Statute Annotations › Michigan › Mich. Comp. Laws § 554.139

Mich. Comp. Laws § 554.139

Residential lessor's covenants: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Michigan
Case notes
92
Cited in passing
57
Citing cases indexed
391
Case dates
1972–2026
Screened through
2026-06-11
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-21
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

149 citing cases reviewed of 391 in the citation index: 92 interpreted the section (annotated below), 57 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-11 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Mich. Comp. Laws § 554.139?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 2008-06-25 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the earlier Allison Court of Appeals decision and held that § 554.139(1)(a) reaches natural snow and ice in a common parking lot but requires fitness for parking and reasonable access, not an ice-free lot; the ordinary accumulation in that case did not breach the duty. Source
  • 2025-10-23 The published McNeal decision held that § 554.139 has no actual or constructive notice requirement for lessor liability, superseding earlier unpublished notice rulings. Source

Repair covenants and rent payment

Section 554.139(1)(b) makes the landlord’s repair and health and safety covenants mutual with the tenant’s covenant to pay rent.

Rome v. Walker · filed 1972-02-23(1)(b)

Mindful of the Legislature’s indication that MCLA 554.139; MSA 26.1109 should be “liberally construed”, we hold that these statutorily required covenants are mutual with, rather than independent of, the covenant to pay rent.
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Duty to warn of latent defects

Section 554.139 permits modification of a landlord’s statutory repair obligation but does not govern the duty to warn tenants about latent defects.

Calef v. West · filed 2002-10-18(2)

While MCL 554.139 allows a landlord to modify its statutory obligation to repair, the statute is silent and inapplicable regarding the landlord’s duty to warn its tenants about latent defects.
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Open and obvious danger doctrine

Section 554.139 imposes duties concerning the condition and repair of leased residential premises; the open and obvious danger doctrine does not bar a claim for a material breach of those duties.

O'DONNELL v. Garasic · filed 2004-02-19(1)(a) and (b)

The open and obvious danger doctrine is not available to deny liability to an injured invitee or licensee on leased or licensed residential premises when such premises present a material breach of the specific statutory duty imposed on owners of residential properties to maintain their premises in reasonable repair and in accordance with the health and safety laws, as provided in MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b).
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Section 554.139 imposes duties concerning the fitness and repair of residential premises, and a landlord that violates those duties cannot assert the open and obvious danger defense.

Woodard v. ERP Operating Ltd. Partnership · filed 2005-01-13(1)(a) and (b)

Accordingly, a question of fact also exists regarding whether Equity violated M.C.L. § 554.139. If it did, it is precluded from asserting the open and obvious doctrine as a defense.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires landlords to keep apartment-complex sidewalks fit for walking, and the open and obvious danger doctrine does not bar a claim for breach of that duty.

Benton v. Dart Properties Inc. · filed 2006-06-12(1)(a)

We hold that the open and obvious danger doctrine cannot bar a claim against a landlord for violation of the statutory duty to maintain the interior sidewalks in a condition fit for the use intended under MCL 554.139(l)(a).
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Landlord's duty to repair

Section 554.139 requires a landlord to maintain leased premises in reasonable repair.

McDowell v. City of Detroit · filed 2005-01-06

Clearly, defendants have duties at law, including compliance with the implied warranty of habitability, to maintain the premises in reasonable repair as set forth in MCL 554.139 of the real and personal property code, and in MCL 125.538, which makes unlawful the keeping of dangerous buildings.
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Law changed since Allison v. AEW Capital Management, LLP (Mich. 2008) later held that natural snow and ice in a common parking lot falls within subsection (1)(a), although the lot need only remain fit for parking and reasonable access.

Section 554.139 does not require a lessor to remove accumulated snow and ice because that accumulation is not a defect in the premises.

Teufel v. Watkins · filed 2005-10-13(1)(a), (1)(b)

The plain meaning of "reasonable repair” as used in MCL 554.139(1)(b) requires repair of a defect in the premises. Accumulation of snow and ice is not a defect in the premises. Thus, a lessor’s duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b) to keep its premises in reasonable repair and fit for its intended use does not extend to snow and ice removal.
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Law changed since The published decision in McNeal v. Lincolnshire 2007 Limited Dividend Housing Assoc (Oct. 23, 2025) held that § 554.139 has no notice requirement, ending this earlier notice limitation.

Section 554.139(1)(b) requires a landlord to make reasonable repairs during the lease when the landlord knew or should have known they were needed.

Davies v. Sheets · filed 2015-09-08(1)(b)

A landlord has the additional duty to “keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease . . . .” MCL 554.139(1)(b). This duty only extends to reasonable repairs that the landlord knew or should have known about.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 554.139(1)(b) requires a landlord to make reasonable repairs to conditions the landlord knew or should have known about.

Priester v. Keisha Bell · filed 2016-08-16(1)(b)

Because defendant did not have notice of the condition until after plaintiff’s fall, defendant’s duty to make reasonable repairs, with respect to the front porch, was not implicated before plaintiff’s fall.
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Section 554.139(1)(b) requires landlords to repair defects in residential premises, but a one-inch difference in floor heights is not a defect requiring repair.

Aguillon v. Fernandez · filed 2017-05-18(1)(b)

Additionally, the one-inch difference between the living room and kitchen floors was not a “defect” requiring repair under MCL 554.139(1)(b).
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Section 554.139(2) permits a lease to modify a landlord’s duty to keep the premises in reasonable repair only if its current term is at least one year.

Sherman v. Israel Bros Inc · filed 2018-05-24(2)

MCL 554.139(2) permits modification of a landlord’s common-law duty to keep the premises in reasonable repair only if a lease has a current term of at least one year. When plaintiffs became holdover tenants with recurring one-month lease terms, the provision of the lease making plaintiffs solely responsible for repairs to the premises became ineffective.
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Section 554.139(1) gives tenants’ social guests and other nonparties to a residential lease no claim against the landlord for breach of its statutory duties.

