Statute Annotations › Federal › 28 U.S.C. § 1391

28 U.S.C. § 1391

Venue generally: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
8,639
Cited in passing
6,372
Citing cases indexed
23,910
Case dates
1949–2026
Screened through
2026-06-26
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-20
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

15,011 citing cases reviewed of 23,910 in the citation index: 8,639 interpreted the section (annotated below), 6,372 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-26 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 28 U.S.C. § 1391?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1957-04-29 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. held that § 1400(b) exclusively governs domestic corporate residence for patent infringement venue; § 1391(c) does not supplement it. Source
  • 1962-10-05 Public Law 87-748 added subsection (e), allowing venue where the plaintiff resides in specified official-capacity suits against federal officers and agencies. Source
  • 1963-12-23 Public Law 88-234 added an automobile tort venue provision in subsection (f); Congress repealed it in 1966. Source
  • 1966-05-16 Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez held that § 1391(c) expands corporate residence for venue under the Jones Act, overruling the narrower Leith rule. Source
  • 1966-11-02 Public Law 89-714 added the district where the claim arose as a general venue option and repealed the automobile-specific subsection (f). Source
  • 1967-06-05 Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen held that an unincorporated labor union resides for venue where it does business, reversing the contrary venue ruling below. Source
  • 1972-06-07 Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc. held that the then-existing alien-defendant rule in § 1391(d) applied even to patent actions governed by § 1400(b). Source
  • 1976-10-21 Public Law 94-574 expanded official-capacity venue under subsection (e) to actions against the United States, and Public Law 94-583 added subsection (f) for actions against foreign states. Source
  • 1979-06-26 Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. reversed a venue ruling based on effects in the plaintiff’s district and held that the claim arose in Idaho, where the challenged official acts occurred. Source
  • 1980-02-20 Stafford v. Briggs held that subsection (e)’s expanded venue and service do not reach personal-capacity damages suits against federal officers. Source
  • 1989-02-17 Public Law 100-702 replaced subsection (c)’s incorporated, licensed, or doing-business corporate residence test with a personal-jurisdiction test. Source
  • 1990-12-01 Public Law 101-650 removed plaintiff residence as a general diversity venue ground and substituted substantial events or property for the single district where the claim arose. Source
  • 1993-01-01 Public Law 102-572 limited subsection (a)(3)’s personal-jurisdiction fallback to actions for which no district is otherwise available. Source
  • 1995-10-03 Public Law 104-34 changed subsection (a)(3)’s fallback from a district where all defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction to one where any defendant was. Source
  • 2003-01-31 Public Law 107-273 added subsection (g), a venue rule for multiparty, multiforum litigation under § 1369, applicable to accidents on or after this date. Source
  • 2012-01-06 Public Law 112-63 rewrote the general venue rules for actions commenced on or after this date: diversity and federal-question actions share the same grounds; the statute defines individual, entity, foreign-defendant, and multidistrict corporate residence. Source
  • 2013-12-03 Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court held that a forum selection clause does not make venue improper under § 1391; transfer to the selected federal forum proceeds under § 1404(a). Source
  • 2017-05-22 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC reaffirmed Fourco and rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that § 1391(c) broadens domestic corporate residence under the patent venue statute, § 1400(b). Source

Effect of 1948 revision

Section 1391(b)'s 1948 rephrasing of the prior federal venue provision made no substantive change to venue rules.

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Graham · filed 1949-06-27(b)

We think that the rephrasing in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) (1948) of 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1046) makes no substantive change in respect of venue of the United States courts generally, and since the decision of" the trial court in the instant case was rendered and the briefs on appeal written in terms of the venue provision as phrased in Section 112, we refer in this opinion to that phrasing rather than to the phrasing of Section 1391 (b).
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Venue in diversity actions

Section 1391(a) governs venue for diversity actions at the district level and does not require filing in a particular division.

Jordon v. Bowman Apple Products Co., Inc. · filed 1990-01-10(a)

Venue is proper in the Western District since the claims arose here. Section 1391(a) makes no reference to Divisions.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where all plaintiffs reside, including any division of that district.

Simpson v. Quality Oil Co., Inc. · filed 1989-10-25(a)

Venue in this case is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). This section permits a civil action founded only on diversity to be brought in any of three possible districts: the district where all plaintiffs reside, the district where all defendants reside, or the district in which the claim arose. ... Venue in this case is exclusively controlled by § 1391(a), and is proper in the Indianapolis division of the Southern District of Indiana.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In diversity cases, § 1391(a) permits venue where all plaintiffs reside, and § 1391(c)’s definition of a corporate defendant’s residence does not limit that option.

Strick Corp. v. A. J. F. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. · filed 1982-02-25(a), (c)

In such cases, section 1391(c) does not impose venue requirements more restrictive than the alternative bases set forth in section 1391(a); instead, it simply provides an expanded definition of a corporate defendant’s “residence” which may be relied upon when venue is sought to be established on the basis of the residence of all defendants under section 1391(a).
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Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue in the district where the plaintiff resides in a suit against federal agency officials or employees.

Heublein, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 1982-03-16(e)(4)

Venue lies in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4), as the defendants are officials or employees of an agency of the United States and the plaintiff resides in this District.
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Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue in an action against federal officers in the district where a plaintiff with standing resides when no real property is involved.

Cohen v. Smith · filed 1982-03-17(e)(4)

Consequently, as plaintiff Cohen’s residence in the Southern District of Texas vests this Court with proper venue in this case, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4) (1976), the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue.
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Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a district where neither party resides and the cause of action did not arise.

Erich v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 1980-11-24(a)

This action could not have been initiated in the Middle District of Pennsylvania because neither plaintiff or defendant reside here, nor did the cause of action arise here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside.

Kirksey v. Beauchesne · filed 1951-06-08(a)

In the present case, the plaintiff brings his action in the District of Massachusetts in which he resides. The venue requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is satisfied, and there is no necessity for consent or waiver on the part of the defendants.
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Section 1391 does not govern venue in an action removed from state court.

Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc. · filed 1953-06-01(a), (c)

But even on the question of venue, § 1391 has no application to this case because this is a removed action. The venue of removed actions is governed by 28 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1441 (a), and under that section venue was properly laid in the Southern District of Florida.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 89-714 (Nov. 2, 1966) added the district where the claim arose as a general venue option, ending the residence-only rule. Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

Section 1391 requires a diversity action to be brought in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

Shall v. Henry · filed 1954-03-05(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that a civil action founded only on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. The record discloses that plaintiff was a resident of California and that of the defendants only one was a resident of Illinois. Defendants Henry, Stiefel and Palermo all resided in other states. Consequently, if the point was properly and timely raised, the court was without jurisdiction to proceed against any of the defendants.
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Section 1391(a)’s residence limits apply when the defendant has not consented to suit in the district.

Rhyne v. Pigott · filed 1954-07-08(a)

Defendant has not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court. Absent defendant’s consent, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) apply.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action only in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

Drapkin v. Keene · filed 1955-02-10(a)

Section 1391(a) Title 28 U.S.C.A. provides that “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may * * * be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Western District of New York therefore, like the Southern District, is not the proper venue.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) requires a diversity action to be brought where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, unless another law provides otherwise.

McNulty v. Heine · filed 1956-01-20(a)

The general venue provisions applicable in cases where federal jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship are set out in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and require, except as otherwise provided by law, that a civil action be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

Section 1391(a) does not allow an infant plaintiff to establish venue based solely on a guardian ad litem’s residence; venue depends on where the infant plaintiff or the defendant resides.

Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Company · filed 1956-03-05(a)

The question before the court, therefore, is this: can an infant residing in one state cause a guardian ad litem or next friend to be appointed in another state for the purpose of bringing suit in the second state and thereby create venue in the federal court in such- second state based solely on the residence of the guardian ad litem or next friend? I am of opinion that he cannot.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) places venue in a diversity action at the plaintiff’s residence when the defendants do not all reside in one state.

Pan American Fire & Casualty Company v. Revere · filed 1960-09-30(a)

Because of the Wisconsin defendant, there is no one district or state in which “all defendants reside” and the only proper venue is that of the plaintiff.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 89-714 (Nov. 2, 1966) added the district where the claim arose as a general venue option, ending the residence-only rule. Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

In a diversity action, venue is proper only in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, including defendants who have not been served.

Shelley v. Maccabees · filed 1961-02-23(a)

Since jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship, the action could “be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Since all defendants (served or named) did not reside in a judicial district in Michigan, venue there was improper; the action could not have been brought there and consequently it may not be transferred there.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

Under § 1391(a), venue in a diversity action lies in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

Industrial Waxes, Inc. v. International Railways of Central America · filed 1961-04-26(a)

Section 1391(a) provides that suits “be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.” ... This attack upon venue must be upheld, since admittedly the plaintiffs are residents of Ohio, the defendants IRCA and Wilier, residents of New Jersey, and McGovern is a resident of Massachusetts.
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Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a district where neither party resides.

MacNeil v. Whittemore · filed 1958-04-30(a)

It is quite clear that this action against a judge of the highest court of Massachusetts, who has only a summer place in Vermont, for claimed violation of plaintiff’s civil rights through official action does not satisfy the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), since neither party resides in the District of Vermont.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391 permits a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff resides and treats a corporation doing business in a district as a resident there for venue purposes.

Trussell v. Bear Manufacturing Co. · filed 1963-03-09(a), (c)

The jurisdiction of this Court is founded only on diversity of citizenship and' the jurisdictional amount and thus, may be brought in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a). The venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. §'• 1391(c).
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Section 1391(a) applies to actions founded only on diversity of citizenship.

Boardman v. Martocchia · filed 1963-05-08(a)

While neither plaintiff nor defendants reside within the District of Columbia, this action is not founded on diversity of citizenship, and this section is therefore inapplicable.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 89-714 (Nov. 2, 1966) added the district where the claim arose as a general venue option, ending the residence-only rule. Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought only in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

O'Shatz v. Bailey · filed 1963-08-16(a)

The applicable test is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which reads: ... “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.” ... For the reasons stated above, the motion of defendant Bailey for dismissal is denied and the action, as regards defendant Dobbs only, is severed and transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

In a diversity case, venue is proper in the district where the plaintiff resides when the defendant is amenable to process there.

Wisconsin Metal & Chemical Corp. v. DeZurik Corp. · filed 1963-09-26(c)

Defendant’s third ground for its motion, that venue is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) is also without merit. A diversity case may be commenced in any District where plaintiff or defendant resides. Plaintiff is a resident of Wisconsin and hence, having found defendant amenable to process under § 262.05(5), Wisconsin Statutes, the case is properly in this District.
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Section 1391(a)'s venue restriction does not affect whether an action may be removed from state court to federal court.

Tamminga v. Suter · filed 1962-12-07(a)

Shortly stated, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) has no possible effect upon the re-movability of an action from a state ■court to a United States District Court.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Selsby v. Vecchione · filed 1963-04-04(a)

Venue in this District is not “wrong” because plaintiff is a resident here (28 U.S. C. § 1391(a)).
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Law changed since Pub. L. 89-714 (Nov. 2, 1966) added the district where the claim arose as a general venue option, ending the residence-only rule.

Section 1391 does not provide venue for common law claims in a district where neither all plaintiffs nor all defendants reside.

New Park Mining Company v. Cranmer · filed 1963-11-01

Venue as to the common law causes of action asserted against these defendants cannot be based upon the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, since this district is not one within which all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
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Section 1391’s general venue rule is modified by Section 1401 for shareholder derivative actions, allowing venue where the corporation could have sued the defendants.

Dowd v. Front Range Mines, Inc. · filed 1965-06-14

We hold that Section 1391, as modified by Section 1401, gives the Court venue. By recognizing that the true interest which is being advanced is that of the Front Range, it follows that the citizenship of the nominal plaintiffs is unimportant from a venue standpoint. Section 1401, as we read it, permits venue to be laid in this district because it is a judicial district where the corporation might have sued the same defendants.
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Section 1391(a)'s residence-based venue rule for diversity actions yields when § 1655 permits the action in the district where the property is located.

A. Alex Shuford, Jr. v. Roy G. Anderson, and Currier & Carlsen, Incorporated, a Corporation · filed 1965-10-14(a)

Moreover, without the reach of § 1655 venue would not lie in the District of Colorado because neither plaintiff nor the defendants are residents of that state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 21 With Anderson subject to service of process under § 1655, however, by the same token venue in the District of Colorado is established and the indispensable party is brought before the court.
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Law changed since Pub. L. 101-650 (Dec. 1, 1990) removed a plaintiff’s residence as an independent ground for general diversity venue.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action arising from an automobile collision where all plaintiffs reside, where all defendants reside, or where the collision occurred.

Granger v. Kemm, Inc. · filed 1966-02-02(a), (c), (f)

Applying this statute to the case at bar, it is evident that this action must be brought in the District of Connecticut where the plaintiffs reside or in the Middle District of Pennsylvania where the collision occurred. It cannot be instituted in the Eastern District of this Commonwealth because neither all the plaintiffs nor all the defendants reside or do business here and the accident did not happen within its borders.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be filed in the district where the plaintiff resides or where all defendants reside.

