29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats a fundamental duty of the position, rather than a marginal task, as an essential job function.

Carter v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. · filed 2019-08-08(n)(1)

To be essential, a function must “bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue.” ... Rather, essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” ... Based on these uncontroverted facts, the Court concludes that the manager-notification policy was an essential aspect of Carter’s job with Spirit. The policy was job-related, uniformly enforced, and consistent with business necessity.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position held or desired by a person with a disability and excludes marginal functions.

Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. · filed 2019-08-20(n)(1)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). It “does not include the marginal functions of the position.” Id. ... “The inquiry into whether a function is essential is highly fact specific.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the position’s fundamental duties and excludes marginal functions.

Dougherty v. Cable News Network · filed 2019-08-30(n)(1)

Essential functions “do[] not include the marginal functions of the position,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1), and here CNN has not provided evidence to suggest that climbing occurs more than marginally in the course of performing the position of photojournalist.

Essential functions are the fundamental duties of a position, and whether a function is essential is determined through a fact-specific, non-exhaustive inquiry that considers factors such as the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the function, and work experience.

Campa v. Energy Nuclear Operations Inc. · filed 2019-09-05(n)(1), (n)(3)

“‘Essential functions’ are defined under EEOC regulations to mean the ‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’” ... “In evaluating whether a particular job function is ‘essential,’ this Court considers” several factors, including “the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the mention of the function in a collective bargaining agreement, the work experience of past employees in the position, and the work experience of current employees in similar positions.” ... “Further, “[c]ourts must conduct a fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job and how the job is actually performed in practice.” ... “No one factor is dispositive, and the regulations themselves state that these examples are non-exhaustive.” ... In sum, the Court, having “consider[ed] the whole record,” Shannon, 332 F.3d at 100, and the “totality of the circumstances,” Rodal, 369 F.3d at 120, concludes that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the “essential functions” of the Watchperson position — that is, its “fundamental . . . duties,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (emphasis added); accord Shannon, 332 F.3d at 100 — include lifting greater than ten pounds and climbing up to ten flights of stairs.

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential job duties as fundamental functions and directs consideration of the employer’s judgment and any written job description when identifying them.

Hartwell v. Richard v. Spencer · filed 2019-11-13(n)

Under the ADA, “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). ... We agree with the district court that reporting to work on time was an essential function of Hartwell’s job as a firefighter/EMT.

Section 1630.2(n) treats the fundamental duties an employee is actually required to perform as the job’s essential functions, evaluated case by case with some deference to the employer’s judgment.

Morgan v. Mercedes Benz US International Inc · filed 2020-03-05(n)(2)(1)

“‘Essential functions’ are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(1)). Courts evaluate essential functions on a case-by-case basis and give some deference to an employer’s judgment as to which functions of a job are essential. E.g., Holly, 492 F.3d at 1257–58. ... By any standard, timely attendance was an essential function of Cleveland’s job at MBUSI.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position a person with a disability holds or seeks, which the court used to assess whether limited-duty work showed the ability to perform a city carrier's essential functions.

(PS) Tafari v. Brennan · filed 2020-03-12(n)(1)

Essential functions are defined as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

The regulation defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal ones and identifies factors for determining whether a function is essential.

Orozco v. Lamb Weston, Inc. · filed 2020-04-23(n)(1), (n)(3)

The “essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” not including “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... Evidence that a function is essential includes (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the functions; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... In the present case, Defendant has submitted evidence, including a job description dated July 2016, showing that the essential functions of the general laborer position included the ability to lift up to 40 pounds and to work in wet and slick conditions. ... Plaintiff testified that she believed a reasonable accommodation would have been to restrict her to working only in that one station. ... This ignores the fact that rotating between stations is itself an essential function of the general laborer position. ... The result of such an accommodation would have been to shift the essential function of switching between stations to Defendant’s other general laborer employees. ... On this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of her position, even with accommodations.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the position’s fundamental job duties, rather than marginal functions.

Fonseca v. Spraying Systems Co. · filed 2020-06-11(n)(1)

Further, consistent with EEOC regulations, the essential functions constitute a position’s “fundamental job duties,” rather than a position’s “marginal functions”; to determine what is essential, courts consider, among other factors: the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)–(3). ... Based upon the record before it, the Court finds that working the QJ360 flow line constituted an essential function of the Assembler job, the job Plaintiff was hired to do.

Section 1630.2(n)(2)'s examples of reasons why a job function may be essential are non-exhaustive, and a function may be essential when the available employees among whom it can be distributed are limited.

Tonyan v. Corporatio · filed 2020-07-20(n)(2)

Tonyan also argues that physical tasks are not an “essential function” of her job pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) because the tasks do not satisfy any of the three enumerated reasons in that section. But the provision explicitly states that its list of reasons is non‐exhaustive. Id. And even if it were a complete list, one of the three enumerated reasons is that “[t]he function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.” Id. at § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii). Again, Tonyan does not dispute that, if a manager cannot perform physical tasks, Dunham’s must allocate hours for additional labor to perform them.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position, and the court applied that concept to treat regular attendance as an essential function.

Gorbea v. Verizon New York Incorporated · filed 2020-08-27(n)(1)

While “the term ‘essential functions’ is not defined by the ADA,” it includes “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2012)).

The regulation defines essential functions as fundamental job duties of the position, rather than marginal functions.

O'Reilly v. Board of Child Care of the United Methodist Church, Inc. · filed 2020-10-06(n)(1)

Federal ADA regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” as opposed to any “marginal functions of the position.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position, rather than marginal functions.

Tierney v. Geisinger System Services · filed 2020-10-16(n)(1)

“Essential functions” refers to the “fundamental job duties of the employment position,” not “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(1).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job the individual with a disability holds or wants.

Guffey v. McClain · filed 2020-12-14(n)(1)

“‘Essential functions’ are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.’” Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats the essential functions of a job as its fundamental job duties.

Payne v. Cornell University · filed 2021-01-05(n)(1)

Although “essential functions” is not explicitly defined by the ADA, regulations promulgated by the EEOC indicate that it encompasses “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

When deciding which job duties are essential, courts consider the employer’s judgment, preexisting written job descriptions, the time spent performing the function, and the experience of past incumbents.

Frilando v. Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 2021-01-13(n)(3)

When determining the “essential functions” of a position, courts look to (1) “[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,” (2) “[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,” (3) “[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function,” and (4) “[t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) requires consideration of the amount of time spent performing a function when determining whether the function is essential.

Hilliard v. Twin Falls County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-01-15(n)(3)

The statute provides that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of the job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (requiring consideration of the amount of time spent performing the function).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential job functions as fundamental duties rather than marginal ones and identifies factors relevant to deciding which duties are essential.

Swain v. McCarthy · filed 2021-09-30(n)(1), (n)(3)

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations define essential functions as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “The term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” Id. ... EEOC regulations identify various factors that are relevant to determining the essential functions of a position, which include “[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,” “[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,” and “[t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Based on this evidence, the Court finds that there is no dispute that opening the cabinets in the tool crib was an essential duty of a tool attendant.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats an employment position’s fundamental job duties as its essential functions.

Misty Brown v. Dejoy · filed 2021-11-19(n)(1)

The term “essential functions,” in turn, refers to the “fundamental job duties of th[at] employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii) (describing why a “job function may be considered essential”); see also Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 2006).

A job function may be essential if the position exists to perform it, it cannot easily be distributed among other employees, or it is highly specialized and the employee was hired for that ability.

Jungblut v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District · filed 2022-01-20(n)(2)

A function may be essential if it (1) is the reason the position exists; (2) cannot be easily distributed among other employees; or (3) the function is highly specialized such that the incumbent was hired specifically for his or her ability to perform it. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential job functions as the fundamental duties of the position, rather than duties with only a marginal relationship to the job.

Spitler v. School Board for the City of Norfolk, Virginia · filed 2022-02-07(n)

Essential functions of a job include “fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual holds or desires,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n), which □□□□□ more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines the essential functions of a job as its fundamental duties.

Rohttis v. Lee County School District · filed 2022-02-22(n)(1)

Essential functions are "the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires." Id. at 949 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... Plaintiff alleges that Defendant provided reassignment to various positions while she was placed on light duty, but she does not allege she could perform the essential functions of the job or that it was vacant. ... Even liberally construing the Complaint at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that Defendant did not provide reasonable accommodations.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats an essential function as a fundamental duty of the employment position.

MONTANEZ v. HESSIAN CO., LTD. · filed 2022-03-15(n)(1)

“Whether a job duty is an ‘essential function’ turns on whether it is ‘fundamental’ to the employment position.” Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 612 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... The “General Laborer” job description Faddis attached to its EEOC Position Statement does not identify an ability to lift as an “Essential Dut[y] & Responsibilit[y]” and lists the position’s “Physical Demands” as requiring only an ability to “lift and/or move up to 25 pounds.” ... At this stage of the case, Montanez’s Complaint and the job description are enough to allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Montanez was qualified to perform the essential functions of Faddis’s General Laborer position without reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position, which a plaintiff must be able to perform with a reasonable accommodation to state an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim.

Williams v. BTST Services, LLC · filed 2022-03-22(n)(1)

Essential functions are the fundamental job duties of the employment position. Fleetwood, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Here, while plaintiff does not explicitly note her job title, she alleges in her proposed Amended Complaint that she performed social work for defendant, including the provision of services to clients, and she was required to submit notes as part of her job. (ECF No. 24-1 at 1-3, ¶¶ 1-4, 9, 13). ... Drawing all reasonable factual inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the court concludes that plaintiff adequately pleads that she could perform the essential functions of her position with a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and identifies factors for determining whether a function is essential, including the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences of nonperformance, collective bargaining terms, and incumbents' work experience.

Veith v. Tyson Fresh Meat, Inc. · filed 2022-03-25(n)

The EEOC regulations provide insight regarding what constitutes an “essential function”: (1) In general. The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term “essential functions” does not include the marginal functions of the position. (2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following: (i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or (iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. (3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and identifies reasons and evidence relevant to deciding whether a function is essential.

Veith v. Tyson Fresh Meat, Inc. · filed 2022-04-26(n)

The EEOC regulations provide insight regarding what constitutes an “essential function”: ... (1) In general. The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term “essential functions” does not include the marginal functions of the position. ... (3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: ... (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or ... (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). Defendant’s evidence appears to fall into the category of “work experience of past incumbents,” and does suggest that there may be no genuine dispute as to whether the challenged job requirement (the work schedule of 70-80 hours and six days per week) is essential.

