29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) defines “substantially limits” by comparing the individual's restriction in performing a major life activity with that of the average person in the general population.

Milton v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2013-02-08(j)(1)(ii)

“‘Substantially limits’ means a person is ‘[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2008)).

An impairment is substantially limiting when it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, without needing to prevent or severely restrict that activity.

Anderson v. National Grid, PLC · filed 2015-03-25(j)(1)(ii)

Thus, an impairment will be considered a disability under the ADA “ ‘if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’” ... An impairment “ ‘need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.’ ”

An impairment is substantially limiting when it limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, and this is a relatively low, non-demanding threshold.

Morissette v. Cote Corp. · filed 2016-05-31(j)(1)(ii)

The ADA regulations state that “[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of [§ 1630.2(j)] if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R, § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). ... In light of the post-ADAA regulations’ instruction that “substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard, and that “the threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis[,]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i), (iii), Morissette meets the relatively low bar set by the ADAA for establishing a disability because a reasonable jury could conclude that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of his circulatory function, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(B) (“[A] major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including ,.. circulatory ... functions.”).

Section 1630.2 defines substantial limitation by comparison with the average person, identifies factors for determining essential job functions, and requires an individualized assessment using specified risk factors to determine whether a person poses a direct threat.

USEEOC v. De Nemours · filed 2004-10-15(r), (j)(1), (n)(1), (n)(3)(iii) and (vi), (n)(3)(iv)

"Substantially limits" means: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). ... Therefore, only duties that are fundamental to Barrios's job of lab clerk are its essential functions. ... The Court may also consider "the amount of time spent on the job performing the function,... the work experience of both past and current employees on the job," and the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function. ... The determination that an employee poses a direct threat to herself or others "shall be based on an individualized assessment of the person's `present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.'" ... The Court should consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm in assessing whether an employee poses direct threat to herself or others in the workplace. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).

Section 1630.2 evaluates substantial limitation, essential functions, and direct threat using the specified impairment, job-function, and risk factors.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours · filed 2004-10-15(r), (j)(1), (n)(1), (n)(3)(iii), (n)(3)(vi), and (n)(3)(iv)

A substantially limiting impairment is determined with reference to (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or expected duration, (3) its permanent or expected permanent long-term impact. ... The Court may also consider “the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, ... the work experience of both past and current employees on the job,” and the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function. ... The Court should consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm in assessing whether an employee poses direct threat to herself or others in the workplace.

The regulation defines substantial limitation by comparison with average-person performance, frames qualification around essential job functions and relevant employer evidence, and defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Branham, Gary L. v. Snow, John W. · filed 2004-12-17(j), (m), (n)(3), (r)

... For an impairment to limit substantially a major life activity, “the impairment must make the individual ‘[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform’ or ‘[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . . . the average person.’ ” Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 904 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)). ... In order to determine whether an individual is qualified under the ADA standards, this court looks first at whether the individual “satisfies the prerequisites of the job, in terms of skills or experience”; second, the court considers whether the individual “can perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation.” Peters, 311 F.3d at 845; see also Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... In determining the essential functions of a job, we may consider, but are not limited to, “the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before . . . interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... “Direct threat” has been defined as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... In order to determine whether Mr. Branham is a direct threat and therefore not qualified to perform the job of criminal investigator, we look to several factors including: “(1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of potential harm.” Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, while § 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate and calls for an individualized assessment of specified risk factors.

EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2007-02-13(n)(3), (r)

The following evidence may be used to establish an "essential function" of a job: (1) "[t]he employer's judgment as to which functions are essential"; (2) "[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job"; (3) "the amount of time spent on the job performing the function"; (4) "the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function"; and (5) "the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs." ... A "direct threat" is defined as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." ... Specific factors to be considered include (1) the duration of risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal tasks and identifies employer judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences of omission, and incumbents’ work experience as relevant evidence; § 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk to others that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2007-02-13(n)(1), (n)(3), (r)

“[a]n essential function ‘means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.’ ” ... The following evidence may be used to establish an “essential function” of a job: ... (5) “the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” ... A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” ... “Specific factors to be considered include (1) the duration of risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.” ... Therefore, we hold that Wal-Mart has failed to prove that Bradley, using a wheelchair or other reasonable accommodation, would pose a direct threat to the safety of himself or others.

Section 1630.2(j) allows a temporary impairment to qualify as a disability when it substantially limits major life activities, and § 1630.2(n)'s factors support treating cooking and cleaning as essential job functions.

Moore v. Jackson County Board of Education · filed 2013-10-28(j); (n)(1), (n)(2)(i)-(ii), (n)(3)(i)-(iv), (n)(3)(vi)-(vii)

The court concludes, in light of the stated purpose of the ADAAA to broaden the coverage of the ADA (and, thus, the Rehabilitation Act), and especially the definition of the phrase “substantially limits,” and in consideration of the persuasive regulatory provisions interpreting the ADAAA, that Congress no longer intends for temporary impairments to be excluded from the definition of “disability.” ... In summary, based on the totality of all of the above factors, plaintiffs cooking and cleaning duties were an essential function of her position as a cafeteria manager.

The essential-function inquiry considers the employer’s determination, written job description, and four listed work-related factors, while the direct-threat inquiry requires assessing the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of the risk and relying on reasonable medical or objective evidence; a slightly increased risk is insufficient.

Backhaus v. General Motors LLC · filed 2014-09-22(o), (n)(3), (r)

An individual is considered “otherwise qualified” for a position if he can perform the essential functions of the job in question, with or without accommodations. ... Consideration should be given to the employer’s determination as to which functions are essential, as well as to the employer’s written description of the job. ... Courts are also encouraged to consider four additional factors; to wit, (1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (2) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, (3) the work experience of past incumbents of the position, and (4) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. ... Under the ADA, employers are required to conduct an individualized assessment to determine if a disability disqualifies an employee from performing a particular job. ... A disabled individual is not “otherwise qualified” for a position if he poses a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation. ... There are four factors to be considered in this analysis: (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. ... However, an employer can not disqualify an applicant simply because of a slightly increased risk of harm. ... The risk must be highly probable and the harm must be substantial. ... Moreover, the risk assessment must be based on reasonable medical and/or objective evidence.

The regulation identifies reasons and factors for deciding whether a job function is essential and requires an individualized, evidence-based assessment of whether an employee poses a direct threat.

Krevinghaus v. Hills & Dales General Hospital, Inc. · filed 2016-06-03(n)(2), (n)(3), (r)

A job function may be considered essential for several reasons, including the following: ... (i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function; ... (ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or ... (iii) The function may be highly specialized so -that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the par- . ticular function. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... Factors to consider when determining whether a job function is essential include: ... (1) the employer’s judgment; (2) the written job description; (3) the amount of time spent performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring performance of the function; (5) the work experience of past incumbents of the position; and (6) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. ... Keith v. County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 926-26 (6th Cir.2013) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... An assessment of whether an employee poses a direct threat must be “individualized” to the employee’s abilities and job functions and “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). In determining whether a direct threat exists, the court should consider: “(1) [t]he ■ duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.”

The regulation identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential and excludes from “otherwise qualified” individuals who pose a direct threat, including a risk to themselves.

Cousin v. United States · filed 2017-01-27(n)(3), (r)

As to the second element, which is the heart of this ease, a person who is “otherwise qualified” is one who could “perform the essential functions” of his position “with or without reasonable accommodation” from his employer. ... Evidence relevant to whether or not a function is essential includes the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the work experiences of current and former employees, the amount of time spent performing that function, and the consequences of not requiring the prospective employee to perform that function. ... The Rehabilitation Act also includes an important exception, providing that an individual is not otherwise qualified if he poses “a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace,” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); Doe, 50 F.3d at 1265, or poses a risk to himself, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).

Section 1630.2(n)(3)(ii)-(vii) makes the employer’s judgment and specified workplace evidence relevant, but not conclusive, to identifying essential job functions; subsection (r) requires the direct-threat determination to assess the individual’s safe performance of those functions.

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia · filed 2017-12-15(n)(3)(ii)-(vii), (r)

“‘Whether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors.’” ... But courts must consider also: “any written job description prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function; the terms of any collective bargaining agreement; the work experience of past employees in the job; and the current work experience of employees in similar jobs.” Samson v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 746 F.3d 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii)-(vii)). Accordingly, “[a]lthough the employer’s judgment is ‘entitled to substantial weight in the calculus,’ this factor alone is not conclusive.” ... In these circumstances, a jury would be justified in concluding that receiving a Taser shock was not an essential function of Ms. Lewis’s job, in which case it would follow that she was a “qualified individual.” ... “Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Moreover, the “direct threat” defense: “must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job,’ reached after considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). ... Here, we disagree with the district court for one simple reason. The definition of the direct threat defense requires an analysis of the individual’s ability to perform safely the “essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). As we have held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact on what the essential functions of a UCPD detective are, we certainly cannot resolve the question of whether she can perform those as-yet-undefined essential functions safely.