Kaiser v. Mayo Clinic · filed 1966-11-15(a)

Since this is a diversity action, plaintiff had a choice under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) of laying venue in the judicial district where he resides (Illinois) or in the district where all defend ... ants reside (Minnesota). Thus venue in Illinois was permissible.
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action where the claim arose, and its 1966 amendment applies to pending suits.

Rosen v. Savant Instruments, Inc. · filed 1967-02-23(a)

In view of this amendment and the facts in this case, it is clear that the alleged wrongful death occurred in the State of Rhode Island; that the claim arose in Rhode Island and, therefore, that venue would properly have been laid in the District Court for the District of Rhode Island. ... Section 1391(a) as so amended is procedural. ... The court holds, therefore, that under section 1391(a), as so amended, venue in the instant case would properly lie in the District Court for the District of Rhode Island as of the time the instant action was instituted in this court.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action where all plaintiffs reside or where the claim arose; a libel or slander claim arises where it was published.

Jaffe v. Dolan · filed 1967-03-03(a)

The plaintiff is a resident of the State of New Jersey. The claim arose in the State of New Jersey. A claim for libel or slander arises in the state where it is published. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., Second Circuit, January 10, 1967, 373 F.2d 175. Therefore, venue could properly have been laid in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside.

Local 15 of Independent Workers of Noble County, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1967-03-03(a)

Contrary to defendants’ position, venue in a case founded solely on diversity of citizenship is proper in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside, as well as where all defendants reside. 28 U.S. C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits initial venue in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

Miller v. Steinbach · filed 1967-04-03(a)

Venue is only initially proper in the district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1964). In the case at bar, plaintiff is a New York resident and neither defendant resides in the same district so that venue for this cause of action was only proper in this district.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity-based Rule 22 interpleader action only in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire · filed 1967-04-10(a)

Third, State Farm could not have invoked it in light of venue and service of process limitations. Whereas statutory inter-pleader may be brought in the district where any claimant resides (28 U. S. C. § 1397), Rule interpleader based upon diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside (28 U. S. C. § 1391 (a)).
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Section 1391(b) requires a nondiversity civil action to be brought in the district where all defendants reside when no special venue provision applies.

Walker v. Weaver · filed 1967-04-12(b)

This action does not rest on diversity of citizenship and under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b), the plaintiff has no choice of venue, but must bring the action in the district where the defendants reside.
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Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the taxpayer has its principal place of business and the defendant holding the disputed funds does business.

United States v. Cameron Construction Co. · filed 1965-10-05

This argument, however, is without merit. Since it appears that the taxpayer Cameron has its principal place of business within the Southern District of New York and that the defendant Smith, which holds the funds, does business within the district, venue is properly laid in the Southern District of New York.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Time, Inc. v. Manning · filed 1966-11-09(a)

Since Manning is a resident of New Orleans, venue in the Eastern District of Louisiana is clearly proper under section 1391(a).
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Section 1391(e) permits venue in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides.

Coledanchise v. Macy · filed 1967-03-07(e)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) venue lies in the judicial district in which plaintiff resides.
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the judicial district where the claim arose.

Ptaszynki v. Ferrell · filed 1967-12-12(a)

The action, founded only on diversity of citizenship, could have been brought in the judicial district “ * * * in which the claim arose. * * *” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as amended by P.L. 89-714; 80 Stat. 1111, approved November 2, 1966.
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Section 1391(b) permits a civil action not founded solely on diversity to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, unless another law provides otherwise.

Sutton v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, COMMONWEALTH OF PA. · filed 1968-06-28(b)

No other venue statute is here applicable. The cause of action arose in Pennsylvania, and the defendants are found in that state. Venue in the Southern District of New York is therefore improper.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity case, § 1391 permits venue in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

Rosen v. Sohn · filed 1968-08-20(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that where jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship, venue is proper “in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.” Since all defendants do not reside in the same district, the case is not properly transferrable to either.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Potter's Photographic Applications Co. v. Ealing Corporation · filed 1968-10-11(a)

As Ealing conceded in its memorandum filed June 17, 1968, venue is therefore properly located in this court since the principal place of business of the plaintiff is in Nassau County, within this district.
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Section 1391(a) limits venue for diversity actions, subject to exceptions provided by law.

Nowell v. Nowell · filed 1968-12-31(a)

The restriction imposed by section 1391(a) must limit the venue of actions commenced under Rule 4(e) because of the injunctive language of Rule 82.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Ryer v. Harrisburg Kohl Brothers, Inc. · filed 1969-09-08(a)

The present action could clearly have been brought in the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), since ... The defendants, of course, are all Pennsylvania residents and the action arose there.
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Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Ladson v. Kibble · filed 1969-12-09(a)

The venue of this diversity action could have been originally laid in the Northern District of Indiana. All the defendants reside there, and, additionally, the automobile accident or claim arose there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the district where the claim arose.

Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Allied Chemical Co. · filed 1970-04-15(a)

Venue would likewise be properly laid in the Southern District of Mississippi. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, * * *, be brought * * * in the judicial district * * * in which the claim arose.” Accordingly, in view of the injuries sustained in Mississippi, venue would be proper in the transferee court.
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Section 1391(a) identifies the federal districts where a civil action may be filed.

Carson v. U-Haul Co. · filed 1969-12-30(a)

Up to one year after the accident the plaintiffs could have sued in the federal courts of Georgia or Kentucky, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Grey v. Continental Marketing Associates, Inc. · filed 1970-06-22(a)

The suit being one in which federal court jurisdiction is founded solely upon diversity of citizenship venue would be proper either in the judicial district in which all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or in the district in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Since the only plaintiff in this action resides in the Northern District of Georgia, it appears that venue in this district is not improper.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action only where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or where the claims arose, and applies to transitory actions.

Gorman v. King · filed 1970-09-14(a)

The defendant’s argument that the venue of this action is improper, however, must be sustained. 28 U.S. C. Sec. 1391(a), provides: “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claims arose.” ... In my opinion, Sec. 1391(a) prohibits the bringing of this action in the eastern district of Wisconsin, since the plaintiffs reside in the states of New York, Washington and Wisconsin, while the sole defendant is . a resident of Michigan. In addition, Sec. 1391 applies only to transitory actions, while the present action appears to be one of a local nature.
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Section 1391(a) and (b) do not treat a federal official sued in his official capacity as a citizen of the state where he resides, and subsection (c) does not apply unless each defendant is a federal officer or employee.

Honchok v. Hardin · filed 1971-05-14(a), (b), and (c)

His official residence is in the District of Columbia; he is not a citizen of Maryland within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) or 1391(a) and (b). ... Section 1391(c) does not apply because “each defendant” is not an officer or employee of the United States.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (a) permits venue where all plaintiffs reside or the claim arose, while subsection (c) defines a corporation’s residence without limiting those alternatives.

Campbell v. Triangle Corporation · filed 1972-01-27(a), (c)

Plaintiff resides in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the claim arose here; therefore, venue is proper. Triangle apparently assumes that subsection (c) of the venue statute supercedes subsection (a) so that a corporation can only be sued where it is incorporated, licensed or doing business regardless of where all the plaintiffs in a diversity action reside. This reading of the venue statute is clearly erroneous. Subsection (c) defines a corporation’s residence for purposes of venue; it does not limit venue, in a case where a corporation is a defendant, to the corporation’s residence if the plaintiffs can satisfy the requirement of subsection (a) which was done in the case before us.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a diversity action where neither the plaintiff nor the defendants reside in the district.

Willametz v. Susi · filed 1972-01-27(a)

The venue of this diversity action was not properly laid in this district when the complaint was filed, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendants were residents of this district. 28 U.S. C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(b) permits venue in a non-diversity action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Daugherty v. R. K. Procunier, Director of the Department of Corrections · filed 1972-02-29(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue in non-diversity actions is proper “ . . . only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose . . .” Therefore, venue was improper in the Northern District, and the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice to Daughtery’s renewing his suit in the proper district.
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Section 1391 makes venue proper in a district where the defendants reside.

Pugh v. Klinger · filed 1971-11-16

In any event, the proper venue of this action appears to be the Eastern District of Pennsylvania where all remaining defendants apparently reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) the court orders this case transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the interest of justice.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

Junior Spice, Incorporated v. Turbotville Dress, Inc. · filed 1972-03-09(a)

In view of our conclusion that the Oshiraks must be considered Kansas residents for purposes of this case, then the Eastern District is not a judicial district in which all of the defendants reside (§ 1391(a)); moreover, all defendants do not reside in different districts within the state (§ 1392(a)). Therefore venue cannot properly be laid in the Eastern District and exists only in the Middle District where the cause of action arose.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action where all plaintiffs or defendants reside or where the claim arose, and subsection (b) does not alter that venue choice.

Walker v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. · filed 1973-10-30(a), (b)

It is further the opinion of the Court that defendant’s contention that venue is improper is without merit. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides in pertinent part that: “(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction, is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” Not only does the plaintiff reside within this judicial district, but it is also alleged that the claim upon which he seeks relief arose here. We do not believe that § 1391(b) alters plaintiff’s choice of venue.
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Section 1391(b) allows venue in a non-diversity action only where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Wingard v. State of North Carolina · filed 1973-12-04(b)

Under 28 U.S. C. § 1391(b), venue in a non-diversity action is proper “only in the judicial district where all the defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” ... The Clerk is therefore directed to transfer this case to the Shelby Division of the Western District of North Carolina, the division in which the plaintiff is located and in which the alleged harm was inflicted, and therefore the division in which the claim arose.
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In a diversity action, venue is proper in a district where the sole corporate defendant does business, because it resides there for venue purposes.

Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1974-02-26(a), (c)

Liberty is incorporated in the State of Massachusetts with its principal place of business there and has at all relevant times been authorized to do business and is doing business in the Northern District of Oklahoma. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) provides that venue in diversity actions such as this lies “in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” Corporate residence for purpose of venue is “any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Liberty is the sole defendant. The Northern District of Oklahoma is therefore a district in which this case might have been brought.
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Section 1391(b) requires a nondiversity action to be filed where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

William L. Bracey, Jr. v. Grenoble · filed 1974-03-18(b)

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1391(b), this action 'not founded solely on diversity of citizenship' could 'be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.' Grenoble resides in the Middle District, and the claim arose in the Middle District.
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Section 1391(a) governs venue in actions based solely on diversity jurisdiction.

North Central Utilities, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe & Supply Co. · filed 1974-04-12(a)

Since plaintiff now has made it clear that jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, there is no longer any question that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all plaintiffs reside or where the claim arose.

Vasquez v. Falcon Coach Co., Inc. · filed 1974-06-12(a)

Venue in this case is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) which provides : “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” The cause of action, if any, arose in North Dakota, and the plaintiff resides therein.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where all plaintiffs reside, even when a conflicting state venue rule would close the state courts.

Miller v. Davis · filed 1974-11-26(a)

Kentucky is Appellants’ residence, so that the federal statute gives the Kentucky federal courts venue to adjudicate these claims. Heeding federal venue provisions despite a conflicting state door-closing rule is appropriate when the state rule itself stems from venue considerations rather than substantive state policies.
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Section 1391 governs venue for cases brought in federal district court and does not apply to cases removed from state court.

Tanglewood Mall, Inc. v. CHASE MANHATTAN BK.(NAT. ASS'N) · filed 1974-02-07

The difficulty with these cases as well as others cited by Tanglewood is that they deal with a conflict between the general venue provisions governing diversity suits brought in federal court, now 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and the venue provision governing suits removed from state to federal court, now 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In such cases § 1391 has no application and the venue provision of § 1441 is given effect simply because § 1391 only governs the venue of cases “brought” in the federal district court.
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Section 1391(a) governs venue in diversity actions originally filed in federal court, but does not govern venue after removal from state court.

Warren Bros. v. Community Building Corp. of Atlanta, Inc. · filed 1974-12-06(a)

This action was originally brought in the state court and not in the federal court. In such a case, the proper venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and not by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a civil action in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

Tillman v. Eattock · filed 1974-12-10(a)

It is clear that venue in this Court is factually proper, inasmuch as a civil action may be brought in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Irving Trust Company v. Smith · filed 1972-10-12(a)

Venue is proper in this diversity action since the plaintiff resides here.
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where all defendants reside, making that district an available forum for transfer.

Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. McAlpine · filed 1975-03-21(a)

Venue in this suit is governed by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Diversity cases may be brought “only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Plaintiff alleges that McAlpine is a resident of the Eastern District of Michigan; defendant admits that allegation. Thus Michigan is a district within which suit could have been brought originally.
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Section 1391(a) and (c) govern whether venue is proper in the district where a diversity suit is filed.

Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc. · filed 1975-05-29(a), (c)

Pursuant to the order of February 21, 1975, the parties filed supplementary briefs on the issue of whether this suit was properly brought in this district pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c), and, additionally, whether dismissal or transfer is warranted under either 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a). ... Since venue is improper in this court, transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is foreclosed.
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Section 1391(e) permits a mandamus action in specified districts, but the record must establish facts supporting venue in the chosen district.

