Mich. Comp. Laws § 600

MCL 600.2919a provides treble damages for conversion when the defendant converts property to its own use, while MCL 600.5855 is a fraudulent-concealment tolling provision that does not create an independent cause of action.

Croy v. Google LLC · filed 2024-08-21

MCL 600.2919a is Michigan’s “statutory conversion remedy,” which “allows a plaintiff to recover three times the amount of damages on a conversion claim if the plaintiff can show the defendant converted the plaintiff's property ‘to the [defendant's] own use,’” Reed v. Presque Isle Cnty., 702 F. Supp. 3d 553, 586 (E.D. Mich. 2023), but here Croy’s claim is that Google is preventing him from accessing his [email protected] account “by secretly disabling [his] access” to the account, not that Google has actually taken or used the alleged “Bitcoin information” contained therein. Finally, MCL 600.5855 is Michigan’s fraudulent concealment tolling provision, which does not create an independent cause of action. Universal Bearing Co. v. Baker Bearing Co., No. 10-11142, 2013 WL 1211463, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2013) (“Under Michigan law, fraudulent concealment is not an independent cause of action and damages may not be awarded.”)

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages when a plaintiff proves common-law conversion and that the defendant converted the plaintiff’s personal property to its own use.

Garco Gaskets Inc v. Huntington National Bank · filed 2024-10-11(1)(a)

Statutory conversion is governed by MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), which ... A defendant converts personal property to their own use if they “employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Section 2919a(1) allows a person damaged by statutory conversion to recover three times the actual damages, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Transport Systems LLC v. United Roadlink LLC · filed 2025-06-23(1)

Similarly, under both a statutory and common-law theory of conversion, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff’s damages. MCL 600.2919a; Badiee v Brighton Area Schs, 265 Mich App 343, 366; 695 NW2d 521 (2005). With respect to the statutory conversion claim, MCL 600.2919a(1) specifically provides that “[a] person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees[.]”

Section 2919a(1)(1)(a) encompasses stealing, embezzling, or converting another person's property to one's own use, and alleged unlawful retention may fall within that language even when the property was lawfully received.

Joseph v. Entertainment Managers LLC · filed 2025-11-25(1)(1)(a)

A claim for statutory conversion encompasses “[a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use” MCL 600.2919a(1)(1)(a). Although defendant may have lawfully received the money pursuant to a contract, it was alleged that he unlawfully retained it, conduct that would be encompassed by the statutory language.

Section 600.2919a(1) permits recovery when another person steals, embezzles, or converts property to their own use, and statutory conversion requires using the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Kaiser v. Langan · filed 2025-12-12(1)

Under MCL 600.2919a(1), a person is damaged and may recover as the result of “[a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling or converting property to the other person’s own use.” Statutory conversion “requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Under § 600.1307a(1)(e), a former felon’s right to serve on a jury is restored once the sentence is completed.

United States v. Brown · filed 1999-09-22600.1307a(1)(e)

accurate statement of the current Michigan law on a convicted felon’s right to serve on a jury.

Section 600.837(1) was not invalidated by Judicial Attorneys Ass’n, so counties retain substantial authority over the budgets of the probate courts they fund.

Turppa v. County of Montmorency · filed 2010-04-28600.837(1)

each county retained substantial authority over the budget of the probate courts they funded.

Section 600.1432 requires an oath to be orally administered and acknowledged, with the oath taker raising the right hand; a signature after a perjury warning alone is insufficient.

People v. Ramos · filed 1988-06-07

Oaths take the form of a significant and readily observable act or acts that serve to impress upon the oath taker the importance of providing accurate information, and operate as objective evidence that the oath taker understands the importance of providing accurate information and is promising, under threat of severe penalties for lying, to be truthful.

Section 600.6421 permits related Court of Claims and circuit-court actions to remain joined when removal would undermine speedy and efficient resolution, and § 600.2925d(b) requires reducing the claim against other tortfeasors by the greater of the stipulated amount or the settlement consideration paid.

Longworth v. Department of State Highways · filed 1981-11-02§ 600.6421; § 600.2925d(b)

The purpose of this statute is to permit joinder of actions arising out of the same transaction in order to ensure their speedy and efficient resolution. ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion for removal. ... MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) provides in part: ... “(b) It reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant or to the extent of the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.”

A statutory-conversion claim accrues when dominion over the personal property is wrongfully asserted; the claims here accrued no later than January 1, 2005, and were therefore time-barred.

Professional Consultation Services Inc. v. Schaefer & Strohminger Inc. · filed 2011-02-23§ 600.2919a

Yet the relevant question is “when dominion [was] wrongfully asserted over” the personal property at issue.

A mortgage servicer is authorized to foreclose by advertisement under § 600.3204(1)(d), and the court held that the complaint established BAC as the servicer for pleading purposes.

Talton v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP · filed 2012-03-07Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1)(d)

The only conclusion that can be drawn from the record is that BAC Home Loans Servicing was the servicer of the plaintiffs’ mortgage and had the authority under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(l)(d) to foreclose by advertisement.

The court held that the statute barred the plaintiff's state-law claims because the injury occurred during flight from felonies and the officers used force a reasonable person would consider appropriate to prevent injury or respond to the felony.

Jackson v. Wilkins · filed 2012-03-28Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2955b(1)(a), (2)(a)-(b)

For the reasons discussed in Part III.A, the Court finds that the non-lethal force applied by the officers was an appropriate response to Jackson’s flight from arrest. Accordingly, Plaintiffs state law claims are barred by § 600.2955b.

Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1)(d), the party foreclosing by advertisement must be the owner of the indebtedness, the owner of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, or the mortgage’s servicing agent.

McCann v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-05-25§ 600.3204(1)(d)

As indicated above, subsection (1)(d) of section 3204 requires that the “party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.”

Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2925d(b), a good-faith release given to one of two or more persons for the same injury discharges that released person from all liability for contribution to any other person.

Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas (In re Greektown Holdings, LLC) · filed 2012-07-13Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2925d(b)

(b) The release or covenant discharges the person to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other person for the injury or wrongful death.

Michigan statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) does not require circumstances indicating fraud.

In re: Susan Dantone v. · filed 2012-09-13MCL 600.2919a(1)(a)

The bankruptcy court erred, however, when it concluded that the allegations in the complaintdescribing circumstances indicating fraud – the third element for nondischargeability under the embezzlement portion of § 523(a)(4) – were also a necessary element for statutory conversion under Michigan law. As noted above, statutory conversion under Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.2919a does not require circumstances indicating fraud. Section 600.2919a(a) defines statutory conversion as “[a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use” (emphasis added).

Michigan statutory conversion under § 600.2919a(1)(a) does not require circumstances indicating fraud.

Dantone v. Dantone (In re Dantone) · filed 2012-09-13§ 600.2919a(1)(a)

As noted above, statutory conversion under Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.2919a does not require circumstances indicating fraud.

Under § 600.3204(4), a foreclosure-notice or process defect does not by itself justify invalidating or enjoining a foreclosure when the mortgagor suffered no prejudice, even though the statute does not expressly require proof of harm.

Frost v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-10-04Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4)

Although there is no statutory requirement to demonstrate harm or prejudice arising from claimed mistakes or omissions in notice, the prejudice inquiry is not irrelevant.

Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4)(f), a lender that fails to follow the required loan-modification procedures lacks authority to begin a foreclosure by advertisement, creating a structural defect so the redemption period does not begin.

Mitan v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2012-12-12Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4)(f)

It follows that, as a matter of Michigan law, a lender that fails to follow the loan-modification procedures set forth by the statute has engendered a structural defect and is thus without authority to commence a foreclosure.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4) prohibits foreclosure by advertisement when a lender does not follow the required loan-modification negotiation procedures; such noncompliance is a structural defect that removes the lender's authority to foreclose.

Mitan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2012-12-20Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4)

Similarly, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4) is a statutory prohibition on foreclosure by advertisement where a lender does not take the required steps to negotiate a loan modification.

Section 600.2946a(2) leaves the jury to decide whether the plaintiff suffered a permanent loss of a vital bodily function when reasonable minds could differ, while requiring the judge—not the jury—to adjust the noneconomic-damages award to the statutory cap.

Peak v. Kubota Tractor Corp. · filed 2013-02-15Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946a(2)

Nevertheless, the Court does not agree with Defendants that this means the question of whether a plaintiff has suffered a “permanent loss of a vital bodily function” is delegated to the judge where there is a question of fact relevant to this determination. In other words, this Court believes that the statute leaves room for the jury to decide whether the plaintiff suffered such a loss where reasonable minds could differ but requires the judge, once that determination is made, to adjust any noneconomic damages awarded.

The court held that the plaintiff's conclusory allegations that defendants failed to send required foreclosure notices were insufficient to support her claim under Michigan's foreclosure-by-advertisement statute.

Goryoka v. Quicken Loan Incorporated · filed 2013-03-18Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204

Goryoka’s conclusory statements alleging a defective notice are insufficient to state a claim for relief.

Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1)(d), a foreclosure defect concerning the foreclosing party's eligibility is actionable to set aside the sale only if the mortgagor shows prejudice, meaning the mortgagor would have been in a better position to preserve the property interest without the statutory noncompliance.

Conlin v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. · filed 2013-04-10§ 600.3204(1)(d)

Kim’s holding makes § 600.3204 defects actionable to the same extent that notice defects under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3208 are—only on a showing of prejudice.

The probate inventory fee is an expense of estate administration calculated from the value of the estate's assets, not from the personal representative's ability to pay.

In re DeCoste Estate · filed 2016-09-20(871)(1)

The language of MCL 600.871(1) supports this conclusion. MCL 600.871(1) provides that the inventory fee is calculated “as an expense of administration on the value of all assets.” Therefore, the inventory fee is considered an expense of administration of the estate, rather than an expense that the personal representative is required to pay from his or her own funds. Additionally, the inventory fee is determined based on the value of the assets in the estate, rather than on the ability of the personal representative to pay the fee.

The comparative-negligence statutes, including § 2957(3)'s preservation of existing defenses and immunities, do not abrogate the common-law wrongful-conduct rule.

