Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805

Section 600.5805 applies to actions seeking damages for injuries to persons or property, including derivative injury claims, but not to a separate contractual indemnity claim.

Frenzel v. City of Muskegon · filed 1969-12-08

We do not conceive this section applicable to the city’s claim against third-party defendant. The city is not seeking to recover damages for injuries to persons or property, nor is the city’s claim derivative in any sense. The city’s third-party action asserts a contract claim for indemnity and the six-year limitation provided in MCLA § 600.5807 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5807) applies.

Section 600.5805(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for injury to person or property when the wrong is not a breach of a specific contractual provision, even if the duty arose from an agreement.

Nelson v. Michigan Bean Company · filed 1970-03-25(7)

The sole issue concerns an error charged to the trial court in its application of the three-year statute of limitations governing actions to recover damages for injuries to person or property. ... Absent any breach of a specific contractual provision, this case is governed by the statutory provisions applicable to injuries to person or property.

Section 600.5805(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons or property, running from accrual.

Tel-Twelve Shopping Center v. Sterling Garrett Construction Co. · filed 1971-06-23(7)

The parties are in agreement that the applicable statute of limitations governing this count is MCLA § 600.5805(7) (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805(7)), but there is disagreement as to when plaintiff’s claim for subrogation first accrued. ... It is likewise in the instant case, that the claim did not accrue later than when the action was filed by Mr. Shile against Tel-Twelve, in September, 1966. ... We rule that plaintiff’s Count II is dismissed for the reason that the statute of limitations had run.

Section 600.5805(7)'s three-year limitations period does not govern an insured's claim against the insured's own insurer under an uninsured-motorist clause when the claim is based on the insurance contract.

Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Hafendorfer · filed 1972-02-25(7)

MCLA 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805, provides, in relevant part, that: ... “(7) The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property.” ... The “legally entitled” phrase does not subject insured’s claim to the three-year statute of limitations. We hold that the six-year statute of limitations applies to defendant insured’s claim against plain*719tiff insurer on the uninsured motorist clause of his insurance contract.

Section 600.5805(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions to recover damages for injuries to persons or property, applying when the injury is specific, visible, tangible, or physical in the classic tort sense.

Case v. Goren · filed 1972-11-27(7)

However, we do not agree that the three-year statute of limitation should apply. The authorities advanced by defendants compelling the application of the three-year statute of limitation are all distinguishable in that the injury to persons or property was visible, tangible, or physical damage in the classic tort sense. This type of injury does not exist here. ... It would be a strained interpretation indeed to consider the latter as being injury to person or property in the classic tort sense of the word.

Section 600.5805(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions seeking damages for injury to property, including deterioration of the defective product itself.

Southgate Community School District v. West Side Construction Co. · filed 1976-12-27(7)

The three-year statute governing actions "to recover damages for injuries to * * * property” applies to this case.

Subsection (7) provides a three-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for injury to persons or property, while a claim arising from breach of a specific contractual provision may instead be governed by the UCC's four-year period.

Hanson v. Art Post American, Inc. · filed 1978-05-23(7)

The Supreme Court has consistently indicated in dicta that the three-year statute of limitations is applicable in all cases where the claim is for damages for injury to person or property except where that injury results from the breach of a specific contractual provision. ... If there is such a specific provision in the sales contract, the four-year limitation set out in the UCC should be applied and the trial court’s order granting accelerated judgment in favor of defendant, Art Post American, should be set aside and trial held. However, if the court finds that the cause of action arose out of the breach of an implied warranty, the three-year limitation period should apply, thus barring plaintiffs action.

Section 600.5805(3)'s malpractice limitations period applies only to claims for injuries to a person or specific property, not merely to claims relating to a person or specific property.

Coats v. Uhlmann · filed 1978-12-05(3)

This Court does not ascribe to the view that "injuries”, as that term is used in § 5805, means "physical injuries”. ... Section 5805 should be construed comprehensively to include actions brought for injuries resulting from invasions of rights that inhere in persons as persons and property owners. However, the injury must be to the person or specific property, and not simply relating to the person or specific property. ... In the case at bar, the realtors’ misrepresentations did not invade any property interest the buyers had in the Holland land, they merely led the buyers to expect more than they ■ received.

Section 600.5805(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions to recover damages for injuries to persons or property.

Huhtala v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1977-09-20(7)

An action for personal injury or property damage against an owner or driver of an automobile arises by "implication of the law” and is governed by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a three-year limitation period for injury to property, including an action based on payment of a check on a forged indorsement even when pleaded as an implied-contract claim.

Insurance Co. of North America v. Manufacturers Bank of Southfield, NA · filed 1983-05-20(8)

Since payment on a forged indorsement is injury to property, the three-year statute of limitations applies where suit is brought on an implied contract theory.

Section 600.5805(8)'s three-year limitation does not govern fraud or misrepresentation claims seeking repayment for money paid based on misleading representations about the value or performance of services.

BLUE CROSS AND SHIELD OF MICH. v. Folkema · filed 1988-11-09(8)

We cannot agree that this action is best characterized as one for damage to person or property.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a three-year limitation period on property-damage claims arising from duties imposed by law, including negligence claims pleaded as breach of contract, running from the time of injury.

Lear v. Brighton Township · filed 1990-04-10(8)

Plaintiffs’ claim is an action to recover damages for injury to property due to defendant township’s negligence, which is a claim arising under a duty imposed by law. ... Thus the applicable period of limitation for plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract is three years under § 5805(8). ... Under § 5805(8), the limitation period begins to run at the time of the injury, here the summer of 1982.

Section 600.5805(8)'s three-year limitation for wrongful-discharge-type injury claims does not apply to rescission allegations sounding in fraud, mistake, or injury to financial expectations; those claims are subject to a six-year limitation period.

Badon v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1991-04-15(8)

Even if we were to apply a statute of limitations in this case, the correct period would be six years, not the three years appropriate for wrongful discharge claims. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). Plaintiffs are not seeking damages for wrongful discharge. Rather, their allegations are in the nature of fraud, mistake, or injury to financial expectations — causes of action which are subject to a six-year limitation period. MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v Folkema, 174 Mich App 476, 481; 436 NW2d 670 (1988).

Section 600.5805(9)'s three-year period for injury to a person or property does not govern a civil action arising from a statutory violation rather than a traditional common-law tort.

DiPonio Construction Co. v. Rosati Masonry Co. · filed 2001-07-31(9)

In the alternative, defendants argue that the three-year limitation period traditionally applicable to actions involving injury to persons or property, MCL 600.5805(9), should apply to civil actions brought under the builders’ trust fund act. ... We reject defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s civil cause of action under the builders’ trust fund act is a traditional common-law tort. While the B F Farnell Court recognized a common-law remedy, it created that remedy to address a statutory violation. B F Farnell, supra at 557. Therefore, we disagree that MCL 600.5805(9) provides the limitation period applicable to plaintiff’s claim.

Section 600.5805(8) provides a three-year limitation period for actions seeking damages for injuries to property.

Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. Leemon Oil Co. · filed 1998-02-10(8)

MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8) provides a three-year limitation period for actions for injuries to property.

Section 600.5805(2) imposes a three-year limitations period for injury to person or property, including conversion claims.

Harkins v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Inc · filed 2019-12-19(2)

Moreover, this Court has held that a conversion claim is subject to the three-year limitation period for injury to person or property. See MCL 600.5805(2); Tillman v Great Lakes Truck Ctr, Inc, 277 Mich App 47, 49-50; 742 NW2d 622 (2007). The alleged conversion here occurred in 2011, and this lawsuit was filed in 2017. Plaintiffs’ proposed conversion claim would therefore be time-barred, and the proposed amendment is futile on this ground as well.

