29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(h)(1) identifies a qualifying physical impairment by reference to a physiological disorder, condition, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, while § 1630.2(g)(1)(i) requires that the impairment substantially limit a major life activity.

Rashad v. Westmore Carries · filed 2025-09-29(h)(1), (g)(1)(i)

Qualifying disabilities for either theory include “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition … or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1), and must “substantially limi[t] one or more of [the plaintiff’s] major life activities,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2 recognizes actual, recorded, and regarded-as disabilities, defines physical impairment broadly, and allows episodic or remitted conditions only when they would substantially limit a major life activity while active; the condition must qualify when the adverse decision occurs.

Hitt v. MHM Support Services · filed 2025-07-31(g)(1)(i), (h)(1), (j)(1)(vii)

A person is disabled and therefore eligible for an accommodation if she has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities” (“actual disability” prong); “has a record of such an impairment” (“record of” prong); or “is regarded as having such an impairment” (“regarded as” prong). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i)-(iii); see also Hustvet, 910 F.3d at 410 (quoting EEOC's regulations). A “physical impairment” means “any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting one or more body systems,” including “neurological, musculoskeletal, ... respiratory (including speech organs) ..., immune, [and] circulatory” systems. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1); Wood, 339 F.3d at 684. Conditions that are episodic or in remission may qualify if they “would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (emphasis added). Jacobs, 719 F. Supp. 3d at 907. Furthermore, a plaintiff must establish that the condition qualified as a disability at the time the adverse employment determination occurred, even if she asserts the condition is episodic or in remission. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1)(vii).

Section 1630.2 defines disability broadly: an impairment need only substantially limit a major life activity relative to most people, and the limitation need not prevent or severely restrict that activity.

Herring v. Shelby County Government Health Service · filed 2025-07-29(j)(1)(iii), (h)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (i)(1)(i)

“Congress intended that using a new lower standard would ‘make the disability determination an appropriate threshold issue but not an onerous burden for those seeking accommodations or modifications.’” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)). ... “Physical or mental impairment” is defined in federal regulations to include “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... “Substantially limits” is a relative term, one defined in relation to a person’s ability to perform a major life activity “as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). An impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id. ... “Major life activities” include a non-exhaustive list of activities, including, among other things, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, and interacting with others. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i), (2). ... Hypokalemia is a physiological disorder affecting a body system and thus constitutes a physical impairment. ... Given that Herring’s burden of demonstrating a disability is “not onerous” or “demanding” and that the term is to be broadly construed in favor of coverage, she has successfully demonstrated that she is disabled under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines a physical or mental impairment as any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems; § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) provides that an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to be substantially limiting.

Herring v. Shelby County Government Health Service · filed 2025-08-22(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

A “physical or mental impairment” is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Impairments “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Under this standard, Plaintiff is an individual with disabilities under the ADA. ... Given the County’s own admissions, it follows that Plaintiff has met her burden as this is not an onerous requirement.

Section 1630.2 treats a physiological disorder affecting a body system as a physical impairment and requires substantial limitation compared with most people, without requiring prevention or severe restriction of a major life activity.

Rogers-Carroll v. Marlboro Central School District · filed 2025-07-08(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

A physical impairment is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems.” 6 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... To qualify as a disability, an impairment must “substantially limit[] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population”; but “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... these references are sufficient to survive dismissal at the pleading stage.

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity as a record of disability; §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) and (j)(1)(i) address substantial limitation by comparison with most people and require broad construction of the standard.

Payton v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2024-06-27(k)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i)

An employee may establish “a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). This includes people “who have recovered from previously disabling conditions… but who may remain vulnerable to the fear and stereotypes of their employers.” See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998). An impairment is a disability if it substantially limits a person’s ability to “perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The standard is “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). While the standard is not a demanding one, “[n]ot every medical affliction amounts to, or gives rise to, a substantial limitation on a major life activity.” Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ. of Rockford Public Schs., Dist. No. 205, 461 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 2006). The employee must specifically connect how their alleged impairment substantially limits a major life activity. See Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015).

Section 1630.2(g)(1) includes an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, and being regarded as having such an impairment within the definition of disability; § 1630.2(g)(iii) requires only an adverse action because of an actual or perceived impairment for a regarded-as claim, without a major-life-activity limitation.

Irvin v. Versatrim, LLC · filed 2024-06-12(g)(1), (g)(iii)

The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities . . .; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). ... Under section 1210283), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (“ADAAA”), an individual bringing a “regarded as” claim need only show that an employer subjected him to an action that the ADA prohibits because of an actual or perceived impairment regardless of whether the employer noreined the impairment to limit the individual in a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(iii); ... Thus, a “regarded as” claim under the ADAAA is much easier to prove than a “regarded as” claim before the ADAAA.

The regulation defines disability through an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, with substantial limitation construed broadly rather than under a demanding standard.

Gobin v. Department of the Air Force · filed 2024-06-25(g)(1)(a), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i)

The appellant may prove that she has a disability by showing that she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). An impairment is considered to be a disability if it substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted under the ADA, and is not meant to be a demanding standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... We find that the appellant’s condition, as it was known at the time of her removal, i.e., skin lesions, was not a “disability” as defined in the EEOC’s regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(a) because the appellant did not proffer any medical or anecdotal evidence showing that the lesions substantially limited one or more major life activity. Indeed, she never made such a claim.

The regulation defines disability to include being regarded as having, or having a record of, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people.

Sharikov v. Philips Medical Systems MR, Inc. · filed 2024-06-04(g)(1), (k)(1), and (k)(2)

A "disability" for the purposes of the ADA is defined as "(i) [a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual . . . or (iii) [b]eing regarded as having such an impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). "An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population." Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (emphasis added); accord id. § 1630.2(k)(2). Therefore, to be perceived as having a disability, one must be perceived as different from most people in the general population. ... Accordingly, Philips did not regard Sharikov as disabled. ... To state a claim under the ADA based on a "record of" a disability, a plaintiff must allege that he "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." Jorgenson, 2023 WL 1472022 at *4 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1)); accord Speaks, 2022 WL 3448649, at *5 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2)). ... A record that an employee is not vaccinated does not imply that the employee has "a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a person’s ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people, while § 1630.2(k)(1) covers a record of such an impairment.

Martin v. Penske Logistics LLC · filed 2024-06-04(j)(1)(ii) (k)(1)

“‘Substantially limits’ means that the individual is limited ‘to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’” Hernandez v. Clearwater Transportation, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 3d 405, 412 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). ... Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that no reasonable fact finder could find that Martin was actually disabled on the date of his termination. ... “An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). ... But this fails to show that he had “a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1).

Section 1630.2 defines disability by requiring a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, measured against most people in the general population, and identifies major life activities including caring for oneself, concentrating, communicating, and working.

Benitez v. Department of the Treasury · filed 2024-03-20(g)(1)(A), (j)(1)(ii), (i)(1)(i)

An individual may prove that she has a disability by showing, as relevant here, that she suffers from “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(A). An impairment is considered a disability if it substantially limits an individual’s ability “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, concentrating, communicating, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2 defines disability-related terms including impairment, substantial limitation, and a record of an impairment; an impairment need not prevent or significantly restrict a major life activity to be substantially limiting, and the record-of-impairment inquiry is construed broadly.

Mohan v. Del Toro · filed 2023-04-25(g), (h), (j)(1)(i), (k)

According to the ADA, an individual is disabled if that individual (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the individual’s major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... Under the ADA, a “physical or mental impairment” includes “any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability . . . emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). ... “Substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard, and an impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii). ... To have a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity means to have “a history of, or [have] been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Whether an individual has a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity should be construed broadly and “should not demand extensive analysis.” Id.

A disability requires an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population; a record of disability requires a history of or misclassification as such an impairment, and major life activities include concentrating, thinking, working, sitting, reaching, and interacting with others.

Correa v. OTTO Engineering Inc. · filed 2023-03-28(j)(1)(ii), (k)(1), (i)(1)(i), and (i)(2)

While ADD can qualify as an “impairment” for purposes of the statute, Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1998), “not every impairment will constitute a disability[,]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... “An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). “Major life activities” include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (additionally including sitting, reaching, and interacting with others). They are “not determined by reference to whether it is of ‘central importance to daily life.’” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2). ... An impairment is a disability under the ADA if it “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). However, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id. ... It is undisputed that Plaintiff has issues with the concept of time, has trouble keeping track of time, and has trouble remembering dates. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff was often tardy to work, although the parties dispute whether Plaintiff’s tardiness was because of his ADD. Even assuming these facts implicate the “major life activity” of “concentrating, thinking, [or] working[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), Plaintiff fails to explain, and the record does not reveal, if and how his ADD “substantially limits” his ability to perform those activities as compared to most people in the general population. ... Simply put, there is not enough evidence in the record for a jury to find that Plaintiff was disabled under the “actually disabled” or “record of” prongs.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) recognizes that not every medical condition or impairment qualifies as an ADA disability, and the court applied that principle by requiring evidence that the alleged PTSD and TBI substantially limited major life activities.

