice tolls the limitations period when it would otherwise expire during that notice period.

Howard v. Smoler · filed 2026-06-17(1); 5856(c)

However, MCL 600.2912b(1) requires a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice to give the defendant written notice of intent to sue at least 182 days before the plaintiff files suit; the 182-day notice period must elapse from the time the Notice of Intent (NOI) is submitted before the plaintiff may file suit. ... When a plaintiff submits an NOI before the expiration of the limitations period, and the limitations period otherwise would expire during the 182-day notice period, the running of the limitations period is tolled during the 182-day notice period.

Section 2912b requires 182 days’ written notice before a medical-malpractice action, but permits the claimant to commence the action after 154 days if the recipient does not timely provide the required response.

Burton v. Reed City Hospital Corp. · filed 2003-12-23(1), (7), (8)

MCL 600.2912b sets forth the procedure for commencement of a medical malpractice action. In order to commence an action, the plaintiff must give written notice not less than 182 days before commencement of the action. MCL 600.2912b(1). ... Consequently, when a written response to the notice of intent is not filed within 154 days, the claimant may commence a medical malpractice action after the expiration of the 154 day period and before the expiration of the 182 day notice period. MCL 600.2912b(8).

Section 2912b(l) bars commencing a medical-malpractice action until the statutory notice period expires, and a prematurely filed complaint is ineffective to toll the limitations period.

Burton v. Reed City Hospital Corp. · filed 2005-01-26(l)

MCL 600.2912b(l) unambiguously states that a person “shall not” commence an action alleging medical malpractice until the expiration of the statutory notice period. A complaint filed before the expiration of the notice period violates MCL 600.2912b and is ineffective to toll the limitations period.

Subsections (1) and (7) exclude medical-malpractice claimants from the disability grace period, so the ordinary medical-malpractice limitations period applies despite minority or insanity.

Vega v. Lakeland Hospitals at Niles and St Joseph, Inc · filed 2005-10-26(1), (7)

Applying these principles, we conclude that MCL 600.5851(1), read together with MCL 600.5851(7), unambiguously excludes medical malpractice claimants from the disability grace period.

A plaintiff may use the shortened filing period after 154 days without first challenging the sufficiency of the defendant’s response, but risks dismissal if the response is later found adequate.

Bush v. Shabahang · filed 2008-05-01(7) and (8)

For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff does not need to challenge the sufficiency of the response required under MCL 600.2912b(7) before utilizing the shortened filing period provided by MCL 600.2912b(8).

Section 2957(2) permits a party to add an identified nonparty by amended pleading within 91 days, but it does not override the more-specific medical-malpractice notice-of-intent requirement when the statutes conflict.

Driver v. Naini · filed 2010-03-02(2)

In relevant part, the nonparty fault statute provides, in effect, that after the initial defendants identified CCA as a nonparty potentially at fault, plaintiffs had 91 days to file and serve an amended complaint naming CCA. MCL 600.2957(2). That subsection provides: Upon motion of a party within 91 days after identification of a nonparty, the court shall grant leave to the moving party to file and serve an amended pleading alleging 1 or more causes of action against that nonparty. A cause of action added under this subsection is not barred by a period of limitation unless the cause of action would have been barred by a period of limitation at the time of the filing of the original action. [MCL 600.2957(2).] ... Because the statutes conflict, and are in pari materia, we must determine which is more specific. ... The notice of intent statute applies only to medical malpractice actions. MCL 600.2912b(l). The nonparty fault statute, by contrast, applies to a broader category of actions, namely any “action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,” in which a defendant gives notice of a nonparty at fault. MCL 600.2957(1). Therefore, the notice of intent statute controls.

Section 2912b(2) treats proof that a medical-malpractice notice of intent was mailed as prima facie evidence of compliance and does not require the defendant to receive the notice before the limitations period expires.

DeCosta v. Gossage · filed 2010-05-25(2)

Plaintiff satisfied the notice-of-intent requirements under MCL 600.2912b(2) when she timely mailed her NOI to defendants’ prior address but defendants did not receive the NOI until after the expiration of the limitations period. MCL 600.2912b(2) states that “[p]roof of the mailing constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with this section,” and plaintiff mailed the NOI before the date the limitations period expired. The date defendants received the NOI is irrelevant.