Section 600.5805(10) gives injury-to-person-or-property claims a three-year limitations period, and a claim based on an injury within that period is not barred merely because similar injuries occurred earlier.

Allen v. Village of Goodrich · filed 2024-04-25(10)

Because the business plaintiffs alleged that they were damaged by the flooding in the three-year period before the plaintiffs filed their complaint, even though they had noticed the flooding many years earlier, the court erred by granting summary disposition of the business plaintiffs’ claims during the limitations period.

Section 600.5805 provides a three-year limit for actions involving injury to person or property, whether they sound in contract or tort; the period begins when the injury first becomes apparent.

Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Petroleum Equipment, Inc. · filed 1991-06-18

Citing State Mutual Cyclone Ins Co v O & A Electric Cooperative, 381 Mich 318; 161 NW2d 573 (1968), this Court held in Malesev that the statute of limitations is three years in all actions for injury to person or property, see MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805, whether they sound in contract or tort. However, the Court held that the action does not accrue until the injuries first become apparent. ... Each of these items properly established that there was no issue of fact that Employers Mutual first had notice of the injuries more than three years before commencement of its action against Warner & Sons.

Section 600.5805(7) barred libel and slander claims by the time Velardo filed suit.

MacDonald and Goren, P.C. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company of Illinois, Standard Fire Insurance Company · filed 1995-03-10(7)

In his pleadings Velardo did not allege that M & G had "libeled" and/or "slandered" him. In fact, at the time Velardo filed his suit, the statute of limitations had run on both of these types of claims. MCLA 600.5805(7).

Section 600.5805(6) imposes a one-year limitation period on libel actions, measured from publication of the libel.

Van Duzer v. Bourisseau · filed 1970-05-25(6)

The period of limitation for an action of libel is one year, MCLA § 600.5805(6) (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805[6]). ... Plaintiff’s action arose when defendant Bourisseau’s letter of June 21, 1966 was published. Publication occurred when the letter was delivered to defendant Hotchkiss, Ball v. White (1966), 3 Mich App 579. Although the specific date of delivery is not shown, that date was sometime after June 21, 1966, and the statute of limitations was tolled June 21, 1967.

Subsection (7) imposes a one-year limitations period on actions charging libel or slander.

Wilson v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc · filed 1991-07-11(7)

We further note that even if res judicata did not bar plaintiffs claim, the claim would be barred by the statute of limitations. MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7) provides that the period of limitation is one year for an action charging libel or slander.

Section 600.5805's three-year statute of limitations applies to wrongful death actions.

Rhule v. Armstrong · filed 1970-07-01

MCLA § 600.5805 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805), the three-year statute of limitations, applies to wrongful death actions.

Section 600.5805(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on malpractice actions, including claims based on registered nurses' malpractice and vicarious-liability claims against their employer.

Kambas v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hosp. of Detroit · filed 1971-04-26(3)

These statutes certainly indicate that the Legislature has intended to treat all professions in the *131same manner. If registered nursing is a profession, as that term is used in the Revised Judicature Act, the malpractice statute of limitations must he applied. ... On these facts, the malpractice statute of limitations applies to an action against the hospital. The statute cannot be avoided merely by changing defendants.

Section 600.5805(7) provides a three-year limitations period for wrongful-death actions, while § 600.5805(3) provides a two-year period for actions charging malpractice.

Castle v. Lockwood-MacDonald Hospital · filed 1972-05-24(7), (3)

The three-year statute of limitation, MCLA 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7), applies to wrongful death actions. ... “(3) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions charging malpractice. ... “(7) The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property.” (Emphasis added.) ... Consequently, any allegations of malpractice in this wrongful death action are governed by the two-year period of limitations.

The three-year limitations period applies to actions seeking damages for injury to property whether the claim is pleaded in tort or contract.

Harrington v. Nelson · filed 1971-04-02(7)

This statute remains applicable whether the action is based on a tort or a contract theory.

Section 600.5805(7) imposes a three-year limitations period on other actions for damages for injuries to persons or property, and an action against a third-party defendant is untimely if not commenced within that period.

Higginbotham v. Fearer Leasing, Inc. · filed 1971-04-30(7)

The tolling statute should be read with reference to the statute of limitations itself, MCLA § 600.5805 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805), which reads in part as follows : ... “(7) The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property.” The plaintiffs did not commence their action against the third-party defendant within the three-year period.

Section 600.5805(7)'s three-year period governs actions to recover damages for injuries to persons or property, but a claim under an uninsured-motorist policy is a contractual claim governed by the six-year contract limitations period.

DET. AUTO. INTER-INS. EXCH. v. Hafendorfer · filed 1972-02-25(7)

Contrary to the position taken by plaintiff insurer in this case, we believe the State Mutual Cyclone Insurance Co test was intended to apply to those cases where plaintiff is seeking to recover from defendant, or defendant's insurer, where defendant had occasioned direct injury to plaintiff in his person or property, not where a party is seeking legal redress from his own insurer, which insurer has contractually agreed to indemnify him for injury perpetrated upon him, not by the insurer, but by third parties. ... We hold that the six-year statute of limitations applies to defendant insured's claim against plaintiff insurer on the uninsured motorist clause of his insurance contract.

Section 600.5805 imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for injuries to persons or property.

Schimmer v. Wolverine Insurance · filed 1974-07-22

Further, MCLA 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 provides that the period of limitations is three years for injuries to persons or property.

Subsection (7) supplies a three-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for injuries to persons or property.

George v. City of Petoskey · filed 1974-09-11(7)

Applied to the situation before us, that would mean the statute of limitations, whether three years (§5805[7]) or six years (§5807[8], §5813), began to run when defendant city dropped the legal proceedings it had brought against plaintiffs and their tenants on October 6,1971. ... We proceed to discuss which of the above statutes is applicable to the pleadings in this case. Neither Count I or Count II seek damages for injuries to persons or property. ... The process of elimination leads us to the conclusion that the general statute of limitations (§ 5813) applies to the allegations in the complaint before us.

Subsection (7) generally gives three years to bring an employment-discrimination damages action because it treats the claim as an action for injury to a person.

Gilbert v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad · filed 1980-02-05(7)

Defendants urge us to hold that an action for damages relating to employment discrimination is in actuality a claim for damages for injury to a person and therefore falls within the ambit of MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7), as in effect on the date the order granting defendants’ motion for accelerated judgment was entered. ... There are no Michigan cases on point. However, there are Federal decisions which have faced the precise question before us, while applying Michigan law. Although not binding precedent, we find their reasoning illuminating and highly persuasive. In Marlowe v Fisher Body, 489 F2d 1057 (CA 6, 1973), Judge Lively, writing for a unanimous court, held that MCL 600.5805(7) applied to an action by an employee alleging discrimination in employment practices. Marlowe, supra, 1063. Accord, Weldon v Detroit Board of Education, 403 F Supp 436, 438 (ED Mich, 1975). We adopt the holdings in these cases as the rule in Michigan. ... We conclude that, generally, the provision to be applied in ruling on whether a claim of alleged employment discrimination is barred is MCL 600.5805(7).

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a three-year limitation period for commencing a wrongful-death action.

Kull v. Watzke · filed 1982-09-09(8)

MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8) provides a three-year period of limitation for commencement of wrongful death actions.

Subsection (8) provides a three-year limitations period for wrongful-death claims, and a later appointment of an administrator relates back to filing when the plaintiff reasonably believed at filing that she had authority to sue.