Santos v. Garner Properties & Management LLC · filed 2020-09-10(1)

Accordingly, under MCL 554.139(1), a landlord owes no duty to a tenant’s social guests or other nonparties to a lease agreement.
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Section 554.139(1)(b) does not require a landlord to repair disrepair caused by a tenant’s willful or irresponsible conduct.

Appiah-Kubi v. Manus · filed 2019-02-28(1)(b)

Under MCL 554.139(1)(b), Tom Manus and his entities had no obligation to repair a condition of the premises “when the disrepair or violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the tenant[’]s willful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct.”
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Section 554.139(1)(b) requires a lessor to repair defects in residential premises; a properly functioning sump pump and drain valve did not require repair.

Schaff v. Time Investments Ltd · filed 2022-12-22(1)(b)

Our Supreme Court in Allison explained that the plain meaning of “reasonable repair” as used in MCL 554.139(1)(b) requires repair of a defect in the premises. ... Ultimately, plaintiff presented no evidence that the rental property was defective, damaged, or needed repair.
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Whether a lessor owes a duty under § 554.139(1) must be determined from the plaintiff's evidence.

Royce v. CHATWELL CLUB APARTMENTS · filed 2008-11-07(1)

The trial court on remand must determine whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff under MCL 554.139(1) on the basis of the evidence the plaintiff has presented in this case.
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Lease covenants and local ordinances

Section 554.139(2) concerns a landlord’s obligations to tenants and does not affect the landlord’s duty to comply with local ordinances.

Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti · filed 2006-03-02(2)

We agree with defendant and the trial court that MCL 554.139(2) and § 58-122 only address a landlord’s obligations to the landlord’s tenants.
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Fitness for intended use

Section 554.139(1)(a) requires landlords to keep residential premises and common areas fit for their intended use.

Hadid v. Huntington Management LLC · filed 2021-07-22(1)(a)

Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to show that the sidewalk here was ever unfit for its intended use.
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Law changed since The Michigan Supreme Court reversed this decision in Allison v. AEW Capital Management, LLP (June 25, 2008), holding that the statute requires a parking lot fit for parking and reasonable access, not one free from all ice.

Section 554.139(1)(a) treats an apartment parking lot as a common area that a landlord must keep fit for tenants to walk on, including keeping it free from ice.

Allison v. AEW Capital Management, LLP · filed 2007-07-10(1)(a)

We therefore conclude that a parking lot, like a sidewalk, constitutes a common area under MCL 554.139(l)(a) and that defendant had a duty to keep the parking lot free from ice.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential lessor to keep a common-area parking lot fit for its intended use; the open and obvious danger doctrine does not excuse that duty.

Royce v. Chatwell Club Apartments · filed 2007-08-07(1)(a)

Because the slippery condition of the parking lot where the fall occurred was open and obvious and no special aspect making the condition unreasonably dangerous existed, and because defendant could not rely on the open and obvious danger doctrine to avoid its statutory duty under MCL 554.139, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Section 554.139(1) requires lessors to keep shared residential parking lots fit for parking and reasonable access despite natural snow and ice, but its duty to repair premises does not cover common areas or require removal of natural snow and ice.

Allison v. AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLP · filed 2008-06-25(1)

We hold that: (1) parking lots in leased residential areas constitute “common areas” under MCL 554.139(1)(a); (2) the natural accumulation of snow and ice is subject to the lessor’s duty established in MCL 554.139(1)(a), but that plaintiff has not shown the duty was violated here because the parking lot was apparently “fit for the use intended by the parties”; and (3) the natural accumulation of snow and ice is not subject to the lessor’s duty established in MCL 554.139(1)(b).
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential landlord to keep common areas, including parking lots, fit for their intended use; the open and obvious danger doctrine does not defeat that duty.

Royce v. Chatwell Club Apartments · filed 2007-10-26(1)(a)

Again, then, this Court's holding in Allison compels a finding that defendant could not rely on the open and obvious danger doctrine to avoid its statutory duty under MCL 554.139, and the trial court therefore erred by granting summary disposition for defendant on plaintiff's statutory claim.
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A landlord must keep a common stairway fit to provide tenants reasonable access between building levels; black ice can create a factual question about whether it was fit for that use.

Hadden v. McDermitt Apartments, LLC · filed 2010-01-12(1)(a)

As with a parking lot, MCL 554.139(1)(a) does not require perfect maintenance of a stairway. The stairway need not be in an ideal condition, nor in the most accessible condition possible, but, rather, must provide tenants "reasonable access" to different building levels.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep common-area sidewalks fit for walking, but an ordinary icy patch that makes walking merely inconvenient does not breach that duty.

Martinez v. Tmf II Waterchase LLC · filed 2016-12-15(1)(a)

Applying those rules to the facts of this case, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) with regard to the accumulation of ice on a sidewalk would only be triggered under much more exigent circumstances that those presented in this case.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a lessor to keep a parking lot fit for its intended use; packed ice between spaces does not violate that duty when the lot remains usable for parking.

Stimpson v. Gfi Management Services Inc · filed 2015-02-24(1)(a)

In this case, the undisputed evidence showed that the parking lot was minimally fit for the use as a parking lot.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep a residential parking lot fit for tenants to access a shared dumpster; reasonable snow removal during an ongoing storm can satisfy that duty.

Cooper v. Civic Center Willow Tree LLC · filed 2016-12-22(1)(a)

We conclude that defendant maintained its parking lot in such fashion that it was fit for providing tenants access to defendant’s dumpster. Plaintiff has failed to present evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the parking lot’s fitness, or evidence depicting any exigent circumstances that would call into question a breach of statutory duty under MCL 554.139.
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Section 554.139(1) requires a residential lessor to keep premises fit for their intended use and comply with applicable health and safety laws.