Andrade v. Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. · filed 2023-06-16(j)(1)(ii)

Nevertheless, not every medical condition or impairment will constitute a disability with the meaning of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... The Court concludes Plaintiff has not established his PTSD and/or TBI substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA or the ORA.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, gives illustrative reasons a function may be essential, and identifies non-exclusive evidence courts should consider.

Moore v. PNC Bank · filed 2023-06-21(n)(1) (n)(2) (n)(3)

The phrase “essential function” is a legal term of art that denotes those tasks so inherent in the nature of a position that a disabled employee’s inability to perform them with the aid of reasonable accommodation justifies the employer in disqualifying that employee from holding that position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.”) ... A job function may be “essential” for myriad reasons. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). The regulations identify three. First, a “function may be essential because the reason the position exits is to perform that function.” Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i). Second, it may be deemed essential “because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.” Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii). Finally, it might be essential because it is “highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.” Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(iii). This list is only illustrative. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... The EEOC has “identif[ied] seven non-exclusive categories of evidence” that courts should consider when conducting this inquiry. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). As both 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) and the Seventh Circuit’s precedent in this area suggest, the inquiry into whether a particular job function is essential is highly nuanced and requires courts at the summary judgment stage to weigh a wide array of record evidence. ... It is undisputed that the ability to handle more than two files per day and rush files is among the essential functions of the Closer position, and Plaintiff has failed to identify any basis upon which a reasonable jury could discount that judgment. Therefore, Defendant has established that those abilities are essential functions as a matter of law. This fact dooms Plaintiff’s claim. The only accommodation Plaintiff claims Defendant should have provided her is “a full-time work week with no overtime and a limit to two files per day.” [Dkt. No. 54, 5]. Because working on more than two files per day is an essential function of the Closer position, this is not a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, excluding marginal functions, and identifies factors relevant to deciding whether a function is essential.

WRAITH v. WAYFAIR, INC. · filed 2023-07-12(n)

The term “essential functions” is defined as: (1) In general. The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term “essential functions” does not include the marginal functions of the position. (2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following: (i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or (iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. (3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). When considering these factors with the parties’ arguments and proof in support of those arguments, Defendants have shown there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation by the employer.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position, and the court applied that standard to treat extended travel as an essential function of the Outreach Coordinator job.

Raymond v. 1199 SEIU National Benefit Fund · filed 2023-07-20(n)(1)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies non-exclusive categories of evidence relevant to deciding whether a job function is essential; applying those categories, the court held that administering physical restraints was an essential function of the TA and RTS positions.

Anderson v. Lawrence Hall Youth Services · filed 2023-08-04(n)(3)

Finally, looking to the seven categories of evidence identified by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3), the evidence in the record fully supports Defendant’s assertion that the ability to administer restraints is an essential function of the TA and RTS positions. ... The “reality on the ground” underscores the importance that direct-care employees be able to administer restraints. Tonyan v. Dunham’s Athleisure Corp., 966 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 2020); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii)–(iv), (vi). ... Because the record amply supports Defendant’s judgment that the ability to administer physical restraints is essential, and because Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence calling that judgment into question, the Court holds that the ability to administer restraints is, in fact, an essential function of the TA and RTS positions.

Section 1630.2(j) applies a lower substantial-limitation standard after the ADAAA and does not require an impairment to be permanent or long-term.

Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions · filed 2023-07-21(j)(1)(iv)

We now take the opportunity to acknowledge, as our sister circuits have, that, following the ADAAA’s passage, an impairment need not be “permanent or long-term” to qualify as a disability.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) treats physiological disorders or conditions affecting body systems such as the respiratory and cardiovascular systems as physical impairments, while § 1630.2(o)(1) defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables a qualified person with a disability to perform essential job functions or enjoy equal employment benefits and privileges.

Felix v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2023-07-24(h)(1), (o)(1)

EEOC regulations implementing the ADA define physical or mental impairment to include “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... First, she suffers from, among other conditions, COPD, congenital heart disease and cardiac arrhythmia, which qualify as physiological disorders or conditions affecting the respiratory and cardiovascular systems. ... “A reasonable accommodation is one that ‘enables an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position . . . or to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment.’” Noll, 787 F.3d at 94 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)). ... A reasonable jury could find that the DOE failed to make reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff’s disability by denying her request to transfer out of Room 411.

The regulations require disability-related limitations to be construed broadly, but an impairment must still substantially limit a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Kozak v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2023-08-01(g)(1)(i), (j)(1)(i)-(ii)

As discussed above, the ADA, as amended in 2009, defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (g)(1)(i). In contrast to caselaw that had developed before the 2009 amendments, the regulations now state that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(i). “An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” Id. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(ii). While “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting, … not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.” Id.

Section 1630.2(h) treats physiological disorders affecting body systems and mental or psychological disorders as impairments covered by the ADA.

Mehboob Shah v. Desert Auto Group V LLC · filed 2024-04-30(h)

To make out a prima facie case for employment discrimination under the ADA, a Plaintiff must show that they (1) suffer from a covered disability, (2) are qualified to perform the essential duties of the job, and (3) were discriminated against due to their disability. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999). The ADA broadly covers “any physiological disorder condition affecting body systems . . . and any mental or psychological disorder.” Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2004); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). In order to qualify as a disability, however, an impairment must substantially limit one or more of the individual’s major life activities.

Section 1630.2(h) treats kidney malfunction as a physical impairment, while § 1630.2(o) defines an accommodation as a modification or adjustment to the job application process or work environment, or one enabling equal employment benefits and privileges.

Cranmer v. Cordell & Cordell P.C. · filed 2024-08-09(h), (o)

It is undisputed that Cranmer has some sort of kidney malfunction, see Doc. 109 at 25, and that qualifies as a physical impairment, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). Moreover, “major life activities” include “the operation of an individual organ within a body system,” meaning kidney malfunction affects a major life activity per the applicable regulations. See id. at § 1630.2(i)(ii); see also Kastrati v. Progress of Peoples Mgmt. Corp., No. 18CV6731, 2020 WL 6940991 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) (permitting an ADA discrimination claim based in part on “kidney malfunction” to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage). ... In ADA cases, an accommodation means “modifications or adjustments” either to the “job application process” or the ”work environment,” or such modifications and adjustments “that enable” a disabled employee to “enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). Requesting a “modification” or “adjustment” implies that the employee is seeking a change in their employment status quo.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines a physical or mental impairment to include a physiological disorder or condition affecting one or more body systems.

Wilson v. TK Elevators Corporation · filed 2024-10-29(h)(1)

Physical or mental impairments include “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more body systems . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).

Section 1630.2(h)(1) treats a physiological disorder or condition affecting a body system, including the neurological system, as a physical or mental impairment; a permanently increased risk of seizures can therefore constitute a current physical impairment.

Johnson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2025-02-14(h)(1)

Physical or mental impairments include “any physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more body systems, such as [the] neurological.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... By contrast, a permanently increased risk of seizures is not a mere characteristic that predisposes Johnson to an adverse event; it is itself a current physical impairment.

Conversion disorder qualifies as an impairment when it is a mental disorder affecting sight, respiratory, and cardiovascular functions.

Bukta v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 2004-12-22(h)

Thus, reviewing the submitted facts in a light most favorable to Bukta, the psychiatric impairment of conversion disorder is a mental disorder and impairs her sight, respiratory and cardiovascular functions. Accordingly, Buk-ta’s condition is an impairment for purposes of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(h) includes psychological disorders in its definition of a mental impairment; alleging such a disorder can establish an impairment at the pleading stage.

Laface v. Boces · filed 2018-11-15(h)

The complaint states that the Plaintiff's driving restriction is due to his psychological disorder. He does not argue that this restriction is limited to work-related driving. At the pleading stage, Laface has successfully alleged that he suffers from an impairment within the meaning of the ADA.

After the ADA Amendments Act, an impairment need not be permanent or long-term to qualify as a disability, and “substantially limits” requires a lower degree of functional limitation than the pre-amendment standard.

Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions · filed 2023-08-04(j)(1)(iv)

Put another way, Congress directed that courts, in assessing whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, “interpret[] and appl[y]” the term “substantially limits” “to require a ... degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard . . . applied prior to the ADAAA.” 5 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). ... We now take the opportunity to acknowledge, as our sister circuits have, that, following the ADAAA’s passage, an impairment need not be “permanent or long-term” to qualify as a disability.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) identifies impairments that should easily be found to substantially limit brain function, including PTSD.