Osner v. Boughner · filed 1986-02-19(8)

The period of limitations for wrongful death claims is three years. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). ... We therefore conclude that, under Michigan law, an appointment as administrator after the statute of limitations has expired relates back to the filing of a wrongful death suit if at the time the suit was filed the plaintiff reasonably believed he had authority to bring suit as administrator.

Section 5805(10) imposes a three-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for a person's death or personal injury, measured from the death or injury, without a common-law discovery-based extension when no statutory tolling provision applies.

Est of Margarette F Eby v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co · filed 2007-07-25(10)

Significantly, Justice Kelly’s preferred application of MCL 600.5805(10) by itself would not yield a different result. First, the time of death under § 5805(10) would be marked from the same moment as the time the wrong was done, under MCL 600.5827. Thus, not only are the statutes complementary, they also have precisely the same effect when applied separately. Second, even assuming that § 5805(10) should alone govern, we would be hard-pressed to inject a common-law discovery rule into this statute’s plain language, which unambiguously establishes that the “period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury.” Finally, using a discovery rule to avoid the plain language of § 5805(10) presents the same problem as does applying the rule under § 5827; it ignores the remainder of the statutory scheme, which clearly provides for discovery-based tolling when the Legislature deems it appropriate, as further discussed infra. ... Accordingly, here, plaintiff argues that her claims did not accrue until she discovered that Gorton was the killer because, before that time, she could not have known of and alleged each element of the claims. We reject this contention because the statutory scheme is exclusive and thus precludes this common law practice of tolling accrual based on discovery in cases where none of the statutory tolling provisions apply.

Subsection (10) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan.

Williams 225280 v. Woodin · filed 2019-09-23(10)

In this case, Plaintiff brings his causes of action against the improperly joined defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Furthermore, “Michigan law provides for tolling of the limitations period while an earlier action was pending which was later dismissed without prejudice.” Kalasho v. City of Eastpointe, 66 F. App’x 610, 611 (6th Cir. 2003). All of the actions about which Plaintiff complains occurred in 2019, well within the three-year period of limitations. Those claims are not at risk of being time-barred.

Section 600.5805(7) sets a two-year limitations period for an action charging malicious prosecution, rather than the statute's general three-year period for personal-injury actions.

Cowan v. State of Michigan · filed 2019-12-10(7)

As a general rule, the statute of limitations for personal-injury lawsuits, including lawsuits alleging claims under 42 USC 1983, is three years. See MCL 600.5805(2) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, the period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all actions to recover damages for the death of a person or for injury to a person or property.”); see also McCune v Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (CA 6, 1988) (“Michigan’s three year statute of limitations for personal injury claims . . . governs section 1983 actions when the cause of action arises in Michigan.”). However, one of the exceptions to that general rule is for malicious prosecution claims. Under MCL 600.5805(7), “[t]he period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malicious prosecution.” Because plaintiff has narrowed his claims in this case to just his malicious prosecution claim against Barber—and because he, both below and on appeal, expressly advocates in favor of a two-year statute of limitations for this claim—we conclude that his only remaining claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Subsection 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Byrd 682089 v. Washington · filed 2020-04-07(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(10) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Brown 367927 v. Totten · filed 2020-08-10(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Subsection (10) provides a three-year limitations period for Michigan civil-rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Johnson 343032 v. Schafer · filed 2021-08-06(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(10) gives civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983 a three-year statute of limitations.

Person Sr. v. Kakani · filed 2021-12-14(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(2) gives civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed in Michigan a three-year statute of limitations.

Stampone 713769 v. Michigan Supreme Court · filed 2024-02-26(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 civil-rights suits filed in Michigan.

Lawrence 970911 v. Valdaze · filed 2024-08-15(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under Section 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for Michigan civil-rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Brantley 924266 v. Grondin · filed 2024-09-11(2)

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). The statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Gallagher and Martin occurred in July of 2023. Therefore, there is no basis to conclude that the statute of limitations has or will run on Plaintiff’s claims against the misjoined Defendants, and Plaintiff has provided no basis for this Court to conclude that he would suffer gratuitous harm if claims against the misjoined Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan.

Rice 490612 v. Nelson · filed 2025-04-15(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed in Michigan.

Joyce 251901 v. Martino · filed 2025-10-07(2)

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). The statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). Here, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Martino and Stallman arise out of events that occurred before Plaintiff was incarcerated at RMI during August of 2022. Because Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Martino and Stallman arose at least three years ago, if the Court dismissed those claims, Plaintiff might suffer statute of limitations consequences. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Martino and Stallman but will sever Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Martino and Stallman into two new and separate actions.

Section 600.5805(2) sets a two-year limitations period for actions charging assault.

Calladine v. Dana Corp. · filed 1988-02-29(2)

The statute of limitations for actions charging assault is two years. Mich. Comp.Laws § 600.5805(2).

Section 600.5805(7) supplies a three-year limitations period for Michigan wrongful death actions.

Szlinis v. Moulded Fiber Glass Companies, Inc. · filed 1977-12-05(7)

Since Michigan’s death act contains no statute of limitations, the limitation has been supplied by court construction which adopts the three-year tort statute as the limitation.

Section 600.5805(3)'s two-year limitation for malpractice actions applies only to actions against licensed professionals, not unlicensed impostors.

Simpson v. Hubert · filed 1971-08-24(3)

Construing the two sections (BJA § 2912 and BJA § 5805 [3]) together, we hold that the short two-year statute of limitation applies only to action against licensed professionals.

Subsection (3)'s two-year malpractice limitation does not apply when the claimed malpractice involves an occupation rather than a profession; such an action falls under subsection (7)'s three-year limitation for other injuries to person or property.

Norling v. James · filed 1972-01-21(3) (7)

We cannot but conclude that if the Legislature had intended cosmetology to be considered a “profession”, it would not have expressly designated it as an “occupation”. The malpractice statute does not apply to occupation as differentiated from profession.

Subsection (3) sets a two-year limitations period for actions charging malpractice; the court applied it to claims against a licensed physician, but not to claims based on a hospital’s independent negligence or an unlicensed X-ray technician’s negligence.

Dyke v. Richard · filed 1972-04-25(3)

MCLA 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3) provides: ... "(3) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions charging malpractice." ... Plaintiff was last treated by defendant Feller on October 17, 1965. This action was commenced on February 9, 1968. The trial court correctly granted defendant Feller’s motion for accelerated judgment on the grounds that the two-year malpractice statute of limitations had run against plaintiffs. ... However, the two-year malpractice statute of limitations does not apply to plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant hospital itself was negligent in failing to provide adequate standards and in failing to X-ray plaintiff’s pelvic area. ... Similarly, as the X-ray technician is not a licensed professional, the two-year malpractice statute of limitations is not applicable to plaintiffs’ claim that the X-ray technician was negligent.

Section 600.5805(7) provides a three-year limitations period for this type of personal-injury action.

Bauman v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad · filed 1972-06-27(7)

Under the statutory law of this state, the period of limitations for a cause of action of the character now before us is three years. MCLA 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7).

Section 600.5805(7) applies Michigan’s general three-year limitation period to actions seeking recovery for personal injuries, including claims based on negligence or breach of warranty.

Waldron v. Armstrong Rubber Co. · filed 1974-06-26(7)

Michigan, of course, applies its general three-year statute of limitations (MCLA 600.5805[7]; MSA 27A.5805[7]), to actions instituted to recover for personal injuries, irrespective of whether the action is predicated upon common-law negligence or breach of warranty.