Estate of Michael Travis Errett v. a Forever Recovery Inc · filed 2017-05-30(2957)(1), (2957)(3), (2958), (2959), (6304)(8)

In light of the applicable law, we conclude that the Legislature’s passage of comparative negligence statutes in 1995 did not abrogate the wrongful-conduct rule. ... In fact, MCL 600.2957(3) ensures the rule’s survival by stressing that codification of comparative negligence did not “eliminate or diminish” preexisting defenses or immunities.

Section 600.631 permits circuit-court judicial review of an existing-source permit action, while MCL 324.5506(14) governs the appeal and provides a 90-day filing period for issuance or denial of a permit to install.

South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Assn v. Deq · filed 2018-07-17

The plain language of this sentence indicates that we turn to MCL 324.5506(14) for the rules governing appeals of permit actions for an existing source, including appeals in the circuit court in accordance with MCL 600.631.

Section 600.631 provides the circuit-court route for judicial review of certain DEQ permit actions, including permit actions for existing sources, subject to the procedures and 90-day filing period in MCL 324.5506(14).

South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Assn v. Deq · filed 2018-07-17

Rather, by saying that appeals of permit actions for existing sources are “subject to” MCL 324.5506(14), the last sentence of MCL 324.5505(8) instructs the reader that a right to appeal certain permit actions for an existing source, including a right to appeal in the circuit court in accordance with MCL 600.631, exists and is subject to MCL 324.5506(14).

Michigan’s statute gives gross-negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Nosse v. City of Ann Arbor · filed 2023-02-27§ 600.5805(10)

A three-year limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10). As such, Plaintiff’s claim must be premised on conduct within the three-year period before the filing of his Complaint on June 9, 2022.

Michigan medical-malpractice claims generally must be filed within two years of accrual or within six months after discovery, with accrual measured from the underlying act or omission, and the court applied that rule to dismiss the claims as untimely.

Rahaman v. Spine Specialist of Michigan · filed 2024-08-13600.5805(8); 600.5838a(2); 600.5838a(1); 600.5805(2); 600.5827; 600.5805(11); 600.2954(1)

Under Michigan law, a plaintiff must assert a medical malpractice claim within two years of the date the claim accrues, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8), or “within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5838a(2). A medical malpractice claim “accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5838a(1).

Section 2911(1)(b) does not change Michigan law to authorize punitive damages designed to punish defendants in libel cases; punitive damages remain limited to compensation for the plaintiff's injuries.

Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc · filed 1982-08-23(1)(b)

Plaintiffs also argue MCL 600.291l(l)(b); MSA 27A.2911(2)(b) changes the nature of punitive damages for libel cases and allows damages designed to punish defendants. We disagree. The Legislature knew of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term "punitive damages” when it enacted that provision. There is nothing in the statute which indicates a desire to change existing law and allow punishment damages. The punitive damages award returned by the jury will not be reinstated.

Section 6013 requires interest on a money judgment to accrue from the filing date of the complaint, rather than from the date an amended complaint first names the judgment debtor.

Rittenhouse v. Erhart · filed 1986-01-08(1)

Section 6013 plainly says that "interest on the judgment shall be calculated from the date of the filing of the complaint."

Section 600.2421b(1) is limited to actions in which the state is a party and does not authorize costs for an otherwise unsupported litigation expense.

Taylor v. Anesthesia Associates of Muskegon, PC · filed 1989-08-09(1)

The trial court’s apparent reliance on the definition of costs in MCL 600.2421b(l); MSA 27A.2421(2)(1) is misplaced because that section is limited to actions where the state is a party. In the absence of statutory authorization, costs may not be awarded to recompense for a claimed litigation expense.

Under Michigan’s wrongful-death statute, a parent’s comparative negligence applies to damages the parent claims for the child’s wrongful death, but cannot be imputed to damages attributable to the child.

Byrne v. Schneider’s Iron & Metal, Inc · filed 1991-07-08

We conclude that the reasoning set forth in Feldman, McCann, and Nielsen is still persuasive; it remains in keeping with the objective of a fair apportionment of damages under the doctrine of comparative negligence. See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). The parent’s comparative negligence is relevant under the wrongful death statute where recovery is sought for damages sustained by the parent because of the wrongful death of the child. However, the comparative negligence of the parent may not be imputed to the recovery attributable to the child’s damages.

Section 2591 sanctions a civil action only when, at the time it was filed, the party had no reasonable basis to believe the supporting facts were true; later discovery, doubts, or an unfavorable outcome do not by themselves make the action frivolous.

Louya v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 1991-07-08(3)(a)(ii)

We will not construe MCL 600.2591; MSA 27A.2591 in a manner that has a chilling effect on advocacy or prevents the filing of all but the most clear-cut cases. Nor will we construe the statute in a manner that prevents a party from bringing a difficult case or asserting a novel defense, or penalizes a party whose claim initially appears viable but later becomes unpersuasive. Moreover, an attorney or party should not be dissuaded from disposing of an initially sound case which becomes less meritorious as it develops because they fear the penalty of attorney fees and costs under this statute.

Section 4011(1)(b) permits garnishment of an obligation owed to the judgment debtor, but it does not reach real estate commissions that are not yet fixed or due because the underlying sale has not closed.

Royal York of Plymouth Ass'n v. Coldwell Banker Schweitzer Real Estate Services · filed 1993-09-07(1)(b)

However, even as amended, we expressly hold that the statute and the court rule do not obligate a garnishee defendant to pay real estate commissions for sales of property that have not yet become fixed or due because closing has not taken place. To conclude otherwise would result in an impermissible expansion of the power given to the circuit court by the statute. See MCL 600.401l(l)(b); MSA 27A.4011(l)(b) (referring to the circuit court’s power to garnish obligations owed).

Section 1629(1)(a) permits a tort action to be commenced in a county where all or part of the cause of action arose, including where the product was defectively manufactured or designed.

Vermilya v. Carter Crompton Site Development Contractors, Inc · filed 1993-09-08(1)(a)

In Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 377; 483 NW2d 844 (1992), our Supreme Court recently interpreted the requirement of MCL 600.1629(l)(a); MSA 27A.1629(l)(a) that an action be brought in a county "in which all or a part of the cause of action arose” to include a county in which a product was manufactured or designed defectively. Because defendant in this case manufactured or designed the allegedly defective goal in Genesee County, venue was proper in Genesee County.

Section 600.2157a(2) generally bars admission of confidential sexual-assault-counselor communications and related records without the victim’s prior written consent, subject to the Child Protection Act exception; due process may nevertheless require in-camera review when the defendant makes the required showing.

People v. Stanaway · filed 1994-08-29(2)

The Legislature expressly provided that confidential communications made to a sexual or domestic assault counselor "shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim.” ... The only exception recognized in MCL 600.2157a; MSA 27A.2157(1) is the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Child Protection Act, MCL 722.623(1); MSA 25.248(3)(1).

Section 308a(3) limits a Headlee refund claim to taxpayers who seek relief within one year, while § 308a(6) allows a successful taxpayer to recover reasonable attorney fees as costs.

Bolt v. City of Lansing · filed 1999-10-12(3), (6)

The one-year statute of limitation will bar relief only to taxpayers who fail to seek relief within the year or to taxpayers who seek only ipjunctive relief in their Headlee complaints and wait too long to seek monetary relief as well.

The insanity saving provision gives an insane medical-malpractice claimant one year after the disability is removed to bring the action, subject to the statute’s specific medical-malpractice limits.

Vega v. Lakeland Hospitals at Niles and St Joseph, Inc · filed 2007-07-18(1)

Because we conclude that the insanity saving provision of § 5851(1) does apply to medical malpractice claims, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of plaintiffs claim.

Section 600.1621's general venue rules apply to divorce actions even though the statute does not mention divorce expressly.

Funk v. Funk · filed 2015-04-02

Further, plaintiff’s assertion that the general venue provision in MCL 600.1621 should not apply to divorce cases because it does not expressly mention divorce is without merit.

Section 600.871(1) makes the probate inventory fee an estate-administration expense calculated from estate assets, not from the personal representative's ability to pay.

in Re Fletcher Estate · filed 2016-09-20(1)

The probate court correctly concluded that waiver or suspension of the inventory fee was not appropriate because the estates contain sufficient assets to pay the inventory fee.

Section 600.6104(3) permits a court to satisfy a judgment from nonexempt funds received by a third party in connection with the judgment debtor, without making that third party jointly liable for the judgment.

Avant Capital Partners, LLC v. Strathmore Development Co. Michigan · filed 2017-07-10(3)

Section 600.6104(3) is broad enough to justify the portion of the district court’s order that obligates Terra (without making Terra jointly and severally liable for the debt) to pay Avant’s judgment out of funds it has received “relating to” the Bear Creek entities.

Subsection (2) makes confidential communications and related reports or statements from a sexual-assault-counselor consultation inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings without the victim’s prior written consent, subject to waiver of the privilege.

People of Michigan v. Cowles · filed 2018-07-19(2)

“Confidential communications between a sexual assault victim and a sexual assault counselor are generally privileged and inadmissible at trial. MCL 600.2157a(2) provides: ... (2) [A] confidential communication, or any report, working paper, or statement contained in a report or working paper, given or made in connection with a consultation between a victim and a sexual assault or domestic violence counselor, shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim. [Stanaway, 446 Mich at 656 n 9, quoting MCL 600.2157a(2).]”

MCL 600.2912a(1) applies to every malpractice action, including accounting malpractice, and requires the plaintiff to prove the recognized professional standard of care and the defendant's failure to meet it.

Broz v. Plante & Moran Pllc · filed 2018-12-11(2912a)(1)

The language of MCL 600.2912a(1) does not specifically state that it applies to accounting malpractice. Rather, the statute provides that “in an action alleging malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving” that the defendant “failed to provide the plaintiff the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care.” Giving this language its plain and ordinary meaning, the statute indicates that the Legislature meant it to apply to “an action alleging malpractice” without exception. MCL 600.2912a therefore imposes upon plaintiffs in this case, who are alleging malpractice, the burden of establishing the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care and that defendant failed to meet this standard in providing professional services to plaintiffs.

