42 U.S.C. § 1983

A count invoking Section 1983 as the cause of action for constitutional claims is not an independent claim.

Ross v. Cecil County Department of Social Services · filed 2012-07-12

Count 1, "Relief Under Act of Congress 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” ECF No. 46 at 7, states the cause of action through which Ross brings portions of counts 2 through 4 and 10. It is not an independent claim.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for interference by state officers with constitutional rights generally; it is not limited to racial equality.

Bar Association of Baltimore City v. Posner · filed 1975-01-28

Instead, he relies upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute is not couched in terms of racial equality, but, rather, it creates a federal remedy for interference by state officers with federal constitutional rights generally.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy only when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; no claim lies when the alleged right to grand-jury indictment does not exist.

Horn v. Peck · filed 1955-04-08

In the present action he seeks to recover money damages on the alleged ground that the defendants, acting under color of State law, conspired to deprive him of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution and Acts of Congress, that is, the right to be indicted by a grand jury. ... The plaintiff had no constitutional right to be prosecuted only upon indictment by a grand jury, and his prosecution upon an information constituted due process of law. ... The court accordingly concludes that the plaintiff’s complaint and supplemental complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief in money damages could be granted against the defendants or any of them.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil-rights action against private citizens who were not acting under color of law.

Smith v. Jennings · filed 1957-01-14

The court concludes as follows: (1) That the plaintiffs’ present action against the defendants is merely an attempt to relitigate the issue as to their guilt of the crime of assault and robbery while armed; (2) that the defendants in testifying against the plaintiffs were acting as private citizens and not under color of any law or in any official capacity; (3) that the Federal civil rights statutes, upon which plaintiffs base their action for money damages, do not afford protection against activities of private citizens not acting under color of law; and (4) that the plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a claim against the defendants upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 confers federal-court jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of civil rights.

National Ass'n v. Patty · filed 1958-01-21

Such a conclusion could not be reached in the pending case since the federal statutes expressly confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts where civil rights have been violated (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or ... where federal questions are involved (28 U.S.C. § 1331).

Section 1983 provides an actionable federal claim when state or local officials, acting under color of state law, deprive a person of constitutional due-process or equal-protection rights.

Hornsby v. Ivan Allen, Mayor of the City of Atlanta · filed 1964-01-07

The role of the courts is to ascertain whether the manner in which this determination was or is made accords with constitutional standards of due process and equal protection. We are of the opinion that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to show that the denial of appellant’s application for a license did not meet these standards and, since done under color of state statute, constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution and laws, and a complaint must allege facts showing an intentional and purposeful deprivation.

Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Board of the State of New York · filed 1964-01-23

Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C. gives a cause of action to any person who, under color of state law, is made to suffer a deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws. ... The section has been broadly interpreted as covering any right protected through the Fourteenth Amendment, and not simply those rights existing by virtue of the amendment's privileges and immunities clause. ... A complaint in a case like this must set forth facts showing some intentional and purposeful deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Colon v. Grieco · filed 1964-02-18

The elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are (1) action under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory which (2) subjects, or causes to be subjected any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Cohen v. Norris, 9 Cir. 1962, 300 F.2d 24, 30.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a plaintiff of constitutional rights, and it does not provide relief for merely trivial violations of state law in making an otherwise valid arrest.

Raab v. Patacchia · filed 1964-08-04

It is now well established, at least in this circuit, that the only elements which need to be present in order to establish a claim under this statute are: (1) that the conduct engaged in by the defendants was under color of state law; and (2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (C.A.9). ... Neither the Constitution nor the Civil Rights Act ought to be taken as proscribing such trivial violations of state law in making an otherwise valid arrest.

Section 1983 requires both action under color of state or local law and a deprivation of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity; a private attorney’s professional acts do not satisfy the state-action requirement.

Kregger v. Posner · filed 1966-01-03

The statutory prerequisites to an action under this section are that the defendant act “under color of” state or local law, and that the plaintiff be subjected to a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” ... It is not the deprivation of rights by private individuals acting in their private capacity for which this section offers redress, but the deprivation of rights by persons acting “under color of” state law. ... An attorney’s status as an “officer of the court” does not make him an officer of the state or of a governmental subdivision thereof. He is just another private individual for the purposes of Section 1983, and a professional act by him could not be considered an act done under color of state authority. ... This complaint does not fulfill either prerequisite to an action under § 1983 and thus fails to state a cause of action within the jurisdiction of this court.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Lucero v. Donovan · filed 1966-01-14

Generally expressed, “The only elements which need to be present in order to establish a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act are that the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.” Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962). Here, it cannot be denied that defendants were acting under “color of state law.” The issue is whether there was “deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution [or laws] of the United States.”

Section 1983 imposes liability when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Lucero v. Donovan · filed 1966-08-22

The conduct of the defendant Conrad was done under color of state law, and constituted a deprivation of plaintiff’s civil rights as guaranteed to her by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires both action under color of state law and a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Jones v. Middlesex County Board of Elections · filed 1966-09-02

At the threshold it is obvious that, since the Board and Clerk who caused the community room of the housing project to be designated and used as a polling place are no longer parties defendant in the action, no relief as provided in § 1983 can be afforded to the plaintiff against them. ... The face of the complaint discloses the absence of the two elements requisite for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, viz.: ... “(1) The conduct complained of must have been done by some person acting under color of law; and (2) such con*472duct must have subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States."

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of federal rights, and a prisoner states a claim when penal officials substantially frustrate access to an available appeal without needing to allege a purpose to deprive a federal right.

Dewitt v. Officer R. F. Pail, Wesley M. Young, Assistant Superintendent, Southern Conservation Center · filed 1966-09-08

As noted at the outset of this opinion, DeWitt intends this as a civil rights action, primarily invoking R.S. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). In order to state a claim under this statute, facts must be alleged which show that the defendant: (1) while acting under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory; (2) subjects, or causes to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Cohen v. Norris, 9 Cir., 300 F.2d 24, 30. DeWitt alleged that defendants Pail and Young were state officers and were acting under color of state law. This was sufficient to satisfy the first of these two requirements. ... When the efforts of a state prisoner to obtain an available state appellate review of his conviction are frustrated by the action of penal officials, there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reasonable access to the courts, state and federal, is guaranteed by that clause. Stiltner v. Rhay, 9 Cir., 322 F. 2d 314, 316; Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 9 Cir., 290 F.2d 632, 636. In order to state a due process claim under R.S. § 1979, it is not necessary to allege a purpose on the part of the defendant to deprive plaintiff of any federal right. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; Cohen v. Norris, 9 Cir., 300 F.2d 24, 29.

Section 1983 imposes civil liability only when a person is deprived of a constitutional or federal statutory right by conduct under color of law; an ordinary tort does not suffice.

Travers v. Paton · filed 1966-11-25

All torts are not violations of rights “secured by the Constitution and laws.” The statute encompasses a much narrower field. This much is clear enough. For the statute to apply, there must be a combination of two ingredients. The tort must be an act in violation of the Constitution or a federal law, ... and the tort-feasor must have acted under color of law. ... Because plaintiff’s claims cannot be supported under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it would not ordinarily be necessary to reach the merits of the claim as based on Connecticut’s common law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of constitutional rights, even if the official acted outside the jurisdiction and without actual authority.

U. S. Ex Rel. Brzozowski v. Randall · filed 1968-03-05

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act prescribes two elements which are essential for establishing a cause of action: ... Applying this standard to the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, we must conclude that if the plaintiff was subjected to an unlawful arrest and detention in the manner alleged, redress is appropriate in accordance with Section 1983 of the Act. ... Since the apprehension, transportation and subsequent arrest were effected “all under color of a policeman’s badge” Basista, supra, at p. 81, a cause of action under Section 1983 has been established, notwithstanding that the policemen were outside their jurisdiction and hence, patently without actual authority to effect an arrest.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when state action allegedly deprives a public employee of First Amendment rights, including free speech and association.