Section 600.5805's three-year limitations period does not govern an action for fraud seeking damages that are not for injury to specific property.

Kwasny v. Driessen · filed 1972-08-28

Defendants next contend that the trial court should have granted their motion for accelerated judgment on the basis that plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The question is whether the three-year limitations statute in MCLA 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 governs or the general six-year statute of limitations found in MCLA 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813. ... The decision of the trial court in denying the motion for accelerated judgment was correct.

The two-year limitations period for malpractice actions applies to wrongful-death actions that charge malpractice.

Olijnyk v. Harrison Community Hospital, Inc. · filed 1977-12-01(3)

Defendant Winkler moved for accelerated judgment on the ground that the action against him was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions charging malpractice. MCLA 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3). ... This Court has ruled, however, that the two-year period of limitations for malpractice actions is applicable to wrongful death actions which charge malpractice. ... We are persuaded that that ruling was correct and we apply it here.

The statute's discovery rule measures accrual from when the plaintiff discovered or, with reasonable diligence, should have discovered the malpractice; a correct diagnosis does not automatically establish notice of an earlier misdiagnosis.

Schalm v. Mt. Clemens General Hospital · filed 1978-04-18(3)

Under Dyke, the question is when was the "asserted malpractice” discovered or, when should it have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Does the fact that plaintiff is given a correct diagnosis always require that he be charged with notice that the earlier, and now known to be incorrect, diagnosis was malpractice? We think not.

Section 600.5805 imposes a two-year limitations period on malpractice claims; the court held that, under the then-applicable discovery rule, filing six and one-half months after discovery was timely.

Boyer v. Vandenbrink · filed 1980-04-21

The period of limitations for claims alleging malpractice is two years. MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805. ... In the instant case, the date of the alleged malpractice was March 17, 1972, when the vasectomy was performed. The two-year discovery rule was in effect at this time. The date the plaintiffs discovered the alleged malpractice was early August, 1975, when they learned that Mrs. Boyer was pregnant and that Mr. Boyer was not sterile. Suit was commenced six and one-half months after discovery. Since the plaintiffs had two years after discovery in which to file suit, their claim is not barred.

Section 600.5805(3)'s medical-malpractice limitations rule applies to wrongful-death claims alleging malpractice, with accrual governed by the medical-malpractice rule rather than the date of death.

Hawkins v. Regional Medical Laboratories, Pc · filed 1979-10-18(3)

Accordingly, we hold that in wrongful death actions claiming malpractice, the cause of action commences as provided by the statutory provision relating to the commencement of actions for medical malpractice, and not at the time of death as plaintiff urges.

Section 600.5805(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on an action charging malpractice.

Tonegatto v. Budak · filed 1982-01-20(4)

We agree with the trial judge’s legal determination that plaintiff’s 1979 visit to defendant Schubert was not a "continuation” of her prior treatment. Since plaintiff’s last treatment with defendant Schubert occurred in June, 1976, her malpractice claim against defendant Schubert was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. MCL 600.5805(4), 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5805(4), 27A.5838(1).

Section 600.5805(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on medical-malpractice claims.

Heisler v. Rogers · filed 1982-01-26(4)

The statute of limitations for malpractice is two years. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). ... We therefore conclude that under the time of discovery rule plaintiffs’ claim is barred.

For a medical-malpractice claim, the applicable limitations period is two years after the last treatment or after the malpractice was discovered or should reasonably have been discovered, using the statute and case law in effect when the malpractice occurred.

Karr v. Williams · filed 1983-06-06(3)

In Boyer v Vandenbrink, 98 Mich App 772, 774-775; 293 NW2d 687 (1980), lv den 410 Mich 888 (1981), the Court held that the statute and case law in effect at the time the asserted malpractice occurred govern. Thus, the applicable period of limitations in the present case was two years after the last treatment or two years after the asserted malpractice was discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.

Section 600.5805(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on medical malpractice actions.

Baldyga v. Independence Health Plan · filed 1987-03-09(4)

Finally, a special two-year limit has been worked out for malpractice suits [MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4)]. ... Therefore, we apply the Barnard analysis and find that, insofar as plaintiff claims that defendant is vicariously liable for the medical care provided by defendant’s physicians, her claim is barred by the two-year period of limitation governing medical malpractice cases.

Section 600.5805(4)'s malpractice limitations period governs a hospital-negligence claim arising from its professional medical services, rather than the three-year period in § 600.5805(8).

Bronson v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp. · filed 1989-01-11(4), (8)

We believe that, in amending § 5838, the Legislature intended that all claims against a hospital for negligent performance of professional medical services would be governed by the statutory period of limitation for medical malpractice actions. We conclude that plaintiff’s action against defendant in this case involved such claims and that summary disposition was therefore properly granted to defendant.

Section 600.5805(4) imposes a two-year limitation period for medical-malpractice claims, including claims against an employee or agent of a licensed health facility acting in that capacity.

Bell v. Mikkola · filed 1992-04-21(4)

In this case, plaintiff, as a respiratory therapist employed by St. Joseph Hospital, was clearly an "employee or agent of a licensed health facility.” Moreover, the alleged negligent act occurred while defendant was acting within that capacity. Therefore, the two-year period of limitation for medical malpractice found in MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) applies to plaintiffs claim.

Section 600.5805(4) requires a medical-malpractice claim to be brought within two years after accrual or within six months after discovery; discovery is an alternative limitations trigger, not an element of the claim.

Lumley v. U of M Bd of Regents · filed 1996-01-12(4)

The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions provides that the claim must be brought within two years of the accrual date or six months of discovery of the claim. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). Discovery is merely an alternative means for commencing the running of the statutory period of limitation. It is not an element of a malpractice action.

Section 600.5805(4) requires a medical-malpractice claim to be filed within two years after accrual or within six months after discovery, whichever is later.

Taylor v. Kurapati · filed 1999-10-08(4)

A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must bring the claim within two years of when the claim accrued, or within six months of when the plaintiff *358discovered or should have discovered the claim, whichever is later.59 MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4), MCL 600.5838a(2); MSA 27A.5838(1)(2); Solowy v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 454 Mich 214, 219; 561 NW2d 843 (1997). ... Thus, the Taylors had until December 4, 1995, to file their claim. By filing their initial complaint on March 26, 1996, the Taylors failed to file within the applicable limitation period and summary disposition was appropriate.

Section 600.5805(5) requires a medical malpractice claim to be filed within two years after the act or omission giving rise to the claim, subject to the statute's applicable extensions.

VandenBerg v. VandenBerg · filed 2002-11-01(5)

In this case, the claim against defendants accrued on October 11, 1990, the last day of treatment and the day decedent died. Thus, pursuant to MCL 600.5805(5), the statute of limitations was set to expire two years later, on October 11, 1992.

Section 600.5805(6) sets a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions.

Stupak v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. · filed 2004-04-23(6)

Under Michigan law, however, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is two years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(6). ... In any event, the only injury for which plaintiff seeks to recover is the death of her son. Because there is no dispute that the death occurred in the State of Michigan, Wisconsin’s borrowing statute makes the shorter Michigan statute of limitations applicable. Because the time allowed for filing under that statute has expired, plaintiffs action is barred.

Section 5805(5), renumbered as subsection (6), subjects medical-malpractice actions to a two-year limitations period.

Ousley v. McLaren · filed 2005-01-20(5) (6)

MCL 600.5805(5) provides that actions charging malpractice are subject to a period of limitations of two years.