Section 600.2912a does not apply to accountant malpractice because accountants, like nurses, are not engaged in the practice of medicine; the common-law standard of care governs instead.

Broz v. Plante & Moran Pllc · filed 2020-01-02(2912a)

In remanding this case to us, our Supreme Court has reminded us of Cox, 467 Mich 1, in which the Court held that MCL 600.2912a does not apply to a malpractice action brought against nurses. ... Applying the analysis set forth in Cox, we conclude in this case that because accountants, like nurses, are not engaged in the practice of medicine, MCL 600.2912a does not apply to accountant malpractice.

Section 600.5801(4) requires clear and cogent proof of 15 years of continuous adverse possession before title can be acquired.

Craig a Martyn v. Mel White · filed 2018-08-09(4)

As such, the Martyns failed to establish that they were entitled to the older shed by virtue of adverse possession.

Section 2803 provides that a judgment lien attaches when the notice of judgment lien is recorded, or, for after-acquired property, when the judgment debtor acquires the interest in the property.

Knapp v. Vulpina LLC · filed 2019-03-212803

“The judgment lien attaches at the time the notice of judgment lien is recorded or, for after acquired property, at the time the judgment debtor acquires the interest in the property.” MCL 600.2803. ... Thus, the question turns on whether the judgment lien attached to Dzierzawski’s interest in the property as “after acquired property” under MCL 600.2803 when the parties divorced and their ownership interests changed from tenants by the entireties to tenants in common.

Section 2955a permits an impairment defense when the defendant shows that intoxication impaired the plaintiff’s ability to function and caused the plaintiff to be at least 50% at fault, with a qualifying blood-alcohol level creating a rebuttable presumption of impairment.

Cavins v. Bat Commercial LLC · filed 2024-05-23(2)(b)

This evidence established a rebuttable presumption of impairment under MCL 600.2955a(2)(b).

Section 2955a makes the statutory defense available only when the decedent was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, that substance impaired the decedent’s ability to function, and the impairment-related conduct caused at least 50% of the accident; substance presence alone does not establish the required impairment.

Estate of James Thomas Bush v. City of St Clair Shores · filed 2019-05-07(1), (2)(b)

To avoid liability pursuant to MCL 600.2955a(1), defendants must show both that the decedent was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and that the substance impaired the decedent’s ability to function such that the decedent was 50% or more the cause of the accident.

Under § 600.5852(2), the two-year medical-malpractice period runs from the date the probate judge signs the letters of authority, not when they are mailed or distributed.

Est of Wanda Jesse v. Lakeland Specialty Hosp at Berrien Center · filed 2019-05-14(2)

Although there is no binding precedent interpreting MCL 600.5852’s use of the term “issued,” this case does not pose an issue of first impression in the literal sense. Reviving Lentini I’s interpretation of the term, we conclude that letters of authority establishing an estate are “issued” on the date they are signed by the probate judge. Because plaintiff did not file the complaint within two years of the date the probate judge signed the letters of authority, the trial court properly dismissed the action as untimely. MCL 600.5852(2).

Section 2955(1) requires a court evaluating a scientific expert opinion’s reliability and helpfulness to consider all seven listed factors, although not every factor will be relevant in every case.

Walsh v. Md · filed 2019-06-13(1)

MCL 600.2955(1) lists seven factors that courts must consider, and as explained in Elher, not all of those factors are always relevant, and there may even be times when none of the factors are relevant.

Section 600.2955 excludes scientific expert opinions that are not based on reliable principles and methods applied reliably to the facts.

Estate of Krystal Gayle Lawrence v. Schauf · filed 2022-02-10(1)

The record reflects that plaintiff failed and could not show that Robbins’s opinions were based on facts or data supported by evidence. His opinions did not account for established facts such as the actual weather or other conditions at the time of the accident. Robbins’s opinions were not the product of reliable principles and methods, nor did he reliably apply scientific principles to the actual facts of the case. Accordingly, Robbins’s opinions did not satisfy the requirements set forth in MRE 702 or MCL 600.2955. Therefore, as a matter of law, Robbins’s report and speculative opinions failed and could not establish a question of fact concerning whether Austin negligently operated his vehicle.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) allows a person damaged by another person's conversion of property to recover reasonable attorney fees, calculated under the Smith/Pirgu framework.

Mika Powers v. Brown · filed 2019-06-18(1)(a)

The plain language of MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) clearly provides that a person damaged by another person’s conversion of their property may recover “reasonable attorney fees[.]” As our Supreme Court instructed in Pirgu, “[t]he operative language triggering the Smith analysis is the Legislature’s instruction that an attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee.” Pirgu, 499 Mich at 279 (emphasis in original.) Moreover, this Court has recently applied the Smith/Pirgu framework in calculating reasonable attorney fees pursuant to MCL 15.364,4 a provision of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq. Caldwell v Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 656-657; 922 NW2d 639 (2018). Returning to the plain language of MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), because it clearly speaks to the ability of a person damaged by another’s “converting property to the other person’s own use[,]” to recover “reasonable attorney fees,” the Smith/Pirgu framework is applicable in calculating those reasonable attorney fees.

Section 600.2919a permits a person damaged by statutory conversion to recover treble actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney fees, but actual damages must be established and, when returned property is not shown damaged or deprived of use, its market value is not the proper measure.

Weiss Construction Co LLC v. Posen Construction Inc · filed 2019-07-18(1)

The statute allows a “person damaged” as a result of conduct specified in the statute to recover “3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.” MCL 600.2919a(1) (emphasis added). At issue here is whether Dearborn can satisfy the requirement of “actual damages,” as a distinct element necessary to establish a claim for statutory conversion. ... That is not the proper measurement of damages in a case where property has been returned. ... Thus, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dearborn, we cannot say that Dearborn met its burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding any “actual damages” to support recovery under MCL 600.2919a(1). ... We agree with the trial court; having found that Dearborn could not establish actual damages, Dearborn was not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to the plain language of the statute.

Section 1307a(1)(d) disqualifies a person from serving as a juror if the person served as a petit or grand juror in a court of record during the preceding 12 months; under section 1354(1), a new trial for that violation requires a timely objection, actual prejudice, and substantial noncompliance.

People of Michigan v. Nicholas Gage Bauer · filed 2025-11-24(1)(d), (1)

MCL 600.1307a(1)(d) addresses specific juror qualifications and states in pertinent part that “[t]o qualify as a juror, an individual must . . . [n]ot have served as a petit or grand juror in a court of record during the preceding 12 months.” ... When an unqualified juror serves in violation of MCL 600.1307a, section 1354(1) of the Act dictates that a new trial is necessary only when the defendant can make the three following showings: ... Defendant’s claim for a new trial certainly fails the first requirement of MCL 600.1354(1) because he did not make a timely objection. ... Ultimately, defendant has not demonstrated actual prejudice to his cause, such that the presence of three unqualified jurors on his jury requires reversal under MCL 600.1354(1).

MCL 600.1307a requires a juror to be a United States citizen who is at least 18 and a resident of the county of selection, while MCL 600.1354 preserves a jury verdict despite noncompliance with the Revised Judicature Act absent a timely objection, actual prejudice, and substantial noncompliance.

Talan v. Stewart · filed 2019-08-06

Indeed, MCL 600.1307a provides that “[t]o qualify as a juror, a person shall . . . [b]e a citizen of the United States, 18 years of age or older, and a resident in the county for which the person is selected[.]” However, MCL 600.1354 also provides that a “[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of [the Revised Judicature Act] shall not be grounds for a continuance nor shall it affect the validity of a jury verdict unless the party requesting the continuance or claiming invalidity has made timely objection and unless the party demonstrates actual prejudice to his cause and unless the noncompliance is substantial.”

Section 600.1354(1) requires a timely objection, actual prejudice, and substantial noncompliance before a disqualified juror can invalidate a jury verdict.

People of Michigan v. Wandahsega · filed 2025-04-15(1)

to invalidate the jury’s verdict under MCL 600.1354(1), defendant was required to raise a timely objection to the juror’s residency and demonstrate actual prejudice. ... Regardless, defendant did not establish actual prejudice. ... This noncompliance can hardly be considered substantial as dictated by MCL 600.1354(1).

Section 600.1307a(1)(d) disqualifies a prospective juror who served as a petit or grand juror in a court of record during the preceding 12 months, but under § 600.1354(1) a resulting verdict is invalidated only upon timely objection, actual prejudice, and substantial noncompliance.

People of Michigan v. Childers · filed 2026-05-21(1)

Chapter 13 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.1300 et seq., governs juror qualification. In pertinent part, MCL 600.1307a requires that prospective jurors must “[n]ot have served as a petit or grand juror in a court of record during the preceding 12 months.” MCL 600.1307a(1)(d). ... Accordingly, a new trial is not warranted on the ground that one or more jurors are unqualified for having already served as jurors in the last 12 months unless: (1) defendant made a timely objection, (2) defendant was actually prejudiced, and (3) the noncompliance was substantial.

Section 600.2163a(16) requires the court, on a party’s pretrial motion, to determine on the record whether special arrangements are necessary to protect a witness’s welfare by considering the witness’s age, the nature of the offenses, the witness’s or family’s desire for a closed courtroom, and the witness’s physical condition.

People of Michigan v. Bell · filed 2019-09-26(16)

The trial court found on the record that AK was 15 years old, that she would be testifying to criminal sexual offenses, and that she and her parents wanted the courtroom closed during her testimony because of the demeanor of defendant’s family during her preliminary examination testimony. The trial court also inquired as to any physical conditions or issues with AK that the court needed to consider; the prosecutor answered that there was none. MCL 600.2163a(16)(d). The trial court’s analysis pursuant to MCL 600.2163a(16) produced “the findings adequate to support closure” required by Waller.

Section 600.2920(1)(c) bars a claim-and-delivery action by a person who lacked the right to possess the goods or chattels when the action began.

