Statute Annotations › Federal › 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Definitions under the Americans with Disabilities Act regulations: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
4,244
Cited in passing
892
Citing cases indexed
11,449
Case dates
1993–2026
Screened through
2026-06-26
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-01
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

5,136 citing cases reviewed of 11,449 in the citation index: 4,244 interpreted the section (annotated below), 892 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-26 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1998-06-25 Bragdon v. Abbott held that reproduction is a major life activity, displacing an earlier exclusion. Source
  • 1999-05-24 Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. held that an SSDI claim does not automatically bar an ADA plaintiff from showing she is qualified under the accommodation framework reflected in § 1630.2(m); an apparent conflict requires an explanation. Source
  • 1999-06-22 Sutton v. United Air Lines required considering mitigating measures in the disability inquiry; the ADAAA later reversed that rule. Source
  • 2002-01-08 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams imposed a strict central-importance and severe-restriction standard for major life activities; the ADAAA later rejected it. Source
  • 2002-04-29 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett held that an accommodation conflicting with a bona fide seniority system is ordinarily unreasonable, but an employee may show special circumstances that justify an exception. Source
  • 2002-06-10 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal upheld § 1630.2(r)’s direct-threat rule for significant risk to the individual’s own health or safety, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of that rule. Source
  • 2009-01-01 The ADA Amendments Act broadened disability coverage, rejected strict substantial-limitation tests, required disregarding most mitigating measures, expanded major life activities, and made regarded-as coverage independent of a perceived substantial limitation. Source
  • 2011-05-24 The EEOC revised § 1630.2 to implement the ADAAA: it removed the former significant-restriction threshold and factor checklists, broadened major life activities and regarded-as coverage, and clarified that short impairments can qualify; the class-or-broad-range inquiry for actual disability based on working remains. Source
  • 2012-04-04 A CFR correction changed wording in § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) from “a qualified individual with a disability” to “an individual with a disability who is qualified,” without changing the accommodation rule. Source
  • 2014-01-29 A CFR correction restored an omitted paragraph of the appendix guidance for § 1630.2(o) describing examples of reasonable accommodation; it did not change the accommodation test. Source

Definitions and reasonable accommodation

Section 1630.2(o) treats reasonable accommodation as an open-ended concept that may include a leave of absence for medical treatment when appropriate, unless leave would impose undue hardship.

Schmidt v. Safeway Inc. · filed 1994-06-09(o)

The term “reasonable accommodation” is an open-ended one. The statutes and regulations offer examples, but caution that the term is not limited to those examples. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (interpretive regulations, section 1630.2(o)); OAR 839-06-245. An employer may, “in appropriate circumstances, have to consider the provision of leave to an employee as a reasonable accommodation, unless the provision of leave would impose an undue hardship.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (EEOC interpretive regulations to Section 1630.15(b) and (c)). ... Although the interpretive regulations were not specifically directed at alcohol problems, I conclude the ADA may require an employer to provide a leave of absence to an employee with an alcohol problem, particularly if the employer would provide that accommodation to an employee with cancer or some other illness requiring medical treatment.
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Section 1630.2(o) defines reasonable accommodation as modifications or adjustments that enable a qualified employee with a disability to perform essential job functions or enjoy equal employment benefits and privileges.

Harmer v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. · filed 1993-09-20(o)

As the Court reads the ADA, the purpose of reasonable accommodation is to allow a disabled employee to perform the essential functions of his job or to enable him to enjoy equal privileges of non-disabled employees, such as access to bathrooms and cafeterias, etc.
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(p)(2)(v) treats an accommodation that adversely affects other employees’ ability to perform their jobs as an undue burden on the employer.

Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. · filed 1995-09-05(p)(2)(v)

Since an accommodation that adversely impacts other employees’ ability to do their jobs is an undue burden on the employer, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v), it is unreasonable.
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Section 1630.2(o) defines reasonable accommodation by reference to enabling employees with disabilities to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment, and the court held that a requested one-year leave was unreasonable as a matter of law.

Dockery v. North Shore Medical Center · filed 1995-12-04(o)

A reasonable accommodation is an accommodation that would “enable [the employer’s employees with disabilities] to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). ... However, this Court concludes that, as a matter of law, an employer is not required to grant a one-year leave of absence, and such an accommodation is, on its face, unreasonable.
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Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines a physical or mental impairment as a physiological disorder or condition that affects one or more body systems.

Scott v. Flaghouse, Inc. · filed 1997-10-16(h)(1)

According to regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a “physical or mental impairment” is a physiological disorder or condition that affects one or more body systems. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1996).
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Section 1630.2(m) defines qualification through a two-step inquiry into job prerequisites and essential functions, while § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines reasonable accommodation as adjustments enabling a qualified individual with a disability to perform those functions.

Armijo v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, Inc. · filed 2022-04-28(m) (o)(1)(ii)

the EEOC has promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) to further elaborate upon the meaning of the term “qualified.” ... That subsection sets forth a two-step inquiry for determining whether the individual is qualified. A court first determines whether the individual satisfies the prerequisites of the job; more specifically, whether “the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). At step two, a court determines whether, “with or without reasonable accommodation,” the individual is able to “perform the essential functions of such position.” Id. ... Moreover, a reasonable accommodation must enable the employee to perform the duties of the position. ... see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (defining “reasonable accommodation” as “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position”).
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Section 1630.2(h)(1) treats depression and anxiety diagnoses as mental impairments, § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation by whether it enables essential job functions, and § 1630.2(o)(3) recognizes an interactive process for determining accommodation.

Armstead v. Anthem/ Elevance Health HR · filed 2024-09-23(h)(1) (o)(1)(ii) (o)(3)

Such diagnoses meet the EEOC definition of “mental” impairments. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1); Jones, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 632. ... A reasonable accommodation is one that enables the employee to perform the “essential functions” of her job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... Because the ADA requires employers to engage in an “interactive process” with employees requesting accommodations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3), engagement in that process would likewise constitute protected conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
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Section 1630.2(o) does not treat as reasonable an accommodation that eliminates an essential function of the job.

Monday · filed 2026-01-15(o)

An accommodation is unreasonable “if it requires eliminating an ‘essential’ function of the job.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to plaintiff’s ADA claim because: (1) plaintiff is not a “qualified individual” under the ADA; and (2) even if she was, plaintiff’s request for a “permanent” remote position is unreasonable.
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Section 1630.2(o)(2) recognizes modified schedules as possible reasonable accommodations, but additional leave is not required in every case.

Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 1997-02-22(o)(2)

This court is mindful that the use of accrued sick leave, part-time or modified work schedules may in some eases be an appropriate accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2), § 1630.2(o) (Appendix). However, such accommodation was not required in this case.
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Direct threat

Section 1630.2(g)(3) does not require a substantial limitation or a record of impairment to establish that an individual was regarded as disabled, while § 1630.2(r) requires an individualized, evidence-based finding of a significant risk of substantial harm rather than a speculative or remote risk.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Amsted Rail Co. · filed 2017-11-16(g)(3), (r)

As the emphasized language suggests, showing that an individual is regarded as disabled “does not require a showing of ah impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (2012). ... “Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable. accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2010). ... No reasonable jury could find Dr. Dirkers conducted an individualized assessment of each claimant’s ability to perform the job of chipper safely and came to a reasonable conclusion based on the best available medical evidence, the abnormal NCT result.- ... For these reasons, the EEOC is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
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Section 1630.2(o)(3) requires an employer to use an informal interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and possible accommodations, while § 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat assessment to consider four specified risks and be individualized and based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Hale v. Johnson · filed 2017-03-28(o)(3), (r)

There are four factors to be considered in this analysis: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. ... An assessment of whether an employee poses a direct threat must be “individualized” to the employee’s abilities and job functions and “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” ... Pursuant to federal regulation: To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome these limitations.
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(r) requires a direct-threat assessment to rely on reasonable medical judgment using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corporation · filed 2012-04-27(r)

“This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rely on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and an individualized assessment of the employee’s present ability to perform the job safely.

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal · filed 2002-06-10(r)

The direct threat defense must be “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,” and upon an expressly “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job,” reached after considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended.
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Section 1630.2(r) permits an employer to consider disability-related risk only when it is a significant risk—meaning a high probability of substantial harm—not merely a slightly increased, speculative, or remote risk.

ESTATE OF · filed 1998-02-25(r)

The EEOC guidelines provide further insight: 23 An employer, however, is not permitted to deny an employment opportunity to an individual with a disability merely because of a slightly increased risk. The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e. high probability, of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient. 24 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996) (citations omitted). ... Thus, our analysis in the instant case must not consider the possibility of HIV transmission, but rather focus on the probability of transmission weighed with the other three factors of the Arline test.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential job functions.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AIC Security Investigation, Ltd. · filed 1993-03-05(r)

Direct threat is defined as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of the individual or other that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” A “direct threat” defense is to be evaluated on a individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (emphasis added).
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm and requires considering whether reasonable accommodation can eliminate or reduce that risk to insignificant proportions.

Altman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. · filed 1995-09-28(r)

A “direct threat” is defined as a “significant risk of substantial harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Although plaintiffs reinstatement as Chief of Medicine in January 1993 would have entailed a significant risk to the public’s health and safety, the defendants would have been obligated to reinstate plaintiff so long as that risk could have been eliminated or reduced to “insignificant” proportions by means of a reasonable accommodation. ... In short, the court concludes that plaintiff would have posed a “significant risk of substantial harm” to Metropolitan’s patients if defendants had restored him to his old post, and that none of the accommodations suggested by plaintiff would have eliminated that risk or reduced it to a manageable level; nor, in view of the considerable difficulties involved in monitoring a Chief of Service’s performance, can the defendants be faulted for fading to devise some other scheme to safeguard patients against the possible harmful consequences of a relapse. Accordingly, the court concludes that defendants were not required to reinstate plaintiff as Chief of Medicine in January of 1993.
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Section 1630.2(r) treats a disability-related risk as a direct threat only when an individualized assessment shows a significant risk to health or safety; speculative or remote risks do not suffice.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kinney Shoe Corp. · filed 1996-02-14(r)

Thus, the court finds that Martinson’s seizures do not pose “a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace,” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b), nor do they pose a direct threat to the safety of Martinson himself, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The potential risk of injury, in the record before the court, simply cannot be characterized as a “high probability of substantial harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) App. And given the court’s previous finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Martinson could perform the essential functions of a shoe salesperson, summary judgment for Kinney is inappropriate on the grounds that Martinson is not “otherwise qualified.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment of whether an individual poses a direct threat, considering the risk’s duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1996-03-06(r)

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, it appears that Dr. Onder did not make an individualized assessment of Darling’s ability to perform safely the essential functions of the job, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The court finds that Defendant fails to provide evidence that Darling posed a direct threat to himself and/or his coworkers.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and lists four factors for assessing it.

Judice v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1 · filed 1996-03-13(r)

First, a “direct threat” is one that poses “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” ... Finally, the regulations set forth four factors to aid in the determination: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
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Whether an individual poses a direct threat is a fact-intensive question that must be decided by the trier of fact after weighing the nature and potential harm of the risk.

Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc. · filed 1996-05-24(r)

Whether one is a direct threat is a complicated, fact intensive determination, not a question of law. To determine whether a particular individual performing a particular act poses a direct risk to others is a matter for the trier of fact to determine after weighing all of the evidence about the nature of the risk and the potential harm.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized, medically grounded direct-threat assessment and bars denying employment based only on a slight, speculative, or remote risk.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dolphin Cruise Line, Inc. · filed 1996-06-27(r)

An employer ... is not permitted to deny an employment opportunity to an individual with disability merely because of a slightly increased risk.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that requires an individualized assessment, and theoretical safety concerns without a reasonable probability of substantial harm do not establish that defense.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Texas Bus Lines · filed 1996-04-23(r)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the likelihood of potential harm as a result of Manuel’s weight impeding her service to her passengers is too remote and does not constitute grounds for a viable defense under the ADA. Despite Texas Bus Lines’ assertions that Manuel posed a “direct threat” to the “men, women and children passengers” that it transports, such theoretical concerns do not serve as a basis for the direct threat defense. An employer cannot assert a direct threat defense unless it makes a showing of a reasonable probability of substantial harm.
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Section 1630.2(r) addresses whether reasonable accommodation could eliminate a direct threat; an employer's failure to investigate possible accommodations does not relieve the employee of proving that such accommodations were available.

Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc. · filed 1996-09-27(r)

We are more troubled by the evidence that American failed to investigate possible accommodations. No language in the ADA mandates a pretermination investigation, but the EEOC advises that "the employer must determine whether a reasonable accommodation would ... eliminate" the direct threat. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.9, Interp. Guidance. We are persuaded that American's failure to investigate did not relieve Moses of his burden of producing probative evidence that reasonable accommodations were available.
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Law changed since Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal (June 10, 2002) upheld the EEOC rule allowing an individualized direct-threat defense for substantial risk to the individual’s own health or safety.

Section 1630.2(r)'s “direct threat” concept does not extend to a risk of harm to the disabled individual himself; the relevant threat is to other individuals.

Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc. · filed 1996-07-10(r)

In sum, the EEOC regulations interpret the term “direct threat” under the ADA to include not only a direct threat to others, but also a direct threat to the disabled person himself. ... Having considered the plain language, legislative history, and relevant caselaw (such as it is), the court concludes that any jury instruction on “direct threat” must refer to a direct threat to other individuals, not a direct threat to the disabled person himself.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to an individual's or others' health or safety that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

Crocker v. Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster-General · filed 2000-03-22(r)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b), a finding that Crocker poses a direct safety threat to himself or others renders him not otherwise qualified. A direct threat entails “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Carrying heavy mail boxes and pushing a heavy hamper down a loading ramp every day while hopping on one leg, as Crocker proposes, would not be safe.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1630.2(r)'s inclusion of threats to the individual's own health or safety was rejected as contrary to the ADA's unambiguous limitation of the direct-threat defense to threats to others.

Echazabal v. Chevron Usa, Inc. Irwin Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-05-23(r)

See 29 C.F.R. S 1630.15(b)(2)(1999)("The term `qualification standard' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace." (emphasis added)); 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(r). ... In the present case, we need not determine what level of deference Title I regulations are due, because we would reject the EEOC's regulatory interpretation of the statutory "direct threat" provision even were we to conclude that Chevron deference is appropriate. ... As we concluded above, the intent of Congress is clear: the language of the direct threat defense plainly expresses Congress's intent to include within the scope of aS 12113 defense only threats to other individuals in the workplace. Accordingly, we reject the EEOC's contrary interpretation.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rely on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to perform essential job functions, grounded in reasonable medical judgment using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Lowe v. Alabama Power · filed 2001-03-23(r)

The implementing regulations require that: [t]he determination that an individual poses a "direct threat" shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Alabama Power's decision that Lowe was not able to perform the mechanic position safely was not based, therefore, on particularized facts using the best available objective evidence as required by the regulations.
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The regulation treats an employee who poses a danger to herself as not otherwise qualified, and the court applied that principle in assessing whether Benson posed such a danger.

Benson v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · filed 2002-01-25(r)

“Similarly, if an employee poses a danger to herself, she is not deemed to be “otherwise qualified.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) App. ... Thus, while Benson was experiencing on occasion extreme frustration, it is not clear that she posed a danger to herself.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires assessing the significance of a direct-threat risk by considering its duration, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the harm will occur, and the imminence of the harm.

Green v. Burton Rubber Processing, Inc. · filed 2002-02-21(r)

Assessment of the significance of the risk involves four factors: (1) duration of risk; (2) nature and severity of potential harm; (3) likelihood that potential harm will occur; and (4) imminence of potential harm.
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Section 1630.2(r) treats an individual as not qualified when a disability-related significant safety risk cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.

Schutts v. Bently Nevada Corp. · filed 1997-06-05(r)

An individual is not “qualified” if he poses a significant risk to others’ safety by virtue of a disability, which risk cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. ... To this extent it would simply have been impossible for Plaintiff to make out a prima facie case.
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Section 1630.2(r) generally requires an individualized assessment of an individual's present ability to safely perform essential job functions to determine whether the individual poses a direct threat, but an employer may rely on a group-based assessment when individualized assessment is impossible or impractical, provided it still proves a significant, unaccommodable risk.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1997-07-01(r)

According to the EEOC’s regulations, “the determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... After analyzing the text of the ADA, the statute’s legislative history, ADA caselaw, and precedent under other employment discrimination statutes, the Court concludes that an employer need not satisfy the direct threat test via individualized assessment if that employer can prove that it is impossible or impractical to individually assess each employee affected by the policy. However, even if an employer shows that individualized assessment is impractical, he must still satisfy the direct threat test by showing that the group affected by the policy constitutes a significant risk of substantial harm to themselves or others that cannot be reduced or eliminated by reasonable accommodation.
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Section 1630.2(r) permits denying public accommodations when an individual poses a direct threat—a significant risk of substantial harm to that person or others that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Jairath v. Dyer · filed 1997-07-24(r)

The ADA does not require a covered entity to extend its public accommodations to an individual where this would pose a “direct threat” or “significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of that individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1984). The legality of defendant’s medical decision not to treat plaintiff therefore depends on whether the cosmetic surgery actually posed a “direct threat” to plaintiffs health. The determination whether surgery poses a “direct threat” to a patient’s health is based on a “Reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge or the most available objective evidence ... to ascertain: the nature, duration, severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2R (1984); 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c).
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized, evidence-based assessment of direct threat and does not require an independent medical examination when clear objective evidence is available.

Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy · filed 1997-10-28(r)

As Den Hartog correctly asserts, the determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” should be based on an “individualized assessment” that relies on “the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996). (Emphasis added.) However, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) does not require an independent medical examination when the available objective evidence is clear. It uses the conjunctive “and/or” between medical knowledge and objective evidence.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment when determining whether an individual poses a direct threat; physicals and tests alone do not satisfy that requirement.

Dipol v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1998-03-30(r)

The administration of the physicals and the tests conducted during Plaintiff’s examinations do not constitute an individualized assessment as contemplated by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
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Section 1630.2(r) permits a direct-threat assessment based on reasonable medical judgment using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, and the risk must be significant.

Burroughs v. City of Springfield · filed 1998-12-28(r)

Nevertheless, a "direct threat" assessment may "be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); ... A risk must be significant to constitute a direct threat. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210. ... The City's decision to remove Burroughs from duty was appropriately based on objective evidence and reasonable medical judgment.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce and requires evaluation of four risk factors; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient.

Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint · filed 1999-01-08(r)

A direct threat means that there is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). To determine if an individual poses a direct threat, the trial court should evaluate the following factors: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... In addition, “[a]n employer ... is not permitted to deny an employment opportunity to an individual with a disability merely because of a slightly increased risk. The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (citations omitted). The proof tendered in the present case did not establish as a matter of law that there was a high probability of potential harm because of Hamlin’s physical limitations, or that the alleged risk was anything more than speculative or remote. Flint simply relied upon its own “subjective perceptions” that all line officers in the Fire Department do nothing other than directly fight fires. There was thus no error in the district court’s reserving this issue for the jury.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized direct-threat inquiry focused on whether the employee poses a significant risk of harm and whether reasonable accommodation can eliminate that risk without undue hardship.

Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Mike Black Rita Silva · filed 1999-01-28(r)

In evaluating a direct threat defense, a court should first consider whether the employer has demonstrated that the employee cannot perform the job without a significant risk of harm.
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A direct-threat assessment may rely on reasonable medical judgment using the most current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, and the risk must be significant.

Burroughs v. City of Springfield · filed 1999-02-04(r)

Nevertheless, a “direct threat” assessment may “be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence.” ... A risk must be significant to constitute a direct threat.
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When a safety requirement tends to screen out people with disabilities, the employer bears the burden of proving that the individual is a direct threat.

Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Incorporated, Doing Business as Cwlc, Incorporated · filed 1999-04-15(r)

The law of Rizzo I, putting the burden of proof on the defendant, applies only in cases concerning "safety requirements that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities." ... In other words, the safety requirement instituted by CWLC was that any teacher whose responsibilities included van driving be able to discriminate spoken words. This is obviously a safety requirement which tends to screen out a class of individuals with hearing disabilities. In such a case, the defendant now bears the burden of proof that the employee poses a direct threat to the health or safety of herself or others. ... We hold that, in accord with the federal regulations, when a court finds that the safety requirements imposed tend to screen out the disabled, then the burden of proof shifts to the employer, to prove that the employee is, in fact, a direct threat.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment of an individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job when determining whether the individual poses a direct threat.

Kapche v. City of San Antonio · filed 1999-05-20(r)

Unfortunately, absent from our written reasons in either Chandler or Daugherty is any attempt to square this outcome with the EEOC regulation which requires, seemingly without exception, the individualized assessment of all job applicants and employees. ... Based on our de novo review of the summary judgment evidence, we conclude that the City’s physicians did not conduct an individualized assessment of Kapche’s present ability to perform safely the essential functions of a police officer.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires the direct-threat determination to be based on an individualized assessment of the person’s present ability to safely perform the job’s essential functions, using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Kapche v. City of San Antonio · filed 2002-08-30(r)

[The “direct threat”] criterion ordinarily requires "an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job," 29 CFR § 1630.2(r) (1998), "based on medical or other objective evidence," Bragdon, 524 U.S., at 649, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (citing School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987)); see 29 CFR § 1630.2(r) (1998) (assessment of direct threat "shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence").
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Subsection (r) requires an individualized assessment of whether a person poses a direct threat, based on reasonable medical judgment using the most current medical knowledge or best available objective evidence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Browning-Ferris, Inc. · filed 2002-09-17(r)

As noted above, the ADA requires employers to conduct an individualized assessment of whether an individual with a disability poses a direct threat of harm before taking an adverse employment action. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). This assessment must be “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an employer invoking the direct-threat defense to make an individualized, medically supported assessment using current medical knowledge or objective evidence and to consider the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of harm.

Echazabal v. Chevron Usa, Inc. Irwin Industries, Inc. · filed 2003-07-23(r)

Before excluding an individual from employment as a direct threat, an employer must demonstrate that it has made an "individualized assessment" of the employee's ability to perform the essential functions of the job, "based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Before refusing to hire Echazabal, Chevron was required, under the terms of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), to consider the severity, imminence, and potential likelihood of harm. Based on consideration of these factors, Chevron had the burden of demonstrating at least a "significant risk of substantial harm" to Echazabal. Id.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on a reasonable, individualized medical assessment using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, considering the risk’s duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence.

Darnell, Brent v. Thermafiber Inc · filed 2005-07-29(r)

The determination that he poses a direct threat must be premised upon “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence, and upon an expressly individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (internal quotations omitted)). The assessment should take into account: (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see also Chevron, 536 U.S. at 86; Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Section 1630.2(r) treats the ADA direct-threat defense as a term of art requiring an individualized, medically informed assessment using four risk factors, and it does not govern discipline for an employee's actual workplace threat.

Sista v. CDC Ixis North America, Inc. · filed 2006-04-13(r)

The "poses a direct threat defense" requires an "individualized assessment of the employee's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job . . . based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... The poses a direct threat defense is not applicable when an employee actually makes a threat, despite the common use of the word "threat"; "poses a direct threat" is a term of art under the ADA, reserved for circumstances not presented by this case.
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Section 1630.2(r) treats a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to the individual's health or safety that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

Taylor, Lorenzo v. Rice, Condoleeza · filed 2006-06-27(r)

“Direct threat” in this context “means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual . . . that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). ... As the district court recognized, to evaluate “the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job,” id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)) (internal quotation mark omitted), we must first determine what functions are essential – a matter the parties contest.
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The regulation defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized assessment; the court applied that standard to find that the plaintiff's near-blindness posed a direct threat to her own safety.

Clayborne v. Potter · filed 2006-09-11

Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. ... Further, Ms. Clayborne was unqualified because her near-blindness posed a direct threat to her own safety.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an employer asserting a direct-threat defense to base it on an individualized assessment supported by reasonable medical judgment and the best available objective evidence, considering the specified risk factors.

Taylor v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority · filed 2008-05-05(r)

The burden lies on the employer to show that the disabled employee would represent a direct threat. ... The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would post a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: ... (1) The duration of the risk; ... (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; ... (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and ... (4) The imminence of the potential harm.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to consider the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of the potential harm.

Justice v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., Inc. · filed 2008-06-03(r)

Applying the factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), while the risk of harm may have been permanent and the severity of the harm great, a reasonable jury could conclude that the likelihood of the harm was extremely small and that Justice therefore did not pose a “direct threat” to the safety of himself or others in the Worland plant.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to assess the duration, nature and severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm when deciding whether a disability presents a significant safety risk.

McCann v. City of Eugene · filed 2011-06-21(r)

Existence of a significant risk is determined by considering such factors as duration of the risk, nature and severity of the risk, likelihood of potential harm, and imminence of potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
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A direct-threat finding requires an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential job functions.

Eldredge v. City of St. Paul · filed 2011-08-15(r)

The determination that an individual poses a direct threat must be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to an individual’s or others’ health or safety that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate.

Johnsqn v. City of Blaine · filed 2013-08-26(r)

A direct threat is a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an employer assessing whether a direct threat presents a significant risk to consider the risk’s duration, potential harm’s nature and severity, likelihood, and imminence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rexnord Industries, LLC · filed 2013-08-30(r)

To determine whether a risk is significant, the employer must consider: (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.
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The regulation requires a direct-threat assessment to rest on a reasonable medical judgment using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Bloomfield v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2013-11-27(r)

This does not mean, however, that the IME was unlawful. The ADA permits an employer to require an employee to undergo a medical evaluation if the employer has a reasonable concern that the employee poses a direct threat. In most cases, the employer is not permitted to conclude on its own that the employee poses a direct threat; the employer must have “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
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The direct-threat determination must be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Tool & Mold, Inc. · filed 2014-04-16(r)

“[t]he determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat assessment to rely on reasonable medical judgment using the most current medical knowledge or best available objective evidence, and it covers threats to the employee himself.

Nevitt v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 2014-05-05(r)

The regulations require that a covered entity’s assessment of whether an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ “shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relied on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence.” ... The roughly three-month interval between Dr. Poczatek and Dr. Cordover’s evaluations and when Dr. Szabo imposed restrictions on Nevitt is not long enough to compel the court to make a similar determination on the medical examination and inquiry claim.
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A direct threat is a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

Archerda v. Department of Defense · filed 2014-07-11(r)

Generally, a disability-related inquiry or medical examination may be “job-related and consistent with business necessity” if an employer “has a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee’s ability to perform essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition; or (2) an employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition.” Watkins, 2001 WL 1097442, at *2. “Direct threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... The agency has not presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the second prong, that it had a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that the appellant posed a direct threat due to a medical condition. There is no evidence that the appellant was violent or posed a significant risk of substantial harm.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized direct-threat assessment based on reasonable medical judgment and the best available objective evidence, not merely an employer's lay intuition.

Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth. · filed 2014-08-19(r)

An assessment of whether an employee poses a direct threat must be “individualized” to the employee’s abilities and job functions and “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... For the regulation to have any meaning, however, an employer must do more than follow its own lay intuition regarding the threat posed by an employee’s potential medical condition.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a “direct threat” as a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the person or others that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Beverage Distributors Co. · filed 2015-03-16(r)

A “direct threat” involves “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the [person] or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Beverage Distributors should have avoided liability if it had reasonably believed the job would entail a direct threat; proof of an actual threat should have been unnecessary.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized direct-threat assessment that considers the duration, nature and severity, likelihood, and imminence of the potential harm.

Jordan v. City of Union City · filed 2015-03-30(r)

The direct threat defense requires a degree of individualized assessment that is lacking here. "In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); ... As a sufficient individualized assessment of Plaintiffs disability based on medical evaluation or comparable objective information was not performed here, Union City cannot avail itself of the direct threat defense.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to an individual's or others' health or safety that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

In the Matter of Paul Williams, Township of Lakewood · filed 2016-01-25(r)

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), the term "[d]irect threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation."
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(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Henschel v. Clare County Road Commission · filed 2016-03-10(r)

Under the EEOC’s regulations, “Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Under the “direct threat” jurisprudence, an employer need not make a reasonable accommodation if it would still result in a risk of harm to the employee seeking the accommodation. Essentially, the rule provides that it would be unreasonable to allow an employer to threaten the health and safety of himself and others. Here, Henschel’s inability to move the excavator while carrying the boom in a stable position could create a situation that threatens his safety (e.g., if the excavator were to become unbalanced and topple) or the safety of anyone in the vicinity of the workplace. The testimony of experienced operators and the excavator manual attest to situations where this situation could actualize. Summary judgment for Defendant is warranted.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation, and the court treated the absence of a direct threat as not automatically establishing that an employee is qualified.

Bruzzese v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-08(r)

“Direct threat” is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... As a matter of law, Turk’s permanent -reassignment of plaintiff did not constitute illegal discrimination because plaintiff has reasonably been determined to be .not “qualified” to be a special agent carrying a gun. While it is true that the question of qualification is often blended with the question of whether an individual poses a “direct threat,” because an individual does not constitute a “direct threat” does not render that individual qualified.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to be based on an individualized assessment of the person's present ability to perform the job safely, using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and specified risk factors.

Littlefield v. State, ex rel. Department of Public Safety · filed 2016-07-15(r)

“Direct threat” means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” is based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment is based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized assessment based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Hernandez-Torres v. Department of the Army · filed 2016-09-12(r)

“Direct threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Discrimination law requires an agency to conduct an individualized assessment of an employee’s qualifications in determining whether an employee poses a direct threat because of a disability. McAlexander v. Department of Defense, 105 M.S.P.R. 384, ¶¶14-15 (2007). An individualized assessment is “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to an individual's or others' health or safety that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. McLeod Health, Inc. · filed 2019-01-31(r)

A “direct threat” is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... The correct way to apply the EEOC’s enforcement guidance in a case like this is to begin by asking: does the relevant job function (here, navigating to and within McLeod’s campuses) qualify as essential? If the answer is yes, we then ask whether the employee is medically capable of performing the function without posing a direct threat to herself or others—i.e., whether the employee can perform the function safely. ... A reasonable jury could conclude that when McLeod required Whitten to take a medical exam, the company lacked a reasonable belief—based on objective evidence—that Whitten’s medical condition had left her unable to navigate to and within the company’s campuses without posing a direct threat to her own safety.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat defense to rest on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, an individualized assessment of the person's ability to perform the job safely, and proof that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate the risk.

U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Gulf Logistics Operating, Inc. · filed 2019-04-04(r)

"The direct threat defense must be 'based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,' and upon an expressly 'individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job[.]' " ... Plaintiff correctly points out that in order to plead a direct threat defense, the defendant must also show that the risk cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, and in this case defendant has not provided any evidence to show that it considered any reasonable accommodations for Mr. Gunderson. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish the direct threat defense at this stage.
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The direct-threat defense requires an individualized assessment based on reasonable medical judgment and current medical or objective evidence.

Lundvall v. Land O'Lakes, Inc. · filed 2020-02-18(r)

Land O’Lakes has not met its burden in showing that Lundvall’s employment was terminated based on an “individualized assessment” based on a “reasonable medical judgment” that he was a direct threat.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. T&T Subsea, LLC · filed 2020-04-29(r)

“The direct threat defense must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.’” Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)) (brackets omitted).
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized, objectively supported assessment.

Sutherland v. Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc · filed 2020-09-10(r)

The EEOC defines a “direct threat” as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” ... Whether an employer appropriately makes a direct threat determination depends on first, whether defendant conducted a “meaningful assessment” that is individualized and based on the essential functions of the job, and second, whether that assessment led the employer to reasonably conclude that the employee posed a threat to the safety of himself or others “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence.” ... Plaintiff did not present evidence showing that Dr. Duet’s conclusion that Sutherland posed a direct threat to himself or others in the master’s job was objectively unreasonable.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized assessment of the person’s present ability to perform essential job functions, supported by reasonable medical judgment using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Krehbiel v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2020-09-11(r)

The “direct threat” determination “shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”
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Section 1630.2(r) treats a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.

Hopman v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2020-09-24(r)

To establish the affirmative defense of direct threat, Union Pacific must prove a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of Mr. Hopman or other persons that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571 (8th Cir. 2007). The party asserting the affirmative defense of direct threat must prove that, at the time it took the action that it justifies with the defense, it had conducted “an individualized direct threat analysis” that relied on “the ‘best current medical or other objective evidence’ in order to ‘protect disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear.’” E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d at 571 (quoting Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, (1998); Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, (1987))). Factors an employer must consider in performing an individualized direct threat analysis include the duration of risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm. Id.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to consider the risk’s duration, potential harm’s nature and severity, likelihood, and imminence.

Howard v. Norfolk Southern Corporation · filed 2020-09-17(r)

“In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.”
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A direct-threat determination must be based on an individualized assessment of the employee’s present ability to perform safely, using current medical judgment and objective evidence.

Bailey v. Metal-Fab, Inc. · filed 2020-10-15(r)

With respect to the duration, nature, and likelihood of the risk, a jury could find that Defendant lacked objective evidence of a significant risk to health or safety. Plaintiff cites evidence that by the time of her termination, she had been seizure-free for nearly a month because her seizures were then being controlled by medication. Although no evidence is cited that Defendant was made aware of this fact, the regulations require an employer claiming a direct threat to consider the employee’s “present ability” to perform safely based on “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge” or other objective evidence. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2. A reasonable jury could find Defendant could have and should have sought a current medical opinion concerning the effect of Plaintiff’s medication on her seizures before it terminated her.
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Section 1630.2's direct-threat framework requires considering the duration, nature and severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm when assessing whether a disability poses a workplace safety threat.

Pontinen v. United States Steel Corporation · filed 2021-03-08

In order to determine whether an employee’s disability poses a “direct threat” to himself or others in the workplace, four factors must be analyzed: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of potential harm.” Stragapede v. City of Evanston, Ill., 865 F.3d 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2017); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.
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Section 1630.2(r) includes a risk to the employee's own health or safety within the definition of a direct threat and requires the employer's determination to be based on reasonable medical judgment using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Bosarge v. Mobile Area Water & Sewer Service · filed 2022-01-24(r)

The applicable regulations have expanded the definition of a direct threat to include a risk to the health or safety of the employee himself. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). An employer’s determination that an individual poses a direct threat must be based on “reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” See id.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized, evidence-based assessment considering four risk factors.

Pontinen v. United States Steel Corporati · filed 2022-02-11(r)

So, what is a direct threat? That term “means a significant risk of substantial harm … that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2012); see also Branham, 392 F.3d at 905–06. Any determination that someone poses a direct threat must rely on an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). In turn, “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence” must inform the assessment. Id. The assessment must consider: “(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.”
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The regulation requires a direct-threat determination to consider the duration, nature and severity, likelihood, and imminence of the potential harm, using a reasonable medical judgment based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc. · filed 2022-03-03(r)

An employer “must decide whether an employee poses a direct threat based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence, and upon an expressly individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” ... To determine whether an individual would pose a direct threat, four factors must be considered: “(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r)); Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d at 1446 (considering (1) “the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted)”; (2) “the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious)”; (3) “the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties)”; and (4) “the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.”) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)).
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized assessment using reasonable medical judgment and the best current objective evidence, considering the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm.

Anderson v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co · filed 2022-04-11(r)

An employer’s determination that an employee would pose a direct threat must: ... In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: ... (4) The imminence of the potential harm. ... Moreover, as the District Court concluded, NSRC reasonably considered Anderson a direct threat under § 1630.2’s four-factor risk analysis. ... The duration of the risk is thus indefinite. ... the high stakes involved mean that the District Court was right to regard the risk as significant. ... thus, the risk is imminent.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat and requires an individualized assessment based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, considering specified risk factors.

Byrd v. Outokumpu Stainless, USA, LLC · filed 2022-06-14(r)

“Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2021). The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. ... Id. (emphasis added). The defendant says that OHC “conducted an individualized assessment,” (Doc. 36 at 19), but the Court cannot agree. ... The Court concludes that the foregoing cases accurately reflect the proper analysis of “direct threat” arguments in the context of prescribed medication. ... OHC’s reports do not establish as a matter of fact or law that the plaintiff was a direct threat and thus not a qualified individual.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to perform essential job functions safely, informed by current medical knowledge or the best objective evidence and four specified risk factors.

Carter v. Union Pacific Railroad LLC · filed 2022-06-03(r)

The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: ... (1) The duration of the risk; ... (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; ... (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and ... (4) The imminence of the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Defendant asserts that the summary judgment facts present no genuine issue whether plaintiff safely could perform the essential functions of his job. The court agrees. The summary judgment facts establish that the Yardman position was a safety-critical job requiring plaintiff to operate trains remotely. It’s undisputed that the position requires good concentration, focus, alertness, insight, judgment, and impulse control. Also, the job duty of operating a locomotive by remote control poses danger and a risk of harm for employees, the public, property, and the environment. After plaintiff sustained his head injury, defendant conducted a FFD evaluation of plaintiff to determine whether he still could perform his job safely. Three doctors—Dr. Hughes, Dr. Frankel, and Dr. Holland—conducted individualized reviews of plaintiff’s medical records. ... These undisputed facts leave no genuine issue whether defendant’s decision to impose five-year work restrictions on plaintiff was “objectively reasonable.”
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to an individual or others that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce; a mere verbal disagreement without threatening or violent behavior is not enough to establish one.

Martin v. United States Postal Service · filed 2022-07-20(r)

“Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 30. ... Here, the “back-and-forth” alleged by the station manager describes a mere verbal disagreement between the appellant and his supervisor, without any suggestion that the appellant behaved in a threatening or violent manner. 2 HCD (testimony of the station manager). Therefore, we find that this was an improper basis to require the appellant to submit additional medical information under the Rehabilitation Act. See Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 30; IAF, Tab 14 at 33-34.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation, evaluated using the risk’s duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence through an individualized assessment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Outokumpu Stainless Steel USA, LLC · filed 2022-09-01(r)

“Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” ... “In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.” ... “Notably, OTK’s motion does not address the relevant legal inquiry relating to the individual assessment required of an employer asserting a direct threat defense.”
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

Litton v. Department of Justice · filed 2022-10-11(r)

Generally, a disability-related inquiry or medical examination may be job-related and consistent with business necessity if an employer has a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that (1) an employee’s ability to perform essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition; or (2) an employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition. ... A direct threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Here, the agency’s inquiries were not due to any reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that the appellant’s ability to perform his essential job functions was impaired by a medical condition or that he posed a direct threat due to a medical condition.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to an individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

Maibie v. United States Postal Service · filed 2022-12-21(r)

While an agency only may conduct an examination if it believes an employee poses a direct threat, it is not required to do so. In fact, the direct threat is a narrow exception to the general prohibition on an employer requiring employees to undergo medical exams or respond to medical inquiries. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1)-(2); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), .13(b), .14(c). Thus, we find that the agency did not violation the Rehabilitation Act by failing to conduct a more exhaustive examination of the appellant’s physical ability to perform in the carrier position.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to focus on whether there is a significant risk of substantial harm, considering the duration, nature, severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm.