Staples v. Taylor International Services Inc · filed 2023-08-04(j)(3)(iii)

Additionally, PTSD is included in the implementing regulations’ list of impairments that “should easily be concluded . . . [to] substantially limit brain function.”

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) identifies obsessive compulsive disorder as an impairment that substantially limits major life activities and should be considered a disability under the ADA.

SKROUPA v. SHALER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2024-07-03(j)(3)(iii)

The Court concludes that the allegations that Collin had OCD which required daily psychotherapy sessions and that he was struggling at school are sufficient to state a claim that he had a mental impairment that substantially limited his major life activity of learning. “Regulations clarifying what constitutes a disability under the ADA state that ‘major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia’ substantially limit major life activities and should be considered disabilities.” Jones v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., 2019 WL 5588824, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2019) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii)). Moreover, the Complaint alleges that Skroupa notified the District of Collin’s diagnosis and psychotherapy needs in 2020, but no action was taken for the approximately two years prior to his death. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim that the District failed to respond within a reasonable time.

The regulation identifies autism, major depressive disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder as impairments that substantially limit brain function for purposes of establishing disability.

Gulyas v. Department of the Navy · filed 2024-06-28(j)(3)(iii)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has listed these conditions as generally sufficient to establish a disability. See McNab, 121 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 7 (recognizing that, under the EEOC’s regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii), major depressive disorder is considered a condition that substantially limits the major life activity of brain function); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (identifying autism, major depressive disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder as impairments that substantially limit brain function). We find these diagnoses, combined with the appellant’s well-documented history of these conditions, more than sufficient to establish that he is an individual with a disability.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) identifies autism as an impairment that substantially limits brain function.

Bryant v. Calvary Christian School of Columbus Georgia Inc · filed 2026-02-12(j)(3)(iii)

And regulations in the employment context list autism as a type of impairment that “substantially limits brain function.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

Section 1630.2(k) treats a person as having a record of a disability only when the person has a history of, or was misclassified as having, a substantially limiting physical or mental impairment.

Brode v. Xeris Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2023-11-02(k)(1) (k)(2)

“An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). Brode alleges that by tracking which employees were vaccinated and which were not, Xeris classified its employees into those with an impairment (the unvaccinated) and those without an impairment (the vaccinated). [22] at 16–17, ¶¶ 62–70. But Brode has not alleged how being unvaccinated is a mental or physical “impairment that substantially limited one or major life activities when compared to most people in the general population,” such that being classified as “unvaccinated” is a “misclassification” creating a record of disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2) (emphasis added).

Section 1630.2(n) identifies the factors and circumstances used to determine whether a job duty is an essential function, including the employer’s judgment, the consequences of not requiring performance, and whether limited staffing prevents distributing the duty among other employees.

Geter v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc. · filed 2023-11-07(n)(3), (n)(2), (n)(2)(ii)

Federal regulations identify several other relevant factors, including “(1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (2) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, (3) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, (4) the work experience of past incumbents in the job, and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). These regulations also enumerate several bases for concluding that a job function is essential, e.g., if the position exists to perform the function, if there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of the job function can be distributed, or if the function is highly specialized and the incumbent in the position was hired for his or her ability to perform the particular function. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... The burdens that Geter’s part-time schedule caused other Schneider employees to bear weigh in Schneider’s favor. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (stating that a “function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed”); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment and explaining that a “minor ‘reshuffling’ of . . . assignments proposed by [the plaintiff] necessarily would require the reallocation of an essential part of his job”).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job, so an employer need not eliminate those duties as an accommodation.

Retamozo v. U.S. Bancorp d/b/a U.S. Bank · filed 2023-08-18(n)(1)

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.”). Put simply, although the ADA requires that employers adapt the workplace to the disabled employees’ needs, all employees—disabled or otherwise—may be required to perform certain tasks and a disabled employee may not demand that the employer dispense with that requirement as an accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats essential functions as the fundamental duties an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.

LLOYD v. TWIN CEDARS YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES INC · filed 2024-01-23(n)(1)

“‘Essential functions’ are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.”

Section 1630.2(g)(3) generally makes it unnecessary to analyze the actual-disability or record-of-impairment prongs when an individual neither requires a reasonable accommodation nor challenges a covered entity's failure to provide one.

COLEMAN v. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2023-11-08(g)(3)

“Flare-ups” or symptomatic episodes do not suggest impairment of major life activities. The fact that Plaintiff has submitted no medical records documenting such episodes nor sought any accommodation further weighs against her. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (“Where an individual is not challenging a covered entity’s failure to make reasonable accommodations and does not require a reasonable accommodation, it is generally unnecessary to proceed under the ‘actual disability’ or ‘record of’ prongs[.]”).

The regulation identifies PTSD as an impairment that substantially limits brain function and thus should easily satisfy the requirements for a disability under the statute.

Brooks v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-09-27(j)(3)(iii)

EEOC regulations specifically list PTSD as an impairment that “substantially limit[s] brain function” and thus “should easily” meet the requirements for a disability under the statute. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) measures substantial limitation against most people in the general population, and § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) recognizes PTSD as substantially limiting brain function.

Staton v. City and County of Butte-Silver Bow · filed 2023-11-09(j)(1)(ii), (j)(3)(iii)

The Ninth Circuit clarified in Weaving v. City of Hillsboro that plaintiffs no longer need to present evidence about labor markets and an inability to work in a broad range of jobs to qualify as having a disability. 763 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2014.) Plaintiffs need only show that they are substantially limited compared to most people in the general population. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). ... The Code of Federal Regulations expressly recognizes PTSD as “substantially limit[ing] brain function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). Staton has presented sufficient evidence that she suffered from a disability.

Subsection (o)(2)(ii) recognizes job restructuring as a reasonable accommodation, but it does not require an employer to remove essential functions from an employee’s job or reallocate them to other employees.

Dooley v. Newmont USA Limited a Delaware Corporation · filed 2023-11-03(o)(2)(ii)

It is well-settled that job restructuring may be a form of reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). However, the “ADA does not require an employer to exempt an employee from performing essential functions or to reallocate essential functions to other employees.” Dark, 451 F.3d at 1089. Restructuring Dooley’s job to only assign him the PM Route would exempt him from the various other essential functions of the position. The ADA does not require that NGM accommodate Dooley by restructuring his job if doing so would exempt him from performing the essential functions of the position. See id. (stating that the defendant did not need to restructure the plaintiff’s position by exempting him from one of the position’s essential duties).

Section 1630.2 defines disability broadly, including mental impairments that substantially limit major life activities, and directs that “major” and “substantially limits” not be interpreted narrowly.

Durr v. Slator · filed 2023-11-30(g), (h), (i)(2), (j)(1)(i)

A qualifying "disability" under the ADA is a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," or "being regarded as having such an impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... A mental impairment is "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disability." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). ... The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has clarified that when applying the ADA, the disability must "be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the statute]." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); accord Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2014). ... It follows that, "the term major shall not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for disability," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2), and "the term 'substantially limits' shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2 does not require a person to be completely unable to walk to have a qualifying ambulatory or back disability.

Davis v. Ma · filed 2012-01-24(j)(1)

Whether a person has a qualifying disability, however, does not depend on whether she attends physical therapy, nor must a plaintiff be completely unable to walk to demonstrate a qualifying ambulatory disability or back disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.

Section 1630.2(p)(1) permits an employer to provide a reasonable alternative accommodation rather than the exact or preferred accommodation requested by the employee.

Hickles · filed 2026-01-28(p)(1)

In other words, a reasonable accommodation need not be the exact accommodation requested by a disabled employee. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n employer is not required to always provide the employee with the best possible accommodations or in the specific manner the employee requested.”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1)).

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) treats a reasonable accommodation as a modification or adjustment that enables a qualified employee with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Schwartz · filed 2025-10-15(o)(1)(ii)

Reasonable accommodations are “[m]odifications or adjustments . . . that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position; or . . . to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by [an employer’s] other similarly situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)-(iii). ... The Court therefore finds that the District has demonstrated that being physically present in the classroom for supervisory purposes was an essential function of the job of a classroom teacher in the District.

The regulation defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Lewis v. R. L. Vallee, Inc. · filed 2024-04-23(o)(1)(ii)

“A reasonable accommodation is one that ‘enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.’” Affiliated Enter. Sols., 2024 WL 1652460, at *4 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines reasonable accommodations as modifications or adjustments to the work environment or work circumstances that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the position's essential functions.