The regulation requires a direct-threat determination to use an individualized assessment and identifies past incumbents’ work experience as relevant evidence of an essential job function.

Hixon v. Tennessee Valley Authority Board of Directors · filed 2020-12-01(r), (n)(3)(vii)

When determining if a direct threat exists, the Court should consider: “(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The regulation further states, the determination of whether an individual is a direct threat “shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Id. ... For example, the Court should consider “the work experience of past incumbents,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vii), and in this case no other workers were required to disclose all of their medications to TVA.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats essential functions as basic job duties distinct from qualification standards, while § 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized assessment supported by current medical knowledge or objective evidence.

Burgoyne v. Rock Creek Firefighters Association, Inc. · filed 2022-10-14(n)(1), (r)

“Essential functions” are not to be confused with “qualification standards,” which an employer may establish for a certain position. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2007). Whereas “essential functions” are basic “duties,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1), “qualification standards” are “personal and professional attributes” that may include “physical, medical [and] safety” requirements. Id. § 1630.2(q). ... See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (“The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, while § 1630.2(r) requires a significant-risk, individualized direct-threat assessment that considers present ability and reasonable accommodation.

Benavides v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2023-12-04(n)(3), (r)

And DFPS presents no evidence that driving at night was a written job description, is a common occurrence, or is part of other employee’s work experiences. ... The “direct threat” standard is not lightly met. Applicable regulations define “direct threat” as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. The determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (emphasis added); Rizzo, 84 F.3d at 763 (noting same).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) directs courts to consider listed factors when deciding whether a job duty is essential, while § 1630.2(r) requires considering the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of harm in a direct-threat assessment.

Vasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2024-08-26(n)(3)(i), (r)

To determine whether a job function is essential, courts “look to several factors, such as the ‘employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential’ and ‘the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.’” Weber v. BNSF Ry. Co., 989 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii)). ... In answering this question, the Court considers four factors: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Carrillo, 2024 WL 3861374 at *4. ... Union Pacific’s restrictions “properly accounted for the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of potential harm, and the imminence of potential harm.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).

The regulation recognizes dyslexia as an impairment, identifies learning as a major life activity, defines essential job functions and reasonable accommodations, and requires employer and employee to communicate in an interactive process to identify an accommodation.

Fleetwood v. Harford Systems Inc. · filed 2005-03-04(h)(2), (i), (n)(1), (n)(2), (n)(3), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

The ADA regulations specifically include dyslexia, a learning disability, as an impairment. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h)(2). They also expressly mention learning in the non-exhaustive list of major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). ... “Essential functions” are the fundamental job duties of the employment position that the person with the disability holds or desires. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). It does not include the marginal functions of the position. ... “Reasonable accommodations” are “[mjodifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(l)(ii). ... Once the employee does this, if it is not immediately obvious what accommodation would be appropriate, the ADA requires that the employer and employee engage in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)'s definition of “substantially limits” remains available for judicial guidance after Toyota, but courts must apply the ADA's demanding statutory standard.

Keane, Judith v. Sears Roebuck · filed 2005-08-10(j)(1)

While we do not express an opinion on the level of deference due to the EEOC’s regulations interpreting “disability” (the question reserved by the Supreme Court), we conclude that Toyota does not prevent courts from looking to them for guidance.

Section 1630.2 requires an individualized assessment of disability, recognizes thinking and concentrating as major life activities, defines substantial limitation by comparison to the average person, and requires an informal interactive process to identify accommodation needs.

Raymond Battle, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee · filed 2006-02-21(j)(2), (i), (j)(1), and (o)(3)

Determining whether an individual has a qualifying disability requires an individualized analysis of the claimed impairment, including factors such as the nature and severity, probable duration, and expected long-term impact of the impairment. ... Major life activities under the ADA are basic activities that the average person can perform with little or no difficulty, including “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” ... Accordingly, thinking and concentrating qualify as “major life activities” under the ADA. ... A “substantial limitation” is an “inability or significant restriction on the ability to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform.” ... Where the employee requests accommodation, the employer must engage in an “informal, interactive process” with the employee to identify the limitations caused by the disability and the potential reasonable accommodations to overcome those limitations.

The regulation defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform, and whether a duty is essential depends on the specific job.

Bishop v. DFCS · filed 2006-03-10(n)(2)(i)

Essential functions are the “fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)). ... But the required degree of acuity and consistency of judgment varies between different jobs. The question at issue here is the degree of acuity and consistency of judgment necessary to perform Plaintiff’s job. ... Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable fact finder might infer from this record that DHR did not really consider “exercising good judgment” to be an essential function of Plaintiff’s job.

An essential function is a fundamental, not marginal, job duty, and whether a duty is essential is assessed case by case using relevant evidence, including the listed factors.

Turner v. Hershey Chocolate · filed 2006-03-20(n)(1), (n)(3)

“Whether a job duty is an “essential function” turns on whether it is “fundamental” to the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). The term “essential function” does not include the “marginal” functions of the position. Id. ... Evidence of whether a particular function is essential might include, but is not limited to: ... Id. at (n)(3). ... Here, several specific facts, when juxtaposed against these factors, weigh against a finding that rotation itself is an essential function of the shaker line position: (ii) the written job description for the shaker table inspector position contains no reference to rotation; (iii) little time– presumably only a few seconds– is actually spent rotating from machine to machine each hour; (v) the collective bargaining agreement makes no reference to the rotating of shaker table inspectors; and (vi) in the past, shaker table inspectors have not rotated. Thus, with the exception of the first and fourth factors, the evidence points against finding that the rotation scheme is an essential function of the job.”

The regulation defines a qualified individual through job-related qualifications and the ability to perform essential functions, recognizes employer judgment in identifying essential functions, and calls for an informal interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations.

Montmerlo v. Goffstown Sch Dist, SAU #19 · filed 2013-10-04(m), (n)(3)(i), and (o)(3)

Assessing whether an individual is qualified requires a two-step analysis. ... First, the employee bears the burden of showing that he or she possesses the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements for the position. Second, the employee must show that he or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations. ... The District correctly argues that I must give a “significant degree” of deference to an employer’s business judgment about the “essential functions” required for a position. ... To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.

Section 1630.2 requires an employer aware of a disability to begin an informal interactive process to identify potential reasonable accommodations, which are modifications or adjustments enabling a qualified employee to perform essential job functions.

Jenkins v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2020-02-20(o)(3), (o)(1)(ii)

Awareness of a disability triggers the obligation to “initiate an informal, interactive process” to identify “potential reasonable accommodations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). ... Reasonable accommodations are “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of that position[.]” Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 759 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2 recognizes that an impairment lasting fewer than six months can be substantially limiting, treats essential functions as fundamental duties evaluated from relevant evidence, and calls for an informal exchange to identify limitations and possible accommodations.

THOMAS v. THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2020-01-23(j)(1)(ix), (n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(iii)(3)

In other words, under the amended ADA, an impairment’s short duration is not outcome-determinative. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). ... “In general terms, the ‘essential functions’ of a position are the ‘fundamental job duties,’ as opposed to the ‘marginal functions.’” Supinski v. UPS, 413 F. App’x 536, 540 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... Evidence that a particular job function is essential may include: ... Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... Based on the aforementioned evidence, this Court finds that the ability to continuously walk, stand, and lift over 25 pounds are essential functions of the resource nurse position. ... Under the ADA’s implementing regulations, the “interactive process” should be an “informal” exchange in which employers and employees work together to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(iii)(3).

Subsection (o)(3) calls for an informal interactive process to identify an employee’s precise disability-related limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Georgia v. Bridgeport · filed 2020-08-10(o)(3)

The determination of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is often made through an “informal, interactive process” initiated by the employer “with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting without requiring prevention or significant or severe restriction, while subsections (n)(3) and (o)(3) guide the assessment of essential functions and the individualized interactive accommodation process.

Orchard v. Novi, City of · filed 2022-05-11(j)(1)(ii), (n)(3), (o)(3)

Under the ADA’s regulations, courts must compare the person claiming a disability to “most people in the general population” to find whether the person suffers from a disability that substantially limits major life activities. ... “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict . . . a major life activity” to substantially limit it. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... “Essential functions are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.’” ... “A job function may be considered essential because (1) the position exists to perform the function, (2) a limited number of employees are available that can perform it, or (3) it is highly specialized.” ... An essential job function looks at several nondispositive factors. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Once an employee requests an accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an interactive process. ... The process is an “individualized inquiry,” id. (quotation omitted), that aims “to ‘identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations,’” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). To that end, both parties must participate in good faith.