United States v. Richard Huss and Jeffrey Smilow · filed 1975-07-25(e)

Secondly, neither the two-page motion nor the testimony indicates facts which would establish venue in the Southern District of New York. Certainly on this barren record, we cannot hold that any appropriate federal mandamus respondent resides in the Southern District of New York.
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where the defendants reside, even when the plaintiff resides in another state.

Kane v. Hallmark Insurance · filed 1976-03-05(a)

Because defendants are citizens of Wisconsin and plaintiff is a citizen of Florida, this action might have been brought in Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Peebles v. Murray · filed 1976-04-16(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), where the action is based solely upon diversity of citizenship as it is here, an action may be brought only in the district where all plaintiffs, or all defendants reside, or in the district in which the claim arose. The Central District for the District of California is not the proper place of venue under § 1391(a); plaintiff is a Kansas resident, and defendant Murray is a resident of Canada rather than of California. The district in which the claim arose would appear to be Missouri rather than California.
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Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; neither basis was met in the Eastern District of New York.

Thee v. Marvin Glass & Associates · filed 1976-05-04(b)

In this case, as Sec. 1391(b) clearly provides, venue would only be proper in this district if either all of the defendants reside in the Eastern District of New York or if the claim arose in the Eastern District of New York. ... Therefore, in this case the residency requirement of Section 1391(b) has not been fulfilled. ... Therefore, the requirement that the claim must have arisen in this judicial district has not been met.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where all plaintiffs reside even if the defendants do not reside there under § 1391(c).

Miles v. Charles E. Smith Companies · filed 1975-10-31(a)

But the fact that Maryland cannot therefore “be regarded as the residence” of either defendant herein “for venue purposes”, as provided by § 1391(c), does not destroy the venue in this case under § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) permits venue where all defendants reside.

James v. Daley & Lewis · filed 1976-01-07(a)

At the outset it should be noted since all defendants reside in Delaware, venue here was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where all defendants reside.

Lau v. Change · filed 1976-05-25(a)

In addition, venue in that court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as the District of Maryland is a district where “all defendants reside.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Berryhill v. Marshall Exploration, Inc. · filed 1976-09-02(a)

Venue is proper since plaintiff is domiciled here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where all plaintiffs reside.

Carter v. Massey · filed 1977-03-04(a)

Venue has been challenged by all defendants pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). In a civil action where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, as is the case here, venue is proper where all plaintiffs reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The motions challenging venue will be denied.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391 permits venue in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside.

Kurtz v. Draur · filed 1977-06-17(a)

Since plaintiff resides in Pennsylvania, venue was properly laid in Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
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Section 1391(b) requires a nondiversity action to be brought in the district where all defendants reside or where the claims arose.

Coleman v. Crisp · filed 1977-09-26(b)

Since this action does not rest on diversity of citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) the plaintiff must bring his action in the judicial district where all the defendants reside or in which his claims arose.
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in a district where all defendants reside.

Teleprompter Corp. v. Polinsky · filed 1977-09-29(a)

It is also uncontested that Minnesota is a district in which the case “could have been brought,” since jurisdiction is based solely on diversity and Minnesota is the residence of all defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) makes venue proper where the plaintiff resides, where all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

Haire v. Miller · filed 1977-09-30(a)

For this case venue is proper in either Mississippi, where the plaintiff resides, or in Indiana, where all the defendants reside ... and where the accident occurred.
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Section 1391(a) permits venue where all defendants reside.

McLaughlin v. Copeland · filed 1977-06-07(a)

In view of this deficiency, transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware is particularly appropriate because the three defendants are Delaware citizens and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391 makes venue proper in a district where the corporate defendants do business and the individual defendant resides.

Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1977-08-09

In this case, it is clear that the Southern District of New York is a proper venue, inasmuch as all of the defendants are apparently doing business there, or, in the case of the individual defendant, a resident there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside.

Corke v. Sameiet M. S. Song of Norway, Royal Caribbean Cruise Line A/s Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., and Per · filed 1978-03-07(a)

Since jurisdiction was premised on diversity of citizenship, the Western District of New York was, for venue purposes, a proper district within which to commence the action because appellant resided in Rochester, New York.
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Section 1391(a) and its corporate venue provision in subsection (c) govern venue in a diversity action against a corporation.

Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. · filed 1978-03-24(a), (c)

With this there can be no quarrel, for we note that the citizenship of the parties and the amount claimed in apparent good faith by the plaintiff satisfies the statutory prerequisites for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1832; the statutory requirements for venue are met under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and the special “corporate venue” provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
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Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity civil action in a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Strada · filed 1978-04-25(b)

As previously noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) allows a civil action to be brought in the judicial district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose. In this case, the defendant R & M Engineering resides in the Northern District of Illinois so venue is proper in that district.
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Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity action against private defendants in the district where they reside or where the claim arose.

De La Fuente Ex Rel. De La Fuente v. Interstate Commerce Commission · filed 1978-06-05(b)

Under § 1391(b), this action may be brought against them only in the district where they reside in Texas or in the Eastern District of Illinois where the claims arose.
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Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff corporation maintains its principal place of business.

Frigiking, Inc. v. Century Tire & Sales Co. · filed 1978-07-14

Plaintiff, until February, 1976, maintained its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas, which is within this District, and both Defendants, Century Tire and Samuel Rogers, are of Cincinnati, Ohio. There is also more than $10,000 in controversy so the Court finds and concludes that it does have jurisdiction of this cause ... and that venue is proper in this District and Division.
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Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue where a corporate plaintiff has its principal place of business.

New England Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Energy Administration · filed 1978-03-23(e)(4)

Venue is had in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4), NEPCO’s principal place of business being New York, New York.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where all plaintiffs reside, even when the defendants and the events giving rise to the claim are in another state.

Rhea v. Muskogee General Hospital · filed 1978-07-25(a)

Here, plaintiff originally filed her action in California, where “all plaintiffs” reside. ... It is clear, therefore, that the California District Court, like this court, had subject matter jurisdiction over the action and that venue was proper in that forum.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case in the district where all plaintiffs reside.

Turner v. McClain · filed 1978-10-31(a)

Jurisdiction here is founded solely on diversity of citizenship, and the case was brought in the district in which all plaintiffs reside. Venue is therefore proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where all defendants reside.

Messinger v. United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd. · filed 1978-12-22(a)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) determines where the corporation, defendant United Canso, might have brought the action. ... It is alleged by plaintiff, and undisputed by defendants, that all the named defendants, for venue purposes, reside in Connecticut.
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Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where all defendants reside.

Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. Boone County Board of Education · filed 1979-02-23(a)

Accordingly, since on this record the Eastern District of Kentucky is a place of proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), and a forum wherein personal jurisdiction over the defendants may be had, in the interest of justice this action is hereby transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Cunningham v. Cunningham · filed 1979-09-26(a)

In a diversity action, proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) lies only in those judicial districts where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose. Applied to the facts in this case, venue would be proper in either the Northern District of Illinois (where the plaintiff resides) or the Western District of Michigan (where the defendant resides and where the injury occurred).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) limits venue in a diversity action to a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

Alderman v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1979-11-02(a)

The Court notes that venue does not lie in this judicial district. ... 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) provides that “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” In this case the accident occurred, and thus the claim arose, in Charlotte County, Virginia.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue for a diversity action in a district where all plaintiffs reside.

Moore v. Conway · filed 1979-12-26(a)

Section 1406(a) is inapplicable in the present situation since venue in this diversity action exists in this district where all of the plaintiffs (now plaintiff) reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights actions and permits a nondiversity action in the district where the claim arose.

Holt v. Jerry Pitts, Sheriff · filed 1980-02-27

There is no special venue statute for civil rights actions, and thus venue is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (nondiversity actions are to be brought either in the district where all defendants reside or in the district in which the claim arose). Plaintiffs claim allegedly arose in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and thus venue for his action was proper in the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue in the district where the plaintiff resides, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Sherman v. Moore · filed 1980-04-22(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), the venue statute applicable in the case at bar, since jurisdiction is founded only on diversity, venue is proper in the district where plaintiff resides or where all of the defendants reside or where the claim arose. In this action, the claim arose in Greene County, where defendants reside, and plaintiff, as has been stated, is a citizen of New Jersey. Thus, venue is improper in this District.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In an action based solely on diversity jurisdiction, venue is proper in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside.

Fleming v. Apollo Motor Homes, Inc. · filed 1980-07-02(a)

... and consequently may “be brought only in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs . . . reside . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). The Flemings assert they are residents of Durham County, North Carolina, Complaint ¶ 1, a part of the Middle District of North Carolina. Safford does not question that assertion. Venue is therefore proper.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In an action based solely on diversity of citizenship, § 1391 permits venue in the district where the plaintiff resides.

McGovern v. Blaha · filed 1980-09-26(a)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, this being an action brought in this court solely on account of diversity of citizenship and this being the judicial district wherein plaintiff resides.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action against a corporation, § 1391(a) permits venue where all plaintiffs reside, and § 1391(c) does not limit that choice.

Galaxy International, Inc. v. White Stores, Inc. · filed 1980-11-14(a), (c)

We do not find it necessary to resolve the factual question of whether or not White is doing business in this judicial district because we believe that the defendant erred when it read section 1391(c) in isolation. Section 1391(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may ... be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” Subject matter jurisdiction in the present case rests solely on diversity of citizenship, and the plaintiff resides in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Aluminal Industries, Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Associates · filed 1980-11-18(a)

A review of the pleadings in the instant, action shows that none of the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) are present; neither all plaintiffs nor all defendants reside in this district, ... and the cause of action, property damage to plaintiffs’ premises in Connecticut, arose outside this district. ... Accordingly, venue does not properly lie in this district.
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Section 1391(a) permits venue for a diversity action in more than one federal district.

Bolanos v. Gulf Oil Corp. · filed 1980-12-15(a)

Venue for this action is proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of Texas, and the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity suit in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.

Driscoll v. New Orleans Steamboat Company · filed 1981-01-08(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1391, regulating venue, provides that a diversity suit may be brought in the district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. This was a proper venue for the suit, since the sole plaintiff resided in that district.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Mead Corp. v. Oscar J. Boldt Construction Co. · filed 1981-02-04(a)

Applying this statute to the facts set forth above, the Court concludes that the present litigation could have been commenced either in Dayton, where Mead, the only plaintiff resides, in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, at Milwaukee, where both defendants reside, or in the Western District of Michigan, Northern Division, at Marquette, where the claim arose.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where all plaintiffs reside and the claim arose.

Melancon v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 1981-03-31(a)

Venue is properly laid in the Eastern District of Louisiana, because all plaintiffs reside herein and the claim arose herein. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue in the district where all plaintiffs reside, even if the defendant does not reside there.

Snyder v. Hampton Industries, Inc. · filed 1981-07-31(a)

Consequently, venue is to be determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Under that section, venue is proper: (1) where all the plaintiffs reside; or (2) where all the defendants reside; or (3) where the claim arose. Both of the plaintiffs reside in Maryland. Accordingly, venue is proper in this District, notwithstanding that the defendant may not “reside” in this District within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Rosemarie T. Schwilm, Administratrix of the Estate of Carrol A. Schwilm, Deceased v. Thomas J. Holbrook, M.D. And Cabell · filed 1981-09-28(a)

In this action, plaintiff resides in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Neff Athletic Lettering Co. v. Walters · filed 1981-10-16(a)

In addition, venue of the action is proper in this Court. In a diversity action, venue is proper “where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (emphasis added). In the instant case, plaintiff is a resident of Greenville, Ohio, which is within the Southern District of Ohio.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where the defendant resides or where a corporate plaintiff does business and thus resides.

AMF, INC. v. Computer Automation, Inc. · filed 1982-02-23(a)

Applying this statute to the facts set forth above, the Court concludes that the present litigation could have been commenced either in Dayton, where the Plaintiff is doing business, and thus resides, ... or in the Central District of California, where the Defendant resides.
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Section 1391 governs venue for § 1983 actions, requiring suit in the district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Hilliard v. Scully · filed 1982-04-28

While defendants have not argued that venue would be improper, the Court notes that the applicable venue provision for a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983 is 28 U.S.C. § 1391 which provides that actions must be brought in the district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff corporation resides.

Cinema Systems, Inc. v. Lab Methods Corp. · filed 1982-08-12(a)

Inasmuch as Cinema is incorporated in Illinois, venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391 permits a diversity action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, and a corporation resides in any district where it does business.

Cambridge Filter Corp. v. International Filter Co. · filed 1982-09-29

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) specifies that, for venue purposes, a corporation’s residence is in any judicial district in which it is doing business. Defendant is doing business in the Northern District of California. Subsection (a) of the same statute provides that a diversity action may be brought in the judicial district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose. A claim arises in any district with which the occurrences giving rise to the claim have significant contact. ... Thus, venue in the proposed transferee forum appears proper whether based on the residence of the defendant or where the claim arose.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides.

ERIE PRESS SYSTEMS, ETC. v. Shultz Steel Co. · filed 1982-10-14(a)

Venue for this lawsuit brought where the plaintiff resides is entirely proper under Section 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where all remaining plaintiffs reside.