Cetin v. Kansas City Kansas Community College · filed 2023-12-18(o)(1)(ii)

Reasonable accommodations are “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.”

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines reasonable accommodations to include changes to the work environment or how a job is performed that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform essential functions.

Grasty v. DaVita Inc · filed 2025-08-18(o)(1)(ii)

Reasonable accommodations include “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” ... So DaVita did make “[m]odifications or adjustments to . . . the manner or circumstances under which the position held . . . is customarily performed, [and] that enable[d]” Grasty “to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

Previously learned techniques an employee can use without an employer’s help are not reasonable accommodations under the regulation.

Hammel, Paul S. v. Eau Galle Cheese · filed 2005-05-11(o)

They are not “modifications or adjustments to the work environment [by the employer]. . . that enable” him to perform the job’s essential functions.

An employee’s previously learned techniques for performing a job are not reasonable accommodations requiring employer action.

Paul S. Hammel, Cross-Appellee v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory · filed 2005-06-24(g)

Thus, we agree with the trial judge’s determination that these “adaptive techniques” were not “reasonable accommodations” within the meaning of the ADA.

A request for FMLA leave can qualify as a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

DREIBELBIS v. COUNTY OF BERKS · filed 2020-02-07(o)(1)(ii)

The Court must conclude that Dreibelbis has adequately pleaded these elements of her failure to accommodate claim, and it would therefore be premature to dismiss the claim at this time. First, there is a legal basis for Dreibelbis’ contention that her request for FMLA leave to cover her absence on June 13, 2018, constituted a request for a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats a record of disability as a history of, or misclassification as having, a substantially limiting impairment, while § 1630.2(o)(3) calls for identifying the disability’s precise limitations and potential reasonable accommodations through the interactive process.

Bush v. Acton-Boxborough Regional School District · filed 2023-05-23(k)(1), (o)(3)

But without allegations that he has a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, Bush lacks a qualifying disability under § 12102(1)(B). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1) (defining § 12102(1)(B) as “the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities”). ... “This process should ... identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

An individual with a record of disability may need an accommodation related to a past impairment even if the impairment no longer substantially limits a major life activity.

EEOC v. M&T Bank · filed 2019-12-19(k)(3)

It is of no consequence that McCollin’s impairment “no longer substantially limits[] a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3).

Section 1630.2 does not require a formal or evidence-based diagnosis to establish an ADA disability.

In the Matter of Antavis Chavis · filed 2023-12-21

Likewise, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2—the EEOC’s regulation regarding definitions under the ADA—is also silent as to diagnoses.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) and (m) require an employee pursuing disability discrimination based on failure to accommodate to establish that she has a disability and is a qualified individual with a disability, in addition to showing that the agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Draughn v. Department of the Army · filed 2023-12-22(g), (m)

In order to establish disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate, an employee must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.

For a disability-discrimination failure-to-accommodate claim, the regulations require showing that the claimant has a disability, is a qualified individual with a disability, and was denied a reasonable accommodation.

Pittman v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2024-03-20(g), (m), (o)(4)

In order to establish a disability -based failure to accommodate claim, an appellant must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13 (2014); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4).

Sections 1630.2(g) and (m) require a failure-to-accommodate claimant to show that he is an individual with a disability and a qualified individual with a disability.

McClelland v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2025-12-10(g), (m)

To establish disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate claim, an employee must show that: (1) he is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide reasonable accommodation. Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13 (2015).

A temporary impairment qualifies as a disability only if it substantially limits an individual's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Cook v. Warren Screw Products, Inc. · filed 2025-03-27(j)(1)(ii)

Under the regulations, a temporary impairment is a disability if it “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii); see id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (“The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.”).

An impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months may still be substantially limiting and qualify as a disability.

Buckman v. DeJoy · filed 2024-09-26(j)(1)(x)

“[u]nder the ADAAA and its implementing regulations, an impairment is not categorically excluded from being a disability simply because it is temporary.” Summers, 740 F.3d at 333; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(x) (“The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting . . .”). Accordingly, to the extent Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s injury cannot qualify as a disability solely because it is temporary in nature, that contention is rejected.

Temporary or episodic medical conditions can qualify as a disability under the ADA.

FAIRCHILD v. IT LANDES COMPANY, LLC · filed 2024-09-09(j)(1)(ix), (j)(1)(vii)

Medical conditions that are temporary or episodic can be considered a qualifying disability under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix), 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii).

An impairment must be sufficiently severe to overcome its short duration to substantially limit a major life activity; a minor concussion that does not meet that standard is not a disability.

Malik v. Amazon.com Services, LLC · filed 2024-01-12(j)(1)(ix)

Plaintiff has also provided no evidence that her concussion was “sufficiently severe” to overcome its short duration. Summers v. Altarum Inst. Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (app)). Rather, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a concussion on August 23. (Def. Ex. J at 110). She was then released back to work, with no restrictions by the Amazon-approved physician on September 2 and by her own physician on September 7. (Def. Ex. M, at 70; Def. Ex. N). Ultimately, the evidence shows that Plaintiff suffered a minor concussion that did not substantially limit any life activities and that was not sufficiently severe to negate its transitory nature.

The regulation treats essential functions as the position's fundamental duties and recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable accommodation, but it does not require reassignment when no vacancy exists.

Kingsolver v. Garland · filed 2024-12-30(n)(1), (o)(iii)(2)(ii)

Essential functions are the fundamental duties of the employment position at issue. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... First, reassignment to a vacant position can be a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(iii)(2)(ii) (2007). “However, even if a disabled employee is qualified for and capable of performing another existing position, the employer is not required to reassign the employee if there is no vacancy.” Branscomb v. Sec’y, U.S. Navy, 461 F. App’x 901, 905 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1257).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position and directs courts to assess essentiality using the position’s purpose, employer judgment, job descriptions, time spent, and the experience of current or former employees.

Randolph v. Cargill Cocoa and Chocolate North America · filed 2025-01-10(n)(1), (n)(2)(i), (n)(3)

Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... “A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to . . . because the reason the position exists is to perform that function” or “because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)–(ii). “To determine whether a job function is essential, [courts] look to the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, and the experience of those who previously or currently hold the position.” Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)); Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001)). ... In sum, Randolph has failed to present the court with evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would contradict Cargill’s description of the essential functions for the packer position. In essence, he is asking the court to second-guess—without evidence—the employer’s plausible description of its own job positions. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that Randolph was able to perform the essential functions of his job—namely, lifting up to fifty pounds and bending or stooping—with or without accommodations. Thus, Cargill is entitled to summary judgment on Randolph’s claims for failure to accommodate and disability discrimination.

Section 1630.2(n)(2) identifies circumstances indicating that a job function is essential, including when the position exists to perform it, few employees can perform it, or it requires specialized expertise.

Efezokhae v. Rocket Mortgage LLC · filed 2025-01-15(n)(2)

A job function may be essential if: (i) the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) there are a limited number of employees available who can perform that function; or (iii) the function requires specialization or expertise.

Section 1630.2(h)(2) treats any mental or psychological disorder, including an emotional or mental illness, as a mental impairment under the ADA.

Acosta v. Kennedy Children's Center · filed 2025-01-10(h)(2)

Mental impairments include “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as an... emotional or mental illness.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). ... Whether Acosta in fact had or later was diagnosed with PTSD, the facts pled—her narrative to her supervisors and their reactions to it—readily support that, as of her termination, she was perceived to have a disability.

Section 1630.2 is applied broadly: an impairment need not be permanent or long term, major life activities are not narrowly construed, essential functions are fundamental job duties, and employers generally must participate in an informal interactive accommodation process.

Sutherland v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc. · filed 2025-01-16(j)(1)(vii)-(ix), (i)(2), (n)(1), (o)(3)

These implementing regulations make clear, contra Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198, that an injury need not be permanent or long term to be considered sufficiently severe and thus, qualify as an "impairment." ... These regulations also clarify that major life activities are "not determined by reference to whether [they are] of 'central importance to daily life,'" and that "the term 'major' shall not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for disability." ... "Essential functions" are "fundamental job duties of the employment position." ... An employer is often obligated to engage in an "informal, interactive process" with the employee to determine whether a reasonable accommodation exists. ... "An employer's refusal to participate in the process may itself constitute evidence of a violation of the statute."

Section 1630.2 identifies factors for determining a job’s essential functions and recognizes part-time or modified work schedules as examples of reasonable accommodations.