Section 2912b requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to serve a written notice of intent and wait 182 days before filing the complaint; a prematurely filed complaint does not commence the action or toll the limitations period.

Tyra v. Organ Procurement Agency · filed 2013-08-15(1)

Pursuant to MCL 600.2912b, a medical malpractice action cannot be commenced unless the plaintiff first provides to health professional or health facility defendants a written notice of intent to commence suit and then waits 182 days before filing the complaint.

Section 600.5856(c) tolls the limitations period at the time compliant medical-malpractice notice is given only if the claim would be barred during the 182-day notice period; notice served on the last day of limitations does not toll it when the notice period begins after limitations expired.

Haksluoto v. Mt Clemens Regional Medical Center · filed 2016-02-18(c)

Because the notice period did not commence until one day after the limitations period had expired due to the rules of computation under MCR 1.108, we are constrained to conclude that filing the NOI on the last day of the limitations period was not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations “at the time notice [was] given,” because in order to toll the statute of limitations at that time, the limitations period must have been scheduled to expire during the 182-day notice period. See MCL 600.5856(c).

The medical-malpractice presuit-notice requirement does not apply to a defendant who is outside the statutory class of persons capable of committing medical malpractice.

Estate of Michael Saldana v. Smith · filed 2016-08-04

The corollary to that proposition, however, is that an individual who is not a member of the class of persons defined under MCL 600.5838a(1), or holding himself or herself out as such a person, cannot commit medical malpractice. ... Accordingly, Smith is not among the class of person to whom the medical malpractice statutes apply and, as such, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed the Saldanas’ claims against Smith and his employer because the Saldanas failed to comply with the statutes governing medical malpractice claims.

Section 5856(c) tolls the medical-malpractice limitations period when a timely notice of intent is given and the claim would otherwise be barred during the notice period; a notice filed on the last day preserves that day for filing after the notice period.

Haksluoto v. Mt Clemens Regional Medical Center · filed 2017-06-27(c)

We hold, therefore, that applying our common-law jurisprudence of fractional days produces a conclusion that a timely NOI preserves the day the NOI is filed as a day to be used once the limitations period begins running after the notice period ends. Notably, this applies to any NOI that triggers tolling under MCL 600.5856(c), whether filed on the final day of the limitations period or on some earlier day.

The medical-malpractice provisions require defendants to provide access to relevant medical records and prescribe filing-period extensions as the remedies for failures to provide records or a notice response; those statutory remedies are adequate, so default judgment is unavailable.

Raphael v. Do · filed 2020-11-05

Next, the record does reflect that defendants did not comply with MCL 600.2912b(5). Yet, the legislature determined that the appropriate remedy for a defendant’s failure to comply with MCL 600.2912b(5) is to permit a plaintiff to file his or her affidavit of merit within 91 days after filing his or her complaint, MCL 600.2912d(3). Likewise, although it is undisputed that defendants did not comply with MCL 600.2912b(7), the remedy for that failure is set forth in MCL 600.2912b(8), which permits a plaintiff to file his or her complaint after a 154-day period rather than the 182 day period set forth in MCL 600.2912b(1). ... Because the statute provides adequate remedies, a default judgment is not warranted for the failure to comply with MCL 600.2912b(5) and MCL 600.2912b(7).

MCL 600.2912b(1) requires a mandatory notice period during which a medical-malpractice plaintiff generally may not file suit after giving notice, and that period is not itself a statutory prerequisite subject to COVID-19 tolling.

Moore v. Wsupg · filed 2022-12-22(1)

The notice period constitutes a mandatory period, during which a plaintiff is prohibited from filing suit after providing notice. MCL 600.2912b(1). Therefore, extension of this period would serve to prohibit or restrict plaintiff from proceeding when she wishes, in direct contravention of the clear, unambiguous language of AO 2020-3. This is true regardless of the subsequently added clarifying language in Amended AO 2020-3. Neither AO 2020-3, nor Amended AO 2020-3, could toll the notice period without interfering with plaintiff’s ability to proceed with her case.

Section 2912b requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to wait the full applicable notice period, including the shortened 91-day period under subsection (3), before filing suit.