Section 1630.2(o)(3) contemplates an interactive process in which the employer and employee identify the employee’s precise limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

McNeal v. Macon County Board of Education (CONSENT) · filed 2022-10-20(o)(3)

Because McNeal admittedly failed to engage in the interactive process, it would not have been possible for MCBOE to “identify the precise limitations resulting from [her] disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). Liability thus cannot attach.

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) covers modifications that enable a qualified employee with a disability to perform essential job functions, while § 1630.2(o)(3) recognizes that employer-employee back-and-forth may be needed to identify an appropriate accommodation.

Ali v. Regan · filed 2024-08-09(o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

Nothing in the Rehabilitation Act requires that employers or employees follow a specific process for identifying a reasonable accommodation, interactive or otherwise. Rather, EEOC regulations and our prior cases recognize that some kind of back-and-forth between employer and employee “may be necessary” to enable the employer “[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (emphasis added); see Ward, 762 F.3d at 31–32. ... In short, whether proposed by the employer or requested by the employee, the reasonableness of telework cannot be presumed. Instead, like many accommodation judgments, the reasonableness of a telework accommodation turns on whether it will enable a specific employee “to perform the essential functions of [his] position” in a specific workplace, which will often be a fact-sensitive inquiry. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii); see Owens, 52 F.4th at 1335.

Section 1630.2(o)(3) requires an employer to work with an employee to identify a reasonable accommodation; the employee need not propose a specific accommodation when making the request.

Scott v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center · filed 2002-02-28(o)(3)

We are well aware that plaintiff does not bear the initial burden of proposing a specific accommodation at the time of the request. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (stating that the employer has an obligation to work with the employee through an interactive process to devise a reasonable accommodation that does not create a hardship for the employer).

Section 1630.2(h)(1) covers sterility or infertility resulting from a hysterectomy as a disability under the ADA.

Yindee v. Cch Incorporated · filed 2006-08-11(h)(1)

The price of curing Yindee’s cancer and saving her life was sterility, which assuredly is a “disability” under the ADA.

The regulation directs that “substantially limits” be construed broadly for expansive ADA coverage, recognizes operation of the cardiovascular system as a major life activity, and permits an impairment lasting less than six months to be substantially limiting.

Baum v. Metro Restoration Services, Inc. · filed 2017-03-09(j)(1), (h), (j)(1)(viii)

The ADA regulations state that § 12102(l)(A)’s term “substantially limits” is intended to be construed broadly in favor of “expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l). It is not intended to be a “demanding standard.” ... The ADA regulations also list the operation of the cardiovascular system as a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)(h). ... Although the ADA regulations state that an impairment lasting less than six months can be substantially limiting, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(viii), the small duration and effect of Baum’s heart condition on his ability to lift contradicts a finding that the impairment substantially limits this life activity. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on Baum’s ADA claim based on the § 12102(1)(A) definition of a person with a disability to the extent that it involves a substantial limitation on his ability to lift.

Section 1630.2 treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a major life activity compared with most people and recognizes activities including manual tasks, walking, standing, concentrating, and working.

Burns v. Kelly · filed 2019-08-19(j)(1)(ii), (i)(1)(i)

Instead, “[t]he inquiry in . . . post-amendment case[s] is . . . whether [plaintiff]’s impairment substantially limits his ability ‘to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’” Id. at 591 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (emphasis added)). Major life activities include, but are not limited to, “[c]aring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Further, the term substantially limits “shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage. . . .” Id.

Section 1630.2(j)(1) defines substantial limitation broadly: an impairment need not significantly restrict a major life activity, and temporary effects may qualify.

Lowe v. Calsonic Kansei North America, Inc. · filed 2020-05-13(j)(1)

Defendant argues Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because a broken foot simply does not constitute a disability and because Plaintiff’s restrictions were temporary. (Doc. No. 33 at 17; Doc. No. 42 at 6-7). However, “the pertinent inquiry is not whether plaintiff's restrictions were labelled ‘temporary’ or ‘permanent’ or the precise length of time []he was under restrictions, but whether []he was substantially limited in a major life activity.” Mullenix v. Eastman Chem. Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 695, 705 (E.D. Tenn. 2017). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was substantially limited in his ability to stand, walk, or work for over six months while his foot was injured. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The Court concludes that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the first element of the prima facie case, that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 854 (6th Cir. 2018); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).

An impairment is a disability when it substantially limits an individual's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, and “substantially limits” is construed broadly.

Roberson v. CrawlSpace Solutions of Arkansas · filed 2021-01-05(j)(1)(ii)

Under EEOC regulations, an impairment is a disability under the ADA “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The regulations advise that the term “substantially limits” must be construed broadly but that “not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of [the ADA].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). “Major life activities” under the ADA include functions such as “performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The determination of whether Roberson is disabled within the meaning of the ADA requires an individualized assessment of the effects of her ADHD on an asserted major life activity. Dr. Ford’s letter provides evidence of a medical diagnosis and his assessment that Roberson would benefit from a quiet work environment, but Roberson offers no evidence regarding the extent that ADHD limits her ability to perform any particular activity. Evidence that Roberson would benefit from a quiet work environment, standing alone, fails to demonstrate that ADHD substantially limits her ability to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be interpreted broadly to provide coverage to individuals to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA’s terms.

Stratton v. Jackson State University · filed 2021-04-06(j)(iv)

The court recognizes that an ADA plaintiff’s burden to prove an actual disability is not a heavy one, and that “’substantially limits’ should be interpreted to provide broad coverage of individuals…to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the Act.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(iv). But plaintiff can only succeed on his claim that he was discharged on account of an actual disability if he was, in fact, actually disabled, not at some remote time months or years earlier, but at the time of his termination.

An impairment qualifies as a disability when it substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, although it need not prevent or severely restrict that activity.

BRYANT v. MOTORSPORTS OF DURHAM, LLC · filed 2021-06-29(j)(1)(ii)

Notably, though, to pursue a claim for discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff must “show[] that she was ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the ADA.” Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 (4th Cir. 2001). The ADA defines “disability” as, inter alia, “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (defining impairment as disability under ADA “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population”).

An impairment is substantially limiting when it prevents a person from performing a major life activity compared with most people, though it need not significantly or severely restrict that activity.

PORTER v. MERAKEY USA · filed 2022-09-30(j)(1)(ii)

“First, Plaintiff has not established that he suffers an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity—walking and/or standing. “Though ‘substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard, ‘[n]ot every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this [statute].’” Koller, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). A person is substantially limited if they cannot “perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not present, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Courts must “determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case basis.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999).”

The regulation says that “substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard when determining whether an impairment limits a major life activity.

Smeraldo v. Jamestown Public Schools · filed 2023-01-26(j)(1)(i)

Although the term “‘[s]ubstantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), “[i]t is well-established that an impairment does not significantly restrict a major life activity if it results only in mild limitations,” Collins v. Giving Back Fund, 2019 WL 3564578, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019) (quoting Whalley v. Reliance Grp. Holdings, Inc., 2001 WL 55726, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001)).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) assesses whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity by comparing the person with most people in the general population, and the impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict the activity.

Reams v. Local 18, International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 2023-02-23(j)(1)(ii)

“Under the applicable ADA regulations, [courts] determine whether a disability substantially limits major life activities through comparison of the person claiming a disability to ‘most people in the general population.’ An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to be substantially limiting.”

Section 1630.2(i)(1)(i) identifies major life activities, and § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and as a non-demanding standard.

Baker v. MTA Bus Company · filed 2023-08-01(i)(1)(i), (j)(1)(i)

Further, the ADA provides that “major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i); McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 2012). In addition, the term “‘substantially limits’ [is] construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); see Morris v. Town of Islip, No. 12-CV-2984 JFB SIL, 2014 WL 4700227, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014).

The regulation treats working and the operation of major bodily functions such as circulatory functions as major life activities, and requires “substantially limits” to be read broadly as a non-demanding standard.

Theron v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2024-09-26(i)(1)(ii) (j)(1)(i)

“Major life activities include such functions as . . . working” and “[t]he operation of a major bodily function, including . . . circulatory . . . functions.” Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir. 2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii). Further, the term “substantially limits” must be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2 requires “substantially limits” and “major” to be construed broadly, so impairments affecting major life activities such as caring for oneself, sleeping, and thinking may qualify as disabilities.