A function is essential when the position exists to perform that function.

Earheart, Jr. v. Central Transport LLC · filed 2022-05-06(n)(2)(i)

A “function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i); Denczak v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F. App'x 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a production quota was an essential function on an assembly line position even though the defendant did not provide a written description of the job because “common sense . . . supports the point”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has pointed to enough evidence to suggest that Plaintiff will not be able to raise a genuine dispute as to whether he was “qualified” for the P&D driver position because he will be unable to show he could perform the essential functions of the job.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) requires considering the employer’s judgment, along with the job description and other listed evidence, when determining whether a job function is essential.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Clarksville Health System, G.P. · filed 2022-07-28(n)(3)

As noted above, applicable regulations state that weight is to be given not only to the job description (and what it indicates about what functions are essential), but also to the employer’s judgment as to what functionals are essential. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n) treats a job function as essential based on the employer's judgment and other relevant evidence, including the job description, time spent performing it, consequences of not requiring it, and past and current work experience.

BARNES v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC · filed 2022-09-26(n), (n)(3)

As Barnes stated, the main issue in this case is whether operating the forklift was an "essential function." The ADA provides that "consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). "[T]o determine whether a particular duty is an essential function," a court considers factors like "the employee's job description, the employer's opinion, the amount of time spent performing the function, the consequences for not requiring the individual to perform the duty, and past and current work experiences." Stern v. St. St. Anthony's Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 285 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gratzl v. Office of the Chief Judges of the 12th, 18th, 19th & 22nd Jud. Cirs., 601 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2010)); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). The evidence before the Court shows a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether operating the forklift was an essential function of the job. While GM maintains that driving the forklift was essential, several pieces of evidence call this into question: Barnes' eight and half years in the position without being required to drive the forklift, Barnes being placed in the position without ever being required to possess a forklift license or undergo regular recertification, there only being one forklift worker while there are several crib attendants working the majority of shifts, testimony that Barnes' supervisor and others knew of his inability to operate a forklift including never accepting overtime for another crib attendant that regularly operated a forklift, and the two September 2019 crib attendant job descriptions which require only one position to operate the forklift. These same pieces of evidence also create a dispute over whether exempting Barnes from the forklift operation requirement is a reasonable accommodation. Given the conflicting evidence at this stage of the case, genuine issues of material fact exist and summary judgment is denied as to Barnes' ADA discrimination claim.

Subsection (n)(3) identifies factors relevant to determining whether a job duty is an essential function, including the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the duty, and the work experience of employees in similar positions.

Stevens v. City of Oneonta · filed 2022-11-01(n)(3)

To determine a particular job's "essential functions," this Court "must conduct 'a fact-specific inquiry into both the employer's description of a job and how the job is actually performed in practice.'" Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp., 851 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013)). Factors to consider include, inter alia, "the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, . . . and the work experience of current employees in similar positions." Stevens, 851 F.3d at 229 (quoting McMillan, 711 F.3d at 126) (citations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, excluding marginal duties; under that standard, physically delivering mail on the assigned routes is an essential function of a carrier position.

Johnson v. United States Postal Service · filed 2023-02-01(n)(1)

“[A]n accommodation that eliminates an essential function of the job is not reasonable.” Id. at 1078; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1), (2) (“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term “essential functions” does not include the marginal functions of the position.” “The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function.”). ... The Court finds that there is no genuine factual dispute concerning Plaintiff’s inability to perform the essential functions of the carrier. ... Finally, this Court’s finding that an essential function of the position is to physically deliver mail to not less than five letter routes is consistent with findings of other courts specific to the position at issue.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) provides that certain impairments will, in virtually all cases, result in coverage as disabilities under the ADA.

Gropen v. Super. Ct. · filed 2023-04-05(j)(3)(ii)

The EEOC’s implementing regulations specify that some impairments will, in “virtually all cases,” result in a determination of coverage under the ADA. (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).)

Under § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), post-traumatic stress disorder will virtually always be found to substantially limit a major life activity.

Rodgers v. Gary Community School Corp. · filed 2016-03-01(j)(3)(ii)

Although neither party brought this regulation to the Court’s attention, there is a recent regulation that lists post-traumatic stress disorder as an impairment that will “virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).

Section 1630.2 treats essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job, distinguishes them from qualification standards, and requires the interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Miller v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2016-03-09(n)(1), (n)(2), (n)(3), (q), (o)(3)

As Miller correctly notes, however, UPS’ reliance on the Section 1630.2(n)(3) factors is untenable in light of the provisions' of 20 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l) and. (2), which establish that the term “essential functions” refers to the “fundamental job duties” of an employment position, which is to say either the functions the performance of which is the reason the position exists, functions that can only be performed by a limited number of employees, or functions requiring such a degree of specialization that to be hired for the position requires expertise in that specialty. ... Indeed, the current evidentiary record suggests instead that such ability to stand and/or walk continuously is, at most, a qualification standard and not an essential function of Miller’s former job. ... Such interactive process “should identify .the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

The regulation requires disability to be assessed broadly: an impairment may be substantially limiting without preventing or severely restricting a major life activity; medication’s ameliorative effects are disregarded, while non-ameliorative side effects may be considered, and bipolar disorder will at minimum substantially limit brain function.

Caporicci v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. · filed 2016-05-27(i)(1)(i) (j)(1)(ii) (j)(1)(vi) (j)(4)(ii) (j)(3)(iii)

The ADAAA emphasizes that “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). Further, “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” including the effects of medication. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(vi), (5)(i). At the same time, “the non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, such as negative side effects of medication ... may be considered.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(ii). In light of these principles, the Regulations specifically provide that “it should easily be concluded” that bipolar disorder “will, at a minimum ... substantially limit brain function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). ... Consistent with the Regulations, the Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs bipolar disorder at least arguably causes substantial limitations in the major life activities of working and brain function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

Section 1630.2(g)(3) generally permits a regarded-as disability analysis alone when reasonable accommodation is not at issue; § 1630.2(l)(2) requires a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment; and § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) makes substantial limitation a nondemanding standard.

Alexander v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2016-06-24(g)(3), (l)(2), and (j)(1)(i)

Considering those alternative definitions was critical. In particular, after the 2008 Amendments, the regarded-as prong has become the primary avenue for bringing the type of discrimination claim that Alexander asserts. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (“Where an individual is not challenging a covered ... it is generally unnecessary to proceed under the ‘actual disability’ or ‘record of’ prongs * * *.”) ... Instead, Alexander needed only to show that the Authority took “a prohibited action against [him] because of an actual or perceived impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2). ... Under the 2008 Amendments, the substantially-limits requirement “is not meant to be a demanding standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), or to require “extensive analysis,” id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies types of evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, and § 1630.2(o)(3) requires the employer and employee to engage in an interactive process when addressing a reasonable-accommodation request.

Ward v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-09-30(n)(3), (o)(3)

Under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3): [e]vidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. ... In light of this evidence, the court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether the overtime requirement was an essential function of Plaintiff’s job. ... When determining how to address a reasonable accommodations request, the employer and employee must engage in an interactive process. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). ... DYRS had an obligation to engage in the interactive process in order to determine whether providing the requested accommodation would cause an “undue hardship.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, while § 1630.2(o)(3) requires an employer to initiate an informal interactive process after an accommodation request.

Mathis v. City of Red Bank · filed 2016-10-25(n)(3), (o)(3)

“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes but is not limited to: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; [and] (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function.” ... “When a disabled employee requests an accommodation, the Act requires employers “to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee]” to “determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). Both parties are obliged to engage in the process in good faith.

Section 1630.2 treats a function as essential based on why the position exists, staffing limits, or specialization, directs courts to consider non-exhaustive evidence, and contemplates an informal interactive process to identify limitations and accommodations.

Reyer v. Saint Francis Country House · filed 2017-03-20(n)(2), (n)(3), (o)(3)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s • regulations defining “essential functions” further state a function may be deemed “essential” because: (i) the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or (iii) the function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... The regulations further set forth a non-exhaustive list of examples of evidence that may assist courts in identifying the “essential functions” of a job: ... (vii) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); ... “[N]one of the factors nor any of the evidentiary examples alone are necessarily dispositive.” ... In conclusion, at least some of the factors identified in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) support a conclusion that lifting fifty-pounds was not an essential function of the Maintenance Worker position. Given that genuine issues of material fact exist, it would be inappropriate to conclusively resolve this question. ... The issues I have identified must be resolved by a jury. ... see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”). ... In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants’ response to the five-pound lifting restriction'was limited and insufficient to satisfy their obligation to engage in the interactive process.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and excludes marginal duties; § 1630.2(o)(3) recognizes that a reasonable-accommodation request may trigger an employer's duty to engage in an interactive process.

Caez-Fermaint v. State Ins. Fund Corp. · filed 2017-12-18(n)(1), (o)(3)

"essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term 'essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the position." ... "a request for a reasonable accommodation may trigger a responsibility on the part of the employer to enter into an interactive process with the employee to determine an appropriate accommodation."

The regulation identifies written job descriptions, past incumbents’ work experience, and current experience in similar jobs as evidence of whether a function is essential, and recognizes that an employer may need to initiate an informal interactive process to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation.

Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. · filed 2018-02-21(n)(3)(ii), (n)(3)(vi), (n)(3)(vii), (o)(3)

Several pieces of evidence produced at trial do support a finding that in-person attendance was an essential function of Mosby-Meachem’s job. This evidence includes the enumerated list of essential functions in the Attorney 3 job description and Mosby-Meachem’s testimony under oath that the first nine of these functions were in fact essential—although she also testified that they could be performed remotely. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes . . . [w]ritten job descriptions. . .”). ... Additionally, two former Attorney 3s testified about the need to be physically present to perform the job, especially for “call-outs,” when an emergency required a physical appearance. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vi) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes . . . [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job . . .”). ... For example, several MLG&W employees as well as outside counsel who worked with Mosby-Meachem testified that they felt she could perform all essential functions during the 10-week period working from home. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vii) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes . . . [t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs . . .”). ... Moreover, “[o]nce the employee requests an accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an ‘interactive process’ to ‘identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.’” Melange v. City of Ctr. Line, 482 F. App’x 81, 84–85 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation [for a given employee,] it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee].”).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for determining whether a job function is essential, while § 1630.2(o)(3) requires an employer and qualified employee to engage in an interactive process to identify limitations and possible accommodations.

Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan, Inc. · filed 2020-05-13(n)(3), (o)(3)

Factors to consider to determine if a job function is essential include, but are not limited to (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... When a qualified individual informs her employer of a disability, the employer must engage the employee in an interactive process to determine if there is a reasonable accommodation which might enable the employee to continue working. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3);Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., a Div. of Echlin, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171-1173 (10th Cir.1999). The interactive process permits employers and employees to work together to identify the employee's precise limitations and to discuss accommodations which might enable the employee to continue working.

Section 1630.2(o)(3) contemplates an informal, interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and possible accommodations; § 1630.2(n)(2) guides whether job duties are essential by factors including employer judgment, written description, time spent, consequences, and whether few employees can perform them.

Lusk v. Daewon America, Inc. · filed 2020-06-11(o)(3); (n)(2)(i); (n)(2)(ii)

In the reasonable-accommodation context, the ADA envisions an “interactive process” by which employers and employees work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3). This “informal, interactive process . . . should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” Id. ... “[E]ssential functions are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” ... “Whether a function of a position is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors, including the employer’s judgment of what it believes to be the essential functions, any written description of the position, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, and the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function.” ... A job function also may be essential if there are a limited number of existing employees who could perform that particular function. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997).

The regulation requires courts assessing whether a job function is essential to consider factors including the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform it and the work experience of incumbents in similar jobs, and it contemplates an informal interactive process for identifying reasonable accommodations.

Cooke v. Carpenter Technology Corporation · filed 2020-11-09(n)(3), (n)(3)(iv), (n)(3)(vii), (o)(3)

The regulations also instruct courts to consider the work experience of past incumbents in the job and the work experience of current incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... But the regulations specifically contemplate considering the “work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vii). ... The ADA and corresponding regulations contemplate “an informal, interactive process” in which employers and disabled employees work together to identify potential accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines an essential function as a fundamental job duty, and the court held that regular and predictable attendance was essential; under § 1630.2(o)(3), an interactive process may be necessary to identify a reasonable accommodation, but it is not mandatory when the employee is not otherwise qualified.

Lamm v. James · filed 2022-02-07(n)(1), (o)(3)

An essential function of a job “is defined as ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.’” Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 915 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... Lamm was absent from her duties excessively and often without warning; thus, she could not fulfill the essential functions of “regular and predictable attendance” and completing administrative and client-facing tasks. ... Because Lamm is not “otherwise qualified,” as we explain in greater detail below, the interactive process is not mandatory in her case. According to the Code of Federal Regulations’ section on implementing the ADA, “[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) treats seven listed considerations as nonexclusive evidence of an essential job function, and § 1630.2(o)(3) directs the interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and potential accommodations.

Keith v. Volvo Group North America, LLC · filed 2023-01-18(n)(3) (o)(3)

Regulations also provide guidance, identifying seven factors as evidence of an essential function: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) work experience of past incumbents in the job; and (7) current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). None of these factors are dispositive, and not all will necessarily be relevant in a given matter. Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 579 (4th Cir. 2015). The list is also not exhaustive. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Written job descriptions are typically relevant only if prepared “before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(3)(ii). ... The ADA regulations further provide that this process “should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, while § 1630.2(o)(3) makes initiating an informal, interactive accommodation process permissive rather than mandatory.

Butler-Smith v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama · filed 2023-04-06(n)(3) (o)(3)

“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to,” the following factors: an “employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,” “[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,” “[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function,” “[t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function,” “[t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement,” “[t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job,” and/or “[t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” ... HMMA is not required to engage in an interactive process. As the regulation cited by Ms. Butler-Smith states, “To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary . . . to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (emphasis added).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats essential functions as the fundamental rather than marginal duties of a position, while § 1630.2(o)(3) contemplates an interactive process to identify an employee’s precise limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Tafolla v. Heilig · filed 2023-08-18(n)(1), (o)(3)

“The term ‘essential functions,’ which is not defined in the statutes themselves, is generally defined in ADA regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (‘EEOC’) to mean the ‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’ Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... To be sure, an employee seeking an accommodation is required to participate in this interactive process in order to help the employer identify the “precise limitations resulting from the disability ... and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2 identifies essential functions as core job duties and supplies factors for determining them, while requiring employers and employees to participate in an informal interactive process in good faith to identify suitable accommodations.

Arnott v. Holzer Health Systems · filed 2024-12-20(n)(1) (n)(3) (o)(3)

Essential functions are “the core job duties, not the marginal ones.” Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 854 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Other factors to consider include the time spent performing the function, the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function, the work experience of past incumbents of the positions, and current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Once an employee has requested an accommodation, her employer must engage in an “informal, interaction process” to identify a suitable accommodation. Brumley v. UPS, 909 F.3d 834, 839–840 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)); see also Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 857. Both the employer and employee have a duty to participate in good faith. Brumley, 909 F.3d at 840. A party fails to participate in good faith if they cause “unnecessary delays or obstruct[s] the process” or “fail[] to adequately communicate or provide information during the process.” Id. But the employer’s refusal to provide a requested accommodation immediately is not alone a failure to accommodate. Id.

Section 1630.2 treats essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and calls for an interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Nickischer · filed 2026-01-12(n)(1), (o)(3)

“A job duty is an ‘essential function’ when it is ‘fundamental’ to the position.” ... “However, it does not include “marginal” functions.” ... “The regulations explain that “it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the” employee to “determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.” ... “This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”

The regulation provides that employers need not provide reasonable accommodation to an individual regarded as disabled and identifies factors, including time spent performing a function, the consequences of not requiring it, and past and current employees’ experience, for deciding whether a job duty is essential.

Leme v. Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc. · filed 2017-03-29(o)(4); (n)(3)(ii)-(vii)

However, to prevail under a “regarded as” theory, he must show that he could perform the essential functions of his job without reasonable accommodation because employers are not required to accommodate individuals “regarded as” disabled. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4). ... Samson v. Fed. Express Corp., 746 F.3d 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 2014); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii)-(vii). ... Here, even an analysis of these factors demonstrates that the record contains no genuine dispute as to whether A-line preparation was an essential function of the Tech position. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Techs spend a significant amount of time preparing A-lines, and also that the function is specialized and requires extensive training.

Being regarded as having an impairment alone does not establish ADA liability; the claimant must prove disability discrimination, and a qualified individual must meet the job requirements and be able to perform the essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Thompson v. United States Postal Service · filed 2016-09-09(g)(1)(iii), (l)(2), (l)(3), (m)

The ADAAA and regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission explain that “regarded as having such an impairment” means that “the individual has been subjected to an action prohibited by the [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)] as amended because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not both ‘transitory and minor.’” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2). ... “Establishing that an individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ does not, by itself, establish liability.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3). Rather, liability under title 1 of the ADA is established “only when an individual proves that a covered entity discriminated on the basis of disability within the meaning of section 102 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3). ... Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, “[t]he term ‘qualified,’ with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (emphasis added).

Section 1630.2(j)(iii) directs that disability analysis focus primarily on compliance and discrimination, so whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not require extensive analysis.

Green v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2016-10-31(j)(iii)

The ADA’s implementing regulations further specify that “the primary object of attention ... should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(iii).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) recognizes cancer as an impairment because it substantially limits the major life activity of normal cell growth.

Weed v. Sidewinder Drilling, Inc. · filed 2017-03-29(j)(3)(iii)

Cancer is listed as an impairment because it “substantially limits [the major life activity] of normal cell growth.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

The regulation treats cancer as an example that substantially limits normal cell growth but does not restrict disability coverage for substantial limitations on normal cell growth to cancer alone.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Optimal Solutions & Technologies (OST, Inc.) · filed 2019-11-19(j)(3)(iii)

The regulation, therefore, does not confine substantial limitation on normal cell growth only to cancer. To read the regulation as restrictively as OST suggests would not only contravene the regulation’s plain language but would also be at odds with the ADAAA’s directive to construe the definition of disability “in favor of broad coverage.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) treats the consequences of not requiring an incumbent to perform a function as a factor in determining whether that function is essential.

Tonyan, Angela v. Dunham's Athleisure Corporation · filed 2019-09-04(n)(3)

Another factor for determining whether a job duty is essential is “the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Defendant has submitted evidence that it must staff its stores efficiently to control labor costs and respond quickly and efficiently to customer needs. Customer service is better if management is able to perform the physical tasks included in the job description in addition to managing and directing staff and daily store operations. If management cannot perform physical functions on a regular basis, defendant must incur higher costs by adding staff hours to maintain a high level of customer service.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position rather than marginal duties and requires their essentiality to be assessed case by case using specified factors and considerations.

Wiggins v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama (CONSENT) · filed 2019-09-20(n)(1), (n)(2), and (n)(3)

The ADA’s implementing regulations provide that “[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” and “does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “Whether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors.” ... The ADA regulations further contemplate that a job function may be deemed essential if: “(1) the reason the position exists is to perform the function; (2) there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of the job function can be distributed; and (3) the function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position was hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.” ... The summary judgment evidence suggests that actually conducting site visits as a Revenue Examiner is not as “essential” as Defendant’s job posting and job description seem to suggest. ... Accordingly, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are disputes of material fact as to what the essential functions of the Revenue Examiner position are and whether Plaintiff is a “qualified individual” under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties of the position the individual with a disability holds or desires.

Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center, LLC · filed 2019-11-12(n)(1)

Based on the record, including the ASM job description, the Court finds that a 48-hour workweek with availability to work 9 to 10-hour days and flexibility to work hours depending on the needs of the store are essential functions of the ASM position. See Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (a job description is evidence of the position’s essential functions.). There is no material dispute that those requirements are fundamental duties of the ASM position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)(essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.”).

Section 1630.2 treats essential functions as fundamental job duties, identifies evidence for deciding essentiality, triggers an interactive accommodation process when a qualified employee communicates a disability and desire for accommodation, and lists factors relevant to undue hardship.

Purewal v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. · filed 2019-10-01(n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(3), (p)(2)

The ADA’s implementing regulations define “essential function” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” Bartee v. Michelin North America, Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 915 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(1)). “‘Determining whether a particular function is essential is a factual inquiry.’” Id. (quoting Davidson v. America Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003)). ... “Evidence of whether a particular function is essential to a job includes (but is not necessarily limited to) (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, (3) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, and (4) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” Wells v. Shalala, 228 F.3d 1137, 1144 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... The duty is triggered when a qualified employee informs his employer of a disability and communicates a desire for accommodation. See Valdez v. McGill, 462 Fed. Appx. 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 1998)); Dinse v. Carlisle Foodservice, 541 Fed. Appx. 885, 890 (10th Cir. 2013). ... For purposes of accommodation under the ADA, factors relevant to the existence of undue hardship include: (i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this part, taking into consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or outside funding; (ii) The overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the number of persons employed at such facility, and the effect on expenses and resources; (iii) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the business of the covered entity with respect to the number of its employees, and the number, type, and location of its facilities; (iv) The type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity, and the geographic separateness and administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity; and (v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility’s ability to conduct business. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2).