Estate of Shabaka Greenwood v. Detroit Receiving Hospital · filed 2026-06-15(1), (3), (3)(d)

Regardless, even assuming plaintiff satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(3), and the 91-day waiting period applied, plaintiff filed the complaint prematurely. ... The Supreme Court, however, has held that the entire no-suit waiting period must expire before a suit may be filed. ... Applying this holding here, plaintiff prematurely filed this action on August 16, 2024—day 91—of the notice period.

Section 6013(6) applies when a complaint was filed between January 1, 1987, and July 1, 2002, the action lacked a final nonappealable judgment as of July 1, 2002, and the judgment was rendered on a written instrument without a specified interest rate; it directs interest to be calculated under subsection (8).

Shuler v. Michigan Physicians Mutual Liability Co. · filed 2004-05-04(6), (8)

Mpmlc correctly argues that this case falls within the category of cases described in MCL 600.6013(6). The plaintiff-patients filed this action between January 1, 1987, and July 1, 2002; the action did not result in a final nonappealable judgment as of July 1, 2002; and the judgment was rendered based , on the insurance policy, which, pursuant to Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co, 457 Mich 341, 346; 578 NW2d 274 (1998), constitutes a written instrument for purposes of the statute. ... Because the judgment at issue fits within the classification described in MCL 600.6013(6), we remand to the trial court for modification of the judgment to conform to MCL 600.6013(8).

At the affidavit-of-merit stage, counsel need only reasonably believe that the expert meets MCL 600.2169's qualifications, while the expert's actual eligibility to testify is determined under the stricter trial standard.

Grossman v. Brown · filed 2004-07-20(1)

Thus, while at the affidavit-of-merit stage a plaintiffs attorney need only “reasonably believe” the expert is qualified, at trial the standard is more demanding because the statute states that a witness “shall not give expert testimony” unless the expert “meets the [listed] criteria” in MCL 600.2169(1).

Section 2912d(1) requires an affidavit of merit from a health professional reasonably believed to satisfy the applicable expert-witness specialty requirements; a general surgeon may satisfy that requirement when general surgery is the most relevant standard of care for the alleged malpractice.

Estate of Luella Ehrlinger v. Phillip a Dean Md · filed 2015-10-15(2912d)(1)

Reading these assertions and concessions together, plaintiff alleges a malpractice claim based solely on a failure by Dean to provide appropriate post-operative care and monitoring following the second surgery. Nothing in the amended complaint suggests that any malpractice occurred during the colorectal surgeries themselves; further, plaintiff concedes that any theory that Dean committed malpractice between the first and second surgeries was not supported by the affidavit and will not be presented to the jury.4 Thus, at the least, plaintiff could have a reasonable belief that the most relevant standard of care was that of a general surgeon, not a colorectal surgeon, relative to these remaining allegations.

Section 2912e(1) requires only that the attorney reasonably believe the expert meets the qualifications in § 2169; the expert need not actually meet those qualifications.

Brown v. Hayes · filed 2006-12-132912e(1)

The plain language of MCL 600.2912e(1) only requires that an attorney reasonably believe that the expert meets the requirements of MCL 600.2169; it does not require that the expert actually meet those requirements.

Section 2912d(1) requires counsel to reasonably believe that the affidavit-of-merit expert satisfies § 2169, including by spending most of the preceding year practicing or teaching the same health profession as the defendant.

Joeann Bates v. Gilbert · filed 2007-07-25(1), (1)(b)(i)-(ii)

We hold that under the clear language of MCL 600.2912d(1) and MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i)-(ii), plaintiff’s counsel must have reasonably believed that the expert selected by the plaintiff to address the applicable standard of practice or care in the affidavit of merit devoted a majority of his or her professional time during the year before the alleged malpractice to practicing or teaching the same health profession as defendant Gilbert.

Section 600.2912d permits an affidavit of merit when the plaintiff’s counsel reasonably believes the affiant meets the expert-witness requirements, even if the affiant ultimately would not qualify to testify at trial.

Estate of Amos Jones v. Botsford Continuing Care Corporation · filed 2015-04-07(1)

However, whether an affidavit of merit signed by an expert is adequate is governed by MCL 600.2912d. This provision requires that plaintiff’s counsel “reasonably believes” that the affiant “meets the requirements of MCL 600.2169[,]” not that the affiant actually meet those requirements for purposes of trial testimony. ... By contrast, the issue for purposes of MCL 600.2912d is not whether the expert signing the affidavit of merit may ultimately testify at trial. The controlling question under MCL 600.2912d is whether plaintiff’s counsel had a reasonable belief that the affiant would qualify.