Wright v. Newman · filed 1982-05-14(a)

Thus, under § 1391(a), venue would be proper only in Missouri. However, plaintiff, Theodore F. Wright, has moved for dismissal of his claim against the defendants, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.Pro. The Court finds that the motion of Theodore F. Wright should be granted. Accordingly, as all remaining plaintiffs reside in this judicial district, venue is properly laid herein.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where all plaintiffs reside.

Kotsonis v. Superior Motor Express · filed 1982-05-26(a)

Viewing venue as between the defendants/third party plaintiffs and the third party defendant, venue originally would have been proper here since defendants/third party plaintiffs are all residents of North Carolina. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action where the plaintiff resides or where the defendants reside.

Hotel Constructors, Inc. v. Seagrave Corp. · filed 1982-07-28

Venue is proper in this district because plaintiff resides in Illinois for venue purposes, and this action could have been brought in the Southern District of New York, which has proper venue and jurisdiction because defendants reside there under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1391.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., Gene Johnson, Randy Scheets, Bruce Faltin as Employees Holiday Inns, Inc. · filed 1982-08-17(a)

Because Santana is a resident of Arizona, venue was proper in the District Court for the District of Arizona. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) governs venue for a diversity action that may be heard in the United States under the Warsaw Convention.

Hill v. United Airlines · filed 1982-10-27(a)

Venue is proper in this court for this diversity case. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Defendant’s objection to venue will therefore be overruled.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits an action founded only on diversity of citizenship in a district where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Jahan Co. v. Dakota Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-02-03(a)

Thus, venue is controlled by section 1391(a) which states that “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Because all plaintiffs reside in New Jersey, venue is proper in the District of New Jersey.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be filed in a district where all plaintiffs reside.

Wilmot H. Simonson Co. v. Green Textile Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-02-04(a)

In the instant case, it is admitted that plaintiff WHS-111, is an Illinois corporation. It is thus deemed to reside in Illinois for venue purposes as a party plaintiff. As it filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, venue is proper in this district under § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) permits venue for a diversity action in the district where the defendant has its principal place of business.

Derry Finance N v. v. Christiana Companies, Inc. · filed 1983-02-09(a)

This case could have been brought in the California Court because Christiana has its principal place of business in California. It is, therefore, subject to the personal jurisdiction of that court and venue would be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where the plaintiff corporation resides and the parties’ agreement places the transaction.

G.H. Miller & Co. v. Hanes · filed 1983-06-28(a)

Because plaintiff is an Illinois corporation which therefore is deemed to be an Illinois resident and because the agreement places the situs of the transaction in Illinois, venue is proper in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a judicial district where all plaintiffs reside.

Robb Container Corp. v. Sho-Me Co. · filed 1983-07-06(a)

Jurisdiction in this matter is based upon diversity of citizenship, and Robb as plaintiff resides in this district. Venue in this district is therefore proper, and insofar as defendants’ motion to dismiss asserted that venue was improper, it is denied.
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Section 1391 permits venue in the federal district where the alleged wrongful conveyance occurred; state law does not control federal venue.

Allied Products Corp. v. Trinidad Petroleum Corp. · filed 1983-09-15

Therefore, venue in the instant action is proper in this court, because the alleged wrongful conveyance occurred in the Northern District of Alabama.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where the plaintiff resides, where all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

Stevens Yachts of Annapolis, Inc. v. American Yacht Charters, Inc. · filed 1983-09-23(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) venue would be in Texas only if the plaintiff or all defendants resided there, or if the claim arose there.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When diversity defendants reside in different districts, § 1391(a) permits venue where the claim arose or the plaintiff resides; the complaint must provide enough facts to establish venue.

Data General Corp. v. Computerized Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-11-04(a)

Thus, because plaintiff is a Massachusetts corporation and not all the defendants are from the same district, venue would be appropriate only in the district in which the cause of action arose or in the district in which the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Although it seems likely that the cause of action arose within this judicial district, the present complaint is plainly insufficient to establish that this is the case.
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Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity action only where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Naartex Consulting Corporation, Russell Huff v. James G. Watt, Secretary of Interior · filed 1983-11-29(b)

We note, to begin with, that venue for this action does not lie in the District of Columbia. When, as here, subject matter jurisdiction “is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship," venue lies only in “the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose .... ” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose; a corporation resides where it is incorporated, licensed to do business, or doing business.

Midwest Precision Services, Inc. v. PTM Industries Corp. · filed 1983-11-30(a), (c)

When federal jurisdiction is founded solely upon diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). A corporation, for venue purposes, is a resident of its state of incorporation, of any state where it is licensed to do business, and of any state where it is doing business. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). In this case, Midwest, the only plaintiff, is incorporated in Illinois and doing business in the Northern District of Illinois. PTM, the only defendant, is incorporated and doing business in Massachusetts. The claim arose in Massachusetts. Venue, therefore, is proper in the transferor court (Northern District of Illinois) and the transferee court (District of Massachusetts).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391 permits venue for a diversity interpleader action in a district where the plaintiff bank resides and issued the disputed letter of credit.

American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Industries International, Inc. · filed 1984-02-22(a), (c)

Venue is proper with respect to the interpleader action in this District because ANB “resides” here and issued the letter of credit in this District.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) supports venue in a diversity action where all plaintiffs reside in the district and the claims arose there.

Miller v. Cudahy Co. · filed 1984-08-13(a)

Venue is proper in this Court because all of the plaintiffs reside in this judicial district and the claims arose here, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the district where the alleged negligence and accident occurred.

Gdovin v. Catawba Rental Co., Inc. · filed 1984-10-19(a)

It is clear that Plaintiffs could have originally brought this action in the Southern District of West Virginia [hereinafter referred to as the transferee district] since the allegedly negligent acts of the Defendants and the situs of the collision occurred in that district; venue, jurisdiction and service of process would all have been proper there in the first instance.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action where the plaintiff is deemed to reside or where all defendants reside.

Walter E. Heller & Co. v. James Godbe Co. · filed 1984-11-08(a), (c)

Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois, the transferor district, since it is where Heller is deemed to reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c). Venue is also proper in the Northern District of Texas, the transferee district, where all the defendants reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

Butler Seafood, Inc. v. Gowdy · filed 1984-12-21(a)

As such, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Under this statute, a diversity action can be brought “only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” ... In short, there are no allegations in the complaint which would support a finding that venue could be proper in the Southern District of Florida.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides.

Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. · filed 1985-04-03(a)

Therefore, venue was properly laid in the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), and this Court must apply the same choice of law rules Judge Williams would have applied — that is, California’s rules.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

Bernie v. Waterfront Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n · filed 1985-04-25(a)

In a diversity action, venue is only proper in the judicial district “where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... venue would thus not be proper in the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside.

Excelite Corp. v. Custom Vanities, Inc. (In Re Excelite Corp.) · filed 1985-06-05(a)

With respect to a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court whose jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citizenship, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). This provision states that venue is proper “in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Because Excelite is the sole plaintiff and is a resident of the Northern District of Georgia, the instant adversary proceeding is appropriately situated in the Northern District of Georgia.
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The court treated § 1391(b) as permitting venue in districts tied to the parties’ residences or the place where the claim arose.

Campbell v. Hilton Hotels Corp. · filed 1985-06-06(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), the statute prescribing venue for diversity of citizenship cases, a lawsuit between citizens of different states may be instituted in either the judicial district where all of the plaintiffs reside, all of the defendants reside, or where the claim arose. ... In the matter at bar, either a Federal District Court in Florida or Michigan would be a proper forum, since the Plaintiffs and Defendant are residents of Michigan and Florida, respectively, along with the cause of action having arisen in Florida.
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Section 1391 does not govern venue in an action removed from state court; § 1441(a) governs instead.

Paul v. International Precious Metals Corp. · filed 1985-07-03

Venue in actions removed pursuant to § 1441(a) however are governed by the venue provisions of that section and not by § 1391.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where the plaintiff resides and the cause of action arose.

Roundball Enterprises, Inc. v. Richardson · filed 1985-09-11(a)

In any event, venue in this Court is clearly proper in that plaintiff resides here and the cause of action arose here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391 permits venue where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Van Gelder v. Taylor · filed 1985-11-13(a)

Where the corporation can sue for venue purposes is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Where jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in a judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or where the claim arose. As such, venue in this Court is improper insofar as not one of the three requirements of § 1391 is satisfied within this district.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where all defendants reside or all plaintiffs reside, or where the claim arose.

Centaur Insurance v. Mission Insurance Group, Inc. · filed 1985-11-14(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) sets forth the districts where venue is proper. § 1391(a) states that when a plaintiff’s action is founded solely on diversity of citizenship, proper venue lies in those judicial districts where all defendants or plaintiffs reside, or where the claim arose. Applied to the facts in this case, venue is proper in either the Northern District of Illinois (where plaintiff resides) or the Central District of California (where all defendants reside).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in a district where all plaintiffs reside.

Reed v. Brown · filed 1985-11-25(a)

In that this is a diversity action, venue is proper in any district in which all plaintiffs reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Reed is the only plaintiff in this case, and is a resident of the State of Nevada. Venue, therefore, is technically proper in this district.
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Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity civil action only where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University · filed 1985-12-23(b)

Venue in this action is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides: ... The Complaint indicates that all Defendants except D.L.S. reside in the State of Pennsylvania. Also, Plaintiffs allegations indicate that any claim he has against the Law Examiners, Gates or Walter arose in Pennsylvania. Therefore, venue in the District of Delaware is improper.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside or where the claims arose.

Dalton v. J.H. Carr & Sons · filed 1986-02-21(a)

Where jurisdiction in a civil action is founded only on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in the judicial district in which all plaintiffs reside or in which the claims arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). In the instant case, therefore, venue in the District of Montana is proper. The motions to dismiss on venue grounds are without merit.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the claim arose.

John Buck Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 1986-04-11(a)

JBC’s claim could have been brought in the Central District of California. Since jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship, this action is properly brought in any judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
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Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the plaintiff conducts substantial business and the claim arose.

Anchor Savings Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co. · filed 1986-05-13(a)

Anchor sues for over $10,000, thus there is federal subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and venue would be proper in the Western District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) both because Anchor is engaging in substantial business operations within the Western District, see National Bank of Canada v. Artex Industries, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 610, 615 (S.D.N.Y.1986), and because the claim arose there.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action in the district where all plaintiffs reside.

Gudaitis v. Adomonis · filed 1986-09-03(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue in a diversity action lies in “the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside or all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.” Since plaintiff resides here venue is proper.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In a diversity action, § 1391 permits venue in a district where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Greiner v. American Motor Sales Corp. · filed 1986-10-20

At the outset, it should be noted that this case could have been brought in the Southern District of Texas, since this cause of action arose in that District, and all plaintiffs reside there.
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Section 1391(b) requires a non-diversity civil action to be brought where all defendants reside or where the action arose.

International Paint Co. v. Grow Group, Inc. · filed 1986-10-22(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that non-diversity civil actions are to be bought in the district in which all the defendants reside or where the action arose. On the face of the amended complaint the individual defendants are not New York residents. There is no allegation that any claim asserted arose in New York either in respect of the Lanham Act allegations or the RICO claim. ... Both venue and jurisdiction are clearly improper in this forum as to the individual defendants and the action must be dismissed as to them.
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Notes 1–150 of 8,639, oldest cases first.