Parks v. Parks · filed 2019-10-22(1)(c)

MCL 600.2920(1) provides that “[a] civil action may be brought to recover possession of any goods or chattels which have been unlawfully taken or unlawfully detained and to recover damages sustained by the unlawful taking or unlawful detention . . . .” Similarly, MCR 3.105(A)(1) provides that “[c]laim and delivery is a civil action to recover . . . possession of goods or chattels which have been unlawfully taken or unlawfully detained[.]” However, MCL 600.2920(1)(c) states that “[a]n action may not be maintained under this section by a person who, at the time the action is commenced, does not have a right to possession of the goods or chattels taken or detained.”

Section 600.3205 did not govern this foreclosure because the Legislature repealed it before the foreclosure occurred.

Fuller v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-10-30

Moreover, Counts 1, 2, and 4 hinge entirely upon Fuller’s assertion that Chase failed to comply with M.C.L. § 600.3205, which precluded a foreclosure if the lender had not, under certain circumstances, determined whether the mortgagor qualified for a loan modification. Fuller’s reliance on this statutory provision fails for the simple reason that the Michigan legislature repealed M.C.L. §§ 600.3205a to 600.3205d effective June 30, 2013, and repealed M.C.L. § 600.3205 effective June 19, 2014—long before Chase foreclosed the Mortgage.

A personal protection order is effective and immediately enforceable throughout Michigan once a judge signs it.

People of Michigan v. Nathaniel Royal Latham · filed 2019-11-19(9)

And a PPO is effective and immediately enforceable anywhere in this state after being signed by a judge. MCL 600.2950a(9).

Section 600.2950a(1) requires facts constituting stalking under § 750.411h to support a stalking-based personal protection order; a single instance of unwanted contact is insufficient.

TRN v. MDG · filed 2019-10-15(1)

However, that is only one instance of unwanted contact and therefore does not constitute stalking as defined by MCL 750.411h.

Section 2950a(1) requires a PPO petitioner to allege two or more separate, noncontinuous stalking acts that are distinct and not connected in time and space.

Bs v. Jb · filed 2019-12-19(1)

For a court to issue a PPO under MCL 600.2950a(1), the petitioner must allege “two or more separate noncontinuous acts” of stalking under MCL 750.411h, which are “distinct from one another [and] are not connected in time and space.”

Under § 600.2950a(1), once the elements of § 750.411s are established, a personal protection order must restrain or enjoin further conduct prohibited by § 750.411s.

Tt v. Kl · filed 2020-10-29(1)

Once the elements of MCL 750.411s are established, the PPO issued by a trial court under MCL 600.2950a must indicate that it restrains or enjoins the respondent from engaging in further conduct prohibited by MCL 750.411s.

Section 2950a(1) requires a petitioner seeking a PPO to allege facts constituting stalking under MCL 750.411h or MCL 750.411i.

Ah v. Ak · filed 2022-06-16(1)

To obtain a PPO under MCL 600.2950a, the petitioner must allege “facts that constitute stalking as defined” by MCL 750.411h or MCL 750.411i. MCL 600.2950a(1).

Section 600.2950a(1) requires a nondomestic PPO petition to allege facts constituting stalking or conduct prohibited by the referenced stalking statutes.

Lw v. Scm · filed 2023-01-19(1)

A court shall not grant relief under this subsection unless the petition alleges facts that constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct that is prohibited under section 411s, of the Michigan penal code.

Subsection (1) permits an individual to petition for a personal protection order restraining conduct prohibited by the specified stalking and harassment statutes, but the petitioner must allege and prove conduct that qualifies under those statutes.

Nm v. Jls · filed 2023-06-15(1)

Pursuant to MCL 600.2950a(1), “an individual may petition the family division of circuit court to enter a personal protection order to restrain or enjoin an individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under . . . MCL 750.411h, 750.411i, and 750.411s.” A PPO may only be issued under this subsection if the petition alleges facts that constitute stalking as defined in section MCL 750.411h or MCL 750.411i, or conduct that is prohibited under section MCL 750.411s. MCL 600.2950a(1).

Section 600.2950a(1) allows an individual to seek a nondomestic personal protection order restraining conduct prohibited by specified stalking or electronic-message statutes, but the petition must allege facts constituting such prohibited conduct.

Smg v. Gg · filed 2023-08-10(1)

Petitioner sought a PPO pursuant to MCL 600.2950a(1), which allows for “an independent action to obtain . . . a [PPO] to restrain or enjoin an individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under . . . MCL 750.411h, 750.441i, and 750.411s.” The petition must “allege[ ] facts that constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct that is prohibited under section 411s, of the Michigan penal code . . . .” MCL 600.2950a(1).

Section 2950a(1) permits a nondomestic personal protection order only when the petition alleges stalking or conduct prohibited under the specified Michigan Penal Code provisions; repeated unwanted contact after notice can satisfy that requirement.

Rm v. Lm · filed 2025-08-18(1)

The PPO was issued under the nondomestic PPO statute, MCL 600.2950a; which as relevant to this appeal addresses stalking behavior. A court may not grant a nondomestic PPO “unless the petition alleges facts that constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct that is prohibited under section 411s, of the Michigan penal code . . . .” MCL 600.2950a(1). ... The record reflects that respondent was repeatedly told not to have contact with RM and that she was not welcome at RM’s events. Despite these communications, respondent continued to insert herself into RM’s extracurricular activities. The trial court correctly reminded respondent that being RM’s great-grandmother did not give her the right to have time with him. Ultimately, RM’s father and step-mother were in control of whom they wanted around RM, and because that wish was not respected, the trial court properly issued the PPO.

Subsection (1) requires a PPO petition to allege facts constituting stalking or conduct prohibited by the specified Michigan Penal Code sections before a court may grant relief.

Swb v. Kjp · filed 2026-03-13(1)

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that these three separate instances of conduct by respondent on October 15, 2024, October 30, 2024, and November 26, 2024 “constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct that is prohibited under section 411s, of the Michigan penal code . . . .” MCL 600.2950a(1). ... Furthermore, in any event, the required “course of conduct” need only comprise two “separate noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose,” and the acts of October 15th and October 30th alone meet that threshold.

A court may issue a nondomestic personal protection order under § 600.2950a(1) only if the petition alleges facts constituting stalking or conduct prohibited by MCL 750.411s.

Jh v. Ti · filed 2026-03-13(1)

Thus, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the PPO because petitioner did not present evidence of stalking as required by MCL 600.2950a(1) and as defined by MCL 750.411h or MCL 750.411i, or conduct that is prohibited under MCL 750.411s. Petitioner failed to introduce evidence of a willful course of conduct in this matter, i.e., “two or more acts of unconsented contact that caused the victim to suffer emotional distress and that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.”

Section 600.2955a gives defendants an absolute defense when the decedent was impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance and, as a result, was at least 50% responsible for the accident or event causing death; impairment is presumed when the applicable vehicle-code blood-alcohol threshold is exceeded.

Estate of Brady Lane Morton v. Theta Chi Fraternity · filed 2019-11-19(1), (2)(b)

To successfully assert “the absolute defense of impairment” under MCL 600.2955a, a defendant must “establish that (1) the decedent had an impaired ability to function due to the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and (2) that as a result of that impaired ability, the decedent was fifty percent or more the cause of the accident or event that resulted in his death.”

Section 2950 requires a domestic-relationship PPO when reasonable cause exists to believe the restrained person may commit a listed act; harassment or stalking requires two or more qualifying unconsented contacts.

Jlt v. Dac · filed 2019-12-12(1), (4)

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to terminate the ex parte PPO. As noted, under MCL 600.2950(4), the trial court must issue a PPO if it finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that respondent may commit one or more of the acts listed in subsection (1). Here, however, the trial court did not address MCL 600.2950 or find reasonable cause to believe that respondent would commit an act identified in MCL 600.2950(1). Rather, as previously indicated, the trial court stated that the PPO was justified simply because respondent had responded to petitioner’s text message after she told him that she did not want any further contact.

Section 600.2950(4) requires issuance of a domestic-relationship PPO when the court finds reasonable cause to believe the respondent may commit a listed act; the petitioner need not prove that the act already occurred, and testimony alone may establish reasonable cause.

Lm v. Bm · filed 2021-06-17(2950)(4)

Second, under MCL 600.2950(4), it is not necessary that a petitioner prove that certain acts occurred. Instead, a petitioner must only establish that there is “reasonable cause to believe” the respondent may commit one of the prohibited acts.

Section 600.5813 requires other personal actions to be commenced within six years after the claims accrue unless another statutory period applies.

Harkins v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Inc · filed 2019-12-19

Rather, the residual six-year limitation period of MCL 600.5813 applies because plaintiffs are alleging a statutory violation for the failure to comply with provisions of the BCA. See MCL 600.5813 (“All other personal actions shall be commenced within the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different period is stated in the statutes.”

The prisoner litigation reform act does not apply to a prisoner's private civil lawsuit unrelated to imprisonment.

Richards v. Fox Television Station · filed 2020-01-23

Accordingly, no protections or duties provided in the prisoner litigation reform act, MCL 600.5501 et seq., apply in this case.

Section 2301 permits courts to amend any process, pleading, or proceeding to further justice and requires defects without an effect on substantial rights to be disregarded; denying an amendment requires actual prejudice.

Legion-London v. the Surgical Institute of Michigan · filed 2020-02-06

The Legislature’s language makes clear that amendments are to be permitted as to “any process, pleading or proceeding” and offers no hint that AOMs fall outside its scope. (Emphasis added). Moreover, it requires a showing of actual prejudice to deny a motion to amend.

MCL 600.6431's notice requirement for claims against the state does not apply to claims against individual state employees or practitioners, and subsection (3) does not alter that limitation.

Lavallii v. Dr Matthew R Jackson · filed 2020-02-11(1), (3)

Beginning with subsection (1) of MCL 600.6431, this Court concluded in Pike, 327 Mich App at 698, that MCL 600.6431 does not apply to individuals. Therefore, the language of subsection (3) is irrelevant to plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Jackson because plaintiff’s claim is not subject to the notice provision of MCL 600.6431 by virtue of subsection (1).