Baker v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2023-05-16(r)

To prove a direct threat, a defendant must prove a significant risk of substantial harm. The direct threat defense requires consideration of the duration, nature and severity, likelihood and/or imminence of potential harm.
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Section 1630.2(r)'s direct-threat framework applies when discrimination is based on qualification standards or failure to accommodate and requires objective medical evidence.

TEDROW v. FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION · filed 2023-05-23(r)

That defense and its requirement of objective medical evidence comes into play when an employee claims that application of qualification standards and a failure to accommodate results in discrimination. ... Mr. Tedrow doesn’t advance claims based on qualification standards and failure to accommodate, so the School Corporation’s stated reasons aren’t a “direct threat” defense and a lack of objective medical evidence doesn’t undermine those reasons.
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The direct-threat defense requires an individualized, particularized assessment of the risks posed or faced by the individual, based on current objective evidence rather than a categorical assumption.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2023-03-31(r)

"Direct threat" is an affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof. E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571 (8th Cir. 2007). It requires "an individualized direct threat analysis that relies on the best current medical or other objective evidence in order to protect disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear." Id. (quotations omitted); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Factors to be considered include: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. Wal-Mart, 477 F.3d at 571; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... But Werner misapprehends the nature of the "direct threat" defense, which demands a "particularized enquiry" into the risks posed or faced by the employee. Chevron, 536 U.S. at 86. "An individualized assessment is required to establish that defense as a matter of law." Baker v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 580 F. Supp. 3d 647, 660 (D. Neb. 2022). Werner's assessment of Deuschle and Robinson wasn't bespoke—it was off-the-rack. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the EEOC that Werner's "direct threat" defense isn't applicable here.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized, medically grounded assessment; an in-person examination is not mandatory, although it may bear on whether the assessment was sufficiently individualized.

Baldwin v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2023-11-09(r)

“Direct threat” means “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). A determination that an individual poses a direct threat requires an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job” and this assessment must also “be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. ... While Union Pacific is correct that an in-person exam is not mandatory, whether or not Union Pacific physicians personally examined Baldwin may be relevant to whether the fitness-for-duty process was sufficiently “individualized,” see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), and thus, the Court will not prohibit Baldwin from referencing the lack of an in-person evaluation. Baldwin, however, also misstates the law. Union Pacific is not required to conduct an in-person examination and thus there is no basis to prohibit it from stating so.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant health or safety risk that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized assessment rather than a blanket disqualification policy.

Bemesderfer v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2023-12-14(r)

The Court rejects the notion that an employer may circumvent the ADA by implementing a blanket policy that disqualifies holders of an FMCSA hearing exemption.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires assessing a direct threat through the duration of the risk, nature and severity of potential harm, likelihood of harm, and imminence of harm, based on the individual's ability to safely perform essential job functions.

Zimmerman v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc. · filed 2024-01-26(r)

The four factors in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) also support SkyWest’s direct threat determination. As to the first factor, the duration of the risk is continuous and indefinite. Zimmerman is “profoundly deaf,” (Doc. 62-1 at 241) and there is nothing in the record suggesting that he can consistently and effectively communicate with individuals who are not in his line of sight. As to the second factor, the nature and severity of the potential harm is significant, as it is undisputed that ramp agents work in a fast-paced environment with heavy machinery. Doc. 62-4 at 182-84. Third, as to the likelihood of potential harm, the record notes one near-miss incident where another employee was almost run over because of the inability to communicate with Zimmerman, which demonstrates the likelihood of future incidents. And finally, it is undisputed that the ramp agent works on the tarmac every shift, so the potential harm is imminent.
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Section 1630.2(r) identifies four factors for determining whether an individual poses a direct threat: the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that it will occur, and its imminence.

Harris v. JTEKT Automotive Tennessee - Morristown, Inc. · filed 2024-02-13(r)

Four factors are considered in determining whether an individual poses a direct threat: “(1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
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Section 1630.2(r) requires evaluating direct threat by considering the duration of the risk, the severity of potential harm, the likelihood of harm, and its imminence; the court found those factors established a direct threat.

Smith v. Newport Utilities · filed 2024-04-17(r)

There are four relevant factors to the direct-threat defense: “(1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... After considering 1) the duration of the risk, 2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, 3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and 4) the imminence of the potential harm, the Court determines that Plaintiff was a direct threat to himself and other employees.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat assessment to consider the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm; applying those factors, the risk from a possible recurrent seizure justified work restrictions.

Carrillo v. RR · filed 2024-08-19(r)

Finally, the railroad’s restrictions properly accounted for the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of potential harm, and the imminence of potential harm. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). First, the record contains undisputed evidence that a second seizure is a high risk for several years after the first—a risk that only time can mitigate. Carrillo’s own expert recognized this. Second, the nature and severity of potential harm was great. Carrillo’s job required him to move or direct trains in an active railyard. He had to climb on those trains and balance on precarious catwalks as high as eighteen feet in the air. He—and everyone else in the railyard—would be significantly endangered if he suddenly lost consciousness. And the likelihood and imminence of potential harm was great. Again, Carrillo’s own expert did not dispute that. Thus, there was a strong chance of harm to Carrillo, others, and Union Pacific property for several years. Union Pacific’s decision to impose restrictions for five years was reasonable.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized, evidence-based assessment considering four specified factors.

Remillard v. Southern New Hampshire Health System, Inc. · filed 2024-09-30(r)

The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm. Id. ... Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the defendants can take shelter behind the direct threat defense. Although Remillard disagrees with the defendants’ assessment of her risk of harm and the likelihood that she would suffer another allergic reaction, those are quintessential factual disputes, and the court cannot resolve them in Remillard’s favor on her motion for summary judgment.
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Section 1630.2(r) treats a significant risk of harm to the disabled individual as a direct threat and requires an individualized assessment based on the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of the risk, using reasonable medical judgment and the best available objective evidence.

Smith v. Newport Utilities · filed 2025-02-27(r)

A regulation expands this definition to include a significant risk of harm to disabled individuals themselves. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 78–87. The regulation tells employers to consider four factors when deciding whether a significant risk exists: the “duration of the risk”; the “nature and severity of the potential harm”; the “likelihood that” this harm will arise; and the “imminence” of the harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)(1)–(4). Employers also should engage in an “individualized” direct-threat “assessment” and base their conclusion on “reasonable medical judgment,” “the best available objective evidence,” or both. Id. § 1630.2(r); see Michael, 808 F.3d at 307.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized direct-threat assessment based on the individual’s present ability to safely perform essential job functions, using reasonable medical judgment and four specified risk factors.

DeFries v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2025-04-07(r)

Determining whether “an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). This determination includes consideration of: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” Id.
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Section 1630.2(r) treats a direct threat as a significant safety risk that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, assessed by considering the risk's nature, duration, severity, and probability.

Lindley v. North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2025-04-09(r)

“[I]n determining whether an individual poses a direct threat, courts must evaluate the significance of the risk that an employee would pose by considering four interrelated factors: the nature of the risk, the duration of the risk, the severity of the risk, and the probability that the potential harm will occur.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to be based on an individualized assessment, current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, and the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of harm; a slightly increased, speculative, or remote risk is insufficient.

Mayer v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2025-07-02(r)

The direct threat assessment must be “based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job” and “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id.; Sanders, 108 F.4th at 1062. In making this judgment, U.P. must have considered: “(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). It is not enough for U.P. to show “slightly increased risk” or a “speculative or remote risk” when applying these factors. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Instead, U.P. must show Mayer “poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of substantial harm.” Id. ... A reasonable jury could conclude Mayer’s heart functioning alone was insufficient to support a “reasonable medical judgment” that Mayer posed “a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of substantial harm” to his coworkers and the public. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized direct-threat assessment considering the risk’s duration, the nature and severity of the potential harm, its likelihood, and its imminence.

EEOC v. Drivers Management, LLC · filed 2025-07-10(r)

“Specific factors to be considered include (1) the duration of risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.” Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Werner, it is undisputed that Werner did not conduct the individualized analysis necessary to prove this affirmative defense: Hamm just made a few general calls to back up her “prejudice, stereotypes, [and] unfounded fear” of allowing a deaf individual to drive a Werner truck. See id. (citation omitted). ... This one-size-fits-all approach is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to Werner’s direct threat defense, and we discern no error by the district court as to this issue.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment before an employer may successfully assert a direct-threat defense.

Garza v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2025-06-16(r)

Furthermore, because conducting an individualized assessment is a prerequisite to asserting a successful direct threat defense, failure to do so warrants judgment as a matter of law in Garza’s favor.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation, assessed using specified risk factors and an individualized, objectively reasonable determination based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Seals v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2025-07-23(r)

The term “direct threat” has been defined to mean “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat, factors to be considered include (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. Id. To establish a direct-threat defense, the employer must “show that its determination that [an employee] posed a direct threat was: (1) the result of an individualized assessment, (2) objectively reasonable, and (3) based on the ‘most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.’” Sanders, 108 F.4th at 1060 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to assess whether a significant risk of substantial harm can be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and to rely on reasonable medical judgment grounded in the most current medical knowledge or best available objective evidence.

Baldwin v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2025-08-01(r)

Here, the direct threat instruction did not fully reflect the law as prescribed by the governing regulation and our precedent. ... The district court’s instruction, therefore, did not meaningfully restore the full scope of the employer’s burden under our standards. ... While the direct threat instruction was erroneous, we conclude the omission did not affect the outcome of the trial.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized, objectively supported assessment of whether an employee poses a direct threat, considering the risk's duration, the potential harm's nature and severity, the likelihood of harm, and its imminence.

Vasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2025-10-30(r)

“The employer must make an ‘individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential function of the job.’ ... In making this individualized assessment, employers should consider “(1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of potential harm, (3) the likelihood that potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of potential harm.” Carrillo, 2024 WL 3861374, at *3; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... The record demonstrates that UPRC appropriately considered the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of potential harm, and the imminence of potential harm, and reasonably concluded Vasquez posed a significant risk of substantial harm.”
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A direct threat is a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation, determined using current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and an individualized assessment.

Herechberger · filed 2026-03-17(r)

A direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(r)). A direct threat determination “shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. In weighing the risks and their magnitude, “the views of public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are of special weight and authority.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998). Here, that also includes OHA. In reviewing those authorities, courts consider: (1) the “duration of the risk;” (2) the “nature and severity of the potential harm;” (3) the “likelihood that the potential harm will occur;” and (4) the “imminence of the potential harm.” Echazabal, 336 F.3d at 1028. “The determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Id. Plaintiff does not rebut then current scientific and medical evidence, including evidence from the CDC, NIH, OHA, and other authorities that, during the relevant timeframe, (1) the duration of risk was unknown; (2) the nature and severity of potential harm was grave given the large number of deaths that the COVID-19 Delta variant were causing; (3) the likelihood that the harm would occur was high given the increased risk of transmission from an unvaccinated caregiver especially to a medically vulnerable patient; and (4) the potential harm was imminent, as evinced by the “cooling bays” that PeaceHealth had to create to hold dead bodies. PeaceHealth determined, based on the “most current medical knowledge” and “best available objective evidence,” that unvaccinated employees, regardless of accommodation, posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of patients and others in the workplace. Plaintiff offers no contrary evidence that, despite her vaccination status, she could have safely performed the essential functions of her job. Accordingly, PeaceHealth is also entitled to summary judgment on its direct threat defense to Plaintiff’s ADA and Oregon disability discrimination claim.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm to an individual or others that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Boltz · filed 2026-03-17(r)

A direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(r)). ... PeaceHealth determined, based on the “most current medical knowledge” and “best available objective evidence,” that unvaccinated employees, regardless of accommodation, posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of patients and others in the workplace. ... Accordingly, PeaceHealth is also entitled to summary judgment on its direct threat defense to Plaintiff’s ADA and Oregon disability discrimination claim.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce, and requires an assessment based on current medical knowledge, objective evidence, and the individual's ability to perform essential job functions.

Combs · filed 2026-03-17(r)

A direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(r)). A direct threat determination “shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. In weighing the risks and their magnitude, “the views of public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are of special weight and authority.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998). Here, that also includes OHA. In reviewing those authorities, courts consider: (1) the “duration of the risk;” (2) the “nature and severity of the potential harm;” (3) the “likelihood that the potential harm will occur;” and (4) the “imminence of the potential harm.” Echazabal, 336 F.3d at 1028. “The determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Id. ... PeaceHealth determined, based on the “most current medical knowledge” and “best available objective evidence,” that unvaccinated employees, regardless of accommodation, posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of patients and others in the workplace. Plaintiff offers no contrary evidence that, despite her vaccination status, she could have safely performed the essential functions of her job. Accordingly, PeaceHealth is also entitled to summary judgment on its direct threat defense to Plaintiff’s ADA and Oregon disability discrimination claim.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct threat assessment to consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of harm, and its imminence.

Bender v. Norfolk Southern Corp. · filed 2014-07-08(r)

In determining the applicability of this defense, the jury was instructed to consider the characteristics of the harm allegedly posed by Plaintiff, including: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of potential harm. ... Thus, the evidence supported the finding that Plaintiff constituted a direct threat and, therefore, the jury’s verdict will not be disturbed.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment of a worker’s present ability to perform the job safely before an employer can establish a direct threat defense.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1998-01-23(r)

Whether a person poses such a direct threat must be determined based upon an “individualized assessment of [his] present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” ... For these reasons, the Court holds as a matter of law that UPRR failed to make the required individualized assessment and is therefore unable to bear its burden of proof on its “direct threat” defense.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a significant risk of substantial harm; a speculative or remote possibility of transmission is insufficient.

Estate of Mauro ex rel. Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center · filed 1998-02-25(r)

Thus, our analysis in the instant ease must not consider the possibility of HIV transmission, but rather focus on the probability of transmission weighed with the other three factors of the Arline test.
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Law changed since Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal (June 10, 2002) reversed this Ninth Circuit ruling and upheld the EEOC rule allowing an individualized direct-threat defense for substantial risk to the individual’s own health or safety.

Section 1630.2(r) cannot extend the direct threat defense to a risk solely to the disabled individual’s own health or safety.

Echazabal v. Chevron Usa, Inc. Irwin Industries, Inc.,opinion · filed 2000-05-23(r)

The implementing regulations of Title I of the ADA promulgated by the EEOC do, as Chevron contends, state that an employer may assert a “direct threat” defense with respect to individuals who pose a threat only to their own health or safety. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Accordingly, we reject the EEOC’s contrary interpretation.
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Under § 1630.2(r), a small likelihood of harm may still constitute a direct threat when the potential harm to others is sufficiently severe.

Hutton v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation · filed 2001-11-28(r)

Even were we to agree with Hutton, however, that the likelihood of an accident is small, we conclude that the severity and scale of the potential harm to others presented by Hutton’s employment nevertheless pose a significant risk under the direct-threat analysis.
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Section 1630.2(r)’s significant-risk standard is not required to prove a removal charge based on an employee’s current medical inability to perform.

Ryals v. Department of Justice · filed 2024-04-29(r)

To extent the appellant argues on review that the agency was required to prove that the appellant’s return to work posed “a significant risk of substantial harm . . . that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation,” we are not persuaded. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Branham v. John W. Snow, Secretary, United States Department of Treasury/internal Revenue Service · filed 2004-12-17(r)

“Direct threat” has been defined as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... In light of these considerations, we must conclude that the record has created a genuine issue of triable fact as to whether Mr. Branham’s physical condition presents a significant risk of substantial harm to himself or others.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate; a remote evacuation risk does not meet that standard.

U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · filed 2005-06-06(r)

A direct threat is a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or other persons that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... The evidence indicated that the likelihood of an emergency evacuation at the DuPont plant is slim, and the risk of substantial harm to Barrios was not imminent. ... Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reject DuPont’s direct threat defense.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk to others’ health or safety that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Haas v. Wyoming Valley Health Care System · filed 2006-12-06(r)

In short, a direct threat exists when there is a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.
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When an employer uses a perceived direct threat as a qualification standard, it must individually assess the person's present ability to perform the job safely.

Wolski v. City of Erie · filed 2011-02-25(r)

Where a perceived “direct threat” is invoked as a qualification standard, however, any determination that an individual poses a direct threat must be based on an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.”
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment based on current medical information when an employer claims an employee poses a direct threat to safety.

Wells v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center · filed 2012-02-15(r)

In light of § 1630.2(r), the Court finds that CCHMC is not entitled to summary judgment on the “direct threat” affirmative defense. ... In short, a reasonable juror could conclude that CCHMC did not consider all of the currently available information in concluding that Plaintiff presented a health and safety risk if she returned to work in the Critical Airway unit.
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A direct threat is a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce; courts assess the risk’s duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence.

Bender v. Norfolk Southern Corp. · filed 2014-01-14(r)

A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” ... Drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the court cannot conclude that a momentary distraction to obtain glucose supplementation or the mild symptoms Plaintiff occasionally experiences as a result of his diabetes rise to the level of a significant risk of harm.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment of a direct threat, including the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm.

Makinen v. City of New York · filed 2014-09-30(r)

An individualized assessment involves a consideration of: “(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.” ... After a careful of review of the record, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact as to both issues, and that both summary judgment motions on these claims should be denied.
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Section 1630.2(r) requires a high probability of substantial harm to establish a direct threat; a somewhat elevated risk is insufficient.

Siewertsen v. Worthington Steel Co. · filed 2015-09-25(r)

Moreover, the testimony of Siewertsen’s supervisors does not establish, as a matter of law, there is “high probability of substantial harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Rather, Willeman testified Siewertsen was only “somewhat at risk” of injuring a coworker (Doc. 80-10 at 43), whereas Lamb opined Siewertsen had only “a higher potential” for an accident than “an operator with — with proper hearing.” (Doc. 80-23 at 55).
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A direct threat determination requires an individualized assessment based on the best available objective evidence; intentionally disregarding that evidence makes the determination objectively unreasonable.

Nall v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2019-02-15(r)

As the Supreme Court and this court have made clear, an employer's direct threat determination must result from an "individualized assessment" of the particular employee based on the "best available objective evidence," not a categorical conclusion that an employee with a particular disability cannot safely perform a job.
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Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce; assessing that risk requires identifying the job's essential functions.

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia · filed 2019-08-15(r)

"Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation." ... As we have held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact on what the essential functions of a UCPD detective are, we certainly cannot resolve the question of whether she can perform those as-yet-undefined essential functions safely.
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Substantial limitation of major life activities

Law changed since The ADAAA (effective Jan. 1, 2009) and EEOC’s 2011 revision replaced the old significant or severe restriction test with a broad, nondemanding substantial-limitation standard. The ADAAA and 2011 EEOC revision allow a short-term or episodic impairment to qualify under the actual-disability or record-of prong when it substantially limits a major life activity; permanent or long-term effects are not required.

A sleep impairment substantially limits a major life activity only if its effect is significant compared with the sleep of the general population.

Newby v. Whitman · filed 2004-10-14(j)(1)(ii)

Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence to show that his sleep problems were severe, permanent or substantial, or that his sleep was any worse than the general population.
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Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity must be determined through an individualized assessment.

Alexander v. Wmata · filed 2015-03-10(j)(1)(iv)

Although some courts have treated alcoholism as a disability without examining whether it substantially limits a major life activity, the more recent trend is to engage in the individualized inquiry described in Sutton. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.”). Alexander fails to make the required showing because he does not identify any evidence that at least one of his major life activities are substantially limited by his alcohol dependency.
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An impairment is substantially limiting when it limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict that activity.