6,372 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Stockbridge-Munsee Community, Band of Mohican Indians v. United States of America, another copy of the same opinion was is judged separately. opinion →
First Bank Business Capital, Inc. v. Agriprocessors, Inc., the parties agree that venue is proper; the court mentions where the collateral is located without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
eBay Inc. v. Digital Point Solutions, Inc., the court discusses alleged predicate acts under a § 1391 citation while addressing personal jurisdiction, without a supported venue ruling. opinion →
Savoy Senior Housing Corp. v. TRABC MINISTRIES, LLC, the court says venue is proper under § 1391(a)(2) and quotes the statutory text without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
Clemens v. McNamee, the court mentions that the action could have been filed in New York without applying any rule under § 1391. opinion →
Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., the court recites § 1391 as a venue basis while proceeding with a diversity action, without resolving a venue dispute. opinion →
Utex Communications Corp. v. Public Utility Commission, the court states that venue is proper because some defendants live in the district without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
United States v. Sommerstedt, the court recites § 1391(b)(2) as a basis for venue in New Mexico without analyzing its requirements. opinion →
Sensormatic Electronics Corp. v. TAG CO. US, LLC, the court cites § 1391(b)(2) only to state that venue is proper because local events occurred. opinion →
Thompson v. Wagner, the court gives § 1391(b) as the basis for venue without discussing its requirements. opinion →
Anthony v. Small Tube Manufacturing Corp., the court cites § 1391(b) only to state that venue is proper because events occurred in the district. opinion →
Miller Ex Rel. Miller v. Penn Manor School District, the court lists § 1391 as the basis for venue before deciding constitutional challenges to school policies. opinion →
Eyal R.D. Corp. v. Jewelex New York, Ltd., the court states that venue is proper based on the defendant’s residence and local events without resolving a venue issue. opinion →
Ditthardt v. North Ocean Condos, LP, the court cites § 1391(a)(2) only to state that venue is proper because events occurred in the district. opinion →
Hernandez v. IKON OFFICER SOLUTIONS INC., the court recites execution of the agreement in El Paso as an undisputed basis for venue. opinion →
Graco Children's Products, Inc. v. Chicco USA, Inc., the court cites § 1391 only to state that venue is proper because the corporate defendant has its principal office in the district. opinion →
Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court cites § 1391(f)(4) to state that venue is proper in the District of Columbia without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
Robinson v. Eli Lilly and Co., the court says the proposed transferee district is an undisputed proper venue, then decides convenience of transfer. opinion →
Hergenroeder v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance, the court cites § 1391 to state that venue is proper because the insurer had local contacts and insured local property. opinion →
Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. National Wrecking Corporation, the court gives defendants’ business activity and the project location as introductory grounds for venue. opinion →
Nisenzon v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., the court states that venue is proper because events occurred in the district without deciding a venue dispute. opinion →
Diaz v. Cobb, the court recites defendants’ local residence as a basis for venue without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
Admiral Insurance v. Little Big Inch Pipeline Co., the court gives local events and two defendants’ business locations as undisputed grounds for venue. opinion →
Dwyer v. Ethan Allen Retail, Inc., the court recites § 1391(a)(2) as an introductory basis for venue without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
Provident Life & Accident Insurance v. Berry, the court states that venue is proper based on defendants’ local jurisdiction without analyzing the section. opinion →
Wada v. United States Secret Service, the court notes that either of two districts was an available venue, then decides transfer under § 1404. opinion →
Ramseur v. United States, the court cites § 1391(e) and § 1402(b) as introductory grounds for venue before addressing other issues. opinion →
Felker v. Southwestern Emergency Medical Service, Inc., the court states that venue is proper because conduct occurred in the district without resolving a venue dispute. opinion →
Anthony v. Small Tube Manufacturing Corp., the court recites § 1391(b) as the basis for venue while proceeding with the case. opinion →
Great Northern Insurance v. ADT Security Services, Inc., the court states that venue is proper under § 1391 because events occurred in the district without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
Consolidated Communications of Fort Bend Co. v. Public Utility Commission, the court gives the agency’s local activity as an introductory basis for venue without analyzing § 1391(b). opinion →
Spencer v. Minnesota Life Insurance, the court lists the plaintiff’s residence and place of claim as reasons venue is proper without analyzing a venue objection. opinion →
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. American Yachts, Ltd., the court cites § 1391(a) only to state that venue is proper in the district. opinion →
Bartal v. Borough of Laureldale, the court states that venue is proper where the events allegedly occurred without resolving a venue dispute. opinion →
Southern Wine and Spirits of Texas, Inc. v. Steen, the court recites why venue is proper before resolving other issues in the telecommunications dispute. opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. Netfran Development Corp., the court lists § 1391 among the bases for venue without deciding a contested issue under it. opinion →
Wagner v. New York Marriott Marquis, the court notes that the plaintiff does not dispute the transferee district as an original venue under § 1391(a). opinion →
Mastercard International Inc. v. Fédération Internationale De Football Ass'n, the court recites alien status and local events as grounds for venue without resolving a venue dispute. opinion →
Qwest Corp. v. Washington State Utilities & Transportation Commission, the court gives § 1391(b)(2) as an undisputed basis for venue without applying its rule. opinion →
AstenJohnson v. Columbia Casualty Co., the court cites § 1391 only to state that venue is proper based on events and defendant residence. opinion →
Grant Thornton, LLP v. Federal Deposit Insurance, the court states that venue is proper under § 1391 because events occurred in the district without resolving a venue issue. opinion →
Spinelli v. Monumental Life Insurance, the court recites two grounds for proper venue before addressing the litigation without deciding a venue dispute. opinion →
Crespo v. United States Merit Systems Protection Board, the court identifies § 1391(e)(3) as a basis for venue but does not decide an issue under it. opinion →
Fabricant v. Kemper Independence Insurance, the court states that venue is proper because events occurred in the district without deciding a disputed venue issue. opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific First Benefit, LLC, the court lists § 1391 among the grounds for venue without construing or applying it to a contested issue. opinion →
PEABODY COAL CO., LLC v. Barnhart, the court gives § 1391(e) as an introductory basis for venue without deciding a venue dispute. opinion →
Ferguson v. Medical College of Wisconsin, the court mentions § 1391(b) only to state that venue is proper before addressing other issues. opinion →
Hi-Tec Sports USA, Inc. v. Stoller, the court rejects several challenges to a default judgment without analyzing any venue rule under § 1391. opinion →
AEP TEXAS CENTRAL CO. v. Hudson, the court states only that venue is proper because a defendant resides in the district without resolving a rule of § 1391(b). opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. QT, Inc., the court cites § 1391 in an introductory venue statement without resolving a dispute under it. opinion →
Payne v. DeLuca, the court cites § 1391(b) alongside the securities venue provision in an introductory statement that venue is proper. opinion →
Janssen Pharmaceutica N v. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals., Inc., the court cites § 1391 alongside the patent venue statute only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Green Party of Arkansas v. Daniels, the court cites § 1391(b) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Carolina Steel Corp. v. Palmetto Bridge Constructors, the court cites § 1391 only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Walker v. Jon Renau Collection, Inc., the court quotes § 1391(c)’s corporate residence text while considering transfer without deciding how it applies. opinion →
Hasbro, Inc. v. Amron, the court cites § 1391 only in a preliminary statement that venue is proper where arbitration occurred. opinion →
Anaeme v. State of Florida, the court agrees that venue does not lie in New Mexico without explaining a rule of § 1391(b). opinion →
Wise v. Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc., the court cites § 1391 only to state that venue is proper because the claim arose in the district. opinion →
Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Lexar Media, Inc., the court notes the parties’ agreement that the action could have been brought in California without deciding a rule of § 1391(c). opinion →
United States ex rel. Bartlett v. Tyrone Hospital, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b)(2) alongside the False Claims Act venue provision without deciding a rule under it. opinion →
United States v. City of Erie, PA, the court cites § 1391(b) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
TIG Insurance v. Newmont Mining Corp., the court cites § 1391(a) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Walker v. North Wales Borough, the court cites § 1391 only to state that venue is proper because the claim arose in the district. opinion →
Florida Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the court cites § 1391 in an introductory venue statement without resolving a venue dispute. opinion →
Highland Tank & Mfg. Co. v. PS International, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b) alongside the patent venue statute only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Sparknet Communications, L.P. v. Bonneville International Corp., the court cites § 1391 only in an introductory statement that the defendant does business in the district. opinion →
Hackos v. Sparks, the court states only that venue is improper under § 1391 without explaining its rules. opinion →
Florida Keys Citizens Coalition, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the court cites § 1391 in an introductory venue statement without deciding a dispute under it. opinion →
Tracinda Corp. v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG, the court describes venue as uncontested and cites § 1391(b) without resolving a venue dispute. opinion →
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., the court cites § 1391 alongside the patent venue statute only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
White v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, International, the court cites § 1391 alongside ERISA only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Dental Plans, Inc., the court treats venue in the proposed transferee district as undisputed while deciding transfer. opinion →
Scaramuzza v. Sciolla, the court cites § 1391(a) only to state that venue is appropriate. opinion →
Multi-Media International, LLC v. Promag Retail Services, LLC, the court states that venue is proper under § 1391(b) without explaining the section’s substantial-events rule. opinion →
Budnick v. Hampden County House of Correction, the court affirms a dismissal for improper venue without explaining a rule of § 1391(b). opinion →
Chebib v. Samaritan Regional Health System, the court affirms an improper-venue ruling without explaining a rule of § 1391. opinion →
United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
American Honda Motor Co. v. Protoform, the court cites § 1391(b)(1) and (2) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
General Motors Corp. v. Autovation Technologies, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b)(1) and (2) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Nichols v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., the court cites § 1391 while recounting the defendant’s venue argument, but does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Lewis v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., the court quotes § 1391(c)'s corporate venue rule while deciding whether it has diversity jurisdiction over the dispute. opinion →
Giffin v. Ensign, the court treats venue as undisputed and cites § 1391(a) while describing another case’s ruling. opinion →
General Felt Products Co. v. Allen Industries, Inc., the court cites the section only to identify the basis for venue in Delaware. opinion →
Montgomery v. Sheldon, the court cites the section while explaining why the unserved defendant might prompt the plaintiff to withdraw the action, then denies the plaintiff’s motion concerning his examination. opinion →
Zabin v. Buxton, the court mentions § 1391 as the defendants’ proposed venue defense and denies their motions to add that defense because they waived the objection. opinion →
In the Matter of Emanuel Josephson, the court cites § 1391 to describe venue rules but relies on § 1401 for venue and leaves the disputed § 1391(c) issue undecided. opinion →
Johannesen v. Gulf & South American Steamship Co., the court cites § 1391 alongside maritime statutes when finding no sufficient reason to decline jurisdiction. opinion →
Collins v. American Automobile Insurance, the court mentions § 1391(c) as part of the plaintiff’s venue argument but dismisses the case without deciding that argument. opinion →
Clayton v. Swift & Company, the court discusses § 1391 as a possible basis for venue but transfers the case under § 1406(a) without deciding whether § 1391 governs. opinion →
Anderson v. British Overseas Airways Corp., the court cites § 1391(c) while describing the defendant’s motion but decides whether the defendant is subject to service of process in New York. opinion →
Gardner v. Gardner, Judge Miller cited § 1391(b) to support his individual view on venue, which the other judges did not join. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Grinnell Co. v. MacPherson, the court quotes another court’s discussion of § 1391(c) while deciding whether related corporations could be served in a New Mexico state court. opinion →
Gentry v. Hibernia Bank, the court cites § 1391(a) while recounting the dismissal of two defendants, but decides the case on other grounds. opinion →
United States v. David Pack, United States v. Harry Pack, the court mentions Section 1391(c) only while describing a Supreme Court case it uses to interpret a different appeals statute. opinion →
Lazar v. Benson, the court recounts a defendant’s venue argument under § 1391(b) and quotes another court’s discussion of the section without making its own ruling under it. opinion →
Bradford Novelty Co. v. Manheim, the court assumed for argument that § 1391 might be satisfied and decided venue under § 1400. opinion →
Fantecchi v. Gross, the court cites § 1391(a) while recounting the plaintiff’s assertion that venue was proper, then decides whether it can enjoin the state court action. opinion →
First Congregational Church & Society of Burlington v. Evangelical & Reformed Church, the court quotes § 1391(c) in a footnote without applying its venue rule. opinion →
Taft Hotel Corporation v. Housing and Home Finance Agency, the court said venue was not properly before it and cited the section while distinguishing an earlier case. opinion →
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., the court cites § 1391 to discuss possible venue consequences of federal jurisdiction over maritime claims. opinion →
Abramovitch v. United States Lines, the court cites § 1391 in a footnote describing hypothetical venue situations while deciding whether § 1402(b) applies to the proposed claim. opinion →
Air Devices, Inc. v. Titus Manufacturing Corp. And C. R. Hutcheon, Incorporated, the court cites § 1391(c) while describing the action’s asserted basis for jurisdiction, but decides whether Titus had sufficient contacts in New Jersey to support service of process. opinion →
Wolkstein v. Port of New York Authority, the court mentioned § 1391(b) as a possible ground for dismissal but did not decide venue. opinion →
Harris-Intertype Corp. v. Photon, Inc., the court mentions § 1391 while recounting another court’s venue ruling and decides this patent case under § 1400(b). opinion →
Hoffman v. Blaski, the Court quoted § 1391(c) as background to its decision about transfers under § 1404(a). opinion →
Bunker v. Armstrong, the court cited § 1391 as part of the venue framework while denying a transfer under § 1404(a). opinion →
Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., the court cites § 1391 to explain the historical separation of venue and service rules while deciding which law governs service on a foreign corporation. opinion →
Western Urn Manufacturing Company and Farmer Brothers Company v. American Pipe and Steel Corporation, the court mentions § 1391 as part of the garnishee’s mistaken view, then decides the attachment issue under District of Columbia law. opinion →
Crawford Transport Company v. Chrysler Corporation, the court mentioned § 1391(c) as a possible corporate venue rule but assumed without deciding that the Clayton Act's venue provision controlled. opinion →
Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., the court cites Section 1391 in a footnote about possible venue problems under the dissent's theory. opinion →
Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., the court declined to decide whether venue was proper under the section and denied transfer because the defendant had waived its venue objection. opinion →
Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Leesona Corp., the court cites § 1391(c) only to state that venue attaches in the district. opinion →
United States ex rel. Bryant Electric Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court mentions § 1391 but does not decide whether venue is proper under it because the defendants waived any venue objection. opinion →
De Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, the court mentions § 1391(b) as part of the Regional Director’s venue objection and decides that the Board members were not necessary parties. opinion →
Brevel Products Corp. v. H & B AMERICAN CORPORATION, the court cites § 1391(c) to contrast general venue rules with the narrower patent venue rule it applies under § 1400(b). opinion →
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., the court quotes § 1391(c) but dismisses the defendant under the antitrust venue provisions. opinion →
Jennings v. McCall Corp., the court reports the defendant’s venue objection but decides the motion based on service of process and the defendant’s business activities in Missouri. opinion →
Suburban Trust Company v. National Bank of Westfield, the court says it need not interpret the amendment to § 1391 after finding that the Comptroller was not an indispensable party. opinion →
Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, the Court cites § 1391 while declining to decide whether national banks located in different counties or districts can be joined in one suit. opinion →
Mutual International Export Co. v. Napco Industries, Inc., a concurring judge concluded that Napco satisfied § 1391(c), but the opinion does not establish that conclusion as the court’s holding. opinion →
United States v. Berkowitz, the court uses § 1391(a) as an illustration while deciding whether transfer is available under § 1406(a). opinion →
Weinberg v. COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG, INCORPORATED, the court cites § 1391 while describing another court’s ruling and decides venue in the removed action under § 1441. opinion →
Walker v. General Features Corporation, the court says the case raises no question under the federal venue statute and decides whether service was valid under Oklahoma law. opinion →
Norte & Co. v. Defiance Industries, Inc., and R. L. Huffines, Jr., Victor Muscat, L F. Serrick, Alfred O'Gara and Edward Krock, the court identifies § 1391(a) as the basis for venue but does not review the ruling concerning suits brought under it. opinion →
Dombrovskis v. P. A. Esperdy, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Depa, the court mentioned § 1391 in recounting the appellants’ request for remand, which it denied because the claim lacked merit. opinion →
Alder v. Garcia, the court notes that the appellant abandoned his argument under § 1391(c) and decides a separate venue objection based on whether Deere & Company made a general appearance. opinion →
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Superior Oil Co. of Venezuela, the court cites the section in connection with an alternative motion it did not reach. opinion →
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, the Court cites the section only to note that venue was uncontested. opinion →
Zemel v. Rusk, the court lists § 1391 among the provisions invoked for the action but does not decide a venue question. opinion →
Diaz v. Chatterton, the court cites § 1391(b) only while recounting another judge’s earlier transfer order. opinion →
Van Dusen v. Barrack, the Court cites § 1391 as statutory context while interpreting the transfer rule in § 1404(a). opinion →
United States v. Montreal Trust Co., the court mentions § 1391(b) while explaining the practical effect of amended service rules and identifies § 1396 as the venue provision for this tax action. opinion →