Section 6431(3) requires a claimant to file a notice of intention to file a claim or the claim itself within six months after the event giving rise to the cause of action.

Taylor v. University of Michigan Regents · filed 2022-08-18(3)

While we understand and sympathize with plaintiff’s predicament, the Legislature specifically qualified the right to bring a case like this on the filing of “a notice of intention to file a claim or the claim itself within 6 months following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.” MCL 600.6431(3). That did not occur in this case. The statutory provision is not ambiguous, and thus, judicial interpretation and construction is not permitted.

Section 600.6431(1) requires every claim against the state, including a claim filed in circuit court, to comply with its one-year written-claim or notice requirement unless an exemption in the section applies.

Christie v. Wayne State University · filed 2023-05-02(1)

We conclude that Tyrrell erred by holding that MCL 600.6431(1)’s notice requirements apply only to claims initiated against the state in the Court of Claims. Instead, MCL 600.6431(1) applies to all claims against the state, including those filed in the circuit court, except as otherwise exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself.

Section 6431 requires a claimant to file a written claim or notice within one year, and for property-damage or personal-injury claims within six months, with strict compliance generally required.

Brourman v. University of Michigan · filed 2023-12-21(1), (4), and (5)

MCL 600.6431(1) provides: ... a claim may not be maintained against this state unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.

Section 6431 requires a claimant to timely file a written claim or notice with the Court of Claims and to verify it, and noncompliance requires dismissal.

Wurster v. University of Michigan Regents · filed 2024-11-21(1), (2)(d)

In this case, because plaintiff did not verify her complaint or file a verified notice with the court of claims, and we are well beyond the one-year notice requirement of MCL 600.6431, plaintiff’s claims against Michigan Medicine would be subject to dismissal, had the jury not already found them not to be liable in this case. Regardless, plaintiff cannot maintain her claims against Michigan Medicine, and her arguments on appeal with respect to Michigan Medicine must fail.

MCL 600.6431 requires claims against the state, including claims filed in circuit court, to be filed within one year after accrual with specified information and claimant verification, and defects cannot be cured after the deadline.

Delgado v. State Police · filed 2025-08-18(1), (2)(a)-(d)

Under MCL 600.6431(1), plaintiff could not maintain an action against the state because he failed, within one year of the claim accrual, to file a written claim or a written notice of an intention to file a claim against the state or its departments or agencies. This claim or notice had to include a statement of the time and place of where the claim occurred, a detailed statement of the nature of the claim and the damages, an identification of the state entity involved with the claim, and the claimant’s signature and verification before an officer authorized to administer oaths. MCL 600.6431(2)(a)-(d). Plaintiff was required to comply with MCL 600.6431 and could not cure any defects during the pendency of the action. Elia Cos, LLC, 511 Mich at 71-73.

A claimant under the public-building exception satisfies MCL 600.6431’s notice requirement by complying with MCL 691.1404(2), even if the enumerated requirements of MCL 600.6431 were not satisfied.

Noyes v. Oakland University · filed 2025-07-14(2)(d)

Thus, under MCL 691.1404(2)’s plain and unambiguous language, a claimant under the public-building exception who complies with the notice requirements in MCL 691.1404(2) is deemed to have satisfied the notice requirement in the COCA.

MCL 600.6052’s public-notice requirements, when incorporated by MCR 3.403(B)(1), require a public sale in a partition action.

Wiegand II v. Ilean M Menhennick Trust · filed 2020-03-10(1)-(2)

MCL 600.6052 contemplates providing notice to the public for purposes of completing a public sale of real property. Because MCR 3.403(B)(1) incorporates the notice requirements outlined in MCL 600.6052, we conclude that a public sale is required in a partition action.

Subsection (2) makes mailing the notice of intent, rather than receipt of it, the relevant issue for timely notice.

Stanow v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2020-03-17(2)

And the question is whether the NOI was mailed, not whether it was received. See MCL 600.2912b(2).

Section 2919a(1)(a) imposes statutory conversion liability when a person wrongfully converts property to their own use.

Bartosiewicz v. A2q LLC · filed 2020-03-17(1)(a)

A statutory claim of conversion requires similar proof—that one party wrongfully “conver[ted] property to [his] own use.” MCL 600.2919a(1)(a).

Section 2163a requires an on-the-record welfare determination before closing the courtroom for a witness and requires notice before a support person accompanies a victim of criminal sexual conduct during testimony.

People of Michigan v. Williams · filed 2020-03-19(4), (16)-(17)

Assuming that the trial court closed the courtroom during one of Connie’s victim’s testimony as contended on appeal by defendant, the trial court committed plain error because it never determined on the record as required under MCL 600.2163a(17) whether the circumstances required closing the courtroom under MCL 600.2163a(16) to protect the welfare of the victim. ... Under MCL 600.2163a(4), a victim of criminal sexual conduct “who is called upon to testify shall be permitted to have a support person sit with, accompany, or be in close proximity to the witness during his or her testimony.” The prosecution, however, was obligated to provide notice of intent to use a support person. Id. ... Assuming that the trial court allowed a support person’s presence in the courtroom during the victim’s testimony, the trial court committed plain error because no evidence establishes that the prosecution filed a notice of intent.

When the courtroom is closed during a child witness’s testimony, the court must broadcast the testimony by closed-circuit television to the public in another location out of sight of the witness.

People of Michigan v. Bonner · filed 2020-04-16(17)(a)

It was error for the court to close the courtroom while refusing to broadcast the victim’s testimony to another location in the courthouse. At the time of defendant’s trial, MCL 600.2163a(17)(a), as amended by 2012 PA 170, provided that if unnecessary individuals are excluded from the courtroom, “[t]he witness’s testimony shall be broadcast by closed-circuit television to the public in another location out of sight of the witness.” The statute was later amended to provide: “The witness’s testimony must be broadcast by closed-circuit television to the public in another location out of sight of the witness.” MCL 600.2163a(19)(a). “Must” and “shall” are mandatory terms. Fradco, Inc v Mich Dep’t of Treasury, 495 Mich 104, 114; 845 NW2d 81 (2014); Vyletel-Rivard v Rivard, 286 Mich App 12, 25; 777 NW2d 722 (2009). The trial court did not have a choice; by closing the courtroom to the public, the court was required to broadcast the proceedings via closed-circuit television to another location in the courthouse.

Section 2163a(4) requires courts to permit qualifying witnesses to have a support person and a courtroom support dog and handler sit with them or be nearby during testimony, and the procedural provision applies retroactively.

People of Michigan v. Brooks · filed 2020-05-28(4)

Thereafter, the Legislature amended MCL 600.2163a(4), effective September 27, 2018, see 2018 PA 282, to provide for the use of both support persons and support dogs with their handlers, but limited their use to witnesses under the age of 16, over the age of 16 with a developmental disability, or a vulnerable adult. ... MCL 600.2163a is a procedural statute that affords witnesses certain protections. It does not create new rights nor destroy, enlarge, or diminish existing rights. Accordingly, we conclude that it operates retroactively. ... The statute clearly authorized the trial court to allow MS to have a support dog and handler sit with or be in close proximity to her.

Section 600.2163a(4) requires a court to permit a qualifying witness to have a support person sit with, accompany, or remain close to the witness during testimony.

People of Michigan v. Williams · filed 2021-07-29(4)

MCL 600.2163a(4) requires a trial court to permit a “witness who is called upon to testify,” and is under 16 years old, developmentally disabled, or a vulnerable adult, to “have a support person sit with, accompany, or be in close proximity to the witness during his or her testimony.”

Section 600.6434 requires a Court of Claims complaint to be verified, but an unverified complaint still commences the action and tolls the limitations period; the defect may be corrected by amendment.

Progress Michigan v. Attorney General · filed 2020-07-27600.6434(2)

Construing MCL 600.6434 as requiring that the complaint be verified, as we must under McCahan, does not mean that an unverified complaint does not commence a civil action under MCL 600.1901 or toll the limitations period under MCL 600.5856. Nothing in MCL 600.6434 (or any other provision of the COCA) suggests otherwise. MCL 600.6434 says absolutely nothing that would contradict or override the general rules pertaining to commencing an action under MCL 600.1901 or tolling the limitations period under MCL 600.5856. Nor does MCL 600.6434 explicitly condition tolling on the verification requirement. All MCL 600.6434 requires is that the complaint be verified.

Section 600.6431(2)(d) requires a claim or notice of intent against the state to be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths; a notarized jurat satisfies that requirement, while the MCR 1.109(D)(3)(b) declaration is not an available alternative.

Cavill v. State of Michigan · filed 2022-09-15(2)(d)

Such signature, notarized by a notary public whose notarization was expressed in the form of a jurat, complied with the requirements of the Michigan law on notarial acts, MCL 55.261 et seq., including its verification provisions because the notary acted under a valid commission and specified that plaintiff’s signature was subscribed and sworn before the notary on the date specified. Plaintiff’s verification also complied with MCR 1.109(D)(3)(a)’s verification oath or affirmation requirement. Accordingly, plaintiff’s notarized signature complied with MCL 600.6431(2)(d)’s verification requirement because plaintiff signed and verified her notice of intent “before an officer authorized to administer oaths.”

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) allows a person damaged by another person's stealing, embezzling, or converting property to recover three times the actual damages, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Camp Inn Lodge LLC v. Kirvan · filed 2020-08-19(1)(a)

A person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees: (a) Another person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use.

Section 2919a(1)(a) allows recovery when a defendant steals or embezzles property or converts it to the defendant’s own use, and depositing the owner’s funds into a personal account constitutes use personal to the defendant’s interests.