Viramontez v. Southwest Housing Solutions Inc · filed 2015-09-15(1)(a), (1)(b)

Summary disposition of plaintiff’s statutory negligence claims by the trial court was proper where plaintiff failed to show the hot water delivery system for her apartment was unfit for its intended use and where plaintiff failed to provide the court with the applicable plumbing code to establish defendants’ duty and breach.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires common areas to be fit for their intended use, but does not require perfect maintenance.

Wildbahn v. Kmg Prestige Inc · filed 2016-03-15(1)(a)

Again, perfect maintenance is not required under MCL 554.139(1)(a), and a landlord is not required to maintain a common area “in the most accessible condition possible.”
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Section 554.139(1)(a) does not require a jury to decide whether a common sidewalk is fit for walking when undisputed facts show that a slight height difference did not make it unfit.

Tremper v. Westland Colonial Village Apartments · filed 2016-06-16(1)(a)

With respect specifically to an alleged breach of duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a), our Supreme Court has held that when the facts are undisputed and reasonable minds could not differ that a particular common area was fit for the use intended by the parties, then there has been no breach of duty under the statute and the plaintiff’s claim in that instance fails as a matter of law. Allison v AEW Capital Management, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 430; 751 NW2d 8 (2008). In the case before us, the undisputed evidence establishes that the sidewalk differential was so slight that reasonable minds could not disagree that the sidewalk was fit for its intended use, namely, walking. Under such undisputed circumstances, no question for the jury exists.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep common sidewalks fit for walking and reasonable access; a pavement height difference that causes only inconvenience does not breach that duty.

Tremper v. Westland Colonial Village Apartments · filed 2016-06-16(1)(a)

Thus, the evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the sidewalk differential was no more than a mere inconvenience and that the sidewalk was fit for its intended use.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep a common driveway fit for pedestrian travel when that is an intended use.

Hendrix v. Lautrec Ltd · filed 2016-10-27(1)(a)

Hendrix established a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lautrec breached its duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to maintain the driveway in a manner befitting its intended use. ... Because the record supports that pedestrian travel constituted an “intended use” of the connected driveways, we reverse the dismissal of Hendrix’s statutory claim and remand for continued proceedings.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep common stairways fit for reasonable access; an ordinary patch of ice does not make a stairway unfit when tenants can still use it.

Dover v. Oak Park Gardens LLC · filed 2017-09-12(1)(a)

Rather, plaintiff slipped and fell on a seemingly ordinary patch of ice, which does not rise to the level of the exigent circumstances necessary to trigger a duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires common-area sidewalks to provide reasonable pedestrian access; whether ice makes a sidewalk unfit for that use may be a jury question.

Schuster v. River Oaks Garden Apartments LLC · filed 2017-11-30(1)(a)

A sidewalk need not in be in the most accessible condition possible and it is not necessary that every potential hazard be eliminated. However, as held in Allison, it must provide “reasonable access” to pedestrians seeking to use it. ... We conclude that “reasonable differences of opinion” exist regarding the sidewalk’s fitness for its intended use.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a lessor to keep steps fit for their intended use by providing reasonable access, without requiring ideal conditions.

Newman v. Kren · filed 2019-04-25(1)(a)

They only had to maintain the steps so that they were fit for use as steps. Our Supreme Court defined “fit” as “adapted or suited,” not perfect. Id. at 429. The record indicates that the step did not deny plaintiff reasonable access to enter and exit the home. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the steps’ fitness for their intended use.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires common sidewalks to be fit for walking; a narrow strip of ice that can be stepped over does not make a sidewalk unfit.

Sandifer v. McKinley Inc · filed 2017-09-14(1)(a)

In other words, the patch of ice did not render the sidewalk unfit for walking; it could be walked on to access areas of the apartment complex.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential lessor to keep a common-area landing fit for walking; an avoidable patch of ice does not breach that duty absent exigent circumstances.

Foley v. Oakland Development LLC · filed 2018-12-18(1)(a)

Because there were no exigent circumstances, the fact that plaintiff walked across the landing six hours after the black ice formed without falling, and that plaintiff could have walked around the ice at the time of the incident, defendant did not breach its duty to ensure that the sidewalk was fit for the use of walking.
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A concrete apron under the lessor’s control that tenants use as a walkway is a common area, and a protruding metal post can raise a factual question about whether it is fit for walking.

Webb v. Ghazi · filed 2019-03-05(1)(a)

However, this argument overlooks that the apron itself constitutes a common area. That is, the apron was under defendant’s control and open to use by all the tenants. And the intended purpose of the apron was, at least in part, to serve as a walkway. ... For those reasons, we conclude that reasonable minds could disagree about whether the common area was fit for its intended use.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential lessor to keep a parking lot fit for parking and to provide tenants reasonable access to their vehicles.

Vernier v. New Baltimore Senior Preservation Lp · filed 2020-07-02(1)(a)

Accordingly, New Baltimore did not breach its duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because the parking lot was “in a condition that render[ed] it fit for its use as a parking lot.” Id.
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A patch of ice does not make a residential sidewalk unfit for its intended use when tenants can still access it and no exigent circumstances trigger the lessor’s duty.

Ferguson v. Lautrec Ltd · filed 2017-12-07(1)(a)

In this case, the sidewalk was not unfit simply because there was a patch of ice. Plaintiff has not shown that the condition of the sidewalk precluded her from accessing it, and there are no exigent circumstances here that trigger the lessor’s duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential lessor to keep common sidewalks fit for walking and reasonable access; a small patch of ice that does not prevent access does not make a sidewalk unfit.

Kendrick v. Professional Property Management Company of Mi · filed 2019-04-16(1)(a)

From the evidence, the patch of ice did not preclude access to the sidewalk or prevent tenants from walking on it. At most, the patch of ice was a “mere inconvenience.” See Id. On this record, reasonable minds could not differ in concluding that the sidewalk was fit for its intended use.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep common areas fit for their intended use, and leaving a walkway without its concrete slabs or safety precautions during construction may breach that duty.