Federal Power Commission v. Texaco Inc., the court cites § 1391(c) as historical context while deciding venue under § 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act. opinion →
Jones v. Tucker Aluminum Products of Miami, Inc., the court cites § 1391 to state that venue is established without addressing the section’s requirements. opinion →
Hunter v. Gronouski, the court cites the section as the basis for venue, then decides the challenge to the plaintiff’s demotion. opinion →
Moore Co. of Sikeston v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., the court mentions § 1391(c) to describe counsel’s attempted service while deciding whether the delay barred the claim under the statute of limitations. opinion →
United Industrial Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. of America, the court cites § 1391(c) as an analogy while deciding venue under § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act. opinion →
Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, the court cited the venue provision to support its ruling that Beech could be served in South Carolina under state law. opinion →
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., the court mentioned § 1391 as a possible basis for a venue objection but did not decide whether venue was proper under it. opinion →
Fandel v. Arabian American Oil Company, a Corporation, the court mentions § 1391(c) when recounting the District Court’s ruling, then bases its own analysis on the D.C. service statute. opinion →
Stewart v. Penny, the court mentions the section as a possible basis for naming the Secretary, then holds that any defect of parties was waived. opinion →
Phillips v. United States Board of Parole, the court cites § 1391(e) while suggesting that the District Court explore a possible transfer on remand. opinion →
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court cites § 1391(e) in a list of authorities concerning suits against federal officers without deciding its venue rules. opinion →
Dragor Shipping Corporation, a Corporation, Formerly Ward Industries Corporation v. Union Tank Car Company, a Corporatio, the court notes that Dragor did not renew its § 1391(c) improper venue defense on appeal. opinion →
Harms v. Federal Housing Administration, the court notes that venue under the section is conceded if jurisdiction exists. opinion →
United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., the court mentions the general venue provision only to compare it with the Miller Act’s venue requirement. opinion →
Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corporation, the court reports the defendant’s affidavit citing § 1391(c) as support for transfer to Oklahoma. opinion →
Miller v. Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, the court mentions § 1391 only as a basis for the complaint and decides the appeal on mootness. opinion →
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Illinois Central Railroad, the court cites the section as the basis for venue in the district without deciding any of its rules. opinion →
Converse v. Udall, the court cites the section only as the basis for venue in the actions. opinion →
American Cyanamid Co. v. Nopco Chemical Co., the court cites § 1391(c) to contrast general venue rules with the patent venue rule it applies. opinion →
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the Court dismissed certiorari on the venue question without deciding how § 1391 defines a corporate plaintiff’s residence. opinion →
Farrell v. American Flyers Airline Corp., the court cites § 1391(c) only to identify Oklahoma as a possible transfer destination and decides the transfer motion on other grounds. opinion →
Geiger v. Keilani, the defendant invoked § 1391(a) in an earlier venue motion that he abandoned before the court could rule on it. opinion →
Delaware & Hudson Railroad v. United States, the court mentions § 1391(a) as context for Rule 19(a) while deciding whether to join a plaintiff. opinion →
Hicks v. Freeman, the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
Levin v. Great Western Sugar Company, the court mentions § 1391 as background while deciding whether the Securities Exchange Act’s venue provision displaces the venue rule for national banks. opinion →
Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Company v. United States, the court cites § 1391 to explain the background of Rule 19(a) while deciding joinder and venue under § 1398(a). opinion →
Carling Brewing Company v. Philip Morris, Inc., the court cites § 1391(c) only as the basis for venue in the district. opinion →
Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., the court mentions § 1391 only to describe another court’s ruling while deciding venue and service under § 12 of the Clayton Act. opinion →
Smith v. United States Air Force, the court cites § 1391(e) to describe venue after the action was transferred. opinion →
King v. The United States, the court cites § 1391(e) as a venue limitation on district court suits while deciding whether the Court of Claims can grant declaratory relief. opinion →
Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., the court mentions § 1391(c) only while quoting another court’s rule for venue in a declaratory patent action. opinion →
Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American National Bank And Trust Company, the court mentions § 1391 to report the appellant's concession while deciding whether the securities laws' venue provisions displace the National Bank Act's venue rule. opinion →
Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American National Bank & Trust Co., the court mentions § 1391 as background while deciding whether the securities laws’ venue provisions override the National Bank Act’s venue restriction. opinion →
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b) and (c) in a footnote to CBS’s transfer request but does not decide either subsection’s venue rules. opinion →
Ziady v. Curley, the court mentions § 1391 in a footnote while deciding the plaintiff’s citizenship for diversity jurisdiction. opinion →
D'Alberto v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., the court discussed whether § 1391 applied to the claim against Petrusky but expressly left the venue question undecided. opinion →
Struthers Scientific & International Corp. v. General Foods Corp., the court mentions § 1391(c) only in a question the defendant sought to certify for appeal and does not decide it. opinion →
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Electronics Corp., the court mentions § 1391(c) only to say it need not decide whether doing business under that provision affects patent infringement venue. opinion →
Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, the court cites the section only to identify the venue for the action. opinion →
Carling Brewing Company v. Philip Morris Incorporated, the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
Safir v. Gulick, the court discussed venue conditionally, then dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim without deciding the venue motion. opinion →
High Horse v. Tate, the court cites the section as a jurisdictional basis while applying a separate statutory bar to judicial review. opinion →
Western Terminal Company v. United States, the court cites the section only as its basis for appellate jurisdiction. opinion →
Owatonna Manufacturing Company v. Melroe Company, the court cites the section only to note hypothetical venue problems with a possible action in North Dakota. opinion →
Johnson v. Mueller, the court mentions § 1391 only as one of the district court's stated reasons for dismissal. opinion →
Cusick v. N. V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, the court cites the section only as a comparison point for the antitrust venue rule. opinion →
Vallentine v. Taylor Investment Co., the court mentions the predecessor to § 1391 only as background for the venue rule in an earlier case. opinion →
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. National Mediation Board, the court cites the section only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Donigian v. Laird, the court cites the section only to note that Colonel Hoffman was served by registered mail. opinion →
Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., the court cites the section only in identifying the presumed venue basis for the action. opinion →
Benson v. United States of America, Paul H. Nitze, the court cites § 1391(e) only as authority for serving the Secretary of the Navy by certified mail. opinion →
Richard D. Zelechower, M.D. v. Evelle J. Younger, Etc., the court cites the section only as the asserted basis for the appeal. opinion →
Hydro-Clear Corp. v. Aer-O-Flo Corp., the court cites the section only to describe general venue cases that it declines to apply to patent venue. opinion →
Alameda Oil Company v. Ideal Basic Industries, Inc., the court mentions § 1391(b) only as a possible basis for venue in Colorado while deciding transfer under § 1404(a). opinion →
Robinson v. Carroll, the court cites § 1391(a) only to identify the case’s proper venue while deciding whether § 1406(a) permits transfer. opinion →
Bouthillette v. COMMANDING OFFICER, NEWPORT NAVAL BASE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND, the court cites the section only as a basis for venue. opinion →
American Oil Co. v. McMullin, the court cites § 1391(c) only while describing the Supreme Court's decision in Lee. opinion →
Insurance Co. of North America v. Alexander, the court mentions § 1391(a) only in the stipulated facts as the basis for venue. opinion →
Christen v. Groff, the court cites the section only to note the parties’ concession that the action could have been brought in Kentucky. opinion →
Nichols v. United States, the court mentions § 1391(e)(4) only as the claimed venue basis for the action. opinion →
Gaddis v. Calgon Corp., the court cites § 1391(c) only to compare its ordinary doing business standard with the patent venue rule it applies. opinion →
Cortright v. Resor, the court cites § 1391 only in describing its venue aspect and historical changes while deciding mandamus jurisdiction under § 1361. opinion →
Rogers v. Bellei, the court cites § 1391(e) only to explain that venue in New York was improper and that the case was transferred. opinion →
Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., and William F. Buckley, Jr., Bantam Books, Inc. And Arlington House, Inc., the court cites the section only in a footnote while noting that venue was proper in the district. opinion →
Lex Tex Ltd. v. Aileen, Inc., the court cites § 1391(c) only to distinguish its general corporate residence rule from the patent venue rule in § 1400(b). opinion →
Datamedia Computer Service, Inc. v. Avm Corporation and Shoup Voting MacHine Corporation, the court mentions Section 1391 as part of the venue challenge but decides the case under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. opinion →
Lieutenant John A. Strait v. Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, the court cites the section only as support for mandamus jurisdiction. opinion →
National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., the court mentions § 1391(c) only while describing another judge’s comparison of general and antitrust venue requirements. opinion →
ECC CORPORATION v. Slater Electric, Inc., the court mentions the section as an unaddressed venue issue while deciding personal jurisdiction under New York law. opinion →
Alland v. Consumers Credit Corp., the court cites the section only to note that venue was not contested. opinion →
Gastown, Inc. of Delaware v. Gastown, Inc., the court cites § 1391(c) as the basis for venue while deciding a trademark infringement dispute. opinion →
Williams v. William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, a concurring judge cited the section to explain why he considered North Dakota a proper venue; the court did not decide a venue issue. opinion →
NW Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corporation, the court cites the section only to state that venue is properly laid in the district. opinion →
Kwake v. Custom Pools, Inc., the court cites Section 1391(c) only while reporting the Supreme Court’s holding about patent venue under Section 1400(b). opinion →
Private First Class (E-3) William Richard Meck v. Commanding Officer, Valley Forge General Hospital and Secretary of the, the court mentions § 1391(e) only as a tentative basis for personal jurisdiction in an unaddressed mandamus claim. opinion →
JAMES T. BARNES & COMPANY v. Romney, the court cites § 1391(e) only as one of the statutes under which plaintiff brought the action. opinion →
Holinone, Inc. v. International Hole-In-One Club, Inc., the court states that venue is proper under the section without analyzing its venue rules. opinion →
Bernard v. Richter's Jewelry Co., the court cites the section only as an example of a statute addressing out-of-state or nationwide service while deciding the meaning of § 1640(e). opinion →
Kreis v. Mates Investment Fund, Inc., the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., the court cites the section only as the plaintiffs’ asserted basis for jurisdiction. opinion →
Ball v. Henderson, the court cites the section only as the basis for the respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. opinion →
Mead v. Jacob J. Parker, Warden, the court mentions § 1391(e) in a footnote while discussing possible joinder under the Mandamus Act. opinion →
Learning Systems, Inc. v. Levin, the court cites § 1391(c) only to report another court's venue ruling while deciding venue under the Sherman Act. opinion →
Plum Tree, Inc. v. NK Winston Corporation, the court cites the section only as a stated basis for jurisdiction and declaratory relief without deciding its venue rules. opinion →
Droke House Publishers, Inc. v. Aladdin Distributing Corp., the court cites § 1391(c) only while explaining that a venue showing under it would satisfy the less restrictive copyright venue rule in § 1400(a). opinion →
Bailey v. Curtis W. Tarr, Etc., the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
United States ex rel. Explosives Corp. v. Gerbus Bros. Construction Co., the court cites the section only to report an earlier dismissal for improper venue. opinion →
Saxe v. United States of America and Department of Housing and Urban Development, the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,718 Glen J. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited, the court cites the section only in reporting the trial court's venue ruling. opinion →
J. & B. & S. RESTAURANT CORP., INC. v. Henry's Drive-In, Inc., the court cites § 1391(a) and (c) only to state that venue would be proper in the proposed transferee district under § 1404(a). opinion →
Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., the court mentions § 1391 only in a footnote describing Levin's treatment of a different venue statute. opinion →
CCP CORPORATION v. Wynn Oil Company, the court declined to decide whether venue was proper under § 1391 and only noted in passing that general venue provisions may supplement special venue provisions. opinion →
Ames v. Vavreck, the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
State of Florida v. Richardson, the court cites § 1391 only as the jurisdictional predicate for the federal question action. opinion →
Shelter-Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Brothers, Inc., the court cites § 1391 only as the venue basis for the diversity claim in an alternative ground. opinion →
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
Kolb v. Chrysler Corporation, the court cites § 1391(c) to contrast its “doing business” standard with the antitrust venue rule the court applies. opinion →
Adams v. Elliot L. Richardson, Individuallyand as Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the court mentions § 1391 in a footnote while describing the procedural options available to schools seeking review of HEW enforcement decisions. opinion →
United States ex rel. Applebaum v. Seaman, the court mentions the section only to say it need not decide whether it applies to habeas corpus actions. opinion →
Stone v. United States Board of Parole, the court mentions § 1391(e) as a possible basis for venue if mandamus applies, then resolves the parole claim on the merits. opinion →
Barnhart v. Brinegar, the court cites the section only in a footnote without deciding any venue rule. opinion →
Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, the court mentions § 1391 as the basis of the defendants’ venue objection but finds venue proper under § 1392. opinion →
Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Company v. Morton, the court cites the section to state that venue is proper, without deciding any of its rules. opinion →
United States Steel Corporation v. Fri, the court cites § 1391(b) only in passing alongside a citation to the service rule. opinion →
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Schmidt, the court mentions § 1391(e) only as the plaintiffs' purported venue basis. opinion →
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. White Motor Corp., the court cites § 1391 to explain why its decision turns on two other venue provisions. opinion →
O.S.C. Corporation and O.S.C. Corporation of California v. Toshiba America, Inc. And Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co., Ltd., the court cites section 1391(d) but expressly declines to decide whether it affects venue under the antitrust statute. opinion →
Marcello v. The Attorney General of the United States, the court mentions § 1391(e) while explaining its jurisdictional ruling but expressly declines to decide the venue issue. opinion →
Medicenters of America, Inc. v. T & v Realty & Equipment Corp., the court discussed § 1391 as a possible basis for venue but left the venue questions unresolved when it transferred the case for convenience. opinion →
Lemelson v. Ampex Corporation, the court mentions § 1391(c) to distinguish a cited case while deciding patent venue under § 1400(b). opinion →
City of Highland Park v. Train, the court mentions § 1391 as the companion venue provision to § 1361 while deciding whether mandamus relief is available under § 1361. opinion →
Gloria FORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALMAC INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant, the court decided venue under Title VII’s separate venue provision and did not rely on § 1391(c). opinion →
Adams v. Carlson, the court quotes another decision’s statement about venue while deciding whether its order covers class members transferred outside the district. opinion →
Avery v. United States, the court leaves venue under § 1391(e) for the sentencing judge to consider on remand. opinion →
Central Appalachian Coal Co. v. UNITED MINE WKRS. OF AM., the court resolved venue under 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) and mentioned § 1391(b) only as a conditional alternative. opinion →
Caesar's World, Inc., Formerly Known as Lum's, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., the court mentions § 1391(c) to distinguish venue timing from the personal-jurisdiction issue it decides. opinion →
Martin Motor Sales, Inc. v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc., the court cites § 1391(d) to explain why venue is uncontested while deciding a motion about personal jurisdiction. opinion →
Arrington v. Taylor, the court cites § 1391(b) only as the basis for venue in this action. opinion →
Campbell v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the court mentions § 1391(c) while describing another court’s venue ruling to distinguish it from the issue under § 636(b). opinion →
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education, Tenn., the court says venue is uncontested and cites § 1391(e) without deciding a venue issue. opinion →
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, the court states that venue is proper alongside its jurisdictional citations without deciding a rule under § 1391. opinion →
Henry v. Warner, the court cites § 1391(e) to report completed service and venue, without deciding its requirements. opinion →
Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the court states that venue is proper and cites § 1391 without explaining or deciding a venue rule. opinion →
Joseph v. Blair, the court states that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Virginia without explaining a § 1391 rule. opinion →
First National Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, the court says only that venue is established under the facts, without deciding how § 1391 applies. opinion →
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Energy Office, the court cites § 1391(e) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Laminex, Inc. v. Fritz, the court lists § 1391(c) with the patent venue statute to state that venue is proper, without deciding their interaction. opinion →
Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma v. Lynn, the court cites § 1391(e) only in a threshold statement that venue lies in the district. opinion →
Honeywell, Inc. v. Apparatewerke, the court reports the District Court’s ruling under § 1391(d) and notes that no one challenged it on appeal. opinion →
Patterson v. Ellis C. MacDougall Director, Georgia State Board of Corrections, Atlanta, Georgia, the court quotes a district court’s reference to § 1391(b) and decides the joinder issue under Rule 19. opinion →
Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Association, the court cited § 1391(c) as a supplement but decided venue under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. opinion →
Blanchard v. Johnson, the court cited § 1391(b) as guidance for transferring the case between divisions under local venue rules. opinion →
Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Paul L'Esperance, Inc., the court cites the section only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. D & G Supply & Maintenance Co., the court cites the section only as the basis for venue and does not decide any of its rules. opinion →
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, the court names § 1391(e) as the basis for venue in a preliminary finding. opinion →
Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., the court reports Shearson’s reliance on § 1391(b) but addresses the venue objection through the rule governing third-party claims. opinion →
