Mich. Comp. Laws § 600

Section 5856(a) tolls the limitations period when the complaint is filed and the summons and complaint are served; it does not expressly condition tolling on filing an affidavit of merit.

Kirkaldy v. Rim · filed 2005-08-25(a)

Once again, MCL 600.5856(a) provides that periods of limitations are tolled "[a]t the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant. . . ." There is no language providing that a limitations period is tolled only when a complaint and an affidavit of merit are filed. ... Although not directly spelled out by § 5856(a), this approach would be consistent with § 5856(a), because a plain reading of the statute indicates that filing only the complaint, along with serving the summons and complaint, tolls the limitations period, and if a court subsequently determines that the accompanying affidavit is defective, there would be a dismissal, which would end any tolling.

MCL 600.5856(d) tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but it does not toll the wrongful-death saving period in MCL 600.5852; a notice of intent may instead toll the two-year limitations period under MCL 600.5805(6).

King v. Briggs · filed 2006-04-21(d)

In Waltz, this Court held that although the filing of a notice of intent in compliance with MCL 600.2912b tolls the two-year period of limitations, MCL 600.5805(6), it does not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful death actions under the wrongful death saving provision, MCL 600.5852, because MCL 600.5856(d) only tolls the applicable "statute of limitations" and the wrongful death saving provision is not a statute of limitations. ... Therefore, a plaintiff may have "five years plus 182 days" to file a complaint, not because the additional period permitted for filing a wrongful death action under the wrongful death saving provision is tolled, but because the two-year limitations period is tolled.

MCL 600.5856 tolls a statute of limitations or repose only upon the filing and timely service of a complaint, a court obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant, or compliant medical-malpractice notice; it does not toll limitations periods for administrative or quasi-administrative proceedings.

The Walt Disney Company v. Eubanks · filed 2025-03-24

MCL 600.5856, as amended by 2004 PA 87, provides for the tolling of a statute of limitations or repose only (1) upon the filing of a complaint if the summons and complaint are timely served on the defendant, (2) when a court obtains jurisdiction over a defendant, or (3) when notice in a medical malpractice action is provided in compliance with MCL 600.2912b.

Section 5856 tolls a statute of limitations or repose when a complaint is filed and timely served, when a court obtains jurisdiction over the defendant, or when compliant medical-malpractice notice is provided; it does not toll limitations for an administrative or quasi-administrative proceeding.

Dine Brands Global Inc v. Eubanks · filed 2025-03-24

MCL 600.5856, as amended by 2004 PA 87, provides for the tolling of a statute of limitations or repose only (1) upon the filing of a complaint if the summons and complaint are timely served on the defendant, (2) when a court obtains jurisdiction over a defendant, or (3) when notice in a medical malpractice action is provided in compliance with MCL 600.2912b. ... MCL 600.5856 does provide for tolling if a holder or the Treasurer files a legal action in court regarding compliance with or enforcement of the UUPA. But that statute does not provide for tolling upon the commencement of an administrative or quasi-administrative proceeding.

Section 5856 does not toll the statute of limitations for claims that were never pending before the federal district court.

MacKey v. Jeff Rising · filed 2025-05-21

Under these circumstances, MCL 600.5856 does not toll the statute of limitations regarding claims that were never pending before the federal district court.

Section 5838a(1) includes agents of a licensed health-care agency within the professional relationship supporting a medical-malpractice claim, even when the paramedics or EMTs themselves are not article 15 licensed health-care professionals.

Lockwood v. Mobile Medical Response, Inc. · filed 2011-06-07(1)

Still, the paramedic and the EMT were acting as agents of a licensed health-care agency, and therefore, can still be the subjects of a malpractice claim. MCL 600.5838a(1).

Section 600.5838a is an accrual statute identifying when a medical-malpractice cause of action accrues; it expands the category of potential malpractice defendants but does not define what constitutes medical malpractice.

Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Centre, Inc · filed 2004-07-30(5838a)

MCL 600.5838a(l) is an accrual statute that indicates when a medical malpractice cause of action accrues. Additionally, as we noted in Adkins v Annapolis Hosp, 420 Mich 87, 94-95; 360 NW2d 150 (1984), this statute likewise expands the traditional common-law list of those who are subject to medical malpractice actions.

Section 2955a makes impairment an absolute defense when the injured or deceased person’s impaired ability due to alcohol or a controlled substance made that person 50% or more the cause of the accident or event, and alcohol withdrawal can qualify as the event.

Harbour v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc · filed 2005-08-03(1), (2)(b)

Therefore, as the trial court properly concluded, alcohol withdrawal meets the broad definition of an “event,” as defined in Piccalo for the purposes of MCL 600.2955a(1). ... Under these circumstances, reasonable minds could not differ that, as a result of that impairment, the decedent was fifty percent or more the cause of the “event” — acute alcohol withdrawal — that resulted in his death. ... As a matter of law, defendant satisfied the requisite elements of MCL 600.2955a and was entitled to the absolute defense provided by that statute.

Section 600.2102 requires the signature of an out-of-state notary on an affidavit received in Michigan judicial proceedings to be certified by the clerk of a court of record in the county where the affidavit was taken, under the court's seal.

Apsey v. Memorial Hospital · filed 2005-08-25(4)

MCL 600.2102 is a law of this state that requires more specific recognition requirements for notarial acts authenticating an affidavit of a person residing in another state that is received in judicial proceedings; i.e., it requires that the signature of a notary public on an affidavit taken out of state “be certified by the clerk of any court of record in the county where such affidavit shall be taken, under seal of said court.”

Section 2912b(6) bars using successive presuit notices to obtain multiple 182-day tolling periods, but it does not prevent a second notice from initiating a single tolling period when the first notice did not toll the limitations period.

Mayberry v. General Orthopedics, PC · filed 2005-10-04(2912b)(6); (5856)(d)

We conclude that a second notice of intent to sue, sent with fewer than 182 days remaining in the limitations period, can initiate tolling under § 5856(d) as long as the first notice of intent to sue did not initiate such tolling. Section 2912b(6) prohibits a plaintiff from giving presuit notice to a defendant multiple times in order to initiate multiple tolling periods that repeatedly extend the period of limitations. This did not occur here.

Section 2912b(6) bars stacking successive 182-day notice periods to obtain multiple tolling periods, but permits a later notice to trigger one tolling period when the initial notice triggered none.

Mayberry v. General Orthopedics, PC · filed 2005-10-04(2912b)(6)

Section 2912b(6) prohibits the tacking of successive notice periods to create multiple tolling periods. In this case, § 2912b(6) poses no bar to plaintiffs’ ability to invoke tolling under § 5856(d) because plaintiffs did not seek to tack or add successive 182-day periods in order to reap the benefits of multiple tolling periods.

Section 600.631 does not provide a circuit-court appeal when another avenue for judicial review, such as a Court of Claims action, is available.

Kroon-Harris v. State · filed 2005-10-13

Nevertheless, we need not decide this issue today, because another phrase from MCL 600.631 is dispositive. ... We conclude that an individual, such as plaintiff, who is enrolled in defendant’s LTD insurance program and contends that defendant has erroneously denied benefits does indeed have an opportunity for judicial review of that denial — she can bring suit in the Court of Claims. ... Accordingly, an appeal under MCL 600.631 is not available.

Section 5852 allows a successor personal representative to commence an action within two years after appointment, but does not let the successor rely on an untimely complaint filed before appointment.

McMIDDLETON v. BOLLING · filed 2005-11-10(5852)

However, applying MCL 600.5852 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Eggleston, it is clear that a successor personal representative cannot rely on the untimely filed complaint that was filed before she was appointed.

For a medical-malpractice affidavit of merit, § 600.2912d(1) requires an expert from the same health profession and the listed affidavit statements, while incorporating only § 600.2169(1)'s qualifications—not § 600.2169(2)'s trial-court evaluation factors.

Sturgis Bank & Trust Co. v. Hillsdale Community Health Center · filed 2006-01-06(2912d)(1) and (2169)(1)-(2)

While § 2169(1) sets forth requirements or qualifications for an expert witness, § 2169(2) is not a set of requirements or qualifications; rather, it is the method by which the court evaluates whether an expert is qualified, and it directs the court to take into consideration the four factors listed therein. Here, § 2169(1) only requires that the affiants, the nurse and the nurse practitioner, practice or teach in the same health profession as those who committed the alleged malpractice, i.e., defendant’s nurses. Either the nurse’s affidavit or the nurse practitioner’s affidavit sufficed. Accordingly, the affidavits complied with § 2912d(l) where the affidavits also contained the necessary statements regarding the standard of care, breach of the standard of care, the actions necessary to comply with the standard of care, and causation. We find that the Legislature did not intend, for purposes of affidavits of merit, that a court undertake an evaluation regarding the credibility and qualifications of a particular expert beyond that stated in § 2169(1). This conclusion is supported by the language in § 2912d(l), referencing “the requirements for an expert witness under section 2169.” We hold that § 2912d(l) implicates § 2169(1), but not § 2169(2).

Section 6304(6)(a) preserves joint and several liability in a medical malpractice action where the plaintiffs are without fault, and that liability extends to damages attributable to an at-fault nonparty.

Bell v. Ren-Pharm, Inc · filed 2006-03-31(6)(a)

However, this case falls within an exception to that rule because it is a medical malpractice action in which plaintiffs have been determined to be without fault. MCL 600.6304(6)(a). Accordingly, “the liability of each defendant is joint and several....” ... Turning to general principles of joint and several liability, we conclude that plaintiffs are correct and that defendants’ joint and several liability extends to damages attributable to the fault of a nonparty such as Martindale. ... The trial court was correct in determining that defendants are jointly and severally liable for all of Taylor’s injuries, even those attributable to the fault of Martindale.

In a medical-malpractice action against a nonphysician, an expert must devote a majority of professional time to the active clinical practice of the same health profession as the defendant to testify about that defendant’s standard of care.

McElhaney v. Harper-Hutzel Hospital · filed 2006-03-31(1)(b)(i)

Section 2169(1)(b), however, makes no qualification of its applicability and, therefore, must be considered to apply generally to all malpractice actions, including those initiated against nonphysicians. ... Specifically, subsection b(i) states that an expert witness must devote “a majority of his or her professional time” to the “active clinical practice of the same health profession” as the defendant. ... Consequently, we conclude that because nurse midwives are separately licensed professionals who practice nursing with specialty certification in the practice of nurse midwifery, obstetricians/gynecologists may not testify about their standard of practice or care.

Section 5852 allows a successor personal representative to commence a surviving action within two years after letters of authority are issued, subject to the statute's outside time limit.