Harper v. Ashgrove Apartments · filed 2019-09-24(1)(a)

However, there is a question of fact as to whether the removal of the concrete slabs without any cleanup or safety precautions constituted a breach of MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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A small, visible patch of ice that tenants can avoid does not make a common sidewalk unfit for its intended use.

Afholter v. Matuk · filed 2018-03-08(1)(a)

Because evidence that ice existed on the sidewalk and that plaintiff slipped is insufficient to constitute a statutory violation under MCL 554.139(1)(a), there could be no reasonable difference of opinion regarding the fact that tenants were able to use the sidewalk.
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A residential parking lot remains fit for its intended use under § 554.139(1)(a) when tenants can enter, park, and reasonably access their vehicles despite snow and ice.

Arheit v. Pheasant Run Co - Phase I · filed 2018-10-11(1)(a)

In this case, plaintiff acknowledged that he was never prevented from exiting or entering the parking lot, that he could park his car in the lot, and that he was never prevented from accessing his vehicle, although he had to “dig out” a few times. ... And even if the maintenance of the parking lot was not perfect or even ideal for winter conditions, it was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. See id. Therefore, there was no genuine issue of material fact that MCL 554.139(1)(a) was not violated and defendant was entitled to summary disposition of this claim.
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A residential parking lot remains fit for its intended use when tenants have reasonable access to their cars despite snow between parked vehicles.

Amin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2020-03-19(1)(a)

Therefore, the fact that snow remained between the cars in the parking lot does not render the parking lot unfit for its intended purpose or deny tenants reasonable access to their cars, but rather, is a mere inconvenience. ... In summary, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Village Park did not breach its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a), and thus, it was entitled to summary disposition of this claim.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential landlord to keep stairs fit for their intended use by providing tenants reasonable access.

Hernandez v. Hoxie · filed 2019-03-14(1)(a)

Additionally, plaintiff was not precluded from reasonably accessing her apartment: She had used the same set of stairs to exit her apartment earlier in the day before the fall and then reentered after her fall by using the same stairway. Under these facts we hold that the trial court did not err when it ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the porch steps were unfit for their intended use.
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A lessor must keep a parking lot fit for parking and reasonable access to vehicles; snow and ice do not breach that duty without evidence that they prevented either use.

York v. Berger Realty Group Inc · filed 2019-04-23(1)(a)

However, plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence that the 1 to 2 inches of snow and patch of ice prevented the tenants from parking their vehicles or having reasonable access to their vehicles.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to maintain a parking lot so tenants have reasonable access to their parking spaces.

Coppola v. Edward Rose & Sons LLC · filed 2019-06-25(1)(a)

The parking lot was fit for use as a parking lot because Pamela was not deprived of reasonable access to her parking spot.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires landlords to keep common-area sidewalks fit for walking; a sidewalk with ice remains fit for that use unless it is completely covered in ice.

Nelson v. Dart Properties II LLC · filed 2019-09-19(1)(a)

A sidewalk that has ice on it, but is not completely covered by ice, is still fit for its intended use. ... Thus, defendant did not breach any duty owed to plaintiff under MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep a parking lot fit for parking and reasonable access to vehicles; some ice does not by itself make the lot unfit.

Scott v. Independence Green Associates LLC · filed 2018-04-12(1)(a)

Consequently, because reasonable minds could not conclude that Independence Green breached a duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a), the trial court properly granted summary disposition to Independence Green.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a landlord to keep a common stairway reasonably usable for access between building levels.

Rottarr v. Kruk Cards Inc · filed 2022-12-22(1)(a)

Defendants were not required to maintain the stairway in perfect or ideal condition; rather, the stairway must only provide reasonable access to different building levels.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires common area stairs to provide reasonable access between building levels, but does not require them to be in ideal condition.

Jamel v. Wbr Kings Arms LLC · filed 2023-01-26(1)(a)

We conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists that these stairs were fit for their intended purpose. First, based on the photos submitted to the trial court, no reasonable juror could conclude that the steps did not allow people to go from the walkway to the landing.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential landlord to keep a sidewalk fit for walking, and substantial ice accumulation can make it unfit.

Jackson v. Aloe · filed 2023-03-15(1)(a)

Ultimately, reasonable minds could disagree about whether a sloped section of sidewalk in which clear ice accumulated and spanned nearly the sidewalk’s entire width rendered the sidewalk unfit for its intended purpose.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) may require a trial to decide whether a front porch provides reasonable access to a home, even when its dangerous condition is open and obvious.

McCarty v. Bepro LLC · filed 2023-04-13(1)(a)

Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, and the aggregate of factors, we agree with the trial court that there could be a reasonable difference of opinion regarding whether the front porch entryway was fit for its intended use as a reasonable means of ingress to and egress from the home. And because the open and obvious doctrine does not apply to a defendant’s statutory duty to ensure that the leased premises were fit for their intended use, Wilson v BRK, Inc, 328 Mich App 505, 517-518; 938 NW2d 761 (2019), Property Management may be liable even if the dangerous condition of the front porch entrance to the home was known or obvious to plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Property Management’s motion for summary disposition with regard to plaintiff’s statutory claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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A sidewalk remains fit for its intended use under § 554.139(1)(a) when pedestrians can traverse it despite an uneven slab and a risk of tripping.

Herrera v. Sun Troy Villa LLC · filed 2023-10-19(1)(a)

Thus, the evidence presented failed to establish that the sidewalk’s defective condition rendered it unfit for its intended purpose within the meaning of MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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A residential lessor must keep a shared parking lot fit for its intended use, including reasonable access to an adjacent dumpster.

Bowerman v. Red Oak Management Co Inc · filed 2024-09-12(1)(a)

The trial court did not err in concluding that the parking lot was fit for its intended use; it provided plaintiff with reasonable access to the dumpster, and thus Red Oak did not violate MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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Subsection (1)(a) requires apartment sidewalks to be fit for walking, but a slight lip at a sidewalk joint does not make a sidewalk unfit.