Way v. City of Missouri City · filed 2025-04-09(j)(1), (i)(2)

Given the expansive construction given to “substantially limits” and “major life activities,” Way’s anxiety satisfies the statute. ... Therefore, “a jury reasonably could find” that Way’s major life activities “of caring for herself, sleeping, and thinking” were substantially limited, rendering Way “disabled under the ADA.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) provides that an impairment does not automatically constitute a disability, even under the broad standard for substantial limitation.

Schmidt v. St. Elizabeth Healthcare · filed 2020-11-04(j)(1)(ii)

However, the fact that Congress lowered this hurdle “does not mean that the hurdle is nonexistent.” Hentze v. CSX Transp., Inc., -- F.Supp.3d --, Case No. 1:17-cv-217, 2020 WL 4569127, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2020). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (“[N]ot every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.”).

The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly, but a claimant must still show that an impairment substantially limited a major life activity.

Feldman v. Law Enforcement Associates Corp. · filed 2013-06-28(j)(1)(i)

Reflecting this purpose, the accompanying regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provide that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i). ... Thus, even when viewing the facts relevant to Feldman’s alleged TIA in the light most favorable to him, and assessing those facts under the more lenient analysis called for by the ADAAA, there is simply no evidence in the record which shows that the TIA substantially limited him in any major life activity.

“Substantially limits” is construed broadly, and evidence that a mental impairment may limit eating, sleeping, or concentrating can allow a jury to find a disability.

Reeder v. County of Wayne · filed 2016-04-06(j)(1)(i)

Courts are to broadly construe the term “substantially limits” in favor of expansive coverage, so that it is not a demanding standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... Nevertheless, Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts to show that his mental impairments may have substantially limited him in the areas of eating, sleeping, and concentrating, since he alleged that he suffered from symptoms including situational anxiety and atypical chest pain due to stress.

An impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months may still substantially limit a major life activity and qualify as a disability.

Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc. · filed 2013-07-19(j)(ix)

However, as Heatherly points out, the regulations of the ADAAA provide that “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix) (2011).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) does not impose a six-month duration requirement for actual or record disability, although duration remains relevant to whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Bush v. Donahoe · filed 2013-08-08(j)(l)(ix)

To the contrary, the regulations provide that the “six-month ‘transitory’ part of the ‘transitory and minor’ exception to the ‘regarded as’ coverage in [29 C.F.R.] § 1630.15(f) does not apply to the definition of ‘disability’ under ... the ‘actual disability’ prong ... or ... the ‘record of disability prong....” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ix).

Section 1630.2(j)(ix) allows an impairment lasting less than six months to be substantially limiting under the ADAAA.

Moates v. Hamilton County · filed 2013-09-04(j)(ix)

Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix).

The geographic area accessible to an individual is a factor courts may consider when deciding whether a person is substantially limited in working; it is not required.

Gallegos v. Swift & Co. · filed 2006-09-06(j)(3)(ii)

I note that the EEOC regulations list the comparison to a geographical area as among the factors that “may” be considered, not that must or even should be considered.

The regulation treats inability to perform a single particular job as insufficient to substantially limit the major life activity of working; substantial limitation requires inability to work in a class or broad range of jobs, evaluated with geographic access and comparable jobs.

Mattison v. Potter · filed 2007-09-20(j)(l), (j)(2), (j)(3)(i), (j)(3)(ii)(A)

The term “substantially limits” as it applies to the major life activity of working is further specified by the EEOC as “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Factors that courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working include the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, as well as the number and types of jobs within the geographical area requiring similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities from which the individual is also disqualified. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B).

The regulation defines physical or mental impairment, recognizes working as a major life activity, and requires a substantial restriction on a class or broad range of jobs—not merely one particular job—to substantially limit working.

Enwonwu v. The Fulton-DeKalb Hospital · filed 2008-05-12(h)(1), (I), (j)(3)(I)

A “physical or mental impairment” is any physiological disorder or condition affecting one or more body systems, or any mental or psychological disorder. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1),(2). A “major life activity” may include working. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I). For a condition to limit a person’s ability to work substantially, it must significantly restrict a person’s ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I). The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I); Hillburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1227 (11th Cir. 1999). ... In light of the unrestricted abilities she testified to concerning her ability to perform her work duties, Enwonwu failed to demonstrate that her sarcoidosis condition substantially limited her ability to work. Thus, Enwonwu failed to demonstrate that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, recognizes that a function is essential when the position exists to perform it, and identifies evidence relevant to deciding whether a function is essential.

Manning v. General Motors · filed 2008-01-07(n)(1), (n)(2)(i), (n)(3)

The essential functions of a job are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” ... One way to establish that a function is essential is to show that the position exists to perform that function. ... Evidence bearing on the essential function question includes: the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; written job descriptions in use by the employer; the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; and the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function. ...

Section 1630.2(n)(l) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job and excludes marginal functions.

Babiak v. Nevada Ex Rel. Department of Taxation · filed 2008-05-22(n)(l)

Essential functions are the “fundamental job duties of the employment position,” and do not “include the marginal functions of the position.”

(g)(1) defines a disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Lane v. Potter · filed 2010-03-30(g)(1)

An impairment constitutes a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, if the impairment “substantially limits” a “major life activit[y].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). The same standard applies to claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 29 U.S.C. § 791(g). ... To qualify as a disability under this statute, the impairment at issue must be severe enough that it “prevents or severely restricts” a major life activity. ... Plaintiffs sole limitations are climbing ladders and driving long distances. While some courts have found that driving may constitute a major life activity, Plaintiffs level of restriction in this area does not qualify as “severe.” He is able to drive short distances daily and long distances on occasion. Plaintiff cites no authority, and the court is aware of none, holding this level of impairment sufficient to constitute a disability under the Toyota standard.

Section 1630.2(i) treats a person as having a qualifying disability when an impairment is treated by a covered entity as substantially limiting major life activities, including when the person has no qualifying impairment but is treated as having one.

Dismore v. Seaford School District · filed 2008-01-25(i)

Under the ADA, a person is regarded as impaired when he: “(1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) [h]as none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).

The regarded-as provision covers an individual whom an employer treats as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, including when myths, fears, or stereotypes drive that treatment.

Rivera v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 2009-06-16(l)

The statute’s definition of “disability” includes: “(A) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual’s major life activities; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis ours). ... Thus, ADA’s protection does not depend exclusively on an individual being actually disabled but rather it also extends to the employer’s erroneous perception as to limitations associated to the plaintiffs real or perceived condition. ... The purpose behind this provision is to avoid situations where an individual is “rejected from a job because of the ‘myths, fears and stereotypes’ associated with disabilities”. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0 EEOC Interpretative Guidance (citing ... The regarded as prong of the ADA exists to cover those cases in which myths, fears and stereotypes affect the employers’ treatment of an individual, because Congress has recognized that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” ... Plaintiffs burden under this particular ADA modality then is to present evidence of BFI’s inaccurate perception as to purported limitations set by his insulin dependent diabetes. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that plaintiff has failed to meet his prima facie burden of establishing that he was “regarded as” disabled within the meaning of ADA. BFI’s decision was not based on either an erroneously perceived disability or on a subjective belief as to unfounded substantial limitations on plaintiffs ability to work due to his insulin-dependent diabetes.

The regulation makes the regarded-as inquiry straightforward: an individual need only have an actual or perceived impairment, without showing that it substantially limits a major life activity or that the employer mistakenly believed it did.

West v. J.O. Stevenson, Inc. · filed 2016-02-24(l)(1)

Thus, unlike the “actually disabled” prong, which requires proof that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, to plead a successful claim under the “regarded as” prong, a plaintiff need only show that he suffers from an impairment, whether or not that impairment actual affects him or is only perceived by his employer and regardless of whether that impairment substantially limits any major life activity. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1); Wolfe v. Postmaster Gen., 488 Fed.Appx. 465, 468 (11th Cir.2012); Marsh v. Terra Int’l (Okla.), Inc., 122 F.Supp.3d 1267, 1282-83, 2015 WL 4139421, at *13 (N.D.Okla.2015). ... The regulations confirm that interpretation of the “regarded as” prong, which is to be applied in a “straightforward” manner, without the need to establish any “mistaken belief’ on the part of the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (app.). ... Rather, it is sufficient under the “regarded as” prong that her employer treated her differently on the basis of her impairment.

Section 1630.2(l)(1) treats a person as having a disability when an employer takes a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment, even if the employer does not view the impairment as limiting a major life activity.

Howard v. College of the Albemarle · filed 2017-03-27(l)(1)

Under section 12102(3), which Congress added in the ADAAA, an individual bringing a “regarded as” claim need only show that an employer subjected him to an action the ADA prohibits because of an actual or perceived impairment regardless of whether the employer perceived the impairment to limit the individual in a major life activity, See 42 U.S.C, § 12102(3); 29 C.F.R, § 1630.2(1X1); Olsen, 713 F.3d at 1154; Gecewicz v. Henry Ford Macomb Hosp. Corp., 683 F.3d 316, 321-23 (6th Cir. 2012); Harris v. Reston Hosp. Ctr., LLC, No. 1:10-cv-1431, 2012 WL 1080990, at *4-5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2012) (unpublished).