Section 600.5805(6) sets a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice actions, which may be equitably tolled in compelling circumstances.

Ward v. Rooney-Gandy · filed 2005-05-17(6)

Plaintiffs cause of action alleges medical malpractice, and the period of limitations for medical malprac*521tice actions is two years. MCL 600.5805(6).

Section 600.5805(6) sets a two-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice actions.

Ward v. Siano · filed 2006-06-22(6)

However, the statutory period of limitations for plaintiffs medical malpractice action was always two years under MCL 600.5805(6). The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions did not change with the decision in Waltz. Waltz only construed the saving provision of MCL 600.5852. Therefore, the statute of limitations in effect at the time the cause of action arose was the same as the statute of limitations that the trial court applied to plaintiffs case.

Section 600.5805(6) sets a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice actions; a later-filed affidavit of merit filed before that period expires can toll the period and commence the suit unless the defendant moves for dismissal or shows prejudice.

Wood v. Bediako · filed 2006-10-26(6)

The period of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years. MCL 600.5805(6). ... Hence, while the filing of a complaint without an affidavit of merit does not toll the period of limitations, and the subsequent filing of an affidavit after the limitations period has run does not relate back *565to the original filing, id. at 549-550, the subsequent filing of an affidavit before the limitations period has run will operate to toll the limitations period and commence the suit unless a defendant moves for dismissal or can demonstrate prejudice.

Section 600.5805 requires an action to be commenced within the applicable period after accrual and sets a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice actions.

Driver v. Naini · filed 2010-03-02(1), (6)

Where the timeliness of a tort action is at issue, we analyze when the claim accrued, because the due date for commencing the action hinges on accrual. MCL 600.5805(1) (“[a] person shall not bring or maintain an action ... unless, after the claim first accrued ... the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section”) (emphasis added). A medical malpractice claim accrues at the time of the acts or omissions that are the basis for the claim. MCL 600.5838a(l).

Section 600.5805(6) gives a medical-malpractice plaintiff two years from the date the claim accrues to file suit.

King v. McPherson Hospital · filed 2010-05-19(6)

Under MCL 600.5805(6), a medical malpractice plaintiff has two years from the date the cause of action accrued in which to file suit.

Section 600.5805(6) establishes a two-year period of limitations for medical-malpractice claims.

Lockwood v. Mobile Medical Response, Inc. · filed 2011-06-07(6)

Generally, the period of limitations for a medical-malpractice claim is two years. MCL 600.5805(6).

Section 600.5805(1) requires injury actions to be commenced within the statutory period after accrual, and subsection (6) provides a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims.

Kincaid v. Cardwell · filed 2013-04-18(1), (6)

A person cannot sue another “to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff . .., the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed” by statute. MCL 600.5805(1). The period applicable to medical malpractice is two years from the accrual date. MCL 600.5805(6).

Section 600.5805(6) ordinarily gives a medical-malpractice action a two-year period of limitations.

Sanders v. Perfecting Church · filed 2013-07-16(6)

The period of limitations for a medical malpractice action is ordinarily two years, MCL 600.5805(6), from “the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the *10plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim,” MCL 600.5838a(l). ... In this case, the alleged malpractice occurred on July 8, 2007. Plaintiff filed her original complaint on July 7, 2010, which was one year after the two-year period of limitations had run. MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838a(l). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion because permitting plaintiff to amend the complaint to include the expired medical malpractice claim would have been futile.

Section 600.5805(6) requires a malpractice action to be commenced within two years after the claim accrues, with timeliness determined alongside the related affidavit-of-merit filing rules.

Wade v. Do · filed 2015-01-29(6)

Under MCL 600.5805(6), a plaintiff bringing an “action charging malpractice” must commence the action within two years after the claim first accrued. ... Plaintiff did not file an affidavit of merit with his complaint, nor did he file a motion seeking an additional 28 days under MCL 600.2912d(2). Instead, plaintiff argues that his claim is not time-barred under MCL 600.5805(6) because defendants failed to provide him access to all of his medical records within 56 days of receiving his notice of intent to sue under MCL 600.2912b(5), such that his May 28, 2013 affidavit of merit was timely filed within 91 days of his February 22, 2013 complaint under MCL 600.2912d(3). We agree.

Section 600.5805(6) gives medical-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period measured from accrual, while subsection (1) generally requires actions to be commenced within the applicable period after accrual.

Hoard v. Mark J Stevenson Dds · filed 2015-02-26(1), (6)

“A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within” certain, specified time periods. MCL 600.5805(1). “The period applicable to medical malpractice is two years from the accrual date.” Kincaid, 300 Mich App at 523, citing MCL 600.5805(6). ... Construing the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint in a light most favorable to her, we find that plaintiff alleged a new, distinct act or omission within the limitations period. ... Thus, plaintiff pled sufficient “facts that would establish that the continued adherence at the later point constituted a breach of the duty owed to the plaintiff” and that her claim should have withstood a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Subsection (6) imposes a two-year limitations period on medical-malpractice claims, absent tolling.

Estate of Sandra Marquardt v. Vellaiah Durai Umashankar Md · filed 2015-03-26(6)

Absent tolling, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice is two years. MCL 600.5805(6). Accordingly, because plaintiff’s claim accrued on July 20, 2007,2 the limitations period was set to expire on July 20, 2009.

Section 600.5805(6) requires a medical-malpractice claim to be filed within two years after it accrues.

Penny Gamble v. David M Kolakowski Dds · filed 2016-04-21(6)

Under MCL 600.5838a(1), the Gambles’ claims accrued, and the two-year period of limitations stated under MCL 600.5805(6) began running, on January 20, 2010.

Section 600.5805(6) sets a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims, subject to statutory tolling.

Hunter v. John M Cilluffo Md · filed 2016-05-24(6)

Because a medical malpractice plaintiff must provide every defendant a timely NOI in order to toll the limitations period applicable to the recipient of the NOI, plaintiff failed to toll the limitations period . . . .” Driver v Naini, 490 Mich 239, 251; 802 NW2d 311 (2011) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s Case II complaint against defendant Corporation was time-barred, MCL 600.5805(6), and, thus, the trial court appropriately dismissed plaintiff’s claim against defendant Corporation.

Section 600.5805(6) generally imposes a two-year limitations period on medical-malpractice claims, and later discovery of the wrongdoer’s identity does not extend that period.

Milostan v. Troy Internal Medicine · filed 2015-01-15(6)

Given the principle that the discovery rule applies to discovery of a claim, and not the discovery of a wrongdoer’s identity, it follows that the discovery rule found in MCL 600.5838a(2) does not apply to plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Fraser, meaning that her claims against Dr. Fraser are instead time barred by the general period of limitation applicable to medical malpractice claims. That is, as discussed, plaintiff’s claim accrued on December 31, 2009, and the applicable statute of limitations expired on December 31, 2011. See MCL 600.5838a(1); MCL 600.5805(6).

Section 600.5805(6) sets a two-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice claims.

Sarafa v. Shiri Levy Md · filed 2016-08-02(6)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim is two years. MCL 600.5805(6). Therefore, had plaintiff taken no action on this case on or prior to May 2, 2011, plaintiff’s claim would be time-barred as of May 3, 2013. However, on April 11, 2013, 21 days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, plaintiff filed a notice of intent to file a claim on defendants. Under MCL 600.2912b(1), a medical malpractice plaintiff is required to give a potential defendant notice of the claim at least 182 days prior to commencement of the claim. MCL 600.5856(c) permits tolling of the two year statute of limitations during that 182-day notice period. Accordingly, upon filing the notice of intent on April 11, 2013, 182 days were added to the statute of limitations period for plaintiff’s claim. Absent proper action by plaintiff, her claim would therefore expire after 203 days, on October 31, 2013.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a two-year limitations period on medical-malpractice claims.