20241125_C368649_51_368649D.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-11-25(1)(a)

A slight lip at a sidewalk joint like the one at issue here does not create a question of fact whether the sidewalk was fit for being walked on.
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Snow and ice do not render an apartment parking lot unfit for its intended use under § 554.139(1)(a) when vehicles can still access and use it.

Walker v. Rivercrest Arms Apartments LLC · filed 2021-08-12(1)(a)

We note also that there was also no evidence that cars could not access and use the parking lot. Id. at 429. In fact, after plaintiff’s fall, he and his roommate drove plaintiff’s car to the bank, accessed the apartment complex again to pay their rent, then left again to take plaintiff to the hospital. The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s statutory claim.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires common-area stairs to provide tenants reasonable access to their apartments, even if the stairs are not in ideal condition.

Kandice Holder v. Anchor Bay Investments Inc · filed 2024-03-21(1)(a)

In contrast to Hadden, this case involved three wooden steps, there was no evidence plaintiff had difficulty seeing the algae. Plaintiff was familiar with the danger posed by the algae—indeed, she testified she “took extra time” when she used the steps. Furthermore, plaintiff said she used the stairway at least twice a day; thus, she was not impeded from accessing her apartment. In this context, the trial court did not err when it concluded there was no genuine question of fact whether these stairs were fit for their intended use under MCL 554.139(1).
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Subsection (1)(a) requires lessors to keep common areas fit for their intended use, but does not require ideal conditions.

Briggs v. Barrington Romulus Apartments LLC · filed 2025-04-16(1)(a)

Further, MCL 554.139(1)(a) only requires lessors to maintain common areas in a condition fit for their intended use, not “in an ideal condition or even in the most accessible condition possible.” Jeffrey-Moise v Williamsburg Towne Houses Coop, Inc, 336 Mich App 616, 637; 971 NW2d 716 (2021).
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A patch of black ice that merely inconveniences access does not make an apartment sidewalk unfit for walking under subsection (1)(a), and subsection (1)(b)'s repair duty does not cover common-area sidewalks.

Lloyd v. Millbrook Apartments LLC · filed 2022-02-01(1)(a), (1)(b)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence indicates that the patch of black ice upon which she slipped created only an inconvenience of access to the sidewalk but did not render the sidewalk unfit for its intended purpose. See Allison, 481 Mich at 428. ... Therefore, the duty to repair “premises” under MCL 554.139(1)(b) does not apply to the sidewalk in this case.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires residential common areas to be fit for their intended use; a sidewalk completely covered in ice is unfit, but patches of ice do not make it unfit.

Estate of Brenda Bowman v. Walker · filed 2022-02-10(1)(a)

In sum, although a sidewalk completely covered in ice is unfit for its intended purpose, a sidewalk covered only in patches of ice does not render the sidewalk unfit for its intended purpose.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential sidewalk to be usable for walking; subsection (1)(b) imposes no duty to repair natural snow and ice accumulation.

Anderson v. Dart Properties · filed 2024-02-22

Because plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of fact for trial concerning whether the sidewalk was fit for its intended use, the trial court did not err when it granted summary disposition of her claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a). ... Because plaintiff’s claim under MCL 554.139(1)(b) is not actionable for snow and ice accumulation, the trial court did not err when it granted defendant’s motion regarding this claim.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires a residential lessor to keep a parking lot fit for parking and reasonable access to vehicles; ice does not make the lot unfit when tenants can still use it that way.

Hargrave v. Oak Park Partners LLC · filed 2025-05-19(1)(a)

There could be no reasonable difference in opinion that tenants could still enter and exit the parking lot, park their vehicles, and have reasonable access to their vehicles. ... Nonetheless, plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that the parking lot was not fit for its intended use, and therefore, summary disposition in favor of defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was proper, as defendant did not breach its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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A lessor does not breach the duty to keep a shared residential parking lot fit for its intended use merely because a tenant falls on a patch of black ice.

Creem v. Singh Senior Living LLC · filed 2025-10-27(1)(a)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendants did not breach their statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep the parking lot fit for its intended use.
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A residential lessor’s duty to maintain a common area depends on its control of that area; occasional snow and ice removal does not establish control of a public sidewalk.

Peterson v. Fenton Oaks LLC · filed 2026-01-15(1)(a)

Therefore, the trial court properly determined that the sidewalk was not a common area, that defendant did not have a duty under MCL 554.139 to maintain the sidewalk, and that summary disposition was appropriate.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) requires lessors to keep common areas usable for their intended purpose; a localized patch of ice does not make a parking lot unfit when parking and ordinary access remain available.

Algena Bowers v. Jacobson Brothers LLC · filed 2026-06-09(1)(a)

MCL 554.139(1)(a) does not require a lessor to maintain common areas in a condition free from all snow or ice. Rather, the question is whether the condition prevented the common area from being used for its intended purpose.
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Parties covered by the statute

Section 554.139(1) imposes duties on a residential lessor to the lessee or licensee, but not to a tenant’s social guest.

Mullen v. Zerfas · filed 2007-12-20(1)

The defendant landlord did not have a duty under MCL 554.139(1) to the plaintiff, a social guest of the tenant.
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Section 554.139(1) does not apply to social guests of a tenant.

Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Services · filed 2012-05-29(1)

There is also no merit to Ms. Buhalis’s argument that the trial court erred when it dismissed her claim premised on the duty imposed on landlords under MCL 554.139(1). Our Supreme Court has held that MCL 554.139(1) does not apply to social guests of a tenant.
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A tenant’s social guest who is not a party to the lease lacks standing to seek relief under § 554.139.

Szematowicz v. Citation Club I LLC · filed 2016-10-20(1)

Because plaintiff was not a tenant of the apartments, he was not a party to the lease and did not have standing to pursue relief under the statute.
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Section 554.139 applies to leases and licenses of residential premises and does not impose a duty on a condominium association toward condominium owners.