Hollie a Bastin v. Welch · filed 2021-05-20(1)(a)

MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) provides a basis for recovery when the defendant steals or embezzles property or converts property to the defendant’s own use. ... These allegations indicate that defendant embezzled or converted the funds belonging to Hollie. Defendant did not have Hollie’s consent when he negotiated the checks and placed the funds into his personal bank account. Further, by placing the money into his personal bank account, defendant was employing the converted funds for a purpose personal to his interests. ... MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) provides a basis for recovery when the defendant steals or embezzles property or converts property to the defendant’s own use.

Sections 600.5805(8) and 600.5838(1) impose a two-year accounting-malpractice limitations period accruing when the professional relationship ends; § 600.5855 extends it only if the plaintiff sues within two years after discovering or when it should have discovered a possible claim; and § 600.2962(1) limits CPA liability for public-accounting services to the statutory categories, including fraud or intentional misrepresentation but not aiding and abetting fraud.

Genesee Intermediate School Dist v. City of Flint School Dist · filed 2020-08-20(5805)(8), (5838)(1), (5855), (2962)(1), (2962)(1)(b)

Under MCL 600.5805(8), a two-year statute of limitations applies to professional malpractice actions, including accounting malpractice actions. ... The accrual provision in MCL 600.5838(1) applies to claims of accounting malpractice. ... Because each year constituted a new and separate engagement under the terms specified in Yeo and Flint’s annual engagement agreements, any claims for accounting malpractice accrued upon the end of each annual engagement. ... Genesee’s fraudulent concealment argument is unavailing because Genesee failed to file this action within two years after Genesee knew or should have known about a possible cause of action, as required by MCL 600.5855. ... The plain language of the second sentence strictly limits the circumstances in which a certified public accountant may be held liable for civil damages in connection with public accounting services and is not restricted to malpractice actions. ... We conclude that MCL 600.2962(1) bars any legal action against a certified public accountant in connection with public accounting services unless the claim falls within one of the categories of claims specified in the statute.

Section 600.2919a permits a statutory-conversion claim for funds delivered for a specified purpose and diverted to the defendant’s own use, and allows treble actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Dhadphale v. Delaney · filed 2020-11-12

However, a claim for conversion of money is available only in narrow circumstances. Kerrigan v. ViSalus, Inc., 112 F.Supp.3d 580, 615 (E.D. Mich. 2015). Under MCL § 600.2919a, a plaintiff may sue “for the conversion of funds that were delivered to the defendant for a specified purpose, but that the defendant diverted to his or her own use.”

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) measures actual damages for converting an attorney’s lien by the lien’s value at the time of conversion, not the value of the encumbered real property.

Alisa a Peskin-Shepherd Pllc v. Blume · filed 2020-11-05(1)(a)

calculated using the “value of the [lien] at the time of the conversion . . . .” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages for converting property to the converter’s own use, which requires using the property for a purpose personal to the converter’s interests.

University of Michigan Regents v. Valentino · filed 2020-12-29(1)(a)

Our Supreme Court has explained that to fulfil this element of statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), a plaintiff “must show that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant's interests, even if that purpose is not the object's ordinarily intended purpose.” ... So too here. Although we reject plaintiff’s suggestion that defendant intended an “extortion,” the evidence supports that by placing the money in his IOLTA account, defendant intended to gain an advantage over plaintiff. Another way of putting this is that plaintiff has created a fact question regarding whether defendant intended to use the money in the IOLTA account as leverage to gain a share for himself. ... As in Aroma Wines, plaintiff has alleged facts that if accepted by a jury, could confirm that defendant converted the proceeds of the check to his own use.

MCL 600.6431(1) requires a claimant to file a written claim or notice within one year for a claim brought against the state in the Court of Claims, but does not require that filing for a properly brought circuit-court claim unless the Legislature conditions consent to suit on compliance with the statute.

Christie v. Wayne State University · filed 2021-01-28(1)

Thus, the Tyrrell Court held that “absent the Legislature conditioning its consent to suit on compliance with the COCA, a plaintiff properly bringing a claim in circuit court against the state or a state defendant to which MCL 600.6431 applies is not required to comply with MCL 600.6431 for his or her claim to proceed in that court.” ... Given the conclusions in Tyrrell and its clear and direct application to the matter before this Court, defendant here was not entitled to governmental immunity from suit based on the claim that plaintiff failed to comply with MCL 600.6431. See MCR 7.215(J)(1). The trial court thus properly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

Section 600.6431 requires notice for claims against the state and its departments, institutions, arms, or agencies, including a university.

Reighard v. Central Michigan University · filed 2022-05-26(1), (3)

The statute plainly provides that notice must be given for claims against either the state or state entities.

Section 600.6431 requires complete compliance with its notice and verification requirements for claims against the state, and noncompliance mandates dismissal.

Msc 162830 Elia Companies Llc V University Of Michigan Regents Order 5/2/2023 · filed 2023-05-02(1)

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 mandated dismissal of this case.

Section 600.6431(1) requires full compliance with its notice and verification requirements for claims against the state, and failure to comply mandates dismissal.

Msc 162830 Elia Companies Llc V University Of Michigan Regents Order 05/02/2023 · filed 2023-05-02(1)

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 mandated dismissal of this case.

Section 600.6431(2)(d) permits a notice of intent to be verified by a jurat notarization showing that the claimant swore or affirmed the factual statements were true, and subsection (4) requires timely filing within six months for personal-injury claims but does not require a verified complaint within that period.

Ortiz v. Fox · filed 2024-04-25(2)(d), (4)

Here, as in Chisholm, plaintiffs’ notices of intent to file a claim contained their jurat notarizations, indicating that they “signed the notice[s] under an oath or affirmation to the notary, verifying and certifying that the factual statements set forth in the notice were true,” and thus sufficiently verified their notices in compliance with MCL 600.6431(2)(d). ... Therefore, we conclude that plaintiffs’ properly verified notices of intent, which were timely filed in the Court of Claims within six months of the accident, fully complied with MCL 600.6431’s requirements for purposes of maintaining their claims against the state.

Section 2940(1) gives circuit courts jurisdiction over claims to abate a nuisance and authorizes injunctions to stay and prevent nuisances.

City of Detroit v. Nationwide Recovery Inc · filed 2021-03-18(1)

However, MCL 257.252e makes no mention of nuisance or nuisance-abatement actions. Conversely, MCL 600.2940(1) provides: “All claims based on or to abate nuisance may be brought in the circuit court. The circuit court may grant injunctions to stay and prevent nuisance.” By way of MCL 600.2940(1), “[t]he Legislature has conferred on the circuit courts broad equitable jurisdiction over nuisance-abatement proceedings, irrespective of the nature and extent of the particular alleged nuisance.” Ypsilanti Fire Marshal v Kircher, 273 Mich App 496, 527 n 12; 730 NW2d 481 (2007). As the provision specifically regarding jurisdiction over nuisance-abatement actions as a class, MCL 600.2940(1) controls this jurisdictional question. See Pike v Northern Mich Univ, 327 Mich App 683, 693; 935 NW2d 86 (2019) (“it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that when two applicable statutory provisions conflict, the one that is more specific to the subject matter prevails over the provision that is only generally applicable”). The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint clearly asserted claims seeking abatement of a public nuisance. Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under MCL 600.2940(1), and we reject defendants’ argument to the contrary.

Section 600.5838b bars a legal-malpractice action after the earlier of the applicable limitations period or six years after the act or omission underlying the claim, and the six-month discovery rule does not extend that repose period.

Marks v. Schafer and Weiner, PLLC · filed 2021-03-19(1)

Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.5838b provides, in relevant part, the following: ... (1) An action for legal malpractice against an attorney-at-law or a law firm shall not be commenced after whichever of the following is earlier: ... (b) Six years after the date of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim. ... The six-month discovery rule does not apply to the statute of repose. ... Likewise, for the time being, this Court need not decide how precisely to interpret the language used in the statute of repose. TMT, Inc. has presented enough evidence to create a genuine fact question as to whether it filed a lawsuit within six years of at least one act or omission that is the basis for its claim. ... Therefore, Defendants are not presently entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of repose.

Sections 600.5838b and 600.5838 limit legal-malpractice claims to the earlier of the applicable limitations period or six years after the underlying act or omission, with accrual generally occurring when the attorney’s professional service ends, regardless of later discovery.

Wiggins v. Gani · filed 2022-08-115838b(1)(a)-(b); 5838(1)

Legal malpractice claims are further limited by the statute of repose, which provides in relevant part: ... (b) Six years after the date of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim. ... Thus, whether or not the plaintiff has discovered the malpractice claim, the statute of repose prevents the plaintiff from filing a timely claim. ... In general, a malpractice claim “accrues at the time that person discontinues serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudoprofessional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose . . . .” MCL 600.5838(1) (emphasis added).

MCL 600.5838b(1)(b) cannot be applied retroactively when doing so would impair a vested right to bring a legal-malpractice action.

C New Products Corporation v. Butzel Long · filed 2023-05-18(1)(b)

Because New Products’ right to sue Butzel vested before the 2013 enactment of MCL 600.5838b(1)(b), the statute of repose may not be imposed retroactively.

Section 600.5838a(2) imposes a six-year medical-malpractice statute of repose that sets an outside deadline for commencing the action, subject to statutory tolling such as the notice-of-intent tolling rule.

Compagner v. Pa-C · filed 2023-06-01(2)

Taking the latter argument first, we disagree and hold that a statute of repose is a deadline by which an action must be commenced. Separate and apart from the applicable statute of limitations or any extension of it by the discovery rule, it establishes an outside deadline by which an action must be filed. Unlike an NOI period, it does not establish a period of time that must elapse before an action is filed. And unlike the one-year-back rule, it is not a damages-limiting provision. Because a statute of repose establishes a deadline for the filing of an action, the AOs by their terms apply, and defendants’ reliance on Wenkel and Hubbard is inapposite.

MCL 600.5838b bars a legal-malpractice action after six years from the act or omission underlying the claim, even if the ordinary limitations period has not expired.

Doraid Elder v. Lites · filed 2026-02-19(1)(b)

Therefore, under the statute of repose, plaintiffs had until October 5, 2017, to file their legal-malpractice claim for failure to record the assignment. See MCL 600.5838b(1)(b). Because the complaint was not filed until December 2020, the claim was time-barred.