Floyd v. Lee · filed 2015-03-31(j)(1)(ii)

An impairment qualifies as a disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population,” though it “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict” such activity.
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Law changed since The ADAAA (effective Jan. 1, 2009) and EEOC’s 2011 revision replaced the old significant or severe restriction test with a broad, nondemanding substantial-limitation standard. The 2011 EEOC revision removed former § 1630.2(j)(2)’s required nature, severity, duration, and long-term-impact checklist; duration may still inform the individualized assessment.

Section 1630.2(j) defines substantial limitation through inability or significant restriction and factors including severity, duration, and long-term impact, while § 1630.2(o)(3) requires an interactive process to identify disability-related limitations and possible reasonable accommodations.

Taylor v. Phoenixville School District · filed 1999-08-18(j)(1), (j)(2), (o)(3)

The EEOC’s regulations define “substantially limits” as follows: “(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l). ... The regulations include the following factors for- evaluating when someone is substantially limited in a major life activity: “(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the.impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... The ADA’s regulations state that: “To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee] in need of accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and the potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
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Section 1630.2(j) requires substantial-limitation determinations to be made case by case without considering mitigating measures such as medication.

Thomas by and Through Thomas v. Davidson Academy · filed 1994-02-07(j)

The determination of whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a ease by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
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Under § 1630.2(i), major life activities include caring for oneself, walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

Brand v. Florida Power Corp. · filed 1994-03-07(i)

The latter defines an "individual with handicaps," subject to certain exceptions not applicable to this case, as one "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." Examples of major life activities include caring for oneself, walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1993).
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Section 1630.2(j) requires whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 1994-09-13(j)

The determination of whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case-by-case basis. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
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The regulation defines major life activities to include caring for oneself, manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

Rosenblum v. Colorado Department of Health · filed 1994-12-15(1)

The term “major life activities” refers to “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
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Law changed since The ADAAA (effective Jan. 1, 2009) and EEOC’s 2011 revision replaced the old significant or severe restriction test with a broad, nondemanding substantial-limitation standard. For actual disability based on working, the class or broad range of jobs inquiry remains.

For the major life activity of working, substantial limitation means significant restriction in performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs compared with people of similar training, skills, and abilities.

Waite v. Blair, Inc. · filed 1995-01-20(j)(3)(i)

The term "substantially limits," when used to describe the major life activity of working, means being significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average persons having comparable training, skills and abilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Plaintiff's only allegation relating to impairment from her arm and shoulder injury are that she was restricted from lifting heavy boxes. (Complaint ¶ 18.) Plaintiff has produced no evidence demonstrating that she was physically incapable of performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
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The regulation defines physical or mental impairment, identifies major life activities, and defines substantial limitation as inability to perform a major life activity or serious restriction compared with an average person.

Carlson v. Inacom Corp. · filed 1995-02-21(h)(1), (i), (j)(l)

The Code of Federal Regulations defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition” which affects one or more of the various body systems, including the cardiovascular system. • 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Examples of “major life activities” include those activities which an average person can perform with little or no difficulty, such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). “Substantially limits” is defined as either the inability to perform a major life activity, or a serious restriction on the ability to perform a major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l). ... The preponderance of the evidence in this case easily establishes that the plaintiffs migraine headaches constitute a physiological disorder which affects both the Carlson’s neurological and vascular systems. ... When Carlson gets a migraine, the headache is severe and debilitating. Both the plaintiff and her husband testified that when Carlson has a migraine headache, she is substantially limited in major life activities. She is unable to care for her infant son, drive a car, or concentrate on work.
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Temporary, minor injuries generally do not substantially limit a person’s major life activities under the regulation.

Fink v. Kitzman · filed 1995-03-29(j)

ADA regulations, as well as ADA interpretive guidance, make clear that temporary, minor injuries do not “substantially limit” a person’s major life activities. 29 CFR §§ 1630.2(j), 1630 App., at 407.
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Law changed since The 2011 EEOC revision removed former § 1630.2(j)(2)’s required nature, severity, duration, and long-term-impact checklist; duration may still inform the individualized assessment.

The regulation requires a case-by-case assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, considering its severity, duration, and long-term impact; for working, the limitation must affect a class or broad range of jobs rather than one particular job.

Barfield v. Bell South Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 1995-04-21(i), (j)(1), (j)(2), (j)(3)(i)

The determination of whether an impairment significantly limits a major life activity is made on a case-by-case basis, and depends on the nature and severity of the individual’s impairment, its duration or expected duration, and its actual or expected permanent or long-term impact on the individual. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
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Section 1630.2 treats an impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity when medication is needed to perform activities the average person can perform, and a person may qualify as disabled even without a substantial limitation in working when another major life activity is substantially limited.

Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas Inc. · filed 1995-05-19(j)

The regulations also make clear that an individual is disabled if he or she requires the aid of medication to perform major life activities that the average individual can perform. ... Washington appears to meet the definition of “disabled” in the ADA because he has a degenerative bone disease which, if left un-medicated, would confine him to bed rest. ... Although it seems anomalous to term a man who can work 50 hours a week “disabled,” this court finds that under the regulations, Washington meets the ADA’s definition.
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Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities, while paragraphs (j)(2) and (j)(3) guide whether an impairment substantially limits them, including that inability to perform one particular job is insufficient and relevant work factors may be considered.

Muller v. Automobile Club of Southern California · filed 1995-09-15(i), (j)(2), (j)(3)(i), (j)(3)(ii)

The regulations promulgated by the EEOC to implement the ADA define “major life activities” as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). ... The EEOC provides a list of three factors to be considered in determining whether an individual is actually “substantially limited” in a major life activity: 1) the nature and severity of the impairment; 2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and 3) the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... Plaintiffs psychological impairment would not rise to the level of a disability as defined by the ADA unless it significantly restricted Plaintiffs ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. As noted above, “The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). ... Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence showing that her psychological impairments prevented her from holding a job in the same class as the one she held at the Auto Club before her termination. That Plaintiff did not want to return to the insurance industry does not demonstrate that her impairments met the standard for “disability” under the ADA Plaintiff has offered no information about the availability in her area of claims adjuster jobs or other jobs requiring similar skills, training, and ability.
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Section 1630.2(c) identifies walking and performing manual tasks as major life activities relevant to determining whether an impairment substantially limits a person.

Spath v. Berry Plastics Corp. · filed 1995-10-18(c)

Federal regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission define “major life activities” as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 CFR § 1630.2© (1994).
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Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities, including working, that are considered when deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a person under the ADA.

Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Soc. Serv. · filed 1995-10-30(i)

According to the Guidelines issued by the EEOC to implement the ADA, the term “major life activities” as used in the ADA includes such activities as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Plaintiff has produced no evidence that she is substantially limited by her depression and paranoia in any of the listed activities.
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Section 1630.2(i) identifies walking as a major life activity when assessing whether an impairment substantially limits an individual.

Nedder v. Rivier College · filed 1995-08-14(i)

As regards the matter sub judice, the court assumes arguendo that Ms. Nedder's morbid obesity constitutes an "impairment" under the ADA, c f . Cook, supra, 10 F.3d at 22-23,8 and acknowledges that walking falls within the category of "major ... life activities" as defined by the EEOC regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) ("Major life activities means functions such as . . . walking . . . .").
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Law changed since The ADAAA (effective Jan. 1, 2009) and EEOC’s 2011 revision replaced the old significant or severe restriction test with a broad, nondemanding substantial-limitation standard. For actual disability based on working, the class or broad range of jobs inquiry remains.

Section 1630.2 treats walking as a major life activity and requires an impairment to leave a person unable to perform or significantly restrict the condition, manner, or duration of that activity compared with the average person; the court found the plaintiff’s obesity did not meet that substantial-limitation standard for walking or working.

Nedder v. Rivier College · filed 1995-08-14(f), (j)(1)(ii)

In very general terms, the regulations indicate that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ means that the individual 'is either unable to perform, or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which the individual can perform, a major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population.”
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Law changed since The 2011 EEOC revision removed former § 1630.2(j)(2)’s required nature, severity, duration, and long-term-impact checklist; duration may still inform the individualized assessment.

Section 1630.2 treats seeing and working as major life activities and requires an impairment to substantially limit such an activity, evaluated by its severity, duration, and long-term impact.

Venclauskas v. State of Connecticut, Dept. of Public Safety Division of State Police · filed 1995-08-17(i), (j)(2)

The regulations define “major life activities” as follows: “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). ... EEOC regulations set forth the following-factors that should be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: “(i) the nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs use of contact lenses is disregarded, the court still does not find the plaintiffs visual “impairment” to be unusually severe or rare.
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Law changed since The ADAAA (effective Jan. 1, 2009) and EEOC’s 2011 revision replaced the old significant or severe restriction test with a broad, nondemanding substantial-limitation standard. For actual disability based on working, the class or broad range of jobs inquiry remains.

Section 1630.2(j)(1) defines a substantial limitation as either inability to perform a major life activity or a severe restriction compared with the general population; the court applied that standard to find no substantial limitation on plaintiff’s ability to work.

McCarter v. West · filed 1995-12-04(j)(1)

“Substantially limits” means “either the inability to perform a major life activity, or a severe restriction on the ability to perform a major life activity as compared to the general population.” ... The court finds that this is not a significant limitation on plaintiffs ability to work. ... The court concludes that plaintiff fails to satisfy the threshold requirement that she is disabled as defined under the Rehabilitation Act and the Code of Federal Regulations.
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Law changed since The 2011 EEOC revision removed former § 1630.2(j)(2)’s required nature, severity, duration, and long-term-impact checklist; duration may still inform the individualized assessment.

Section 1630.2(j)(2) directs courts assessing substantial impairment to consider the impairment’s nature and severity, duration or expected duration, and permanent or long-term impact.

Williams v. Avnet, Inc. · filed 1995-12-07(j)(2)

In determining whether a disability meets the “substantial impairment” test, the EEOC has suggested a Court should consider three factors: “(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). Of course, these factors must be analyzed in light of the Fourth Circuit’s stringent “general foreclosure” standard.
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Section 1630.2(i) treats walking as a major life activity, but a healed knee injury causing only recurring discomfort does not make a person disabled for ADA purposes.

Little v. Lycoming County · filed 1996-01-18(i)

A healed knee injury which sometimes causes recurring discomfort does not render plaintiff “disabled” for ADA purposes. Com ... pare: 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (“Major life activities means functions such as ... walking....”).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities, and the substantial-limitation inquiry under § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) considers the impairment’s nature and severity, duration, and permanent or long-term impact.

Branch v. City of New Orleans · filed 1996-02-02(i), (j)(1)(i)

“Major life activities,” under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.” Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). “Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is determined in light of (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or expected duration, and (3) its permanent or expected permanent or long-term impact.” Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726 (footnotes omitted); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii).
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Law changed since The ADAAA (effective Jan. 1, 2009) and EEOC’s 2011 revision replaced the old significant or severe restriction test with a broad, nondemanding substantial-limitation standard. For actual disability based on working, the class or broad range of jobs inquiry remains. The ADAAA rejected Toyota’s strict central-importance test, and the 2011 EEOC revision broadened the nonexhaustive major-life-activities definition.

Section 1630.2(i) treats major life activities as activities the average person can perform with little or no difficulty, while § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires a significant restriction in a class or broad range of jobs; inability to work under one particular supervisor is not enough.

Hatfield v. Quantum Chemical Corp. · filed 1996-04-02(i) and (j)(3)(i)

According to the appendix to the guidelines announced by the EEOC, “major life activities” are those “that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), App. These include walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, lifting, and learning. ... A person is substantially limited in working if the person is “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs____ The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation on working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
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Section 1630.2(i) defines major life activities to include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1996-04-16(i)

“Major life activities” means “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 CFR § 1630.2(i). In this ease, Kotlowski does not assert that her depression substantially limits her ability to care for herself, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak or learn. Kotlowski’s primary claim is that her depression prevents her getting out of bed early enough to work the early morning hours required by Kodak.
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Law changed since The ADAAA and 2011 EEOC revision removed the requirement that an employer perceive a substantial limitation of a major life activity; an ADA-prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment generally suffices, subject to the transitory-and-minor exception.

The regulation defines major life activities, requires a substantial work limitation to extend beyond inability to perform one particular job, identifies the impairment factors relevant to substantial limitation, and requires a covered entity to perceive or treat a person as substantially limited for a “regarded as” disability.

Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., a Missouri Corporation in Good Standing, Equal Employment Advisory C · filed 1996-06-05(i), (j)(2), (j)(3)(i), (l)(1)-(3)

Because the ADA does not define the term “major life activities,” we are guided by the definition provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations issued to implement Title I of the ADA. ... As defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), the phrase “major life activities” means “functions such as earing for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The regulations further provide that “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Rather, a person claiming a disability must show that the impairment “significantly restrict[s] [his or her] ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” ... Finally, the EEOC regulations state that the following factors should be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: (i) the nature and severity of the impairment, (ii) its duration or expected duration, and (iii) its actual or expected long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
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Law changed since The ADAAA (effective Jan. 1, 2009) and EEOC’s 2011 revision replaced the old significant or severe restriction test with a broad, nondemanding substantial-limitation standard. The 2011 EEOC revision removed former § 1630.2(j)(2)’s required nature, severity, duration, and long-term-impact checklist; duration may still inform the individualized assessment.

Section 1630.2(j) defines “substantially limits” by inability or significant restriction in performing a major life activity and directs consideration of the impairment’s nature, duration, and long-term impact.

Coghlan v. HJ Heinz Co. · filed 1994-04-21(j)

The EEOC definition of one of those constituent elements appears in the Code of Federal Regulations as follows: (1) The term substantially limits means: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. (2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: (i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
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Notes 1–150 of 4,244, oldest cases first.