The regulation treats an impairment as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity under a broad, non-demanding standard, and treats a person as regarded as disabled when subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment.

Schirnhofer v. Premier Comp Solutions, LLC · filed 2018-03-28(j)(1)(ii), (l)

According to the regulations, "[a]n impairment is a disability" when it "substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population." ... "The term '[s]ubstantially limits' shall be construed broadly in favor of expensive coverage" and "is not meant to be a demanding standard." ... "An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section." ... An individual is 'regarded as disabled' if he is 'subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity.' ... Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Ms. Schirnhofer as the nonmoving party, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that PCS regarded Ms. Schirnhofer as disabled. Accordingly, PCS's argument is rejected.

Section 1630.2(j)(2) does not require proof that an employer believed the perceived impairment substantially limited a major life activity.

BRIDGES v. INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2019-07-11(j)(2)

It is not necessary to show that the employer believed that the impairment substantially limited one or more of the person’s major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(iii) treats a person as regarded as having a disability when an employer takes a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not transitory and minor.

Boike v. Akal Security, Incorporated · filed 2019-09-30(g)(1)(iii)

The EEOC’s regulations interpreting the ADA confirm a “regarded as” definition that contradicts recent Sixth Circuit decisions. Where a person has been subjected to an action prohibited by the ADA because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not transitory and minor, a person will be regarded as disabled. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii). Further, the code notes that the “regarded as” prong does not require a showing of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Id. at (g)(3).

Section 1630.2 defines disability to include an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and substantial limitation in working requires restriction from a class or broad range of jobs rather than only one particular job.

Matthews v. City of Houston Fire Department · filed 2009-03-10(g), (j)(1), (j)(3)(i)

A “disability,” under the ADA, includes (1) a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. ... “Substantially limits” means that a person is “[sjignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l); ... substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2 identifies major life activities and defines when an impairment is regarded as a disability; the court applied those definitions to find generalized limitations insufficient to prove actual disability but evidence that the employer believed Maggio could not climb stairs sufficient to support regarded-as status.

Maggio v. Konica-Minolta Business Solutions USA · filed 2008-09-15(f), (i)

Major life activities to include functions such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(f). ... An employee’s impairment is “regarded as” a disability when (1) his employer treats the employee’s non-substantially limiting impairment as constituting a substantially limiting impairment, (2) his employer regards an employee without a substantially limiting impairment as having one, or (3) the employee’s impairment is only substantially limiting because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). An employer’s knowledge of an individual’s impairment is not enough; the employer must also believe that it substantially limits a major life activity. ... These statements could be understood as reflecting a belief that Maggio was wholly incapable of climbing stairs — in other words, that KMBS believed his impairments were more limiting than they actually were. ... A jury reasonably could find that a worker’s complete inability to climb stairs (in contrast to the vague difficulties in stair climbing that Maggio described in his deposition) constitutes a substantial limitation on a major life activity.

The regulation defines impairment and major life activities and explains when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Martinez-Jordan v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 2009-02-18(h)(1), (i), (j)(1), (j)(2)

The E.E.O.C. has promulgated regulations and issued interpretive guidelines implementing the ADA, which define “impairment” broadly to include “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... An impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity if an individual is unable to perform a major life activity “that the average person in the general population can perform” or is significantly restricted in the ability to do so. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l).

Section 1630.2 defines disability and major life activities and treats job-related adjustments, facility modifications that make workplaces usable, equal employment benefits, and good-faith interactive efforts as components of reasonable accommodation.

McDonald v. Department of Environmental Quality · filed 2009-06-17(g)(1), (i), (o)(1)(iii), (o)(2)(i), (o)(3)

“The duty to accommodate also includes making modifications or adjustments which enable an employee with a disability to enjoy “equal benefits and privileges of employment” as are enjoyed by similarly situated employees without disabilities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). ... reasonable accommodation may include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with physical or mental disabilities.” Admin. R. M. 24.9.606(3)(a); accord 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i). Thus, the duty to make reasonable accommodations does not end with allowing the assistive device through the front door. It also requires the employer to address any barriers to the employee’s ability to actually use that device effectively in the workplace. We conclude that this includes modifying a floor surface (if such an accommodation is otherwise reasonable).”

The regulation defines a “class of jobs” by reference to the job from which the individual is disqualified and other geographically available jobs using similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities.

Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC · filed 2009-06-23(j)(3)(ii)(B)

The policy, however, only speaks to whether Mountain Coal regarded Mr. Dillon as substantially limited in his ability to work at West Elk Mine. The policy does not reveal “the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skill or abilities” in the geographic area, as the EEOC regulations require. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). Mr. Dillon did not put on other evidence describing the jobs available in the area that fell into the class of “mining jobs,” nor did he produce evidence demonstrating that mining jobs are, in fact, a class of jobs. He therefore produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mountain Coal regarded him as substantially limited in the ability to perform a class of jobs.

A job function may be essential when the employer requires all employees in the position to perform it, and the regulation's factors include the employer's judgment, the time spent performing the function, and the consequences of not requiring it.

Hennagir v. UTAH DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2009-09-10(n)(1), (n)(3), (n)(3)(i), (n)(3)(iii), (n)(3)(iv)

To determine whether POST certification is an essential job function, we begin by deciding "whether [DOC] actually requires all employees in the particular position to satisfy the alleged job-related requirement." Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir.2003). If it does, we look to whether POST certification is fundamental to the Gunnison PA position. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Among the factors we consider in this inquiry are: (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Mason, 357 F.3d at 1119. ... We weigh heavily the employer's judgment regarding whether a job function is essential. See Mason, 357 F.3d at 1119; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (listing "[t]he employer's judgment as to which functions are essential" as a factor to be considered). ... Further, the risks involved in direct inmate contact strike at the heart of another factor used to determine whether a job function is essential: the consequences of not requiring an employee to perform the function. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). ... This argument goes to a number of properly weighed factors: the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the work experience of past incumbents, and the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii), (vi), (vii).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability to include an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and the court applied that definition to find that an alleged impairment affecting the ability to work was sufficiently pleaded.

Altman v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVS. · filed 2009-09-28(g)

The ADA defines “disability” as follows: ... The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— ... (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; ... (B) a record of such an impairment; or ... (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. ... 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... She also has established that this alleged disability affects her ability to work, which falls within the ADA definition. The plaintiff has, therefore, sufficiently alleged a disability affecting a major life activity under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(n) directs courts to consider whether a requirement is fundamental to the job and to weigh factors such as the employer’s judgment, the consequences of not performing the function, and relevant work experience; applying those factors, the court held POST certification an essential function of the Gunnison PA position.

Hennagir v. Utah Department of Corrections · filed 2009-11-25(n)(1), (n)(3), (n)(3)(I), (n)(3)(iii), (n)(3)(iv), (n)(3)(vi), (n)(3)(vii)

To determine whether POST certification is an essential job function, we begin by deciding “whether [DOC] actually requires all employees in the particular position to satisfy the alleged job-related requirement.” Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003). If it does, we look to whether POST certification is fundamental to the Gunnison PA position. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Mason, 357 F.3d at 1119. However, this analysis “is not intended to second guess the employer or to require him to lower company standards. . . . Provided that any necessary job specification is job-related, uniformly enforced, and consistent with business necessity, the employer has a right to establish what a job is and what is required to perform it.” Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1191 (citation omitted). ... We weigh heavily the employer’s judgment regarding whether a job function is essential. See Mason, 357 F.3d at 1119; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(I) (listing “[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential” as a factor to be considered). ... Further, the risks involved in direct inmate contact strike at the heart of another factor used to determine whether a job function is essential: the consequences of not requiring an employee to perform the function. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). ... This argument goes to a number of properly weighed factors: the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the work experience of past incumbents, and the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii), (vi), (vii). In light of the undisputed evidence described in the preceding paragraphs, however, we find this argument insufficient to create a material issue of fact. ... We agree with the Sixth Circuit that, in such circumstances, completion of emergency response training is an essential job function.

Section 1630.2 defines physical and mental impairments, recognizes combined impairments, and requires proof that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity to establish disability.