Albaum v. Carey · filed 1968-03-15

Since the federal constitution protects such expression and association from intrusion by the states, plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied tenure in a state school solely because he exercised his rights of free speech states a cause of action over which this Court has jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for damages and injunctive relief against a public official who, under color of state law, deprives public employees of constitutional rights, including First Amendment freedom of association.

American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Woodward · filed 1969-01-17

The principal question raised on this appeal is whether public employees, discharged because they joined a labor union, have a right of action for damages and injunctive relief under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 against the public official who discharged them.2 The answer to this question turns on whether public employees have a constitutionally protected right to belong to a labor union.3 The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint on the grounds that it failed to allege facts constituting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse. ... To invoke the remedies provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the plaintiffs must show that the Commissioner deprived them of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or by the laws of the United States, and that the Commissioner acted *139under color of law.4 The plaintiffs argue that this was done here as the Commissioner deprived them of their right to freedom of association under the First Amendment made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Union membership is protected by the right of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Hill v. American Express Money Order Co. · filed 1969-03-06

The District Court denied appellants’ motion on the ground that there is nothing in the complaint to indicate that any federal rights were denied and that the defendant was acting under color of state law. We agree with the District Court.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege facts showing that defendants acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Padilla v. Lynch · filed 1968-07-22

This is not sufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, because it does not allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or statutes of the United States.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Jones v. Hopper · filed 1969-05-19

The basic requirements of a complaint based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action, assuming state action, when a complaint alleges an acute physical condition, an urgent need for medical care, failure or refusal to provide it, and tangible residual injury.

Smith v. Merle R. Schneckloth, Superintendent, California Conservation Center · filed 1969-07-22

Assuming proper averments of state action, a complaint states a cause of action under section 1983 when it alleges “an acute physical condition, the urgent need for medical care, the failure or refusal to provide it, and tangible residual injury.”

Section 1983 requires alleged facts showing a deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment right under color of state authority.

Johnson v. Mueller · filed 1969-08-29

To state a claim for relief under § 1983 there must be alleged facts (1) constituting a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment (2) under color of state authority.

Section 1983 permits federal injunctive relief without exhaustion of state remedies, but requires an alleged intentional and purposeful deprivation of civil rights rather than a mere state-law error.

Gold v. Lomenzo · filed 1969-09-18

However, an aggrieved party suing under § 1983 of 42 U.S.C. need not exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal injunctive relief. ... Intentional and purposeful deprivation of civil rights must be alleged before a claim for relief is made out under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. ... If this were not the case, all instances in which a state administrative agency exceeded its powers or erred in the application of state law would result in litigation in the federal courts.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights judgment for conduct under color of state law, but state action by an official does not support suing private citizens who did not themselves act under color of state law.

Munoz v. Munoz · filed 1964-06-19

The complaint alleges conduct of a county official which could, if true, support an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 241, or a judgment for the Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The State action alleged here, however, cannot support a suit against a large group of private citizens who merely hold poll tax receipts which the Plaintiffs claim were improperly issued. ... Although this complaint does allege action by a State official under color of State law, the suit is not directed at him. The defendants named did not commit the acts complained of which might provide the basis of a civil rights action.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s heir to maintain a wrongful-death damages action for alleged deprivation of the decedent’s constitutional rights when § 1988 supplies the state-law remedy.

Galindo v. Brownell · filed 1966-03-22

Defendants contend that plaintiff, mother and sole custodian of the minor fatally shot by defendant Los Angeles County deputy sheriff, has no standing under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to bring an action for damages for alleged deprivation of the decedent’s constitutional and federally protected rights. ... Plaintiff herein, who, judging from her amended complaint, seeks only to maintain a wrongful death action for any pecuniary loss sustained by loss of her son’s society, comfort, attention, services and companionship, has standing as an heir of the decedent to sue for damages for his wrongful death, see Evans v. Shanklin, 16 Cal.App.2d 358, 60 P.2d 554 (1936), or so we must assume for purposes of passing upon a motion to dismiss. ... In the opinion of this Court resort to such remedy is necessary to render the Civil Rights Act fully effective in this case and is therefore sanctioned under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for federal civil-rights violations only when the defendant acts under color of state law, so it does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Carey v. Settle · filed 1966-08-09

A civil remedy for vindication of federal civil rights violations is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, that section applies only to officials acting under color of State law and has no application to actions against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state, and quasi-judicial officers are protected by judicial immunity for acts performed in that capacity.

Stewart v. Vesta Minnick, Official Court Reporter · filed 1969-03-06

The State is not amenable to suit under the civil rights statute (Williford v. People of California (9th Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 474); the acts charged to the individual appellees were acts performed in their capacity as quasi-judicial officers and they are clothed with judicial immunity (Cf. Peckham v. Scanlon (7th Cir. 1957) 241 F.2d 761); and the action was barred by res judicata in that appellant’s prior civil rights complaint including the same grievance was dismissed and this court denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis on the ground that the appeal was frivolous. (Sarelas v. Sheehan (7th Cir. 1965) 353 F.2d 5).

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations, and imprisonment does not toll that limitations period absent a special federal rule or discriminatory effect.

Conard v. Stitzel · filed 1963-12-27

It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff’s imprisonment during all or part of the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint did not toll the running of the applicable Pennsylvania statute of limitations. ... The present case is not one calling for special intervention against the operation of the state statute of limitations. ... Nor is there any closely interwoven federal statutory scheme which will be hampered unless actions under the Federal Civil Rights Acts are preserved during imprisonment. The general and “catch-all” language of the Civil Rights Acts gives rise to federal causes of action for many unrelated types of wrongs, and there is no such need for uniformity as exists in areas such as federal labor law.

Section 1983 damages claims use the most analogous state statute of limitations, so the applicable state periods govern false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims.

Gaito v. Strauss · filed 1966-02-03

In accordance with the rule requiring the application to Civil Rights Act damage suits of the most analogous relevant state statute(s) of limitations, we hold that any federal claim that plaintiff may have had for the alleged illegal arrest and detention and related indignities sustained during the period prior to his conviction in November, 1959 is barred by the two-year limitations statute applicable to false imprisonment suits and the one-year limitations statute applicable to false arrest suits.

A § 1983 action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations when the complaint shows it was filed too late.

No. 16283 · filed 1966-02-10

A careful review of the briefs and the file indicates conclusively to us that the complaint on its face states facts which establish (as the District Judge found) that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914); Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119 (C.A.6, 1964); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consolidated, 185 F.2d 196 (C.A.9, 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943, 71 S.Ct. 506, 95 L.Ed. 680 (1951); Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304 (C.A.7, 1949).

Section 1983 damages actions are subject to applicable statutes of limitations.

Gaito v. Strauss · filed 1966-11-08

To the extent that the complaint sought damages, we affirm on the basis of the District Court's conclusion that the action was barred by applicable statutes of limitations.

When federal law supplies no limitations period, a Maryland action under § 1983 is governed by the state's three-year limitations period applicable to violations of Article 23.

McIver v. Russell · filed 1967-01-31

This Court, in searching for guides in Section 1 of Article 57, concludes that since the Maryland legislature has provided a three-year limitations period for actions, which may exist from time to time, for violation of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and since the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that such rights are similar to the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted to provide a cause of action for violation of rights under that federal constitutional amendment, those same three-year Maryland limitations are applicable to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the forum state's statute of limitations as incorporated through § 1988.

Hughes v. Smith · filed 1967-03-08

The claim asserted by plaintiff is within the Civil Rights Act, referred to earlier, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but is barred by the New Jersey 2 year Statute of Limitations, which state statute is incorporated into the Civil Rights Act by reference.

Section 1983 claims borrow the applicable state statute of limitations when Congress has provided no federal limitations period.