892 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Matter of Ultraflex Enterprises'appeal, the regulation is mentioned only in the Commissioner's argument about whether a factual issue existed; the court does not construe what § 1630.2(h) means or decide any issue under it. opinion →
In re Ultraflex Enterprises' Appeal from Decertification in the Minnesota Small Business Procurement Program, the regulation is cited only as part of the Commissioner's argument that mental and physical disabilities are separately defined. The court does not interpret or apply § 1630.2(h); it concludes that no hearing is needed because the undisputed evidence shows Maher's disability was mental rather than physical. opinion →
Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(g) only to identify the ADA’s definition as modeled on the Rehabilitation Act while analyzing the meaning of California’s FEHA; it does not independently construe or apply § 1630.2(g). opinion →
Chandler v. City of Dallas, the court cited § 1630.2 and its interpretive guidance as background for the parties' argument about diabetes, but expressly declined to decide whether the ADA regulation's treatment of diabetes applied under the Rehabilitation Act. opinion →
White v. York International Corp., the references to § 1630.2(g)-(j) state York’s argument and the court says only that the evidence creates a factual issue; the court does not construe or apply those regulatory definitions. The footnote reference to § 1630.2(m) is merely a comparison to Rehabilitation Act regulations. opinion →
Capitano v. State, the court cited § 1630.2(E) only in a parenthetical while discussing the Rehabilitation Act’s record-of-impairment theory. Its holding was that the failed hearing test did not establish a record of substantial disability; the court did not construe or independently apply this regulation. opinion →
Lyle S. Chandler and Adolphus A. Maddox, on Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly Situated v. The City of Dallas, th, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1992) to identify the EEOC's definitions and related interpretive guidance, but expressly declined to decide whether that guidance made insulin-dependent diabetes a per se handicap under the Rehabilitation Act. The decision rested on other statutory elements and did not construe or apply § 1630.2 as a holding. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 1630.2 only in footnotes when reciting ADA definitions. It does not interpret or apply those regulatory provisions; the operative discussion concerns the ADA generally and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4. opinion →
Hamm v. Marvin Runyon, Postmaster General, the reference to § 1630.2(g)-(j) is a nonbinding, general supporting citation rather than a construction of subsection (g). The court's substantive discussion applies the factors in the appendix's § 1630.2(j) to the facts, while the judgment rests on the Rehabilitation Act. opinion →
Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(f) only in a footnote to list examples of major life activities. Its holding concerns whether pregnancy and related conditions are physical impairments under the ADA, relying on the interpretive guidance concerning § 1630.2(h), not construing or applying subsection (f). opinion →
Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corp., the court cited the EEOC comments to § 1630.2(j) and (h) as supporting authority while interpreting the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. It did not decide what § 1630.2 means or how that federal regulation applies as the governing statute. opinion →
Sawinski v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc., the opinion merely recounts a ruling from the court’s earlier order and identifies 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 as the cited authority; this summary-judgment order does not itself construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Rhodes v. Bob Florence Contractor, Inc., the court recited the regulatory definition of major life activities and cited § 1630.2(1), but it assumed arguendo that Rhodes was disabled and resolved the case on reasonable-accommodation and discrimination grounds without construing or deciding the cited provision. opinion →
Courtney v. American National Can Co., the court merely reports Courtney’s analogy to the ADA regulation and expressly declines to alter Iowa’s accommodation requirements; it does not construe or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p). opinion →
Larson v. Koch Refining Co., the court merely recited the regulation’s examples of major life activities while describing the ADA and MHRA framework. It expressly assumed without deciding that plaintiff was disabled and resolved the claims on misconduct and employer-knowledge grounds, so it did not construe or apply § 1630.2(i). opinion →
Oswald v. Laroche Chemicals, Inc., the court merely recites the defendant's argument and its parenthetical citation to § 1630.2(o). It resolves the issue on a genuine dispute of fact about whether reallocation would be necessary, without deciding what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) as supporting authority for the ADA definition of a qualified individual with a disability, but does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Tenbrink v. Federal Home Loan Bank, the only direct citation to § 1630.2(o) appears in FHLB's argument. The court's decision applies the ADA to the undisputed facts and does not construe or expressly adopt that regulation; the later discussion quotes the interpretive appendix in describing the reasoning of another case. opinion →
Fritz v. Mascotech Automotive Systems Group, Inc., the court cited subsection (n)(3)(ii) only by way of comparison while finding that attendance and punctuality were essential functions; it did not construe or independently decide the regulation’s meaning or application. opinion →
Muller v. Hotsy Corp., the § 1630.2(i) citation appears while recounting Muller’s argument that working is a major life activity; the opinion then says the court will analyze the issue, and the available text does not show the court construing or adopting the regulation. The § 1630.2(l)(3) citation merely reports the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Wooten. opinion →
McCollough v. Atlanta Beverage Co., the court merely recites the regulatory definition of physical or mental impairment and then assumes, for purposes of discussion, that plaintiff is disabled; it does not decide the meaning or application of subsection (h). opinion →
Johnson v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(i) in a footnote merely to identify working as a major life activity while discussing the ADA definition of disability; it does not construe, explain, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Thomas v. Mississippi State Department of Health, the court cites § 1630.2(i), (j), and the appendix only while reciting general examples of impairments that may constitute disabilities; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any disputed meaning or requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Marvello v. Chemical Bank, the court merely recites the ADA definition and cites § 1630.2(m) parenthetically. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation; the motion was denied because factual discovery was needed on judicial estoppel and any change in the plaintiff’s condition. opinion →
Gonzales Ex Rel. Estate of Bourgeois v. Garner Food Services, Inc., the court mentioned the EEOC's interpretive guidance under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(a)-(f) as background in analyzing the ADA, but did not construe or adopt the regulation; it expressly said the guidance was not controlling and decided the case from the ADA's statutory text. opinion →
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., the opinion mentions the EEOC's interpretive guidance concerning 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(a)-(f), but does not construe or adopt that regulation. The court treated the guidance as noncontrolling and resolved the issue under the ADA's statutory text. opinion →
Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc., the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) only as supporting authority while deciding the meaning of West Virginia’s Human Rights Act; it does not construe or independently apply the federal regulation. opinion →
Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the opinion quotes and discusses 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) while considering whether Wernick was disabled, but expressly says it need not decide that issue; the judgment is affirmed instead because the accommodations were sufficient. Thus the regulation's discussion is incidental rather than a holding about the regulation. opinion →
Brasfield v. Gilmore Memorial, the court merely recited examples of major life activities while analyzing whether the plaintiff's impairment was substantially limiting; it did not interpret or decide a disputed issue about § 1630.2(I). opinion →
Willett v. State of Kan., the court quoted § 1630.2(i)'s definition of major life activities in its background discussion, but did not construe or apply that definition; it resolved the case on reasonable accommodation and the plaintiff's rejection of an offered accommodation. opinion →
Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(r) as part of the authority for reporting EEOC advice, but it does not interpret the regulation or decide what it independently requires; the judgment rests on Moses’s failure to produce probative evidence in his ADA claim. opinion →
Smith v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., the regulation appears only in a footnote as part of dicta predicting that hypothetical ADA claims would likely fail; the court did not decide the meaning or application of § 1630.2(r). opinion →
Detko v. Blimpies Restaurant, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only as support for the proposition that speaking is a major life activity; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, deciding the motion under the ADA's statutory definition and pleading requirements. opinion →
Stratton v. Hawaii Electric Light Company, the opinion cites 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g)-(k) only when describing Stratton's contention, then expressly assumes without deciding whether she had a qualifying history of disability. The court's decision rests on the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(a), so it does not construe or apply § 1630.2. opinion →
Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Company, the court cites § 1630.2(i) for the uncontroversial proposition that working is a major life activity, but does not construe the regulation or decide any dispute about its meaning or application; the disability claim was resolved because Bradley offered no evidence of an impairment. opinion →
Mohamed v. Marriott International, Inc., the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) alongside the ADA's statutory definition as background, but it does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires; the ruling concerns judicial estoppel and whether SSDI representations bar the ADA claim. opinion →
Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, the court merely cited § 1630.2(j)(2) in a footnote as a comparison concerning one factor in substantial-limitation analysis; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Fitts v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, the court cites § 1630.2(h)(2) only parenthetically as authority for the ADA's definition of mental impairment while evaluating whether bipolar disorder was reasonably classified as a mental disability under an ERISA insurance policy. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, - Mary Boyle, Intervenor v. R.J. Gallagher Company, the opinion mentions 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) in a footnote listing major life activities, but the court decided that working is a major life activity from the ADA's plain text and expressly declined to decide whether the EEOC regulations are valid, authoritative, or entitled to deference. opinion →
Peter Cannice,appellee/cross-Appellant v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A. And Norwest Bank Iowa N.A. Card Services Division, Appe, the regulation is cited only in Mr. Cannice's argument about the employer's possible duty to consult and seek accommodations. The court did not construe § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii); it rejected the claim based on the rule that failure to engage in an interactive process does not create per se ADA liability. opinion →
Silk v. City of Chicago, Incidental citation: the court expressly says accommodation was not on appeal and cites the regulation only while describing the interactive process and accepting that the employer provided the requested accommodations; it does not construe or decide what 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 requires. opinion →
Varela v. Philadelphia Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc., the court recited the regulatory definition in a footnote, but plaintiff’s cardiac condition and qualification were undisputed; the court did not construe or independently apply § 1630.2(j)(l), and the judgment turned on accommodation and pretext. opinion →
Treglia v. Town of Manlius, the court merely cites § 1630.2(i) for examples of major life activities. Its ruling applied ADA case law on substantial limitation in working and did not construe or independently apply this regulation. opinion →
Ivy v. Jones, the court merely cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) alongside the ADA's statutory definition of disability; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. The holding concerns the effect of corrective measures under Sutton. opinion →
Carpenter v. Central Vermont Medical Center, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting an alternative ground given by the trial court below; the Supreme Court of Vermont expressly said it need not reach that issue and did not decide what § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) means or requires. opinion →
Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(f) only in a “see also” string cite while discussing the general regulatory list of major life activities; it did not construe or apply this regulation as an issue it decided. opinion →
Clark v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., the court cites § 1630.2(m) only as a see-also authority supporting the ADA's statutory definition of a qualified individual; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything specifically about the regulation. opinion →
Bissell v. Reno, the court cited § 1630.2(m) only as a parallel citation for the ADA definition of a qualified individual with a disability; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. The decision rested on the plaintiff's failure to show that she needed the requested accommodation or was qualified for the desired position. opinion →
Vollmert v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation, the court cited § 1630.2(m) only as a parallel authority for the ADA’s statutory definition and did not interpret, apply, or decide what the regulation requires. The holding instead concerned the sufficiency of an expert report and whether the employer’s accommodations were reasonable. opinion →
Val D'Aosta Co. v. Cross, the court mentions 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) only in a footnote string cite to authorities concerning the definition of a person with disabilities; it does not construe, explain, or apply that regulation. opinion →
Yeskey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the court did not construe or apply § 1630.2(i); it merely noted in a footnote that its definition is identical to the Title II regulation, while deciding under the ADA statutory term and 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2) that strenuous exercise is not a major life activity. opinion →
Taliaferro v. Associates Corp. of North America, the court quoted § 1630.2(h)'s definition in a footnote, but expressly assumed without deciding that the plaintiff's condition constituted an impairment. It resolved the ADA claim on whether the condition substantially limited working, so it did not construe or apply the regulation's impairment definition. opinion →
Schneiker v. Fortis Insurance Company, Formerly Known as Time Insurance Company, the court cites § 1630.2(h)(2) only as background support for the proposition that major depression may be a covered disability; it does not interpret or apply the regulation, and resolves the appeal because the plaintiff failed to show a substantial limitation of a major life activity. opinion →
Patrick C. Jackan, United States of America, Intervenor v. New York State Department of Labor, the court mentioned 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) only in a footnote acknowledging a separate employer-assistance obligation and explaining that it was distinct from the litigation burden at issue. The court did not construe or apply the regulation; its holding concerned the employee's burden to prove that a suitable vacancy existed. opinion →
Miller v. BellSouth Bus Sys, the regulation is cited in the dissent’s account of the district court’s reasoning, while the majority merely affirmed without independently construing § 1630.2; the dissent’s extensive interpretation is not the court’s holding. opinion →
Heyman v. Queens Village Committee for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program, Inc., the court recited the regulation’s definitions while explaining the ADA’s disability standard, but it did not interpret or decide the meaning, scope, or requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Its holding concerned whether the defendants regarded the plaintiff as disabled under the ADA. opinion →
Lloyd v. Hardin County, IA, the regulation is quoted only while reporting the district court’s reasoning on a direct-threat argument. The appellate court did not construe or adopt that standard; it affirmed on essential-functions and reasonable-accommodation grounds. opinion →
Kenneth E. Lloyd, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Hardin County, Iowa, Appellee/cross-Appellant, the regulation is quoted only while describing the district court's rejected direct-threat argument in the procedural history. The appellate court does not adopt, interpret, or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 in its own holding. opinion →
Doe v. Eagle-Union Community School Corp., the court cites § 1630.2(i) while giving a background summary of ADA disability law; it does not interpret or apply the regulation to decide an issue in the case. opinion →
Hiller v. Runyon, the opinion cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2® only for the general list of major life activities while deciding Hiller’s disability claim under the Rehabilitation Act; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Rosa v. Brink's Inc., the court cited § 1630.2 only while reporting the Court of Appeals’ standard in Colwell; it did not independently interpret or construe the regulation. opinion →
Stekloff v. St. John's Mercy, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) to describe the ADA's broad-range-of-jobs standard as an analogy while deciding an FMLA issue. It decided that the FMLA does not require a similar showing and made no ruling applying or construing the ADA regulation itself. opinion →
Stekloff v. St. John's Mercy Health Systems, the court mentioned § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) only to describe the ADA standard as an analogy while deciding the different FMLA incapacity issue; it did not construe or apply this regulation as the basis for its holding. opinion →
Centennial School District No. 28J v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries, the court mentions § 1630.2(n) only in a footnote describing what an FMLA regulation directs; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 1630.2(n) itself. opinion →
Pulcino v. Federal Express Corp., the court mentions § 1630.2(j)(2) only to describe the ADA's narrower definition by contrast with Washington law; it does not construe or apply the regulation. The § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) citation likewise supplies background support for reassignment as an accommodation without deciding anything about that regulation. opinion →
Pulcino v. Federal Express Corp., the court cites § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) as support for the general proposition that reassignment is an accommodation and describes § 1630.2(j)(2)’s factors in a footnote. It does not construe or apply either federal-regulation provision; the holding applies Washington’s disability-discrimination law and expressly contrasts it with the federal ADA standard. opinion →
Santiago v. City of Vineland, the court quoted § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) and referenced § 1630.2(i) while discussing whether working was substantially limited, but it expressly assumed the issue without deciding and stated that the central issue was whether the plaintiff was perceived as having an impairment. Thus, the statute was discussed incidentally rather than construed as part of the holding. opinion →
Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, the regulation is cited only while describing an earlier case's discussion of the interactive process; this court does not interpret or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). opinion →
Nowlin v. K Mart Corporation, the court recited the regulatory standard but expressly declined to decide whether Nowlin was disabled, resolving the appeal on constructive discharge based on Kmart’s accommodation efforts. opinion →
Hummel v. County of Saginaw, the court cited § 1630.2(n)(3) while recounting the illustrative factors for determining essential functions, but did not analyze or decide how any factor applied. The judgment instead rested on the plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence that she could perform the job’s duties. opinion →
Young v. Employment Department, the court quoted the statute only in a footnote as part of the text of an Oregon administrative rule defining good cause. It did not interpret or apply the federal regulation, and affirmed on the claimant’s failure to prove good cause under the unemployment-benefits standard. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Judith Keane, Intervenor-Appellant v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court cites § 1630.2(j) as supporting authority for the ADA disability standard, but does not construe or independently decide anything about the regulation; it remands because factual disputes preclude summary judgment and assumes the EEOC regulations' validity. opinion →
Ketcher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(n)(3) parenthetically as support for a list of factors bearing on whether a job function is essential, but it does not interpret, analyze, or independently apply the regulation; the citation is incidental to its ADA summary-judgment ruling. opinion →
Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, the court cited § 1630.2(g)(3) only to identify the EEOC source of the term “informal, interactive process” and expressly declined to decide whether the federal regulations’ accommodation details applied to FEHA claims. opinion →
Hook v. Georgia-Gulf Corp., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(1) and (2) only through a supporting citation to Weber while applying the Louisiana Human Rights Act's disability standard. It did not construe or independently decide anything about the federal regulation. opinion →
Farrish v. Town of East Hartford, the court cited § 1630.2(j) as supporting authority for the ADA disability standard while affirming dismissal for lack of evidence; it did not construe or independently decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company, a Delaware Corporation James McIntosh, the majority merely cited subsection (k) to observe that the ADA definition parallels Oregon law; it did not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. References to subsections (m) and (o)(3) appear in the dissent and do not state the court's controlling holding. opinion →
Fronczak v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 parenthetically for the definition of major life activities, but did not analyze or decide what the regulation means or requires; its ADA ruling rested on other requirements and authorities. opinion →
Sheets v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., the court cited § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) parenthetically to Earl and § 1630.2(j)(3) in a string cite while stating and applying general ADA standards; it did not construe or independently decide what either regulatory provision requires. opinion →
Doris Rowe,plaintiff-Appellant v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., a Foreigncorporation,defendant-Appellee, the court cited § 1630.2(n) only because the FMLA regulation incorporates its essential-functions concept; the court decided whether the leave was FMLA-qualifying and did not construe or independently apply § 1630.2(n). opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J. H. Routh Packing Co., the court quotes § 1630.2(i) only to identify the regulation's definition of “major life activities” as background. Its holding concerns the liberal federal notice-pleading requirements for an ADA complaint and does not construe or decide how § 1630.2(i) applies. opinion →
Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., the regulation is cited only while recounting the motion judge's reasoning and the source quoted in the trial court's analysis. The appellate court did not construe or adopt a holding about § 1630.2; it decided the LAD and ADA accommodation issues under other authorities. opinion →
Powell v. City of Pittsfield, the regulation appears only in Pittsfield’s argument; the court did not adopt or construe it, expressly declining to resolve whether hepatitis C substantially limits a major life activity and deciding the issue on the separate “regarded as” theory. opinion →
Maull v. Division of State Police, the regulation is cited only in a parenthetical citation to Taylor to support the discussion of an interactive process. The court does not construe or independently apply § 1630.2(o)(3); it grants summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to establish disability, qualification, and discrimination. opinion →
Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified School District, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) in a footnote to state the regulatory standard, but expressly left the issue aside and held that the District had not preserved any question about applying that requirement to the case. opinion →
Stephenson v. United Airlines, Inc., the court merely recites the regulation's definition of physical impairment while discussing the ADA disability framework. It does not construe § 1630.2(h)(1) or decide a disputed issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., the court expressly accepted the proposition arguendo and did not decide what § 1630.2(i) means or requires; the citation supports a passing assumption, while the decision rested on the plaintiff's failure to show a substantial limitation in working. opinion →
Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, the court mentioned § 1630.2(n)(3) in a footnote while discussing the parties’ legislative-history arguments, but did not interpret or apply the regulation; it resolved the appeal under the Railway Labor Act’s preclusion rule. opinion →
Maynard v. Pneumatic Products Corp., the citation appears only in the dissent's discussion of an alternative ADA disability issue. The majority expressly limited its holding to the untimely EEOC filing and did not decide the disability question, so the regulation was not part of the court's holding. opinion →
Maynard v. Pneumatic Products Corp., the majority limited its holding to Maynard’s failure to prove timely filing of his EEOC charge and expressly declined to address the alternative disability issue. The regulation is mentioned only in the dissent’s discussion of the vacated prior opinion, not adopted as the court’s holding. opinion →
Smith v. Bell Atlantic, the court cites 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n) only as parallel support for factors used to analyze an essential-function issue under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B. The court’s ruling concerns the state-law claim and whether summary judgment was proper, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of the federal regulation. opinion →
Fotos v. Internet Commerce Express, Inc., the court does not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); it reports that Sutton quoted the regulation and discusses the Supreme Court's skepticism about the EEOC regulations while applying Sutton's ADA pleading rule. opinion →
Whitney v. Greenberg, Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli, P.C., the court cites § 1630.2(i) only to support the background proposition that working is a major life activity. Its decision concerns whether the impairment substantially limited working or learning, not the meaning or application of subsection (i). opinion →
Parker v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. And Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(o)(3) generally as support while discussing the interactive process, but it did not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires; the case was resolved on the jury’s finding that disability was not a motivating factor, and the citation arose in the attorney’s-fee discussion. opinion →