Section 600.2912d asks whether counsel reasonably believed the affidavit affiant met the expert requirements, not whether the affiant would ultimately qualify to testify at trial.

Jones v. Botsford Continuing Care Corporation · filed 2015-04-07

We conclude that plaintiffs affidavit of merit regarding Dr. Selznick satisfied MCL 600.2912d. Our holding is limited, however, to that statute and the sufficiency of the affidavit of merit.

Section 2538(1) imposes a $3.50 monthly charge on persons required to make support payments through the FOC or SDU; the portions funding FOC and court services are user fees, while the portion funding the Attorney General’s operations fund is a tax.

Trantham v. State Disbursement Unit · filed 2015-11-10(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), and (4)

The Court of Claims did not clearly err by concluding that the $2.25 portion of the monthly charge sent to local counties to fund FOC services that are not reimbursable under Title IV-D, MCL 600.2538(1)(a), and the $1.00 sent to the state treasurer for deposit into the state court fund, MCL 600.2538(1)(c), are valid user fees associated with plaintiff’s use of the circuit court and the FOC system to collect child support payments. ... In light of its predominant revenue raising function, we conclude that the $0.25 charge pursuant to MCL 600.2538(1)(b) and (4) is a tax. ... Therefore, we conclude that imposition of the user fees and tax under MCL 600.2538 was not so arbitrary as to violate substantive due process.

MCL 600.2516 governs fees for services performed in court proceedings by court officers, so it does not apply to a private adjuster's appraisal.

Farm Bureau General Insurance Company v. Susin · filed 2016-03-10

Finally, Susin asserts that Associated Adjusters’ fee violates MCL 600.2516, which provides that “[n]o fee or compensation allowed by law, shall be demanded or received by any officer or person for any service, unless such service was actually rendered by him . . . .” However, this statute pertains to fees allowed for services mentioned in the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.101 et seq., and “done or performed in the several courts in this state, by the officers thereof, or in any proceeding authorized by law . . . .” MCL 600.2501. Because Associated Adjusters is not an officer of the court nor was its appraisal a court proceeding or service, MCL 600.2516 is inapplicable.

Section 6304(6)(a) makes each defendant jointly and severally liable in an action involving a medical-malpractice claim when the plaintiff is without fault, even if another tortfeasor was not joined in that action.

Chelsie Barker v. Hutzel Women's Hospital · filed 2015-12-08(6)(a)

This argument erroneously focuses on whether Hutzel could have been jointly and severally liable for the Wayne County defendants’ alleged § 1983 violations where the sole inquiry under MCL 600.6304(6) is whether the action includes a medical malpractice claim and whether plaintiff is without fault. If the answer is affirmative as to both, then joint and several liability applies. “The action” at issue here is plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims against Hutzel. “The action” is not referring to plaintiff’s previous claims against the Wayne County defendants in federal court. Therefore, it is irrelevant that Wayne County was never joined in plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim against Hutzel.

Section 600.2956 does not prevent parties from agreeing by contract to joint and several liability; it does not apply to this breach-of-contract action for contract damages.

Travelers Indemnity Company v. Pellow · filed 2016-05-24

Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the fact that the parties’ lease agreement mentioned negligence and intentional misconduct does not automatically transform this breach-of-contract action into a tort action, nor does it create a hybrid tort-contract lawsuit where MCL 600.2956 rewrites the agreement that the parties voluntarily entered into as defendant suggests. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]o adopt the position that MCL 600.2956 renders express contractual indemnification clauses unenforceable would require that we negate the parties’ contract. We find no language in the statute, nor any compelling public policy, that would require us to do so.”

Section 2912b(4) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to make good-faith, sufficiently particularized statements addressing each listed category of information, including the applicable standard of care, breach, corrective action, proximate cause, and notified professionals or facilities.

Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospital · filed 2004-07-21(4)

The unambiguous language of MCL 600.2912b(4) requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to include in her notice of intent a statement of (1) the factual basis for the claim, (2) the applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant, (3) the manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached, (4) the alleged action that should have been taken to comply with the alleged standard, (5) the manner in which it is claimed that the breach was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice, and (6) the names of all professionals and facilities the claimant is notifying.

