Mich. Comp. Laws § 600

Under § 600.2925c(4), settlement before litigation triggers the first limitations clause, while settlement during pending litigation triggers the second clause, requiring payment and commencement of the contribution action within one year after the agreement.

New Hampshire Insurance v. Charlevoix County Road Commission · filed 1992-04-07(4)

The commentary to this section states that the first clause applies to situations where liability has been settled without an action being filed. The second clause applies to situations where liability has been settled while an action was pending and before judgment.

Section 600.2925a(1)-(2) allows contribution between parties jointly or severally liable for the same tort injury, but only a tortfeasor who paid more than its pro rata share may recover the excess.

Moisenko v. AG · filed 1998-07-02§ 600.2925a(1)-(2)

Under Michigan law, the right of contribution exists between “persons [who] become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury _” ... This right “exists[, however,] only in favor of a tort-feasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share.”

Sections 600.2925a-c allow a negligent third-party tortfeasor to seek contribution from a negligent workers' compensation insurer that is jointly liable for the employee's injury.

Stafford v. E.W. Bliss Co. · filed 1978-10-02

Where the insurer itself has been negligent the third party may properly seek contribution under 1961 PA 236, § 2925, repealed by 1974 PA 318, § 2, currently found at MCL 600.2925a, b, c; MSA 27A.2925 (1), (2), (3).

MCL 600.2925 provides a statutory right of contribution only when a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defendants, and MCL 600.2925a applies only to torts committed on or after January 1, 1975.

Genesee County Road Commission v. State Highway Commission · filed 1978-10-03

Nor can plaintiffs rely upon MCL 600.2925; MSA 27A.2925, as applied in Morgan v McDermott, 382 Mich 333; 169 NW2d 897 (1969), as a basis for this action. That statute, which provides for a statutory right of contribution, only applies when a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defendants. Such is not the case here. Nor can plaintiffs rely upon MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925a which amended this section, since the amendment applies only to torts committed on or after January 1, 1975. See 1974 PA 318, § 3.

Section 600.2925a provides for pro rata contribution among joint tortfeasors, rather than contribution based on relative fault.

Friend v. Campbell · filed 1980-12-03

Our conclusion is further strengthened by the recognition that fault is not an issue in dramshop cases, Duncan v Beres, supra, and that contribution is, by statute, effected on a pro rata basis. MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1).

Section 600.2925a(1) permits a joint tortfeasor summoned as a third-party defendant to be liable for contribution, subject to the statute's pro rata-share limit.

May v. WOLVERINE TRACTOR AND EQUIPMENT CO. · filed 1981-06-16(1)

The contribution statute itself was amended by 1961 PA 236 to avoid such a result among nongovernmental litigants. The amendment permits contribution from joint tortfeasors who are joined as third-party defendants. Previously, contribution was only possible when a judgment had been recovered jointly against the tortfeasors.

Section 2925(1) entitles a defendant who paid more than its pro rata share of a joint judgment to contribution, and the parties cannot relitigate the extent of their joint-tortfeasor liability in the contribution action after judgment.

Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Dumon · filed 1981-12-01(1)

We find that the above-quoted, italicized language is dispositive of the instant case. In the instant case, plaintiff has paid more than its pro rata share of costs, interest and principal in a judgment wherein plaintiff, the estate of Logan and defendants were found jointly and severally liable. This joint judgment against all the original defendants brings them within the provisions of MCL 600.2925; MSA 27A.2925. See, generally, Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401; 231 NW2d 46 (1975). The time for defendants to dispute the basis and/or extent of their liability was during the original suit in a cross-claim against plaintiff. Once the joint judgment was rendered it was too late for defendants to litigate the question of the extent of their liability as joint tortfeasors under MCL 600.2925.

Section 2925 permits a defendant who paid more than its pro rata share of a jointly recovered bodily-injury judgment to seek contribution, without requiring the claimant to be a joint tortfeasor under the first section.

Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Dumon · filed 1985-02-01(1)

That doctrine has been incorporated in the statute applicable here. The language of § 2925 is clear and unambiguous and authorizes contribution in an action such as the one before us, providing a judgment is "recovered jointly.” The statute does not require, at least under the first section thereof, that a claimant for contribution be a "joint tortfeasor."

Section 2925d requires a nonsettling joint tortfeasor's liability to be reduced by the amount of the settlement or release, and this settlement rule remains applicable under comparative negligence.

Bacon v. Department of State Highways · filed 1982-04-21

This statute provides that the release of one of two or more joint tortfeasors discharges the party released from all liability for contribution and reduces the claim against the remaining party by the amount of the release or the amount of the settlement. MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4). ... Accordingly, we must conclude that the statutory settlement provision applicable to joint tort liability survived the Supreme Court’s adoption of comparative negligence and plaintiff is entitled to recover $369,760.

Section 2925a(3)(a) bars a settling tort-feasor from recovering contribution unless the settlement extinguishes the contributee's liability.

Buckeye Union Insurance v. Lenawee County Road Commission · filed 1982-06-04(3)(a)

The court declines to follow plaintiffs suggestion that the total extinguishment provision of MCLA 600.2925a(3)(a) has been rendered moot by the revisions of the contribution statutes. Sound policy considerations support the continued viability of MCLA 600.2925a(3)(a).

Section 2925d(b) keeps the contribution-release rule in force after comparative negligence and reduces the claim against nonsettling tortfeasors by the settlement amount, rather than by the settling tortfeasor’s percentage of fault.

Mayhew v. Berrien County Road Commission · filed 1982-11-23(b)

As a matter of fact, when the Legislature, by 1982 PA 147, amended § 2925b and did not amend § 2925d of the contribution between joint tortfeasors section of the Revised Judicature Act, the Legislature gave this Court a strong signal that it intended § 2925d to remain viable rather than be superseded by inference by Placek or the products liability comparative negligence statute, MCL 600.2949; MSA 27A.2949. We acknowledge that signal and hold § 2925d to be still viable.

Section 2925d prevents double recovery by reducing the damages recoverable from one tortfeasor by sums paid by another tortfeasor or that tortfeasor’s insurer.

Maynard v. Sauseda · filed 1982-12-06

It is argued that it is necessary to reduce the judgment by the $20,000 received from Andrew’s insurer in order to avoid double recovery, a result which the Legislature intended to avoid by the adoption of MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4). In the action against Leon, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the full amount of their damages, less any sum paid by Andrew or Andrew’s insurer.

The statute bars a settling tort-feasor from seeking contribution when it fails to give the other tort-feasor reasonable notice of settlement negotiations and a reasonable opportunity to participate, and contains no exception for discovering the other tort-feasor's potential liability after settlement.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Super City, Inc. · filed 1983-04-19(b), (c)

It is clear that at least two of the other remaining statutory prerequisites to plaintiff’s right to bring an action for contribution were not satisfied. It is undisputed that plaintiff failed to notify defendant that settlement negotiations with Strange were ongoing and that it did not give defendant an opportunity to participate in those negotiations. We reject plaintiff’s claim that its failure to satisfy the statutory requirements may be excused because it did not become aware of the potential liability of defendant until after the settlement with Strange had been reached. The statute contains no such exception.

Section 600.2925d provides for comparative fault, permitting the jury to consider the negligence of another person in the action.

Feher v. Montgomery Ward & Co. · filed 1983-07-07

In Mayhew v Berrien County Road Comm, 414 Mich 399; 326 NW2d 366 (1982), the Supreme Court held that MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) provided for comparative fault. Therefore the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider the negligence of Robert Benson.

Section 600.2925b preserves contribution among joint tortfeasors while leaving an injured party’s right to recover a joint and several judgment unaffected; relative fault determines the tortfeasors’ pro rata shares between themselves.

Gorelick v. Department of State Highways · filed 1983-07-19(a)

The policies underlying the foregoing decisions have been reaffirmed by the recent amendment to MCL 600.2925b; MSA 27A.2925(2), effective April 28, 1982. That section now provides in part: ... "(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be considered.” (Emphasis added.) The amended statute preserves a right of contribution between joint tortfeasors, but the emphasized language reaffirms that principles of joint and several liability have survived Placek, supra. In short, the foregoing language requires this Court to recognize plaintiffs right to recover the entire judgment from defendant herein, even though defendant’s responsibility for the accident has been adjudicated as less than 100%.

MCL 600.2925a applies only to torts committed on or after January 1, 1975.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1983-07-19

The current statute, MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1), applies only to torts committed on or after January 1, 1975. The former statute, which was in effect at the time Grujovski was injured, is also inapplicable since it applied only to joint tortfeasors.

Section 2925 creates an independent, substantive cause of action allowing a tortfeasor who paid more than a pro rata share of a judgment to seek contribution from joint tortfeasors, including a governmental road commission.

Sziber v. Stout · filed 1984-10-31(1)

We hold, therefore, that the statute creates a substantive cause of action for contribution available to the third-party plaintiffs in this case which is wholly independent of the underlying tort action, unaffected by the governmental immunity statute, and which may be prosecuted to judgment, providing that the other requirements of the contribution statute are met.

Sections 600.2925a and 600.2925b preserve contribution rights among joint tortfeasors despite comparative negligence, while barring consideration of individual relative fault in determining contribution rights.