Badri v. Huron Hospital · filed 2010-02-10(h)(1), (h)(2), (j)

Under the regulations, a “physical impairment” includes “any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitor-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). A mental impairment, in turn, is defined as “any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). ... Combining ailments is allowed under the applicable regulation: “[mjutiple impairments that combine to substantially limit one or more of an individual’s major life activities also constitute a disability. Some impairments may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others, depending on the presence of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j). ... The diagnosis of a qualifying impairment alone, however, is not enough to establish disability under the ADA, as a plaintiff must prove that the impairment substantially limits his individual abilities in one or more major life activities. ... According to the EEOC regulations, “substantially limit[ed] means ‘[u]n-able to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform;’ or ‘[significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity.’ ” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). Finally, “major life activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. This is not an exhaustive list. For example, other major life activities include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting and reaching.”

Section 1630.2 defines an impairment, identifies major life activities, and explains when an impairment substantially limits one.

Maldonado-Ortiz v. De San Juan · filed 2011-04-04(h)(1), (i), (j)(1)

The plaintiff must first prove that he suffers from a physical or mental impairment. ... Second, the Court must evaluate whether the life activities affected by the impairment constitute “major” life activities. ... Lastly, the impairment must substantially limit said major life activities. ... In this case, it is uncontested that Plaintiffs breast cancer was treatable and her breast was saved; the surgery in December 2004 was successful in removing all of the cancerous tissue from her breast; Plaintiff worked while undergoing chemotherapy; and the only physical limitation resulting from her breast cancer was Plaintiffs temporary inability to move her right arm after the surgery and while undergoing chemotherapy. This, however, does not render her disabled for purposes of the ADA. ... In light of the above, it is evident that none of Plaintiffs impairments permanently and substantially impaired any major life activities.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) treats post-traumatic stress disorder as an impairment that substantially limits brain function, making the disability inquiry straightforward.

Franklin v. City of Slidell · filed 2013-03-27(j)(3)(iii)

Because (a) neither party has challenged the reasonableness of the EEOC implementing regulations and- (b) the Court finds that they are instructive, the Court will rely on the these regulations. ... Considering that Congress has clearly indicated that the threshold question of whether an individual’s impairment constitutes a disability should not demand extensive analysis, and that the EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA indicate that post-traumatic stress disorder is an impairment that should easily be concluded to substantially limit brain function, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(4)(ii) directs courts to consider factors including the difficulty, effort, or time required to perform a major life activity, pain experienced while performing it, its duration, and the effect on a major bodily function when deciding whether an individual is substantially limited.

Gaylor v. Greenbriar of Dahlonega Shopping Center, Inc. · filed 2013-09-27(j)(4)(ii)

In determining whether an individual is substantially limited, relevant considerations include “the difficulty, effort, or time required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when performing a major life activity; the length of time a major life activity can be performed; and/or the way an impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(ii). ... Plaintiff does not contend that he is unable to walk, only that his ability to walk is substantially limited because of the pain caused by his multiple sclerosis.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) requires substantial limitation to be measured against most people in the general population, so a relative weakness compared with the individual's own higher baseline is insufficient.

Rawdin v. American Board of Pediatrics · filed 2013-11-06(j)(1)(ii)

The relevant inquiry remains whether the impairment “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) treats an episodic or remitted impairment as a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active, and § 1630.2(o)(3) contemplates that the covered entity may need to initiate an informal interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation.

Walters v. Mayo Clinic Health System-Eau Claire Hospital, Inc. · filed 2014-02-11(j)(1)(ix), (o)(3)

As plaintiff points out, the 2008 amendments to the ADA changed the definition of “substantially limits” in at least two key respects: ... (2) “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” ... In light of this broad definition, the court has little trouble finding that plaintiff has put forth more than sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her mental health issues substantially limits one or more major life activities, at least during the period of time or times she experienced heightened anxiety or increased depression due to a reoccurrence of PTSD. ... The regulations also contemplate an interactive process initiated by the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation, it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.”). ... As a result, where an employee suffers from mental health problems, the employer has “some responsibility” to take the small step of inquiring about possible accommodations.

The regulation's “substantially limited” standard is not demanding, and the court applied that broad standard to conclude that the plaintiff's lifting restrictions created a material factual dispute about disability under the ADAAA.

Molina-Parrales v. Shared Hospital Services Corp. · filed 2014-01-17(j)(l)(I) and (iii)

After the ADAAA, the EEOC regulation defined “substantially limited” under the ADAAA as “not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(I) and (iii).

The regulation defines a qualified individual by reference to the ability to perform essential functions, and defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions; the employer's judgment and other listed factors guide whether a function is essential.

Cummings v. Dean Transportation, Inc. · filed 2014-04-02(m), (n)(1), (n)(3)(i), (n)(3)

In order to be “otherwise qualified” for a job, the individual must satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and-, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the-essential functions of such position. ... “Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position,” but do “not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Whether a particular job function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors. ... Among the relevant factors is “[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i).

The regulation defines disability by comparing the impairment's effect on a major life activity with that experienced by most people, directs attention primarily to compliance and discrimination rather than extensive threshold analysis, and identifies examples of impairments that substantially limit major bodily functions.

Baron v. Advanced Asset & Property Management Solutions, LLC · filed 2014-04-29(j)(l)(ii), (j)(l)(iii), (j)(3)(iii)

Moreover, “[a]n impairment is a disability ... if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). Furthermore, “[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity,” and “the threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(iii).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, excluding marginal functions, and requires considering specified factors when deciding whether a function is essential.

Lewis v. Livingston County Center for Nursing & Rehabilitation · filed 2014-06-25(n)(1), (n)(3)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires ... [it] does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). The ADA regulations set forth various factors to consider when determining whether a function is essential including, but not limited to: “(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

The regulation recognizes major bodily functions as major life activities, but requires an individualized showing that an impairment substantially limits such a function; listing rheumatoid arthritis as affecting musculoskeletal functions does not create an automatic disability.

Scavetta v. Dillon Companies · filed 2014-06-27(i)(1)(ii), (j)(3)(iii)

These authorities are insufficient to establish that RA will substantially limit major bodily functions in all cases. “There is no ‘per se’ disability.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(3). An individualized assessment is still required to determine “whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). ... Because there was no specific evidence that RA substantially limited the operation of Scavetta’s major bodily functions, the court correctly declined to reference major bodily functions in its instruction.

Section 1630.2 recognizes telecommuting as a potential reasonable accommodation, but an employer need not approve it when the employee cannot perform the position’s essential functions from home; essential functions are fundamental job duties, with the employer’s judgment among the relevant evidence.

Albert ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant · filed 2014-06-27(o)(2)(ii), (n)(1), (n)(3)

It is true that an employer must generally consider telecommuting as a potential form of reasonable accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii); Carr, 23 F.3d at 530 (“in appropriate cases, [the ADA] requires an agency to consider work at home . . . as [a] potential form[] of accommodation”) (citation omitted). That obligation, however, only goes so far. The typical reasonable-accommodation analysis still applies to telecommuting, and so if the job in question requires that an employee leave his home – that is, if the employee can perform the essential functions of his job only by being in the office or out on the road – the employer need not grant a telecommuting request. Such accommodation may be required, conversely, if the employee can do his whole job from home – for example, if his work is entirely electronic and requires no personal interaction in the office. ... EEOC regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). In determining whether a function is essential to a particular position, the Court is to grant the employer substantial deference. See Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes . . . [t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential.”).

A physical impairment must substantially limit a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.

Scott v. District Hospital Partners, L.P. · filed 2014-07-28(j)(1)(ii)

Second, to prove disability under the ADA, Scott must allege facts showing that she had a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity as compared to the general public. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). While difficulty breathing, if severe enough, can certainly constitute an impairment of a major life function, Scott alleges that she had difficulty breathing when she had to sit in a poorly ventilated and dusty office along with the other co-workers who shared her office. Compl. ¶¶ 15–19. Because this impairment—namely the effect of dust on breathing—is shared with the general public, it is not a disability under the ADA.

The regarded-as definition covers a person subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not both transitory and minor, and it is distinct from being actually disabled.

Y. Camacho v. Department of the Army · filed 2014-08-25(g)(1)(iii), (l)(2)

The “regarded as” category covers individuals who are not disabled but who are regarded as disabled by others who have an effect on the individual’s employment. ... Because the appellant has been found to be a disabled individual, she cannot also claim that she is not disabled but that the agency discriminated against her because it regarded her as disabled.

Section 1630.2 treats diabetes as substantially limiting endocrine function for disability purposes, identifies criteria and evidentiary factors for essential job functions, and defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Rednour v. Township · filed 2014-09-24(j)(3)(iii), (n)(2), (n)(3), (r)

Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs type 1 diabetes constitutes a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“it should easily be concluded that ... diabetes substantially limits endocrine function”); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923-924 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that claimant with insulin-dependent diabetes was disabled in the major life activity of eating because of this endocrine impairment). But see Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir.2006) (cautioning that' diabetic status is not a per se disability). ... They provide that a function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function, there are a limited number of employees among whom the performance of the position can be distributed, or the function is so highly specialized that an employee was hired for her expertise in performing it. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... The regulations further suggest that the following factors can serve as evidence that a given function is essential: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, ... and/or (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... An employee is ineligible to bring a claim under the ADA if she presents a “direct threat” to her own health and safety or that of others, see Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir.2000); federal regulations implementing the ADA further define a direct threat as a “significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906-907 (7th Cir.2004).