Verbrugghe v. Select Specialty Hospital-Macomb County, Inc · filed 2006-05-24

As noted in Eggleston, the statute contains only two limitations on the circumstances under which a successor personal representative can take advantage of the two-year period of limitations: the decedent passing away during the limitations period and the successor receiving letters of authority. Once these events occur, the statute simply indicates that if a lawsuit is brought by a successor, it must be filed within two years of the issuance of the letters of authority, but no more than five years after the cause of action accrued.

Section 2955a(1) does not, as a matter of law, bar an injured plaintiff from recovery solely because alcohol-impaired functioning made the plaintiff 50% or more the cause of the accident.

Mallison v. Scribner · filed 2006-06-07(1)

The Court of Appeals and the Gogebic Circuit Court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that as a result of plaintiff’s impaired ability to function due to the influence of intoxicating liquor, she was 50% or more the cause of the accident that resulted in her injuries and that she is barred from recovery under MCL 600.2955a(1).

MCL 600.5856(c) tolls the limitations period for 182 days after a timely notice of intent, but it does not toll the additional filing period provided by the wrongful-death saving statute.

McLean v. McElhaney · filed 2006-03-02(c)

However, MCL 600.5852 is a saving statute and not a statute of limitations. ... MCL 600.5856(c) ... does not toll the additional period provided for filing an action under the wrongful death saving statute, MCL 600.5852.

Section 5838a(1)(a) limits “licensed health facility or agency” to facilities licensed under article 17 of the Public Health Code, so a pharmacy licensed under article 15 does not qualify for medical-malpractice actions.

Kuznar v. Raksha Corp. · filed 2006-11-22(1)(a)

Because the licensure requirement applicable to a pharmacy appears in article 15 of the public health code, specifically MCL 333.17741, and not in article 17, a pharmacy does not qualify as a “licensed health facility or agency” subject to malpractice actions, as set forth in MCL 600.5838a(l).

Section 5838a(1) permits malpractice claims against licensed health care professionals and licensed health facilities or agencies; a psychologist licensed under article 15 qualifies as a licensed health care professional, while a psychological practice or human-resources company outside the statutory facility categories does not qualify in that capacity.

Sabbagh v. Hamilton Psychological Services Plc · filed 2019-08-06(1)(a), (1)(b)

A “licensed health facility or agency” is “a health facility or agency licensed under article 17 of the public health code . . . .” MCL 600.5838a(1)(a). ... Because Hamilton is a psychological practice and Ulliance is a human resources company, neither of which is included in MCL 333.20106(1), they “cannot be directly liable for medical malpractice in that capacity.” Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 178; 750 NW2d 121 (2008). Thus, any claims of negligence against Hamilton and Ulliance must sound in ordinary negligence as opposed to medical malpractice. ... A “licensed health care professional” is “an individual licensed or registered under article 15 of the public health code . . . and engaged in the practice of his or her health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity.” MCL 600.5838a(1)(b). ... Therefore, they are both licensed health care professionals, MCL 600.5838a(1)(b), and thus “capable of malpractice,” Bryant, 471 Mich at 420.

Subsection (1) limits who may be subject to a medical-malpractice action to persons or entities within its specified categories, including licensed health facilities or agencies, licensed health care professionals, and agents of licensed facilities or agencies.

Lafave v. Alliance Healthcare Services Inc · filed 2020-04-02(1)

Defendant has not offered this Court any statute or case law to suggest that a person or entity who does not fall squarely within the category set out in MCL 600.5838a(1) (and articles 17 and 15 by reference) can somehow otherwise qualify as a professional susceptible to a medical-malpractice suit. We conclude that the Legislature has expressly identified the category of persons or entities who can be subject to a medical-malpractice suit, and if the category is to be expanded to include an MRI technician or MRI provider, then it is the place of the Legislature, not this Court, to make the expansion.

Section 600.5838a(1)(a) limits the statute's licensed-health-facility category to facilities or agencies licensed under article 17 of the Public Health Code, so certification as an intermediate care facility alone is insufficient.

Estate of Aaron Kelly Miller v. Angels' Place Inc · filed 2020-10-22(1)(a)

However, MCL 333.20115(1) provides that “[t]he department may define a specific organization as a health facility or agency for the sole purpose of certification authorized under this section. For purpose of certification only, an organization defined in [MCL 333.20106(5), MCL 333.20108(1), or MCL 333.20109(4)] is considered a health facility or agency” (Emphasis added). Additionally, MCL 333.20108(1) also references only certification, not licensure. Consequently, both statutory sections establish that being an “intermediate care facility” establishes only that it is “certified” under the Public Health Code, not that it is “licensed.” The plain language of MCL 600.5838a(1)(a) specifically requires licensure.

Section 5838a(1) permits medical-malpractice claims against a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or an employee or agent of one.

Tw v. Corewell · filed 2026-06-05(1)

The trial court therefore properly concluded that Corewell is capable of committing, and can be held liable for, medical malpractice pursuant to MCL 600.5838a(1).

Section 2912d(1) requires the plaintiff’s counsel to reasonably believe that the affidavit-of-merit expert practiced or taught the defendant’s same health profession during the preceding year.

Bates v. Gilbert · filed 2007-07-25(1)

Thus, under § 2912d(l) and § 2169(l)(b)(i) and (ii), the plaintiffs counsel must reasonably believe that the expert selected by the plaintiff to address the applicable standard of practice or care in the affidavit of merit devoted a majority of his or her professional time during the year before the alleged malpractice to practicing or teaching the same health profession as the defendant health professional.

Section 600.2169(1)(c) qualifies a board-certified family practitioner to testify against a general-practitioner defendant when the expert satisfies the statute’s recent general-practice or instruction requirement.

Robins v. Garg · filed 2007-10-26(1)(c)

For purposes of satisfying the requirements of MCL 600.2169, therefore, we hold that an expert who is a board-certified family practitioner is qualified under MCL 600.2169(l)(c) to testify against a defendant doctor who is a general practitioner, as long as MCL 600.2169(l)(c)(i) or (ii) is also satisfied.

Sections 2169(2)-(3) require the court to evaluate a medical-malpractice expert’s education, training, specialization, clinical practice or instruction, and testimony’s relevance, while preserving other grounds for disqualification; these requirements operate alongside § 2955’s reliability standard.

Walworth v. Metropolitan Hospital · filed 2016-07-28(2169)(2)-(3); (2955)(1), (3)

Consequently, the trial court properly considered Dr. Kitain’s lack the education, professional training, and experience when deciding that Dr. Kitain could not reliably testify regarding the standard of care requisite for performing a canaloplasty.

For medical-malpractice standard-of-care testimony, an expert must devote a majority of professional time in the preceding year to practicing or teaching the defendant’s relevant specialty; time spent in another specialty cannot be combined to satisfy that requirement.

Estate of Patricia E Leblanc v. Eugene J Agnone Md · filed 2017-07-06(1)(b)

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiff failed to establish that Dr. Sokol devoted a majority of his professional time to the practice or teaching of medical oncology in the year immediately preceding the alleged malpractice. ... It is thus improper to combine Dr. Sokol’s time spent in medical oncology with his time spent practicing internal medicine when considering whether he is qualified as an expert under MCL 600.2169(1)(b).

To testify about the standard of care in a medical-malpractice action, an expert must have devoted a majority of the preceding year's professional time to practicing or teaching the same health profession as the licensed professional being sued.

Cox v. Eric J. Hartman, M.D., & Blue Water Obstetrics & Gynecology Prof'l Corp. · filed 2017-12-12(1)(b)

Given that Beckmann did not spend a majority of her professional time in the relevant time period practicing or teaching the health profession of nursing, she was not qualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care under MCL 600.2169(1)(b).

Section 600.2169(1)(b)(i) requires a medical-malpractice expert to spend a majority of professional time practicing the relevant specialty in the preceding period; matching board certifications alone is insufficient.

Estate of Luella Ehrlinger v. Phillip a Dean Md · filed 2018-01-09(1)(b)(i)

Accordingly, Dr. Silverman does not meet the active clinical practice requirement for the relevant standard of care (general surgery) under MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i).

Section 2169(1)(b) requires a malpractice expert to have spent a majority of the preceding year practicing or teaching the same health profession as the defendant; a nurse practitioner who mainly practiced or taught as a nurse practitioner was therefore not qualified to testify against a registered nurse.

Angelina a Cox v. Eric J Hartman Md · filed 2017-12-12(1)(b)

Given that Beckmann did not spend a majority of her professional time in the relevant time period practicing or teaching the health profession of nursing, she was not qualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care under MCL 600.2169(1)(b).

An expert in hospital administration must know the applicable local standard of care to qualify to testify under § 600.2169; knowledge of only a national standard is insufficient.

Estate of Jason a Blackwell v. St Mary's of Michigan · filed 2020-08-13

Before we can turn to the question of whether a witness meets the requirements to testify regarding the standard of care under MCL 600.2169 (which is based on his or her licensure and work experience), we must first determine the applicable standard of care and the expert’s knowledge of it. ... Thus, an expert in hospital administration must be knowledgeable of the standard of care in the relevant locality to be qualified as an expert in a medical malpractice case. See id. at 20-22. ... In his deposition, Hawkins testified about a national standard of care, not the local standard of care for a level II trauma center in Saginaw, Michigan, such as defendant. ... Because Hawkins was not knowledgeable about the applicable standard of care, he was not qualified to offer standard of care testimony in this case.

Section 600.2169(1)(a) requires an expert witness testifying against a board-certified specialist to be board-certified in the same specialty.

Rushlow v. Bodell · filed 2021-04-29(1)(a)

However, as indicated, MCL 600.2169(1)(a) explicitly states that “if the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist who is board-certified, the expert witness must be a specialist who is board-certified in that specialty.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 2169(1) requires a medical-malpractice expert to match the defendant specialist's one most relevant specialty and to have devoted a majority of the preceding year's professional time to practicing or teaching that specialty.

Strasser v. Oakwood Heritage Hospital · filed 2021-11-04(1)(a)-(b)

When the procedure to control plaintiff’s pain is viewed within the context of the underlying surgery, it becomes evident that the one most relevant specialty is anesthesiology and not pain medicine. Moreover, during the year immediately preceding the date of the alleged medical malpractice, Dr. Savala had not devoted the majority of his professional time to either the active clinical practice of anesthesiology or to the instruction of students in anesthesiology. MCL 600.2169(1); Woodard, 476 Mich at 561-562.

Subsection (1)(a) requires a medical-malpractice expert to match the defendant specialist’s specialty, while subsection (1)(b) requires the expert to have spent a majority of the preceding year practicing or teaching that specialty.