When a defendant allegedly fails to provide medical-record access under § 2912b(5), § 2912d(3) gives the plaintiff 91 days from filing the complaint to file an affidavit of merit, and litigation over the provision does not toll that period.

Zarzyski v. Joanna Lynne Nigrelli Do · filed 2021-06-24(3)

This language is plain and unambiguous. We fully recognize that the parties were litigating the issue whether MCL 600.2912d(3) was implicated in this case, but the clock began running on the 91-day period when the complaint was filed on August 15, 2019.

MCL 600.2912d(3) permits a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit within 91 days after the complaint when the defendant has not timely allowed access to medical records, without requiring a motion for that grace period.

Lamas-Navarro v. Spectrum Health · filed 2023-03-23(3)

By contrast, subsection (3) does not require a party to file a motion—the AOM is simply filed within 91 days of filing of the complaint.

Section 600.2919a does not establish statutory conversion when the defendant disposes of already-destroyed property pursuant to government orders rather than using it for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Aspen American Insurance Company v. Interstate Warehousing Inc · filed 2021-07-30

In the end, the undisputed facts in this case, even when all reasonable inferences therefrom are drawn in favor of Aspen American, show that Interstate’s actions following the roof collapse did not constitute common law or statutory conversion as those claims are defined under Michigan law and Aroma Wines.

Under § 2919a(1)(a), statutory conversion requires that the defendant employ converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests; a person damaged by that conduct may recover treble actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.

Michael a Pickett v. Graczyk · filed 2023-06-22(1)(a)

Although the language of MCL 600.2919a “is rooted in common-law conversion, the tort established in MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) is not the same as common-law conversion.” Aroma Wines, 497 Mich at 361. “Rather, the separate statutory cause of action for conversion ‘to the other person’s own use’ requires a showing that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.” Id. ... Furthermore, as it relates to statutory conversion, plaintiff stated in an affidavit that when he communicated with defendant to resolve the dispute, defendant indicated that he intended to sell plaintiff’s own property to plaintiff and allow others access to plaintiff’s property. Accordingly, the available evidence establishes that defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even though that purpose may not have been the ordinarily intended purpose of plaintiff’s personal property. See Aroma Wines, 497 Mich at 361.

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages for statutory conversion only when, in addition to the common-law conversion elements, the defendant used the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Estate of James D Branch v. Rudolph · filed 2025-03-19(1)(a)

“Treble damages for statutory conversion are available under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), but, in addition to the common-law elements for conversion, a plaintiff claiming statutory conversion must show that the conversion was for the defendant’s ‘own use.’ ”

Section 2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages for statutory conversion, but requires proof of common-law conversion plus that the defendant used the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Estate of James D Branch v. Rudolph · filed 2025-05-01(1)(a)

“Treble damages for statutory conversion are available under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), but, in addition to the common-law elements for conversion, a plaintiff claiming statutory conversion must show that the conversion was for the defendant’s ‘own use.’ ” Magley, 325 Mich App at 314 n 3, quoting Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 356; 871 NW2d 136 (2015).

Michigan’s statutory-conversion provision requires proof that the defendant used the converted property for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests; moving commingled soil to fill the defendant’s own parcel satisfies that requirement.

Norton v. Bischer Revocable Family Trust · filed 2025-11-17(1)(a)

“Conversion, both at common law and under the statute, is defined as any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.” ... “[I]n addition to the common-law elements for conversion, a plaintiff claiming statutory conversion must show that the conversion was for the defendant’s own use.” ... “Someone alleging conversion to the defendant’s own use under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) must show that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.” ... “Because Kenneth admitted to moving a portion of the comingled soil to fill his own vacant parcel, he clearly used the soil “for some purpose personal to [his] interests,” and therefore, his own use.” ... “Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that the Trelfas committed statutory conversion.”

Subsection (1)(a) permits treble damages, costs, and attorney fees for converting another person’s property to the defendant’s own use, but requires proof of common-law conversion plus use for a purpose personal to the defendant’s interests.

Cowan v. Stubborn Rebel Farms · filed 2025-08-26(1)(a)

To recover treble damages for statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), in addition to establishing the elements of common-law conversion, the plaintiff must establish that the conversion “was for the defendant’s ‘own use,’ ”

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) requires statutory conversion to involve property converted to the defendant’s own use and permits recovery of treble actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Wixie Acquisitions LLC v. Marrocco · filed 2025-12-02(1)(a)

MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) and (b) provide: ... (a) Another person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use. ... Therefore, in addition to proving the common-law elements of conversion, to prove statutory conversion, a party must satisfy the additional element “that the conversion was to the other person’s own use.” ... “[S]omeone alleging conversion to the defendant’s ‘own use’ under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) must show that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.”

Section 600.2919a allows treble damages for property converted to the defendant’s own use, and a statutory-conversion plaintiff must prove that own-use element in addition to the common-law elements of conversion.

City of Detroit v. Eastside Detroit Elderly Dividend Housing Assoc · filed 2026-03-24(1)(a)

“[I]n addition to the common-law elements for conversion, a plaintiff claiming statutory conversion must show that the conversion was for the defendant’s ‘own use.’ ” Magley, 325 Mich App at 314 n 3. This requires the plaintiff to show “that the defendant employed the converted property for some purpose personal to the defendant’s interests, even if that purpose is not the object’s ordinarily intended purpose.” Aroma Wines II, 497 Mich at 359.

Section 600.5078(1) requires an arbitrator to issue an award within 60 days of the final hearing or receipt of proposed findings, but an untimely award is reversible only when the error substantially affects the outcome.

Davidson v. Davidson · filed 2021-01-28(1)

Simply put, while MCL 600.5078(1) requires the arbitrator to issue an opinion with 60 days of the final hearing or after the receipt of any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, thereby rendering any untimely awards as an error of law, errors of law in arbitration matters must have been so substantial to have affected the outcome in order to warrant reversal. Assuming any error existed, plaintiff has failed to show how the error of law was “so substantial that, but for the error, the award would have been substantially different.” Collins, 228 Mich App at 567. Contrary to plaintiff’s position, there is no automatic reversal when an arbitrator makes an error of law.

Section 2955a provides an absolute defense when an impaired person's intoxication-related inability to function makes that person 50% or more at fault for the accident or event causing the injury; if the person is less than 50% at fault, damages are reduced by that percentage.

Wood v. Luckett · filed 2021-08-12

This statute provides an absolute defense to an action for injury when the injured person had an impaired ability that caused him to be 50% or more the cause of the incident that led to the injury.

Section 600.2955a(1) makes voluntary intoxication an absolute defense when the intoxicated individual was 50% or more at fault for the accident or event causing the injury.

Kastl v. Greektown Casino LLC · filed 2024-06-27(1)

The trial court based its award of summary disposition to defendant on MCL 600.2955a(1), which decrees that plaintiff cannot recover damages if she was voluntarily intoxicated and, as a result, she was 50% or more at fault for the accident. Specifically, the statute says “[i]t is an absolute defense in an action . . . for injury to a person or property that the individual upon whose . . . injury the action is based had an impaired ability to function due to the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . , and as a result of that impaired ability, the individual was 50% or more the cause of the accident or event that resulted in the . . . injury.” MCL 600.2955a(1).

Section 2164(1) permits enhanced expert-witness fees to be taxed as costs only for an expert who appeared by deposition or trial testimony, or who would have appeared if the case ended before trial.

Estate of Kinzie Renee Carlsen v. Southwestern Mi Emergency Servs · filed 2021-09-02(1)

The question presented here is whether the phrase “is to appear” applies to a witness who was not deposed and did not testify at trial even though the case went to trial and resulted in a final verdict. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that it does not. Instead, the phrase “to appear” applies to witnesses who could have been called to testify at some point, either by deposition or through trial testimony. The phrase “to appear” does not refer to the situation which took place here, in which a case proceeded to trial and verdict but the witness gave neither deposition nor trial testimony, notwithstanding language in other cases which could be read as authorizing witness fees under such circumstances.

Section 600.2164 gives the trial court discretion to include an expert witness’s preparation time in taxable expert fees.

Spine Specialists of Michigan Pc v. State Farm Auto Insurance Co · filed 2026-02-11(1)

The trial court also has discretion under MCL 600.2164 to include fees for the expert’s preparation time.

Section 1513(4) requires Battle Creek to provide a suitable courthouse and sufficient jail for circuit-court terms without expense to Calhoun County, and the statute is a general act concerning the statewide court system rather than a local or special act requiring voter approval.

Calhoun County v. City of Battle Creek · filed 2021-09-02(4)

The management of the state court system is an issue of statewide concern and a statute governing the funding and operations of the circuit courts is a general act. ... Accordingly, MCL 600.1513 is a general act.

Section 2421b(3)(b) defines the prevailing party in an action involving one issue or count as the party prevailing on the entire record.

Collins Jr v. Nizzi · filed 2022-01-20(3)(b)

Under the applicable provisions, plaintiff was the prevailing party. A party need not recover the full amount of requested damages to be a prevailing party entitled to costs under MCR 2.625. Rather the party must only show that its position was improved by the litigation. ... The fact that plaintiff did not recover the full amount sought is not dispositive of whether he was the prevailing party under MCL 600.2421b(3)(b) or MCR 2.625. ... Plaintiff improved his position, even if only slightly and not nearly as he had hoped. Therefore, the trial court erred by ruling that plaintiff was not the prevailing party.

Section 600.2912a(2) requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff claiming a lost opportunity to show a greater-than-50% chance of a better outcome; § 600.2955(1) requires reliable, sufficiently grounded expert opinions; § 600.2169(1) requires a standard-of-care expert to match the defendant’s specialty and majority practice; and § 600.2164 permits taxable expert fees, including preparation fees, when a case ends before the expert testifies.