Woodland v. District Council 20, the court cited § 1630.2(f) by way of a Cf. citation and § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) in a string of supporting authorities and an explanatory parenthetical. Its holding adopted Stroman's rule under the DCHRA; it did not construe or decide the meaning or application of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
the City of Alamo v. Espinosa, Arturo, the court cited § 1630.2(i) parenthetically for the general proposition that seeing is a major life activity while analyzing a Texas-law retaliation claim; it did not construe or independently apply the federal regulation. opinion →
Sepulveda v. Glickman, the court mentions § 1630.2(g) only in a parenthetical string citation comparing the ADA and Rehabilitation Act definitions. It does not construe the regulation or decide an issue based on its regulatory text; its disability ruling rests on the ADA standard and the evidence concerning plaintiff’s diabetes. opinion →
Stafne v. Unicare Homes, Inc., the regulation is discussed only in the dissent, which invokes it to criticize the majority’s essential-function analysis; the court’s holding does not construe or apply § 1630.2. opinion →
Stafne v. Unicare Homes, D/B/A Trevilla of New Brighton, Inc., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus, the regulation is substantively quoted and applied in the dissent's criticism of the majority's essential-functions analysis, but the majority did not construe or adopt this interpretation; the dissent is not the court's holding. opinion →
Conant v. City of Hibbing, the court merely recites the regulation's list of major life activities as background to its ADA analysis; it does not construe or decide any issue concerning § 1630.2(i). opinion →
Alifano v. Merck & Co., Inc., the court analyzed the ADA's statutory definition of disability and whether the complaint adequately pleaded it, but the opinion does not cite, interpret, or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
In Re Kenna Homes Cooperative Corp., the court cites § 1630.2(i) only while reciting the background definition of handicap and major life activities; it does not interpret or apply the regulation, deciding instead the requirements for service-animal accommodations under the federal and state Fair Housing Acts. opinion →
Doebele v. Sprint Corp., the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Cody and Steele while the court decides the ADA claim; Doebele does not independently construe or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
Snyder v. Medical Service Corp., the only discussion of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 appears in Justice Ireland's dissent, which contrasts the ADA definition with Washington law. The majority did not adopt or rely on that discussion, so it is not this court's holding. opinion →
Huberty v. Esber Beverage Company, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2001), the court merely recited the regulation's disability and major-life-activities definitions as background. It did not construe § 1630.2, decide whether the decedent satisfied that definition, or apply the regulation as the basis of its holding; the decision turned on whether he was a qualified individual and the scope of the interactive accommodation process. opinion →
Jeffreys v. Teamsters Union Local 1150, the court only identifies the EEOC guidelines as legal authority that was already available in the earlier case; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about what 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 means or requires. opinion →
Overstreet v. Calvert County Health Department, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(I) while reciting the standard for substantial limitation in working, but expressly declined to decide that issue because the ADA claim failed on the constructive-discharge prong. opinion →
Thompson v. Davis, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only to support the plaintiffs’ allegation concerning major life activities; it does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Thompson v. Davis, the court merely cites § 1630.2(i) as support for the allegation that drug addiction substantially limited major life activities; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Nichols v. Harford County Board of Education, the opinion cites § 1630.2(o)(3) only while reporting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and holding in Barnett; it does not independently construe or decide what this regulation means or requires. opinion →
Graham v. Casey's General Stores, the court cites § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) only as background support for the governing ADA disability standard while deciding the permissible scope of subpoenas for medical records. It does not construe or apply the regulation’s listed factors. opinion →
Thompson v. Davis, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(f) only in support of the plaintiffs' allegation about major life activities; it does not interpret or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Stubbs v. Marc Center, the court mentioned 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) in a footnote through a citation to Vande Zande, but expressly said the parties did not dispute disability and decided the case on whether Stubbs was a qualified individual. The court therefore did not construe or apply subsection (j) as part of its holding. opinion →
Karbusicky v. City of Park Ridge, the court recites § 1630.2(j)(1)(n)'s definition while discussing whether the plaintiff was disabled, but expressly declines to decide that issue and grants summary judgment on the separate qualified-individual and reasonable-accommodation grounds. opinion →
Gonzagowski v. Widnall, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) while recounting the district court’s reasoning, then expressly assumed without deciding that the alleged anxiety disorder was a disability. It resolved the case on the otherwise-qualified inquiry and did not construe or apply the regulation as its own holding. opinion →
Jyoti Shah v. The Upjohn Company, the court expressly said it was unnecessary to consider the argument about § 1630.2(j)(3)(i), so the regulation was not construed or applied in the holding. opinion →
Clouse v. Boise Cascade Corp., the regulation is cited in a comparative chart to recite ADA definitions. The court did not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; its decision relied on a prior ADA ruling and the parallel Louisiana statutes. opinion →
Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer Research Center, the court recited § 1630.2(i)'s examples of major life activities as part of the ADA legal framework, but assumed without deciding that psoriasis was a disability and resolved the claim on whether Cehrs was qualified and could perform the essential job functions with reasonable accommodation. opinion →
Fouraker v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., the regulation is quoted only as part of Fouraker’s argument about reasonable accommodation. The court does not construe or adopt that language; it resolves the ADA claim on the ground that the termination was for insubordination rather than disability discrimination. opinion →
Coffey v. Employment Department, the court merely quotes OAR 471-30-038(4), which incorporates the regulation's definition of “physical or mental impairment,” while deciding whether claimant had good cause to quit under Oregon unemployment law. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning or requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). opinion →
Llanes v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., the court recited the regulation's definition and factors but expressly assumed without deciding whether Llanes was disabled, resolving the case on reasonable accommodation instead. opinion →
Schnake v. Johnson County Community College, the court mentions § 1630.2 only in a parenthetical citation to MacDonald’s description of the regarded-as-disability concept; it does not construe, explain, or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners, the opinion mentions 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii) only in a parenthetical quoting a case's supporting authority; the court's own analysis relies on the ADA and 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, and does not construe or apply § 1630.2. opinion →
Weaver v. New Mexico Human Services Department, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) as supporting authority, through Bolton, for the ADA disability analysis; it did not construe or decide what § 1630.2 requires. The citation was incidental to the court’s holding under Title II of the ADA. opinion →
Nihiser v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, the court cited § 1630.2(o) while listing examples of reasonable accommodations in its analysis of whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act accommodation provisions were a valid exercise of Congress’s § 5 power. It did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 1630.2(o); the disposition rested on sovereign immunity and constitutional authority. opinion →
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A., the cited regulation appears in a dissenting judge's argument about the ADA's definition of disability; the court's majority holding was based on the statute and did not adopt a construction of § 1630.2. opinion →
Butler v. City of Prairie Village, the court recited the regulation as part of the ADA prima facie-case standard, but it did not decide whether the plaintiff was substantially limited in working or otherwise construe § 1630.2. Summary judgment was based on the plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence that he was terminated because of his disability. opinion →
Ogburn v. The Gas & Water Dept., City of Clarksville, the regulation appears only in a footnote citing EEOC interpretive guidance and federal cases while the court expressly declines to address whether temporary, work-related injuries qualify as handicaps. The court therefore does not construe or apply § 1630.2(j). opinion →
In Re: CARNEGIE CENTER ASSOCIATES, Debtor. Deborah RHETT, Appellant, v. CARNEGIE CENTER ASSOCIATES, the references to § 1630.2(g) and (j) appear in a dissenting discussion of the ADA, using the provisions to criticize the majority's analogy between pregnancy and temporary disabilities. The majority did not construe or adopt these provisions; its holding concerned the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and cited 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 instead. opinion →
Latch v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the court cites 29 CFR § 1630.2 only in a string citation accompanying a general statement of the ADA disability definition; it does not construe the regulation or decide a regulation-specific issue. opinion →
Carol N. Cooper, an Individual v. Neiman Marcus Group, a Delaware Corporation, Susan B. Zegers, an Individual, Maria Dem, the court cited subsection (i) while reciting the ADA's definitions, but it did not construe or apply the regulation. It expressly left unresolved whether Cooper was a qualified individual with a disability and whether the discharge was lawful under the ADA. opinion →
Kralik v. Durbin, the regulation is cited only in a background recitation of examples of major life activities. The court did not construe subsection (i); its decision rested on the separate reasonable-accommodation issue involving collective-bargaining seniority rights, and the discussion of disability-related facts reported the district court's ruling. opinion →
Kralik v. Durbin, the regulation appears only in the appellate court's description of the district court's analysis of whether Kralik had a disability. The appellate court did not construe § 1630.2(i); it affirmed on the independent ground that the requested accommodation would violate seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement. opinion →
Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, the court recites the regulation's definitions of reasonable accommodation and essential functions as background to its ADA analysis, but it does not construe or decide what 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 means or requires. Its dispositive holding concerns judicial estoppel based on Jackson's workers' compensation position. opinion →
Saylor v. Ridge, the regulation is cited in a footnote while reciting the statutory definition of disability; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
Smith v. Ameritech Ameritech Publishing, Inc. Sickness and Accident Disability Benefit Plan Long Term Disability P, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) only as supporting authority for the general proposition that reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring or reassignment to a vacant position. It does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its holding is that the plaintiff failed to propose an objectively reasonable accommodation under the ADA. opinion →
Raciti-Hur v. Homan, the regulation appears only in a footnote as authority for a general statement about pregnancy under the ADA. In the actual analysis, the court expressly assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff's pregnancy qualified as a temporary medical disability for purposes of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, so it did not construe or apply § 1630.2(h). opinion →
Hartney v. Runyon, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) as one authority supporting its conclusion that Hartney had no evidence he was perceived to be disabled, but it did not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires or whom it covers. opinion →
Hartney v. Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster General Postal Service, (u.s.), the court cites § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) in a string of supporting authorities for affirming summary judgment, but it does not interpret the subsection or explain what it requires; the operative holding is the factual conclusion that Hartney offered no evidence he was perceived to be disabled. opinion →
Bond v. Sterling, Inc., the court mentions § 1630.2(g)(1) in a footnote while discussing the ADA as an analogy for interpreting New York's disability standard. It decides only that breastfeeding is not a disability under the New York Human Rights Law; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the federal regulation. opinion →
Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Company, the court recited § 1630.2’s definitions as background to the ADA analysis, but it accepted the district court’s disability finding and affirmed on the separate ground that Plaintiff failed to identify an objectively reasonable accommodation. It did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 1630.2. opinion →
Settle v. SW Rodgers, Co., Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(i) only parenthetically through Williams to list major life activities and mentions § 1630.2(h)(1) in a footnote as guidance on physical impairment; it does not construe or decide what either regulatory provision means or requires. Its ruling concerns whether the complaint adequately alleged an ADA disability. opinion →
Martinez v. City of Roy, the court quoted §§ 1630.2(h) and (l) as background definitions, but did not construe or decide whether the children’s condition met either provision. The court expressly deemed the “regarded as” issue unnecessary after deciding that recreational swimming was not a major life activity, so the citations are incidental to the actual holding. opinion →
Bell v. Wells Fargo Bank, the court merely cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) as part of the parties' discussion of analogous ADA authorities, then expressly declines to examine those federal authorities and decides the case under California's FEHA. opinion →
Bailey v. Reynolds Metals, the court cited § 1630.2(i) in a footnote while reciting the ADA's definition of disability; it did not decide what the regulation means or apply its major-life-activities standard to resolve the case. opinion →
Harter v. University of Indianapolis, the court cited § 1630.2(o)(3) as support for a general description of the ADA’s interactive accommodation process. Its ruling concerned attorney disqualification and attorney-client privilege, and it did not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
McGarry v. DIRECTOR, DEPT. OF REVENUE, STATE OF MO., the court recites the regulatory definitions in describing the plaintiffs’ undisputed ADA status; it expressly says the defendant did not challenge whether they fell within the ADA’s protections. The court’s ruling concerned the ADA surcharge provisions and parking-placard fees, not the meaning or application of § 1630.2. opinion →
Steffes v. Stepan Company, the citation appears in the procedural history to report the district court’s alternative ground for summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed based on Steffes’s factual responsibility for the breakdown in the interactive process, but did not construe or otherwise decide what § 1630.2(o)(3) means or requires. opinion →
Himes v. State of California Department of Social Services, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) in a string cite supporting its conclusion that Himes offered no evidence he was qualified, but it does not explain, interpret, or otherwise decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Adams v. Strombecker Corporation, a Corporation D/B/A Durant Plastics, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) only as additional authority while applying the ADA's substantial-limitation standard; it did not interpret or separately analyze the regulation. opinion →
Lachance v. Duffy's Draft House, the court merely recited the general ADA reasonable-accommodation standard and cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) in a footnote. It did not interpret or decide an issue about the regulation; the decision turned on the direct-threat and evidentiary issues in this case. opinion →
Brickers v. Cleveland Board of Education, the court merely recited the seven factors in § 1630.2(n)(3). It did not interpret or independently apply that regulation; instead, it resolved essentialness from a state-law qualification and the ADA's statutory definition in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). opinion →
Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) only conditionally, while assuming the plaintiff's depression was a long-term disability. It did not construe or apply the regulation; it decided the ADA claim on lack of substantial limitation and lack of qualification. opinion →
Sullivan v. River Valley School District, the court merely recites examples of major life activities while summarizing the ADA definition of disability. It does not construe subsection (i) or decide whether any particular activity qualifies under it. opinion →
Blakely v. USAirways, Inc., section 1630.2(n)(3)(v) is cited in the defendant’s argument about what evidence may show essential job functions, which the court does not adopt as a construction of the regulation. Section 1630.2(g) is mentioned only in a general recitation of the ADA’s disability framework; the court decides RLA preclusion and arbitration issues instead. opinion →
Johnson v. State Technology Center at Memphis, the court cites § 1630.2(p) as supporting authority for a broader conclusion that the ADA's accommodation provisions are constitutionally proportional; it does not construe, independently apply, or decide a dispute under the regulation. opinion →
Young v. U.S. West Comm., the court merely recites the regulation’s examples of major life activities as background. It does not interpret or decide any issue about § 1630.2(i); the ADA claim is resolved under the separate substantial-limitation standard for working. opinion →
Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, the court quoted § 1630.2(o) as part of Nihiser’s description of examples of reasonable accommodations while discussing the ADA’s constitutional validity. It did not construe or apply this regulation to decide the plaintiffs’ claims. opinion →
Brune v. BASF Corp., the court recites the regulation’s general list of major life activities, but expressly declines to conduct a factual inquiry into whether the plaintiff’s limp constituted a disability and decides the disability claim on lack of causation. Thus, it does not construe or apply § 1630.2 as a holding. opinion →
Burkett v. United States Postal Service, the regulation appears in plaintiff's counsel's trial argument seeking a jury instruction. The court granted a new trial because the record-of-disability issue was supported by sufficient evidence, but it did not construe or apply § 1630.2(k) itself. opinion →
Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber, the regulation is cited and discussed only in Judge Lay’s dissent. The majority opinion did not construe or adopt the dissent’s interpretation, and the court affirmed summary judgment for Buckhorn. opinion →
Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc., the regulation is mentioned only in the dissent while reporting Mole's argument; the majority did not adopt that interpretation or construe § 1630.2(o)(3), and the court affirmed summary judgment on other grounds. opinion →
Barzen v. Carlson Co., the court cites § 1630.2(i) parenthetically for the general definition of “major life activities” but does not interpret or apply any disputed language of the regulation. Its disability ruling relies on the ADA and other precedent concerning substantial limitation and working. opinion →
McKenzie v. EAP Management Corp., the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Pritchard. The court did not interpret or independently apply § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); it resolved the ADA claim by finding that plaintiff offered insufficient evidence of a disability. opinion →
Hafner v. Conoco, Inc., the court quoted § 1630.2(r)'s interpretive guidance as useful support for a Montana-law independent-assessment duty; its holding was expressly under Rule 24.9.606(8), ARM, and did not construe or apply § 1630.2(r) itself. opinion →
Powers v. Polygram Holding, Inc., the court treated the coverage of mental illness as undisputed background and did not construe or independently decide the regulation; its ruling addressed whether the requested seventeen-week leave was a reasonable accommodation. opinion →
Jackson v. Univ. CO Hosp. Auth., the citation to § 1630.2(h)(1) appears only in Ms. Jackson's argument. The court did not adopt or construe that provision; it affirmed on the ground that her impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity. opinion →
Robert C. Koshinski, Jr. v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., the court quoted 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) while discussing the employer's unaddressed direct-threat defense, but expressly held that it did not reach whether the foundry had a valid defense because the plaintiff could not establish ADA protection. The regulation therefore was incidental to the decision rather than construed or applied. opinion →
Rizzo v. Children's World, the only direct citation to § 1630.2(m) appears in the dissent's footnote supporting its description of a qualified individual; the majority did not adopt that analysis, and the majority's ruling concerned direct-threat burden allocation under other provisions and guidance. opinion →
Winifred Browning v. Liberty Mutual Ins., the court cited § 1630.2(j) App. only as additional support while deciding that Browning was not a qualified individual at the time of termination. It did not construe or apply the regulation's definition of disability. opinion →
Rutlin v. Prime Succession, Inc., the court recited the regulation's definition of major life activities, but did not construe or independently apply § 1630.2; its ruling addressed whether medicated epilepsy substantially limited the plaintiff under the ADA and followed Sixth Circuit precedent concerning mitigating measures. opinion →
Engel v. Montana Dakota Utilities, the court recited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)'s standard while discussing whether Engel was disabled, but expressly declined to reach that issue because his lack of qualification was dispositive; it therefore did not decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Johnson v. Exxon Co USA, the regulation is cited within a passage quoted from Burch and serves as supporting authority for the district court’s first ADA holding. This court affirmed the judgment without independently construing or applying § 1630.2(j). opinion →
Valentine v. Standard & Poor's, the court cites § 1630.2(m) in a see citation after quoting the ADA’s statutory definition of a qualified individual; it does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Francia Pond v. Michelin North America, Inc., Also Known as Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Manufacturing, Inc., the regulation is mentioned in a footnote while describing Pond's argument about the interactive process; the court decided the case on the ADA's reassignment and bumping provisions without construing § 1630.2(o)(3). opinion →
Attorney General Opinion No., the opinion cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) only in a footnote supporting the definition of “direct threat”; it does not construe or apply that regulation as the basis for its opinion. opinion →
Connolly v. Bidermann Industries U.S.A., Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(n)(1) only as the source of language quoted from Stone while deciding the ADA reassignment issue; it does not independently construe or apply this regulation. opinion →
In Interest of Matthew S., (Jul. 16, 1999), the court merely cites § 1630.2 (I) as support for a list of major life activities while discussing the ADA. It does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its ruling addresses whether the respondent proved an ADA disability and denial of DCF services. opinion →
Durant v. Rikard Nursing Home, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only in a string cite supporting its conclusion that the plaintiff was not disabled; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Matuska v. Hinckley Township, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) only as additional support for the rule it attributed to Sutton. It did not discuss the regulation's text or decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Katzowitz v. Long Island Railroad, the court recited the regulation's definition while questioning the plaintiff's qualification under the ADA, but expressly stated that the claim failed regardless because the plaintiff did not show denial of transportation benefits by reason of disability; the citation was therefore incidental to the dispositive second-prong ruling. opinion →
Lee v. ITT STANDARD, the court recited the regulation's employer-coverage and physical-impairment definitions as background while deciding Williams's ADA summary-judgment claim; coverage was undisputed, and the court did not construe or resolve a disputed issue under § 1630.2. opinion →
Anyan v. New York Life Insurance, the court merely cites § 1630.2(h)(1) as an example supporting the uncontested point that diabetes is a physical impairment; it does not interpret or apply the regulation's definition. opinion →
Spielman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(p)(1) in a parenthetical supporting a rule quoted from Selenke, but does not construe the regulation or decide its meaning or independent application. The court expressly declines to resolve the general question whether working at home may be a reasonable accommodation and decides the claim on the particular facts. opinion →
Reid v. Runyon, the court merely cites § 1630.2(i) for the background proposition that working is a major life activity. It does not interpret or apply that regulation; the appeal is resolved on the unchallenged conclusion that the plaintiff was not disabled. opinion →
Vinson v. Thomas, the majority held only that factual disputes precluded summary judgment under the Rehabilitation Act and cited other regulations; the cited discussion of § 1630.2(h)(2), (i), and (j) appears solely in Judge O'Scannlain's dissent and was not adopted by the court. opinion →
Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Associates, Inc., the court recited the regulatory definitions while reviewing Dvorak’s ADA claim, but it expressly assumed the disability issue without deciding it and resolved the appeal on the absence of discriminatory motive. opinion →
Lopez-Hernandez v. Municipality of San Juan, the court cited § 1630.2(e)(2) only as part of a string citation while reciting the ADA's disability definition. It did not interpret or specifically apply subsection (e)(2), concerning a record of impairment; the dismissal rested on the plaintiff's failure to allege an impairment and identify a major life activity. opinion →
Ballard v. Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) only to describe the interactive-process framework while deciding whether Ballard requested accommodation; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Brown v. Cox, the court merely recited the regulation's examples of major life activities in a footnote and noted that the record did not support Brown's claim regarding learning; it did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 1630.2(i). opinion →
Stein v. United Airlines, the court cites § 1630.2(j) only parenthetically through Webb while applying the ADA standard to Stein’s claim; it does not interpret or independently decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Powers v. Tweco Products, Inc., the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Steele as a contrary authority. The court did not interpret or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; it analyzed the ADA's statutory definition using Sutton and Tenth Circuit precedent. opinion →