Lavalley v. St Mary Mercy Hospital · filed 2020-12-22(8)

Generally, a two-year limitations period applies to malpractice claims. MCL 600.5805(8); MCL 600.5838a(1).

Section 600.5805(8) sets a two-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice claims, subject to the separate statutory discovery rule that may provide a later filing period.

Lonsway v. Yale University · filed 2021-02-11(8)

Under MCL 600.5805(8), the statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging medical malpractice is two years.

Subsection (8) imposes a two-year limitations period on medical-malpractice claims.

Carlomusto v. John M Colasanti Dds Pc · filed 2021-08-12(8)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim is two years. MCL 600.5805(8).

Section 600.5805(8) sets a two-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice actions.

Ghaleb v. Md · filed 2022-11-10(8)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice case is two years. See MCL 600.5805(8); see also Haksluoto, 500 Mich at 310.

Section 600.5805(8) sets a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice actions, and its expiration date is computed subject to the COVID-related exclusion of days under the Supreme Court’s administrative orders.

20230202_C358487_54_358487.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-02-02(8)

Had it not been for the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court administrative orders discussed above, this date would be obvious: based on the May 15, 2018 accrual date, the limitations period would have expired on May 15, 2020. MCL 600.5805(8). ... Thus, 66 days remained in the limitations period on June 20, meaning that the limitations period was set to expire on August 25, 2020, as a result of the Supreme Court’s COVID-related administrative orders.

Section 600.5805(1) requires an action to be commenced within the applicable limitations period, and subsection (8) generally gives medical-malpractice actions two years; a timely served complaint tolls that period even without an affidavit of merit.

Ottgen v. Md · filed 2023-07-14(1), (8)

And plaintiffs must file the action within the applicable statute-of-limitations period, MCL 600.5805(1), 1 which for medical malpractice actions generally is two years, MCL 600.5805(8).

Section 600.5805(8) gives a medical-malpractice claimant two years after the claim accrues to bring suit; claims accruing at the treatment visits were time-barred here, and no new claim accrued when the physician merely continued the prior diagnosis and treatment.

20250115_C365154_66_365154.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-01-15(8)

Under MCL 600.5805(8), individuals have two years after a claim accrues to bring an action for medical malpractice. ... Applying these rules to the dates of treatment stated in Coleman’s complaint leads to the following deadlines by when each “claim” could be timely filed: ... Thus, assuming that each visit resulted in a separate malpractice claim accruing on that date, they are all time-barred except for the July 16, 2020 visit. ... As a matter of law, however, no claim accrued at the July 16, 2020 visit. ... Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because all of Coleman’s claims were time-barred.

Section 600.5805(8) sets a two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions.

Estate of Glenn Steven Brooker v. Trinity Health Michigan · filed 2026-03-19(8)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years. MCL 600.5805(8). ... In this case, the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims expired on November 10, 2022, two years after the decedent’s shoulder surgery. See MCL 600.5805(8); MCL 600.5838a(1).

Section 600.5805(4) sets a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims.

Buszek v. Harper Hospital · filed 1982-05-07(4)

On these facts, we believe the trial court properly granted defendants’ accelerated judgment motion. Plaintiffs concede on appeal that their lawsuit was filed more than two years after their malpractice claim accrued. See MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) and MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1).

Section 600.5805(8) sets a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions.

Paynter v. ProAssurance Wisconsin Insurance Company · filed 2019-06-07(8)

Again, it is undisputed that the Paynters mailed their mediation request in May 2015, which was more than two years after the June 14, 2010 misdiagnosis.

Subsection (10) provides a three-year limitations period for the specified tort and § 1983 claims, while subsection (5) provides a two-year limitations period for malicious-prosecution claims.

Lechner v. Peppler · filed 2018-05-08(10), (5)

Under MCL 600.5805(10), the statute of limitations for Lechner’s claims of abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress is three years. See also Nelson v Ho, 222 Mich App 74, 85; 564 NW2d 482 (1997) (“Claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress must be brought within three years after they accrue in order to avoid the limitation bar.”). “Michigan’s three year statute of limitations for personal injury claims . . . governs section 1983 actions when the cause of action arises in Michigan.” McCune v Grand Rapids, 842 F2d 903, 905 (CA 6, 1988) (citations omitted); MCL 600.5805(10). The limitations period for civil conspiracy premised on the allegedly improper arrest/violation of civil rights is likewise a three-year period. Terlecki v Stewart, 278 Mich App 644, 653; 754 NW2d 899 (stating “the conspiracy claim takes on the limitations period for the underlying wrong that was the object of the conspiracy”). Finally, to the extent that Lechner brought a claim for malicious prosecution, the statute of limitations is two years, MCL 600.5805(5).

For a personal-injury action, the three-year limitations period begins when all elements of the claim, including damage, are present; later damages do not create a new cause of action or restart the period.

Connelly v. Paul Ruddy's Equipment Repair & Service Co. · filed 1972-08-30

Once all of the elements of an action for personal injury, including the element of damage, are present, the claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run. Later damages may result, but they give rise to no new cause of action, nor does the statute of limitations begin to run anew as each item of damage is incurred.

The two-year limitation for actions charging malpractice does not cover negligence claims against nurses; those claims fall under the three-year limitation for other tort actions, which also applies to the hospital vicariously liable for the nurses.

Kambas v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hosp. of Detroit · filed 1973-03-27(3), (7)

Section 5805 is nothing more than a compilation of existing limitations with no change in time periods. It provides for limitations on actions for injuries to persons and property and after setting forth one and two year limitations for several specific tort actions, including malpractice, it then provides in subsection (7) for a three year limitation on all other tort actions.

Section 600.5805(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on a medical-malpractice claim, running from its accrual.

Hammond v. Weiss · filed 1973-04-26(3)

A medical malpractice claim accrues when the alleged responsible person discontinues treating the plaintiff, RJA 5838. RJA 5805(3) provides a two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff’s cause of action arose in 1954 and would, therefore, be barred in 1956, but for the fact that plaintiff was an infant.

Subsection (7) provides a three-year limitations period for such cases, tolled while the suit is pending before dismissal.

Lud v. Sammons · filed 1974-04-16(7)

The statute of limitations for such cases is three years, but was tolled while suit was pending and before dismissal. MCLA 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7).

Section 600.5805(7) provides a one-year limitations period for libel and slander actions, while § 600.5805(8) provides a three-year period for tortious interference with economic relations even when defamatory statements cause the interference.

Joba Const. Co., Inc. v. Burns & Roe, Inc. · filed 1982-12-06(7), (8)

At the outset, we reject defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to libel and slander actions, MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7). Defendant argues that the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim is the publication of various defamatory statements made by defendant to the PLC and that plaintiff’s designation of its claim as one for interference with prospective advantageous economic relations was merely an attempt to circumvent the shorter period of limitation applicable to actions based upon libel and slander. In Wilkerson v Carlo, 101 Mich App 629, 634; 300 NW2d 658 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 984 (1981), this Court held that tortious interference with economic relations is actionable in and of itself and is subject to the three-year period of limitations, MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8), even though the interference is caused by defamatory statements. As plaintiff’s action was filed within the applicable three-year period of limitations, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for an accelerated judgment.