Estate of Lamarr Green v. Md · filed 2023-05-25(1)(a), (1)(b)

General surgery and surgical critical care are distinct specialties for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1) because they are “particular branch[es] of medicine or surgery in which one can potentially become board certified.” Woodard, 476 Mich at 561 (emphasis added). ... Dr. Nirgiotis was not a specialist in surgical critical care and was, therefore, not qualified under MCL 600.2169(1)(a) to testify about the standard of care applicable to Dr. Abbassi. ... As such, he did not meet the statutory “same practice or instruction” requirement to provide expert testimony concerning general surgery. MCL 600.2169(1)(b).

In a medical-malpractice action, the expert’s specialty must match the defendant’s most relevant specialty, and if the defendant is board-certified in that specialty, the expert must also be board-certified in it.

Estate of Douglas Widmar v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2023-11-09(1)(a)

In sum, the evidence establishes that Dr. Villalba and Dr. Frikker were practicing surgical critical care when they performed the percutaneous tracheotomy on the decedent on October 21, 2015. Surgical critical care is therefore the most relevant specialty. Because Dr. Villalba and Dr. Frikker were both board-certified in surgical critical care, and Dr. Salzman was not, Dr. Salzman was not qualified under MCL 600.2961(1)(a) to testify regarding whether Dr. Villalba or Dr. Frikker breached the applicable standard of care.

For a nurse-practitioner expert witness, § 600.2169(1)(b)(i) requires active clinical practice of nursing, the same health profession as the nurse-practitioner defendant, but its specialist-practice requirement does not apply.

Leibinger v. Metropolitan Health Corporation · filed 2023-11-21(1)(b)(i)

We therefore hold that, under MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i), the phrase “if that party is a specialist, the active clinical practice of that specialty” does not apply to nurse practitioners because nurse practitioners are not “specialists” as defined by the statute.

Section 600.2169(1)(b) requires an expert to match the defendant’s specialty, but does not require matching subspecialties; the court must also evaluate the expert under the factors in subsection (2).

Myers v. Board of Hospital Managers for City of Flint · filed 2024-11-19(1)(b)

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the specialty, rather than the subspecialty, was the controlling factor for purposes of MCL 600.2169(1)(b). However, we vacate the trial court’s opinion and remand for the trial court to assess further Dr. Philp’s qualifications under MCL 600.2169(2).

For a medical-malpractice claim accruing before age eight, § 600.5851(7) gives the claimant until the tenth birthday or the applicable § 600.5838a limitations period, whichever is later; that ten-year period is a limitations period subject to notice tolling.

Vanslembrouck v. Halperin · filed 2008-01-15(7)

Following the Miller Court’s logic, we believe that the 10-year provision of MCL 600.5851(7) is a period of limitations rather than a saving provision. It is a “statutory provision that requires a person who has a cause of action to bring suit within a specified time.” Miller, supra, 466 Mich at 202. MCL 600.5851(7) provides that, if a medical malpractice claim accrues before the claimant has reached his or her eighth birthday, the claimant must bring the claim before the claimant reaches his or her tenth birthday or within the period of limitations set forth in MCL 600.5838a(2), whichever is later.

Section 5851(1) tolls the limitations period for a minor’s civil action and gives the minor one year after the disability is removed to bring the action, including a breach-of-contract action.

Klida v. Braman · filed 2008-02-19(1)

Here, plaintiffs claim premised on the breach of an UIM contract is “an action under [the RJA].” Her cause of action accrued when she was under 18 years of age, but she brought this claim within one year of reaching the age of majority, thus meeting the requirements of MCL 600.5851(1). Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary dismissal on this ground.

Section 5856(a)'s Michigan tolling rule does not toll the limitations period for a federal admiralty tort claim; federal maritime limitations law controls.

Kott-Millard v. Fieger · filed 2019-03-05(a)

Defendants’ argument that tolling under MCL 600.5856(a) would apply is misplaced. To promote uniformity, state tolling statutes do not apply to federal admiralty tort claims.

Under Chapter 600, a claim founded on a duty imposed by law rather than a breach of promise is subject to § 600.5805’s three-year limitations period, and § 600.5856 tolls limitations when the complaint is filed or jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired.

Eggleston v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation · filed 2023-09-29

Under MCL § 600.5805(2), the general limitations period “to recover damages … for injury to a person or property” is three years. MCL § 600.5807(9) provides a six-year limitations period “to recover damages or money due for breach of contract,” subject to some limitations not relevant here. MCL § 600.5813, meanwhile, subjects “[a]ll other personal actions” to a six-year limitations period. ... But Eggleston does not seek equitable relief. ... the Michigan Supreme Court has held that when a claim is founded on a duty “imposed by law” rather than the breach of a promise, it is governed by MCL § 600.5805’s three-year limitations period. ... The applicable limitations period is three years. ... Michigan’s tolling provisions are set out in MCL § 600.5856, which provides that the statutes of limitations governing claims are tolled “[a]t the time the complaint is filed” or “[a]t the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired.”

Section 600.2946(5) grants drug manufacturers broad immunity from product-liability suits when the FDA approved the drug and its labeling complied with FDA requirements, including for off-label uses, unless a statutory exception applies.

White ex rel. Estate of McCullough v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. · filed 2008-03-06(5)

Assuming the well-pled facts in the complaint as true, as this Court must for this motion, under the plain language of the statute, Defendant GSK is protected from this product liability suit. The Michigan Legislature provided immunity for drug manufacturers for products approved by the FDA, so long as the product and its labeling meet the FDA standards. Through the definition of “production,” the statute extends the protection from suits broadly to a myriad of activities a manufacturer might perform related to the product. The statute does not limit the protection to situations when the drug is used for its approved purposes. Should the Legislature wish to limit the protection available to “off-label” uses of the drug, it may do so. Until such an amendment is enacted, this Court must interpret the statute as it is written. Under Michigan law, the actions of Defendant GSK alleged in the complaint are protected from a lawsuit because Defendant has complied with FDA regulations.

Sections 600.2912b(4)(b)-(d) require a notice of intent to state a particularized standard of care for each named professional or facility, the manner of the breach, and the action needed to comply, while § 600.2912d requires an affidavit of merit to include the required statement of proximate cause.

Potter v. McLeary · filed 2008-03-202912b(4)(b), 2912b(4)(c), 2912b(4)(d), 2912d

The standard of care completely fails to make any reference to defendant Huron Valley Radiology. ... Therefore, it met the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4)(b) with regard to Murry. However, the notice cannot satisfy all the statutory requirements with regard to defendant Huron Valley Radiology. ... The only statutory requirement is that the notice contain “ ‘a statement’ of each of the enumerated categories of information,” not that it “be in any particular format.” ... To comply with the standard of care, Murry should have properly interpreted the MRI images and conveyed accurate information to the emergency room physician.

Section 2912b(4) requires a notice of intent to contain each listed item and reasonably communicate the claim, but permits any format, while § 2912d(1)(d) is satisfied when the affidavit as a whole explains how the alleged breach caused the injury.

Esselman v. Garden City Hospital · filed 2009-06-04(2912b)(4); (2912d)(1)(d)

Although all the information required by the statute must be “specifically identified in an ascertainable manner within the notice,” it does not need to be set forth in any particular “method or format.” ... Thus, the issues are whether the NOI contains “a statement” that provides information containing all the enumerated requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4), and whether those statements reasonably communicate to a medical professional or medical facility (which surely has better access to information than the plaintiff) the nature of the claim the plaintiff intends to pursue against the medical professional or medical facility. ... We agree with the trial court that plaintiffs NOI satisfied MCL 600.2912b. ... Thus, even if a given section of the affidavit does not adequately address proximate cause, the dispositive question is whether the affidavit as a whole nevertheless explains how the alleged malpractice proximately caused the injury. ... We therefore agree with the trial court that plaintiffs affidavits of merit satisfied MCL 600.2912d.

Michigan’s medical-malpractice notice and affidavit statutes require specific information, including how the alleged breach proximately caused the injury; filing a complaint with a defective affidavit does not toll the wrongful-death saving period, and dismissal is required when that period has expired.

Ligons v. Crittenton Hospital · filed 2009-08-182912b(4), 2912d(1), 5852, 5856(a)

MCL 600.2912b(1) provides, in part, that “a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.” ... We conclude that the supplemental NOI remedied the deficiency in the original NOI. ... Defendants also argue that plaintiff failed to file with his complaint affidavits of merit that conformed to the requirements of MCL 600.2912d, which provides that a plaintiff claiming medical malpractice must file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a qualified health professional. ... To satisfy the requirement that an affidavit of merit state “[t]he manner in which the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury alleged,” it is insufficient to merely allege that the defendant’s alleged negligence caused the injury. ... We therefore conclude that the affidavits of merit were insufficient to comply with the statutory requirements.

Subsection (1) requires an affidavit of merit to certify that the health professional reviewed the notice and all medical records supplied by the plaintiff’s attorney, but it does not require review or identification of particular records.

Kalaj v. Khan · filed 2012-02-14(1)

However, by its plain language, MCL 600.2912d(l) requires only “that the health professional has reviewed the notice and all medical records supplied to him or her by the plaintiff s attorney concerning the allegations contained in the notice.” There is no specific requirement concerning which hospital or medical provider’s records must have been reviewed in order for the expert to ascertain a breach of the standard of care. Nor does the statute require that the health professional even identify the medical records he or she has reviewed. It is sufficient, under the plain language of the statute, for the expert to indicate that he or she has reviewed the records provided by the plaintiffs counsel and that in' light of those records, the expert is willing and able to opine with respect to the defendant’s negligence consistently with the elements set forth in the statute.

MCL 600.2912b(5) and MCL 600.2912d(3) use the plain meaning of “medical record,” and MCL 600.2912b(5) does not require defendants to explain why unavailable documents were no longer available.

Wade v. McCadie · filed 2016-04-06

The Court of Appeals erred by interpreting the term “medical record” in MCL 600.2912b(5) and MCL 600.2912d(3), which are sections of the Revised Judicature Act, by reference to the definition of “medical record” in a section of the Medical Records Access Act that begins with the limitation “[a]s used in this act.” MCL 333.26263 (emphasis added). See Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 563 (2006). The Court of Appeals further erred by imposing an obligation not found in MCL 600.2912b(5) that required the defendants to “offer a timely explanation for why [documents not within the defendants’ control] were no longer available.”

A medical-malpractice notice of intent must specifically identify the factual basis, applicable standard of care, breach, corrective action, and proximate cause; generalized allegations or inferences are insufficient.