United States Ex Rel. Lois Sero v. Preiser, the court cites § 1391(a)'s rule for diversity class actions as an analogy when deciding venue for a habeas class action. opinion →
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, the court cited § 1391 in a parenthetical about where a patent claim arises, then dismissed under its declaratory-judgment discretion without deciding venue under that section. opinion →
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the court cites § 1391(d) while describing another court’s ruling on venue for alien corporations. opinion →
Electro Medical Systems, Inc. v. Medical Plastics, Inc., the court mentions the section only when reporting the plaintiff’s allegation that venue is proper. opinion →
Tormo v. Yormark, the court cites the section while recounting why the lawyer referred the clients’ case to a New Jersey attorney. opinion →
Mohawk Petroleum Corp. v. Department of the Navy, the court cites § 1391(c) only to state that venue is proper in the district. opinion →
United States v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the court uses § 1391(e) as context for deciding whether § 1361 confers subject matter jurisdiction. opinion →
Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Limited, the court cites the section only to report Spembly’s concession that venue is proper. opinion →
Van Winkle v. McLucas, the court cites the section only as a basis for jurisdiction. opinion →
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1858 v. Callaway, the court reports that the complaint cited § 1391 as a basis for jurisdiction but does not decide any venue rule under it. opinion →
Muniz v. Hoffman, the Court mentions § 1391(c) while describing an earlier venue decision as an analogy for interpreting a different statute. opinion →
Leonhart v. McCormick, the court discussed § 1391 but declined to decide whether venue was proper and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. opinion →
First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., the court cites the section in a passing statement that venue is proper, then decides whether to dismiss or stay the antitrust action. opinion →
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, the court discusses a probable venue defect under § 1391 but proceeds because the defendants raised no objection. opinion →
McDowell v. Schlesinger, the court cites § 1391(e) only to state that venue is proper in the district. opinion →
Hitt v. Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., the court found venue proper under § 12 of the Clayton Act and declined to consider whether § 1391 applied. opinion →
Buckles v. Weinberger, the court cites the section only to state that venue lies in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. opinion →
Economic Opportunity Commission Of Nassau County, Inc. v. Weinberger, the court identifies § 1391(e) as a venue provision while deciding whether § 1361 supplies jurisdiction. opinion →
Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., the court cites § 1391(c) to contrast general corporate venue with the patent venue rule it applies under § 1400(b). opinion →
Harris v. Bobby G. Killian Corp., the court cites the section as the basis for a venue question it plans to examine at a later hearing. opinion →
Beltone Electronics Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, the court mentions § 1391(e) only as the plaintiffs’ asserted basis for venue, which the defendants did not contest. opinion →
Jones v. Kreminski, the court cites § 1391 while discussing an earlier venue ruling, then decides whether the National Bank Act’s venue provision applies to an impleaded bank. opinion →
Jake King v. Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States, a dissent mentions the section in passing as a basis for venue. opinion →
American Federal Casualty Agency, Inc. v. Cross Country Insurance Agency, Inc., the court says venue lies under § 1391(a) and (c) without explaining a rule under either subsection. opinion →
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Travelers Indemnity Co., the court noted that § 1391(c) would allow venue in Massachusetts absent a contractual venue provision, then denied dismissal because the payment bond’s venue provision controlled. opinion →
Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, the court cites § 1391(d) while stating that venue is not in issue, then decides personal jurisdiction under Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute. opinion →
Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the court cites § 1391(e) only to state that venue is proper for a corporate defendant. opinion →
Long v. Attorney General of United States, the court lists Section 1391 among the petition’s stated bases for relief but does not decide any venue rule under it. opinion →
National Research Development Corp. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., the court cites § 1391 only to state that venue is proper in the district. opinion →
Great Western Financial Corp. v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, the court states only that venue is proper under § 1391, without deciding a venue rule. opinion →
Brewer v. Aaron, the court leaves the plaintiff’s legal residence for venue to be shown in a renewed action. opinion →
Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Associates, the court reports defendants’ argument under § 1391(a) but decides venue under the securities laws’ venue provision. opinion →
Clegg v. U. S. Treasury Department, the court discusses a federal official’s residence only conditionally because that official was not joined. opinion →
Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., the court lists § 1391(b) with other statutes as grounds for venue without deciding its application. opinion →
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, the court cites § 1391(e)(1) only to state that venue lies in the district. opinion →
Celanese Corp. v. Federal Energy Administration, the court lists § 1391 with other venue grounds for the transferee district without deciding a rule under it. opinion →
Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., the court cites § 1391(c) while recounting the defendant’s venue objection but does not decide the section’s requirements. opinion →
Mode Art Jewelers Co. v. Expansion Jewelry Ltd., the court cited § 1391(c)'s corporate-residence definition but made dismissal for improper venue conditional on further evidence. opinion →
Meat Systems Corp. v. Ben Langel-Mol, Inc., the court cites § 1391(c) among federal standards it expressly declines to consider and decides the motions under New York's doing-business rule. opinion →
League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, the court cites § 1391(b) and (c) as the basis for venue for the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims. opinion →
Pullman Inc. v. W. R. Grace & Co., the court reports the plaintiff’s venue argument under § 1391(b) but dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without deciding venue. opinion →
INTERN. U., UNITED AUTO., ETC. v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., the court states only that venue is proper under § 1391, without explaining its application. opinion →
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Cardwell Manufacturing Co., the court states only that venue is proper under § 1391, without explaining its application. opinion →
American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, the cited sentence denies a motion but does not state the rule attributed to § 1391(e). opinion →
Thompson v. Board of Education of Romeo Community Schools, the court mentions § 1391 only while recounting defendants’ argument that severance would make venue improper. opinion →
Mathews v. Diaz, the court lists § 1391(d) as an example of a statute imposing added burdens on aliens. opinion →
New England Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Energy Administration, the court cites the section as the basis for venue while deciding Exxon's motion to intervene. opinion →
Haase v. Mallenkrodt, Inc., the court states that venue would lie in New Jersey without deciding how § 1391(a) applies. opinion →
Mulcahy v. Guertler, the court cites § 1391(a) only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
The Nature Conservancy v. MacHipongo Club, Inc., the court cites the section only as the basis for venue. opinion →
Rixner v. White, the court notes that North Dakota is not a proper venue without stating a § 1391 rule. opinion →
American Federation of Government Employees v. Hoffmann, the court mentions § 1391 only when reporting the complaint’s asserted basis for jurisdiction; it does not decide a venue issue. opinion →
Burns v. Vowell, the court cites § 1391(b) only to state that venue is proper in the district and division. opinion →
McCarthy v. Askew, the court notes that the defendants withdrew their venue motion under the section, waiving it under Rule 12. opinion →
Vaughn v. American Basketball Ass'n, the court assumed venue was proper under § 1391 for purposes of deciding a transfer motion under § 1404(a). opinion →
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., the court lists § 1391 with another statute to state that venue is proper. opinion →
Clopay Corp. v. Blessings Corp., the court lists § 1391(c) with the patent venue statute after stating the defendants’ corporate status, without deciding their interaction. opinion →
Freedman v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., the court cites § 1391(b) and (c) as a basis for venue without deciding what either provision requires. opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. Western General Dairies, Inc., the court addresses § 1391 only on the conditional premise that § 1337 supplies jurisdiction. opinion →
Seegul v. A.C.N.Y. Agency Co., the court mentions § 1391(b) as a ground for the defendant’s motion but dismisses for lack of personal jurisdiction without deciding venue. opinion →
Pierce v. Atlas Powder Co., the court says venue would be proper under § 1391(c) in the proposed transfer district without deciding its rule. opinion →
AM General Corp. v. Department of Transportation, the court states venue is proper under § 1391(e) without interpreting or applying a requirement of that subsection. opinion →
Williams v. Canon, Inc., the court mentions § 1391(d) as an unresolved issue and decides venue under § 12 of the Clayton Act. opinion →
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. McLucas, the court cites § 1391(e) only as an unexplained basis for venue. opinion →
Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Manufacturing Co., the court mentions § 1391(b) in a footnote explaining why the plaintiff filed in a district bound by Fifth Circuit precedent. opinion →
Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Manufacturing Co., the court mentions § 1391(b) in a footnote about where the action could have been filed, while deciding the dispute under another statute. opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. Tenneco, Inc., the court lists § 1391(c) as a basis for venue without explaining its application. opinion →
Marshall v. District of Columbia Government (Three Cases), the court cites the amendment to Section 1391(e) as context for interpreting a change to Section 1331(a). opinion →
Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co., the court cites § 1391 only to state that venue is proper for this action. opinion →
DeWitt v. AMERICAN STOCK TR. CO., the court cites the section as the plaintiff's claimed basis for venue without deciding whether venue is proper under it. opinion →
Dewitt v. American Stock Transfer Co., the court reports plaintiff’s venue claim under § 1391(b) without deciding whether venue is proper under that section. opinion →
In re Amarnick, the court quotes a concurrence comparing § 1391(c) with the national-bank venue rule while deciding whether to issue mandamus over a transfer. opinion →
In re Amarnick, the court quotes a concurrence comparing § 1391 with the national-bank venue rule while deciding whether a transfer warranted mandamus. opinion →
United States for Use of Garcia v. McAninch, the court states a conditional jurisdictional conclusion under § 1391(e), without deciding whether the defendants had the required contacts. opinion →
Isothermics, Inc. v. U. S. Energy Research & Development Agency, the court reports that the plaintiff claimed venue under the section but decides the case on jurisdictional grounds. opinion →
Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, the court cites the section only to state that venue is proper while deciding the ERISA dispute. opinion →
Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, the court cites § 1391(b) only to state that venue is proper in the district. opinion →
D. Nelsen & Sons, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance, the court reports the plaintiffs’ reliance on § 1391(b) but decides venue under the National Bank Act and transfers the case under § 1404(a). opinion →
Magno v. Corros, the court cites § 1391 in an unexplained statement that venue is correctly laid. opinion →
Data General Corp. v. Skinner, the court cites § 1391(a) only in an unexplained statement that venue is proper. opinion →
CMI Corp. v. Costello Construction Corp., the court mentioned § 1391(c)'s doing-business test but dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction without deciding venue. opinion →
Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, the court cites § 1391(b) in a list of venue statutes while deciding a transfer motion under § 1404(a). opinion →
Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Bougas, the Court cites a case interpreting § 1391(a) for a general point about convenience while deciding venue under 12 U. S. C. § 94. opinion →
American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., the court recounts the plaintiff’s argument under § 1391(b) but bases its venue analysis on § 12 of the Clayton Act. opinion →
Neloms v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., the court cites section 1391(b) alongside other venue statutes after stating that venue is proper, without deciding its requirements. opinion →
Joy Manufacturing Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., the court lists § 1391(c) with a patent venue statute without deciding a rule under it. opinion →
Northwest Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Earnhardt, the court cites § 1391(a) only while stating that an action could have been brought in Arizona. opinion →
A. L. Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., First National Stores, Inc., the court reports the district court’s ruling under § 1391(b) but decides venue under § 12 of the Clayton Act. opinion →
Rozier v. Roudebush, the court cites the section for venue without deciding any issue under it. opinion →
Morales v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., the court assumed the § 1391(b) venue objection was correct and decided that transfer under § 1406(a) resolved it. opinion →
Va. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, the court reports the plaintiffs’ venue allegation but does not decide whether venue is proper under the section. opinion →
Peak v. Topeka Housing Authority, the section appears only in the plaintiff’s complaint, which the court reproduced as an appendix; the court did not decide venue. opinion →
Reed v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word of Louisiana, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b) among the statutes supporting its statement that venue is proper, without deciding a rule under that section. opinion →
Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., the court lists § 1391 as a basis for venue without addressing any of its requirements. opinion →
Husky Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, the court cites § 1391(e) only to state that venue is proper in the District of Wyoming. opinion →
Engineering Equipment Co. v. SELENE, the court cites § 1391(d) only as a comparison while deciding whether maritime attachment supports jurisdiction. opinion →
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., the court mentions § 1391 as an alleged basis for venue but dismisses the bank under the National Bank Act’s venue rule. opinion →
Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, the court cites the section only as the basis for venue in the district. opinion →
Poe v. Kuyk, the court held that an earlier ruling on § 1391(e) service bound the plaintiff under estoppel, without deciding the section’s reach itself. opinion →
Precision Universal Joint Corp. v. Republic Parts, Inc., the court mentions the section only in quoting defendants’ venue allegation and decides whether the counterclaim adequately pleads subject matter jurisdiction. opinion →
Adibi-Sadeh v. Bee County College, the court cites the section only to state that venue is proper. opinion →
United States v. Maryland Casualty Company, the court discussed § 1391(a) as an analogy while deciding venue under the Miller Act. opinion →
United States ex rel. Harvey Gulf International Marine, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., the court discusses § 1391(a) as background to a precedent while deciding venue under the Miller Act. opinion →
Digital Equipment Corp. v. Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp., the court mentions § 1391(d) only to describe the rule for alien defendants and decides venue under § 1400(b). opinion →
Bonner v. B-W Utilities, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b) to state that venue is proper without addressing its requirements. opinion →
Smokey's of Tulsa, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., the court left open whether Section 1391 supplements the antitrust venue statute and decided venue under 15 U.S.C. § 22. opinion →
Hines v. Olinkraft, Inc., the court cites § 1391(b) in a statement that venue is proper without addressing the section’s rules. opinion →
Jackson Sawmill Company, Inc. v. United States, the court mentions § 1391(b) only to report where the plaintiffs alleged venue. opinion →
Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States, the court mentions § 1391(b) only to report where the plaintiffs alleged venue. opinion →
Continental Can Co. v. Marshall, the court reports the plaintiff’s basis for venue under § 1391(a) and notes that venue is unchallenged. opinion →
Langbein v. Kirkland, a separate opinion discusses § 1391(b) and agrees with the majority’s conclusion that the claim arose in Texas. opinion →
Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, a dissenting judge cited the section to illustrate how venue rules apply to suits against New York residents. opinion →
Folding Cartons, Inc. v. American Can Co., the court mentions the section only as a claimed basis for venue while deciding class certification under Rule 23. opinion →
Minichiello Realty Associates, Inc. v. Britt, the court lists § 1391(e)(3) among federal provisions while deciding that a local action concerning Florida real estate cannot proceed in New Jersey. opinion →
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, the court mentions the section as a venue statute the plaintiff relies on but does not decide its rules. opinion →
Hsing Chow v. Union Central Life Insurance, the court reports the plaintiff’s allegation that venue is proper under the section but does not decide venue. opinion →
California ex rel. Younger v. Blumenthal, the court cites § 1391(e) in a footnote stating that service on the defendant appears sufficient. opinion →
Pieper v. United States, the court mentions § 1391(e) as a venue provision the plaintiff invoked but does not decide its rules. opinion →
Chinetti-Garthwaite Imports, Inc. v. Ferrari Societa Per Azioni Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili E Corse, the court cites the section to support its brief statement that venue is proper, without discussing its rules. opinion →
E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., the court mentions § 1391(c) as background on corporate venue while deciding whether it can transfer an arbitration petition. opinion →
Loria & Weinhaus, Inc. v. H. R. Kaminsky & Sons, Inc., the court mentioned § 1391(c) to explain why it deferred deciding venue. opinion →
United Transportation Union, Etc. v. Florida East Coast Railway Company Etc., the opinion cites the section as the basis for venue while deciding whether the claims are time-barred. opinion →
Lee v. PlyGem Industries, Inc., the court cites § 1391 as a comparison while deciding venue under § 12 of the Clayton Act. opinion →
Sheridan v. Andrus, the court lists the section among the provisions invoked at the outset of the suit and does not decide a venue issue. opinion →
North American Soccer League v. National Football League, the court cites the section only as an asserted basis for venue. opinion →
Young v. Cuddington, the court cites § 1391(a) in recounting defendants’ venue argument, then decides whether § 1406(a) permits transfer despite proper venue. opinion →
East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra, the court mentions § 1391 only as a provision amended by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act while deciding personal jurisdiction under other sections. opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. Southland Corp., the court cites § 1391(c) alongside other provisions to state that venue is proper in the district. opinion →
Piedmont Label Company v. Sun Garden Packing Company, the court listed § 1391 among the venue statutes but resolved the case under the Clayton Act’s venue provisions. opinion →
North Carolina v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, the court cited § 1391 to recount another court’s observation about venue while denying a transfer under § 1404(a). opinion →
Utah International, Inc. v. Andrus, the court cites the section only to identify venue for the action. opinion →
United States v. Scott, the court mentions § 1391(e) while discussing another court’s decision, then decides the defendant’s residence under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b). opinion →
…and 5,972 more.