Huk v. Golfpointe Village Condominium Association · filed 2015-07-16(1)

As the trial court found, the plain language of MCL 554.139 applies to leases and licenses of residential premises; it does not impose a duty upon a condominium association when dealing with condominium owners.
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Section 554.139 does not apply to a condominium association that does not lease the common areas to a unit owner.

Francescutti v. Fox Chase Condominium Association · filed 2015-10-15

Defendant is not leasing the common areas to plaintiff under a lease and, therefore, it is not a “lessor” under MCL 554.139 and that statute is not applicable to this case.
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Section 554.139 allows only parties to a lease to bring a claim for breach of a lessor’s statutory duties.

Qamer v. Sterling Knolls Apartments · filed 2016-08-09

In any event, our Supreme Court has made it clear that an action under MCL 554.139 is only available to parties to a lease. ... We agree with the trial court that plaintiff could not pursue a claim for defendant’s violation of its statutory duties under MCL 554.139.
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Section 554.139 applies when the defendant is the lessor or licensor of residential property and the plaintiff is its lessee or licensee.

Fagan v. Uznis Family Limited Partnership · filed 2017-06-29(1)

In order for MCL 554.139 to apply, defendant must have been the lessor or licensor of residential property of which plaintiff was a licensee or lessee. There is no allegation in the complaint that this relationship existed.
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Section 554.139(1)(b) requires a lessor to keep the premises in reasonable repair, but a person who is not a party to the lease cannot recover under that covenant.

Morrish v. Sun Communities Inc · filed 2018-09-20(1)(b)

Therefore, the trial court did not err when it concluded that the statute did not apply to Morrish because he was not a party to the lease.
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Section 554.139(1) imposes duties on a residential lessor only toward parties to the lease or license, not a tenant’s social guest.

Bardeleben v. Millikin · filed 2019-05-16(1)

We conclude that plaintiff was not a party to the vacation rental agreement and, therefore, defendant owed no duty to plaintiff under MCL 554.139(1).
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Section 554.139(1) protects only parties to the residential lease or license; living in the home does not by itself create a right under the section.

Marcquesia Walker v. Hela Management LLC · filed 2021-07-15(1)

The slate is not blank, however, and we agree with defendants that we are bound by the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the statute applies only to “contracting parties” to the lease, which plaintiff indisputably was not.
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Section 554.139(1) imposes duties on a residential lessor or licensor; a condominium association that leases neither the unit nor the common areas to the tenant has no duty under it.

Ramic v. Bullock Enterprises LLC · filed 2022-02-01(1)

There is no evidence in the record that Bradford leased either the unit or the common areas to Ramic, or indeed, to Liebich. Because Bradford is not a lessor, MCL 554.139 does not impose any duty upon Bradford in this case.
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Section 554.139 creates duties between the parties to a residential lease or license, not a statutory duty to a social guest.

Hassen v. Hopson · filed 2022-08-11(1)

The statutory duties created by the Michigan Housing Code, see, e.g., MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b), “establish duties of a lessor or licensor of residential property to the lessee or licensee of the residential property, most typically of a landlord to a tenant. By the terms of the statute, the duties exist between the contracting parties.” Mullen v Zerfas, 480 Mich 989, 989-990 (2007). ... In this case, defendant owed no contractual or statutory duty directly to plaintiff, a licensee.
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A residential license includes a covenant that common areas are fit for their intended use, even when the licensee is not a party to a lease.

Skiver v. Durga · filed 2022-10-13(1)(a)

The Legislature has provided that such a license must include the covenant applicable to common areas. See MCL 554.139(1)(a). Accordingly, there was—at the very least—a question of fact as to whether Silver Shores had granted a license to remain in Silver Shores as a resident.
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Section 554.139 applies to contractual residential leases or licenses, so its duties do not cover a guest’s use of property outside the rental agreement.

Wenzel v. Tremonti · filed 2022-12-15

Thus, Michigan courts have indicated that the statute applies where there is a formal contract to use property. Consequently, it does not apply here, where it appears that there was no contract regarding the use of the zip line at Defendants’ personal residence.
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Section 554.139 requires a contractual relationship between a residential tenant and the party alleged to owe the statutory duty.

Penny Gabrielson v. the Woods Condominium Association Inc · filed 2024-01-04(1)(a)

MCL 554.139 only applies when a license to use residential property arises from a contractual agreement. ... There was no contractual relationship between plaintiff, the association, and J.P. Carroll. Therefore, the association and J.P. Carroll did not owe plaintiff a duty under MCL 554.139.
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Section 554.139 applies to residential premises, not commercial premises.

Radney-Maxwell v. Menard, Inc. · filed 2023-01-19

There is no dispute that the incident occurred on commercial, not residential, premises, so MCL § 554.139 is not applicable.
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Section 554.139 applies only to leases of residential premises.

Estate of Manuel Ramos-Pelayo Jr v. Aaj Holdings LLC · filed 2025-04-15(1)

Like the HLM, however, MCL 554.139 only applies in the context of a “residential premises.”
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Section 554.139(1)(a) gives a tenant rights concerning the apartment she rents and the building’s common areas, but gives her no rights against the landlord in her capacity as its employee.

Lofquist-DeYoung v. DTN Management Co. · filed 2025-05-30(1)(a)

As a tenant, Plaintiff had a right to the same covenants from DTN as every other lessee. That right ran only to the apartment Plaintiff herself rented and the building’s common areas. ... The Court finds that section 554.139 vested Plaintiff with no rights vis-à-vis her employer, at least in her capacity as an employee.
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Notice of unsafe conditions

Law changed since The published decision in McNeal v. Lincolnshire 2007 Limited Dividend Housing Assoc (Oct. 23, 2025) held that § 554.139 has no notice requirement, ending this earlier notice limitation.

A tenant claiming that ice made a common sidewalk unfit for its intended use must present evidence that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the ice; general weather evidence alone does not establish constructive notice.