Hunter v. John M Cilluffo Md · filed 2016-05-24(4)(a)-(e)

While the remainder of plaintiff’s NOI may allow an inference to be drawn that he alleged malpractice on June 28, 2012, Roberts, 470 Mich at 697, or may assert the “gravamen” or substantial point or essence of plaintiff’s claims, Boodt, 481 Mich at 560-561, such assertions are insufficient to comply with the remaining subsections of MCL 600.2912b(4). It is unclear what exactly plaintiff is “claiming” under the remaining subsections with regard to any actions by defendant Cilluffo on June 28, 2012, and the NOI failed to “specifically identif[y]” the factual basis for such a claim. Roberts, 470 Mich at 701. Therefore, plaintiff’s NOI was deficient.

For medical-malpractice claims, a good-faith attempt to satisfy the notice-of-intent content requirements permits defects to be cured rather than dismissed without prejudice, and an amended complaint does not require an additional affidavit of merit.

Estate of Andrew Jackson v. Oakwood Healthcare Inc · filed 2017-12-072912b(4); 2912d(1)

According to Bush, a defective NOI will satisfy both prongs of the test so long as the plaintiff attempted in good faith to comply with § 2912b(4). Bush, 484 Mich at 178. Stated differently, “only when a plaintiff has not made a good-faith attempt to comply with § 2912b(4) should a trial court consider dismissal of an action without prejudice.” Id. (emphasis added). ... By its own terms, MCL 600.2912d(1) does not require the filing of an additional affidavit of merit with an amended complaint. This Court will not read anything into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature, as gleaned from the language of the statute itself.

MCL 600.2912b(4) requires a medical-malpractice notice of intent to state the applicable standard of care, how it was breached, what should have been done, and how the alleged negligence caused the injury, with some degree of detail.

Lavalley v. St Mary Mercy Hospital · filed 2020-12-22(4)

Furthermore, in contrast to the commendably thorough recitation of all of the notice elements required by MCL 600.2912b(4) as to Dr. Tahir and Michigan Neurodiagnostics, the first NOI sets forth nothing as to Dr. Daitch. ... The NOI doesn’t include any statement regarding the standard of care that applies to Dr. Daitch or SMMH relative to Dr. Daitch’s conduct, does not identify how Dr. Daitch and, by-extension, SMMH breached the standard of care, does not indicate what Dr. Daitch and, by-extension, SMMH should have done to comply with the standard of care, and does not explain how the allegedly negligent conduct of Dr. Daitch and, by extension, SMMH caused Colleen’s alleged injuries.

Section 600.2912d(1) requires the health professional signing an affidavit of merit to personally review the notice of intent and all supplied medical records before signing, and telephone discussions alone are insufficient.

Hilley III v. Joseph Ihab Saleh Alamat Dds · filed 2022-11-10(1)

To “review” documents that were “supplied” generally means, at the bare minimum, to look over and thoughtfully consider documents that were provided. ... Having telephone conversations with a plaintiff’s attorney about the contents of the NOI and the plaintiff’s medical records is insufficient to meet the requirements of MCL 600.2912d(1).

Section 2912b treats the office of personal representative as a “person,” allowing a successor personal representative to rely on a notice of intent filed by the predecessor.

Braverman v. Garden City Hospital · filed 2008-04-09

Moreover, plaintiff, as successor personal representative, may rely on the notice of intent filed by the previous personal representative because the office of personal representative is a “person” under MCL 600.2912b.

Section 5838a(1) permits medical-malpractice claims against licensed health-care professionals, licensed health facilities or agencies, and employees or agents of licensed health facilities or agencies, but a pharmacy and a nonpharmacist employee of a pharmacy are not covered defendants under those categories.

Kuznar v. Raksha Corp. · filed 2008-06-11(1)

The primary issue in this case is whether the pharmacy technician and the pharmacy are covered by MCL 600.5838a(1). We conclude that they are not. ... A pharmacy is neither a licensed health facility or agency nor a licensed health-care professional and cannot be directly liable for medical malpractice. ... A nonpharmacist employee of a licensed pharmacy is neither a licensed health-care professional nor an employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency.

Section 5838a(1) includes professional corporations within the entities covered by Michigan's medical-malpractice statutory scheme.

Potter v. Richard C McLeary Md · filed 2009-07-31(1)

Because this same list of health facilities contained in § 333.20106(1) does not include PCs, the question arises whether PCs are exempt from any of the requirements of the medical malpractice statutory scheme. We conclude that it is unnecessary to refer to the list in § 333.20106(1) in this instance because the plain language of § 600.5838a, as amended effective April 1, 1994, expressly includes professional corporations within its definitional section.

Section 5838a(1) covers a professional corporation as an entity capable of medical malpractice liability when it renders professional services through a licensed health care provider, including through an employee whose individual licensure is not dispositive.

Estate of Annie Ruth Flie v. Oakwood Healthcare Inc · filed 2017-12-12(1)

A PC is considered a “licensed health care provider” when the PC renders professional services, see id. at 418 (“When a PC renders professional services, it is rendering those professional services through the licensed health care provider and the two are treated as though they are one entity.”); id. at 412 (“For all practical purposes, the PC and the health care provider are treated as the same entity when professional services are involved.”). Thus, if an employee is one that provides professional services through the PC as defined in MCL 450.1285(1) (previously MCL 450.225), then the actions of the PC, and therefore of the employee, are treated as the actions of the licensed health care provider, regardless of the employee’s licensure.

Section 600.5838a(1)(b) permits an institutional defendant to be vicariously liable for medical malpractice only for professional negligence by employees who are licensed health care professionals; negligence by an unlicensed employee sounds in ordinary negligence.

Estate of John Swanzy v. Edward J Kryshak Md · filed 2021-03-11(1)(b)

Kuznar, Potter, LaFave, and Sabbagh stand for the proposition that an institutional defendant is only capable of being held vicariously liable for the professional malpractice of its employees who are licensed health care providers under MCL 600.5838a(1)(b). ... Accordingly, because Spectrum’s employee, Zamarron is not a licensed health care professional under MCL 600.5838a(1)(b), plaintiff’s claim that Spectrum is vicariously liable for the actions of Zamarron sounds in ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice.

Section 600.6128(2) permits a person claiming adversely to a judgment debtor to be joined in supplemental proceedings.

Estes v. Titus · filed 2008-07-02(2)

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Swabash should be joined in the wrongful death action. She is both a “person claiming adversely to the judgment debtor” in that action under MCL 600.6128(2) and a necessary party to plaintiffs claim for UFTA relief under MCR 2.205(A).

Section 600.6128 requires a court to bring in and join an adverse third-party claimant when the judgment debtor may have an interest in disputed property.

Daws Excavating LLC v. Camp Retreats Foundation · filed 2018-02-13(1)(a) and (2)

Accordingly, under MCL 600.6128, once the judgment creditor shows that the judgment debtor “may have” an interest in the property held by a nonparty, the court “shall by show cause order or otherwise” cause that nonparty to be “brought in and made a party” to the action.

Section 600.6304 treats comparative negligence as an issue for the trier of fact when the evidence permits reasonable disagreement about the parties’ fault.

20231207_C364223_36_364223.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-12-07(1)(b), (2)

Because there is evidence from which reasonable persons could conclude that Myers’s negligence was a cause of the accident, proximate cause is an issue for the trier of fact, Rodriguez, 191 Mich App at 488, as is comparative negligence, MCL 600.6304(1)(b) and (2).

The comparative-fault statutes allocate fault only for persons whose conduct contributed to the underlying injury and resulting damages, not for a later, separate tort in a different causal chain.

Vandonkelaar v. Kid's Kourt, LLC · filed 2010-09-302956, 2957(1), 2957(3), 6304(1)(b), 6304(2), and 6304(8)

Accordingly, when subsections (l)(b) and (2) of MCL 600.6304 are read together, consideration of the causal relation between the conduct and the claimed damages means consideration of conduct that jointly contributed to the injury and the damages flowing from that particular conduct and resulting injury. Those statutory subsections, when read together, do not direct a trier of fact to consider damages unrelated to conduct that produced or caused the underlying injury.

Section 600.6304 requires the factfinder in a tort action involving multiple at-fault persons to determine each person's percentage of fault, including the plaintiff's, when the plaintiff's fault was a proximate cause of the damages.

Zaremba Equipment, Inc. v. Harco National Insurance · filed 2008-07-31(1)(b)

Furthermore, MCL 600.6304(l)(b) unambiguously requires the finder of fact to assess the percentage of fault attributable to a plaintiff if the plaintiffs fault constituted a proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages.

Section 600.2956 does not apply to contract actions, so the parties’ contractual allocation of liability controls.

Tibble v. American Physicians Capital Inc · filed 2014-10-28

We find the above analysis persuasive and hold that MCL 600.2956 does not apply to contract actions, and the language chosen by the parties as contained in the contract is controlling.

The comparative-fault statutes require consideration and allocation of a responsible nonparty’s fault even when the nonparty is immune, provided the nonparty owed a duty; the allocation determines the named defendant’s fair share and does not impose liability on the nonparty.

Estate of Ezekiel D Goodwin v. Northwest Michigan Fair Association · filed 2018-07-03(2957)(1), (2957)(3), and (6304)(1), (4), (8)

Consistent with this distinction between duty and immunity, the comparative fault statutes make plain that the availability of immunity does not control the existence of a duty that can give rise to an allocation of fault to a nonparty under MCL 600.2957 and MCL 600.6304. That is, while preserving any immunity held by a nonparty, the statutes allow for consideration of a nonparty’s fault for a breach of duty, regardless of whether immunity would preclude a plaintiff from naming the immune person as a party.

MCL 600.2957 and MCL 600.6304 require the fact-finder to allocate fault among all responsible persons, including immune nonparties, without regard to whether the nonparty could be sued; the allocation preserves immunity and limits named defendants to their fair shares.

Estate of Ezekiel D Goodwin v. Northwest Michigan Fair Association · filed 2018-07-032957(1), 2957(3), 6304(1)(b), 6304(3), and 6304(8)

First of all, the trial court erred by focusing on whether Ezekiel’s estate could obtain a recovery against Jeff. Quite simply, under MCL 600.2957 and MCL 600.6304, the allocation of fault is not dependent on whether a plaintiff can recover damages from the nonparty. Following the enactment of tort-reform legislation, the finder of fact must allocate fault among all responsible persons, “regardless of whether the person is, or could have been, named as a party to the action.” MCL 600.2957(1). See also MCL 600.6304(1)(b). A finding that a nonparty is at fault “does not subject the nonparty to liability.” MCL 600.2957(3). Rather, the sole purpose of assessing the fault of nonparties is to “accurately determine the fault of named parties,” MCL 600.2957(3), to ensure that each named defendant-tortfeasor does not “pay damages in an amount greater than his allocated percentage of fault,” Gerling, 472 Mich at 51. In other words, the nonparty’s “liability” to the plaintiff is not at issue under the comparative fault statutes and it is immaterial whether a plaintiff could have named the nonparty as a defendant.