Section 600.5805 provides a two-year limitations period for a malicious prosecution action, and when the underlying action is appealed, the period accrues upon the appellate court’s final decision.

Parisi v. Michigan Townships Ass'n · filed 1983-02-25

The parties agree that the limitations period is two years pursuant to MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805. ... We hold that the action accrued on July 8, 1980, and reverse.

Subsection (10) imposes a three-year limitations period on § 1983 claims filed in Michigan federal courts.

Paeth v. Worth Township · filed 2010-04-09(10)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal courts sitting in Michigan.

Subsection (1)'s three-year limitations period does not bar the age-discrimination claim at the pleading stage when the actionable adverse impact may have occurred as late as 2009.

Loffredo v. AG · filed 2012-09-25(1)

Third, defendants claim that Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations bars these claims. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(1), (10). ... The complaint suggests this may have occurred as late as 2009, making the lawsuit timely, at least according to the pleadings.

Subsection (10) provides Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations, under which the state-law claims were time-barred because they accrued when the information returns were filed.

Vandenheede v. Vecchio · filed 2013-10-01(10)

With regard to the state-law claims for conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which accrued upon the filing of the 2006 and 2007 information returns, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5827, the district court correctly found them time-barred under Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10).

Section 600.5805 supplies a three-year limitations period for unjust-enrichment claims based on duties implied by law, rather than the six-year period for claims based on an express promise.

In re Lamictal Indirect Purchaser & Antitrust Consumer Litigation · filed 2016-03-22

Here, Plaintiffs’ cause of action is not based on a breach of implied contract or an express promise, but by the breach of Defendants’ duties under the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act. Though the issue is not a clean one, the Court finds that the three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs’ Michigan unjust enrichment claim.

Subsection (10) provides a three-year limitations period for these two state-law tort claims, but the claims were not time-barred because a substantive restriction prevented Peterson from litigating them until his conviction was vacated.

Peterson v. Heymes · filed 2017-09-29(10)

The statute of limitations for these two claims is three years. ... MSP Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the claims as time barred. ... Until the conviction was vacated, Peterson was operating under a substantive restriction that prevented him from litigating these two state torts.

Section 600.5805(10) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on conversion claims.

Ziad Kasi Salah Al-Zabet v. Ansara · filed 2019-01-22(10)

In Tillman v Great Lakes Truck Ctr, Inc, 277 Mich App 47; 742 NW2d 622 (2007), this Court addressed whether the statute of limitations for a claim of conversion was three years or six years. ... Based on Tillman, the trial court correctly held that the three-year statute of limitations applied to plaintiff’s conversion claim. Plaintiff does not contest that, if the three-year statute of limitations applied, then his conversion claim was time-barred. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7) for this claim.

Section 600.5805(2) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on a common-law fiduciary-duty claim.

Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich. · filed 2019-05-20(2)

Plaintiffs' claim that defendant breached its common law fiduciary duty is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Here, plaintiffs knew the fiduciary breach occurred in 2009, and so the claim is time-barred.

Subsection (9) provides a two-year limitations period for claims alleging misconduct by a sheriff or sheriff's deputy.

Hency v. St. Clair County · filed 2019-09-24(9)

But claims that allege misconduct by a sheriff or sheriff's deputy are governed by a two-year statute of limitation. See Hoxie v. Livingston Cty., at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2009); see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(9). Defendants' alleged misconduct occurred on July 28, 2014. See, e.g., ECF 1, PgID 12. And the complaint was filed on June 23, 2017. ECF 1. Plaintiffs' ethnic intimidation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are therefore time-barred.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Collins 182427 v. Rhodes · filed 2019-11-01(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983.

Spencer 753452 v. Adams · filed 2019-11-13(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(10) gives civil-rights claims filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan a three-year statute of limitations.

Williams 225280 v. Edlinger · filed 2020-02-28(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(10) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed in Michigan.

Nelson 630619 v. Shaffer · filed 2020-04-20(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for civil-rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan.

Jenkins 792331 v. Smith · filed 2020-06-25(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Subsection (10) gives § 1983 personal-injury claims a three-year limitations period, while subsection (5) gives malicious-prosecution actions a two-year limitations period.

Grein v. Kajy · filed 2020-12-03(10), (5)

Michigan maintains a three-year limitations period for § 1983 personal injury claims. MCL § 600.5805(10); ... Consequently, the statute of limitations has lapsed since Grein refiled his Complaint with this Court on May 11, 2020. ... Michigan law provides the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malicious prosecution. MCL § 600.5805(5). ... On May 11, 2020, Grein refiled his Complaint with this Court—more than a year past the statute of limitations period.

Section 600.5805(10) provides a three-year statute of limitations applicable to the claims at issue.

Roberson v. Wynkoop · filed 2021-02-10(10)

Finally, the addition of Sergeant Lesinkski and Officers Inman, Miller, Korpalski, Murchie, and Osborne would be futile because the claims against them are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10) (establishing applicable statute of limitations period as three years); see also Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 15(c)(1)(B) . . . does not authorize the relation back of an amendment adding a new party.”).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims in Michigan.

Washington v. Macomb, County of · filed 2022-01-27(2)

In Michigan, where the events giving rise to the present complaint took place, the limitations period is three years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (“[W]here state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.”); Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005) (using the three-year limitations period in Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805). ... Any amended complaint that names the Doe Defendants, even if lodged simultaneously with Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time on May 13, 2021, would be filed after the limitations period expired.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 civil-rights suits in Michigan, and subsection (10) provides a three-year period for personal-injury actions.

Rudd v. Norton Shores, City of · filed 2022-03-16(2), (10)

State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); ... The statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action. ... Likewise, Rudd’s claims of abuse of process and infliction of emotional distress are subject to the three-year limitations period in Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10) (2013) for personal injury actions. ... Rudd’s allegations against Shaw, Rhyndress, and Wasilewski concern conduct that occurred in 2013. Rudd filed his complaint in 2018, more than three years after he had reason to know of the injury on which his retaliation claims are based. Rudd provides no argument in response to Defendants’ statute-of-limitations defense. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claims against Shaw, Rhyndress, and Wasilewski because they are untimely.

Section 600.5805’s three-year limitations period does not govern PPPA claims; the court held that those claims are subject to a six-year limitations period under § 600.5813.

Nock v. Boardroom, Inc. d/b/a Bottom Line Inc. · filed 2023-05-19

The parties next spar over whether the appropriate limitations period for PPPA violations is three years, pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805, or six years, pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws §600.5813. ... Since there is no well-reasoned basis to depart from this line of precedent, the Court likewise concludes that the PPPA’s statute of limitations is six-years. See Mich. Comp. Laws §600.5813. The PPPA claim is, therefore, timely.

Section 600.5805(1) limits the time to commence an action for damages after the claim accrues, but does not bar using time-barred conduct as evidence to support or defeat an affirmative defense.

Pianko v. General R.V. Center, Inc. · filed 2023-05-23(1)

The time-bars cited by Defendants limit the conduct for which General (and the other Defendants) may be held liable, but they do not limit the evidence that the parties can use to support or defeat an affirmative defense, such as General’s Faragher-Ellerth defense. ... M.C.L § 600.5805(1) (“A person shall note bring or maintain an action recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.” (emphasis added)).

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits filed under § 1983 in Michigan.

Miles 237011 v. Michigan, State of · filed 2023-08-21(2)

The Court notes that this claim also appears to be untimely. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Jones 617568 v. Ingham County Correctional Facility · filed 2024-03-27(2)

This means that for civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) supplies the three-year general personal-injury limitations period for Michigan § 1983 claims, while the special criminal-sexual-conduct period in subsection (6) does not apply to those claims.