Hileman v. Knable · filed 1967-04-18

There is no federal statute of limitations as to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “In the absence of a congressionally-enacted time limitation for the bringing of such actions, the state stat*318ute of limitations should be applied.” Jones v. Bombeck, 375 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. Decided March 27, 1967). Thus the Pennsylvania statute of limitations is applicable.

A state statute of limitations can bar an action brought under § 1983.

Krum v. Richard D. Sheppard and Gordon P. Hurley, Jointly and Severally · filed 1967-11-03

District Judge Noel P. Fox sustained a motion of the defendants to dismiss on the ground that the Michigan Statute of Limitations is a bar to this action. We are in accord with this conclusion, and it is ordered that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed for the reasons set forth in Judge Fox’s opinion (Krum v. Sheppard, supra).

Section 1983 has no federal limitations period, so courts apply the state limitations period governing the analogous action.

Hileman v. Lawrence Knable, Jr., Police Officer, Andrew Kurey, Police Officer · filed 1968-03-18

There being no federal statute of limitations in respect to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court below properly held that the Pennsylvania statute of limitations for analogous actions should be applied.

When § 1983 lacks its own limitations period, courts apply the most analogous state limitations period, and an equitable claim cannot evade the bar applicable to a concurrent legal remedy.

Madison v. Wood · filed 1969-04-24

Since the Civil Rights Act and the federal statutes do not contain a statue of limitations for actions brought under Section 1983, we will apply the most analogous period of limitations under Michigan law. ... We hold that Appellant’s claim is controlled by the three-year provision of M.S.A. § 27.605. We conclude, moreover, that his claim is outlawed even though he amended his complaint to seek purely equitable relief because “equity will withhold its relief * * * where the applicable statute of limitations * * * bar[s] the concurrent legal remedy.”

Section 1983 borrows the state limitations period applicable to a comparable action and does not require a plaintiff to seek relief in state court first.

Romer v. Leary · filed 1969-10-16

There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to actions under section 1983. In view of this, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that, in these actions, “the applicable period of limitations is that which New York would enforce had an action seeking similar relief been brought in a court of that state.” Swan v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1963). ... Under section 1983 of Title 42, the plaintiff need not have first sought relief in a state court before bringing his action here.

Section 1983 has no specific limitations period, so the court applies the state limitations period for an action seeking similar relief.

Walter Frank Knowles Alias John Frank Smith v. Carson · filed 1969-11-07

Sections 1983 and 1985 do not include a specific limitation. Since the Act contains no provision limiting the time within which an action thereunder may be brought, the applicable Statute of Limitation is that which the State would enforce had the action seeking similar relief been brought in the State Court.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of constitutional rights; errors or irregularities in an otherwise valid state-court proceeding are not enough.

Sarelas v. Sheehan · filed 1963-12-27

A claim under the Civil Rights Act requires that a plaintiff show deprivation of his constitutional rights. In the instant action plaintiff alleges no deprivation of such rights. ... The events that gave rise to plaintiff’s “rights” on which he bases his action, are not of constitutional stature, vindicable under the Civil Rights statutes. Constitutional due process and equal protection of the laws have a more fundamental meaning than plaintiff ascribes to them in this action. Mere errors and irregularities occurring in a judicial proceeding must be differentiated from a situation where the proceeding itself is a sham or nullity.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only when a plaintiff is deprived of constitutional rights, not merely when state law has been violated.

Hardy v. Kirchner · filed 1964-07-27

As to Police Sergeant S. Kenneth Cliff, plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cause of action for deprivation of due process (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or for deprivation of equal protection (42 U.S. C. § 1985). Before a cause arises there must, of course, be a denial of due process. This Court, being aware of the nature of these allegations, afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the entire matter, and to produce before this Court all evidence supporting the same. In determining whether or not plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been deprived, I considered the complaint, arguments, testimony and all papers presented to me. The Civil Rights Act does not purport to make every violation of a state law an infringement of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is applicable only when plaintiff is deprived of constitutional rights in light of every guarantee as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. No such deprivation has been shown to this Court. The Civil Rights Act was enacted to protect the rights of individuals and was not enacted to discipline local law enforcement officers. Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153 (7 Cir. 1954).

Section 1983 authorizes an action against a state actor for redress of an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Clarke v. Redeker · filed 1966-09-15

The statute which, in this instance, authorizes the plaintiff to institute an action against the defendants herein is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the plaintiff was denied, or that there was a conspiracy to deny him, a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity; police participation in entrapment alone is not a constitutional violation.

Jones v. Bombeck · filed 1967-03-27

To state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act it is necessary that there be an allegation that plaintiff was denied or that there was a conspiracy to deny him a constitutional right, privilege or immunity. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Here, at best, all that appellant has alleged is entrapment. While entrapment may be a proper defense in a criminal action, a police officer’s participation in such activity does not constitute a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a state official’s tort, even when committed under color of law, actionable by itself; the plaintiff must show an invasion of a protected right.

Bowman v. Hale · filed 1969-07-11

Assuming petitioner is complaining of an assault, or an assault and battery, a tort committed by a State official, acting under color of law is not, in and of itself, sufficient to show an invasion of a person’s rights under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a prisoner's claim absent a deprivation of constitutional rights, and prison officials' treatment decisions are protected by wide discretion unless that discretion is abused.

Roy v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida · filed 1969-11-12

This Court is unwilling to interfere in the internal operation and administration of prison systems unless prison authorities have abused their wide discretion as to treatment of prisoners. ... There has been no abuse of discretion shown here. ... The court below was correct in finding that appellant has failed to show a deprivation of constitutional rights upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 did not support a cause of action on the allegations in this complaint.

Edna Anderson, Individually, Etc. v. Tensaw Land and Timber Company · filed 1964-01-10

The District Court found that the appellant did not state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a careful examination of the record we find that the holding of the lower court is correct. Cf. Simmons v. Whitaker, 5 Cir., 1958, 252 F.2d 224.

Section 1983 damages claims require highly specific factual allegations rather than bare conclusory allegations.

Pugliano v. Staziak · filed 1964-06-30

In an action for damages under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must allege highly specific facts. ... It is not enough to state bare conclusory allegations without support in facts alleged.

Section 1983 does not support a civil-rights claim against a state department when the alleged facts show no violation of a federal right.

Johnson v. California Department of Corrections · filed 1967-11-22

With regard to the relief requested from the California Department of Corrections, plaintiff admits that he is incarcerated in California pursuant to a *398valid conviction. Furthermore, California is not denying plaintiff a speedy trial by keeping him incarcerated, as Louisiana has not requested that he be returned for trial. Thus the complaint does not shadow forth a claim under the Civil Rights Act against the California Department of Corrections. See Jenks v. Henys, 378 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1967).

Section 1983 imposes liability for conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of constitutional or statutory rights, and the legality of the arrest is measured under state law.

Antelope v. George · filed 1962-12-13

While defendant is an Indian police officer, it is evident from the testimony his actions were under color of state law. This is exemplified by defendant’s taking plaintiff before the probate court (rather than before federal or tribal authorities) and charging her with a violation of a state statute. Also, the evidence reveals that defendant was working in consort with the sheriff of Benewah County not only in making the arrest but in the incarceration and prosecution of plaintiff. ... In determining whether there has been an invasion of civil rights, lawfulness of the arrest must be measured under state law. ... It appears plaintiff was not informed of defendant’s intention to arrest her, of the cause of arrest, nor of defendant’s authority to make it, as required by Idaho statute (I.C. § 19-608); she was not taken without delay to the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county where the arrest was made (I.C. § 19-615); while the offense was allegedly committed in defendant’s presence (I.C. §§ 19-603, 19-604) defendant did not make the arrest until' several hours thereafter, nor did he obtain a warrant during the interval. Further, the court before which plaintiff was eventually taken had no jurisdiction. Arquette v. Schneckloth, 56 Wash.2d 178, 351 P.2d 921. The facts here patently show a violation of the civil rights of the plaintiff.

Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or laws.

Marland v. Heyse · filed 1963-03-26

The purpose of Section 1979 is to create a right of action, enforceable in federal courts, against those who, "under color of" state law, deprive any person of any rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 imposes liability when a defendant acts under color of state or local law and thereby deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Marland v. Heyse · filed 1963-03-26

The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act ‘under color of’ state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’ * * * ” (Footnote omitted.)

Section 1983 requires a defendant acting under color of state or local authority to deprive the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

York v. Ron Story and Louis Moreno · filed 1963-10-28

A complaint states a claim under section 1979, if the facts alleged show that the defendant: (1) while acting under color of state or local authority, (2) subjected the plaintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be subjected, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured to the plaintiff by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Walker v. Reed · filed 1997-01-03

To state a cognizable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff's complaint must allege that the conduct of a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

A § 1983 complaint must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right and identify the defendants’ specific conduct that proximately caused the injury.

Larue v. Jim Blodgett, Deputy Director L. Wrinkle, Mail Room Officer · filed 1997-07-22

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. ... The complaint must allege specific conduct by the defendants that was the proximate cause of the section 1983 injury. ... The facts alleged by LaRue are sufficient to state a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove both a deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution and action by the defendant under color of state law.

Konczak v. Tyrrell · filed 1979-07-12

In order to recover under Section 1983, the plaintiff must establish both deprivation of a right secured by federal law or the Constitution and action by the defendant under the color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of a constitutionally protected right, and an isolated negligent failure by prison officials to protect an inmate is not actionable.

Parker v. McKeithen · filed 1971-06-25

To be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the acts complained of must be done under color of State law and must amount to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right; in this case, freedom from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment and equal protection of the laws. Since Monroe v. Pape4, some courts have held that unintentional conduct does not state a claim under Section 19835, while others have indicated that negligent conduct may support a claim under that section. We are of the opinion that, under exceptional circumstances, unintentional conduct on behalf of prison officials may support a claim. This is not a disciplinary case, where prison authorities were called upon to preserve order or were justified in exerting necessary force to restrain or punish a prisoner. Rather, it is a case where an inmate was set upon and physically attacked by another inmate who had been permitted, in some manner, to have or gain possession of a dangerous weapon. In order to be actionable under Section 1983, more than an isolated incident of negligent failure to protect must be alleged.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws and provides a damages remedy for such violations.

Henderson v. Goeke · filed 1971-08-09

In order to establish a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be shown that the defendants acted “under color of state law” and that they deprived the plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].” Unquestionably, it is alleged that the officers acted in their official capacity in conducting the search, and unquestionably the plaintiff has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In enacting § 1983, Congress intended to provide a remedy, including the recovery of damages, for such unlawful actions.

Section 1983 permits a sufficiently specific claim that state officers conspired to obtain a conviction through the knowing use of perjured testimony; the claim is not categorically deficient merely because it challenges a conviction.

Kauffman v. Moss · filed 1970-01-14

Moreover, whatever the validity of this rule when applied to civil rights suits based on allegations of perjury alone, we believe that claims of a conspiracy by state officers to convict a person of a crime by the knowing use of perjured testimony, when set forth with sufficient specificity, are not categorically deficient in stating a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant, while acting under color of state law, subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right.

Mahurin v. Moss · filed 1970-05-19

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, facts must be alleged which show that defendant, while acting under color of state law, subjected plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be subjected, to the deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right and acted under color of state law.

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. · filed 1970-06-01

The terms of § 1983 make plain two elements that are necessary for recovery.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of law and deprived the plaintiff of constitutionally protected rights, privileges, or immunities.

Balistrieri v. Warren · filed 1970-07-20

To state a viable cause of action under the civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that the defendants acted under color of law and that they deprived plaintiffs of constitutionally protected rights, privileges, or immunities.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to prove deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right and action under color of state law.

Smith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Montgomery, Inc. · filed 1970-07-20

To be entitled to relief under this section of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs must show two things. First, they must prove that the defendant deprived them of a right secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States. Second, they must show that the defendant was acting ‘“under color of law,” that is, was acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory.” ... This Court concludes, therefore, that defendants’ discriminatory conduct denied plaintiffs their Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection of the Law. While the concepts of “state action” and “under color of law” are not necessarily synonymous, ... this Court further concludes that under the facts of this case, plaintiffs’ showing of “state action” satisfies the requirement under § 1983 that defendants’ conduct be “under color of law.”

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; without such a deprivation, there is no claim for relief.

Schultz v. Palmberg · filed 1970-10-02

The elements required to establish a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiffs to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10 Cir., 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 991, 90 S.Ct. 1111, 25 L.Ed.2d 399 (1970). ... The plaintiffs do not have a right of tenure or continued employment at Central Wyoming College, hence the denial of their request for a formal hearing was not a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Rowe v. Chandler · filed 1971-07-12

There are two essential elements to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. These are (1) that the conduct complained of was by a person acting under color of state statutes or local law, custom or usage, and (2) that while so acting, deprived another of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... It is in this perspective that the Court must determine plaintiff’s probability of success, i. e., it must reasonably appear that plaintiff was denied a constitutionally protected right by the defendants acting under color of state or local law. ... This Court has carefully considered the arguments advanced by the plaintiff and concludes that the asserted indicia of state participation do not indicate that state action, as opposed to private action, forms the basis of the complaint.

Section 1983 requires an ascertainable deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, committed under color of law.

Jackson v. Hepinstall · filed 1971-07-15

It is essential in order for claims to be valid and viable under the terms of Section 1983 that there be reasonably ascertainable, or at least arguably so, circumstances indicating that defendants deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and did so under color of law.

Section 1983 requires a person acting under color of state law to deprive another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Endicott v. Van Petten · filed 1971-08-12

There are two essential elements to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These are: (1) that the conduct complained of was by a person acting under color of state statutes or local law, custom or usage, and (2) while so acting, deprived another of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires conduct by a person acting under color of law that deprives another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Peoples Cab Co. v. Bloom · filed 1971-08-19

The terms of § 1983 make it eminently plain that two elements are requisite for recovery. First, the conduct complained of must be done by some person acting under color of law. Second, such conduct must have subjected the plaintiffs to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires proof that a person acting under color of law caused the plaintiff to suffer a deprivation of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity.

Dykes v. Camp · filed 1971-09-30

There are two specifications which plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence in order to recover under § 1983: (1) The conduct complained of must have been done by some person acting under color of law; and (2) Such conduct must have subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965). In this case, the first specification has been stipulated to by defendants. The second specification, which requires proof that a particular defendant's conduct caused or subjected plaintiff to a deprivation of any constitutionally protected right, has not been established by plaintiff at trial by a preponderance of the evidence. In his testimony, plaintiff was unable to identify with particularity which defendant searched his person, or the trunk of his car, or which defendant, if any, detained him on Forest Park Boulevard (after the legally justified stop and frisk), or which defendant, if any, detained him at the police station. John Doe pleadings will not suffice.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a defendant acting under color of state law deprives a person of a federal constitutional right.

Holt v. Brown · filed 1971-10-29

The only elements required in order to establish a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act are that conduct complained of was engaged in by defendants under color of state law, and that such conduct subjected plaintiffs to a deprivation of some right, privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution. See Marshall v. Sawyer, 9th Cir., 301 F.2d 639 (1962).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right under color of state law.

Cochran v. Odell · filed 1971-11-30

Plaintiff has failed to establish by credible evidence that defendants have deprived her of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Plaintiff has failed to prove by credible evidence any deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 reaches deprivations under color of state law of rights secured by federal law, but this court held claims whose gist is injury to property were outside its scope.