Parliament Construction Co. v. Beer Precast Concrete, Ltd. · filed 1982-04-05600.2925a, 600.2925b

Consideration of the relative degrees of fault on the part of individual tortfeasors is prohibited in determining rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors. MCL 600.2925b; MSA 27A.2925(2).

A good-faith release or covenant not to sue one of multiple joint tortfeasors does not discharge the others unless its terms say so; the rule does not apply when the parties are not technically joint tortfeasors.

Lincoln v. Gupta · filed 1985-02-21

Thus, under current Michigan law, the release of one of several joint tortfeasors does not release other joint tortfeasors unless the terms of the release so provide. However, where the master or principal’s liability is based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master or principal and servant or agent are technically not joint tortfeasors. ... Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that since Dr. Carey and defendant Hutzel are not joint tortfeasors MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) is not applicable to the present case.

Section 2925d(b) reduces a claim against other tortfeasors by the amount stipulated in a release or covenant, and its setoff applies only to claims involving tortfeasors sharing a common tort-liability burden.

Industrial Steel Stamping, Inc v. Erie State Bank · filed 1988-04-05(b)

Under present Michigan law, the distinction is not significant. A release of one tortfeasor no longer releases the others unless the terms of the release so provide. MCL 600.2925d(a); MSA 27A.2925(4)(a). Under either characterization, a party’s claim against other tortfeasors is reduced by the amount stipulated to in the release or covenant. MCL 600.2925d(b); MSA 27A.2925(4)(b). ... The contribution-release statute applies only to tortfeasors sharing a common burden of liability in tort. ... Accordingly, on remand, the setoff provisions of the statute should only be applied to iss’s negligence claim. We express no opinion on whether iss has sufficiently set forth claims that do not sound in tort.

Section 2925d(b) reduces the claim against the remaining tortfeasors by the amount stipulated in the release or the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater.

Theophelis v. Lansing General Hospital · filed 1985-03-04(b)

"When a release or a convenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to 1 of 2 or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: ... \"(b) It reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors ... to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant or to the extent of the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever amount is the greater.” ... Under the statute, we find that the trial court properly computed the amount of setoff to be applied against the $1,000,000 jury verdict. $172,-739 is \"the amount of the consideration paid” by Dr. Gilmore on behalf of the plaintiffs in return for their agreement to release him from any further claims."

Section 2925d(b) reduces a tort claim against other tortfeasors when a plaintiff gives one of two or more persons liable for the same injury a good-faith release or covenant, by the greater of the stipulated amount or the consideration paid, and the setoff does not reach exemplary damages based solely on a nonsettling defendant’s own conduct.

Hall v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America · filed 1985-04-01(b)

The statute plainly applies where a release is obtained by "1 of 2 or more persons liable in tort for the same injury". ... We find, however, nothing in the plain language of the statute which would limit its application to joint tortfeasors. ... Furthermore, we do not believe the setoff provided in § 2925d(b) is rendered inapplicable merely because a portion of Citizens’ liability may have been based on vicarious liability for the acts of Attorney Brackett. See Piper Aircraft Corp v Dumon, 421 Mich 445; 364 NW2d 647 (1984).

Section 2925(c) lets a tortfeasor pursue contribution in a separate action and does not require joining the potential contributor in the original suit.

Duncan v. State Highway Commission · filed 1985-11-19(c)

However, appellants were not required to file a claim against defendant to preserve their right of contribution. MCL 600.2925c; MSA 27A.2925(3) permits a tortfeasor to seek contribution in a separate action, so that "plaintiffs caprice in choosing to join or not to join third-party defendants is not determinant of third-party plaintiffs’ right to contribution”.

Section 2925d does not make comparative-negligence principles controlling in determining contributions of settling tortfeasors, and a release or covenant is effective against contribution claims when executed in good faith.

Shaffner v. City of Riverview · filed 1986-09-09

However, while there is a "reasonable relationship” between comparative negligence principles and contribution, comparative negligence principles do not control the contributions of settling tortfeasors under MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4). ... Based on the facts before us, we are unable to conclude that the releases were not executed in good faith. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying the city’s motion for contribution.

For a settling tortfeasor to obtain contribution, § 2925a requires joint liability, payment above its pro rata share, extinguishment of the other tortfeasor’s liability, notice and an opportunity to participate in settlement negotiations, and a good-faith settlement; a tortfeasor satisfying a judgment must have joined the alleged contributee and made a reasonable effort to notify it of the action.

Reurink Bros. Star Silo, Inc. v. Clinton County Road Commissioners · filed 1987-02-04(3), (5)

The statute implicitly sets forth the elements of a claim for contribution by a settling tortfeasor: (1) There must be joint liability on the part of the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the plaintiff must have paid more than its pro rata share of the common liability; (3) the settlement entered into by the plaintiff must extinguish the liability of the defendant; (4) a reasonable effort must have been made to notify the defendant of the pendency of the settlement negotiations; (5) the defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to participate in settlement negotiations; and (6) the settlement must be made in good faith.

Section 2925d(a) does not abrogate the common-law rule that releasing an agent discharges the principal's vicarious liability, even when the release reserves claims against the principal.

Theophelis v. Lansing General Hospital · filed 1988-06-06(a)

When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to 1 of 2 or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: ... Plaintiffs argue that the word "tortfeasors” in the statute includes persons whose liability is based solely upon the theory of respondeat superior, as in the case of principal and agent. We disagree.

A judgment against one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the others until it is satisfied; satisfaction of the judgment for a single indivisible injury bars further recovery from the other tortfeasors for that injury.

Kaminski v. Newton · filed 1989-04-04(5)

The common-law prohibition against more than one satisfaction is codified in MCL 600.2925c(5); MSA 27A.2925(3)(5), which provides in pertinent part: ... The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against 1 tort-feasor does not of itself discharge the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death ... unless the judgment is satisfied. [Emphasis added.] ... Satisfaction of the judgment based on actual litigation of the measure of plaintiffs’ loss discharges any potential liability of Holy Cross to plaintiffs for that loss and thus renders plaintiffs’ appeal moot.

Section 600.2925d does not abrogate the common-law rule that releasing an agent from liability also releases a principal sued solely on a theory of vicarious liability for that agent’s negligence.

Felsner v. McDonald Rent-A-Car, Inc · filed 1992-04-07(a)

Because four justices concurred that MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) does not abrogate the common-law rule in question, Theophelis is binding with regard to that point of law.

A release of a principal does not discharge an agent or another tortfeasor from liability unless the release expressly says it does.

Smith v. Childs · filed 1993-02-01(a)

We conclude that enactment of the statute did abrogate the common-law rule that release of the principal discharged the liability of the agent. By the plain wording of the statute, if the principal obtains a release, that release does not discharge any other tortfeasor, including its agent, from liability unless the release says it does. MCL 600.2925d(a); MSA 27A.2925(4)(a). Because the release in this case did not say that it discharged Childs’ liability, it did not discharge the agent from liability. Therefore, even if Farm Bureau Life was vicariously liable for Childs’ negligence, the release of Farm Bureau Life had no effect on Childs’ liability.

Subsection (3) governs contribution claims by a tort-feasor who settles, including a settlement reached through mediation, and requires extinguishment of liability, notice, an opportunity to participate, and good faith; subsection (5) governs contribution after satisfaction of a judgment and requires notice and an opportunity to defend or intervene.

Klawiter v. Reurink · filed 1992-10-06(3), (5)

The trial court correctly held that, under such circumstances, plaintiffs must plead under MCL 600.2925a(3); MSA 27A.2925(1)(3). ... The statute sets forth the elements of a claim for contribution by a settling tortfeasor. ... Additionally, and for the same reasons, we are of the opinion that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief pursuant to MCL 600.2925a(5); MSA 27A.2925(1)(5), notwithstanding the inapplicability of that section to the case at bar. ... It is clear that notice and an opportunity to defend are contemplated by subsection 5, because a potential contributee has the right to intervene in the action and "defend” as if joined as a third party.

Section 2925b requires liability among joint tortfeasors to be apportioned pro rata according to their relative degrees of fault.

Secura Insurance v. Cincinnati Insurance · filed 1993-02-16

Liability between joint tortfeasors is to be apportioned pro rata considering relative degrees of fault. MCL 600.2925b; MSA 27A.2925(2). However, without knowing the percentage of fault between Vanderkelen and Schaffnitt, we cannot determine the amount each party must contribute to the settlement.

Section 6304 does not require the factfinder to determine the fault of tortfeasors who settled and are no longer parties to the personal-injury action.

Department of Transportation v. Thrasher · filed 1994-08-02(1), (2), and (5)

Subsections (1) and (2) of § 6304 are almost identical to the ucfa and HB 5154, with one very important omission: they do not include a reference to released parties. ... The language of HB 5154 explicitly allowed the factfinder to consider the fault of released parties and would have undone that portion of Mayhew that did not allow for such consideration. However, § 6304 as adopted, does not. ... The mdot is not entitled to have the factfinder determine the fault of settling tortfeasors.

In an action for contribution by a tort-feasor who settled with the claimant, the defendant may assert any defense available against its alleged liability to the injured party, including a contractual release defense.

Universal Gym Equipment, Inc v. Vic Tanny International, Inc · filed 1994-11-07(4)

Vic Tanny contends that the release provision qualifies as "any other defense,” thereby exonerating it from liability for contribution. We agree that the plain language of the statute cannot be read any other way. The reference to a defendant’s "alleged liability for such injury or wrongful death” clearly refers to liability to the injured party. The statute allows the defendant to apply "any” defense available against such liability to the contribution claim. Where the language of a statute is clear, the Legislature must have intended the meaning plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written.