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification to the work environment or how a position is performed that enables an individual to perform the position's essential functions.

Ricasa v. State of Hawaii, Department of Human Services · filed 2019-10-11(o)(1)(ii)

A reasonable accommodation is defined as modifications to the work environment, or to the manner under which the position is performed, that enable an individual to perform the essential functions of that position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). The employee bears the burden of showing that the accommodation is reasonable and it would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of the position. Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006). ... Plaintiff ignores the requirement that the reasonable accommodation must allow the Plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the position. Dark, 451 F.3d at 1088. Plaintiff admits that he became unable to perform the essential functions of a Youth Corrections Officer. The essential functions of the position include numerous physical requirements that Plaintiff could not perform with or without reasonable accommodations, including restraining and subduing wards, breaking up fights, carrying wards to seclusion rooms, walking and standing prolonged hours, and chasing and apprehending escaping wards. (Job Description at Ex. 10 p. 9, ECF No. 36-5). Plaintiff’s own physician determined that he could not perform the essential functions of the position in December 2016. (Dr. DiCostanzo’s December 12, 2016 evaluation, attached as Ex. 22 to Def.’s CSF, ECF No. 37-2). There was no reasonable accommodation that would allow Plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the Youth Corrections Officer position. Reza v. Int’l Game Tech., 351 Fed. Appx. 188, 190 (9th Cir. 2009).

Under the pre-ADAAA rule, “substantially limits” means being unable or significantly restricted in performing a major life activity, assessed by the impairment’s nature, duration, and long-term impact.

GARDNER v. SEPTA · filed 2019-10-17(j)(1)(i), (j)(2)(i)

According to pre-ADAA EEOC regulations, “‘substantially limits’ means ‘[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform’ or ‘[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.’” Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 782–83 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting pre-ADAAA EEOC regulations 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i),(ii)). In considering whether a major life activity has been substantially limited, courts were to consider “(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of [the impairment] or resulting from the impairment.” Id. at 783 (quoting pre-ADAAA EEOC regulations 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)–(iii)).

The regulation treats major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia as substantially limiting major life activities and therefore disabilities.

JONES v. JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL · filed 2019-10-29(j)(1)(3)(iii)

Regulations clarifying what constitutes a disability under the ADA state that “major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia” substantially limit major life activities and should be considered disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(3)(iii). ... There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Plaintiff suffered from a major depressive disorder.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Serian v. JetBlue Airways Corporation · filed 2024-07-11(j)(1)(iv)

“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.” ... “In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she experienced “respiratory distress, fatigue, and nausea” and this caused her “to vomit as many as nine times per flight.” ... These allegations are sufficient at this stage to survive a motion to dismiss.”

For impairments that virtually always substantially limit a major life activity, § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) calls for a particularly simple and straightforward individualized assessment.

Chapman v. Olymbec USA, LLC. · filed 2019-11-01(j)(3)(ii)

The individualized assessment of some types of impairments will, in virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage under the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). Given the inherent nature of some types of impairments, they will as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity (e.g., blindness substantially limiting sight). See id. at § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii),(iii)(giving other examples). “Therefore, with respect to these types of impairments, the necessary individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.” Id. at § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). ... These statements and facts, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, taken as true, are sufficient to satisfy the ADA and the TDA’s definition of disability. This analysis is “particularly simple and straightforward.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). As “construed broadly,” one may plausibly infer from these statements that Chapman has a mental disability and that it “substantially limits” major aspects of her life.

The regulation requires an individualized, fact-specific assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and does not create a presumption that diabetes is substantially limiting.

Dillard v. SNC Lavalin Engineers & Constructors Inc. · filed 2021-05-27(j)(1)(iv)

While the regulation implementing the ADA’s substantial-limitation requirement states that diabetes will satisfy this requirement in virtually all cases due to its effect on endocrine function, the regulation does not relieve the plaintiff of his burden to present evidence to support such a finding. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv), (j)(3)(ii). Nor does the regulation establish a presumption that diabetes substantially limits endocrine function. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv), (j)(3)(ii)–(iii).

The regulation requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, even when the assessment is particularly simple and straightforward for conditions such as cancer.

5539-181 & 182 Prospect Park W. Brooklyn LLC v. Rivera · filed 2025-08-29(j)(3)(ii)

Although the ADAAA makes the individualized assessment 'particularly simple and straightforward' for diseases like cancer, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), an individualized assessment must still take place.

Section 1630.2(j)(3) treats cancer as an impairment that will virtually always qualify for coverage but still requires an individualized assessment of substantial limitation.

Sobie · filed 2026-03-27(j)(3)

The 2008 Amendments to the ADA (“the ADAAA”), which identify certain impairments that “will, in virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)Ci), include cancer because it “substantially limits normal cell growth,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(/)(3)Gii). ... Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 18) identifies no evidence of the type set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) concerning how her impairment substantially limits a major life activity. ... Absent such evidence, Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof to establish she was disabled.

Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.

Smith v. Dart · filed 2020-12-10(j)

The Seventh Circuit has similarly stated that the question of whether an individual is disabled is “an individualized one, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment”). ... Accordingly, Smith has plausibly alleged that he is qualified individual with a disability, and further factual development will reveal the extent to which his condition limits one or more major life activities.

Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment; allegations that sleep apnea substantially limits sleep can suffice at the pleading stage.

Cotledge v. Dart · filed 2020-12-10(j)

The Seventh Circuit has similarly stated that the question of whether an individual is disabled is “an individualized one, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment”). ... Accordingly, Cotledge has plausibly alleged that he is qualified individual with a disability, and further factual development will reveal the extent to which his condition limits one or more major life activities.

Section 1630.2(j) requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Green v. Dart · filed 2020-12-10(j)

The Seventh Circuit has similarly stated that the question of whether an individual is disabled is “an individualized one, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment”). ... Accordingly, Green has plausibly alleged that he is qualified individual with a disability, and further factual development will reveal the extent to which his condition limits one or more major life activities.

Cancer will virtually always qualify as a disability under the ADA.

Buczakowski v. Crouse Health Hospital Inc. · filed 2019-11-26(j)(3)(ii)

Similar to the plaintiff in Berk, Plaintiff missed work for a period of several months after she was diagnosed with cancer and underwent surgery. Am. Compl. ¶ 12–15. Consequently, Plaintiff’s cancer constitutes a qualifying disability under the ADA. See Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Cancer will ‘virtually always’ be a qualifying disability.”) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)–(iii) (2011)).

The regulation provides that cancer substantially limits normal cell growth for purposes of determining whether a person has a disability.

Moore v. Brouillette · filed 2020-12-11(j)(3)(iii)

Notably, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) implementing regulations for the ADA specify that “cancer substantially limits normal cell growth,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii), and that “normal cell growth” constitutes a “major life activity,” id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii).

Cancer qualifies as an impairment under the ADA disability framework.

Durns v. Family Guidance Centers, Inc. · filed 2021-09-29(j)(3)(iii)

Cancer is an impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

The regulation treats cancer as an impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of normal cell growth.

Trcka v. Atzenhoffer Chevrolet Company, Inc · filed 2023-03-27(j)(3)(iii)

Relevant here, cancer is considered to be an impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of normal cell growth. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii); see also Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 786 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1185 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (finding that cancer “is capable of qualifying as a disability under the ADA” even if, when active, the cancer constitutes a limitation only on the major life activity of normal cell growth). Accordingly, Trcka has provided sufficient summary judgment evidence establishing that he has a disability under the ADA.

Cancer substantially limits normal cell growth and qualifies as a disability under the ADA.

Angell v. Fairmount Fire Protection District · filed 2012-11-05(j)(3)(iii)

As the Equal Employment Opportunities Coalition (“EEOC”) implementing regulations state,... “it should easily be concluded that ... cancer substantially limits [the major life activity of] normal cell growth” and accordingly, constitutes a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). ... Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer, and that he underwent surgeries and treatment for his cancer; therefore, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he had a disability under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone who can perform essential job functions with or without accommodation; § 1630.2(n) identifies factors for determining essential functions; and § 1630.2(o)(3) requires the parties to identify disability-related limitations and possible accommodations through an interactive process.

Wilson v. Saint Francis Ministries, Inc. · filed 2019-12-10(m), (n), (o)(3)

To be a “qualified individual,” plaintiff need show himself capable, with or without accommodation, of performing his position’s essential functions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). As such, determining which functions are essential to plaintiff’s position is critical to determining whether plaintiff is qualified. ... C.f. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (listing a variety of nonexclusive considerations that inform whether a particular job function is essential). ... Working together, the parties should “identify the precise limitations resulting from the [employee’s] disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). ... The interactive process required defendant to consult further with plaintiff to ascertain “the precise job-related limitations imposed by [his] disability and how those limitations could be overcome.” Section 1630.9 Process of Determining the Appropriate Reasonable Accommodation, Appendix to Part 1630—Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2, App.; see also Valdez v. McGill, 462 F. App’x 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2012) (“An employer must make a reasonable effort to explore the accommodation possibilities with the employee.”).

Subsection (m) defines a qualified individual by the ability to meet job requirements and perform essential functions with or without accommodation, while subsection (o)(3) requires an employer to discuss limitations and potential accommodations after an employee requests one.

Roseman v. Linmoore Investments, Inc. · filed 2021-08-17(m), (o)(3)

In order to be “otherwise qualified” for a job, the individual must satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... Thus, based on the undisputed facts, Roseman was not able to complete an essential function of the position, and his failure to accommodate claims must fail. ... “[O]nce an employee notifies the employer of any limitations and requests an accommodation, the employer must discuss the limitations and potential accommodations with the employee.” Id. (citing Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). Both parties must participate in good faith in this interactive process to explore possible accommodations. ... Thus, because Roseman did not request his proposed accommodations, or even attempt to discuss any accommodations until after his termination, these claims must fail.