Section 1630.2 treats a diagnosed physiological condition as an impairment, but requires proof that it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population to qualify as a disability.

Rader v. Upper Cumberland Human Resource Agency · filed 2016-03-22(j)(ii)

Inasmuch as EEOC regulations define a physical or mental impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as ... digestive[,]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1), Plaintiff, having been diagnosed with colitis and diverticula, has shown that he has a physical impairment. What he has not shown, however, are facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his impairment(s) substantially limit a major life activity. ... “An impairment is a disability within the meaning of [the ADA] if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii), and it is “not sufficient for a plaintiff to identify an impairment and leave the court to infer that it results in substantial limitations to a major life activity.” ... Apart from Plaintiffs claims of occasional “incapacitating pain,” he offers nothing from which a jury could conclude that he was substantially limited in any major life activity.

The regulation requires a substantial, not necessarily severe, limitation of a major life activity, and testimony about the impairment and its limiting effects may suffice to establish disability at summary judgment.

Baron Bement v. Cox · filed 2020-03-16(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(v)

Disability is a physical impairment that substantially limits—but “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict,” see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)—an individual from performing a major life activity. ... Although not overwhelming, this testimony is sufficient to survive summary judgment, and the district court erred in disregarding it. See e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v).

The regulation defines substantial limitation by comparing an impairment’s effect on a major life activity with the effect experienced by most people in the general population.

Collins v. School Board of Pinellas County, Florida · filed 2020-11-19(j)(1)(i)

“Under this more lenient standard, courts consider whether an impairment ‘substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)). Nevertheless, Collins bears the burden of establishing that her impairment substantially limited a major life activity. ... Collins’s claims fail because she is not disabled.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) requires an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity compared with most people in the general population to qualify as a disability.

Munoz v. Selig Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2020-12-04(j)(1)(ii)

To qualify as disabled under the ADA, the employee must be substantially limited in a major life activity “as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

An impairment is substantially limiting when it restricts an individual's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Butrym v. Sarsick · filed 2021-05-13(j)(ii)

As to the second, an impairment qualifies as a disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii).

Section 1630.2(j) defines “substantially limits” broadly: the required functional limitation is lower than the pre-ADAAA standard, and an impairment need not prevent or significantly restrict a major life activity; the comparison is to most people in the general population.

Milligan v. Rambosk · filed 2022-03-29(j), (j)(1)(iv), (j)(1)(ii)

Not every impairment, however, will constitute a disability under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). The ADAAA provides that the term "substantially limits" "is not meant to be a demanding standard," but rather "shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). The term “substantially limits” is “interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Rather, Plaintiff must be substantially limited in a major life activity "as compared to most people in the general population." Munoz v. Selig Enters., 981 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). Here, both ACP and PKD constitute a substantial limitation “as compared to most people in the general population.”

Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines an impairment to include a physiological disorder or condition affecting specified body systems, while § 1630.2(j) and (j)(1)(ii) govern whether it substantially limits a major life activity by considering the person's limitations relative to most people and the impairment's nature, severity, duration, and impact.

Person v. Mulligan Security Corp. · filed 2023-03-27(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (j), (j)(1)

The EEOC has issued regulations implementing the ADA that define an “impairment” to include any “physiological disorder, or condition” that affects the neurological, musculoskeletal, and cardiovascular systems. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... Determining whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity involves evaluating the plaintiff’s ability relative to most people in the general population. ... “Factors to consider in determining whether a major life activity is substantially limited include: the nature and severity of the impairment; its duration or expected duration; and the existence of any actual or expected permanent or long-term impact.” ... Even if this vague allegation could be said to constitute an impairment, the plaintiff provides only a conclusory assertion that the impairment substantially limits his ability to stand. ... Nor has the plaintiff shown that he is more limited than the average person in his ability to stand long hours in the heat so as to be “substantially limited” in a major life activity. ... Because the plaintiff does not demonstrate he is a person with a disability under the ADA, his discrimination claim is dismissed.

Section 1630.2 directs courts to focus on whether covered entities complied with their obligations and discrimination occurred, while treating the substantial-limitation threshold as requiring little analysis.

Patton v. Quality Enterprises, LLC · filed 2023-12-19

“The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.”

Section 1630.2(j)(ii) measures substantial limitation by comparing an individual's ability to perform a major life activity with that of most people in the general population.

Bennett v. New York State Thruway Authority · filed 2024-03-11(j)(ii)

As to the second, an impairment qualifies as a disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). ... To plausibly allege a disability-discrimination claim, the plaintiff needs to allege facts tending to show that he was substantially limited in his ability to perform a major life activity, or that his employer mistakenly regarded him as being so limited in one or more of those areas. ... Plaintiff has not done so.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits an individual's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people, without requiring prevention or severe restriction; section 1630.2(k)(1) defines a record of disability as a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Brown v. Fat Dough Incorp. · filed 2024-03-29(j)(1)(ii), (k)(1)

An impairment qualifies as a disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population”; at the same time, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... However, the Amended Complaint is devoid of factual allegations indicating how Plaintiff’s conditions, the fatigue they cause, or their impact on his “ability” to use his arms and hands “effectively,” substantially limit a major life activity. Such a deficiency “is fatal to [his] claim.” ... Failing to allege a substantial limitation on a major life activity similarly prevents Plaintiff from establishing he has a disability under prong (B). See Kelly v. N.Y. State Off. of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). (“Plaintiff’s failure to plausibly allege a substantial limitation to a major life activity . . . precludes her from asserting that she has a record of disability.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1) (“An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”).

A physical impairment is an actual disability when it substantially limits an individual's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

United States v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2025-08-15(j)(1)(ii)

A physical impairment is an actual disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

The regulation calls for a broad, non-demanding substantial-limitation inquiry, but an individualized assessment with facts showing the impairment’s substantial effect is still required, even where bipolar disorder may substantially limit brain function.

Kramer v. Bessent · filed 2025-09-04(j)(i), (j)(3)(ii), (j)(3)(iii)

Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i) (indicating that the requirement that an impairment substantially limit major life activities is not a “demanding” standard, and courts shall construe the term “substantially limits . . . broadly in favor of expansive coverage”), with ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L 110-325, sec. 1201 Note, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553 (Sept. 25, 2008).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) indicates that autism spectrum disorder qualifies as a disability under the amended ADA.

Latson v. Clarke · filed 2017-04-20(j)(3)(iii)

Recent regulations clearly indicate that ASD now qualifies as a disability under the amended version of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii); 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(2)(iii)(E). It is not clear, however, that ASD and ID, as they affect Latson, would have been recognized as disabilities prior to the ADA Amendments Act.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) identifies major depressive disorder as a condition that substantially limits brain function.

McNab v. Department of the Army · filed 2014-10-07(j)(3)(iii)

EEOC’s regulations implementing the ADAAA list conditions that “it should easily be concluded . . . substantially limit the major life activities indicated.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). Among those items listed is “major depressive disorder,” which is identified as “substantially limit[ing] brain function.” Id.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) treats major depressive disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder as impairments that, at a minimum, substantially limit brain function, while still requiring an individualized assessment rather than imposing a per se disability.

Beebe v. State of Colorado · filed 2019-11-22(j)(3)(iii)

Among these regulations, and pertinent to the instant action, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) provides that ... “major depressive disorder . . . [and] obsessive compulsive disorder . . . substantially limit brain function.” ... The ADA still requires an individualized assessment to determine “whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”

Under the pre-ADAAA regulation, “substantially limits” means being unable to perform a major life activity that the average person can perform or being significantly restricted in the condition, manner, or duration of performing it; the assessment considers the impairment’s nature and severity, duration, and permanent or long-term impact.

Sowell v. Kelly Services, Inc. · filed 2015-10-14(j)(1)(i)-(ii), (j)(2)(i)-(iii)

The phrase “substantially limits” for purposes of this statute means “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform” or “[significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which, the average person in the general population can perform the. same major life activity.” Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 782-83 (3d Cir.1998) (alteration in the original) (citing.pre-ADAAA EEOC regulations 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i),(ii)). Courts consider: “ ‘(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of [the impairment] or resulting from the impairment’ ” in determining whether or not an individual is disabled within, the meaning of the statute. Id. at 783 (alteration in the original) (quoting pre-ADAAA EEOC regulations 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i) — (iii)).