Section 600.2925d does not abrogate the common-law rule that releasing an agent discharges the principal from vicarious liability.

Larkin v. Otsego Memorial Hospital Ass'n · filed 1994-11-07

Because four justices concurred that MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) does not abrogate the common-law rule in question, Theophelis is binding with regard to that point of law.

Section 600.715 authorizes limited personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation when its Michigan business, in-state tort consequences, or contracts for in-state services or materials give rise to the claim.

Neogen Corporation v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. · filed 2002-03-06600.715(1), 600.715(2), 600.715(5)

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715 extends limited personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in claims “arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following relationships,” including: “[t]he transaction of any business within the state” under § 600.715(1), “[t]he doing or causing of any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort” under § 600.715(2), and the “[ejntering into a contract for services to be performed or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant” under § 600.715(5).

Under § 600.745(2), a written agreement selecting Michigan as the forum supports limited personal jurisdiction only when all four statutory conditions are satisfied; failure to consider each condition makes reliance on contractual consent erroneous.

the Caden Companies Inc v. Mj Steps · filed 2017-09-14(2)

However, this Court need not engage in a lengthy analysis of each element, because failure to meet even one element is sufficient to invalidate a defendant’s consent for purposes of exercising jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. ... The trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction without ensuring that each factor of MCL 600.745 had been satisfied was in error.

Under § 600.715(2), Michigan may exercise personal jurisdiction when a defendant's out-of-state conduct causes an injury in Michigan resulting in a tort action, even without proof that the defendant specifically contemplated Michigan.

Sullivan v. LG Chem Ltd. · filed 2023-08-17§ 600.715(2)

Pursuant to the plain meaning of § 600.715(2), the consequences of LG Chem’s alleged-negligent manufacture or design of the 18650 batteries occurred in Michigan when LG Chem’s 18650 batteries exploded in Plaintiff’s pocket, resulting in an action in tort. ... Therefore, we hold that the district court, sitting in Michigan, has the power under Michigan’s long-arm statute to exercise personal jurisdiction over LG Chem.

Michigan's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in Michigan and an LLC formed under Michigan law that continuously and systematically conducts part of its general business in the state.

BMO Bank N.A. v. N & P Carrier LLC · filed 2025-04-22600.701; 600.731

Indeed, Singh was present and domiciled in Michigan at the time process was served, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.701, and the Court is satisfied that N & P Carrier was formed under Michigan laws and “carr[ies] on a continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state,” id. § 600.731.

Michigan’s long-arm statute supports personal jurisdiction where a defendant was present and domiciled in Michigan when served and carried on a continuous and systematic part of its general business in the state.

PNC Bank, NA v. Key Dot Company LLC · filed 2025-06-09600.701; 600.731

The Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants under Michigan’s long-arm statute, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.701–775, and the Due Process Clause, ... Knapp was present and domiciled in Michigan when he received service of process, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.701, and the Court is satisfied that Knapp formed Key Dot under Michigan law and “carr[ies] on a continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.731.

Michigan’s long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in Michigan or enters a contract for services to be performed there.

Case name unavailable · filed 2025-11-21600.715(1), (5)

The Court is satisfied that Porter Brothers “transact[s] . . . business within the state” and “[e]nter[ed] into a contract for services to be performed . . . in the state.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715(1), (5).

Section 600.715(1) and (5) authorize limited personal jurisdiction when a corporation transacts business in Michigan or enters into a contract for services to be performed in Michigan.

Case name unavailable · filed 2026-01-13600.715(1), 600.715(5)

The Court is satisfied that Retail Finishes “transact[s] . . . business within the state” and “[e]nter[ed] into a contract for services to be performed . . . in the state.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715(1), (5).

Section 600.705 permits limited personal jurisdiction over an individual who transacts any business in Michigan when the claim arises from an act creating that relationship, subject to constitutional due process limits.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Kentucky School Board Insurance Trust · filed 1994-04-26

“The word ‘any’ means just what it says. It includes ‘each’ and ‘every.’ It comprehends ‘the slightest.’” Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 199, n. 2, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971) (citations omitted). Michigan courts have interpreted the long-arm statute to be co-extensive with the scope of personal jurisdiction permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.5 Id. at 198, 188 N.W.2d 623. ... The sum of these activities easily meets the long-arm statute’s requirement of transacting “any business” in Michigan.

MCL 600.711 permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on consent only when the consent requirements of MCL 600.745 are satisfied.

the Caden Companies Inc v. Mj Steps · filed 2017-09-14

However, as noted, consent to personal jurisdiction satisfies the long-arm statute, MCL 600.711, only when the requirements for granting consent under MCL 600.745 are also met. ... In other words, a trial court may not rely on a foreign defendant’s consent to support its exercise of personal jurisdiction until it determines that the defendant’s consent was proper under that statute.

In a medical-malpractice action, an affidavit of meritorious defense must state the factual basis for each defense, while an affidavit of merit must include the applicable standard of care, breach, required corrective actions, and proximate-cause explanation; lack of greater specificity does not make an otherwise compliant affidavit insufficient.

Lucas v. Awaad · filed 2013-01-29(1)(a), (1)(b)-(d)

We conclude that the trial court erred when it made this determination. While we agree that the affidavits did not state that Awaad correctly read and interpreted the EEG tests, the affidavits clearly identified defendants’ defense against this claim. ... MCL 600.2912e(1)(a) only requires a “factual basis for each defense,” not a factual basis for each claim asserted by the plaintiff. If no factual basis is applicable for a particular defense, then no factual basis needs to be, or could be, provided. ... Thus, the affidavits of meritorious defense adequately address this issue by providing a different standard of care. ... MCL 600.2912d(1) provides that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must file with the complaint “an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiffs attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements of an expert witness under [MCL 600.2169].” The affidavit must contain a statement of each of the following: ... The failure to include any of these required items of information renders the affidavit of merit insufficient. ... However, this lack of specificity does not render the affidavits noncompliant with the statute. Because we conclude that the affidavits of merit met the requirements of MCL 600.2912d(l), the trial court did not err when it denied defendants’ motion to strike.

Section 600.2912d(1)'s heightened pleading and affidavit-of-merit requirement does not apply in a federal diversity medical-malpractice action because it conflicts with the Federal Rules governing pleading.

Long v. Adams · filed 2006-01-23600.2912d(1)

The Court believes that Michigan’s heightened pleading requirements for medical malpractice cases do not apply to cases filed in federal court invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction because the state rules collide with the plain requirements of the Federal Rules and statutes prescribing the procedures to be used in the federal courts.

Section 600.2912a(2) treats traditional medical-malpractice claims and loss-of-opportunity claims as distinct theories; the latter requires an opportunity greater than 50%.

Kava v. Peters · filed 2012-03-19600.2912a(2)

The second sentence of subsection (2) modified the Falcon rule by providing that in loss-of-opportunity cases, the opportunity “must be greater than 50%.”

Section 600.2912d(1) does not require a medical-malpractice plaintiff in federal court to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint.

MIlline v. Macomb, County of · filed 2021-10-06600.2912d(1)

Gallivan compels the conclusion that Michigan’s Affidavit of Merit Statute does not apply to medical malpractice claims brought in federal court.

A medical-malpractice action remains subject to the applicable limitations period and the notice-of-intent and affidavit-of-merit requirements even when res ipsa loquitur permits it to proceed without expert testimony.

Trowell v. Providence Hospital and Medical Centers, Inc · filed 2016-08-16

Regardless, while a medical malpractice case may proceed to a jury absent expert testimony if the requirements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are satisfied, id. at 6, the case nevertheless remains a medical malpractice action subject to the applicable statute of limitations for medical malpractice suits, as well as to the “notice of intent” and “affidavit of merit” requirements.

Michigan medical-malpractice claims must be filed within the later of two years after accrual or six months after discovery.

Paynter v. ProAssurance Wisconsin Insurance Company · filed 2019-06-07600.5805(8); 600.5838a(1); 600.5838a(2)

In Michigan, a claim for medical malpractice accrues when the malpractice occurs.

Section 600.2912d requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit, and failure to do so means the plaintiff has not satisfied the prerequisites for the action.

MIlline v. Macomb, County of · filed 2020-11-30

Because Plaintiff’s state-law claims sound in medical malpractice, Plaintiff was required to comply with the procedural requirements under Michigan law for the commencement of a medical malpractice action. He did not. ... Because Plaintiff did not meet the prerequisites for a medical malpractice action under Michigan law, this Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Michigan law requires a plaintiff bringing a medical-malpractice claim to file an affidavit of merit.

Flint 248501 v. Eicher · filed 2022-01-24600.2912d(1)

A plaintiff asserting a medical malpractice claim arising under Michigan law must comply with the requirements of the state medical malpractice statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912d(1), which requires an affidavit of merit.

Michigan's medical-malpractice notice and 182-day waiting-period requirement is substantive state law that applies in federal court.

Albright v. Christensen, MD · filed 2020-12-17600.2912b

So the Erie analysis clearly points to the conclusion that the Michigan notice-of-intent statute is substantive and must be applied in federal courts as well as state courts in Michigan.