Section 1630.2(m) ties qualification to having the skills and experience needed to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, while § 1630.2(o)(3) calls for an informal interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Kennedy v. Dynamic-Pro, Inc. · filed 2023-03-17(m), (o)(3)

This means that she must have had the necessary skills and experience to “perform the essential functions of [the] position,” with or without the requested reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... The governing regulations reflect this requirement: To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation[,] it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2(m) treats an employee as qualified when the employee can perform essential job requirements with or without reasonable accommodation, while § 1630.2(o)(3) describes the interactive process as identifying disability-related limitations and potential accommodations.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2025-07-02(m), (o)(3)

Further, as far as the ADA requires that the disabled employee be able to perform the essential requirements of the role “with or without reasonable accommodation,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), Shefke was applying to these part-time positions in order to accommodate her need to work fewer hours. There is no genuine dispute that Shefke was “otherwise qualified” for these positions when by nature their work requirements were better suited to her medical needs, and when Beaumont has presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. ... The purpose of the interactive process is to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(iii) covers an employee whom the employer regards as disabled; § 1630.2(h) includes a physiological condition such as a traumatic brain injury as an impairment; and § 1630.2(r) requires an individualized, evidence-based assessment of present ability and specified risk factors to establish a direct threat.

Robson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2019-12-13(g)(1)(iii), (h), (r)

A person meets the definition of disabled under the ADA when his employer regards the employee as disabled. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii). ... A physical or mental impairment means: (1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability (formerly termed “mental retardation”), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). ... Whether a person poses such a direct threat must be determined based upon an “individualized assessment of [his] present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The assessment must rely on the best current medical or other objective evidence and consider (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.” Id.; see also Nunes v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998)).

Section 1630.2 applies disability coverage broadly: substantial limitation is measured against most people in the general population and need not significantly or severely restrict a major life activity, while a record of disability includes a history of such an impairment.

Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co. · filed 2019-12-23(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), (k)(1)

Under the 2008 amendments to the ADA, Congress made clear that the definitions of both a “disabled person” and “substantially limits” are to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage. See § 12102(4)(A), (B); see also 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). “To determine whether a disability substantially limits major life activities, the regulations direct courts to compare the person claiming a disability to ‘most people in the general population.’” Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 854 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). This is not a demanding standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (Appendix), and in general, a plaintiff does not need to submit scientific, medical, or statistical proof to establish a substantial limitation, § 1630.2(j)(v). Additionally, “‘[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict . . . a major life activity’ to be substantially limiting.” Id. at 853-54 (quoting § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). ... Given that the term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage,” Morrissey has satisfied her burden of showing that she is disabled. ... On the merits, though, Morrissey’s personnel file had medical notes supporting her restriction; she repeatedly told Coldwater that she was under a restriction; and for a time, Coldwater honored the restriction. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1) (“An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”). Therefore, this claim must also progress.

The regulation treats the regarded-as inquiry as separate from an employer’s affirmative defense, and requires a direct-threat determination to be individualized, based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, and evaluated under four specified risk factors.

Brasier v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2023-01-09(l), (l)(2), (r)

The determination whether an employer “can ultimately establish a defense to liability is an inquiry separate from, and follows after, a determination that an individual was regarded as having a disability.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, app. to § 1630.2(l). In other words, an employer can regard an employee as disabled and be legally justified in doing so. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2) (“[A]n individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ any time a covered entity takes a prohibited action against the individual because of an actual or perceived impairment, even if the entity asserts, or may or does ultimately establish, a defense to such action.”). ... An employer can avoid liability by establishing that its employee posed a “direct threat.” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). This term means “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). A direct-threat determination must result from an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Id. The assessment, in turn, must be “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. An employer must consider four factors when determining whether an employee poses a direct threat: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” Id.

Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized direct-threat assessment based on reasonable medical judgment, current medical knowledge, and the best available objective evidence; § 1630.2(l)(1) permits unlawful-screening claims under a regarded-as-disabled theory.

Brasier v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2023-03-31(r), (l)(1)

Although Union Pacific need not show its assessment of Brasier was infallible, it cannot prevail by merely showing it acted reasonably. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Rather, Union Pacific must show its assessment was reasonable as well as individualized and based on the best and most current medical evidence. See id. ... Under § 1630.2(l)(1), Brasier may allege unlawful-screening based on the regarded-as-disabled theory.

The regulation broadly construes “substantially limits” and may require an employer to begin an informal interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation.

Lowe v. Pettway · filed 2023-03-28(j)(1)(i), (o)(3)

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.”). ... In some circumstances, an employer may “need to ‘initiate an informal, interactive process’ with a disabled employee to determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).” ... On this record, a jury must determine whether JCSO was obligated to “explore the universe of reasonable accommodations, identify one that [was] mutually agreeable to the parties, and implement it.” ... Reasonable jurors could conclude that JCSO breached its obligation.

Section 1630.2 treats an impairment as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity, and requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly rather than as a demanding standard.

Hendershott v. St. Luke's Hospital · filed 2020-01-06(g)(2), (j)(i), (j)(ii)

There is no dispute that Hendershott will be considered “disabled” under the ADA if he has: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). ... “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i). Rather, An impairment is a disability…if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). ... SLH’s argument fails because, as both common sense and Hendershott’s medical treatment records indicate, depression is an impairment that substantially limits many major life activities when active. ... A reasonable jury could find that these hospitalizations show that when his illnesses are active, Hendershott is substantially limited—as compared to most people in the general population—in his ability to perform life activities such as learning, thinking, and working.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and directs courts to consider non-dispositive factors when deciding whether a function is essential.

Douglas v. Esper · filed 2020-01-14(n)(1), (n)(3)(i)-(vii)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... Some non-dispositive factors courts consider when deciding whether a job function is essential are: (i) the employer’s judgment about which functions are essential; (ii) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) the consequences of failing to require the incumbent to perform the function; (v) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii). ... Given the unique nature of Douglas’s job, questions about his work and which of his duties were essential are properly left to a jury. ... Summary judgment on the issue of essential functions is not warranted.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position and excludes marginal functions.

Lima v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-02-19(n)(1)

Lima must then allege that “he could perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Roman-Oliveras, 655 F.3d at 48. “The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... Here, Lima’s Complaint does not present any factual allegations regarding the nature of Lima’s job, his proposed accommodations, or how such accommodations could be feasibly implemented. Accordingly, the Complaint cannot support a reasonable inference that Lima could perform the fundamental job duties of his position.

The regulation defines “substantially limits” broadly and requires an individualized assessment; an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to qualify.

BERARDINUCCI v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY · filed 2020-07-22(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(iv)

An impairment is a disability for purposes of a discrimination claim if it “substantially limits” the plaintiff’s ability to perform major life activities as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly, favoring expansive coverage. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). An impairment does not need to “prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity” in order to be “substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). An “individualized assessment” is required to determine whether a plaintiff’s impairment substantially limits her major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). ... A reasonable jury could determine that these symptoms created substantial limitations of Plaintiff’s life activities. Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA and PHRA.

“Substantially limits” is not a demanding standard, and the ADA’s disability definitions are construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.

Jose "Po" Rodriguez v. Dollar General Corporation · filed 2020-07-30(j)(1)(i)

The findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) require courts to construe the definitions of “disability” and “substantially limits” broadly and in favor of expansive coverage. See 110 P.L. 325 § 3(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ix). “‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) provides that “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard.

Lee v. Dallas County Sheriff Office · filed 2020-12-16(j)(1)(i)

“‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2020).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly for expansive coverage and does not demand that an impairment prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity.

Curtis v. DPSCS · filed 2021-06-14(j)(1)

The regulations interpreting the meaning of “substantially limits” within the definition of a disability under the ADA, state that “‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA” and “‘substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding term.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). Moreover, the regulations state that “[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id.

Section 1630.2(j) treats “substantially limits” as a broad, non-demanding standard requiring less functional limitation than the pre-ADAAA standard, while § 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination based on current medical knowledge, objective evidence, an individualized assessment, and specified risk factors.

Milligan v. Rambosk · filed 2022-02-24(j), (r)

Not every impairment, however, will constitute a disability under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). The ADAAA provides that the term "substantially limits" "is not meant to be a demanding standard," but rather "shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). The term “substantially limits” is “interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Rather, Plaintiff must be substantially limited in a major life activity "as compared to most people in the general population." Munoz v. Selig Enters., 981 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). Here, both ACP and PKD constitute a substantial limitation “as compared to most people in the general population.” ... For example, the regulations state that it “should easily be concluded” that “. . . cerebral palsy substantially limits brain function . . . .” § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). ... A “direct threat” “must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job,’ reached after considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). See also Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1184. This includes consideration of (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86. An employer may not “deny an employment opportunity to an individual with a disability merely because of a slightly increased risk. The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient.” EEOC v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 577, 587 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting EEOC Interpretive Guidance on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). ... In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, material questions of fact remain as to whether Plaintiff posed a direct threat to his safety or the safety of others, and whether the Sheriff’s decision to terminate his employment was based on particularized facts using the best available objective medical evidence, as required by the governing regulations. Resolving those questions will hinge on assessment of witness credibility and a weighing of the evidence, which are tasks the Court may not perform in reviewing a summary judgment motion. Buending v. Town of Redington Beach, 10 F.4th 1125, 1130 (11th Cir. 2021). Therefore, summary judgment is denied on the issue of whether, or not Plaintiff is a qualified individual.

The phrase “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard for determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Mayes v. Westrock Services, LLC · filed 2023-02-28(j)(1)(i)

“‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); see id. at § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.”); see, e.g., Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292, 300 (6th Cir. 2019) (“an individual whose impairment causes pain or fatigue that most people would not experience when performing that major life activity may be substantially limited.”).”

The regulation directs that “substantially limits” be construed broadly in favor of expansive ADA coverage.

Randolph v. Bath & Body Works, Inc. · filed 2025-04-23(j)(1)(i)

“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)). “Indeed, “‘[s]ubstantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.”” Id.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) provides that blindness substantially limits the major life activity of seeing, making blindness an ADA disability.

Hwang v. Couple Spa 65, Inc. · filed 2025-09-23(j)(3)(iii)

First, plaintiff is legally blind, (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 16), and therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” including “seeing”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“[I]t should easily be concluded that the following types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated: . . . blindness substantially limits seeing.”).

Deafness substantially limits hearing and qualifies as a disability, but the claimant must provide sufficient evidence that he is deaf.