Section 2912b(4)(e) is satisfied when a notice of intent, read as a whole and in conjunction with the underlying facts, gives defendants enough information to understand how the alleged breach of the standard of care caused the claimed injury.

Tousey v. Brennan · filed 2007-09-12(4)(e)

Among the information required by MCL 600.2912b to be stated by the claimant in the notice of intent is “[t]he manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.” MCL 600.2912b(4)(e). ... However, guided by Roberts, this Court recently held that in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2912b, the question is “whether the notice contains the required information, not whether any specific portion of the notice does.” Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 272 Mich App 621, 628; 728 NW2d 471 (2006) (emphasis in original). ... This information, when viewed in combination with the statement that Dr. Brennan breached the applicable standard of care by failing to immediately hospitalize Tousey and secure both a coronary angiogram and a cardiology consultation, begin aspirin and heparin therapy and the use of beta blockers, and send Tousey’s blood for laboratory testing, fulfills the purpose of MCL 600.2912b by informing defendants of plaintiffs belief that Dr. Brennan’s failure to do these things resulted in Tousey’s fatal heart attack. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants on that ground.

Section 600.2912b(4)(e) requires a notice of intent to explain how the alleged breach proximately caused the claimed injury; a general assertion that negligence caused the harm is insufficient.

Miller v. Malik · filed 2008-09-18(4)(e)

With respect to causation, it is not sufficient to state that the defendants’ negligence caused the alleged harm.

MCL 600.2912b(4) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to state how the alleged breach caused the claimed injury; failure to include all required information means the notice does not toll the statute of limitations, and MCL 600.2301's amendment provision applies only to pending actions.

Johnson v. Hurley Medical Group Pc · filed 2012-04-06(4)

Because the NOI failed to contain all the information required under MCL 600.2912b(4), it did not toll the statute of limitations. ... The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that under MCL 600.2301 and Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009), the plaintiff could amend her NOI retroactive to when it was filed. ... Further, because the plaintiff failed to file an NOI that complied with all the content requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4), no action could be commenced, Boodt, 481 Mich at 562-563, and MCL 600.2301 applies only to pending actions.

MCL 600.2301 permits curing defects in a medical-malpractice notice of intent when no substantial right is affected and the cure furthers justice, and a plaintiff satisfies the latter requirement by making a good-faith attempt to comply with MCL 600.2912b.

Gonzalez v. Beaumont Hospital-Farmington Hills · filed 2020-06-25

To obtain relief under MCL 600.2301, a party must satisfy a “two-pronged test: first, whether a substantial right of a party is implicated and, second, whether a cure is in the furtherance of justice.” Bush, 484 Mich at 177. “If both of these prongs are satisfied, a cure will be allowed on such terms as are just.” Id. at 177-178 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the injury.

Craig v. Oakwood Hospital · filed 2004-07-23(2)

Furthermore, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must establish the proximate causation prong of his prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.

Teal v. Prasad · filed 2009-04-14(2)

“In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” MCL 600.2912a(2).

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove that the injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.

Torrey v. Pa · filed 2014-12-11(2)

A medical malpractice plaintiff “has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.”

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, and requires an opportunity for a better result to have been greater than 50%.

Goedker v. Jon L Schram Md · filed 2016-05-10(2)

MCL 600.2912a(2) requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to prove proximate cause: ... In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants. In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of . . . an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%. ... However, we note that given Dr. Baker’s failure to address medical probabilities in his affidavit, even if the trial court properly considered that affidavit, it was deficient for the purposes of MCL 600.2912a(2).

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the patient's injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.

Estate of Perry Pace v. Hurley Medical Center · filed 2017-01-26(2)

A plaintiff claiming medical malpractice must prove that the patient “suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” MCL 600.2912a(2) “In order to be a proximate cause, the negligent conduct must have been a cause of the plaintiff’s injury and the plaintiff’s injury must have been a natural and probable result of the negligent conduct.”

Section 600.2912a(2) requires proof that the plaintiff's injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.

Stasser v. Paul W Clancy Dds · filed 2017-02-23(2)

In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.

Section 2912a's requirement that a medical-malpractice plaintiff prove the defendant breached the standard of care does not bar use of res ipsa loquitur in a medical-malpractice case.