Section 600.2912d's affidavit-of-merit requirement is a state procedural rule that does not apply in federal diversity or supplemental-jurisdiction cases.

Lee v. Washtenaw, County of · filed 2021-03-11600.2912d

While the Court agrees with this response, there is an even clearer ground to deny Defendants’ arguments: as a state procedural rule, the affidavit of merit requirement does not apply to diversity and supplemental jurisdiction cases in federal court.

Michigan’s medical-malpractice notice and affidavit-of-merit filing requirements are procedural and therefore are not mandatory in federal court.

Streeter Jr. v. Macomb County · filed 2023-02-06600.2912b, 600.2912d

This Court has held, however, that a plaintiff bringing a state law medical malpractice action in federal court does not need to adhere to Michigan’s filing requirements for such actions.

For a Michigan medical-malpractice claim, § 600.2912a(2) requires proof that negligence more probably than not proximately caused the death and that the patient's chance to survive or achieve a better result exceeded 50%.

Jones v. Kent, County of · filed 2023-08-24(2)

For Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim, Plaintiff had to show that Jones’s death “more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912a(2). Plaintiff also had to show that, at the time of the negligent conduct, Jones’s “opportunity to survive or . . . opportunity to achieve a better result . . . was greater than 50%.” Id.

Section 600.5838b(1) requires a legal-malpractice action to be filed within six years of the act or omission giving rise to the claim, or earlier if the applicable limitations period expires first.

Patel · filed 2025-11-05600.5838b(1)

Under the statute of repose, an action for legal malpractice must be commenced within six years of the act or omission giving rise to the claim or before the expiration of the period of limitations in Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5805, whichever period is earlier. Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5838b(1). ... Plaintiffs have adequately alleged harm by Wang well within the six-year requirement under the statute of repose, and therefore the Court finds the legal malpractice claims timely.

The six-month medical-malpractice discovery period runs from when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the claim, and the court held that McGuire could not have discovered her claim on April 11, 2023, based only on the MRI results.

McGuire · filed 2025-11-17600.5838a(2)

But even assuming she knew the MRI indicated the presence of adenoid cystic carcinoma on April 11, no reasonable jury could conclude that she “discover[ed] or should have discovered the existence” of her claim at that time. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5838a(2).

The former medical-malpractice limitations provisions required suit within two years after treatment ended or within two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the malpractice; when discovery timing was factually disputed, the issue was for the jury.

Wakefield v. Hills · filed 1988-11-22

The applicable statute of limitations is that which is in effect at the time a plaintiff’s cause of action arises. A cause of action arises, for purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations, when the alleged negligent act occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that negligence or malpractice. ... The applicable statute of limitations is set forth by the former provisions of MCL 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3) and MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838. These sections must be read together. ... The Dyke Court held that an action based on malpractice by a state-licensed person must be brought within two years of the time when such person discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff, or within two years of the time when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the asserted malpractice. ... Reasonable minds could differ as to when Peggy Wakefield discovered or should have discovered defendants’ alleged malpractice. The discovery issue is a question of fact for the jury. The lower court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants based on the statute of limitations.

Sections 600.5805(4) and 600.5838(1) impose a two-year medical-malpractice limitations period that accrues when treatment ends for the matter underlying the claim.

Amrhein v. Philip Petachenko, DC, PC · filed 1988-10-055805(4), 5838(1)

The limitations period for a medical malpractice action is governed by MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4), which provides that "the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.” MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1) provides that a medical malpractice claim "accrues at the time that person discontinues serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudo-professional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” A malpractice cause of action accrues when the defendant discontinues treatment of the plaintiff for the matter from which the malpractice action arose.

Section 5838(1) delays accrual of a medical-malpractice claim until the health professional discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff regarding the matters underlying the claim, including ongoing periodic preventative examinations.

Morgan v. Taylor · filed 1990-03-06(1)

Particularly in light of the contractual arrangement which bound defendant and entitled plaintiff to periodic eye examinations, it cannot be said that the relationship between plaintiff and defendant terminated after each visit. The obligation and responsibility of defendant to provide glaucoma testing extended beyond the 1981 examination of plaintiff’s eyes. We conclude that defendant did not discontinue "treating or otherwise serving” plaintiff "as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose” until August 18, 1983. Thus, we hold that the claim of plaintiff is not barred by the statute of limitations.

The six-month medical-malpractice discovery period begins only when the plaintiff knows of the act or omission and has good reason to believe it was improper.

Hardwick v. Reddy · filed 1990-03-07

However, knowledge of the act itself is not enough to trigger the time clock on the six-month period. Plaintiff must also have good reason to believe that the act was improper.

The two-year limitation period for medical malpractice applies to claims against a respiratory therapist employed by a licensed health facility when the alleged negligence occurred in that capacity.

Bell v. Mikkola · filed 1992-04-21(4)

In this case, plaintiff, as a respiratory therapist employed by St. Joseph Hospital, was clearly an "employee or agent of a licensed health facility.” Moreover, the alleged negligent act occurred while defendant was acting within that capacity. Therefore, the two-year period of limitation for medical malpractice found in MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) applies to plaintiffs claim.

Section 2912d(4) limits a medical-malpractice security bond for a plaintiff who files no or a late affidavit of merit to taxable costs and excludes attorney fees.

Dunn v. Emergency Physicians Medical Group, PC · filed 1991-05-21(4)

The amount of a bond securing costs in a medical malpractice action imposed on a plaintiff who files no affidavit or a late affidavit of merit is limited to taxable costs and may not include attorney fees.

The six-month limitations period begins when the claimant discovered or should have discovered the claim, whichever occurred earlier; the actual-discovery prong is subjective and the should-have-discovered prong is objective.

Levinson v. Trotsky · filed 1993-04-05(2)

The express language of the statute of limitations makes this inquiry two-faceted: the court must determine whether plaintiff commenced the action within six months after (1) she discovered or (2) should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever was earlier.

Section 5838a(2) gives a medical-malpractice plaintiff six months after discovering, or reasonably should have discovered, the claim when the injury was not immediately apparent, but the lawsuit here was untimely.

Shawl v. Dhital · filed 1995-03-10(2)

However, in those cases in which an injury is not immediately apparent, MCL 600.5838a(2); MSA 27A.5838(1)(2) allows a plaintiff to commence an action within the two-year statutory period of limitation or "within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later.” ... After applying the above principles, we are convinced that plaintiff’s claims were not filed timely for purposes of MCL 600.5838a(2); MSA 27A.5838(1)(2). ... Accordingly, under the discovery rule, the lawsuit had to have been filed before January 1989. Because the lawsuit was filed on January 3, 1990, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

For medical-malpractice claims governed by the current statute, accrual occurs when the underlying act or omission occurs, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the claim.

Simmons v. Apex Drug Stores, Inc · filed 1993-08-16(1)

Plaintiff’s action accrued after October 1, 1986, and, thus, is governed by the present version of MCL 600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838(1). That statute explicitly provides that a claim for medical malpractice accrues "at the time of the act or omission which is the basis for the claim.” Decisions relating to cases that arose before October 1, 1986, then, are inapplicable.

Section 600.5827's ordinary accrual rule does not prevent application of the discovery rule to negligence claims against hospitals and their agents that are similar to malpractice claims.

Chase v. Sabin · filed 1994-05-17

The corresponding accrual statute provided that "the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827; MSA 27A.5827. ... Our conclusion regarding the additional policies underlying the statute of limitations, compels the holding that the discovery rule governs the accrual date for negligence claims, pursued against hospitals and their agents, which are similar to malpractice claims.

Section 2912a requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to prove the applicable standard of care, breach, injury, and proximate causation.

Locke v. Pachtman · filed 1994-08-23

Proof of a medical malpractice claim requires the demonstration of the following four factors: (1) the applicable standard of care, (2) breach of that standard of care by the defendant, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury. MCL 600.2912a; MSA 27A.2912(1).

MCL 600.2102(4) provides one valid method for authenticating an out-of-state notarized affidavit, but the affidavit may instead satisfy the alternative authentication requirements of the URAA.

White v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute · filed 2007-02-08(4)

An out-of-state notarized affidavit must conform to either the requirements of the URAA or those of MCL 600.2102(4), and these provisions do not conflict.

Section 2102(4) requires a sister-state notary’s signature and status to be certified by the clerk of a court of record under that court’s seal before the out-of-state affidavit may be read in Michigan judicial proceedings.

Kaczynski v. Anderson · filed 2007-04-24(4)

We affirm because we are required by MCR 7.215(J)(1) to follow the holding in Apsey v Mem Hosp (On Reconsideration), 266 Mich App 666; 702 NW2d 870 (2005), lv pending, that the special certification required by MCL 600.2102(4) to authenticate the credentials of an out-of-state notary public must accompany an affidavit of merit to initiate a valid medical malpractice action and toll the limitations period.

Section 600.2102(4) provides one method for authenticating an out-of-state affidavit, but compliance with Michigan's Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgments Act provides an alternative method, so an affidavit satisfying the URAA is not a nullity merely because it lacks the certification required by § 600.2102(4).