Scarborough v. Central Bucks School District · filed 2015-11-09(j)(3)(iii)

Through regulation, the ... EEOC has determined that “deafness substantially limits hearing,” that hearing is a major life activity, and thus a deaf person is disabled within the meaning of the Act. ... Given the underwhelming evidence offered by Scarborough at trial, we therefore find that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Scarborough failed to establish that he suffered from a disability under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification or adjustment enabling a qualified individual with a disability to perform essential job functions, and § 1630.2(o)(3) requires an informal interactive process to identify limitations and potential accommodations.

Scruggs v. Johns Hopkins University · filed 2026-03-05(o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

A reasonable accommodation means “({mJodifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held . . . is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1)(ii)._ ... To arrive at a reasonable accommodation, “it may be necessary . . . to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee]. This Process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that would overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(3)(2012).

Section 1630.2 treats in-person teaching as an essential function when the employer’s judgment, time spent, consequences of omission, and the position’s purpose support that conclusion, while allowing a reasonable and effective accommodation that reduces but need not eliminate that function.

Dillard · filed 2026-02-05(n)(3), (n)(3)(iv), (n)(2)(i), (o)(1)(ii)

Here, Defendant’s judgment is supported by other factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Thus, in-person teaching constitutes a significant portion of the time spent on the job for the Assistant Professor position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(n)(3)(iii). ... Also, the record shows that there are significant “consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function,” because in-person teaching forms a critical performance criterion used for evaluating tenure-track Assistant Professors. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). ... Finally, and perhaps most dispositively, the fact that “the position exists . . . to perform that function” plainly suggests that in-person teaching forms an essential function of Plaintiff’s position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i). ... Thus, accommodations which included partial, but not total, remote work “were entirely reasonable” to account for both Plaintiff’s limitations and Defendant’s needs. See Yochim v. Carson, 935 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2019).

The regulation defines essential functions as fundamental duties, excludes marginal functions, identifies factors for determining essentiality, and defines reasonable accommodation as adjustments enabling performance of essential functions rather than removing them.

DuBoice v. PA HRC · filed 2020-01-23(n)(1), (n)(2)(ii), (n)(3)(iii), (o)(1)(ii)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). This term “does not include the marginal functions of the position.” Id. “A job function may be considered essential . . . because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii). “Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to . . . [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii). ... “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... Thus, a reasonable accommodation is a change that helps a disabled individual perform the essential functions of the job, not a modification that reinvents the position. ... Reallocating essential job functions involving physical tasks8 to DuBoice’s sole co-worker would therefore constitute an unreasonable accommodation as a matter of law.

The regulation treats essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal tasks and directs courts to consider listed factors; in the reasonable-accommodation context, it contemplates an informal interactive process when circumstances warrant.

Smith v. State of Illinois Department of Human Services · filed 2020-02-24(n)(1)–(3); (o)(3)

Further, EEOC regulations advise that essential functions constitute a position’s “fundamental job duties,” rather than a position’s “marginal functions,” and that courts should examine the following factors to determine essential functions: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)−(3). ... Instead, based upon the circumstances, employers may need to “initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.” Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 840 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to deciding whether a function is essential, and § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) makes the impact on other employees a factor in accommodation reasonableness rather than an absolute bar to reallocating duties.

Morrill v. Acadia Healthcare · filed 2020-03-16(n)(1), (n)(3), (p)(2)(v)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Evidence considered in determining whether a particular function is essential includes: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; and (5) the work experience of past incumbents in the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Wells v. Shalala, 228 F.3d 1137, 1144 (10th Cir. 2000). ... Similarly, the other regulation cited in Milton states only that the impact of a proposed accommodation on other employees is a factor for courts to consider. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(p)(2)(v). Neither Milton nor the regulation it cites suggests that it is never permissible to reallocate some work duties; it is simply not permissible to reallocate duties in a way that makes other employees work longer or harder.

Section 1630.2 requires a reasonable accommodation to enable a qualified employee to perform essential functions effectively, defines essential functions as fundamental rather than marginal job duties, and permits consideration of the employer’s judgment, written job description, and incumbents’ work experience in identifying them.

Saphilom v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2020-04-02(o)(1)(ii), (n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(1)(i)

A reasonable accommodation is a modification that “enables [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of [her] position,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... “The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). It does not “include the marginal functions of the position.” Id. ... Furthermore, she must provide evidence that the accommodation sought “would be ‘effective,’ i.e., [it] would . . . address the job-related difficulties presented by [her] disability.” Bryant, 923 F. Supp. at 736 (D. Md. 1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i)–(ii)). ... After carefully reviewing each party’s submissions, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that personally inspecting assigned properties, including difficult-to-access areas, is an essential function of the Field Claims Specialist role that Saphilom was unable to perform. ... These declarations also speak to the “work experience of incumbents in similar jobs,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vi-vii), and provide evidence that such incumbents are sometimes “required to climb, crawl, or stoop to get to inspect [] potentially damaged areas of the property” to which they are assigned. (Walker Decl. ¶ 6; Scott Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10.)

Section 1630.2(o) permits job restructuring as a reasonable accommodation by reallocating nonessential, marginal functions, but does not require an employer to reallocate essential functions.

BROWN v. MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC. · filed 2020-02-24(o)

On the one hand, Martin Marietta was not required to reallocate the essential job function of a Truck Driver – driving a truck – so that Brown could perform the position’s marginal functions, nor was it required to move others out of their positions so that Brown could perform their jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) App. (“An employer . . . is not required to reallocate essential functions.”).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for determining whether a job function is essential, and § 1630.2(o)(1) defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the functions of the position.

Clark v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Northern New England, Inc. · filed 2020-11-20(n)(3), (o)(1)

“In determining whether a particular function is essential, courts consider, among other things, ‘[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,’ ‘[w]ritten job descriptions,’ and ‘[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function.’ ... Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that lifting, pulling, and pushing of at least 50 pounds was an essential requirement of the general warehouse position, and of each of the subfunctions Plaintiff claims he could have performed. ... A “reasonable accommodation” is a modification “to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the functions of that position.”

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) treats a job duty as essential when it is fundamental and excludes marginal functions; § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence for determining essential functions; and § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines reasonable accommodation in part by enabling a qualified person with a disability to perform essential functions.

RAGUSA v. LEHIGH UNIVERSITY · filed 2021-03-29(n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(1)(ii)

Whether a job duty is an "essential function" turns on whether it is "fundamental" to the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); Turner, 440 F.3d at 612 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). The term "essential function" does not include the "marginal" functions of the position. Id. at § 1630.2(n)(1). The regulations further set forth a non-exhaustive list of seven examples of evidence that are designed to assist a court in identifying the `essential functions' of a job. They include: (1) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (7) the work experience of past incumbents in the jobs; and/or (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Skerski, 257 F.3d at 279 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... A reasonable accommodation is one that enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position … [or] to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)-(iii).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats an essential function as a fundamental job duty rather than a marginal one, while § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification or adjustment that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Talcott v. Barr-Nunn Transportation, Inc. · filed 2021-12-23(n)(1), (o)(1)(ii)

As a preliminary matter, an “essential function” refers to the “fundamental job duties of the employment position,” though this does not include the “marginal” functions of the position. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(1); see also Turner, 440 F.3d at 612 (describing factors used to support a finding that a job function is essential, including “[w]ritten job descriptions” or the “amount of time spent on the job performing the function”). ... The relevant regulations define reasonable accommodations as “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.” Skerski, 257 F.3d at 284 (citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) directs courts to assess essential functions case by case using factors such as time spent, consequences of nonperformance, and work experience, while subsection (o)(3) calls for an informal interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Wiggins v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama (CONSENT) · filed 2022-03-03(n)(3), (o)(3)

Determining whether a function is essential is done on a case-by-case basis and includes examining factors such as the time spent performing the function, consequences of not requiring an employee to perform the function, work experience of past employees, and current work experience of employees in similar jobs. Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... Thus, the Court concludes that walking on rough terrain, visiting construction sites, and climbing stairs are not essential functions of the revenue examiner’s job. ... The process should be viewed with a problem-solving mindset. It should be a mutual and searching evaluation of options to determine whether there are any reasonable accommodations that would allow the employee to perform the essential job functions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (stating that the process “should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations”). ... Instead, at a minimum, the City should have evaluated Wiggins’s actual limitations, the essential job functions, and any reasonable accommodations in that context while in dialogue with Wiggins. It did not.

A reasonable accommodation must enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position, and a job function is essential when the position exists to perform it, staffing is insufficient without it, or it requires specialized expertise.

Abler v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore · filed 2022-03-18(o)(1)(ii), (n)(2)

A reasonable accommodation “enables [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of [a] position.” ... While not all job functions are essential, a job function is essential when “‘the reason the position exists is to perform that function,’ when there aren’t enough employees available to perform the function, or when the function is so specialized that someone is hired specifically because of his or her expertise in performing that function.” Id. at 579 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)). ... The court, therefore, concludes that plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that he was able to perform the essential functions of a firefighter or some other position within the BCFD.

The regulation defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and recognizes reasonable accommodations that adjust how work is performed or include job restructuring, modified schedules, or reassignment, while preserving equal employment benefits and privileges.

Sohnen v. Charter Communications, Inc. · filed 2022-03-28(n)(1), (n)(2), (o)(1)(iii), (o)(2)(ii)

The term “essential function” is not defined by statute. However, the ADA’s implementing regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). The regulations also provide a non-exhaustive list of the reasons a function may be deemed essential, among them: (1) because the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (2) because the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and (3) because the function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his expertise or ability to perform the particular function. ... Upon a proper consideration of all of the factors set out above, it is clear that at a minimum there is a question of fact as to whether driving is an essential function of Plaintiff’s job as a DSR. ... The ADA regulations provide that a reasonable accommodation may include, inter alia, “[j]ob restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; [or] reassignment to a vacant position[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). ... a reasonable accommodation is also one that will enable an employee to “enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). ... Thus, based on the record before the Court, at a minimum, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendant’s offer of an alternative position in the care department was a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n)(2) identifies when a job function is essential, and § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform those essential functions.

HOELZER v. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA · filed 2022-03-31(n)(2) (o)(1)(ii)

A function is essential to the position when “‘the reason the position exists is to perform that function,’ when there aren’t enough employees available to perform the function, or when the function is so specialized that someone is hired specifically because of his or her expertise in performing that function.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 579 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)). An accommodation is reasonable if it enables a qualified “individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

The regulation identifies when a job function is essential, defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables a qualified individual to perform essential functions, and requires the interactive process to identify precise limitations and potential accommodations.