The six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions applies even when the claim is styled as a declaratory-judgment action.

Tenneco Inc. v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance · filed 2008-10-30(5807)(8)

We conclude that although plaintiff styled this lawsuit as an action for a declaratory judgment, it is essentially a breach of contract claim that is governed by the six-year period of limitations. MCL 600.5807(8).

Section 2919a preserves the common-law measure of conversion damages and permits trebling of actual damages, but does not make investigatory expenses recoverable or trebleable.

Marko Law Pllc v. Salling · filed 2025-11-13(1)(a)

Under MCL 600.2919a, a person harmed by another’s theft, embezzlement, or conversion may recover three times the amount of “actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.” We hold that the statute leaves the common-law measure of damages for conversion unchanged, except to authorize a multiplied recovery. Because investigatory expenses incurred in uncovering or responding to a conversion fall outside that measure, they are not recoverable as “actual damages” under the statute and cannot be trebled.

Section 600.2919a permits three times actual damages, rather than four times actual damages, and permits recovery of postjudgment and appellate attorney fees and costs.

New Properties, Inc v. George D Newpower, Jr, Inc · filed 2009-01-20

However, the statutory language unambiguously states that a person “may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained. ...” It does not state that a person may recover four times the amount. The last sentence means that the remedy of “3 times the amount of actual damages sustained” is in addition to any other remedy, at law or otherwise, such as an equitable remedy or damages. Michigan’s trial courts typically award only three times the actual damages sustained when awarding treble damages and the Kitchens have cited no authority for this Court to change this practice. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of treble damages in the amount totaling $300,000. ... The same reasoning applies here. We conclude that MCL 600.2919a permits the recovery of postjudgment fees related to this appeal. Moreover, as we have already stated, unlike the statute at issue in Haliw, the statute applicable here does not specifically focus on trial-related costs. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment that includes the Kitchens’ postjudgment fees and costs and appellate fees and costs.

MCL 600.2919a makes an award of treble damages, costs, and attorney fees for statutory conversion or embezzlement discretionary rather than mandatory.

Israel v. Putrus · filed 2014-11-04

As this Court has previously held, the decision to award treble damages, costs, and attorney fees for statutory conversion or embezzlement under MCL 600.2919a is entirely discretionary.

Section 600.2919a permits attorney fees for a prevailing statutory-conversion plaintiff, and the fees are not conditioned on an award of treble damages.

Hunt v. Hadden · filed 2016-12-07

Michigan law expressly provides for an award of attorney’s fees in cases, like this one, where a plaintiff prevails on a claim of statutory conversion.

Section 600.2919a entitles a person damaged by another's stealing, embezzling, or converting property to three times the actual damages, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Metro Healthcare Services Inc v. Innovative Payroll Processing Inc · filed 2019-10-10

Under MCL 600.2919a, a person damaged as a result of another person’s stealing, embezzling, or converting property, is entitled to recover “3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.”

Section 600.2919a(1)(A) is a post-event remedial provision allowing treble actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees for qualifying conversion of property, rather than regulating conduct.

Salamone v. Douglas Marine Corporation · filed 2020-12-15(1)(A)

Michigan's statutory conversion law provides that "[a] person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees: [a]nother person's . . . converting property to the other person's own use." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2919a(1)(A). Clearly, this law is not conduct regulating but provides a post-event remedial rule by only addressing the recovery for the conversion action.

Section 600.2919a(1) makes treble damages discretionary rather than mandatory.

Jackson v. Bulk Ag Innovations LLC · filed 2022-06-16(1)

the trial court was entrusted with the discretion to treble—or not treble—the damages under MCL 600.2919a(1), which states that plaintiffs harmed by conversion “may recover 3 times the amount of action damages sustained[.]”

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages only for property actually converted; the full value of distributed assets may not be trebled when some distributions were authorized.

In Re Stephenson Estate · filed 2023-05-18(1)(a)

those particular Trust assets in excess of what Stephenson and his children were entitled to under Attachment A represented converted property that was subject to treble damages.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) measures treble damages by the victim's actual loss from embezzlement or conversion, without reducing that loss by insurance proceeds received.

Alken-Ziegler, Inc v. Hague · filed 2009-03-31(1)(a)

Applying this definition to MCL 600.2919a, “actual damages” means the actual loss a complainant suffered as a result of a defendant’s criminal conduct. ... The definition of “actual damages,” however, does not contemplate the victim’s receipt of insurance proceeds in determining actual damages. Actual damages must exist in the first instance before the question of insurance proceeds properly arises. Once inflicted and created, actual damages do not change simply because an insurer has a contractual obligation to compensate the victim in whole or in part.

The comparative-fault statutes require proof of a legal duty before fault can be apportioned or liability allocated for a negligence claim.

Romain v. Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance · filed 2009-03-31(8)

Additionally, MCL 600.6304(8) includes in the definition of fault “a breach of a legal duty . .. that is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.” Before there can be “a breach of a legal duty,” there must be a legal duty. Without owing a duty to the injured party, the “negligent” actor could not have proximately caused the injury and could not be at “fault” for purposes of the comparative fault statutes.

Section 600.1307a sets statutory qualifications for jury service, and § 600.1354(1) requires actual prejudice before a violation warrants a new trial.

People v. Miller · filed 2008-12-30(1)

There are several statutory qualifications that a person must satisfy in order to be eligible to serve as a juror.

Section 600.1307a(1) sets minimum requirements for jury service but does not require every person who meets them to be empaneled as a juror.

People of Michigan v. Hinton · filed 2026-05-13(1)

Further, Eccles was not wrongly decided. The Court in Eccles applied the plain language of the court rule. Further, MCR 2.511(E)(10) does not conflict with the intent of our Legislature as expressed in MCL 600.1307a(1). Although the statute sets forth minimum requirements to serve on a jury, it does not state that every person who meets those requirements must be empaneled as a juror.

Section 600.1307a(1)(e) disqualifies a person convicted of a felony from serving as a juror.

People of Michigan v. Agee · filed 2014-10-30(1)(e)

MCL 600.1307a sets out the requirements a person must meet to qualify as a juror, one of which is having not been convicted of a felony.

Noncompliance with the jury-law provisions invalidates a jury verdict only when the noncompliance is substantial and causes actual prejudice.

People of Michigan v. Jackson · filed 2015-06-11(1)

Further, even if the prospective jurors were excused improperly, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice or that he was denied an impartial jury. “Failure to comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not . . . affect the validity of a jury verdict unless . . . the party demonstrates actual prejudice to his cause and unless the noncompliance is substantial.” MCL 600.1354(1). In short, defendant fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced in any way from the trial court’s actions. He is not entitled to relief.

Section 1405 gives a direct third-party beneficiary a cause of action to enforce a promise, but only the same enforcement rights as the original promisee and subject to the contract’s conditions and limitations.

Shay v. Aldrich · filed 2010-08-23(1)

The third-party-beneficiary statute expressly provides that the rights of the third-party beneficiary are “subject always to such express or implied conditions, limitations, or infirmities of the contract to which the rights of the promisee or the promise are subject.” Thus, a person who qualifies under the third-party-beneficiary statute gains the right to sue to enforce the contract. But in doing so, that person stands in the shoes of the original promisee and only gains the same right that the original promisee would have had. Accordingly, a third-party beneficiary is not automatically entitled to the sought-after benefit merely by qualifying as a third-party beneficiary. While a third-party beneficiary has the right to seek enforcement of a promise, courts must still apply basic principles of contract interpretation when determining the extent of the third party’s rights under the contract.

Section 1405(1) gives a third-party beneficiary the right to enforce a contract when the promisor undertakes to act directly to or for that person.

Coa 361133 Eric Preston V Abbott Pointe Associates Llc Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 3/7/2025 · filed 2025-03-07(1)

MCL 600.1405(1) provides, “A promise shall be construed to have been made for the benefit of a person whenever the promisor of said promise has undertaken to give or to do or refrain from doing something directly to or for said person.” ... Therefore, Abbott is a third-party beneficiary under the terms of the release. However, as the Supreme Court instructed us in Shay, this is not the conclusion of our analysis.

Section 2922a(1) imposes liability only for affirmative or positive wrongful or negligent acts against a pregnant individual, not for omissions or refusals to act.

Johnson v. Pastoriza · filed 2012-06-05(1)

The Legislature clearly intended to impose liability for affirmative or positive acts under MCL 600.2922a(l). ... The Legislature’s decision to exclude omissions from MCL 600.2922a indicates that it did not intend to attach liability to omissions that cause prenatal death or injury. ... Because the statute specifically requires a wrongful or negligent act, a wrongful or negligent omission does not impose liability under the statute.

Sections 600.2922 and 600.2922a allow a wrongful-death claim for fetal death caused by neglect or fault, and the medical-procedure exception in § 600.2922a(2)(b) does not cover a physician’s refusal to perform a requested procedure; the 2005 clarification applies retroactively.

Johnson v. Pastoriza · filed 2010-10-122922(1); 2922a(2)(b)

We disagree with defendants’ interpretation of the applicable statutory scheme. Pursuant to MCL 600.2922, a party need not establish that the injury was caused by an act. Rather, MCL 600.2922 specifically provides that liability is possible when the injury is “caused by wrongful act, neglect, or fault of another .. . .” While MCL 600.2922 refers to a “death as described in [MCL 600.2922a],” it does not indicate that the death in question must occur in the manner described in MCL 600.2922a. ... MCL 600.2922a(2)(b) clearly provides that there is an exception to MCL 600.2922a if the death of the fetus is the result of the performance of a medical procedure. However, in this case, there was no medical procedure performed. Rather, the claim was based on defendants’ failure or refusal to perform an explicitly requested medical procedure. Consequently, we find that MCL 600.2922a(2)(b) is inapplicable to the factual allegations in this case.

Section 600.579(1) directs the county clerk in qualifying large counties to appoint or promote a chief deputy circuit court clerk and at least one deputy circuit court clerk for each acting circuit judge, but it does not override the judiciary’s inherent constitutional authority over courtroom-clerk assignments.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Wayne County · filed 2011-03-24(1)

The union cites MCL 600.579(1) in support of the argument that the county clerk has the authority to make court clerk assignments to courtrooms absent approval and acceptance by WCC judges. ... MCL 600.579(1) provides: ... In counties having a population of more than 1,000,000 or that shall hereafter attain a population of more than 1,000,000 and that have adopted civil service under Act No. 370 of the Public Acts of 1941, as amended, being sections 38.401 to 38.428 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, the county clerk shall appoint or promote from the classified eligible list of the civil service a chief deputy circuit court clerk and at least 1 deputy circuit court clerk for each acting circuit judge in the county. ... We decline to rule that MCL 600.579(1), which does not reference the need for judicial approval, resolves the dispute in favor of the union, considering that, for the same reasons that we rejected the union’s PERA argument, the judicial branch’s inherent constitutional powers take precedence over the statute.