White v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute · filed 2007-10-26(4)

The affidavit of merit in this case was notarized by an out-of-state notary, and it lacked the certification required by MCL 600.2102(4) at the time the relevant limitations period expired. However, the affidavit of merit otherwise satisfied the requirements of the alternative method of proving notarial acts set forth in Michigan's Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgments Act (URAA), MCL 565.261 et seq. ... Because the affidavit of merit satisfied the requirements of the URAA, it was not a nullity.

Sections 600.2912b(1) and 600.2912d(1) require a medical-malpractice plaintiff to give notice and wait the statutory period before filing, and to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint.

Sawicki v. Katzvinsky · filed 2015-03-17(1)

Additionally, plaintiffs were required to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint. MCL 600.2912d(1); see also Lockwood, 293 Mich App at 26-28 (stating same).

The general tenancy-by-the-entirety exemption codifies traditional common-law principles and is presumptively constitutional.

In Re Basch · filed 2006-04-12600.6023a

The general entireties exemption in Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6023(a) is presumptively constitutional and a codification of traditional common law principles.

Michigan law protects tenancy-by-the-entirety property from involuntary exposure to a spouse’s separate creditors because the spouse cannot unilaterally convey the interest voluntarily.

Olson v. Parker (In Re Parker) · filed 2008-09-16600.6023a

If a spouse is unable to make a unilateral conveyance voluntarily, then it follows that the spouse cannot do so involuntarily by exposing the property to the claims of his or her separate creditors. Mich. Comp. Laws 600.6023a.

MCL 600.5451(1) does not make its listed bankruptcy exemptions exclusive; a Michigan debtor proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) may also claim historically available state-law exemptions, including MCL 500.2207's life-insurance exemption.

Shapiro v. Sassak · filed 2010-03-17600.5451(1)

Given the absence of express limiting language in the opening paragraph of MCL 600.5451 and the conflict which a finding of exclusivity would present with the broader mandate of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), and further in view of the lack of demonstrable intent in the available legislative history to radically alter the historically available exemptions that Michigan debtors have long been entitled to claim, and finally, given the directive that this Court should avoid deciding a constitutional issue if resolution can reasonably be reached by statutory interpretation, this Court concludes that Appellee, who claims exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), is also entitled to claim an exemption under MCL 500.2207 for the value of his whole life policy.

Section 600.5451(l)(o) is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because its joint-debt exception conflicts with 11 U.S.C. § 522(c).

In Re Alan Wayne Raynard · filed 2005-07-15600.5451(l)(o)

Therefore, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5451(l)(o) must be declared unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it conflicts with Section 522(c).

Section 600.2945(j) creates separate sophisticated-user definitions for entities and nonemployee persons based on expected knowledge and for employees based on actual knowledge, and neither definition depends on the other.

Irrer v. Milacron, Inc. · filed 2007-05-02600.2945(j)

The plain language and structure of § 600.2945®, by focusing on differing levels of knowledge, provides two distinct definitions for a “sophisticated user.” Entities and persons who are not employees are defined in the statute “sophisticated users” if they are “generally expected to be knowledgeable about a product’s properties, including a potential hazard or adverse effect.” Employees are defined in the statute as “sophisticated users” only if they have “actual knowledge of the product’s potential hazard or adverse effect that caused the injury.” Neither the language nor the structure of the statute makes one definition dependent upon the other.

MCL 600.2919a covers money obtained through false pretenses as stolen property, and liability under subsection (1)(b) requires proof that the recipient knew the property was stolen; circumstantial evidence may establish that knowledge.

Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels, LP · filed 2023-11-21(1)(a), (1)(b)

Consistent with the majority opinion in Shiffman, this Court concludes that the phrase “stolen property” as used in MCL 600.2919a is broad enough to include money obtained through false pretenses. ... However, MCL 600.2919a requires Plaintiff to prove that Defendants knew that this $4.25 million transferred by the LLC to WNRJ was stolen property. ... Yet, Plaintiff correctly notes that, under MCL 600.2919a circumstantial evidence can be used to prove Defendants’ actual knowledge.

Section 600.2919a applies only when the defendant has actual knowledge that the property was stolen, embezzled, or controverted.

NAS Surety Group v. Cooper Insurance Center, Inc. · filed 2007-11-08§ 600.2919a

This statute applies only when the defendant has “actual knowledge” that the subject property has been stolen, embezzled or controverted.

Section 600.2919a permits treble damages and other remedies for statutory conversion, and retaining lawfully received funds beyond the required pass-through period may constitute conversion when the circumstances show wrongful dominion.

Whitmore Lake Public Schools v. Telecom · filed 2008-02-29600.2919a(1)-(2)

In the present case, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendant’s possession of the E-Rate funds constitutes conversion.

Section 600.2919a(1) requires proof that converted property went to the other person’s own use; unexplained disappearance alone is insufficient.

Scarff Bros. Inc. v. Bischer Farms Inc. · filed 2008-03-05600.2919a(1)

Because a plaintiff bears the burden of substantiating its own case and because Scarff Brothers provided nothing to suggest that the missing cattle were put to the Bischers’ own use, the Court cannot conclude that the Bischers converted Scarff Brothers’ cattle, pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a, even were that claim not barred by the economic loss doctrine.

A joint payee’s ownership of insurance proceeds does not by itself defeat a statutory-conversion claim when contractual provisions govern how the proceeds may be used.

Gillis v. Wells Fargo Bank NA · filed 2012-06-25600.2919a(1)(a)

As such, the Court concludes that Ms. Gillis’ conversion claim is not subject to dismissal simply because Wells Fargo was a joint payee on the Farm Bureau check.

Under § 600.2919a(1)(a), the treble-damages remedy applies to a person who directly converts property, while § 600.2919a(1)(b) applies only to knowing third parties who buy, receive, possess, conceal, or aid in concealing converted property.

McCallum v. Pixley · filed 2011-10-18600.2919a(1)(a)-(b)

That part of the statute applies to persons who commit conversion. Subpart (l)(b) of the statute, also quoted above, does not apply here.

Michigan's statutory-conversion provision permits treble damages against a person who steals, embezzles, or converts property to that person's own use.

Graf Miller v. Joaquin · filed 2019-12-17(1)(a)

Statutory conversion allows for recovery of treble damages “against a person who steals or embezzles property or converts property to the . . . person’s own use.”

Michigan's statutory-conversion provision permits treble damages, costs, and attorney fees for stealing, embezzling, or converting property to the defendant's own use, and requires the elements of common-law conversion plus conversion to the defendant's own use.

Innovative Accounting Solutions, Inc. v. Credit Process Advisors, Inc. · filed 2020-02-27§ 600.2919a(1)(a)

Statutory conversion under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a(1)(a) permits a plaintiff to recover treble damages, costs and attorney fees that accrue as the result of “another person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use.” To plead this cause of action, a plaintiff must plead the same elements as common law conversion, and also that the property converted was “to defendant’s own use.”

Under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), a statutory conversion claim requires proof that the defendant stole, embezzled, or converted the plaintiff's property to the defendant's own use.

Skywatcher, LLC v. Oliver · filed 2020-08-20600.2919a(1)(a)

To prevail on its statutory conversion claim, Plaintiff must establish that Oliver stole, embezzled, or converted Plaintiff’s property to his own use.

A statutory-conversion claimant must satisfy the elements of common-law conversion and show that the defendant employed the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests.

G&R Live, LLC v. Janese · filed 2020-01-16600.2919a(1)(a)

In order to prevail on a claim for statutory conversion, a claimant must satisfy the elements of a common law conversion claim. ... someone alleging conversion to the defendant’s ‘own use’ under [M.C.L. § 600.2919a(1)(a)] must show that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) imposes statutory-conversion liability when the defendant employs converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the property’s ordinarily intended purpose.

Aroma Wines & Equipment, Inc v. Columbian Distribution Services, Inc · filed 2015-06-17(1)(a)

We hold that “converting property to [that] person’s own use,” as used in MCL 600.2919a, is not coextensive with common-law conversion. ... Rather, we hold that the separate statutory cause of action for conversion “to the other person’s own use” under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) requires statutory conversion to involve property converted to the defendant’s own use, meaning use for a purpose personal to the converter; the plaintiff must also have an enforceable interest in the property at the time of conversion.

Berg v. Munoz · filed 2015-07-23(1)(a)

Statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) refers to “a subset of common-law conversions in which the common-law conversion was to the other person’s ‘own use.’ ” ... Under the statute, “own use” means that the property “must be used for a purpose personal to the converter.” ... This requires that a plaintiff alleging statutory conversion demonstrate “that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Section 600.2919a permits statutory-conversion claims to proceed cumulatively with MBTFA claims, but a money-conversion claim fails when the claimant consented to the defendant’s receipt of funds in a debtor-creditor relationship.

Windrush Inc v. Vanpopering · filed 2015-09-10(2), (1)(a)

Applying the rationale employed by our Supreme Court in Appletree, we conclude that plaintiff may maintain both claims cumulatively. ... Accordingly, we conclude that an action for statutory conversion may be maintained for a violation of the MBTFA. ... There is no evidence that Northland “stole” or “embezzled” the money to which plaintiff was entitled. MCL 600.2919a(1)(a). ... Northland obtained the funds with plaintiff’s consent to the creation of a debtor-creditor relationship, id., and, therefore, the trial court did not err by ruling that plaintiff failed to establish statutory or common-law conversion.

Michigan's statutory conversion remedy permits a person with a nonexclusive ownership or other property interest in converted property, including royalties attached to severed natural resources, to bring a conversion action.