Yager v. County of Erie · filed 2025-01-16(n)(2), (o)(2)(ii)

A number of factors determine the essential functions of a job. These factors, none of which is dispositive, include the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent on the job performing the function, the inclusion of the function in a collective bargaining agreement, and the work experience of past employees. See Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(2). These factors must be analyzed as part of a “fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job and how the job is actually performed in practice.” Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995). ... A modified work schedule may be a reasonable accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o)(2)(ii) (including “part-time or modified work schedules” as an example of a reasonable accommodation). ... Such is the case here. Construing the evidence in her favor, Yager’s request for a partial leave of absence was finite and designed to allow her to return to full-time work. The County presents no undisputed evidence demonstrating that Yager’s request was unreasonable or that the requested 4-week graduated return to a full-time schedule would have caused an undue hardship. Summary judgment is therefore not warranted.

Section 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) treats a qualified reader as a possible, not automatically sufficient, reasonable accommodation; whether it is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances.

Santos v. McDonough · filed 2025-07-10(o)(2)(ii)

And to the extent that VA argues that—as a matter of law—it has provided Santos with a reasonable accommodation because it provided her with a sighted assistant, see Mot. at 61, the regulation on which VA relies provides only that a qualified reader “may” be a reasonable accommodation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). Whether it is a reasonable accommodation in a particular circumstance remains a question of fact.

When deciding whether an impairment is substantially limiting, courts should consider the impairment’s condition, manner, and duration, including negative medication side effects and burdens from a treatment regimen.

Hartman v. Graham Packaging Company, L.P. · filed 2022-01-25(j)(4)(ii)

As relevant here, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(ii) states that, in considering whether an impairment is “substantially limiting,” courts should consider the “condition, manner, or duration” of the impairment, including “the non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, such as negative side effects of medication or burdens associated with following a particular treatment regimen[.]” (Emphasis added).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(v) provides that deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity usually does not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.

Baum v. Metro Restoration Servs. · filed 2019-04-11(j)(1)(v)

He also cites an implementing regulation stating that the phrase “substantially limits” warrants broad construction and “is not meant to be a demanding standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), and that the substantial-limitation inquiry “usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v). Read together, Baum contends, these provisions set a low bar for proving an actual disability. That they do.

Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities, and § 1630.2(j)(1) defines substantial limitation by comparing the individual's ability with that of the average person in the general population.

Strickland v. Harris · filed 2018-08-23(i), (j)(1)

“Major life activities” include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). ... “Substantially limited” is defined as: ... (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). ... Here, drawing all reasonable inferences from the complaint, Plaintiff’s allegation is that her pain causes her to be restricted in the duration of her ability to stand and work without some break periods. However, there are no facts that state this restriction is significant as compared to others.

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly and does not require an impairment to prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity.

Nunies v. Hie Holdings, Inc. · filed 2018-11-01(j)(1)(i) & (ii)

The relevant regulations add that “substantially limits” should “be construed broadly” and that “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) & (ii).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and says it is not a demanding standard.

McDonough v. Brennen · filed 2018-11-02(j)(1)(i)

Under the regulations passed pursuant to the ADAAA, the key test is still whether an impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities, but “the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1)(i).

A restriction can substantially limit a major life activity without any minimum duration, and “substantially limits” must be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.

Knox County Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Melissa (Cope) Davis · filed 2018-04-18(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ix)

There is no time threshold to overcome for a restriction to substantially limit a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). As the ADAAA requires the term substantially limit to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), we conclude the ICRC did not err when it determined Davis had a disability under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(l)(i) establishes that “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard.

Glaser v. Gap Inc. · filed 2014-01-31(j)(l)(i)

The regulations implementing the ADAAA provide that “ ‘substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly for extensive coverage and as a non-demanding standard.

Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int'l, LLC · filed 2014-03-31(j)(1)(i)

And the EEOC, pursuant to its statutory authority to issue regulations implementing the definition of “disability” in the ADA, see id. at § 12205a, has further explained that the phrase “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in terms of extensive coverage” and is “not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly and sets a non-demanding standard for determining disability.

Stragapede v. City of Evanston · filed 2014-09-26(j)(1)(i)

The EEOC’s regulations interpreting the ADA instruct that “the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i).

The term “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard, and whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity must be assessed in the individual circumstances.

Peterson v. Commissioner, NHDOC, et al. · filed 2017-01-30(j)(1)(i)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations implementing the pertinent ADA definitions, as amended, make it clear that while not every impairment is a disability under the ADA, “‘[s]ubstantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... Defendants’ argument about what most people “tend” to do misses the mark by construing the term “substantially limits” without reference to the undisputed facts regarding Peterson. ... The pertinent definition requires an “individualized assessment,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). Construing the pertinent definitions broadly in favor of expansive coverage, and taking into account Peterson’s medical records regarding his urine retention problems while at the NHSP, this court finds that there is a triable issue in this case as to whether plaintiff had an impairment substantially limiting his ability to perform a major life activity, during the relevant time period.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be interpreted broadly and sets a low, nondemanding threshold for disability coverage.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Helia Healthcare of Salem, LLC · filed 2026-05-06(j)(1)(i)

“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage […]. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) requires a lower degree of functional limitation than the standard applied before the ADAAA.

Smith v. Bryce Corporation · filed 2023-04-28(j)(1)(iv)

In light of the ADAAA, the EEOC guidelines now direct courts to interpret and apply the term “substantially limits” to require “a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.”

Section 1630.2 defines key ADA disability concepts: substantial limitation is construed broadly, termination can be a prohibited action for regarded-as claims, regarded-as individuals need not be accommodated, and essential functions are fundamental duties assessed using listed factors.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Allstate Beverage Company, LLC · filed 2022-10-17(j)(1), (l)(1), (o)(4), (n)(1), (n)(3)

The EEOC regulations define the term “substantially limited” as: (i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. ... The EEOC regulations further instruct that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... Even under the broad construction of the definition of an ADA disability, the evidence cannot raise a genuine dispute of material fact that Mr. Freeman suffered from physical impairments that substantially limited the major life activities of circulatory and respiratory functions as of May 2, 2018. ... And a “prohibited action” includes termination of employment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1). ... Hence, for the EEOC’s ADA wrongful termination claim, it must show that Mr. Freeman is a qualified individual who can perform the essential functions of his job as POS warehouse administrator with no accommodations. ... “Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Whether a job function is essential is analyzed case-by-case based on several factors. ... These factors include “[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,” (2) “[w]ritten job descriptions,” (3) “[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function,” and (4) the work experience of other employees performing the same or similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Samson, 746 F.3d at 1201 (outlining the § 1630.2(n)(3) factors).

When evaluating whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the focus is not on the outcomes the person can achieve; the impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict the activity.

Molina v. DSI Renal, Inc. · filed 2012-01-04(J)

Specifically, the regulations instruct that when evaluating whether someone is “substantially limited” the focus should not be on the “outcomes” the person can achieve, as “an impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.”

Subsection (j) defines “substantially limited” by comparing the person’s inability to perform a major life activity with the ability of most people in the general population.

Bates v. Roche Diagnostics Corp. · filed 2013-09-12(j)

The term “substantially limited” refers to the inability to perform a major life activity “as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and says it is not a demanding standard.

Tygrett v. City and County of Denver a/k/a Denver Water · filed 2020-11-23(j)(1)(i)

“‘[S]ubstantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the [ADAAA] . . . [and] is not meant to be a demanding standard.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) treats a person as substantially limited in a major life activity when the person is unable to perform an activity that the average person in the general population can perform.

Hope v. Berg · filed 2022-01-07(j)(1)(i)

According to the ADA regulations, an individual is “substantially limited” in performing a major life activity if she is either: (1) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform (e.g., walking), or (2) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which she can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity (e.g., being able to walk only for brief periods of time).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) guides the essential-function inquiry with seven non-exhaustive factors, giving particular weight to the employer’s judgment and using the remaining factors as circumstantial evidence of employer policies and practices.

Credeur v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Office of the Attorney General · filed 2017-06-23(n)(3), (n)(3)(i), (n)(3)(iii)

True, the regulations present a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider, but they all relate to the employer’s judgment in some fashion. The first two restate the statutory considerations, which directly pertain to the employer’s judgment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)–(ii). The remaining five fall into the category of circumstantial evidence of an employer’s policies and practices pointing to a function being essential, or not. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii)–(vii).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and directs courts to consider non-exhaustive factors such as the employer’s judgment, the consequences of not requiring the duty, and the collective bargaining agreement.

Manigan v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth · filed 2010-07-12(n)(1), (n)(3)(i), (n)(3)(iv), and (n)(3)(v)

The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... To determine whether a particular function is “essential” courts consider the following list of non-exhaustive factors: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 726 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... In sum, SORTA presented evidence of its judgment of functions essential to bus-driver positions, the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function when the assigned route required, and the terms of the CBA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i), (iv), and (v). And, Manigan did not provide evidence to controvert that working more than eight hours a day when the assigned route required was an essential function of all SORTA bus driver positions.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) provides non-exclusive factors for determining whether a particular job duty is an essential function.