The regulation requires substantial limitation to be construed broadly and as a non-demanding standard, directs courts to focus on coverage and discrimination without extensive threshold analysis, broadly construes a record of impairment, and requires an interactive process to identify limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Harp v. Barr · filed 2022-03-31(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(iii), (j)(1)(iv), (k)(2), (o)(3)

To qualify as “substantially limiting” under step three, the impairment must “substantially limit[] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Pursuant to the governing regulation, the term “substantially limits” must be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... The court’s “primary object,” however, is to determine “whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). Accordingly, assessment of this threshold issue “should not demand extensive analysis.” Id. ... Performing an “individualized assessment” as required, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently established that her impairments “substantially limited” one or more of her major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv); ... “Whether an individual has a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity shall be construed broadly . . . and should not demand extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2); ... When a federal agency receives a request for accommodation, it is obliged to engage in an “interactive process” envisioned by federal regulations. Wilkerson, 606 F.3d at 1266 (describing interaction between employer and employee as an “essential component of the process by which a reasonable accommodation can be determined” (internal quotation marks omitted); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).

Section 1630.2 defines impairment and major life activities broadly, requires substantial limitation to be construed in favor of expansive coverage, and contemplates an employer-initiated interactive process to identify accommodations when needed.

Badwal v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2015-09-28(h), (i)(1)(i), (i)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

“Per the EEOC’s regulations, an “impairment” refers to “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). “Major life activities” include, but are not limited to “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, readings, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). In determining other examples of major life activities, the term “major” shall “not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for disability.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii). Finally, according to the regulations, the “substantially limits” requirement, is also to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... As to limitations on major life activities, plaintiff has alleged that the limitations to his arm “often made eating more difficult” and “often made sleeping more difficult.” ... “[C]aring for oneself” is also a major life activity, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i), and the ability to dress and undress oneself, in the Court’s judgment, is a facet of caring for oneself. ... Accordingly, plaintiff having alleged a limitation on at least four major life activities, the Court is satisfied that he has met this prong of the analysis. ... With this in mind, the Court holds that plaintiff’s impairment is substantial. ... While plaintiff certainly could have provided more detail as to the nature and extent of the injury to his arm, taking heed of the EEOC’s caution not to undertake an extensive analysis, the Court believes plaintiff’s allegations of disability are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. ... “The EEOC regulations provide: “[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).”

The regulation defines disability as a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities and requires the interactive process to identify the disability’s precise limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Dorsey v. Postal Service (U.S.) · filed 2021-02-03(g)(1)(i); (o)(3)

Disability under the ADA is defined at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i) as “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual[,]” and this definition is incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(2). ... Through this process, the parties are to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).

The regulation permits an employer to defeat a regarded-as-disabled claim by showing objectively that the actual or perceived impairment is transitory and minor.

Willis v. Noble Environmental Power, LLC · filed 2015-10-22(j)(l)(ix)

The regulations expressly state that it may be a defense to the regarded as prong “that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) ‘transitory and minor.’” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(l)(ix), '1630.15(f).

Section 1630.2 defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and undue hardship as significant difficulty or expense, with the listed factors guiding the undue-hardship inquiry.

Snead v. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Board of Trustees · filed 2018-02-21(n)(2)(i), (l), (p)(2)

“Essential functions” are the “fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Id. at 1257; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i). Whether a job function is “essential” must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. ... “Undue hardship” means “significant difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity, when considered in light of” several factors. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). Those factors include “[t]he nature and net cost of the accommodation needed”; “[t]he overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the number of persons employed at such facility, and the effect on expenses and resources”; “[t]he overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the business of the covered entity with respect to the number of its employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities”; “[t]he type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure and functions of the workforce of such entity, and the geographic separateness and administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity”; and “[t]he impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to conduct business.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2).

The regulation defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and directs courts to assess them case by case using nonexclusive factors.

Vaughn v. Parkwest Medical Center · filed 2017-11-20(n)(1), (n)(3)(i)–(vii)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... The determination “is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors.” ... These factors include: “(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)–(vii). ...

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job, and § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for determining essential functions while allowing an employer to establish job requirements that are job-related, uniformly enforced, and consistent with business necessity.

Nguyen v. City & Cnty. of Denver · filed 2017-12-21(n)(1), (n)(3)

"Essential functions" are "the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires." ... The essential function analysis should not "second guess the employer or ... require [it] to lower company standards. Provided that any necessary job specification is job-related, uniformly enforced, and consistent with business necessity, the employer has a right to establish what a job is and what is required to perform it."

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions, and subsection (n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to determining them.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AutoZone, Inc. · filed 2016-01-04(n)(1), (n)(3)

In addition, EEOC regulations clarify that essential functions are the “fundamental job duties” of the position, as opposed to the “marginal functions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Further, the employer’s judgment, the amount of time performing the function at issue, the work experience of prior employees in the same position, and written job descriptions are among the relevant evidence that can be considered to determine the essential functions of a position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job and makes their identification a case-specific inquiry in which the employer’s judgment is relevant but not dispositive.

Fortkamp v. City of Celina · filed 2016-02-01(n)(1)

“Essential functions are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.’ ” ... “Contrary to the City’s claims, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to just what, exactly, the essential duties of the lineman position are. The City’s judgment that climbing utility poles and lifting heavy weights, while entitled to deference, is not dispositive.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats the fundamental duties of a position, but not marginal duties, as its essential functions, so a reasonable accommodation cannot reallocate an essential duty.

Atencio v. United States Postal Service · filed 2016-08-04(n)(1)

The “essential functions” of a position “means the fundamental job duties of the employment position,” but not “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). ... Therefore, because Atencio’s suggested accommodation would result in the reallocation of an essential function of a T-6 carrier, USPS is entitled to summary judgment on Atencio’s claim for failure to engage in an interactive process to accommodate her disability.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies written job descriptions, the employer’s judgment, and the time spent on a function as methods of proving a job’s essential functions.

LaRochelle v. Wilmac Corp. · filed 2016-09-27(n)(3)

To be sure, the ADA’s corresponding regulations set forth numerous methods of proof available to parties seeking to establish the “essential functions” of a job position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). These include written job descriptions, the employer’s judgment, and the amount of time spent on the function. Id.

Section 1630.2(n) identifies nonexclusive evidence for determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the function, consequences of not requiring it, and the work experience of past and similar-job incumbents.

Camp v. Bi-Lo, LLC · filed 2016-10-21(n)

The regulations also instruct us to consider the consequences of Camp not performing the heavy lifting. Because Camp and his coworkers had worked out an arrangement where Camp did not lift the heaviest items, the consequences of Camp not performing some of the required work fell to them.

Section 1630.2(n) identifies factors—including the employer’s judgment, the written job description, time spent performing the function, and the work experience of incumbents—to determine whether a job function is essential.

Perry v. The City of Avon Park, Florida · filed 2016-11-18(n)

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (describing factors to consider in determining whether a job function is essential, including, the employer’s judgment, the written job description, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, and the work experience of past incumbents in the job or current incumbents in similar jobs).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies the types of evidence used to determine whether a job function is essential.

Reagan-Diaz v. Sessions · filed 2017-03-30(n)(3)

“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes” several aspects: “(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function;” as well as “[t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2 defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, excluding marginal functions.

Sanford v. Thor Indus., Inc. · filed 2018-02-09(n)(1), (n)

"The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires." ... "Undoubtedly, using a nailer and replacing trim are essential functions of the trimmer position."

(n)(3) identifies factors for determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, the consequences of not requiring the function, and past and current work experience.

Bilinsky v. American Airlines · filed 2018-08-31(n)(3)

Essential functions are determined by looking at factors including but not limited to the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, the consequences of not requiring the employees to perform the function, and past and current work experiences. Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 285 (7th Cir. 2014); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position.

Finnegan v. CSX Transportation · filed 2019-03-25(n)(1)

Essential functions are the “fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the function, consequences of nonperformance, and past incumbents’ work experience.

Reynolds v. AutoZone · filed 2019-07-15(n)(3)

“Evidence considered in determining whether a particular function is essential includes: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; and (5) the work experience of past incumbents in the job.”

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, and a function may be essential because the position exists to perform it.

Lam v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2019-05-30(n)(2)(i)

“Essential functions” refers to the “‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question.” Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1996)). ADA regulations note that a function “may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties of the employment position.

Toro v. Northstar Demolition · filed 2019-03-28(n)(1)

"Although the term 'essential functions' is not defined by the ADA, regulations promulgated by the [EEOC] indicate that it encompasses 'the fundamental job duties of the employment position.' "