BOSTICK v. CABARRUS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2022-05-26(n)(2), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

A function is essential to the position when “‘the reason the position exists is to perform that function,’ when there aren’t enough employees available to perform the function, or when the function is so specialized that someone is hired specifically because of his or her expertise in performing that function.” ... “A reasonable accommodation is one that ‘enables [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of [a] position.’ ... “This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2 treats a job's fundamental duties as its essential functions, evaluates essentiality using factors including time spent and the consequences of omission, and defines reasonable accommodation as modifications to the work environment or manner of performance that enable a qualified employee to perform those functions.

REID v. MIDDLE FLINT AREA COMMUNITY SERVICE BOARD · filed 2022-09-30(n)(1), (n)(3)(ii)–(vii), (o)(1)(ii)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... Other relevant factors include “the amount of time spent on the job performing the function[,] the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function[,] . . . the work experience of past employees in the job[,] and the current work experience of employees in similar jobs.” Samson, 746 F.3d at 1201 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii)–(vii)). ... A “reasonable accommodation” is one that entails “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

Under § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), a reasonable accommodation is one that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Della Mura v. Thomas · filed 2022-09-30(o)(1)(ii)

A reasonable accommodation is one that “enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position . . . [or] to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by [ ] other similarly situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), (iii); see Limauro v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., No. 20-cv-3558 (CM), 2021 WL 466952, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2021). “Typically, the determination of whether a particular modification is ‘reasonable’ involves a fact specific, case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in light of the disability in question and the cost to the organization that would implement it.”

Section 1630.2 defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, excludes marginal functions, lists evidence for determining essentiality, defines reasonable accommodation as adjustments enabling performance of essential functions, and calls for an informal interactive process to identify limitations and potential accommodations.

Congress v. McWilliams · filed 2022-12-01(n)(1), (n)(3), (n)(3)(v), (n)(3)(vii), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

“Essential functions” is defined as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... [e]vidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. ... Reviewing all evidence analyzed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that whether Adobe CQ assignments were an essential function of Mr. Congress’s employment position is a genuinely disputed material fact.

The regulation defines a reasonable accommodation as an adjustment that enables a qualified employee to perform essential job functions, and defines a qualified individual by the ability to perform those functions with or without accommodation.

Nadler v. Tucson, City of · filed 2022-12-27(o)(1)(ii), (m), (n)

As an initial matter, the Court finds that attendance at voluntary overtime shifts for which an employee has signed up is an essential function of Nadler’s position. ... Although the overtime shifts at issue here are voluntary, once an employee has signed up, the facts show that attendance is essential. ... Thus, even if Nadler has a qualifying disability within the meaning of the ADA, she is not a “qualified individual” for purposes of the statute because, with or without a reasonable accommodation, she is unable to perform the essential function of in-person attendance at her position during her overtime shifts. The accommodation Nadler suggests, namely, being allowed to apply FMLA leave to absences from voluntary overtime shifts, does not qualify as a “reasonable accommodation” within the meaning of the statute because it does not enable her to perform the essential functions of her job.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job, subsection (n)(3) lists evidence relevant to identifying them, and subsection (o)(2) recognizes job restructuring as a possible reasonable accommodation without allowing an essential function to be eliminated.

Lavender v. Verizon Inc. · filed 2023-02-09(n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(2)

“An employee is qualified for a position only if she can perform its essential functions.” McBride, 583 F.3d at 98. While the ADA does not define the term “essential functions,” the EEOC has promulgated regulations that indicate the term “encompasses ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Ultimately, whether a given task “constitutes an essential function depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2004). However, evidence of whether a particular duty is an essential function under the ADA may include: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Jones v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 838 F. App’x 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... A reasonable accommodation “may include adjustments to work schedules or other job restructuring.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 127 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2). However, “[a] reasonable accommodation can never involve the elimination of an essential function of a job.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 127 (quoting Shannon, 332 F.3d at 100).

Section 1630.2 treats essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, evaluated through a fact-specific inquiry that considers the employer’s description and actual practice, and defines reasonable accommodation as a modification enabling a qualified individual with a disability to perform those duties.

Kronstein v. Albany County · filed 2023-09-22(n)(1), (n), (o)(1)(ii)

Although “the term ‘essential functions’ is not defined in the ADA, the regulations promulgated by the EEOC37 define this term as the ‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’” ... The “identification of the essential functions of a job requires a fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job and how the job is actually performed in practice.” ... The ADA defines a “reasonable accommodation” as a “modification ‘to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.’” Atencio v. United States Postal Serv., 198 F. Supp. 3d 340, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a material question of fact as to whether she was able to perform the essential functions of a Correction Officer with or without a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2 excludes marginal duties from essential functions and treats modifications or adjustments enabling a qualified individual to perform essential functions as reasonable accommodations.

Butler v. Collins · filed 2023-01-19(n)(1) (o)(1)(ii)

Essential functions do “not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... “The ADA requires employers to make ‘[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position[.]’” E.E.O.C. v. LHC, 773 F.3d at 698 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2(o)(1) defines reasonable accommodation as modifications or adjustments to the work environment or work circumstances that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the position’s essential functions.

Porter v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2024-07-12(o)(1)

An employer must reasonably accommodate its employee’s disability with respect to “modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” Howard v. City of Sedalia, 103 F.4th 536, 538 (8th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)). This regulation is “no less relevant to the interpretation of the [Rehabilitation Act].”

Section 1630.2 treats essential functions as the position’s fundamental duties and directs courts to assess them using factors such as the employer’s judgment and the consequences of not requiring the function; it also includes adjustments that give disabled employees equal benefits and privileges with similarly situated nondisabled employees within reasonable accommodation.

Bridges v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2025-02-11(n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(1)(iii)

Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... “To determine whether a job function is essential, [courts] look to the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, and the experience of those who previously or currently hold the position.” Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)); Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001)). Consideration may also be paid to the “consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Because the record does not reveal what essential functions those jobs entailed, Bridges has not established that the other employees were “similarly situated.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (defining “reasonable accommodation” to include “modifications or adjustments that enable a [disabled employee] to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by [the employer’s] other similarly situated employees without disabilities”). Accordingly, the remote authorizations divulge nothing about the reasonableness of Bridges’ specific request to work remotely.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) provides non-exhaustive factors for determining essential job functions, while § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) treats reassignment of nonessential functions as a reasonable accommodation.

Royce v. Spears Manufacturing Company · filed 2025-04-28(n)(3); (o)(2)(ii)

Additionally, the ADA regulations identify several non-exhaustive factors for courts to consider: ... (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). The employer has the burden of establishing what job functions are essential. ... Importantly, reassignment of non-essential functions is plainly a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). If, as was presumably the case in Bunn, the employer did not view rotation as an essential function, then the accommodation was reasonable.

The regulation treats reasonable accommodation as including adjustments that let an employee with a disability enjoy equal employment benefits and privileges, and lists factors for deciding whether a job function is essential.

Harper v. Charter Communications · filed 2025-05-21(o)(1)(iii); (n)(3)

On that view of the evidence, Ms. Harper did not “enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by ... other similarly situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1)(iii). ... Evidence of whether a particular function is essential [under the ADA] includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Here, a jury could find that working in person was not an essential function of Ms. Harper’s job and, further, that she could perform all the essential functions of her job from home.

The regulation asks whether an accommodation enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the position; it need not be perfect.

Whitney v. Montefiore Med. Ctr. · filed 2025-07-28(o)(1)(ii)

The relevant inquiry is whether the accommodations enabled Whitney “to perform the essential functions of [his] position.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)). Whitney has not identified evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that Montefiore’s failure to comply perfectly with the granted accommodations somehow rendered the accommodations as a whole unreasonable.

Section 1630.2(o) treats a request to eliminate an essential job function as not a reasonable accommodation; telework may be rejected on that basis only when physical presence is proven essential for the employee’s specific role.

Hunt-Brown · filed 2026-02-06(o)

What that case reiterated is the basic tenet that “an employee’s request to be relieved from an essential function of her position is not, as a matter of law, a reasonable or even plausible accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o); see Picture People, 684 F.3d at 987. Accordingly, telework is an unreasonable accommodation if the employer “has decided that physical presence at the workplace is an essential function of the position.” Punt, 862 F.3d at 1051.

Section 1630.2(j)(3) requires an individualized disability determination and does not make a minor stroke or TIA categorically incapable of qualifying as an impairment.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc. · filed 2020-03-02(j)(3)

Moreover, this nonbinding case does not stand for the proposition that a minor stroke or TIA can never meet the definition of impairment under the ADA. ... “There is no ‘per se’ disability.”

The ADAAA regulations require broad construction of “substantially limits,” direct attention to coverage and discrimination, recognize episodic impairments, eliminate a six-month limit for actual-disability claims, and reject the former single-job rule.

Burgess · filed 2026-01-21(j)(1)(iii), (j)(1)(vii), (j)(1)(ix), (j)(3)(i)

The regulations further instruct that the “primary object of attention” in disability cases “should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). ... The regulations also instruct that an “episodic” impairment can qualify as a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii), and specifically that the six-month durational timeframe does not apply to an actual disability claim, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). The post-ADAAA regulations also remove some earlier provisions, including the guidance that the “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major lief activity of working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (effective until May 24, 2011).

An impairment may substantially limit a major life activity even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict that activity; the comparison is to most people in the general population.

Mathias v. Dolgencorp, LLC · filed 2022-10-28(j)(1)(ii)

“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Richardson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)); see also id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.”). “The question is whether a plaintiff is limited ‘as compared to most people in the general population.’” Bob-Maunuel v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 854, 881 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2014) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)).

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be read broadly and not as a demanding standard, and an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity.

McCrae v. H.N.S. Management Company · filed 2022-11-02(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii)

The term “substantially limits” is to “be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage,” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage under the ADA.

Hoeffner v. County Of Orange · filed 2020-03-10(j)(1)(i)

The regulations provide that the statutory language “‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... Here, there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff’s asthma was substantially limiting.

The regulation applies a broad, non-demanding standard for deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and requires an interactive process to assess reasonable accommodation.