Kodra v. Stoney Creek Village Apartments LLC · filed 2017-11-16(1)(a)

Neither party contests that there is a notice requirement for liability to arise under MCL 554.139(1)(a). ... Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to relief because he failed to offer evidence sufficient to demonstrate a question of fact regarding defendant’s actual or constructive notice of the condition.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 554.139(1)(b) requires a lessor to keep rental premises in reasonable repair, but the lessor has no duty to repair a defect before knowing or having reason to know of it.

Secunda v. Gregory · filed 2019-02-21(1)(b)

Defendant repaired the defect within two days of learning of the incident. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that defendant had prior actual or constructive knowledge that the window was stuck or defective in any way, and thus, he did not have a duty to repair the window before learning of the defect.
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Section 554.139(1)(a) does not require a lessor to have notice of an unfit condition before it can be liable for breaching the covenant.

Thiel v. Pines at Cloverlane LLC · filed 2024-06-27(1)(a)

Because there is no published caselaw holding that a lessor must have notice of unfit conditions to be liable under MCL 554.139(1)(a), and the statute itself does not contain a notice requirement, we will not engage in judicial legislation by adding language to the statute and requiring notice under MCL 554.139(1)(a).
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Section 554.139 does not require a lessor to have notice of a defect to be liable under its residential lease covenants.

McNeal v. Lincolnshire 2007 Limited Dividend Housing Assoc · filed 2025-10-23(1)

Therefore, according to the plain language of the statute, no notice is required for liability under MCL 554.139.
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Remedies for breach

A tenant may pursue economic damages for breach of the residential lessor’s covenant even if the tenant cannot establish that the breach caused physical injuries.

Greiner v. R&P Investments LLC · filed 2019-04-23(1)(a)

Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for violation of MCL 554.139 on the basis of defendant’s second, unrebutted dispositive motion because the motion did not address plaintiffs’ economic damages. ... The mere fact that plaintiffs failed to establish causation with respect to their noneconomic damages does not preclude plaintiffs from offering evidence that defendant breached its statutory duty and that plaintiffs suffered economic damages as a result of the breach.
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A tenant claiming a breach of the lessor’s duty to keep the premises in reasonable repair must plead and prove that the breach caused the injury.

Gutierrez v. J D Smith · filed 2020-07-16(1)(b)

Without evidence of causation, Gutierrez cannot pursue her claims under either common- law premises liability or MCL 554.139(1)(b), which imposes on lessors a duty “[t]o keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease.” Both causes of action require the plaintiff to plead and prove causation.
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Section 554.139(1) makes its duties part of every residential lease, so a claim for their breach is not subject to the three-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

McCree v. Continental Management LLC · filed 2021-03-18(1)

This also holds true with respect to Count VI, for the duties imposed by MCL 554.139 are by law considered a part of every lease agreement.
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Compliance with health and safety laws

Section 554.139(1)(b) separately requires residential landlords to comply with applicable state and local health and safety laws, including laws governing common-area sidewalks.

Estate of Daniel George Trueblood v. P&G Apartments LLC · filed 2019-03-12(1)(b)

For these reasons, we conclude that a landlord’s covenant to comply with local health and safety laws is distinct from its covenant to make reasonable repairs.
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Modification of statutory duties

Section 554.139(2) permits parties to modify a landlord’s statutory duties only when the lease has a current term of at least one year; a month-to-month lease cannot do so.

Jackson v. Aloe · filed 2023-11-20(2)