Cremeens v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama · filed 2011-05-31(n)(3)

The ADA’s implementing regulations provide a non-exclusive list of factors indicating that a particular function is essential, which includes, inter alia: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) the written job descriptions of the position; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; and (4) the consequences of not requiring the individual to perform the function.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) lists non-exclusive factors for determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences of not requiring the function, collective-bargaining terms, and the experience of past and current incumbents.

Green v. BakeMark USA · filed 2017-03-27(n)(3)

ADA regulations help illuminate what job functions are essential by providing several non-exclusive factors for consideration: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions . . .; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Third, the written job description for operations manager emphasizes the position’s full-time nature by stressing the “supervisory responsibilities” inherent in the position, including “closely interacting with department associates.” ... Accordingly, a twenty-hour-per-week part-time work schedule would not have allowed Green to perform the essential functions of the operations-manager position. Green’s proposed accommodation was therefore unreasonable, and BakeMark was not required to provide it.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies seven nonexclusive types of evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential; applying those factors, the court held that full-time, on-site work was an essential function of the operator position.

Pullins v. Conagra Brands, Inc · filed 2020-06-09(n)(3)

Thus, full-time, on-site work is an essential function of the operator position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies nonexclusive evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the consequences of not requiring the function, and the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

Valdez v. Delta Electric & Air LLC · filed 2022-08-09(n)(3)

Although Defendant’s list of essential job functions does not explicitly include electrical skills, that list is not necessarily exclusive. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3), “[e]vidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to[,] [t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; . . . written job descriptions; . . . [t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; [and t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” Id. See also Bates, 511 F.3d at 989 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) with approval). Defendant proffers undisputed testimony that installing light fixtures and running wires to service boxes are elementary, expected tasks for novice electricians, which is some evidence of (1) the employer’s judgment and (2) the work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Thus, with no response from Plaintiff, Defendant has established that installing light fixtures and running wires to service boxes are essential functions of an electrician position. (This conclusion also comports with common sense—the ability to perform some electrical work must be an essential function of an electrician’s role.)

Section 1630.2(n)(3) requires consideration of seven non-exclusive evidentiary categories when determining whether a job function is essential; the employer’s judgment is important but not dispositive.

Tate v. Dart · filed 2022-10-25(n)(3)

The employer’s judgment is a factor, and an important one, but it is not necessarily decisive. ... Careful attention to the regulation’s other evidentiary factors can counter the employer’s judgment. ... Considering all the evidence on all the relevant factors, we agree with the district court that even though violent workplace emergencies might be infrequent, the undisputed facts show that the ability to respond to violent emergencies is an essential function for correctional lieutenants.

Section 1630.2(h) excludes ordinary weight within the normal range from impairment absent a physiological disorder, but severe obesity need not be shown to have an underlying physiological basis to qualify as an impairment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Resources for Human Development, Inc. · filed 2011-12-07(h)

A careful reading of the EEOC guidelines and the ADA reveals that the requirement for a physiological cause is only required when a charging party’s weight is within the normal range. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). However, if a charging party’s weight is outside the normal range— that is, if the charging party is severely obese — there is no explicit requirement that obesity be based on a physiological impairment. ... Therefore, according the EEOC Guidelines to the ADA the appropriate deference, the Court should recognize that severe obesity qualifies as a disability under the ADA and that there is no requirement to prove an underlying physiological basis.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) treats obesity as a physical impairment only when it results from an underlying physiological disorder or condition.

Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth. · filed 2019-06-12(h)(1)

Without evidence that Richardson’s extreme obesity was caused by a physiological disorder or condition, his obesity is not a physical impairment under the plain language of the EEOC regulation.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines a physical impairment to include a physiological disorder or condition, so extreme obesity qualifies as an ADA physical impairment only when caused by an underlying physiological disorder or condition.

Richardson v. CTA · filed 2019-06-12(h)(1)

Without evidence that Richardson’s extreme obesity was caused by a physiological disorder or condition, his obesity is not a physical impairment under the plain language of the EEOC regulation.

Section 1630.2(h) treats obesity as a physical impairment only in special cases where it relates to a physiological disorder.

Francis v. City of Meriden · filed 1997-11-17(h)

Francis’s claim fails because obesity, except in special cases where the obesity relates to a physiological disorder, is not a “physical impairment” within the meaning of the statutes.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) requires obesity, whether actual or perceived, to result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition to qualify as a physical impairment.

Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth. · filed 2017-11-13(h)(1)

Because EEOC regulations clearly limit the definition of a physical impairment to a "physiological disorder or condition" that affects "one or more body systems," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1), a physical characteristic such as obesity, whether actual or perceived, must still be the result of an underlying physiological disorder or condition to qualify as an impairment under the ADA.

Cancer will virtually always qualify as a disability under the regulation.

Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc. · filed 2012-01-10(j)(3)(ii)

Cancer will “virtually always” be a qualifying disability.

Subsection (3)(iii) recognizes cancer as an impairment that substantially limits normal cell growth for purposes of determining an ADA disability.

Griego v. Arizona Partsmaster, Inc. · filed 2020-11-23(3)(iii)

Cancer is a disability because it substantially limits normal cell growth.

Cancer substantially limits the major life activity of normal cell growth and therefore qualifies as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity under the ADA.

Fishbeck v. Lavaca County, Texas · filed 2025-02-28(j)(3)(iii)

Cancer is an impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of normal cell growth. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“[C]ancer substantially limits normal cell growth . . . .”); ... Defendants have not established that Fishbeck’s cancer is not a disability as a matter of law.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) treats HIV infection as substantially limiting the major life activity of immune function, so an HIV-positive plaintiff may plausibly allege an ADA disability on that basis.

Doe v. Merritt Hospitality, LLC · filed 2018-12-18(j)(3)(iii)

The ADA's implementing regulations explain that the phrase "substantially limits" is broadly construed in favor of expansive coverage, but that whether an individual's "impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment." ... Although, Doe does not specifically state which major life activity is limited, the ADA's implementing regulations explain that an HIV infection limits immune function.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) states that HIV infection substantially limits immune function, supporting disability coverage under the ADA.

Alexiadis v. New York College of Health Professions · filed 2012-09-20(j)(3)(iii)

The Court notes that this conclusion— namely, that there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a rational factfinder could conclude that the function of plaintiff's immune system may have been substantially limited by his HIV status — is consistent with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations to implement the equal employment provisions of the ADA, which state, "it should easily be concluded that the following types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated: ... Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection substantially limits immune function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.

Section 1630.2 requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly and not as a demanding standard, and treats an individual as regarded as having a disability when subjected to an ADA-prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment.

Graham v. St. John's United Methodist Church · filed 2012-10-25(j)(l)(i) (g)(ii)

The associated regulations instruct courts to be liberal in determining whether a plaintiff is substantially limited: “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i). ... Furthermore, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in Graham’s favor, he has sufficiently pleaded that he was regarded as an individual with a disability. Being “regarded as” having a disability “means that the individual has been subjected to an action prohibited by the ADA as amended because of an actual or perceived impairment....” 29 CFR § 1630.2(g)(ii).

An impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to qualify as a disability.

Broadwater v. Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 2014-05-23(j)(l)

Under the current, more liberal definition, the Court concludes that being unable to work more than twenty hours a week could qualify as a “substantial” limitation.

Subsection (g) defines an individual with a disability as someone with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Worthen v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2015-06-26(g)

We agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant is an individual with a disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g), i.e., an individual with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.

Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities as basic daily activities such as walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working, while § 1630.2(h) defines an impairment to include specified physiological, anatomical, or mental conditions.

Cosme-Perez v. Municipality of Juana Diaz · filed 2015-06-26(i), (h)

Major life activities are basic activities of daily life that an average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty— “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1991). ... The EEOC defines an impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or any mental or physiological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1991).

Section 1630.2(g) defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Randall v. United Petroleum Transports, Inc. · filed 2015-09-17(g)

In this context, a disability is “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such in(jividual[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

Section 1630.2(j)(4)(ii) allows negative side effects of medication to be considered when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Russell v. Phillips 66 Company · filed 2017-05-04(j)(4)(ii)

“[N]egative side effects of medication . . . may be considered when determining whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(ii).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i)'s class-of-jobs analysis does not require a separate showing that an impairment prevents performance of a broad class of jobs when the impairment substantially limits another major life activity.