D'Anna v. Furgal · filed 2015-09-17

Michigan additionally provides a statutory remedy for conversion in MCL 600.2919a, separate from and additional to common law conversion. ... However, each person having an interest in wrongfully converted property has a right of action for conversion. ... The same result should follow for statutory conversion. Consequently, the Furgals’ ownership need not be exclusive, and nothing in Sarver, upon which Trajcevski relies, holds otherwise. ... The trial court did not expressly address each element of conversion under MCL 600.2919a in its summary deposition ruling, but this Court will not reverse where the trial court reaches the right result.

Section 2919a(1)(a) requires a person alleging statutory conversion to the defendant's own use to show that the defendant employed the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests, even if that purpose was not the property's ordinarily intended purpose.

Ambler v. Thompson · filed 2016-03-29(1)(a)

A claim for statutory conversion, MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), adds the requirement that “someone alleging conversion to the defendant’s ‘own use’ under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) must show that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits treble actual damages for injury caused by another’s stealing, embezzling, or converting property to the other person’s own use; the statutory conversion claim requires use of the property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Chapman v. Alawi · filed 2018-01-18(1)(a)

In addition, MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) provides for recovery of three times the amount of actual damages when a person is damaged as a result of “[a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use.” “[T]he separate statutory cause of action for conversion ‘to the other person’s own use’ under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Under § 600.2919a(1)(a), statutory conversion requires proof that the defendant converted property to a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests; without evidence of such conversion, the claim fails.

Jeanne Starr Enterprises Inc v. Towns · filed 2018-03-01(1)(a)

In Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Serv, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 359; 871 NW2d136 (2015), the Court held that “someone alleging conversion to the defendant’s ‘own use’ under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) must show that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the objects’ ordinarily intended purpose.” ... Because plaintiffs’ failed to present evidence during their case-in-chief that would allow a jury to find that defendant converted plaintiffs’ property, the trial court did not err when it granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on plaintiffs’ statutory conversion claim.

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits recovery when another person steals, embezzles, or converts property; stealing includes taking personal property illegally with intent to keep it unlawfully, including by false pretenses, and treble damages under the statute are discretionary.

Shiffman v. Auto Source Wholesale LLC · filed 2018-08-14(1)(a)

MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) should be read as providing a basis for recovery when another person steals, or embezzles, or converts another person’s property. ... The defendants’ actions fit within this definition of “steal.” ... Thus, defendants’ conduct fits within the dissent’s preferred definition of “steal” and amounts to a violation of MCL 600.2919a. ... “May” is permissive, and indicates discretionary action. ... An award of treble damages is within a court’s discretion, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the trial court’s denial of treble damages was outside the range of principled outcomes.

Michigan's statutory-conversion provision authorizes a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees without proving that the conversion was willful or wanton.

Hunt v. Hadden · filed 2016-02-02(1)

Michigan’s statutory conversion statute expressly authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees when a plaintiff establishes a violation of the statute.

Section 600.2922b extends civil-liability immunity for qualifying deadly force to individuals sued in civil proceedings, including police officers.

Blowers v. Battle Creek, City of · filed 2022-01-12§ 600.2922b

§ 600.2922b expressly extends immunity to individuals sued in civil proceedings. It is not limited to criminal defendants. ... However, nothing in the text of the statutes suggests that the term “individual” excludes police officers.

Michigan's statutory-conversion law creates a cause of action separate from traditional conversion, authorizes treble damages and attorney fees, and requires proof that the defendant converted the property to the defendant's own use.

Tyson v. Rental · filed 2016-09-02600.2919a(1)-(2)

§ 600.2919a creates a cause of action wholly separate from the traditional tort of conversion—and although the statute comes with the added benefit of treble damages and a fee-shifting provision, it requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant converted the-property to his or her “own use.”

Statutory conversion requires a wrongful act of dominion over another's personal property and the converter's own use of that property; own use means employing it for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests.

KRUEGER v. City of Eastpointe · filed 2020-04-06600.2919a(1)(a)

A successful statutory conversion claim requires proof of a “distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial or inconsistent with his rights therein” as well as the converter’s “own use” of the property. ... The Michigan Supreme Court has defined “own use” in the context of statutory conversion as “employ[ing] the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant's interests, even if that purpose is not the object's ordinarily intended purpose.”

Michigan's statutory-conversion claim requires proof that the defendant converted property for personal use, so the claim fails without evidence of that personal use.

Akno 1010 Market Street St. Louis Missouri LLC v. Pourtaghi · filed 2021-08-26600.2919a(1)(a)

Plaintiff has also failed to provide facts to establish the “own use” requirement of a statutory conversion claim.

Michigan's statutory-conversion provision requires conversion to the other person's own use, meaning use for a purpose personal to that person's interests.

Franklin Capital Funding, LLC v. Austin Business Finance, LLC · filed 2023-06-07600.2919a

The statute adds the requirement that the conversion be to the other person’s “own use.” ... To satisfy that element, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Michigan’s statutory-conversion law does not support a claim based only on retaining money that was lawfully given to the defendant.

Intermed Resources TN, LLC v. General RV Center, Inc. · filed 2024-03-15600.2919a

However, like common law conversion, statutory-conversion cannot be established by merely alleging a defendant retained money lawfully given to them.

Michigan's statutory-conversion law requires proof that the defendant used the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests, and a successful claim permits treble damages.

In re Craig Steven Romanzi · filed 2022-04-08600.2919a

“[T]he separate statutory cause of action for conversion” codified at Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a imposes an additional requirement, “a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Under § 600.2919a(1)(a), statutory conversion requires the defendant to put converted property to the defendant's own use, which can include using the property as leverage for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests.

Ultra Manufacturing Limited v. Williamston Products, Inc. · filed 2022-04-14600.2919a(1)(a)

But statutory conversion requires more. The Michigan statute permits a plaintiff to seek treble damages plus costs and fees only if the defendant has, among other things, put the “convert[ed] property to the[ir] . . . own use.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a(1)(a). And property is converted to the defendant’s “own use” if the defendant “employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Michigan's conversion statute requires the same showing as common-law conversion plus proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the converting activity.

Lipton Law Center, P.C. v. Andrus Wagstaff, PC · filed 2024-04-24§ 600.2919a

Michigan’s conversion statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a, requires the same showing, along with proof “that the defendant had ‘actual knowledge’ of the converting activity.”

Michigan statutory conversion requires an additional element beyond common-law conversion: the property must be converted for the defendant's own use and/or the recipient must know it was converted; plausible allegations that defendants received and knowingly retained funds owed to plaintiffs stated a claim.

AP Electric, Incorporated v. Oakland Automation, Limited Liability Company · filed 2024-10-16600.2919a

The difference between common law and statutory conversion is mainly that the statutory claim requires an additional element that the converted property be either converted for the party’s “own use” and/or that the recipient knows that the property was converted.

Michigan’s statutory-conversion law requires an additional showing that the property was converted for the defendant’s own use or that the recipient knew it was converted.

Seither & Cherry Quad Cities, Incorporated v. Oakland Automation, LLC · filed 2024-10-16(1)(a)-(b)

The difference between common law and statutory conversion is mainly that the statutory claim requires an additional element that the converted property be either converted for the party’s “own use” and/or that the recipient knows that the property was converted.

Michigan statutory conversion includes aiding in concealing stolen, embezzled, or converted property with knowledge that it was stolen, embezzled, or converted, and the court found the pleaded facts plausibly alleged that conduct.

Nirenberg v. Couzens, Lansky, Fealk, Roeder & Lazar, PC · filed 2025-06-25600.2919a(1)(b)

In Michigan, statutory conversion under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a(1)(b) is defined, in relevant part, as “[a]nother person’s . . . aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property when the person . . . [doing so] knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted.”

Section 600.2919a permits damages for conversion of a plaintiff’s property to the defendant’s own use and requires proof of that own use.

Case name unavailable · filed 2025-10-15600.2919a

Under Michigan statute, a plaintiff may recover damages for defendant’s conversion of plaintiff’s property to its own use. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a. ... The statute, however, imposes an additional requirement that the plaintiff “prove [] the defendant converted the property to his or her ‘own use.’”

Michigan’s statutory-conversion law requires a plaintiff to prove the elements of common-law conversion, and a claim that property was taken for the defendant’s own use requires personal use of that property.

Nirenberg · filed 2025-10-17600.2919a

Michigan’s conversion statute prohibits both a person from “stealing or embezzling property” for his own use, and the knowing receipt of converted property. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a. To prevail on a claim for statutory-conversion, the plaintiff must satisfy the elements of common-law conversion.

Michigan's statutory-conversion claim under § 600.2919a(1)(b) requires actual knowledge that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted; constructive knowledge is insufficient.

Salamey v. Houssam Salami · filed 2025-12-04(1)(b)

Constructive knowledge that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted is not enough. ... Actual knowledge is required.

Section 600.2919a treats knowingly buying, receiving, or helping conceal stolen, embezzled, or converted property as statutory conversion, but merely retaining money does not qualify.

Lawsuit Financial, LLC v. Curry · filed 2004-04-15

This Court has ruled that simply retaining money does not amount to “buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled or converted property.” Hovenesian v Nam, 213 Mich App 231, 237; 539 NW2d 557 (1995). According to defendant Fieger, it had placed the litigation proceeds in a client trust account, which essentially amounts to retaining money. ... We therefore hold that the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim for statutory conversion.