The parties to a lease agreement may agree to modify these statutory duties, but only where “the lease or license has a current term of at least 1 year.” MCL § 554.139(2). ... The lease in this case was for a month-to-month term, rendering Magyar inapplicable.
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57 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Falconer v. Salliotte, the court cited the section as support for the plaintiff’s repair-duty theory but decided that the eviction notice had not ended his rights as a tenant. opinion →
Jackson v. Weatherby, the court cites the section as support for one way the plaintiff could have avoided eviction while deciding whether her inaction cut off liability. opinion →
Evans v. Van Kleek, the court identifies the section as the basis for one claim in the complaint but affirms liability under inferred negligence. opinion →
Woodbury v. Bruckner, the court found a common-law duty and declined to decide whether the section independently creates a duty in tort. opinion →
Woodbury v. Bruckner, the concurrence reports the trial court’s ruling under the section, while the Court denies reconsideration without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Bentfield v. Brandon's Landing Boat Bar, the section appears only in a dissent describing a liability theory the plaintiff first raised on reconsideration. opinion →
Long v. BRIDGEWOOD APARTMENTS, LLC, the court removed the reference to the section from the Court of Appeals judgment because the plaintiff had not raised it. opinion →
McDowell v. City of Detroit, the majority decided governmental immunity and trespass nuisance; only the dissent cited § 554.139 for the landlord’s duties. opinion →
Allison v. AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLP, the court granted leave to appeal and identified questions about the section for briefing without deciding them. opinion →
Estate of Buckner v. City of Lansing, the concurrence cites another court’s interpretation of the section only to support its discussion of a different statute’s highway repair duty. opinion →
Hadden v. McDermitt Apartments Llc, the court denied leave to appeal; only a dissent discussed the landlord’s obligation under the section. opinion →
Solomon v. Blue Water Village East Llc, the court cited the section while directing the parties to address a factual issue at oral argument on whether to grant leave to appeal. opinion →
Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Nyhof, the court mentions the section as a claim in the underlying complaint and decides whether the insurers owed coverage. opinion →
Dotson v. Garfield Court Associates, LLC, a dissent discusses the section while urging the court to grant leave to appeal; the court denied leave. opinion →
Davies v. Sheets, the section appears in a dissent proposing that the landlord’s statutory duties presented a factual dispute. opinion →
Tremper v. Westland Colonial Village Apartments, the dissent relied on the section to argue that a jury should decide whether the sidewalk was fit for its intended use. opinion →
Hendrix v. Lautrec Ltd, the section is discussed in a partial dissent that disagrees with the majority’s ruling. opinion →
Martinez v. Tmf II Waterchase LLC, the section appears only in a dissent arguing that the tenant’s claim should proceed. opinion →
Martin v. Milham Meadows I Limited Partnership, the court requested supplemental briefs about the claim under the section but did not decide it. opinion →
Battle v. Anderson Villas LLC, the section is analyzed in a dissent, which also reports the majority’s ruling. opinion →
Stone v. Boulder Creek Apartments LLC, the court addressed pleading and amendment issues without deciding whether the landlords violated the section. opinion →
Kodra v. Stoney Creek Village Apartments LLC, the section is construed only in a dissent, which would reverse the dismissal of the tenant’s statutory claim. opinion →
Schuster v. River Oaks Garden Apartments LLC, the concurrence questions whether the section’s duty extends to snow and ice accumulations without deciding that issue. opinion →
McMillan v. Douglas, the court mentions § 554.139 as an example of a landlord’s habitability duties while deciding whether a city ordinance lets a tenant recoup rent. opinion →
Smith v. Aberdeen Village Association, the court reports the trial court’s ruling on the § 554.139 claim and notes that neither party challenged it on appeal. opinion →
Afholter v. Matuk, the section is discussed in a dissent that would have sent the question of statutory breach to a jury. opinion →
Jasmine Fares Abazeed v. Awad, the court cites the section as a contrast while deciding whether building code violations give rise to a private cause of action. opinion →
Sherman v. Israel Bros Inc, a dissenting judge discusses the section’s lease-term requirement; the opinion contains no majority ruling on it. opinion →
Hendrix v. Lautrec Ltd, the court ordered briefing on the driveway claim under § 554.139(1)(a) without deciding it. opinion →
Green v. Detroit Square Properties LLC, the court recounts plaintiff’s statutory claim, which was dismissed by stipulation, and decides the remaining procedural and premises liability issues. opinion →
Thompson v. Gibson, Justice Markman discussed the section's repair covenant only in a dissent from the denial of leave to appeal. opinion →
Hendrix v. Lautrec Ltd, the Court denied leave to appeal; discussion of § 554.139 appears only in a concurrence and dissent. opinion →
Kristopher William Robert Wilson v. Brk Inc, the court cites the section as an example while deciding whether the statutory-duty exception applies to a different statute. opinion →
Tiffani King v. Munro, the court mentions the section as the basis of plaintiff’s negligence allegation but decides only whether an earlier case barred that claim. opinion →
Cedar Springs Mobile Estates v. Smith, the court reports the circuit court’s application of subsection (2) but reverses on insufficient evidence of negligence without deciding the statutory issue. opinion →
Fitzpatrick v. Bridgestone Retail Operations, L.L.C., the court mentions the section while recounting another court’s ruling and decides the premises liability claim under common law. opinion →
Rockov v. Lilley Pointe Condominium Association, the court remands the statutory-duty issue for the trial court to decide and discusses § 554.139 only through the parties’ arguments and a quotation from an earlier opinion. opinion →
Ramic v. Bullock Enterprises LLC, only the dissent would have applied the section to the condominium association; the majority did not adopt that view. opinion →
Honesti Price v. Country House Apartments LLC, the court mentions the section only to describe the plaintiff’s claim and decides the appeal on parental immunity grounds. opinion →
Erskine v. Mallie, the court affirmed dismissal of the statutory claim without explaining or applying the section's rules. opinion →
20230209_C361529_24_361529D.Opn.Pdf, the court recounts the trial court’s dismissal of a claim under the section but decides only the premises liability claim. opinion →
Harris v. Singh Management Co LLC, the court declined to review the statutory duty claim because Harris raised it in her reply brief, then discussed its merits only conditionally. opinion →
Shelby v. Patterson, the court mentions the section only as one basis for the tenant’s counterclaim and decides whether the circuit court could set aside its judgment. opinion →
Hermanowska v. Trenton Village Condo Assoc, the court recounts the trial court’s dismissal of the MCL 554.139 claim without deciding the section’s requirements or scope. opinion →
Haley Weaver v. Flint Lodging Inc, the court declined to review the statutory claim because the plaintiff had conceded below that the statute did not apply. opinion →
P Kandice Holder v. Anchor Bay Investments Inc, the separate opinion concurs in the disposition of the handrail claim and proposes reversing the dismissal of the algae claim. opinion →
Wenzel v. Tremonti, the court dismissed the § 554.139 claim because Wenzel said she was no longer pursuing it. opinion →
Bowerman v. Red Oak Management Co Inc, the section is analyzed in a dissent that would have reversed summary disposition. opinion →
20241125_C368649_51_368649D.Opn.Pdf, the dissent would have held that the sidewalk’s fitness for walking presented a factual question under the section. opinion →
Ramic v. Bullock Enterprises LLC, the court mentions the earlier ruling on the statutory claim but decides only the common law negligence claim on remand. opinion →
Fowlkes v. the Abbeys of Westland Condominium Assoc, the court declined to address the plaintiff’s arguments concerning the section after granting relief on other grounds. opinion →
Mancill v. Trio Investment Properties LLC, the court mentioned the section but declined to decide the statutory claim because the trial court had not addressed it. opinion →
Edwards v. Motor City Theatre Organ Society Inc, the court mentions the section to describe plaintiff’s alleged statutory claim but decides the appeal under premises-liability law. opinion →
McPherson v. Alten Homes Inc, the court identifies a claim under the section but decides only whether res judicata bars that claim. opinion →
Murray v. Nom Estates Properties Aa2 LLC, the court mentions the section only while recounting the landlord’s argument, then resolves the appeal under premises-liability law. opinion →
Williams v. Fairlane Meadow LLC, the dissent cites the section while explaining that the tenant abandoned her implied-warranty arguments on appeal. opinion →
Chapman v. Alawi, the court quotes an earlier § 554.139 remedies ruling as background but resolves the mold claims for lack of causation evidence. opinion →

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