Isley v. Aker Philadelphia Shipyard, Inc. · filed 2017-08-17(j)(3)(i)

Under current regulations; the EEOC has clarified that the need to conduct “class-of-jobs” analysis has been largely eliminated: ... In most instances, an individual with a disability will be able to establish coverage by showing substantial limitation of a major life activity other than working; impairments that- substantially limit a person’s ability to wprk usually substantially limit one or more other major life activities. ... Because Isley’s costochondritis appears to have interfered, with his ability to sleep and breath, his failure to show that he was unable to perform a broad class of jobs is not fatal to his ADA claim.

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(i) treats an impairment as a disability only when it substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Hustvet v. Allina Health System · filed 2018-12-07(g)(1)(i)

A person is disabled for purposes of an accommodation claim if he or she has “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual” or has “record of such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i) and (ii). ... There is insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Hustvet’s chemical sensitivities or allergies substantially or materially limit her ability to perform major life activities. ... This is not enough for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude she is disabled.

Section 1630.2(g) defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Dillaha v. Pascagoula Gautier School District · filed 2019-10-30(g)

Relevant to this case, a disability is “‘[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual[.]’” Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). ... The record clearly establishes that Dillaha has met her evidentiary burden of establishing that she is disabled under the ADA.

HIV infection is an inherently substantially limiting impairment under § 1630.2(j).

Hernandez v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1997-09-23(j)

Impairments, such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).

Section 1630.2(j) treats substantial limitation in a particular major life activity, such as seeing, differently from substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Laws v. HealthSouth Northern Kentucky Rehabilitation Hospital Ltd. Parnership · filed 2012-12-11(j)(1)(ii), (j)(3)(i)

The question of whether Laws was “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes” is relevant only to the major life activity of “working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2008). The district court’s finding, therefore, does nothing to address Laws’ alternate claim that she was also substantially limited in the major life activity of “seeing.” ... With respect to the major life activity of “seeing,” Laws need only prove that she is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which she can perform that particular activity as compared to the average person in the general population. Id. at §1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2008).

The regulation defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, identifies factors for determining essentiality, and requires the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements for qualification.

Morse v. Jetblue Airways Corp. · filed 2013-03-31(n)(1), (n)(2), (n)(3), (m)

Because the ADA does not define the term “essential functions,” the Second Circuit has referred to regulations promulgated by the EEOC, which indicate that “essential functions” encompass “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” ... Under the EEOC regulations, a job function may be considered “essential” because (1) “the reason the position exists is to perform that function”; (2) there is a “limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed”; and/or “[t]he function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... “EEOC regulations further indicate that, to be qualified for a position, a plaintiff must in addition ‘satisffy] the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position.’ ” ... Ultimately, however, “the question whether a task constitutes an essential function depends on the totality of the circumstances.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3)(vi) permits consideration of the work experience of employees performing the same or similar jobs when determining a position’s essential functions, but experience from different jobs at different facilities is not relevant to that inquiry.

Kramer v. Tosco Corp. · filed 2007-03-14(n)(3)(vi)

While the EEOC regulations governing what constitutes evidence of essential functions allow consideration of the work experience of employees performing the same or similar jobs, the regulations do not suggest that the work experience of employees performing other jobs at different facilities is relevant to this inquiry.

The essential functions of a job are its fundamental duties, and courts may consider the employer’s judgment and the time spent performing a function in identifying them.

Wells v. BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair · filed 2007-04-02(n)(1), (n)(3)(i)

“[Essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). In determining which job functions are essential, the court may consider the employer’s judgment and the amount of time an employee must spend performing the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i), (iii).

A job duty is an essential function when it is fundamental to the job, and courts assess that question using factors including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the duty, and the consequences of not requiring it.

Kurek v. North Allegheny School District · filed 2007-05-01(n)(1)

Whether a particular duty is an “essential function” of a given job turns on whether that duty is “fundamental” to the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). To make this determination, courts should look to numerous factors, including, but not limited to: ... Id. ... Accordingly, we hold that Kurek’s evidence is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether working a 7-3/4 hour workday is an “essential function” of a teacher’s duties at Allegheny.

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal ones and identifies the employer’s judgment, job descriptions, time spent, consequences, bargaining agreements, and incumbent work experience as evidence of essentiality.

Rehrs v. The Iams Company · filed 2007-05-15(n)(1), (n)(3)

Essential functions are the fundamental job duties but not the marginal functions of a particular job. ... Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to, (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job ... performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. ... Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Rehrs, we conclude shift rotation was a non-discriminatory essential function of Rehrs’s technician job at P&G and Rehrs’s restrictions to work only a straight shift rendered him unqualified to carry out all the essential functions of his P&G technician job.

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential functions as the fundamental duties an individual with a disability is actually required to perform and calls for a case-by-case evaluation using specified factors.

Musarra v. Vineyards Development Corp. · filed 2004-11-10(n)(2)(l), (n)(3)

“ ‘Essential functions’ are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” ... “Whether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors.” ... Other factors to consider include: (1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (2) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, (3) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, (4) the work experience of past incumbents in the job, and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job and directs courts to consider specified evidence when identifying them, including employer judgment, job descriptions, collective bargaining agreements, time spent, consequences, and comparable work experience.

Summerville v. TWA · filed 2000-08-07(n)(1), (n)(3)

Essential functions are the fundamental duties of a job, not activities at the margins. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Essential functions are established by looking at: the employer's judgment as to what functions are essential; written job descriptions; the collective bargaining agreement; the amount of time spent on the job performing the functions; the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the functions; and the work experience of employees in similar jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) provides seven non-exclusive factors for determining whether a job function is essential.

Brown v. Chase Brass & Copper Co. · filed 2001-07-10(n)(3)

As this court has recognized, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) enumerates seven non-exclusive factors to weigh in determining if a function is “essential,” to wit: (1) an employer’s judgment that the function is essential; (2) written job descriptions; (3) the amount of time on the job devoted to performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function; (5) terms in a relevant labor agreement; (6) the work experience of those who have held the position in the past; and (7) the current work experience of those who hold similar jobs.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies nonexclusive evidence for determining which functions of a job are essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences of not performing the function, collective bargaining terms, and employee work experience.

Winfrey v. City of Chicago · filed 2001-07-26(n)(3)

Evidence pointing to essential functions includes, but is not limited to: 1) the employer’s judgment as to what functions are essential; 2) written job descriptions prepared for advertising for, or interviewing, job applicants; 3) the amount of time spent on the job performing a particular function; 4) the consequences of not requiring an employee to perform a function; 5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; and 6) work experience of past and present employees in the position.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats a fundamental job duty as an essential function and excludes a marginal duty from that category.

Loretta M. Emerson, Formerly Known as Loretta M. Rubenzer v. Northern States Power Company · filed 2001-06-26(n)(1)

An essential function is a fundamental job duty required of a person in the job the plaintiff holds or desires; a marginal duty is not an essential function.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, rather than marginal duties.

Felix v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2001-07-16(n)(1)

The term “essential functions” has been defined by the EEOC to mean the “fundamental” duties to be performed in the position in question, as opposed to functions that are merely “marginal.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats the essential functions of a job as its fundamental duties, rather than its marginal duties.

Morton v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2001-11-30(n)(1)

A job’s “essential functions” are its “fundamental” duties, not the “marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). The record contains conflicting evidence as to whether the ability to drive UPS’s larger trucks is an essential function of the package car driver position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) lists nonexclusive evidence for determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the function, consequences of not requiring it, collective-bargaining terms, and work experience.

Herrera v. CTS Corp. · filed 2002-01-15(n)(3)

Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents on the job; and (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies the types of evidence relevant to determining whether a job function is essential.

Morton v. GTE Service Corp · filed 1997-04-10(n)(3)

A number of types of evidence are relevant to whether a function is “essential,” including: (I) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (iv) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (v) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Riel v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 99 F.3d 678, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1996), citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n) defines the essential functions of a position as its fundamental job duties; whether a function is essential is a factual question evaluated using the regulation’s factors.

Kees v. Wallenstein · filed 1997-05-14(n)

The “essential function” question, however, is one of fact, not law. ... The “essential functions” of a position are “the fundamental job duties of the position.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position the individual holds or desires and excludes marginal duties.

Stone v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 1997-06-30(n)(1)

However, proper analysis of a claim under the federal disability statutes, must be focused on "the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability ... desires," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (emphasis added), rather than solely on the title held by a person occupying that position or the other positions occupied by most persons holding that title. ... A function is, by definition, not "essential" to a position if that function is "marginal," and the evidence that neither the past nor the incumbent firefighters assigned to those bureaus have ever been requested to engage in a fire-suppression activity suggests that it would be entirely permissible for a factfinder to infer that the ability to engage in fire-suppression activities is marginal to the positions in FAB and FPB.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the basic, fundamental duties of a job, excludes marginal functions, and identifies factors for deciding whether a function is essential.