Burns v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2017-05-18

Defendants also argue that Hand is inconsistent with MCL 600.2912a, which requires a plaintiff to prove “the defendant” breached the standard of care. However, if a pronouncement is to be made that, contrary Jones, 428 Mich 132, and its progeny, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be used in a medical malpractice case, that pronouncement must come from our Supreme Court.

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s actions were more probably than not the proximate cause of the injury.

Petretis v. West Shore Medical Center · filed 2018-06-12(2)

In the context of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s actions “more probably than not” were the proximate cause of his or her injury. MCL 600.2912a(2).

Section 2912a(2) requires traditional medical-malpractice plaintiffs to prove that negligence more probably than not proximately caused an injury, while its second sentence applies to loss-of-opportunity claims rather than a delayed-diagnosis claim involving an actual adverse result.

Estate of Patricia Benigni v. Md · filed 2022-09-08(2)

Section 2912a(2) sets forth the proximate cause requirements in medical malpractice claims. The first sentence deals with claims of traditional malpractice, where proximate cause is established by a showing that the defendant’s negligence more probably than not caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The second sentence of the statute “addresses a subcategory of injuries in medical malpractice litigation governed by the loss-of-opportunity doctrine.”

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that the injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.

Estate of Ronald Deroven v. Patrick T Gartland Md · filed 2023-08-17(2)

Our Legislature has defined the applicable causation standard for medical malpractice cases in MCL 600.2912a(2), which provides in relevant part: “In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.”

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove that an injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.

20250220_C369009_41_369009.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-02-20(2)

“In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” MCL 600.2912a(2). ... “We do not suggest that it is a certainty that a jury would conclude that Dr. Jeffrey committed malpractice resulting in plaintiff’s additional pain and suffering. But we are convinced that plaintiff has sufficient evidence of such that merits presentation to a jury for the jury to make that determination.”

Section 6304(1) requires the factfinder to consider a plaintiff's pretreatment negligence in apportioning fault when it may be a proximate cause of injury and damages; § 1483 permits the higher noneconomic-damages cap when the injured person suffered an enumerated condition while still living; and § 6311 treats the decedent as the plaintiff in a wrongful-death action for determining whether future damages must be discounted.

Shinholster v. Hosp · filed 2004-07-306304(1); 1483(1)(a)-(c); 6311

On the basis of the clear and unambiguous language of § 6304(1), we hold that a trier of fact is permitted in “personal injury, property damage, [and] wrongful death” tort actions, which necessarily include medical malpractice actions, to consider a plaintiffs pretreatment negligence in offsetting a defendant’s fault where reasonable minds could differ with regard to whether such negligence constituted “a proximate cause” — a foreseeable, natural, and probable cause — of the plaintiffs injury and damages. ... We agree with the results reached by the lower courts and hold that § 1483 permits a plaintiff to recover a maximum of $500,000 in medical malpractice noneconomic damages if, as a result of the defendant’s negligent conduct, the plaintiff at some point thereafter, and while still living, suffered one of the enumerated conditions of § 1483. ... We agree with the trial court and hold that, for purposes of § 6311, the term “plaintiff” refers to the decedent, Mrs. Shinholster.

Section 600.5852 treats letters of authority as issued on the date the probate judge signs them, starting the statute's limitations-savings period then rather than upon certification or mailing.

Lentini v. Urbancic · filed 2004-09-01

We hold that the trial court correctly decided that the letters of authority are "issued" on the date they are signed by the probate judge and not on the date they are certified or the date they are mailed to the fiduciary.

Sections 600.2946a(1)-(2) and 600.2945(f) require all noneconomic damages, including loss-of-consortium damages, to be aggregated under one annually adjusted cap applied when judgment is entered.

Wessels v. Garden Way, Inc · filed 2004-11-10§ 600.2946a(1)-(2); § 600.2945(f)

Reading together the plain language of these two statutory sections, we hold that the total amount of damages awarded in this case for noneconomic losses, which specifically includes any damages for loss of consortium, that can be recovered is $280,000, as adjusted. In other words, the statute requires that all damages awarded for noneconomic losses be added together for a single total that is then subject to the trial court’s application of the statutory cap of $280,000, as annually adjusted. MCL 600.2946a(2). ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the Legislature intended courts to apply the caps to the verdict, and courts can only do so by entry of a written judgment. It is also clear that the cap is to be annually modified consistently with changes in the CPI to protect the cap amount from inflationary increases. Thus, although the jury in this case rendered its verdict in 2001, the court did not apply the cap through a judgment until 2003. Before that time, the verdict was unenforceable by plaintiffs, and their verdict was to be protected from a decrease in value until the judgment and cap were applied and enforced through entry of the judgment.