Sandra v. Morrissey v. General Mills, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) parenthetically as support for a proposition adopted from the Tenth Circuit, but it did not construe the regulation or decide what it independently requires. opinion →
Vailes v. Prince George's County, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only in identifying breathing as a major life activity; its decision rests on the lack of evidence that Vailes was substantially limited, rather than on any construction of the regulation. opinion →
Thompson v. Davis, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only to support the allegation that learning and working are major life activities; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and its holding concerns Title II of the ADA and parole decisions. opinion →
Hewitt v. Union Oil Co. of California, Inc., the court merely cites § 1630.2(j) parenthetically for the existence of factors relevant to substantial limitation. It does not construe the regulation or decide what its factors require; the court only finds a genuine issue of fact based on the record. opinion →
Mickelsen v. Albertson's, Inc., the regulation is cited only parenthetically as the source of factors recited from the Supreme Court’s Toyota Motor decision. The court’s own ruling applies the ADA standard described in Toyota Motor and does not construe or independently decide what § 1630.2(j)(2) requires. opinion →
Mertes v. Westfield Ford, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) only while relying on the Supreme Court’s statement about the duration of an impairment; it did not construe or independently decide the regulation’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
Ogborn, Jerry v. United Food Comm 881, the court cited § 1630.2(g) while reciting the general ADA definition of disability, and also cited related regulatory provisions in discussing the claim, but it did not interpret or decide a requirement of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. The decision instead resolved the ADA claim on the evidence concerning the duration and extent of the plaintiff’s depression. opinion →
Bertinetti v. Joy Mining MacHinery, the regulation is cited only to support the court's identification of walking as a major life activity under the ADA; the court's holding concerns whether the plaintiff's impairment substantially limited walking, not the meaning or application of § 1630.2(i). opinion →
Conrad v. Board of Johnson County Commissioners, the opinion contains only footnote citations to § 1630.2 and related string cites; it does not state or apply a holding construing the regulation. opinion →
Farmiloe v. Ford Motor Co., the court merely cites § 1630.2(f) alongside the ADA’s definition of employee, then states that the definition provides no guidance and decides employee status under payroll and traditional agency principles. It does not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Stevens v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., the court cited 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) only as supporting authority for the quoted Toyota definition of “substantially limited.” It did not analyze the regulation’s text or decide what § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) means or requires. opinion →
Soules v. Mount Holiness Mem. Park, the appellate court mentions 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) only while describing the federal standards relied on by the motion judge. It rejects applying those ADA/RA standards to New Jersey's broader LAD definition and does not construe or decide anything about this regulation itself. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dillon Companies, the court cited § 1630.2(o) while recounting an earlier case's rule and assessing subpoena relevance; it did not construe the regulation or decide whether the employer actually satisfied the accommodation requirement. opinion →
Peters, Robert v. City of Mauston, the court cites § 1630.2(l) only as a “see also” authority appended to a standard drawn from the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and judicial precedent. It does not independently construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Gover v. Speedway Super America, LLC, the court cited subsection (i) only for examples of major life activities during its ADA analysis. It did not construe or apply that subsection to resolve a disputed issue; its holding concerned whether pregnancy itself is a disability, relying on other authority and the interpretative guidance concerning § 1630.2(h). opinion →
Ogborn v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 881 and Steven Powell, the regulation is cited only in a general statement of the ADA disability definition, alongside the statute and a case. The court did not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); its decision concerned whether the evidence showed that Ogborn's depression substantially limited his ability to work. opinion →
Howard v. Lehman, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 in a string cite while affirming summary judgment, but it did not interpret, explain, or independently apply the regulation; the citation merely accompanied the court’s conclusion that Howard had not shown he was disabled under the ADA. opinion →
Stalter v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services, the opinion mentions § 1630.2(h)(1) in a footnote describing the EEOC’s definition of impairment, but the court states that BOCES did not contest that cerebral palsy is a physical or mental impairment and does not decide the regulation’s meaning or application. opinion →
Chinchillo v. Powell, section 1630.2 appears only in a footnote as part of a list identifying the current version of cited regulations. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 1630.2; its analysis relied on 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203 and other authorities. opinion →
Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, the opinion cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) in a footnote to a definition of “essential functions of the job,” but § 1630.2(h)(1) concerns physical or mental impairment. The court does not construe or apply the cited subsection; it resolves the ADA claims on the plaintiffs’ failure to show they were disabled. opinion →
Vazquez v. Salvation Army, Inc., the regulation appears only in a string citation supporting the court’s ADA regarded-as analysis. The court does not independently construe or apply § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). opinion →
Ebbert v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation, the citation to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 appears only in the court’s description of the holding in Deane. This court did not construe, apply, or decide what § 1630.2 means or requires. opinion →
Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc., the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) only to identify the federal substantial-limitation standard as a contrast to California’s FEHA standard; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Columbia Plaza Medical Center of Fort Worth Subsidiary, L.P. v. Szurek, the court cited § 1630.2(l), along with other ADA authorities, as persuasive support while construing the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act; it did not decide the meaning or application of the federal regulation itself. opinion →
Beveridge v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(n)(3) in a string citation supporting the general proposition that an employer’s judgment about essential job duties is highly probative, but it does not interpret or independently apply the subsection. opinion →
Swanson v. Senior Resource Connection, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) in a parenthetical while offering guidance on an Ohio disability claim. It did not construe or apply this federal subsection, and the citation was incidental to denying summary judgment on the state-law claim. opinion →
Benge v. General Motors Corp., the court mentioned § 1630.2(j)(2) only in a footnote as a regulation cited by Toyota and relied on by Ohio courts. Its ruling applied Toyota to the Chapter 4112 claim and did not interpret or independently decide what the federal regulation requires. opinion →
Denise Felix, Naomi Felix and Irene Cooper as Administrators of the Estate of Denise Felix v. New York City Transit Auth, the court cites § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) in a parenthetical as supporting authority for its ADA analysis, but does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Carter v. Department of Justice, the court merely recounts the discrimination issues Carter raised before the Board, including whether he was disabled under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; it dismisses for lack of jurisdiction and does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Dyke, Michael v. O'Neal Steel Inc, the court cites § 1630.2(i) in passing for the proposition that seeing is a major life activity, but the decision concerns whether the employer regarded Dyke as substantially limited and whether he was qualified; it does not construe or independently decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Dyke v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., the regulation is cited only in support of the proposition that seeing is a major life activity. The court does not interpret or apply § 1630.2; it resolves the regarded-as claim by analyzing the evidence of O’Neal’s beliefs. opinion →
Bayless v. Orkin Exterminating, the court cited § 1630.2(i) only to identify the EEOC's list of major life activities, then expressly assumed without deciding that working is a major life activity. It did not construe or adopt the regulation, and its decision turned on the lack of a substantial limitation. opinion →
Szczesny v. General Electric Co., the court cites § 1630.2(h) only in passing as background support for the ADA disability discussion; it does not interpret the regulation, decide what it requires, or apply its definition to resolve the appeal. opinion →
Jenkins v. NORTHWOOD REHAB. & EXTENDED CARE FACIL., the court recited the regulation's examples of major life activities while discussing whether plaintiff had a disability, but expressly assumed that issue and decided the case on qualified-individual and essential-function grounds. Its separate citation to § 1630.2(r) was only a passing reference to patient safety. opinion →
Jenkins v. Northwood Rehabilitation & Extended Care Facility, the court recited examples of major life activities and cited subsection (r) in support of its safety discussion, but it assumed disability and resolved the case on whether the plaintiff could perform the essential job functions; it did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 1630.2. opinion →
Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass'n, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(n) only in a parenthetical cross-reference while discussing the essential functions of the volunteer-counselor position; it did not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Kimball, Bennett, Brooslin & Pava v. McGahan, the regulation is mentioned as authority cited by McGahan in support of a requested jury instruction. The court did not construe or apply § 1630.2; it decided the issue under Massachusetts law, stating that Massachusetts law does not require an employer to negotiate the accommodation. opinion →
Rush v. National Board of Medical Examiners, the court mentioned § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) once in a “See also” parenthetical, without interpreting the subsection or analyzing its requirements. The injunction rested on Title III of the ADA and the court’s factual findings about Plaintiff’s disability and requested accommodation. opinion →
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, the regulation is quoted and cited only while presenting Catlin's argument under the ADA. The court decided the case under Wisconsin law and expressly said federal law was guidance only and not binding; it did not construe or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) as the basis for its holding. opinion →
Davis v. Emery Worldwide Corp., the court quoted the regulatory definition as background but expressly declined to resolve whether climbing is a major life activity; it decided the ADA claim on the insufficiency of evidence that the defendant perceived the plaintiff as substantially limited. opinion →
Hastings v. Department of Corrections, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 app. only as an analogy and quoted support for the FEHA’s same-level reassignment principle. It does not construe, apply, or decide any requirement under the federal regulation; the actual holding concerns FEHA and California civil-service law. opinion →
Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(i) only in a footnote as part of a string of authorities supporting that walking is a major life activity; it did not construe or independently decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Michael Jerome Ollie, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Titan Tire Corporation, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee, the only express citation to § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) reports the district court’s conclusion in the procedural history. The appellate court’s own discussion applies ADA standards from Sutton and does not construe or independently apply this regulation. opinion →
Liljedahl v. Ryder Student Transportation Services, Inc., the regulation is cited in a footnote for a general interactive-process proposition, but the court did not construe or decide the regulation. The judgment rested on the employer's lack of knowledge of the alleged disability and the absence of evidence that an accommodation was required. opinion →
Gottesman v. J.H. Batten, Inc., the opinion mentions § 1630.2(h)(1) (and separately § 1630.2(j)) in a footnote while reciting ADA definitions from other authorities. The court did not interpret or apply the regulation as the basis for deciding the motion to dismiss. opinion →
Conroy v. Township of Lower Merion, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) as authority for the elements of Conroy's ADA and PHRA claims, but does not interpret or apply the regulation's meaning beyond recounting that she had not shown a qualifying disability. opinion →
Kratzer v. Collins, the opinion mentions § 1630.2(m) only in a parenthetical citation to a prior case supporting the ADA qualification test. It does not interpret, define, or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Doe v. Lennox School District No. 41-4, the court merely recited the regulation’s definitions in a footnote and assumed, without deciding, whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability; it granted summary judgment on the separate bad-faith/gross-misjudgment issue. opinion →
Peebles v. Henderson, the court expressly says it declines to address the otherwise-qualified-individual element; § 1630.2(m) is cited only in an explanatory footnote and is not construed or applied to decide the appeal. opinion →
Peebles v. John E. Potter, 1 Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, the court expressly said it did not address the qualified-individual element; § 1630.2(m) appears only in a footnote explaining a possible overlap with the accommodation issue, not as a rule the court decided or applied. opinion →
Parker v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, the court mentions § 1630.2(l)(2) in a footnote while describing an alternative route under the EEOC regulations, but it does not construe or apply that provision; the decision instead resolves the regarded-as claim under the ADA and Supreme Court precedent. opinion →
Barta v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only as general support for an illustrative list of major life activities while resolving the ADA disability issue; it did not construe the regulation or decide what it independently requires. opinion →
Ordahl v. Forward Technology Industries, Inc., the court merely cites § 1630.2(h) to support an undisputed background point that the plaintiff’s conditions are physical impairments; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires or covers. opinion →
Conrad v. Eaton Corp., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) while contrasting the ADA with the FMLA; it did not decide the ADA claim or construe or apply this regulation. opinion →
United States v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety, the court used the regulation only as a parenthetical source for a proposition attributed to the Fifth Circuit and decided the issue under the ADA’s statutory definition; it did not interpret or apply § 1630.2(j) itself. opinion →
Burnett v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, the court cites § 1630.2(g) in a string of authorities supporting a general statement about ADA disability determinations; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything specific about the regulation. opinion →
Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Company, the court cites § 1630.2(g)(2)-(3) in a general statement of the ADA's coverage, but it does not construe or apply the regulation; the decision turns on whether the employer's stated reason for refusing to rehire was pretextual and whether the evidence supported disability discrimination. opinion →
Carter v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the regulation is cited only in Carter’s appellate argument. The court does not construe § 1630.2(c)(3) or adopt that citation; it decides the interactive-process issue under the ADA and cited precedent. opinion →
Monak v. Ford Motor Co., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) only parenthetically as support for the Ohio Supreme Court's formulation of Ohio disability law; it did not construe or independently apply the federal regulation. opinion →
Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., the court merely cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2)-(3) alongside the ADA and another case when stating the governing background rule; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, the court cited § 1630.2(m) only to contrast the ADA's standard with the NJLAD's present-performance requirement; it did not decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 1630.2(m). opinion →
Johnson v. Metrohealth Med. Ctr., Unpublished Decision (6-3-2004), the concurrence merely reports that McGlone noted the regulation while discussing federal guidance; it does not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
Polini v. Lucent Technologies, the regulation appears only in a footnote as a supporting reference for the ADA's regarded-as framework. The court does not construe or decide what § 1630.2(l)(2) means or requires; its holding concerns the ADA and controlling case law. opinion →
Thomas v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) as supporting authority for a principle it applied to Louisiana's disability-discrimination statute; it did not construe, define, or independently apply the federal regulation. opinion →
Andrew H.K. Wong v. Regents of the University of California, the regulation is cited and explained only in the dissent; the majority does not adopt or construe 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. The citation therefore is not this court's holding. opinion →
Verzeni v. Postmaster General, the appellate court merely reported the district court’s ruling and noted that the parties did not dispute it; it did not construe or decide how § 1630.2(h) applies. opinion →
Genthe v. Quebecor World, the majority cites § 1630.2(i) only in its background statement of the ADA's major-life-activity definition. The detailed discussion of §§ 1630.2(j)(1) and (j)(2) appears in the dissent, which the majority did not adopt; the binding disposition affirmed on evidentiary grounds without construing or deciding the cited regulatory provisions. opinion →
Hoge v. Honda of America, the court cites § 1630.2(o) only in a parenthetical quoting an ADA reassignment standard, while contrasting ADA accommodation duties with the FMLA restoration right. It does not interpret or apply § 1630.2(o). opinion →
Lori Hoge, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) only parenthetically, through Kiphart, while rejecting Honda’s argument that ADA reasonableness principles should alter FMLA restoration timing; it does not interpret or apply § 1630.2(o). opinion →
Bishop v. NU-WAY SERVICE STATIONS, INC., the court quoted §§ 1630.2(i) and (j)(3)(i) as background legal standards, but expressly said it need not decide whether Defendant perceived Plaintiff to be disabled. Summary judgment instead rested on Plaintiff's failure to show that he could perform the night-shift mechanic job without accommodation, so the regulation was not construed or applied as the basis of the holding. opinion →
McKenzie v. Benton, the court mentions 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) only as a citation in McKenzie’s argument about who bears the burden of proving a direct threat. The court did not adopt or construe the regulation; it resolved the issue under the ADA’s statutory provisions and precedent. opinion →
Lorenzen v. GKN Armstrong Wheels, Inc., the opinion mentions § 1630.2(j)(2) only within a block quotation from Wood as supporting authority for the factors used to assess substantial limitation; it does not independently interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Haggar Apparel Co. v. Leal, the court merely mentions that federal regulations treat working as a major life activity, while expressly assuming rather than deciding that issue and resolving the case under Texas law using the Supreme Court's broad-range-of-jobs standard. opinion →
Lundquist v. Rice Memorial Hosp., the regulation is cited only in a parenthetical citation to Helfter. The court did not construe § 1630.2(i) or decide its meaning; its ruling rested on existing Eighth Circuit precedent that a general lifting restriction is insufficient to establish an ADA disability. opinion →
Collins v. Prudential Investment & Retirement Services, Incidental: the court recited the regulation while addressing Collins’s argument that Gagliardo endorsed it, but expressly said Gagliardo merely mentioned the regulations and did not construe or adopt them. The disability determination rested on the ADA framework and Supreme Court precedent, not on a holding about § 1630.2(j). opinion →
Louis v. Nese v. Julian Nordic Construction Company and Administaff, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) only as additional authority while stating the ADA's regarded-as standard. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(l) only in a footnote as additional support for a definition it derived from the ADA's statutory text; it did not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Wong v. Regents Univ. of Ca, the regulation is cited and described only in the dissent’s analysis. The majority did not adopt or construe § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii); it affirmed using the ADA’s statutory definition and Supreme Court precedent. opinion →
Andrew H.K. Wong v. Regents of the University of California, the regulation is cited and described only in Judge Thomas's dissent; the majority did not adopt or analyze this regulatory language, so it is not the court's holding about 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
Head v. Glacier Northwest, Incorporated, a Washington Corporation, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) in a footnote through Fraser while quoting a general list of major life activities. It held that reading is a major life activity under the ADA, but did not construe or apply this regulation itself. opinion →
Taylor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court cited and quoted § 1630.2(i) to identify possible major life activities, but did not construe or independently apply the regulation. It expressly declined to determine what level of deference the EEOC regulations were due, and resolved the ADA claim under the statutory substantial-limitation requirement and Supreme Court precedent. opinion →
Burke v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) and (j) parenthetically while reciting the ADA disability framework, but it does not interpret or apply either regulation. The decision turns on the evidence concerning Burke’s asthma and ability to work generally. opinion →
Diaz v. Federal Express Corp., the court cites the regulation to summarize the ADA framework while analyzing whether the plaintiff's condition qualifies as a disability under California's FEHA; it does not decide a question about the regulation itself. opinion →
Arce-Montalvo v. Hospital Buen Samaritano, Inc., the regulation appears only in a footnote reciting the EEOC definition and factors for substantial limitation; the court did not construe or independently decide anything about § 1630.2. opinion →
Knutson v. Ag Processing, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) only as supporting authority while applying the ADA’s broad-class-of-jobs standard; it did not construe or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Shultz v. Postmaster General, Incidental: the footnote recites the regulatory definition and identifies which disability theory the plaintiff pursued, but the court does not interpret or develop § 1630.2(g). Its actual decision rests on the plaintiff's evidence and the scope of her asserted claim. opinion →
Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) only in a footnote as additional authority for the meaning of “regarded as disabled.” Its decision is based on the plain language of the ADA, and it does not construe or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Burke v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., the court cites § 1630.2(j) only parenthetically as a regulation defining “substantially limiting impairment”; it does not interpret or apply that regulation, and its disability analysis turns on the facts of Burke’s asthma and ability to work. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court cited the regulation to explain the federal-law backdrop while interpreting FEHA’s broader definition of disability. It did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 1630.2(j)(3)(B) itself. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3)(B) and (j)(3)(i) only to describe the federal ADA backdrop and provide a comparison for interpreting California FEHA. It did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
Mercier, Jr. v. Dept. Of Justice, the court merely recites the regulation's definition while describing Mercier's handicap-discrimination defense. It does not interpret or decide the regulation's application; it resolves the defense because Mercier presented insufficient expert evidence that he had alcohol dependence causing the misconduct. opinion →
Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., the regulation appears in a string citation supporting the court’s discussion of the Fair Housing Act’s reasonable-accommodation requirement. The opinion does not decide what § 1630.2(o)(3) means, requires, or covers, and does not independently apply its rule. opinion →
St. Laurent v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(n)(3) only through Ward as background support for factors relevant to identifying essential job functions. It decides the claim under Massachusetts handicap-discrimination law and does not construe or independently apply the federal regulation. opinion →
Lochridge v. City of Winston-Salem, the court cited § 1630.2(g) and (j) as supporting references while stating the ADA's disability standard and examples of major life activities. It did not interpret or independently apply those regulations; its conclusion rested on the ADA statutory definition, Supreme Court precedent, and Plaintiff's deposition testimony. opinion →
Chatmon v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services, the court quoted the regulatory definition and recited the substantial-limitation factors while reviewing the ADA issues, but it vacated the trial court’s disability conclusion and remanded for factual findings. Because it expressly left the ADA legal issues to be determined after remand, it did not construe or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 as a holding. opinion →
Arrieta-Colon v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., the court cited and described § 1630.2(l) in recounting the unpreserved "regarded as" disability issue, but expressly declined to decide whether the plaintiff satisfied the test; it therefore did not hold anything about the regulation. opinion →
Hurlbert Ex Rel. Estate of Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care System, Inc., the court decided the meaning of FMLA incapacity and held that the ADA inquiry should not be used for that issue. Section 1630.2 is mentioned only as part of the incorporated ADA standard and is not itself construed or applied as the basis for the decision. opinion →
Gasser v. District of Columbia, the opinion expressly says it had not decided whether working is a major life activity under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) and merely assumes the issue arguendo. The other references to § 1630.2 are parallel or background citations; the judgment rests on the ADA and Duncan’s evidentiary standard, not an interpretation of this regulation. opinion →
Cutrera v. Bd of Suprs of LSU, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only to identify examples of major life activities, including seeing, while deciding whether the plaintiff raised a fact issue under the ADA; it does not construe or otherwise decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Mahoney v. Ernst & Young LLP, the court cites and recites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 as background guidance on ADA disability terminology; it does not decide a disputed issue by construing or applying the regulation. opinion →