Barber v. Nabors Drilling U.S.A., Inc. Nabors Loffland Drilling Company, Nabors Drilling U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1997-12-04(n)

The phrase “essential functions” of an employment position means the basic, fundamental duties of the job the person with a disability holds or desires. Essential functions do not include the marginal functions of the position. A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following: ... In determining whether a particular function is essential, you may consider: ... (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, ... (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, ... (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, ... (4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function, ... (5) the work experience of past incumbents in the job, and/or ... (6) the current work experience of persons with similar jobs. ... This charge was taken almost verbatim from the E.E.O.C.’s regulations/guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and directs the determination of essentiality by considering factors such as the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, and the consequences of not requiring the function.

Mitchell v. Washingtonville Central School District · filed 1998-01-30(n)

In this ease, the District’s written job description states that it involves “responsibility for supervising and performing routine building cleaning and semi-skilled maintenance tasks.” The job “involves the general supervision, care, maintenance and protection of the school building which may include the efficient performance of a variety of groundskeeping activities.” According to the description, therefore, while supervision is an important part of the job, physical labor is an essential component. Further, while the “typical work activities” include a variety of administrative and supervisory duties, they also include a number of duties that cannot be performed from a sitting position. For example, the Head Custodian is required-to perform chores such as sweeping, dusting, waxing, mopping, repairing furniture and equipment, mowing lawns, cultivating trees and shrubs, removing snow.

Section 1630.2(N) defines “essential functions” as the basic, fundamental duties of the job a person with a disability holds or desires.

Hill v. Harper · filed 1998-05-22(N)

The phrase “essential functions” means “the basic, fundamental duties of the job the person with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(N).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties that the position holder must perform, unaided or with reasonable accommodation.

Turner v. Jack Rabbit, Inc. · filed 1998-07-31(n)

The regulations implementing the ADA define “essential functions” as “those functions that the individual who holds the position must be able to perform unaided or wjth the assistance of a reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). Essential functions áre “fundamental job duties,” not “marginal functions” of an employment position.

Section 1630.2(n) treats whether a job function is essential as a case-specific inquiry considering relevant factors such as the employer's judgment, the position's purpose, and available employees; regular attendance and staying awake were essential functions of a night-watchman job.

Commercial Carrier Corp. v. LaPointe · filed 1999-01-13(n)

Whether a function is essential is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the employer's judgment, whether the position exists to provide for the performance of the function, and the number of employees available to perform the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).... We thus conclude that repossessing property, which entails moving furniture, appliances, and other property from the customer's home to the RAC store, is an essential function of the account representative's job. ... If Paul, with his lifting limitation, were to work at RAC as an account representative, his essential duties could not be completed without allocating an essential function to another employee. Rent A Center, 956 P.2d at 535-36. Here the judge of compensation claims reasonably concluded that reporting for work (and staying awake while at work) was essential to the function of a night watchman.

Section 1630.2(n) treats as essential those job functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to the position.

Rocky v. Columbia Lawnwood Regional Medical Center · filed 1999-07-02(n)

First, the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff is able to perform the essential functions of her job, that is, the functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of an employment position, assessed case by case, with more than a marginal relationship to the position.

Pender v. District Council 37 of American Federation · filed 2002-09-30(n)(1)

The ADA and accompanying regulations provide some guidance. A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the ‘essential functions’ of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Essential functions” is defined as the fundamental duties of the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Whether a particular employment function is essential must be made on a case-by-case basis, but the duty must bear more than a marginal relationship to the position at issue.

An employer's judgment about which duties are essential functions is highly probative, especially when supported by the job description and workplace circumstances.

Alexander v. The Northland Inn · filed 2003-03-05(n)(3)

An employer’s judgment on this question is highly probative. See Moritz, 147 F.3d at 787; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Here, Northland’s written job description for a housekeeping supervisor included as an essential function, “Provide assistance in other job classifications as determined necessary by immediate superior.” Every Northland supervisor testified that this function included vacuuming, which is essential to housekeeping, and Alexander admitted that she occasionally vacuumed, though not three-to-five-times a day. Given the importance of cleanliness to maintaining Northland’s AAA four-diamond rating, the limited number of employees available to perform vacuuming and other housekeeping tasks, and Northland’s persistent problems with housekeeping staff truancy, we agree with the district court that vacuuming was an essential function of the housekeeping supervisor position.

The evidence listed in § 1630.2(n)(3) may be considered when determining a position’s essential functions, but it is not entitled to greater weight merely because it appears on the regulatory list.

Equal Employment Oppurtunity Commission v. Dollar General Corp. · filed 2003-03-20(n)(3)

However, as indicated by the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidelines, such evidence is not to be given greater weight simply because it is included in the non-exclusive list set out in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position and excludes marginal duties.

Davis v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2003-06-05(n)(1)

The term "essential functions" is derived from the WLAD's federal counterpart, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), [5] and it has been defined in the regulations of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as follows: "The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term `essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2002) (emphasis added); see Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir.1995) (noting that EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA, while not controlling, constitute "`a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts ... may properly resort for guidance'" (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986))).

Section 1630.2(n) requires a fact-specific, individualized assessment of whether job duties are essential, using the regulation’s listed factors.

Knutson v. Ag Processing, Inc. · filed 2003-07-28(n)

In this case, consideration of the regulation’s factors do not support a finding that pulling bottom ash and rodding the stokers are essential functions of the boiler operator position when the evidence is viewed in the fight most favorable to the plaintiff.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, and § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to deciding whether a function is essential.

Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc. · filed 2004-01-13(n)(1), (n)(3)

“‘Essential functions’ are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.’ 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Evidence considered in determining whether a particular function is essential includes: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; and (5) the work experience of past incumbents in the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Wells v. Shalala, 228 F.3d 1137, 1144 (10th Cir. 2000). ... Bearing these propositions in mind, the district court properly held Mason’s physical attendance at the administration center was an essential function of the service coordinator position because the position required supervision and teamwork. ... we conclude Mason’s case is not one in which the essential function inquiry must go to the jury because no reasonable jury could find for Mason applying the factors set forth by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.

An essential function is a fundamental, not marginal, job duty, and whether a duty is essential depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C. · filed 2004-05-24(n)(1)

EEOC regulations define “essential functions” to mean the “ ‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’ ” ... But ultimately, the question whether a task constitutes an essential function depends on the totality of the circumstances. ... Mindful of this precedent, we conclude that the record in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Rodal, did not permit the district court to rule as a matter of law that night and weekend duty constituted an essential function of his job as a Group anesthesiologist.

Section 1630.2(n) defines an essential function as a fundamental job duty rather than a marginal one and identifies employer judgment, written job descriptions, and time spent performing the duty as relevant evidence.

Lucas A. Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up · filed 2006-03-09(n)(1), (n)(3)

“An essential function ‘means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term “essential functions” does not include the marginal functions of the position.’” Id. at 787 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Evidence a function is essential includes the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, a written job description, and the amount of time spent on the job performing the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

A job function may be essential because the position exists to perform that function.

Denczak v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2007-02-01(n)(2)(i)

Assembly-line positions, and dependent production jobs, are only as fast as the slowest member of the production team. While Ford does not take this point to its ruthless extreme—it acknowledges, for example, that an employee who meets 80% of a production quota may continue to work without discipline—it understandably takes the position that an employee who can satisfy just 35% of the quota comes up short in performing an essential function of the job. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i) (“The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function.”); id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv) (permitting courts to consider “the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function”).

Section 1630.2(n)(l) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, excluding merely marginal functions.

Lyte v. South Central Connecticut Regional Water Authority · filed 2007-04-09(n)(l)

An individual is not otherwise qualified unless he is able, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job in question. The term “essential functions,” which is not defined in the ADA itself, is defined by the EEOC as constituting “the fundamental job duties” of the employment position in question, but not functions that are merely “marginal.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, and the court treated counseling, teaching, and safely performing job duties as potentially essential functions.

Menchaca v. Maricopa Community College District · filed 2009-01-26(n)(1)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Here, MCCD contends that “counseling and teaching students” and “performfing] ... job duties safely and without causing or threatening harm to others” are essential functions of Menchaca’s job as a student counselor.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies five types of evidence that may establish a job's essential functions, including the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, time spent on the function, consequences of omitting it, and the work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

Rooney v. Sprague Energy Corp. · filed 2008-10-09(n)(3)

This same analysis applies to the December 2004 job description. The Court acknowledges that the essential functions may be established by (1) the employers judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions; (3) the amount of time spent performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; and, (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.