Section 2591 does not allow a pro se litigant, including a lawyer representing herself, to recover attorney fees because she has not actually incurred attorney fees.

Cheshure v. Marrero · filed 2026-02-13

As a pro se party, Gappy did not incur any attorney fees. As explained in FMB-First Mich Bank v Bailey, 232 Mich App 711, 725-726; 591 NW2d 676 (1998), MCL 600.2591 predicates an award of attorney fees on the idea that fees are actually incurred by the litigant. However, a pro se litigant does not incur attorney fees because she represents herself. Id. at 726. Additionally, notwithstanding that Gappy is both a lawyer and a pro se litigant, she cannot act as an “attorney” for herself. Id. “[A]n attorney is an agent or substitute who acts in the stead of another, a party acting in propria persona cannot truly be said to be an attorney for himself.” Id. As such, an attorney who acts in propria persona is not entitled to recover her attorney fees under MCL 600.2591 because she neither acts as an attorney for herself nor incurs attorney fees.

Section 600.2919a(1)(a) permits treble damages for statutory conversion when the defendant converted property to the defendant’s own use, while § 600.2591 does not support frivolous-action sanctions when the challenged action has a reasonable factual basis and arguable legal merit.

Woodside Meadows Condominium Association v. Parker · filed 2025-02-12§ 600.2919a(1)(a); § 600.2591(1), (3)(a)

Statutory conversion is governed by MCL 600.2919a(1)(a), which allows the plaintiff to recover treble damages if, in addition to the elements of common-law tort, the defendant converted the property to his own use.

Section 2591 requires an award of the prevailing party’s costs and fees when a civil action or defense is frivolous, meaning it lacks a reasonable factual basis or arguable legal merit.

Fidelity National Title Ins Company v. Hamilton Farm Bureau Coop · filed 2014-10-30(1), (3)(a)(ii)-(iii)

Sanctions are also permitted by MCL 600.2591, which provides in relevant part: ... (1) Upon motion of any party, if a court finds that a civil action or defense to a civil action was frivolous, the court that conducts the civil action shall award to the prevailing party the costs and fees incurred by that party in connection with the civil action by assessing the costs and fees against the nonprevailing party and their attorney. ... (3) As used in this section: ... (a) “Frivolous” means that at least 1 of the following conditions is met: ... (ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party’s legal position were in fact true. ... (iii) The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit. . . . ... Here, Hamilton raised a legally and factually supportable defense based on the plain language of the Wiltzer mortgage and promissory note. ... Given the factual support for Hamilton’s defense, we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake” in imposing sanctions. See Hills & Dales Gen Hosp, 295 Mich App at 19. That the court disagreed with Hamilton’s business practices did not render its defense frivolous and did not justify the sanctions order.

Section 2591 treats a civil action or defense as frivolous when the party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying its legal position were true.

Harrison v. Munson Healthcare, Inc. · filed 2014-01-30(3)(a)(ii)

The statute defines “frivolous” to include that a party “had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party’s legal position were in fact true.” MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii).

Section 2591(3)(a) allows a court to deem a party’s action frivolous when it was brought to harass, lacks arguable legal merit, or rests on facts the party had no reasonable basis to believe.

Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury · filed 2015-12-15(3)(a)

A court may find that a party’s action is frivolous if (1) the party initiated the suit for purposes of harassment, (2) “[t]he party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit,” or (3) “[t]he party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party’s legal position were in fact true.”

Section 600.2591 sanctions frivolous claims and defenses based on their legal and factual merit at the time they were made.

Black Law Offices Pc v. First Merit Bank · filed 2016-11-15(3)(a)

To determine whether sanctions are appropriate under [MCL 600.2591], it is necessary to evaluate the claims and defenses at issue at the time they were made.

MCL 600.2591(1) requires a court to award the prevailing party costs and fees when, on motion, it finds that a civil action or defense was frivolous; frivolousness is determined from the circumstances when the claim or defense was asserted, and rejecting a legal position alone does not make it frivolous.

Chapman v. Alawi · filed 2018-01-18(1)

The mere fact that a court rejects a party’s legal position does not mean that the party’s position was frivolous.

Section 6303 treats insurance payments and discounts as collateral-source benefits, but excludes them from the statutory setoff when a contractual lien is exercised under subsection (3).

Greer v. Advantage Health · filed 2014-05-13(4)

We conclude that the two insurers in this case, Aetna and Priority Health, or the payments they made to plaintiffs’ healthcare providers are “collateral sources” within the plain meaning of § 6303(1) because both insurers “paid ... in whole or in part” “the expense of medical care” that plaintiffs sought in a personal injury action and for which plaintiffs obtained a jury verdict in their favor. Furthermore, the insurance discounts that reduced the amount of the medical expenses that plaintiffs would otherwise have been responsible to pay must also plainly be “benefits received or receivable from an insurance policy” and, therefore, a “collateral source” within the meaning of the first sentence of MCL 600.6303(4). ... Thus, applying the plain terms of the last sentence of § 6303(4) compels the conclusion that both the cash payments and discount, i.e., the “benefits received or receivable from an insurance policy,” are excluded as statutory collateral source benefits.

Section 600.6303's collateral-source rule bars evidence of benefits when offered to mitigate damages, but permits the evidence for another proper purpose such as credibility.

White v. Md · filed 2017-08-03(1)

The collateral source rule bars such evidence when introduced for the purpose of mitigating damages.

Section 2971(3) bars recovery of child-rearing expenses in negligent wrongful-conception claims, but subsection (4) allows those expenses when the act or omission was intentional or grossly negligent.

Cichewicz v. Salesin · filed 2014-06-26(3), (4)

That is, a plaintiff asserting a wrongful-conception claim premised on a negligent act or omission of a defendant still cannot recover damages “for daily living, medical, educational, or other expenses necessary to raise a child to the age of majority[.]” MCL 600.2971(3). But, under MCL 600.2971(4), a plaintiff is permitted to recover such damages for a wrongful-conception claim premised on an intentional or grossly negligent act. Thus, the types of damages recoverable in a wrongful-conception claim depend on whether the defendant’s act or omission was merely negligent, or whether it was intentional or grossly negligent.

Section 600.3204(4)(f) barred commencement of foreclosure by advertisement when the parties had agreed to modify the mortgage and the mortgagor was not in default under the modified agreement.

Williams v. Mae · filed 2015-07-16(4)(f)

Plaintiff next argues that Nationstar violated MCL 600.3204(4)(f), which provided that foreclosure proceedings could not be commenced where “[t]he mortgagor and mortgagee have agreed to modify the mortgage and the mortgagor is not in default under the modified agreement.” This argument fails because, as the trial court noted, plaintiff and Nationstar never entered into a loan modification agreement.

Before the repeal, § 600.3204(4), together with §§ 600.3205 and 600.3205a, required foreclosure notice and an opportunity to request modification negotiations, but did not require the lender to offer a modification.

US Bank National Association v. Curtis · filed 2015-11-03(4)

Defendants also argue that Ruckes was not given a notice that was required at the time under sections of Michigan law that have now been repealed, MCL 600.3204(4), 600.3205, and 3205a, but were in effect when the mortgage was foreclosed. Prior to the amendment, MCL 600.3204(4) required a foreclosing party to send a notice to the mortgagor as required in MCL 600.3205a. Section 3205a required a foreclosing party to send the borrower a written notice providing certain information, including the opportunity to request a meeting to attempt to work out a modification. MCL 600.3205 provided that prior to foreclosure a mortgage servicer or holder needed to designate an employee or entity to facilitate negotiations and meetings with the borrower.

The mandatory loan-modification process under former § 600.3204(4) applied to foreclosure by advertisement, not to judicial foreclosure.

Jp Morgan Chase National Association v. Teany · filed 2016-01-07(4)

MCL 600.3204 plainly addresses only foreclosures by advertisement. Indeed, prior to its amendment in 2014, its first sentence read: “(1) Subject to subsection (4) [the section requiring the modification process], a party may foreclose a mortgage by advertisement . . . .” (emphasis added). The mandatory loan modification process did not apply to judicial foreclosures, which operated under the supervision and timetable of the court. See generally MCL 600.3101 et seq.

Section 600.2957(2) permits a plaintiff to add an identified nonparty within 91 days and relate the claim back only when the nonparty notice complies with MCR 2.112(K).

Rayba v. Md · filed 2015-01-22(2)

For MCL 600.2957(2) to apply, however, there must first be notice of a non-party at fault in compliance with MCR 2.112(K).

Section 2957(2) allows a plaintiff to add claims against an identified nonparty within 91 days, with the added claims escaping the limitations bar if they would have been timely when the original action was filed, but proper nonparty-at-fault notice is required.

Taylor v. Michigan Petroleum Technologies, Inc · filed 2014-10-14(2)

Moreover, because proper notice under that rule is a prerequisite to the application of MCL 600.2957(2), the trial court could not apply that statute to save Taylor and Nieznajko’s otherwise untimely claims against Consumers Energy.

Section 600.3204(3) requires only recorded evidence of the foreclosing party's chain of title, not an actual assignment of the mortgage.

Katulski v. Cpca Trust I · filed 2015-01-20(3)

The circuit court properly interpreted MCL 600.3204(3) as requiring only evidence of the foreclosing party’s record chain of title interest in the real property.

Section 3204 requires a party foreclosing by advertisement to be the owner of the indebtedness, an interest-holder, or the mortgage servicer, and, if it is not the original mortgagee, to have a record chain of title; a foreclosure defect is not enough to set aside the sale without prejudice.

Morgan Stanley Mortgage Home Loan Trust v. Liebetreu · filed 2014-10-16(1)(d), (3)

Because all five of the posted and published notices of the foreclosure sale specifically listed as a potential interested party only the current mortgage assignee, Deutsche Bank as trustee for plaintiff, the circuit court erred in reversing the district court’s grant of summary disposition on the basis that Chase Home Finance was the foreclosing party. ... And because the documentary evidence establishes that plaintiff currently holds the most recent, recorded assignment of the mortgage, it qualified as a proper foreclosing party under the plain language of MCL 600.3204(3). ... We conclude that defendants have not established “that they would have been in a better position to preserve their interest in the property absent . . . [any] failure to comply with MCL 600.3204.”