Section 600.2919a reaches an accomplice, not the person who directly converted the property, and constructive knowledge based on reasonable diligence can create a jury question on statutory conversion.

Echelon Homes, LLC v. Carter Lumber Co. · filed 2004-03-30

The statute provides a remedy against the accomplice only and not against the *439person who actually stole, embezzled, or converted the property. ... On the basis of this standard, the inference could be drawn that Carter had constructive knowledge that the funds used to pay it were embezzled as required by MCL 600.2919a.

Section 2919a provides a remedy against a person who knowingly buys, receives, or aids in concealing property converted by another, but not against the person who himself converted the property.

Campbell v. Sullins · filed 2003-08-11

Plaintiff does not claim, nor does the evidence support, that defendant received converted property; rather, plaintiff claims that defendant converted plaintiff’s property, i.e., the first engine. Therefore, even if defendant’s actions were wrongful, in that he, as the principal, eventually converted the property, his actions did not constitute the “buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of converted property” actionable under MCL 600.2919a. Thus, the evidence failed to establish a claim for statutory conversion as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in directing a verdict in defendant’s favor on this claim.

Section 2919a targets a person who knowingly buys, receives, or helps conceal stolen, embezzled, or converted property, rather than the person who actually stole, embezzled, or converted it.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Bank One, NA · filed 2005-09-28

“Statutory conversion, by contrast, consists of knowingly ‘buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property.’ ” ... “But statutory conversion is “ ‘not designed to provide a remedy against the individual who has actually stolen, embezzled, or converted the property.’ ” ... Because McIntyre and Estep are the persons who took the local’s money, plaintiffs may not assert claims for statutory conversion against them.

Subsection (2) makes the remedy for statutory conversion cumulative with any other right or remedy available at law or otherwise.

Department of Agriculture v. Appletree Marketing, LLC · filed 2010-03-10(2)

MCL 600.2919a(2) provides that relief for a claim of statutory conversion “is in addition to any other right or remedy the person may have at law or otherwise.” This clear, unambiguous language explicitly indicates the cumulative nature of statutory conversion claims.

Section 600.2919a(1) provides a cause of action for stealing, embezzling, or converting another person's property to one's own use, but authorized disclosure and a lack of evidence of wrongful dominion defeat the claim.

Innovation Ventures LLC v. Liquid Manufacturing LLC · filed 2014-10-23(1)

Concerning statutory conversion, MCL 600.2919a(1) provides a cause of action for “[a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use.” ... Plaintiff’s conversion claims were premised on defendants’ alleged use or disclosure of plaintiff’s confidential information and/or trade secrets. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s claims must fail with regard to defendants Liquid Manufacturing and Paisley because plaintiff expressly authorized the disclosure about which it complains, i.e., using the equipment to bottle liquid energy shots. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants Liquid Manufacturing and Paisley exercised dominion and control over plaintiff’s property.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) treats converting another person’s property to the other person’s own use as statutory conversion, and the term “use” includes employing the property for any purpose, not only its ordinary purpose.

Aroma Wines & Equipment, Inc. v. Columbian Distribution Services, Inc. · filed 2013-12-17(1)(a)

In light of the dictionary definitions of “use,” we conclude that plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence that defendant converted the wine to its own use to survive defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits, but does not require, the factfinder to award three times the actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney fees for conversion of property to the converter's own use.

Hard Luck Distributors LLC v. Temperance Distilling Company · filed 2015-05-21(1)(a)

MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) provides that damages resulting from another person’s conversion of property to the other person’s own use “may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.” Because of the use of the permissive term “may,” “whether to award treble damages is a question for the trier of fact, and we cannot simply order treble damages upon a finding of conversion.” Aroma Wines, 303 Mich App at 449-450.

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits statutory treble damages only when the defendant converts property to the defendant's own use, meaning for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests.

Howard v. National City Mortgage · filed 2016-01-12(1)(a)

The Court concluded that “the Legislature’s inclusion of the phrase ‘to the other person’s own use’ in § 2919a(1)(a) indicates its intent to limit § 2919a(1)(a) to a subset of common-law conversions in which the common-law conversion was to the other person’s ‘own use.’ ” Id. at 355, quoting MCL 600.2919a(1)(a). Therefore, in order to be entitled to statutory treble damages in this case, plaintiffs were required to prove that ASIC converted the property to its “own use,” meaning that ASIC “employed the converted property for some purpose personal to [ASIC’s] interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.” Id. at 340.

Section 2919a(1) allows a person damaged by statutory conversion to recover treble actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees; without damages from statutory conversion, attorney fees are not available under the statute.

Mobiletech Automotive LLC v. Crystal Clean Automotive Detailing · filed 2016-02-16(1)

Because there was no finding of damages pursuant to MCL 600.2919a(1), plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the plain language of that statute.

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages for property converted to another person’s own use only when the defendant employed the property for a purpose personal to its interests; merely withholding a check and refusing to transfer possession does not adequately plead statutory conversion.

Sutter v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2016-05-24(1)(a)

“Conversion ‘to the other person’s own use’ requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.” ... The complaint did not contain any allegation regarding the fact that defendant converted the check for its own use. Accordingly, we again conclude that plaintiffs failed to include allegations in their complaint necessary to reasonably inform defendant of the nature of the statutory conversion claim. ... Therefore, plaintiffs’ complaint stated a legally cognizable claim of common-law conversion, but did not state a legally cognizable claim of statutory conversion.

Section 2919a(1)(a) limits statutory conversion to property used for a purpose personal to the converter's interests.

Jackson v. Spencer · filed 2016-12-27(1)(a)

conversion ‘to the other person’s own use’ requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.

Section 600.2919a creates a statutory conversion claim that incorporates the elements of common-law conversion, so a mere breach of a debtor-creditor agreement does not support treble damages under the statute.

Lansing Ice and Fuel Company v. Smith · filed 2017-04-11(a)

MCL 600.2919a provides a statutory conversion claim that is separate and distinct from a common law conversion claim, but which necessarily incorporates the elements of a common-law conversion claim. See Aroma Wines v Columbian Distrib, 497 Mich 337, 361-362; 871 NW2d 136 (2015). ... The cardholder agreement formed a debtor-creditor relationship; therefore, plaintiff could not establish that defendant converted property—i.e. money, Curry, 261 Mich App at 591, which was necessary to advance a claim under MCL 600.2919a. In short, the statutory conversion claim failed as a matter of law and plaintiff was not entitled to treble damages.

Section 600.2919a uses “converting” according to its common-law meaning; retaining rent proceeds under a consensual debtor-creditor arrangement is not statutory conversion.

Matouk v. the Robert Barrick Trust · filed 2017-05-02

Because defendants did not “convert” the rent proceeds under the common-law principles that govern conversion, defendants are not liable for statutory conversion either. Because the term “converting” in MCL 600.2919a is one with a particular meaning under the common law, we construe it as such. See MCL 8.3a (“[T]echnical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”). Under the applicable legal meaning, defendants’ retention of the rent proceeds did not constitute a “converting” of plaintiffs’ assets to defendants’ own use. Thus, the trial court did not err by summarily disposing of plaintiffs’ statutory conversion claim.

Section 2919a treats stealing, embezzling, or converting another’s property as statutory conversion and permits liability for knowingly receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of such property.

Elkins v. Benner · filed 2017-10-10(1)(a), (1)(b)

Although plaintiff cited MCL 600.2919a, the parties and the trial court relied on case law involving common-law conversion. While MCL 600.2919a is rooted in the common-law form of conversion, statutory conversion is not the same as common-law conversion. ... By contrast, statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) provides that the tort is committed when another’s “property” is stolen, embezzled, or converted for the converter’s own use. ... MCL 600.2919a(1)(b) provides that one “receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property” can be liable “when the person . . . receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted.” This statute allows liability to be imposed on a party who knowingly receives converted property, or knowingly aids in the concealment of converted property.

Section 2919a(1)(a) requires proof of common-law conversion plus conversion of the property to the defendant’s own use, which may be shown by using, moving, damaging, or destroying the property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Dumm II v. Brown · filed 2018-04-17(1)(a)

Pertinent to MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), therefore, statutory conversion requires, in addition to proof of common-law conversion, a showing that the defendant converted the property “to [his] own use.” Our Supreme Court has interpreted that language to mean that the defendant “employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.” ... The act of moving the property in a manner that is inconsistent with a contract may satisfy this requirement. Id. at 360. So too may conduct that damages or destroys the property. Id. at 359, citing Kreiter v Nichols, 28 Mich 496, 498-499 (1874).

Section 600.2919a requires proof that the defendant applied or employed the taken property for a purpose of the defendant's own.

McGrew v. Duncan · filed 2018-08-10

Statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a requires proof that a defendant applied or employed the taken property for some purpose of his own. ... The Court GRANTS summary judgment with respect to McGrew's statutory conversion claim against all Defendants because she has not (1) pled the required use element of a statutory conversion claim (see Doc # 1, Pg. 9, ¶ 65), or (2) provided evidence that establishes the use element of a statutory conversion claim.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) requires a statutory-conversion plaintiff to show that the defendant used the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests.