Golden Dawn Shops, Inc. v. Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1971-12-03

If plaintiff’s complaint could be brought within the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar would not apply. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950). Plaintiff has alleged a deprivation under color of state law, of “rights * * * secured by the * * * laws [of the United States],” and therefore comes within the language of § 1983. Since the decision in Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939), however, it has been recognized that not all deprivations of federal rights are within the scope of the Civil Rights Act. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently stated its “inclination” toward the view that § 1983 “was not designed to support a cause of action, the ‘gist’ of which is damage or injury to property.” National Land & Investment Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1970). Plaintiff has alleged violations of rights which fall on the “property” side of the difficult-to-draw line between “property” and “civil” rights, and therefore cannot claim the benefits of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when officials acting under color of state law deprive individuals of constitutional rights, including freedom of association.

Teamsters Public Employees Union Local No. 594 v. City of West Point · filed 1972-02-10

The Court thus finds that there is a reasonable probability that the aforementioned defendants have, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, deprived the individual plaintiffs of the right of freedom of association as guaranteed to them by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to assert deprivation of the plaintiff’s own federally protected rights, does not require class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus, and applies across the range of federal civil rights rather than only to equal-protection claims.

Perkins v. Salafia · filed 1972-02-12

Since a person may not sue for the deprivation of another’s civil rights, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962), the plaintiffs as individuals must allege deprivation of their own federally protected rights in order to state a claim. ... The plaintiffs plainly state that each count is founded also on § 1983 in which no such element is required and which applies to the entire range of federal civil rights, not simply to equal protection.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Deanel Chism and Perry H. Thompson v. Ted R. Price · filed 1972-02-29

Substantively to bring themselves within the Act, the appellants must establish that they have been deprived, under color of state law, of rights which are secured to them by the Constitution and federal laws. There is no evidence of discrimination against either of them because of race, color or religion or any other constitutionally protected right. They were members of a road maintenance crew who had permitted or caused bad blood to build up against their foreman until it culminated in a near-physical altercation and open rebellion against him. For this, they were fired. They were accorded hearings before the review boards established by the Highway Commission, including review by the Commission itself. We find no denial of procedural due process nor of any other federally secured right that would bring them within the Act.

Section 1983 requires both a constitutional deprivation and state action by the defendant.

Tanner v. Armco Steel Corporation · filed 1972-03-08

Therefore, it is clear that a sufficiently stated claim under section 1983 must embrace two elements properly alleged: (1) a constitutional deprivation, and (2) state action. ... It follows, of course, that a claim under Section 1983 has not been stated and subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 has not been invoked.

Section 1983 does not categorically exclude negligence by a state actor, but relief still requires conduct that deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Gentry B. Puckett v. Weldon W. Cox · filed 1972-03-08

We believe it is incorrect as a general rule, and misleading in this particular case, to state that the negligent conduct of a person acting under color of state law cannot be the basis for relief under § 1983. ... These decisions do not, however, eliminate the requirement under § 1983 that the plaintiff establish a deprivation of his constitutional rights through the conduct of the defendant. ... We do not believe, however, that the alleged negligence of Appellee in permitting an “insane” prisoner to roam within the prison and in allowing that prisoner to have access to a dangerous instrument, resulting in injury to another prisoner, constitutes a denial of equal protection cognizable under § 1983. ... We thus believe that Appellant’s claim based on Appellee’s alleged negligence was properly dismissed by the District Court.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a constitutional right.

Green v. Waterford Board of Education · filed 1972-04-12

Where, as here, a complaint alleges the deprivation of a constitutional right by persons acting under color of state law, it has sufficiently stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law and does not impose a separate requirement of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

Parker v. Mandel · filed 1972-06-14

First, they argue that no claim has properly been stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that statute requires an “intentional or purposeful discrimination against a discreet class.” Secondly, they argue that in any event the complaint does not state facts amounting to a violation by defendants of the equal protection clause. ... A careful reading of that decision indicates that it dealt not with any special requirements of § 1983 but rather with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. ... Whether or not they violate the Fourteenth Amendment, such variations quite clearly result from State and not merely private action. Plaintiffs’ allegations in this respect are therefore sufficient.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right while acting under color of law.

Smith v. The Young Men's Christian Association of Montgomery, Inc. · filed 1972-06-14

Two elements must be proven to recover under Title 42, U.S.C., § 1983, (1) a deprivation of a constitutional right by the defendant, and (2) that the defendant acted under “color of law”. ... The district court correctly found that the Montgomery YMCA was so closely entwined with the City of Montgomery that it acted under “color of law” when it refused the plaintiffs’ applications for Camp Belser as well as in its conduct of segregated branches and activities. ... Since both necessary elements of a Section 1983 violation, (a) the deprivation of 14th Amendment equal protection of rights (b) under color of law, were proven, the district court was on solid ground when it concluded that the Montgomery YMCA was in violation of Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits equitable relief against a school district and its trustees and superintendent in their representative capacities, and back pay sought as part of reinstatement is an equitable remedy not subject to jury determination.

2 Fair empl.prac.cas. 926, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,235 Mildred Harkless v. The Sweeny Independent School District · filed 1970-06-02

While the question is not free from doubt, we are of the view that the school district here was included within the meaning of “person” in § 1983 for the equitable relief sought and that the district court erred in holding to the contrary. ... We therefore conclude that § 1983 includes school district trustees and school superintendents, acting in their representative as well as their individual capacities, within the meaning of “person” as the term is used in § 1983 for the purposes of the equitable relief sought here. ... We conclude that these authorities teach that a claim for back pay presented in an equitable action for reinstatement authorized by § 1983 is not for jury consideration nor are the factual issues which form the basis of the claim for reinstatement.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on the United States or the Department of Public Welfare, and an assault under color of state law is not actionable without a constitutional violation.

Davis v. United States · filed 1970-07-28

It is the opinion of the Court that the Department of Public Welfare and the United States of America are not persons liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... It is further the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against any defendant. The plaintiff has alleged only an assault and not a violation of a constitutional right. An assault by person acting under color of state law, not otherwise shown to be in violation of the Constitution, is not actionable under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not authorize a civil-rights action against the California Adult Authority because the Authority is not a person within the statute's meaning.

Flemming v. California Adult Authority, Department of Corrections, State of California · filed 1970-11-09

The California Adult Authority is not a person within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only against persons acting under color of state law; states are not persons, and private parties without state action are outside the statute.

Palermo v. Rockefeller · filed 1971-01-15

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for the actions of “persons.” It is settled law that a state is not a person within the meaning of this section. Fear v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 413 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969); Israel v. City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration of City of New York, 285 F.Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y.1968). The complaint is therefore dismissed as to the State of New York. ... Federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not extend to all controversies between individual citizens, but only to deprivations of constitutional rights arising from the actions of persons acting under color of state law, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941). Since Esveroff, Rein and Provident were not acting under color of state law, jurisdiction under § 1983 is not properly invoked. Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1969); Rhodes v. Mayer, 225 F.Supp. 80, 93-94 (D.Neb.1963), affd., 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 263, 13 L.Ed.2d 186; Pugliano v. Staziak, 231 F.Supp. 347, 351 n. 5 (W.D.Pa.1964), affd. per curiam, 345 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1965); Jackson v. Hader, 271 F.Supp. 990 (W. D.Mo.1967); Pritt v. Johnson, 264 F.Supp. 167 (M.D.Pa.1967); Kregger v. Posner, 248 F.Supp. 804, 806 (E.D.Mich.1966). The motion of Esveroff, Rein and Provident for dismissal are therefore granted. ... Members of the Parole Board act under color of state law and thus may be sued under § 1983 for deprivations of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages cause of action against federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Bethea v. Joseph J. Reid, Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Newark, New Jersey, Etal. · filed 1971-07-27

First, it rejected the plaintiff’s contention that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1964) give him a cause of action for damages in the circumstances alleged. These were federal officers acting under color of federal law, and that ruling was correct.