Section 600.3204 permits foreclosure by advertisement when the foreclosing party owns an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, and requires a record chain of title showing assignment to that party when it is not the original mortgagee.

Manoushag Al-Raeis v. Aurora Bank Fsb · filed 2014-12-09(1)(d), (3)

Accordingly, the circuit court properly rejected Al-Raeis’s contention that Aurora Bank could not foreclose by advertisement without any interest in the related promissory note. ... Because Al-Raeis failed to properly dispute that “a record chain of title” exists “evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the party foreclosing the mortgage,” Aurora Bank qualifies as a proper foreclosing party under MCL 600.3204(3).

Former MCL 600.3205c(5) required the lender to provide any loan-modification calculations it made, but did not require the lender to perform calculations.

Franzel Jr v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2014-10-28(5)

While it is true that this provision required defendants to provide any calculations that were made, the statute did not actually require defendants to perform any calculations.

Section 600.2919(1) generally provides treble damages for removing vegetation from another's land, but the more-specific Highway Advertising Act controls when it governs the same conduct.

Department of Transportation v. Wolverine Sign Works · filed 2014-11-04(1)

Likewise in this case, while the RJA and NREPA only permit treble damages, the HAA allows for damages up to five times the value of the vegetation at issue in this case plus a $1,000 penalty. Thus, the HAA damage provision is in conflict with the damage provisions found in the RJA and the NREPA. See Michigan Deferred Presentment Servs Ass’n, 287 Mich App at 334. Therefore, the more specific statute controls.

Section 2955(1) requires courts to consider listed reliability factors for expert scientific opinions, but the factors are contextual guideposts and need not all favor admissibility.

Elher v. Dwijen Misra Jr Md · filed 2014-11-25(1)

Consistent with its “gatekeeper” role, a trial court must also consider the factors listed in MCL 600.2955(1). ... This Court has held that each of these statutory factors need not favor the proposed expert’s opinion. ... It suffices that “the opinion is rationally derived from a sound foundation.”

Section 600.2955 requires courts to consider reliability factors for expert scientific opinions, but those factors are not a rigid checklist; testing, peer review, and general acceptance need not control a nonempirical medical standard-of-care opinion grounded in qualified experience.

Elher v. Misra · filed 2014-12-02(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(e), (2)

As part of its “gatekeeper” role, a trial court must also consider the factors listed in MCL 600.2955(1). ... Four of the seven factors identified in MCL 600.2955(1) (Subdivisions (a) through (d)) derive directly from Daubert, 509 US at 593-594, and overlap with the components of MRE 702. This Court has held that not all of these statutory factors must favor the proposed expert’s opinion for it to be deemed reliable. ... Here, however, no testing or “replication” underlies either side’s expert opinions. And we fail to understand how standard-of-care opinions such as Dr. Priebe’s could ever be tested or replicated. ... Because Dr. Priebe’s opinion simply does not implicate any possible testing or replication, the trial court abused its discretion by using this factor to exclude his testimony. ... Accordingly, the “general acceptance” guidepost is not pertinent here. ... Contrary to defendants’ argument, no rule of evidence and no caselaw requires that an expert’s standard-of-care opinion be universally accepted, or that an expert affirmatively demonstrate that his or her standard-of-care view falls within “the mainstream.”

Section 2955(1) requires courts to assess the reliability of scientific expert opinions using factors such as testing, peer review, acceptance, reliable basis, error rate, and use outside litigation.

Howard-Reed v. Barry Braver Do · filed 2022-05-192955(1)(a)-(g)

Dr. Bader’s testimony failed to establish that his opinion regarding plaintiff’s lost opportunity for a more favorable outcome was subjected to scientific testing and replication, or subjected to peer review publication. MCL 600.2955(1)(a)- (b). His testimony also fails to show the “degree to which the opinion and its basis are generally accepted within the relevant expert community.” MCL 600.2955(1)(e). He did not demonstrate that “the basis for the opinion is reliable and whether experts in that field would rely on the same basis to reach the type of opinion being proffered.” MCL 600.2955(1)(f). There is no evidence related to the factors in MCL 600.2955(1)(c) (“existence and maintenance of generally accepted standards governing the application and interpretation of a methodology or technique”) or (1)(d) (“known or potential error rate of the opinion and its basis”). Nor is there any indication in the record that Dr. Bader’s opinion “is relied upon by experts outside of the context of litigation.” MCL 600.2955(1)(g). Therefore, the trial court did not err by excluding Dr. Bader’s opinion that failure to timely follow up with the 2015 CT scan cost plaintiff the opportunity for a better outcome.

MCL 600.2955(1) requires a court evaluating a qualified expert’s scientific opinion to assess reliability and assistance to the fact-finder using all listed factors, and lack of peer-reviewed literature is not dispositive.

Danhoff v. Daniel K Fahim Md · filed 2024-07-08(1)

Neither MRE 702 nor MCL 600.2955 requires a trial court to exclude the testimony of a plaintiff’s expert on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to support their expert’s claims with published literature. Instead, MCL 600.2955 presents a nonexhaustive list of seven factors that a trial court shall consider when it determines whether an expert’s opinions are reliable.

Section 600.2955(1) requires the trial court to analyze the statutory reliability factors when deciding whether expert testimony is admissible.

Ah v. Mercy Health Partners · filed 2025-05-12(1)

Earlier in the trial court’s opinion, it did cite the Daubert test, MRE 702, and some of the factors enumerated in MCL 600.2955(1). However, it failed to provide any analysis of the factors in MCL 600.2955(1) or cite any specific literature supporting its conclusion. Simply reciting that “the methodologies from which these opinions are drawn have been subjected to testing, replication, and peer-reviewed publications which take such things as error rates into consideration” provides no analysis of whether MCL 600.2955(1) is satisfied.

Section 600.2901 abolishes claims premised on alienation of affections, but does not bar a malpractice claim for the plaintiffs’ own injuries when loss of companionship is only an indirect component.

Roberts v. Salmi · filed 2014-12-18

As this Court has recognized, MCL 600.2901 broadly applies to all claims premised on the alienation of affections, not just the traditional situation involving the seduction of another person’s spouse. Nicholson v Han, 12 Mich App *63335, 39-40; 162 NW2d 313 (1968). However, Lale and Joan Roberts did not allege that Salmi acted with the intent to estrange K from them; they alleged that Salmi negligently treated K, causing her to have false memories of sexual abuse, which in turn caused them damage. Lale and Joan Roberts’s claim does indirectly involve the loss of K’s society and companionship, but it is not premised solely on that harm. If able to prove their claim, Lale and Joan Roberts would be entitled to damages for all the harms they suffered as a result of the false allegations. The fact that their claim involves the alienation of K’s affections to some extent does not transform the essential character of the claim; as pleaded, the claim is for malpractice. Because they brought their claim to recover for their own injuries caused by Salmi’s purported malpractice, Lale and Joan Roberts’s claim is not barred by the statute abolishing claims for alienation of affection. See Cotton v Kambly, 101 Mich App 537, 539; 300 NW2d 627 (1980).

The cited provisions require timely notice of claims against the state, require a qualified affidavit of merit to commence a medical-malpractice action, limit expert testimony to qualified health professionals, require a direct contractual undertaking for third-party-beneficiary status, and do not entitle prisoners to appointed counsel.

Moffat v. Department of Corrections · filed 2014-12-18

Considered in its entirety, the intent of the different provisions in MCL 600.6431 “was to provide for two time periods—the shorter one established to require that a claimant give prompt notice of his intention to file a claim, and the longer to provide the claimant with the opportunity to make his claim specific, but within a relatively short time.” ... Plaintiff did not comply with the mandatory requirement set forth by the plain language of the statute to file a notice of intent to bring a claim within one year of his injury. ... A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must file with the complaint “an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness . . . .” ... Finally, the statute on which plaintiff relies in arguing an entitlement to the appointment of counsel, MCL 600.5507(1), provides no right to counsel for prisoners. It restricts when representation paid by the state may be allowed but does not set up an entitlement.

Section 6431(3)'s six-month notice period is not incorporated into the GTLA's separate 120-day notice requirement merely because filing the GTLA notice constitutes compliance with § 6431.

Goodhue v. Department of Transportation · filed 2017-05-16(3)

MCL 691.1404(2) provides, “Filing of such notice shall constitute compliance with [MCL 600.6431] . . . .” As the trial court aptly noted, this language merely provides that compliance with MCL 691.1404 shall be treated as compliance with MCL 600.6431, irrespective of the fact that MCL 600.6431’s enumerated requirements may not have been satisfied. Nothing in the language of MCL 691.1404(2) shows that it actually incorporates any of MCL 600.6431’s requirements.

Section 6431(1) requires a claim or notice against the state to be timely, signed, and verified; an unverified initial complaint is a nullity that cannot be cured by amendment.

Progress Michigan v. Attorney General · filed 2018-06-19(1)

The Court of Claims Act is clear that “[n]o claim may be maintained” unless certain conditions are satisfied, and the original complaint here undisputedly did not satisfy those requirements. ... Because the word “maintained” as used in the Court of Claims Act is used in a technical legal manner to convey a particular legal result, we are thus required to construe it according to that “peculiar and appropriate meaning.” ... Thus, in the absence of the claim being verified in plaintiff’s initial complaint, the claim could not be asserted and thus lacked legal validity from its inception. In other words, because the claim in the initial complaint could not be “maintained,” it was a nullity.

A claim against the state must be signed and verified when filed, and a defective complaint that omits those requirements is a nullity that cannot be cured by amendment.

Progress Michigan v. Attorney General · filed 2018-06-19(1)

However, the complaint failed to comply with the Court of Claims Act because it was neither signed nor verified. The complaint thus triggered the Court of Claims Act’s “bar-to-claim language” of MCL 600.6431 that “[n]o claim may be maintained against the state” if the claim failed to comply with the Court of Claims Act’s strictures. ... Because plaintiff’s complaint was invalid from its inception, there was nothing pending which could be amended. Thus, any attempt by plaintiff to amend under MCR 2.118 was ineffectual.

Section 600.6431's notice, signature, and verification requirements apply to claims against the state and specified state entities, but not to a claim against an individual state employee.

Petra Pike v. Northern Michigan University · filed 2019-04-25(1)

Plaintiff is correct that MCL 600.6431(1) expressly addresses maintaining a claim against “the state,” not against the “the state or any of its departments or officers” which is defined to include employees but only with respect to “this section,” i.e., the jurisdiction statute, MCL 600.6419—not the entire Court of Claims Act. ... Therefore, the requirements of MCL 600.6431 did not apply to the gross negligence claim against Bosma because it was not a claim against “the state.”