Statutory history

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935; Pub. L. 87–748, §2, Oct. 5, 1962, 76 Stat. 744; Pub. L. 88–234, Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 473; Pub. L. 89–714, §§1, 2, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1111; Pub. L. 94–574, §3, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2721; Pub. L. 94–583, §5, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2897; Pub. L. 100–702, title X, §1013(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4669; Pub. L. 101–650, title III, §311, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5114; Pub. L. 102–198, §3, Dec. 9, 1991, 105 Stat. 1623; Pub. L. 102–572, title V, §504, Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4513; Pub. L. 104–34, §1, Oct. 3, 1995, 109 Stat. 293; Pub. L. 107–273, div. C, title I, §11020(b)(2), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1827; Pub. L. 112–63, title II, §202, Dec. 7, 2011, 125 Stat. 763.)

  • 2011—Subsecs. (a) to (d). Pub. L. 112–63, §202(1), added subsecs. (a) to (d) and struck out former subsecs. (a) to (d) which related to venue when jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship, when jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, when a defendant is a corporation, and when an alien is sued, respectively.
  • Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 112–63, §202(2), inserted subsec. heading, substituted "(A)", "(B)", and "(C)" for "(1)", "(2)", and "(3)", respectively, in first par., designated first and second pars. as pars. (1) and (2), respectively, and inserted par. headings.
  • Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 112–63, §202(3), inserted heading.
  • Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 112–63, §202(4), inserted heading.
  • 2002—Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 107–273 added subsec. (g).
  • 1995—Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 104–34 substituted "any defendant is" for "the defendants are".
  • 1992—Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 102–572 inserted before period at end ", if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought".
  • 1991—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 102–198 substituted "in (1)" for "if (1)".
11 earlier amendment entries
  • 1990—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101–650, §311(1), substituted cls. (1) to (3) for "the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose".
  • Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101–650, §311(2), substituted "may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only if" and cls. (1) to (3) for "may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law".
  • Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101–650, §311(3), substituted "(2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3)" for "or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4)".
  • 1988—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 100–702 amended subsec. (c) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (c) read as follows: "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
  • 1976—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 94–574 provided that, in actions against the United States, its agencies, or officers or employees in their official capacities, additional persons may be joined in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with other venue requirements which would be applicable if the United States, its agencies, or one of its officers or employees were not a party.
  • Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 94–583 added subsec. (f).
  • 1966—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89–714, §1, authorized a civil action to be brought in the judicial district in which the claim arose.
  • Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89–714, §1, authorized a civil action to be brought in the judicial district in which the claim arose.
  • Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 89–714, §2, repealed subsec. (f) which permitted a civil action on a tort claim arising out of the manufacture, assembly, repair, ownership, maintenance, use, or operation of an automobile to be brought in the judicial district wherein the act or omission complained of occurred. Present provisions are now contained in subsecs. (a) and (b) of this section.
  • 1963—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 88–234 added subsec. (f)
  • 1962—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 87–748 added subsec. (e).

Enactment and amendment notes are the official text of the United States Code, 2024 edition (laws through 2025-01-06), Office of the Law Revision Counsel, via govinfo.gov.

References in text

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (e), are set out in the Appendix to this title.

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