Section 1983 permits parents to maintain a civil-rights action alleging that a state education-funding act arbitrarily discriminates against their children by providing proportionally less financial benefit.

Battle v. Cherry · filed 1972-02-02

While there is serious question as to whether plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations are sufficient to enable them to maintain this action in their capacity as taxpayers, plaintiffs may maintain the action as a civil rights suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon allegations as parents that the Act arbitrarily discriminates against plaintiffs’ children by reason of the fact that they receive proportionally less financial benefits from the program established by the Act.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action for injunctive relief against state judges sued individually for acts violating civil rights in their official capacity, but a state appellate division as a body is not a statutory “person.”

Erdmann v. Stevens · filed 1972-04-12

Judge Ryan relied upon the decision of this Circuit in Zuckerman v. Appellate Division, 421 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1970), which held that a civil rights action could not be maintained against the Appellate Division as a body, since it is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Where (as here) the Justices and the Clerk of the Appellate Division have been sued as individuals, however, we are persuaded ... that no sound reason exists for holding that federal courts should not have the power to issue injunctive relief against the commission of acts in violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights by state judges acting in their official capacity. Accordingly, we conclude that jurisdiction exists and proceed to the merits.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for deprivations caused by state officials, not federal officials.

Kochie v. Norton · filed 1972-06-01

They have no cause of action under § 1983, which is available only against state officials.

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is borrowed from the law of the state where the cause of action arose.

Butler v. Sinn · filed 1970-04-03

The statute of limitations applicable to an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985 (1964) is that of the state in which the cause of action arose.

For a § 1983 suit arising in New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the applicable limitations period is the three-year period under CPLR § 214(2).

Romer v. Howard R. Leary, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York, and the City of New York · filed 1970-04-10

It is now settled by Swan v. Board of Higher Education, 2 Cir. 1963, 319 F.2d 56, that in a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief which is based on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable limitation in a case arising in New York is the three year limitation now provided for suits “to recover upon a liability * * * created or imposed by statute” by what is now CPLR § 214, subdivision 2.

The time limit for bringing a § 1983 action is determined by the law of the state where the cause of action arose because no federal statute of limitations applies.

Crosswhite v. Glenn H. Brown, Ex Sheriff, Tulsa County, Oklahoma · filed 1970-04-29

There is no applicable federal statute of limitations relating to civil rights actions brought under Sections 1983 and 1985. The time within which such action must be brought is to be determined by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose.

Section 1983 actions borrow the limitations period of the analogous state-law claim, including the state tolling rule for a plaintiff’s imprisonment.

United States ex rel. Sabella v. Newsday · filed 1970-06-22

Since there is no statute of limitations included in the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state law analogue is the source of the appropriate limitations period. ... Since the running of the limitations period is tolled during the plaintiff’s imprisonment and the other grounds for the defendant District Attorney’s motion to dismiss have been rejected, his motion is denied.

Section 1983 claims use the most analogous state limitations provision when no federal limitations period is provided; here, the court treated the state false-imprisonment and malicious-prosecution provision as the closest analogy.

Skrapits v. Skala · filed 1970-06-26

Where, as in Federal civil rights actions, a Federal statute does not provide a limitations period, appropriately analogous state limitations provisions are to be invoked. ... We find that the closest analogy to the instant action is not the tort immunity scheme suggested by the defendants, but the state provision regarding false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Consequently, this action is not barred and the motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, so courts borrow the most analogous limitations period from the state where the claim arose.

Harrison v. Marvin H. Wright, Metropolitan Police Department, Nashville, Tennessee · filed 1972-04-03

“Since the Civil Rights Act itself contains no limitation period, the courts will look to the most analogous statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose.”

Section 1983 actions are subject to the forum state's statute of limitations, which may bar the action.

Marnin v. Edward F. Zampella, Esq. · filed 1972-05-30

This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, dismissing a complaint brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This court has repeatedly held, in similar situations, that the applicable statute of limitations is that of New Jersey, and that it bars the action.

Section 1983 requires more than negligent conduct under state law: the conduct must deprive a person of a constitutional right or other federally secured right.

Gittlemacker v. Arthur T. Prasse, Commissioner of Prisons of Pa. And Frank C. Johnston, Warden, State Correctional · filed 1970-06-12

These cases teach that an allegation of negligent conduct by a state public official is not sufficient, in and of itself, to bring a claim within section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional right under color of law; a probationary public-school teacher dismissed with proper notice and in conformity with state law has no actionable claim based only on that dismissal.

Shirck v. Thomas · filed 1970-07-28

In order to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants have deprived her of a constitutional right “under color of law.” ... but a teacher must show that the defendants abridged some right, privilege or immunity within the scope of the Constitution of the United States and the Civil Rights statute on which she relies. ... This court holds that a complaint by a former probationary school teacher, stating only that she was dismissed upon proper notice and in conformity with state law, fails to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of constitutional rights to state an actionable civil-rights claim.

Shaffer v. Jennings · filed 1970-09-09

On the basis of these facts we find that the alleged ten day restriction on communication did not prejudice the plaintiff and, as such, the plaintiff has failed to allege a deprivation of his constitutional rights, which is an essential element of an actionable civil rights complaint.

Section 1983 does not provide relief when the complaint makes no allegations entitling the plaintiff to civil-rights relief.

Wardrop v. Brierley · filed 1970-10-29

Appellant has made no allegations which would entitle him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, or 1986.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim on the allegations in McDaniel’s civil-rights complaint.

McDaniel v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas · filed 1972-02-24

The District Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. We affirm the dismissal of the civil rights action, which ruling is clearly correct.

Section 1983 does not support relief when the complaint’s allegations are insufficient to state a civil-rights cause of action.

Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority · filed 1972-06-22

The allegations of the complaint are totally insufficient to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a federal right under color of state law; a heavily regulated monopoly gas utility acts under color of state law.

Stanford v. Gas Service Company · filed 1972-07-13

There are two essential elements to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... “The terms of § 1983 make plain two elements that are necessary for recovery. First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the ‘Constitution and laws’ of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.’ This second element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted ‘under color of law.’ ” ... Accordingly, the Court holds that the defendant Company was acting by or under color of state law for purposes of this proceeding.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right by a defendant acting under state law; conspiracy is not an element but may extend liability to private or federal actors who conspire with state actors.

Jones v. Bales · filed 1972-07-13

To maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must show (1) that he has been deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, (2) that the defendants subjected plaintiff to the deprivation or “cause[d]” him to be so subjected, and (3) that the defendants acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regula*458tion, custom or usage of any State . . . Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F. 2d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 1969). ... For a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a conspiracy is not a vital element. Nevertheless, a conspiracy may be used as the legal mechanism through which to impose liability on each and all defendants without regard to the person doing the particular act. Mizell v. North Bro-ward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468, 472-473 (5th Cir. 1970); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 126 (5th Cir. 1963). ... For example, in this case defendants Bales, a private citizen, and Kirksey and Taylor, federal officers, could not be sued under section 1983 absent the allegation of conspiracy with persons, such as Cheatham and Waggoner, who were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a federal right caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc. · filed 1972-07-21

In order to state a cause of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) the plaintiff must allege, first, the deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of a state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, ... he must allege the presence of state action, see United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966). ... Consequently, in light of the failure of the plaintiff’s complaint to pass muster on the first requisite to a § 1983 action the court need not go further and formally pass upon the second requirement—the presence of state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right under color of state law; state officers or agencies acting through state authority satisfy the latter element.