MCL 600.2912b(5) requires a health professional or facility, within 56 days of receiving a medical-malpractice notice of intent to sue, to allow access to all claim-related medical records in its control, including billing information; the defendant may not decide which requested records are relevant.

Wade v. Do · filed 2015-01-29(5)

It simply provides that within 56 days of receiving a plaintiff’s notice of intent to sue “the health professional or health facility shall allow the claimant access to all medical records related to the claim that are in the control of the health professional or health facility.” Although MCL 600.2912b(5) contains the phrase “related to the claim”, defendants are not permitted to determine what is relevant, especially in the face of a specific request. Instead, a medical malpractice plaintiff is entitled to either receive or access all of his medical records within the defendants’ control, including billing information.

Section 600.2932 permits a general quiet-title action but does not address a mortgagor's specific challenge to the validity of an underlying mortgage assignment.

Hagerman v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2015-02-17

Plaintiffs assert that they have general standing to bring an action to quiet title pursuant to MCL 600.2932. However, while plaintiffs may be able to bring a quiet title action pursuant to MCL 600.2932, the statute does not speak to the specific nature of the challenge brought by plaintiffs in this case—the invalidity of the underlying assignment. Further, plaintiffs lack a substantial interest that may be detrimentally affected by the assignment.

Section 2918 provides remedies for unlawful interference with a tenant's possessory interest, but a person without the necessary landlord-tenant relationship has no enforceable rights or standing to sue under it.

Porter v. City of Highland Park · filed 2015-02-19(2)

Considering this provision, it is plain that plaintiffs lack standing to file suit under MCL 600.2918. At the outset, the statutory provision deals with landlord and tenant relations and the unlawful interference with possessory interests. Plaintiffs had no possessory interest as they did not assert or demonstrate that they had any form of lease with the City or ownership rights for the building, and in fact Achievable Visions had been lawfully evicted from the premises. ... Based upon the absence of the necessary legal relationship between defendants and plaintiffs, plaintiffs have no enforceable rights under the statutory provision and, therefore, they lack standing to pursue a claim premised on a violation of MCL 600.2918.

Section 600.2918(2)(b) gives a tenant damages and possession remedies when an owner unlawfully interferes with a possessory interest by removing, retaining, or destroying personal property, but subsection (3)(c) excludes an owner who in good faith believes after diligent inquiry that the tenant abandoned the premises and did not intend to return.

Midway North LLC v. Wexford County Treasurer · filed 2024-03-14(2)(b), (3)(c)

MCL 600.2918 states, in relevant part: ... (2) Any tenant in possession of premises whose possessory interest has been unlawfully interfered with by the owner is entitled to recover the amount of his or her actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, for each occurrence and, if possession has been lost, to recover possession. Subject to subsection (3), ... unlawful interference with a possessory interest includes 1 or more of the following: ... (b) Removal, retention, or destruction of personal property of the possessor. ... (3) An owner’s actions do not unlawfully interfere with a possessory interest if any of the following apply: ... (c) The owner . . . believes in good faith that the tenant has abandoned the premises, and after diligent inquiry has reason to believe the tenant does not intend to return, and current rent is not paid.

Subsection (23) makes failure to comply with a personal protection order subject to criminal contempt, with up to 93 days' imprisonment and a $500 fine upon guilt.

in Re Mary Pat Foster · filed 2015-02-24(23)

The PPO in this case was entered pursuant to MCL 600.2950a. Pursuant to MCL 600.2950a(23), the failure to comply with a PPO subjects the respondent to the criminal contempt powers of the court and, upon a finding of guilt, permits imprisonment for up to 93 days and a fine of up to $500. It is clear that the contempt proceedings in this case were criminal, not civil, in nature.

Section 600.2950a(23) subjects a person who violates a personal protection order to the court’s criminal-contempt powers.

In Re Pk · filed 2022-07-28(23)

Under MCL 600.2950a(23), a person who fails to comply with a PPO is subject to the criminal-contempt powers of the court.

After a stalking-based personal protection order is issued, a criminal-contempt proceeding for violating it does not require reproof of every stalking element.

In Re Pk · filed 2022-07-28(1)

it is not necessary to reestablish all the elements of stalking.

Section 600.2950(23) limits criminal-contempt punishment for violating a domestic-relationship personal protection order to up to 93 days’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $500, and does not authorize an award of attorney fees.

Lac v. Gls · filed 2024-07-25(23)

An individual who is 17 years of age or older and who refuses or fails to comply with a personal protection order under this section is subject to the criminal contempt powers of the court and, if found guilty, must be imprisoned for not more than 93 days and may be fined not more than $500.00. ... Both statute and court rule provide a specific punishment for a PPO violation that does not include the assessment of attorney fees. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by ordering respondent to pay petitioner’s attorney fees.

Section 2950(23) subjects a person age 17 or older who refuses or fails to comply with a personal protection order to criminal contempt, and the evidence supported contempt because respondent knowingly violated the order’s no-contact and no-entry terms.

In Re Vh · filed 2025-12-11(1), (23)

Pursuant to MCL 600.2950(23), “an individual who is 17 years of age or older and who refuses or fails to comply with a [PPO] . . . is subject to the criminal contempt powers of the court . . . .” ... The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that respondent willfully disregarded or willfully disobeyed a court order, i.e., the PPO, beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent admitted that after the original PPO was issued, he contacted petitioner by telephone, entered petitioner’s property, and appeared on her property in the doorbell camera recording. The PPO expressly prohibited respondent from contacting petitioner by telephone, entering petitioner’s property, or sending any communications to petitioner. See MCL 600.2950(1). Respondent’s admissions, combined with the doorbell recording and texts admitted at trial, establish multiple PPO violations.

Section 2919a permits a person damaged as a result of another's theft, embezzlement, or conversion to recover under the statute even without an ownership or possessory interest in the converted property.

Security Financial Management Company v. Nelms · filed 2015-02-24(1)

There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiffs’ MCL 600.2919a claim. According to the plain language of the statute, plaintiffs were “damaged as a result” of defendant stealing, embezzling, or converting the cemetery trust funds for his own use. Although defendant insists that there is no evidence that he converted SFMC funds, or any property that SFMC had an ownership or possessory interest in, the statute broadly offers recovery for “a person damaged as a result” of defendant’s acts of theft, embezzlement, or conversion. Under the plain language of the statute, it is not a condition precedent that plaintiff have had an ownership interest in the cemetery trust funds for MCL 600.2919a to apply. Because plaintiffs were clearly damaged as a result of defendant’s conversion of the cemetery trust funds, they are entitled to recovery under the statute.

The statute permits an expired personal protection order to remain in LEIN because it provides no removal procedure, while vacating the order updates LEIN to show that it was rescinded, terminated, or modified.

Benson v. Foster · filed 2015-02-24(16), (17), (19), and (20)

A PPO may be entered into the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN). See MCL 600.2950a(16) and (17). Although a PPO may expire, it may remain entered in the LEIN because there is no statutory provision for the removal of an expired PPO. However, if we were to vacate the PPO, the LEIN would be updated to reflect that the order has been rescinded, terminated, or modified. MCL 600.2950a(19) and (20).

When a PPO is rescinded, the rescission must be reflected in LEIN, and that potential correction gives an expired-PPO appeal a live controversy.

T.M. v. M.Z. · filed 2018-05-18(19)(b), (20)

We conclude that identifying an improperly issued PPO as rescinded is a live controversy and thus not moot. A judgment here can have a "practical legal effect" under Anway because if the Court concludes that the trial court should never have issued the PPO, respondent would be entitled to have LEIN reflect that fact. Thus, an appeal challenging a PPO, with an eye toward determining whether a PPO should be updated in LEIN as rescinded, need not fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine to warrant appellate review; instead, such a dispute is simply not moot.

The Court of Claims Act requires notice of an intended property-damage suit within six months and bars a claim against the state unless filed within three years after the claim accrues.

Ranch Rheaume LLC v. Department of Agriculture · filed 2015-03-17

Accordingly, to sustain his action in the Court of Claims, plaintiff was required to: (1) file notice with the court that he intended to file suit against defendants for “property damages” within 6 months of September 2008 and/or February 2009, pursuant to MCL 600.6431(3); and (2) actually file suit against defendants within 3 years of September 2008 and/or February 2009, pursuant to MCL 600.6452(1).

Absent a legislative condition tying consent to suit to compliance with the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6431 requires compliance for claims against state defendants brought in the Court of Claims, but not for claims properly filed in circuit court.

Tyrrell v. University of Michigan · filed 2020-12-22(1)

On that issue, we hold that absent the Legislature conditioning its consent to be sued on compliance with the COCA, a plaintiff bringing a claim in circuit court against a state defendant is not required to comply with MCL 600.6431.

Section 2907a provides a cause of action for recording a document encumbering property without lawful cause and with intent to harass or intimidate, but does not create a claim merely because a lien was not properly perfected.

Pletos v. Lake in the Woods Homeowners Association · filed 2015-04-14

In Counts XIV and XV, plaintiffs alleged that the Association encumbered their property with the lien in violation of MCL 600.2907a, which establishes a cause of action for “[a] person who violates [MCL 565.25] by encumbering property through the recording of a document without lawful cause with the intent to harass or intimidate any person . . . .” ... Plaintiffs also claim the liens were not perfected according to MCL 565.25(1), but MCL 600.2907a gives no claim of right against a person who fails to properly perfect a lien. Whether the liens were properly perfected would be relevant to an action by defendant to enforce them, but defendant never filed an action to enforce any liens.

In a third-class district, all district funding units must financially support the district court, while § 8379’s one-third/two-thirds distribution applies to fines and costs, not fees for building or retiree-health funds.

City of Huntington Woods v. City of Oak Park · filed 2015-06-11

By using the mandatory term “shall,” instead of the permissive term “may,” MCL 600.8271(1) clearly requires each district funding unit to provide funding for the district court. Reading these provisions of the Revised Judicature Act together, in accordance with the doctrine of in pari materia, the statutory scheme clearly imposes on all district funding units in a third-class district a duty to provide financial support for the district court, regardless of which political subdivision the court is seated. Titan Ins Co, 296 Mich App at 83. ... Therefore, monies assessed and collected for the building fund and the retiree healthcare fund are not “costs” under MCL 600.4801(a). Such assessments come within the statutory definition of “fee,” which is defined as “any monetary amount, other than costs or a penalty, that the court is authorized to impose and collect pursuant to a conviction, . . . .” MCL 600.4801(b). Because a “fee” is not part of the allocation required by MCL 600.8379(1)(c), neither Oak Park nor the 45th District Court was required to distribute one-third of the assessment to plaintiffs.