Dock Farish v. Department of Talent and Economic Development · filed 2018-12-11(1)(a)

Statutory conversion is similar to common-law conversion, except that it includes a requirement that the defendant converted the property for his or her own use. MCL 600.2919a(1)(a); Aroma Wines, 497 Mich at 359 (to support a claim under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), a plaintiff “must show that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests”).

Section 2919a does not support statutory conversion or treble damages when money was voluntarily transferred in a debtor-creditor relationship and the promised bargain was not performed.

Har-Tzion v. Sagi · filed 2018-07-24(1)

To support an action for conversion of money, the defendant must have an obligation to return the specific money entrusted to his care.

Section 2919a requires a plaintiff seeking statutory-conversion relief to show that the defendant used the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Woodland Condominiums Homeowners Assn v. Federal National Mortgage · filed 2019-02-28(1)

The civil tort of conversion is defined as “any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another’s property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.” Lawsuit Fin, LLC v Curry, 261 Mich App 579, 591; 683 NW2d 233 (2004) (citation omitted). Statutory conversion requires an additional showing that the defendant “employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.” Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 358-359; 871 NW2d 136 (2015); see also MCL 600.2919a.

Section 600.2919a defines statutory conversion as converting another person’s property to one’s own use and requires use of the property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Rahaim v. Denton · filed 2019-08-29

Pursuant to MCL §600.2919a, statutory conversion consists of “another person’s converting property to the other person’s own use.” It “requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Section 600.2919a authorizes treble damages for specified conversion-related conduct and requires a statutory-conversion plaintiff to plead common-law conversion plus the defendant's actual knowledge.

TSFR Burger, LLC v. Starboard Group of Great Lakes, LLC · filed 2019-10-30(1)(a)-(b)

To assert statutory conversion in Michigan, a plaintiff must allege a common law conversion claim and state “that the defendant had ‘actual knowledge’ of the converting activity.” Id. TSFR did not state a valid common law conversion claim, and it fails to allege actual knowledge.

Section 2919a(1)(a) requires additional evidence that the defendant converted the property to the defendant’s own use to support statutory conversion damages, costs, and attorney fees.

Cassidy Rae Studio LLC v. Bocks · filed 2020-02-11(1)(a)

To obtain damages pursuant to MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), a plaintiff must provide additional evidence to show that the defendant converted the plaintiff’s property to the defendant’s own use.

Section 2919a does not support a statutory-conversion claim when the plaintiff had no property interest in the property allegedly converted.

Zenmuse LLC v. Hamood · filed 2020-09-24(1)(b)

These allegations do not adequately allege a statutory-conversion claim. Stated simply, Nathan did not allege, much less provide support for, the notion that he (or MGM Restoration) had a property interest in the Dodge Place property at the time of the alleged conversion. Lack of a property interest is fatal to a conversion claim. See, e.g., Lawsuit Financial, LLC v Curry, 261 Mich App 579, 592; 683 NW2d 233 (2004) (affirming summary disposition on conversion claims pursuant to common law and MCL 600.2919a).

Section 2919a(1)(a) treats the money applied to another person’s own use as the converted property, rather than the underlying inchoate lien.

Alisa a Peskin-Shepherd Pllc v. Blume · filed 2020-11-05(1)(a)

The language of the conversion statute also compels the conclusion that the amount converted was the amount of money that Nicole applied to her “own use.” MCL 600.2919a(1)(a). Nicole applied the proceeds of the sale to her own use, not the lien itself.

MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) allows treble damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees only for a person damaged by stealing, embezzling, or converting property; proof of actual damages is an essential element of statutory conversion.

Gen-Wealth Inc v. Brian a Freckman · filed 2021-05-13(1)(a)

The Legislature provided that a person may recover “3 times the amount of actual damages, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees” if damaged as a result of another person’s “stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use.” MCL 600.2919a(1)(a). ... Because Gen-Wealth did not present any evidence that it suffered actual damages, which was an essential element of statutory conversion, see MCL 600.2919a(1), there was no factual dispute for the jury to resolve.

MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) covers conversion of property to another's own use, but a fixture is not personal property; MCL 600.2918(3)(a) excludes an owner's actions taken pursuant to a court order from unlawful interference with a possessory interest.

Vedrode v. Abdole · filed 2021-07-22

First, as relevant to the statutory conversion claim in this case, plaintiff was required to prove that she was “damaged as a result of . . . [a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use.” MCL 600.2919a(1)(a). ... In this case, because title of the mobile home transferred to defendant as a fixture to the real property defendant obtained through the tax foreclosure sale, plaintiff no longer held any ownership interest in the mobile home. ... Hence, because plaintiff no longer held an ownership interest in the mobile home and because it was no longer personal property, plaintiff did not establish her statutory conversion claim against defendant. ... However, another provision of this statute, contained in MCL 600.2918(3)(a),7 provides that “[a]n owner’s actions do not unlawfully interfere with a possessory interest if . . . [t]he owner acts pursuant to court order.” ... Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding in defendant’s favor on plaintiff’s claim for violation of the anti-lockout statute.

Section 2919a(1)(a) requires that statutory conversion involve employing converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the property’s ordinary intended use.

Vhs of Michigan Inc v. Jones · filed 2022-05-12(1)(a)

The phrase “ ‘to the other person’s own use’ under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Section 2919a(a) permits treble damages when another person steals, embezzles, or converts property to their own use, with each alternative requiring distinct proof.

Automation Guarding Systems, LLC v. Industrial Steel Guarding, LLC · filed 2022-08-22(a)

This claim is brought under MCL 600.2919a, which provides that an entity can recover treble damages in the case of: (a) Another person's stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person's own use. ... Plaintiff’s claim is brought under Section (a): it claims that Defendants embezzled the $900k+ of product. ... Each of the three actions (stealing, conversion, and embezzlement) in Section (a) have distinct proofs. ... Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the claim for statutory conversion is also granted.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) requires proof of common-law conversion and conversion to the defendant’s own use; for money, the plaintiff must show an obligation to return the specific funds.

O County of Ingham v. Mi County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool · filed 2022-07-14(1)(a)

To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy all of the elements for common-law conversion and also “show that the conversion was for the defendant’s ‘own use.’ ”

Section 600.2919a measures actual damages without reducing them by insurance proceeds received by the victim.

Word Network Operating Company Inc v. Ross · filed 2023-03-02(1)

Actual damages must exist in the first instance before the question of insurance proceeds properly arises.

Section 600.2919a requires a statutory-conversion plaintiff to prove the elements of common-law conversion and that the defendant actually knew the property was converted.

In Re Ralph a Siddell Living Trust · filed 2023-05-11

To establish statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a, a plaintiff must satisfy the elements of a common-law conversion claim, as well as show that the defendant actually knew that the property was converted. See Echelon Homes, LLC v Carter Lumber Co, 472 Mich 192, 197; 694 NW2d 544 (2005). Because Smith cannot establish common-law conversion, she cannot establish statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a or MCL 700.7813(4). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition of her statutory conversion claim in favor of Heilman.

Section 600.2919a can supply a separate legal duty when the plaintiff suffered the type of harm the statute intended to prevent and belongs to the class of persons it intended to protect.

Fraser Engine Rebuilder Inc v. Lancaster · filed 2023-06-08

Accordingly, we remand this issue for the trial court to evaluate whether plaintiffs suffered the type of harm MCL 600.2919a intended to prevent and whether plaintiffs, as parties to service contracts, are the types of parties the statute intended to protect. If the trial court answers both of these questions in the affirmative, then a legal duty arises from MCL 600.2919a.

Michigan statutory conversion covers converting property for another person’s own use and allows treble actual damages plus costs and attorney fees; publishing words imputing a criminal offense is defamation per se.

Abu v. Mulholland · filed 2023-06-27

Statutory conversion occurs when said property is converted for “the other person’s own use.” MCL 600.2919a(1)(a). Damages for conversion under Michigan law are “3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.” Id. ... Furthermore, pursuant to MCL 600.2911(1), “uttering or publishing of words imputing the commission of a criminal offense” is defamation per se.

Section 2919a(1)(a) covers damages caused by another person’s stealing or embezzling property, and the claimant’s initial lawful possession of the property does not by itself defeat a statutory-conversion claim.

Hamilton Avenue Property Holdings LLC v. Resnick Law Pc · filed 2023-07-20(1)(a)

Although not articulated by plaintiffs, this same argument does not apply to statutory conversion, which is defined, in pertinent part, as a person being damaged as a result of “[a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling property.” MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) (emphasis added). “Embezzlement” is defined as “[t]he fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has been entrusted, esp. as a fiduciary. The criminal intent for embezzlement—unlike larceny and false pretenses—arises after taking possession (not before or during the taking).” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed). Thus, whether defendants’ initial possession of the money was wrongful is not controlling for statutory conversion, but the result is the same.

Section 2919a's “conversion to the other person's own use” prong requires proof that the defendant employed the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant's interests.

R a D Construction Inc v. Davis · filed 2023-08-10(1)(a)

RAD also claimed that Integrity and Boyd were liable for statutory conversion. MCL 600.2919a provides: ... “[C]onversion ‘to the other person’s own use’ requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.” ... On this evidence, the trial court did not err by finding that Integrity and Boyd did not commit common-law or statutory conversion.