Cargill v. Monroe County Jail · filed 2024-10-03(2), (6)

Furthermore, because § 1983 claims must “borrow [a state’s] general or residual statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989), Michigan’s special statutes of limitations for criminal sexual assault, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.5805(6), 600.5851b, do not apply to § 1983 claims. ... Although Plaintiff’s claims involve sexual abuse when she was a minor, only the general statute of limitations, which is three years for personal injury actions, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2), applies here.

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Hill 793484 v. Smith · filed 2024-10-25(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under Section 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) generally gives tort claims a three-year limitations period measured from when the injury occurs.

Cotton v. Hughes · filed 2025-02-05(2)

In general, the statute of limitations for torts in Michigan is three years after the injury occurs. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2).

Section 600.5805 provides a two-year limitations period for false-imprisonment claims and a three-year limitations period for actions alleging personal injury.

Shade v. Harper Woods, City of · filed 2025-02-24

Further, by the time Plaintiff filed the current action, his claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. See Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972 F.3d 853, 867 n.8 (6th Cir. 2020) (providing that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is three years, which runs from when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the conduct providing the basis for the alleged injuries occurred); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805 (setting forth a two-year limitations period for false imprisonment and a three-year limitations period for actions alleging personal injury). As indicated, Plaintiff’s claims arise from the search of his vehicle and his seizure and arrest on December 17, 2020. Thus, at the latest, the time for filing his claims expired on or about late December 2023.

Section 600.5805(2) establishes a statute of limitations that bars assertion of claims, but it does not bar the admission of evidence.

Moore v. Memberselect Insurance Company · filed 2025-05-23(2)

In support of this assertion, plaintiff cites the statute of limitations. See MCL 600.5805(2); MCL 600.5807(9). The statute of limitations acts as a bar on the assertion of claims. It is not a bar on the admissibility of evidence.

Section 600.5805 supplies a three-year limitations period for Michigan civil-rights claims, requiring suit within three years of the alleged discrimination or adverse action.

Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc. · filed 2025-09-04

We cannot resolve his PWDCRA accommodation claim like his ADA claim because the state law does not share the ADA’s exhaustion requirement and instead has a three-year statute of limitations.8 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805; Garg v. Macomb Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 472 Mich. 263, 281–82 (2005), opinion amended on denial of reh’g (July 18, 2005). ... To allege an ELCRA violation, Pemberton must bring suit within three years of the alleged adverse action. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805.

Subsection (10) provides a three-year limitations period for Michigan § 1983 civil-rights suits, while subsection (11) provides a one-year limitations period for defamation, libel, and slander claims.

Brazil 627439 v. Washington · filed 2025-09-04(10) (11)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). ... Under Michigan law, defamation, libel, and slander claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Courser v. Allard, 969 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(11)).

Section 600.5805(2) gives Michigan § 1983 claims a three-year limitations period, while subsection (3) gives assault, battery, and false-imprisonment actions a two-year limitations period.

Evans · filed 2025-10-22(2), (3)

Insofar as Evans claims are predicated upon events that transpired before August 26, 2022 – three years before he initiated this lawsuit – those causes of action must be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds because section 1983 claims arising in Michigan have a three-year limitations period. Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972 F.3d 853, 867 n.8 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2). Counts I and II are, therefore, time-barred. ... The state law causes of action fair no better. Since the events underlying these claims all occurred more than two years before Evans commenced this action, they are time-barred as well. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(3), (7) (stating that the limitations period is “2 years for an action charging assault, battery, or false imprisonment” and “2 years for an action charging malicious prosecution.”); ... Terlecki v. Stewart, 278 Mich. App. 644, 653 (2008) (holding that a civil “conspiracy claim takes on the limitations period for the underlying wrong that was the object of the conspiracy.”).

Subsection 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan.

Howard · filed 2025-10-27(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(2) requires an ELCRA action to be commenced within three years.

Autokiniton · filed 2026-01-14(2)

An action under the ELCRA must be commenced within three years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Major v Vil. of Newberry, 316 Mich. App. 527, 534 (2016).

Section 600.5805(8) provides a three-year limitations period, barring Elliott-Larsen claims arising from events occurring more than three years before suit.

Hollowell v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. · filed 1999-05-27(8)

With respect to plaintiffs claims under ElliotN-Larsen, defendant notes that the applicable statute of limitations, pursuant to Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(8), is three years. ... Therefore, this court accepts defendant’s argument with respect to the application of the statute of limitations in this case. As a result, this court finds that plaintiffs Title VII claims premised on the events described in EEOC Charges 1 and 2, as well as plaintiffs ElliotNLarsen claims related to events prior to August 31, 1994, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 600.5805(7)'s general three-year limitations period does not govern claims against a county road commission arising under the governmental tort liability act when § 691.1411(2) supplies a two-year period.

Forest v. Parmalee · filed 1974-05-30(7)

Plaintiffs have argued that rather than the two-year statute of limitations contained in MCLA 691.1411(2); MSA 3.996(111)(2), applying to this case, the general three-year limitation period contained in MCLA 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7) should apply, and that therefore the trial court erroneously found that the complaint against the defendant county road commission had failed to come within the statutory period. ... It is clear that the two-year period of limitations applies to the instant suit.

For an action seeking damages for personal injury, the three-year limitations period applies based on the nature of the damages sought, regardless of whether the plaintiff pleads breach of contract or another form of action.

Rach v. Wise · filed 1973-04-26(7)

The general rule when choosing which of several statutes of limitations is applicable to a particular case is that the nature of damages sought, rather *732than the form of the action plaintiff has proceeded under, is determinative.

Section 600.5805(7)'s three-year limitations period for injuries to persons or property does not apply to claims for strictly financial losses without property damage.

Borman's, Inc. v. Lake State Development Co. · filed 1975-04-07(7)

A close examination of Borman’s complaint similarly discloses no allegation of property damage. Plaintiffs damages are strictly financial. There is no allegation that the faulty drainage system caused any injury to any other property or any persons. None of the buildings were damaged nor was the pavement damaged by virtue of the failure of the water to drain properly. The claim is that because the drain didn’t work, the plaintiff was forced to expend money to replace it, and lost profits during periods of flooding and reconstruction. As to these items, whether recovery is founded on contract, MCLA 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8), or fraud, MCLA 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813, the applicable period of limitations is six years.

Section 600.5805's malpractice and negligence limitation periods do not govern a claim for deficiencies in an improvement itself when the claim is essentially for breach of contract.

Burrows v. bidigare/bublys, Inc · filed 1987-01-07

We agree with defendants and the Marysville panel that claims for deficiencies in the improvement itself are not governed by MCL 600.5839; MSA 27A.5839, but disagree that MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 is applicable. A claim for damages for deficiencies in the improvement itself is essentially a suit for breach of contract. ... In Michigan, the pertinent statute is MCL 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8), which provides for a six-year limitation.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on Elliott-Larsen racial-discrimination claims.

Hollowell v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. · filed 2001-08-24(8)

The applicable statute of limitations for such claims is three years.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on Elliott-Larsen claims, running from accrual.

Nizami v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2000-07-31(8)

Under Michigan law, a plaintiff must assert an Ellioti^Larsen claim within three years after it accrues. ... (applying the three-year statute of limitations set forth at Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8) to a claim brought under Elliott-Larsen). ... Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiffs appeal to the “continuing violation” theory, and finds that Plaintiffs failure-to-promote claims are time-barred to the extent that they rest upon promotion denials occurring prior to May of 1996.