Section 1483(1)(c) permits the higher noneconomic-damages cap only when negligence causes permanent loss of or damage to a reproductive organ resulting in inability to procreate.

Ykimoff v. W a Foote Memorial Hospital · filed 2009-07-16(1)(c)

MCL 600.1483(1)(c) requires, for application of the upper tier damages cap, that “permanent loss of or damage to a reproductive organ resulting in the inability to procreate” must have occurred. ... Significantly, the definition for “erectile dysfunction” does not equate with a level of impairment sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of an “inability to procreate” for purposes of applying the higher damages cap.

The product-liability exception to the noneconomic-damages cap requires actual knowledge that the product was defective and that the defect was substantially likely to cause the injury; constructive or imputed knowledge is insufficient.

Estate of Harishkumar Patel v. Reinalt-Thomas Corporation · filed 2018-10-25

Plaintiff thus urges this Court to read the statutory language that imposes liability if Goodyear “had actual knowledge that the product was defective” to impose liability if Goodyear “should have known that there could be a defective product in the product line.” We decline to so read the statute. MCL 600.2949a does not specify whether the term “the product” refers to a specific unit or the entire product line. We agree with the trial court, however, that “actual knowledge” is not the same as constructive knowledge or imputed knowledge. The trial court therefore did not err in concluding that plaintiff did not establish the criteria required by MCL 600.2949a for setting aside the noneconomic damages cap.

MCL 600.2948(2) leaves the obviousness of a product risk to the jury when reasonable minds could differ; MCL 600.2947(2) makes reasonably foreseeable misuse a legal issue for the court while permitting the jury to resolve underlying facts; and MCL 600.2947(6)(a) permits seller liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, including breach of an implied warranty, that proximately causes injury.

Greene v. a P Products, Ltd · filed 2005-01-202948(2); 2947(2); 2947(6)(a)

MCL 600.2948(2) does not prohibit a jury from determining the obviousness of a risk. Here, the obviousness of the risk of death must be determined by the jury. ... MCL 600.2947(2) does not preclude us, or any court, from allowing the jury to resolve underlying factual issues that bear on misuse. ... Accordingly, if the jury determines that an appropriate warning was required, such as “keep out of the reach of children,” “do not ingest,” or “ingestion can be fatal,” which determination would necessarily mean that the jury found that the danger was not open and obvious and that plaintiff did not have knowledge of the danger, the misuse of the product is deemed reasonably foreseeable. Summary disposition predicated on misuse was improper. ... We have already determined here that the issues whether the Wonder 8 Oil required a warning, or in other words whether the product was adequately labeled, and whether proximate cause was established are questions for the jury. Accordingly, dismissal of plaintiffs claims premised on breach of implied warranties was in error.

Section 2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff alleging loss of an opportunity to survive to show that the opportunity was reduced by more than 50% because of the malpractice.

Klein v. Kik · filed 2005-02-16(2)

Therefore, in this case, MCL 600.2912a(2) requires plaintiff to show that the decedent’s chances of survival fell more than fifty percent between the time of defendant’s alleged malpractice on or around March 30, 1998, and the initial discovery of the decedent’s lung cancer on July 14, 1998.

Section 600.2919a requires actual knowledge that property was stolen, embezzled, or converted; constructive knowledge is insufficient, although knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Echelon Homes, LLC v. Carter Lumber Co. · filed 2005-04-12

We hold that under the plain language of the statute, constructive knowledge is not sufficient to impose liability under MCL 600.2919a.

Section 5856(a) tolls the limitations period when the complaint is filed and the summons and complaint are served; its text does not require an affidavit of merit for tolling.

Kirkaldy v. Rim · filed 2005-06-07(a)

Once again, MCL 600.5856(a) provides that periods of limitations are tolled “[a]t the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant. . ..” There is no language providing that a limitations period is tolled only when a complaint and an affidavit of merit are filed.