Maxey v. Botsford General Hospital · filed 2022-02-17(2); 2955(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(f); 2169(1)(a), (1)(b); 2164(1)

In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%. ... The trial court did not misapply MRE 702 or MCL 600.2955 in concluding that Dr. Venkatasubramanian’s and Dr. Futrell’s opinions were not based on reliable methods. Their opinions were based on unsound statistical interpretations that produced results inconsistent with the body of research on stroke treatments with tPA. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this expert testimony. ... Although research showed promise for endovascular intervention, it did not meet the 51 percent threshold for medical malpractice when applied to plaintiff’s circumstances. See MCL 600.2955(1)(a) and (b). The basis of the opinion was not reliable because it did not apply to patients similarly situated to plaintiff. See MCL 600.2955(1)(f). ... Accordingly, plaintiffs’ expert had to have a specialty in general neurology and devote more than 50 percent of his or her professional time to general neurology. ... Hence, a party may recover expert fees under MCL 600.2164 where a case is dismissed before that expert can testify at trial.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires a medical-malpractice expert testifying about an RN's standard of care to have spent a majority of the preceding year's professional time practicing or teaching nursing; NP practice or teaching does not satisfy that requirement.

Gliniecki v. Ascension St John Hospital · filed 2022-05-26(1)(b)

For plaintiff to establish the standard of care and breach of that standard at trial, plaintiff would need to submit evidence from an RN—with a pertinent one-year history before the ablation—regarding the purported standard and breach. See MCL 600.2169(1). ... Because neither Bucher nor McLean can testify regarding the standard of care applicable to RNs, as a matter of law, plaintiff cannot establish all of the requisite elements of a medical malpractice claim.

A product-liability action includes a negligence claim whose essence is injury caused by a product defect, so the statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies even when the defendant is sued in its separate role as the product's owner.

Holmes v. Polaris, Inc. · filed 2022-03-08(h)

At its essence, plaintiffs’ negligence theory is a product liability action and is therefore subject to the MPLS cap on non-economic damages.

Section 1307a(1) sets the basic qualifications for jury service; satisfying those qualifications does not prevent a prospective juror from being challenged for cause under MCR 2.511(D)(10).

People of Michigan v. Perry Jr · filed 2024-10-03(1)

MCL 600.1307a(1) provides inflexible requirements for an individual to be considered for jury duty. ... MCL 600.1307a(1) and MCR 2.511(D)(10) operate harmoniously. A prospective juror must first meet the qualifications set out in MCL 600.1307a(1) to sit as a juror, and then the analysis shifts to MCR 2.511(D)(10) to determine whether he or she is subject to a challenge for cause.

Section 1307a(1) sets minimum qualifications for jury service and does not require every person who meets them to be seated as a juror.

People of Michigan v. Lapinskas · filed 2025-07-23(1)

As stated in MCL 600.1307a(1), these criteria are the minimum requirements a person must meet to be permitted to serve as a juror. This statute does not mandate that once a person meets these minimum requirements, they must be allowed to serve as a juror. As such, MCR 2.511(E) does not contravene these minimum requirements.

Michigan's comparative-fault statutes permit fault to be allocated to a parent entitled to parental immunity as a nonparty for apportioning a defendant's liability, but the allocation does not impose liability on the parent or eliminate parental immunity.

Honesti Price v. Country House Apartments LLC · filed 2022-03-312957(1), (3); 6304(1), (4), (8)

Under the comparative-fault statutes, which distinguish between immunity and duty, “a person entitled to parental immunity may nevertheless be named as a nonparty at fault and allocated fault for purposes of determining a defendant’s liability under the comparative-fault statutes.” Id. at 145.

Section 600.2907a(1)(b) allows recovery only for damages caused by filing the encumbrance; retained property value mitigates a lost-sale claim, and expenses incurred before the slander are not attributable to it.

Details Automotive Finishes LLC v. Four Childrens Enterprises LLC · filed 2022-04-21(1)(b)

The arguments advanced by Ware and FCE implicate MCL 600.2907a(1)(b),6 which authorizes recovery of “[a]ll damages the owner of the property may have sustained as a result of the filing of the encumbrance.” (Emphasis added.) A slander-of-title claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the damages sought were caused by the defendant’s act that constituted the disparagement or slander of the plaintiff’s title. ... Thus, although plaintiff lost the opportunity to sell the property for $150,000, plaintiff still retained the real property with a value of $148,000, thereby mitigating the damages incurred from the lost sale. The trial court therefore clearly erred by determining that plaintiff had suffered a loss of $150,000 that was caused by Ware and FCE’s slander of title. ... all of these expenses were incurred before Ware committed the act constituting slander of title and such damages therefore were not attributable to the disparagement of plaintiff’s title.

Section 600.2163a covers a qualifying child witness who alleges sexual assault and authorizes protective courtroom arrangements when the statutory welfare findings are made.

People of Michigan v. Hall · filed 2023-12-21(1)(g)(i), (2)(a), (18), and (19)

In this case, the child qualified as a “ ‘witness’ ” under MCL 600.2163a because she was 14 years old at the time of the trial, see MCL 600.2163a(1)(g)(i). And, because she alleged that she had been sexually assaulted, MCL 600.2163a was applicable. See MCL 600.2163a(2)(a).

Section 600.2163a requires courts to allow a support person for a child witness in a criminal sexual conduct proceeding and permits specified courtroom accommodations, including excluding unnecessary persons, closed-circuit broadcasting, positioning the defendant out of the witness's sight, and podium questioning, when the statutory requirements are met.

People of Michigan v. Jack · filed 2023-12-28(4), (18), and (19)

MCL 600.2163a authorizes courts to accommodate witnesses under the age of 16 in criminal sexual conduct proceedings. Subpart (4) in relevant part requires a court to permit a witness “who is called upon to testify to have a support person sit with, accompany, or be in close proximity to the witness during his or her testimony.” 600.2163a(4). Under Subpart (19), the court may exclude all persons not necessary to the proceeding during a witness’s testimony and broadcast the proceedings to the public via closed-circuit television at a separate location, arrange the courtroom with the defendant out of the witness’s direct sight, and require all questioning of the witness be performed from a podium. MCL 600.2163a(19).

Section 2163a(18) requires a court, on a pretrial motion, to make on-record findings and consider four factors before ordering subsection (19)'s protective courtroom arrangements for a witness.

People of Michigan v. Evans · filed 2022-04-21(18), (19)

To balance the rights of child victims while still protecting the constitutional right to public trials, our Legislature adopted MCL 600.2163a(18), which provides: ... MCL 600.2163a(19) requires the trial court to determine “on the record that [closure] is necessary to protect the welfare of the witness[.]” If that determination is made, the trial court must order one or more of several listed options that include removal of all unnecessary persons from the courtroom and public broadcast during witness testimony, defendant’s courtroom placement away from the victim and all other witnesses, and podium placement in front of the witness stand. ... Considered together, these factors demonstrated that partial closure of the courtroom was necessary to protect the welfare of the victim, a minor witness.

Section 2955(1) requires a trial court evaluating the reliability of expert testimony to consider the statutory reliability factors; published literature is relevant but not dispositive.

Walsh v. Md · filed 2025-07-08(1), including (a), (b), (e), (f), and (g)

In addition to MRE 702, the trial court in a medical malpractice case also must consider the factors listed in MCL 600.2955(1) when deciding whether an expert’s opinion and its basis are reliable.

Section 2955(1) requires the court to examine a scientific expert opinion and its factual and methodological basis for reliability and to consider the listed factors; insufficient peer-reviewed and other support can render the opinion unreliable.

Walsh v. Md · filed 2022-09-01(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (1)(g)

The trial court thus clearly erred in finding that Dr. Samuels’ testimony met the factors of MCL 600.2955 (b), (c), (e), (f), and (g). The literature offered to support Dr. Samuels’ opinion and his testimony about his informal polling of his colleagues are not sufficient to demonstrate that his opinion is reliable and generally accepted in the relevant community. The lack of supporting peer-reviewed literature combined with the lack of any other support for Dr. Samuels’ opinion renders his opinion unreliable. See Elher, 499 Mich at 28. The trial court therefore abused its discretion by determining that Dr. Samuels’ testimony was admissible.

Section 600.2955(1) requires the court to determine whether a scientific expert opinion is reliable and will assist the trier of fact by examining the opinion and its basis and considering the listed reliability factors.

20230202_C359859_41_359859D.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-02-02(1)

In addition to MRE 702, in a medical malpractice action, the trial court must consider the factors listed in MCL 600.2955(1) when evaluating whether an expert’s opinion and its basis are reliable.

MCL 600.2955(1) requires a trial court to consider all seven listed reliability factors for a scientific expert opinion, but no single factor must favor admissibility.

Lienard v. Applewood Nursing Center Inc · filed 2023-04-27(1)

“[A]lthough MCL 600.2955(1) explicitly requires the trial court to consider all seven of the factors it enumerates, the statute does not require that each and every one of those seven factors must favor the proffered testimony.” ... “To the extent the trial court apparently placed emphasis on the lack of peer-reviewed articles cited by Corn, which in itself is one of the proper considerations, the trial court erred by treating that fact as dispositive and by failing to consider or address the other factors.”

Section 600.2955(1) requires the court to assess an expert opinion’s reliability and helpfulness by examining its factual, technical, methodological, and reasoning bases and considering seven statutory factors.

Spolyar v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2023-05-25(1)

basis, including the facts, technique, methodology, and reasoning relied on by the expert, and by considering seven factors: (a) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to scientific testing and replication.

Section 2955(1) requires courts to assess the reliability and helpfulness of scientific expert opinions using the listed factors, including accepted standards, error rate, expert-community acceptance, basis reliability, and nonlitigation use.

Klapp v. Beaumont Health · filed 2024-05-23(1)(c)-(g)

MCL 600.2955(1) provides that, in an action for an injury to a person: a scientific opinion rendered by an otherwise qualified expert is not admissible unless the court determines that the opinion is reliable and will assist the trier of fact. ... First, the trial court did not err by finding that, under the third factor, MCL 600.2955(1)(c), Dr. Suite’s reliance on a single age subgroup from the Genentech study did not meet generally accepted standards when the subgroup included only 53 individuals.