Zako v. Encompass Digital Media, Inc. · filed 2020-06-30(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

“[A] regulation enacted pursuant to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 [ADAAA] provides that ‘[t]he term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, . . . [and] is not meant to be a demanding standard.’” ... “Based on these allegations, Zako has plausibly alleged that he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA—a physical impairment that substantially limits his urinary function as compared to most people in the general population.” ... “The ADA envisions an ‘interactive process’ by which employers and employees work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated.” ... “Upon notice of an employee’s disability, the ADA requires employers to “engage in an interactive process with their employees and in that way work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated.” ... “Therefore, I deny the motion to dismiss Zako’s failure to accommodate claims.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and as not imposing a demanding standard.

DONNELLY v. MyEyeDr · filed 2021-08-02(j)(1)(i)

As a result, post ADAAA EEOC guidance states the “substantially limits” language “shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA . . . [as it] is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). Furthermore, such an assessment of an impairment’s limiting impact “requires an individualized assessment”. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). As a result, “courts interpreting the Act in light of the 2008 amendments have found that complications arising out of pregnancy can constitute disability sufficient to invoke the ADA”. Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00549, 2015 WL 1003981, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2015) (emphasis in original). Whether such complications qualify for protection under the law is a question of fact. Id.

Section 1630.2 requires disability-related definitions to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, with an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

KONIAS v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2021-08-25(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)

Making this determination requires an “individualized assessment” Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc., 679 F. App'x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2017) and “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and makes clear that it is not a demanding standard.

Schorsch v. Miller · filed 2021-09-10(j)(1)(i)

The ADA does not explain what degree of impairment “substantially limits” these activities, but regulations stress that this phrase must be broadly construed. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and as a standard that is not demanding.

GROSS v. TRIS PHARMA, INC. · filed 2023-05-22(j)(1)(i)

“And “[w]hat constitutes a disability [under the ADA] must be construed broadly.” Stewart, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 260 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (“Substantially limits” “shall be construed ... broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.”)). ... Here, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff suffered from hip pain and physical limitations in 2017, and, by late 2018, her ability to move around unassisted was significantly inhibited. (See Pl.’s SOMF ¶¶ 8–10.) Plaintiff began using a walking cane as a result of her condition and resorted to use of a mobility scooter at a work conference in 2019. (See id. ¶¶ 9, 15.) Subsequently, Plaintiff was diagnosed with two large tumors in her lower abdomen. (See id. ¶ 25.) Tris does not contest that Plaintiff’s condition qualifies as a disability under the ADA and NJLAD. As such, the unrefuted evidence is sufficient to establish Plaintiff suffered from a disability.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and sets a non-demanding standard.

Perez-Velez v. P.R. Ticket.com, Corp. · filed 2024-07-08(j)(1)(i)

(i) The term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. “Substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard. ... A plaintiff, therefore, need not show that they cannot perform a particular major life activity. Instead, the only requirement is that they allege facts sufficiently demonstrating that, compared to most people in the general population, their performance of a major life activity is substantially limited.

The regulation identifies breathing and working as major life activities, defines when an activity is substantially limited, and treats a physiological disorder affecting the respiratory system, such as asthma, as a physical impairment.

Svoboda v. Timkensteel Corporation · filed 2020-03-30(i), (j)(i), (h)(1)

Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). An activity is “substantially limited” when an individual cannot perform an activity that an average person in the general population could perform, or faces significant restrictions in the “condition, manner, or duration under which the individual an . . . perform [the] activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)-(ii). Here, Svoboda claims a disability of “asthma” or a “respiratory condition.” (Pl. Br. Opp. P. 9, ECF 23, Comp. § 50.) It is clear that asthma constitutes a physical impairment. Regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission define physical or mental impairment as “any physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting [the] . . . respiratory [system].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). “Asthma is a physiological disorder or condition that affects the respiratory system,” and hence is a physical impairment.

Section 1630.2(g)'s disability definition can be satisfied by allegations that a cancer survivor must wear and irrigate a colostomy bag multiple times a day.

Gunzenhauser v. Garland · filed 2023-02-21(g)

First, Gunzenhauser has sufficiently pleaded, and the BOP does not dispute, that he is a person with a qualifying disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (providing the definition of disability under the Rehabilitation Act). Gunzenhauser specifically alleges that he has a disability based on being a cancer survivor and his need to “wear a colostomy bag which must be irrigated multiple times a day,” FAC ¶¶ 17, 42-43, which meets the definition under the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1630.2 treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, and defines physical or mental impairments to include physiological or mental disorders; the court held that seizure allegations plausibly satisfied those requirements.

Johnson v. New York State Police · filed 2023-03-02(j)(ii), (h)

As to the second qualification, a plaintiff’s impairment must “substantially limit[ ] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). ... To demonstrate that decedent suffered from a “physical or mental impairment,” plaintiffs must show the alleged impairment fits within the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations defining physical and mental impairments. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). ... Although these allegations are somewhat thin, they are sufficient to plausibly allege that decedent’s seizure disorder amounted to a “physical or mental impairment.” ... Upon review, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that decedent’s seizure disorder substantially limited his ability to perform “a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.” ... Accordingly, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that decedent was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Acts.

The regulation says “substantially limits” is interpreted broadly and is not a demanding standard, but an impairment is not automatically a disability.

ANDERSON v. DIAMONDBACK INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC · filed 2023-03-14(j)(i), (j)(ii)

The ADA defines an individual with a “disability” as an individual with “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The EEOC has promulgated regulations regarding the definition of “disability” that direct that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage . . . [and] is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i). However, those regulations also provide that “[n]onetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning [of the ADA].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). On the record in this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that she is an individual with a disability as defined by the ADA and therefore she has failed to establish the first element of a prima facie case for wrongful discharge.

Section 1630.2 defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, including working.

Wallace v. Dejoy · filed 2023-04-13

The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “Major life activities” include “working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B). Plaintiff alleges she suffered “panic attacks, stress, and other symptoms” and that her medical provider placed her “on medical leave.” ... But Plaintiff does not plead that her “panic attacks, stress, and other symptoms” substantially limit her major life activities. ... Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for failure to accommodate.

Section 1630.2 defines major life activities and a substantially limiting impairment, and covers a person with a history of or misclassification as having such an impairment; the court applied those definitions and found the condition's short duration insufficient to establish actual disability or a record of disability.

Freeman v. Savard Labor & Marine Inc · filed 2023-06-27(j)(1) (k)

“Major life activities” means “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). An impairment is “substantially limiting” if it results in (a) an inability “to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform” or (b) a significant restriction “as to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” ... She “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.” ... Given the short duration of Ms. Freeman’s condition, the court is unable to determine that she was actually disabled or had a record thereof under the ADA.

Section 1630.2 defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Wallace v. Dejoy · filed 2022-10-24

The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). ... But Plaintiff does not plead that her “panic attacks, stress, and other symptoms” substantially limit her major life activities.

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(iii) defines disability to include being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment, whether or not the impairment substantially limits or is perceived to substantially limit a major life activity.

Mills v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2024-01-16(g)(1)(iii)

The federal regulations implementing the ADA define “disability” in part as “[b]eing regarded as having [a physical or mental impairment] . . . whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii), (l)(1) (emphasis added).

Being a disabled veteran alone does not establish that an individual has a disability under the regulation.

Genise A Pennant v. Department of the Air Force · filed 2024-07-09(g)

An appellant’s status as a disabled veteran is not dispositive for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); see also 74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48448 (2009) (“The fact that an individual has a record of being a disabled veteran . . . does not guarantee that the individual will satisfy the definition of ‘disability’ under part 1630.”).

A physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities qualifies as a disability.

Dimaano v. Virginia Center for Behavioral Rehabilitation · filed 2024-08-13(g)(1)(i)

Here, Mr. Dimaano alleges thathis diabetes is a “physical impairment” that “‘substantially limits one or more [] major life activities’ ... including eating, sleeping, walking, standing, breathing, thinking, communicating and working” if left untreated. ... As such, Mr. Dimaano plausibly alleges that he has a disability under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(g) includes a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities within the ADA definition of disability.

Zihlman v. Office of Personnel Management · filed 2024-09-23(g)(1)(i)

By contrast, the ADA as amended defines “disability” as, among other things, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1)(i).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability through three alternative showings—a substantially limiting impairment, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment—and an alleged medical condition alone does not establish disability.

Di'Onna Fallen v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2024-12-31(g)

As a threshold matter, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) explains that an appellant can show that she has a disability by showing that (1) she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) she has a record of such impairment; or (3) she is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1). To the extent the administrative judge concluded that the appellant was an individual with a disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) solely because she alleged that she suffered from lumbar disc disease and carpal tunnel syndrome, such a bare conclusion was without basis in the law. Nonetheless, as explained in the text, we ultimately agree with his conclusion that the appellant otherwise failed to establish her claims of failure to accommodate and disparate treatment disability discrimination. As such, we need not resolve at this time whether the appellant was disabled within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). See Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 29 n.9 (explaining that, although a determination of whether the appellant proved that she is a qualified individual with a disability is generally regarded as a threshold question, some disability discrimination claims may be resolved without reaching that question).

A person has a disability under the ADA when a physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities; the court applied that definition and found Crohn’s disease satisfies the disability element.

REMETZ v. LEHIGH VALLEY HOSPITAL · filed 2024-12-09(g)(1)(i)

Under the first factor, “one has a disability if [s]he has ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.’” Gardner, 824 F. App’x at 106 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i)). Plaintiff argues without denial that she suffers from Crohn’s disease. Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts at ¶ 4. This claim meets the first factor because courts in this district “have recognized [Crohn’s disease] as a disability within the meaning of the ADA.” MacVaugh v. Cnty. of Montgomery, 301 F. Supp. 3d 458, 464 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Ruder v. Pequea Valley Sch. Dist., 790 F. Supp. 2d 377, 393 (E.D. Pa. 2011)).

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(i) defines disability to include a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Ellerbee v. State of Louisiana Division of Administration, Office of Technology Services · filed 2025-01-28(g)(1)(i)

Specifically Ellerbee alleges he is bilaterally blind, due to a complication from diabetes. ... This is sufficient to meet the first element. ... See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i) (“Disability means, with respect to an individual[,a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual[.]”; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A) (“[M]ajor life activities include . . . seeing . . .”).

Section 1630.2(g) treats an individual as having a disability when a physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Short v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2025-03-20(g)

The medical evidence the appellant submitted to the agency clearly demonstrates that her diagnoses of Major Depressive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder substantially limited her major life activities of concentration, sleep, mood regulation, and eating, among others, and she therefore meets the definition of an individual with a disability. IAF, Tab 9 at 40-44, Tab 10 at 125, 129, 170; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).