Lopez v. White Plains Housing Authority · filed 1972-10-04

Plaintiffs, therefore, have met the first requisite for stating a cause of action under § 1983: that defendants have deprived them of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The second element requires that such deprivation be accomplished by defendants “under color of state law.” ... Since all defendants are state officers or agencies by virtue of state enabling legislation (N.Y.Const., art. 18; N.Y. Public Housing Law § 422 (McKinney Supp.1971); 9(c) NYCRR § 1600.1 et seq.), it is quite clear that defendants acted under color of state law. Indeed, defendants have not raised any objections to this element of a § 1983 cause of action. ... Having satisfied the requirements necessary to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution.

Phillips v. Singletary · filed 1972-10-13

Section 1983 prescribes two elements as requisite for recovery: (1) the improper conduct must have been done by some person acting under color of state or loal law, and (2) that such conduct must have subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights secured to him by the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to show that defendants acted under color of state law and deprived them of a constitutional or federal statutory right.

Lamb v. Hamblin · filed 1972-11-30

To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiffs must show that defendants, acting under color of state law, have deprived them of a right secured by the Constitution and laws. of the United States.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and a deprivation of a constitutional or federally secured right; acting pursuant to a state license alone is not state action.

Ouzts v. Maryland National Insurance Company · filed 1972-12-06

For appellant’s first count to state a claim entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must allege that (1) the appellees were acting under color of state law and (2) their conduct subjected or caused him to be subjected to a deprivation of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. ... As cau be readily seen, appellant has equated acting pursuant to state law with acting under authority of law. ... Merely acting under a state license is not state action within the meaning of/ the civil rights acts. ... Appellant’s amended complaint does not establish a claim upon which relief can be granted because it fails to allege deprivation of any right guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right under color of state law for a civil action for redress.

Sims v. Board of Education of Independent Sch. Dist. No. 22 · filed 1971-07-01

This section of the complaint shows no deprivation of any federal right requisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a state official who, acting under color of state law, suspends an employee for exercising constitutional rights.

Lontine v. Guy Vancleave, Sheriff of Adams County, State of Colorado · filed 1973-08-27

He has, therefore, established a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. VanCleave was, of course, acting under color of state law when he suspended Lontine, as is apparent from his reliance on the provisions of Colo. Rev.Stat.1963, § 35-5-5, which provides that Sheriffs may revoke the appointment of their deputies at their pleasure, to justify his suspension of Lontine.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging the nonrenewal of a non-tenured faculty member's public-university contract to show that the decision rested on impermissible grounds.

Watts v. Board of Curators, University of Missouri · filed 1973-09-12

Plaintiff, to establish a claim in the case at bar, under the Federal Civil Rights Act, in respect to the non-renewal of a non-tenured faculty member’s teaching contract must show that the decision not to reappoint him rested on impermissible grounds.

Section 1983 provides a substantive remedy for violations of any constitutionally protected right, with the same required level of state involvement regardless of which constitutional right is at issue.

Gibbs v. Titelman · filed 1973-11-08

It is true that the “Civil Rights Act of 1871,” 17 Stat. 13, the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was established to counter the outrages committed by the Ku Klux Klan against the Negro population in the South. The early eases enforcing this statute restricted its scope to this end. However, when Congress superceded the 1871 Act, it broadened the language and purpose of the statute to encompass a substantive remedy for violation of any constitutionally protected right. ... Since Congress has chosen not to distinguish between constitutionally protected rights in § 1983, this Court can only assume that the amount of state involvement necessary to constitute “color of state law” for a deprivation of one constitutional right would equal the amount of state involvement necessary for another constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a tenant to factually plead a denial of administrative due process to state this kind of claim.

Wilson v. Lincoln Redevelopment Corporation · filed 1973-11-09

However, we need not decide the constitutional question here. We affirm the trial court for a different reason. We find that plaintiff’s complaint is deficient in that it fails to factually plead a denial of administrative due process under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law and caused a deprivation of constitutional or federal rights.

Lykken v. Vavreck · filed 1973-11-16

To prove their cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must show (1) action taken under color of state law and (2) a resulting deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or by federal law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of federal constitutional rights, and officials may invoke qualified immunity only upon a showing of good faith.

Gomez v. Board of Education · filed 1973-11-30

In examining the above statute under which this action is brought, it is apparent that the .statutory prerequisites for liability under § 1983, supra, are that the defendants must have acted under color of law, regulation, custom or usage of the State of New Mexico, and that the plaintiff must have been deprived of federal constitutional rights, privileges and immunities. We believe that the first statutory requirement or prerequisite to stating a claim has been met in this case, since the defendants are state officials, local officials and employees, who acted under the authority of statutes, regulations, custom or usage of the State of New Mexico, and the complaint so alleges in those very terms. ... We feel that plaintiff’s participation in a lawsuit against the board is a constitutionally protected right which falls under the rights covered by § 1983, supra. ... In view of the foregoing, we hold that in considering the existence of liability on the part of the defendants herein, the application of the doctrine of qualified immunity is appropriate, if there is a showing of good faith on their part for the action complained of by the plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a federally protected constitutional right and facts showing that defendants deprived the plaintiff of that right.

Raper v. Lucey · filed 1973-12-11

In ■ order to evaluate whether plaintiff’s contentions state a cause of action under § 1983, we must focus our attention upon two separate and distinct questions. First, does the claim involve a federally protected constitutional right? Secondly, has the plaintiff alleged facts which indicate that defendants have infringed upon that right?

Section 1983 permits a claim when an officer acting under color of law deprives a person, including an alien, of a federally protected right, even through unauthorized or illegal conduct.

Simon v. Lovgren · filed 1973-12-13

To come under § 1983 such an officer’s conduct need not be authorized and may even be patently illegal. ... This is a sufficient allegation of color of law for purpose of stating a § 1983 claim. ... If an assault and battery is instrumental to the denial of federally protected rights, then without doubt it comes within the purview of § 1983. ... In this context, it should be noted that § 1983 explicitly applies to aliens. ... Color of law and a federally protected right are the only elements necessary to plead a sufficient § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law that deprives a person of a constitutional or statutory right, and a private party may meet the under-color requirement by willfully participating in joint activity with state officials.

Bond v. County of Delaware · filed 1973-12-20

There are two elements to a cause of action under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There must (1) be action under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State, and (2) the action must subject the plaintiff to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws. ... Moreover, a private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an. official of the State, can be liable under § 1983. “Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of the statjite. To act ‘under color’ of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,” United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 [86 S.Ct. 1152, 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267] (1966).

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.

William L. Roberts, as Administrator of the Estate of James O. Roberts, Deceased v. James Acres and the Village of Markh · filed 1974-03-19

“only elements which need to be present in order to establish a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act are that the conduct complained of was engaged under color of state law, and that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.”

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a deprivation of a constitutional right caused by action under color of state law.

Stout v. Whiteaker · filed 1974-06-28

In the instant case, however, the state action assented as being constitutionally impermissible was the manner in which plaintiff’s dismissal was accomplished, not that dismissal arose from his exercise of constitutionally protected activity. Thus, the question under § 1983 becomes whether plaintiff’s status was such as to make applicable to its termination the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural safeguards, and if so, whether the procedures in effect at the time of plaintiff’s dismissal accorded with due process requirements.

Section 1983 provides a claim when a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Limuel v. Southern Union Gas Company · filed 1974-07-05

For Plaintiff’s claim to be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show: 1) That Defendant has deprived her of a right secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States; and 2) That Defendant acted “under color of law.”

Section 1983 does not treat a state Board of Regents or its members, officers, and representatives acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit under the statute.

Sheppard v. West Virginia Board of Regents · filed 1974-07-09

The West Virginia Board of Regents and its members, officers and representatives, acting in their official capacities, are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal constitutional rights, not ordinary state tort claims, while permitting courts to borrow developed state-law rules governing actionable wrongs and procedural bars.

Tucker v. Dewey Duncan and Tom Rasmussen · filed 1974-07-09

. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a right of action for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights. It is not a federal remedy for ordinary state tort claims, for it can vindicate only federal constitutional rights determined under federal substantive law. See Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974). Within those confines, however, it is not inappropriate to borrow from state law a developed body of rules governing actionable wrongs and a procedural bar to the assertion of a federal claim of relative triviality.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Gotkin v. Miller · filed 1974-07-24

Yet, it has been uniformly held that in order to successfully maintain a cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he has been denied a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; (2) that it was the defendants who subjected him to the deprivation complained of; and (3) that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a federal claim when a defendant acting under color of state law deprives a person of a constitutional right, including due process.

Edward Charles Davis, III v. Edgar Paul, Chief of Police, Louisville Division of Police, and Russellmcdaniel, Chief of P · filed 1974-10-22

We are of the view that appellant has set forth a claim cognizable under § 1983 in that he has alleged facts that constitute a denial of due process of law. ... Similarly, law enforcement officials cannot, consistent with the Due Process Clause, brand a person as an active shoplifter when he has never been tried for the offense.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege facts showing that defendants deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Giannaris v. Frank · filed 1974-12-03

To rely upon the civil rights statutes the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendants did deprive him of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of federal constitutional or legal rights carried out under color of state law.

Jack Neal, District Attorney, 8th Judicial District v. Honorable Kearney Brim, Judge, 8th Judicial District · filed 1975-01-09

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege some deprivation of federal constitutional or legal rights accomplished under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable constitutional claim for a failure to post prison rules unless the plaintiff shows that the failure prejudiced him.

Russell v. Oliver · filed 1975-01-21

Therefore, even if this court were to find that the rules and regulations were not in fact posted, no constitutional claim cognizable under § 1983 is stated absent a showing by the plaintiff that he has been prejudiced as a result.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law and a deprivation of federal rights, and a private person cannot be liable for conspiring with an immune state judge against whom no valid § 1983 claim can be stated.

Meyer v. Lavelle · filed 1975-02-18

The Act prescribes two elements as requisite for a cause of action: (1) the conduct complained of must have been done or caused to have been done by a person acting under color of law; and (2) the conduct must have subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... A private person cannot be held liable under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless his wrongful action was done under color of state law or state authority. Further, a private person alleged to have conspired with a state judge and prosecuting attorney who are entitled to immunity, cannot be held liable, since he is not conspiring with persons acting under color of law ‘against whom [plaintiff] could state a valid claim’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Under this rule neither Wisconsin Surety nor Hulse may be held liable for conspiring with the state judge who is immune from suit. Meyer has therefore failed to state a claim under § 1983 for which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show injury caused by a person acting under color of state law that resulted in a constitutional deprivation.

Srack v. NORTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY · filed 1975-03-20

Three elements must be established if an action is to be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, the resulting injury must have been caused by a “person." Secondly, the “person” must have been acting under color of state law. Finally, the injury sustained must result in a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 applies only when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School District · filed 1975-03-20

The defendants correctly view 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as requiring two jurisdictional elements to be present. ... The second jurisdictional element of § 1983 is a showing by the plaintiff that the defendant deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... The court concludes that there exists no constitutionally protected property interest in competing for a place on a high school athletic team. To hold otherwise would too greatly strain the concept of property.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove both deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right and action under color of state law.

Board of Education of Independent School District No. 53 v. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 52 · filed 1975-03-31

In considering Plaintiff’s burden to establish that its rights have been violated by persons acting under “color of state law” the Court finds that in addition to Plaintiff failing to establish that its constitutional rights had been violated, that it likewise has failed to establish the second element required to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for federal-court correction of school administrators’ discretionary errors unless they rise to a violation of a specific constitutional guarantee.

Hibbs v. Board of Education of Iowa Central Community College · filed 1975-04-24

[Section] 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 [89 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21 L.Ed.2d 228] (1968) ; Tinker, supra, 393 U.S. at 507 [89 S.Ct. at 736].

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, and a private party may be liable when involved in a conspiracy with a state official.

Hazo v. Geetz · filed 1975-06-19

In order to find a valid claim under § 1983, two requirements must be met, (1) the plaintiff must assert a deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant must have acted under color of state law. ... We accept plaintiff’s argument that a private party may be liable under § 1983 if involved in a conspiracy with a state official, in this case, co-defendant Deputy Sheriff Telford.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show both deprivation of a federally secured right and causation by a person acting under color of state law.

Girard v. 94th Street and Fifth Avenue Corp. · filed 1975-06-30

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) causation of such deprivation by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires both action under color of state law and a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Meyer v. Curran · filed 1975-07-15

Section 1983 prescribes two elements as requisite for recovery: (1) the conduct complained of must have been done by some person acting under color of state law, and (2) such conduct must have subjected the complainant to the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for federal-court correction of school officials’ discretionary errors that do not rise to the level of specific constitutional violations.

Gilbertson v. McAlister · filed 1975-11-04

The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Chase v. McMasters · filed 1975-12-20

The basic requirements of a § 1983 complaint are: (1) that complained conduct was under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct subjected plaintiff to a deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of constitutional rights; defamation alone does not establish a § 1983 claim.

Ralph L. Williams and Mary Jane Williams, His Wife v. Slade Gorton and Sally Gorton, His Wife, Etc. · filed 1976-01-19

Two elements are necessary to establish a claim for damages under these sections: (1) the conduct complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and (2) the conduct subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. ... The complaint detailed the allegedly defamatory statements made by Gorton, but defamation itself does not establish a cause of action under these sections. It is the deprivation of constitutional rights for which the Act creates a remedy, and on that score the allegations contained in the complaint were deficient.

Section 1983 requires allegations that defendants acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Rosado v. Santiago · filed 1976-02-27

These are the basic elements of a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove both a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law and action under color of state law.

Smith v. Webb · filed 1976-08-09

The terms of § 1983 make plain two elements that are necessary for recovery. First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” This second element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted “under color of law.”

A § 1983 claim requires conduct under color of state law and a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District · filed 1976-09-08

There are two essential elements of a cause of action under § 1983. First, the conduct complained of must have been done by some person acting under color of state law and, second, such conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 claims alleging discrimination require particularized factual allegations rather than conclusory assertions.

Durso v. Rowe · filed 1977-02-07

Conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws under color of state law, does not require an improper motive, and permits good-faith and probable-cause defenses.

Winfield v. United States · filed 1977-03-11

In order to recover under Section 1983 of Title 42, plaintiff must establish that he was deprived “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” and that the deprivation occurred “under color of” state law. It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to establish an ulterior or improper motive. ... But since Section 1983 is to be read in the context of common law tort liability, the defenses of good faith and probable cause are available to the officer. ... Although no issue has been raised as to the color of state law requirement, I will examine it since it is a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. ... I find that the “color of law” requirement is satisfied.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead action under color of state law, deprivation of constitutional rights, and specific illegal conduct and resulting harm.

Uretsky v. Baschen · filed 1977-04-01

To state a cause of action under 1983 a plaintiff must first plead facts sufficient to show that the defendant has (1) acted under color of State law and (2) infringed upon or deprived him of constitutional rights. Cf. Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846, 24 L. Ed. 2d 95, 90 S. Ct. 90. ... However, the plaintiff is also required to set forth specific illegal conduct and resultant harm in a way which will permit an informed ruling whether the wrong complained of abridges the Federal rights included in section 1983. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894, 34 L. Ed. 2d 152, 93 S. Ct. 116, 175.

Section 1983 reaches constitutional-rights claims without requiring class-based discrimination, but a conspiracy claim must allege the agreement and overt acts with particularity.

Perrotta v. Irizarry · filed 1977-05-03

Although not specifically referred to in the complaint, plaintiff’s allegations could conceivably state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The reach of § 1983 is greater than § 1985 — there is no requirement of class-based discrimination. ... Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights by means of selective prosecution. However, he presents no underlying facts to support his claim. He neither alleges that defendants actually formed an agreement nor that they engaged in any overt act in furtherance thereof.