Curl v. United Supermarkets, Ltd., the court cites § 1630.2(h)(2) only to state the general proposition that emotional or mental illness can qualify as a mental impairment. It assumes Curl had an impairment and decides the case on whether he was substantially limited, without construing or applying subsection (h)(2). opinion →
MacY v. Hopkins County Board of Education, the court cited the regulations in a background footnote describing ADA disability definitions, but disability status was conceded for summary judgment and the court decided the case on whether the termination was because of misconduct rather than disability. It did not construe or apply these regulatory provisions to decide an issue. opinion →
Fornes v. Osceola County Sheriff's, the court cited § 1630.2(i) for the definition of major life activities but expressly said it need not decide whether running is a major life activity. It cited § 1630.2(n)(3) for a general list of essential-function factors, without interpreting or independently applying the regulation; the decision rested on the ADA's qualified-individual requirement. opinion →
Aguirre-Rodriguez v. Little Caesars, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only as part of the general ADA disability framework. It did not interpret or apply the regulation; instead, it assumed arguendo that plaintiff was disabled and granted summary judgment because he could not show the adverse action was motivated by his diabetes. opinion →
Lucenti v. Potter, the court decided the reasonable-accommodation claim under the Rehabilitation Act and 29 C.F.R. § 32.3. It cited § 1630.2(o) and (p) only to note similar ADA definitions, without interpreting or applying those provisions. opinion →
McClarty v. Totem Electric, the court cited § 1630.2(j) while reporting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA and adopted the ADA definition of disability for Washington law; it did not independently construe or apply this regulation. The footnote’s citation to § 1630.2(j)(2) likewise merely notes that it lists factors and does not announce a holding about the regulation. opinion →
Bourbeau v. City of Chicopee, the court cited § 1630.2(h)(1) to support the apparently conceded premise that the plaintiff’s seizures or seizure disorder were physical impairments. It did not construe or independently decide the regulation’s meaning or application; its analysis concerned whether the impairments substantially limited a major life activity. opinion →
Torok v. Gibralter Veterinary Hospital, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(i) for the uncontroversial premise that performing manual tasks is a major life activity, but did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. The ruling instead applied the ADA's substantial-limitation standard as explained by Toyota and found the plaintiff's limitations insufficient. opinion →
Neisendorf v. Levi Strauss & Co., the court mentions § 1630.2(d)(3) only to identify the ADA source of the term “interactive process” in the appellant’s argument. It does not construe or apply the regulation; the CFRA claim was resolved on other grounds. opinion →
In re M.H. & G.H., the court cited § 1630.2(g) only for the general definition of an ADA-protected impairment. It did not decide whether the father met that definition or otherwise interpret the regulation; it rejected his challenge on the accommodation issue without resolving whether the ADA applied. opinion →
Gentry v. Summit Behavioral Healthcare, the court cites § 1630.2(I) only to recite the ADA definition of major life activities while deciding the plaintiff’s regarded-as disability claim; it does not independently construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Cassimy, Glenn v. Rockford School Dist, the Seventh Circuit cited the regulation only through parentheticals to describe background ADA standards and then decided Cassimy's claims under the ADA's substantial-limitation and evidentiary requirements. It did not construe or independently hold what § 1630.2(h)(2) or § 1630.2(j)(2)(i) means or requires. opinion →
Sanchez v. American Popcorn Co., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(2) in a string cite supporting a general statement of ADA law, but did not construe or apply the regulation. It granted summary judgment on actual disability because Sanchez made no assertion that her shoulder condition substantially limited a major life activity. opinion →
Conners v. SpectraSite Communications, Inc., the court cites § 1630.2(m) only to support a general comparison between ADA and Ohio-law standards; it does not construe the regulation or decide a distinct issue based on its meaning. opinion →
Cassimy v. Board of Education of the Rockford Public Schools, District 205, the court cited § 1630.2(h)(2) only through a parenthetical describing Schneiker's reasoning and cited § 1630.2(j) only in a parenthetical to Toyota. It decided Cassimy's ADA disability claim under the statute and did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Access 4 All, Inc. v. Trump International Hotel & Tower Condominium, the regulation is mentioned only in a parenthetical citation to Fouad supporting the general proposition that walking is a major life activity; this court did not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
Wyche v. United States Postal Service, the Federal Circuit merely reported the Board’s conclusion and affirmed the agency decision under its general scope-of-review analysis; it did not construe or independently apply § 1630.2(g). opinion →
Bynum v. MVM, INC., the court cites § 1630.2(i) only in passing while summarizing the ADA definition of disability and examples of major life activities. It did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the regulation. opinion →
Jimenez v. Potter, the court merely cites § 1630.2(i) for the undisputed point that working is listed as a major life activity while recounting Jimenez's argument; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation's meaning. The decision instead turned on the lack of evidence that his impairments substantially limited his ability to work. opinion →
McNeice v. Globalsantafe Drilling Co., the regulation appears only as a citation in a footnote accompanying a quotation from Sutton. The court did not interpret or independently apply § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); it decided the ADA claim using the statutory standard and circuit precedent. opinion →
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc., the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) and (i) only as support for interpreting an Arizona assistive-device statute; it did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of the federal regulation. opinion →
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(g)(1) and (i) only as background support while analyzing the meaning of Arizona’s assistive-device statute. It did not interpret or decide what the federal regulation means, requires, or covers. opinion →
John S. v. County of Orange, the court cited § 1630.2(i) and (j) in a string of authorities supporting its case-specific summary-judgment conclusion, but did not interpret, explain, or independently apply the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
John S. v. County of Orange, the court cited § 1630.2(i) and (j) as authorities while affirming summary judgment for lack of evidence that the plaintiff was disabled; it did not interpret or explain what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Silva v. Chertoff, the opinion cites § 1630.2 only in parentheticals reporting that Dutcher cited it; this court does not interpret, explain, or apply the regulation. opinion →
Sanders v. Ryan, the court cited the regulation only while reciting the general ADA standard and examples of major life activities. It did not construe or decide the regulation’s application; it treated the plaintiff’s status as a handicapped individual as undisputed and resolved the claims on other grounds. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Schneider National, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3) only to identify the EEOC’s position that working is a major life activity; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and the citation was incidental to its discussion of the ADA’s broad-range-of-jobs requirement. opinion →
Thompson v. Henderson, the court cites § 1630.2(i) while reciting the ADA legal framework, but does not decide whether the regulation's definition applies to Lee or construe the regulation. The disability claim was resolved on the inability to perform essential job functions, with or without accommodation. opinion →
Maples v. American Greetings Corp., the court cited § 1630.2(i) only through Chalfant for the general list of major life activities; it did not interpret the regulation or decide any issue about its meaning or requirements. opinion →
EEOC v. Schneider Nat'l Inc, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3) only to report the EEOC's view that working is a major life activity. It did not construe or adopt the regulation, and decided the case on the requirement that a claimant be unable to work in a broad range of jobs. opinion →
Evans v. Consumer Information & Dispute Resolution, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2® only as supporting authority while applying the ADA to Evans's evidence; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Albra v. Advan, Inc., the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only as part of the regulations and guidance considered while deciding the separate question of individual liability under the ADA's anti-retaliation provision; it did not construe or apply § 1630.2 itself. opinion →
Broadway v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court merely recited the regulation’s examples while analyzing whether the plaintiff had a disability under the ADA. It did not interpret or independently decide what § 1630.2(i) requires; the outcome rested on the plaintiff’s failure to show a substantial limitation under the ADA and controlling case law. opinion →
EEOC v. Convergys Customer, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only as a bare supporting citation after relying on the ADA's statutory definition of reasonable accommodation. It did not quote, interpret, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Ahmet Yigit Demirelli, Intervenor-Appellee v. Convergys Customer Management Gro, the court decided the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation under the ADA and cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only as a supporting “see also” authority; it did not interpret, apply, or identify a specific subsection of the regulation. opinion →
Kenneth S. Hantman, Inc. v. Office of Unemployment Compensation Tax Services, the court merely recited the regulation's examples of major life activities. It did not construe § 1630.2(f) or decide the disability issue under that provision; instead, it held that the record lacked sufficient credible evidence of the alleged disability. opinion →
Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the opinion cites § 1630.2(o)(3) while recounting the Third Circuit’s prior authority and the ADA’s general interactive-process requirements. Hohider does not decide what the regulation means, what it requires, or how it applies; its own ruling concerns Rule 23 class-certification requirements. opinion →
Honeck v. Nicolock Paving Stones of New England, LLC, the court cites § 1630.2(g) parenthetically as support for applying the ADA’s disability standard to the facts, but does not interpret or independently decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Maglietti v. Nicholson, the court recited the regulation as part of the general legal framework for the Rehabilitation Act claim. It did not construe or independently apply § 1630.2; it granted summary judgment because the plaintiff lacked medical evidence and failed to show that her alleged disorder substantially limited a major life activity. opinion →
Dortch v. Memorial Herman Healthcare System-Southwest, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only through Talk to support a list of examples of major life activities. Its decision applies the ADA's disability standard and does not interpret, define, or independently apply this regulation. opinion →
Clements v. HOUSING AUTH. OF BOROUGH OF PRINCETON, the court cites § 1630.2 only alongside the ADA and Title VII statutory definitions, without separately interpreting or applying any regulation-specific language. Its employee-count ruling rests on the statutes and the evidence concerning the Housing Authority’s workforce. opinion →
Kucharski v. Cort Furniture Rental, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(2) only as supporting authority for its ADA analysis of whether the plaintiff's pregnancy-related condition was a disability; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) in a parenthetical describing the direct-threat standard, but expressly declined to reach whether the direct-threat ground justified the employer’s requests. Thus, the statute was not construed or applied as a holding. opinion →
Leeds v. Postmaster Gen U.S., the court cited § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) as authority for a general proposition about reasonable accommodation, but did not construe or independently apply the regulation; the disability claim was resolved on the plaintiff’s lack of qualification and lack of notice/request for accommodation. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ford Motor Credit Co., the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only as supporting authority for the general proposition that modified work schedules may be reasonable accommodations. It does not interpret or apply the regulation; the ruling instead addresses whether the employer's medical inquiry was job-related and subject to ADA confidentiality requirements. opinion →
MacLin v. AMERITECH, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) parenthetically as the source of a general disability standard quoted from Squibb. It does not construe the regulation; the decision applies the ADA standard and prior case law to MacLin’s sitting limitation. opinion →
Brown v. Paulson, the court recites § 1630.2(i)'s examples while setting out the governing disability standard, but it does not construe or independently apply the regulation; its ruling rests on collateral estoppel and the plaintiff's failure to prove the disability claim. opinion →
Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(n) only as a general reference for the definition of essential functions while deciding that the evidence created a factual dispute under Connecticut law; it did not construe or decide what the federal regulation requires. opinion →
Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., the cited regulation is discussed in the dissent's argument about whether the plaintiff's duties were essential. The majority affirmed summary judgment and did not adopt or construe that regulatory discussion. opinion →
Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., the majority did not construe or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; the regulation is discussed only in the dissent’s analysis, which was not adopted as the court’s holding. opinion →
Burgos v. Chertoff, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only as authority for a general list of major life activities in its background discussion. It does not construe the regulation or decide an issue about what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Lee v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3) only in a parenthetical quotation from Gaul within a string cite supporting dismissal of the ADA claims; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
James v. ServiceSource, Inc., the opinion cites § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)–(iii) as support for the Supreme Court’s general description of the ADA’s “substantially limits” requirement, but expressly declines to determine whether the plaintiff’s condition substantially limits a major life activity or whether diabetes is a disability. The citation therefore does not reflect a holding about the regulation. opinion →
Farid v. Bouey, the regulation is cited parenthetically in a footnote as support for the court's discussion of whether perceived-disability discrimination is actionable under ADA Title II and section 504. The court does not construe 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 or decide a rule about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Sánchez-Figueroa v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, the court mentions § 1630.2(o)(3) only in a footnote as background for the medical questionnaire completed by the treating physician. It does not construe the regulation, decide what it requires, or base its judgment on it; the holding instead concerns whether the plaintiff had a substantially limiting, non-temporary impairment under the ADA. opinion →
Sanchez-Figueroa v. de Vida, the court cited § 1630.2(o)(3) in a footnote while noting that an employer may need to engage in an informal, interactive process and gather information from a treating physician. It did not decide what the regulation requires or apply it to resolve the case; the judgment rested on the finding that the plaintiff's impairment was foreseeably temporary and not substantially limiting. opinion →
Edwards v. Tacoma Public Schools, the court cites § 1630.2(g), § 1630.2(m), and § 1630.2(n)(2) only to identify undisputed facts and support the parties' background assertions; it does not interpret or decide what any provision requires. opinion →
Lovely H. v. Eggleston, the court merely recited § 1630.2(i)'s examples of major life activities in a footnote while describing the proposed ADA subclass; it did not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Wright v. Dallas School District, the court expressly declined to address the accommodation and interactive-process requirements under § 1630.2(o)(3), deciding the appeal on the separate ground that Wright had not established that she had a disability. opinion →
Sprague v. Kasa Industrial Controls, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(j) only in a general citation to Aldrich while observing that plaintiff alleged no substantially limited major life activity; it did not construe or apply the regulation's meaning or requirements. opinion →
Shangri-La Ltd. Partnership v. Meade, the court cited § 1630.2(h) and (i) for preliminary, largely undisputed points that a latex allergy is an impairment and breathing is a major life activity. Its dispositive analysis concerned whether the allergy substantially limited breathing under the ADA/HCHR Code, so the regulation was incidental rather than construed or independently applied. opinion →
In Re the Estate of Broderick, the court only repeats the regulation's citation and enumeration within a quotation from Chenoweth while discussing that precedent's treatment of driving; it does not interpret or apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) itself. opinion →
Nadaf-Rahrov v. the Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., the court quoted § 1630.2(c)(2) and § 1630.2(o)(l)(ii) as persuasive ADA guidance while construing California’s FEHA; it did not independently construe or apply the federal regulation. opinion →
Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar Inc, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(3) only as secondary support for the standard stated from Toyota and did not independently interpret or decide the regulation’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
Feliz v. Kintock Group, the court cited § 1630.2(i) only for examples of major life activities while rejecting the pleaded ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for failure to allege a qualifying impairment; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Thompson v. Rice, the court cites § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) in a string cite while reciting the reasonable-accommodation standard; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Basso v. Potter, the court recited the regulatory standard while discussing whether Basso could establish a prima facie disability claim, but expressly stated that it need not decide those issues. Thus, § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) was incidental to the disposition rather than construed or applied as a holding. opinion →
Smith v. Shinseki, the court recited the regulatory definitions as part of the legal standard but did not interpret or decide any issue about what § 1630.2 means or requires. Its ruling rested on the Rehabilitation Act claim elements, constructive-discharge analysis, and the absence of a vacant position for accommodation. opinion →
Rohr v. Salt River Project, the court mentions § 1630.2(i) in a footnote listing examples of major life activities; it does not interpret or apply the regulation as the basis for its ruling, which instead relies on the ADA and Ninth Circuit precedent. opinion →
Detterline v. Salazar, the court cites subsection (i) only to state an undisputed proposition while explaining the scope of the plaintiff's claim; it does not construe, interpret, or decide any issue about what subsection (i) means or requires. opinion →
Nanos v. City of Stamford, the court cites § 1630.2(i) only as passing support for the proposition that working is a major life activity. It does not construe or apply the regulation; its ruling concerns the ADA claim involving alcoholism and attendance standards. opinion →
Keeler v. Florida Department of Health, the court merely recites § 1630.2(i)'s definition of major life activities as background authority; it does not construe the regulation or decide a claim based on its meaning. opinion →
Kemppainen v. Aransas County Detention Center, the court cites § 1630.2 only in a parenthetical reference to Albertson’s while stating that the ADA itself lists seeing as a major life activity; it does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
McLain v. Andersen Corp., the court cites § 1630.2© only as federal guidance while analyzing what counts as a major life activity under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. It does not decide what § 1630.2 means, requires, or how it applies as a federal regulation. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., the court gives the general ADA standard for “substantially limits” and cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) in passing, but the court does not construe, rely on, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
McLain v. Andersen Corporation, etc., the court cited § 1630.2(i) as interpretive guidance for defining “major life activities” under the Minnesota Human Rights Act; it did not construe or apply the federal regulation itself. opinion →
McNamara v. Tourneau, Inc., the court recited the regulatory definitions as background to the ADA prima facie standard, but did not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; it affirmed for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. opinion →
McNamara v. Tourneau, Inc., the court recites the regulatory definitions while setting out the ADA prima facie framework, but does not analyze or construe them; it affirms summary judgment for the reasons stated by the district court. opinion →
Harris v. Mills, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 for the general proposition that an informal interactive process may be necessary, but it did not construe the regulation. It rejected Harris's argument because he had already received hearings and was therefore already reasonably accommodated. opinion →
Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court quotes § 1630.2(o)(3) as background for the existing interactive-process doctrine, but its decision concerns ADA liability and holds that failure to engage in the interactive process alone is not an ADA violation. It does not construe or independently apply this regulation. opinion →
Zeigler v. Potter, the regulation is cited only in describing the plaintiff’s argument. The court resolved the issue by finding no evidence that USPS departed from its normal procedures and did not interpret or apply the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Zeigler v. Potter, the regulation appears only in the plaintiff’s argument about pretext; the court did not construe or decide what § 1630.2(o)(3) requires, resolving the case on the retaliation claim and lack of evidence of retaliatory animus. opinion →
Harris v. Mills, the court cites § 1630.2 in support of a general interactive-process proposition, but does not interpret or apply the regulation; it rejects Harris’s claim because he received hearings and was already reasonably accommodated. opinion →
Castellani v. Bucks County Municipality, the court cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) only as authority for reciting the general definition of a qualified individual; it does not interpret or otherwise decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
McFadden v. Krause, the court cited § 1630.2(g)-(l) only as support for the conclusion that McFadden had not established that she was disabled; it did not interpret, explain, or independently apply the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Loperena v. Scott, the regulation is cited in a footnote while recounting the district court’s ADA analysis and stating the definitions it applied below. The appellate court does not construe or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; it simply affirms for the reasons given in the district court’s order. opinion →
Darcy v. Lippman, the court expressly declined to decide whether commuting is part of working and cited § 1630.2(j)(1) only as supporting authority while resolving the claim on the plaintiff’s allegations; it did not construe or apply the regulation as a holding. opinion →
Darcy v. Lippman, Incidental: the court expressly declined to decide whether commuting is part of the major life activity of working and cited § 1630.2(j)(1) only while explaining that Darcy's allegations did not meet the asserted limitation. opinion →
Castellani v. Bucks County Municipality, the court states the ADA qualified-individual standard and cites 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) only parenthetically through Turner; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and the disposition rests on the absence of an available position for which Castellani was qualified. opinion →
Seil v. Keystone Automotive, Inc., the court recites the regulatory definition while setting out the ADA framework, but it does not interpret or independently apply § 1630.2(h); its disability ruling turns on whether the defendants regarded plaintiff as substantially limited in working or breathing. opinion →
Batlidze v. Harris Beach, LLP, the court cited § 1630.2(n)(2) only parenthetically to identify the regulation as defining essential job functions. It did not construe or apply the regulatory definition; the holding was that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie ADA discrimination case. opinion →
Aguillard v. Gonzales, the court cited § 1630.2(j)(2) only in a parenthetical reproducing its listed factors while discussing the Rehabilitation Act and Supreme Court precedent. It did not construe or independently apply the regulation as a source of a legal rule. opinion →
Graffius v. Mansfield, the regulation appears only in a string cite supporting the quoted definition of “qualified individual”; the court did not separately construe or decide what 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) requires. opinion →
Cooper v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(i) and § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) for background definitions and examples, but it did not construe or independently apply either provision. It assumed arguendo that Cooper had a disability and resolved the ADA claims because he could not perform the essential functions of his job and had not shown a vacant alternative position for which he was qualified. opinion →
Ramos-Echevarría v. Pichis, Inc., the court quoted the regulation’s definition while explaining the ADA disability framework, but did not interpret or independently apply § 1630.2(h)(1) or (h)(2). Its ruling rested on the plaintiff’s failure to identify a major life activity substantially limited by epilepsy. opinion →
Gratzl v. Office of the Chief Judges of the 12th, 18th, 19th & 22nd Judicial Circuits, the court decided the ADA qualification and essential-function issues, but § 1630.2(n)(3) appears only parenthetically in a string citation to Basith. The court did not interpret or independently apply that regulation, so the reference is incidental. opinion →
Boston v. Memorial Medical Center, the court mentions § 1630.2(i) only when describing Boston's argument and the district court's reasoning; the appellate court did not interpret or apply the regulation as an independent holding. opinion →
Boston v. Memorial Medical Center, the regulation is cited only while recounting Boston's argument and the district court's reasoning in the procedural history. The appellate court did not adopt, interpret, or apply § 1630.2(i) as the basis of its decision. opinion →
Hawkins v. Genesys Health Systems, the court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)-(3) in a footnote only as general guidance while analyzing a Michigan PWDCRA claim; it did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the federal regulation. opinion →
Kelly v. Cort Furniture, the regulation is quoted in a footnote as general background that federal guidelines may assist interpretation of the Massachusetts handicap statute. The court did not construe or apply § 1630.2(n)(2) to decide the case; its essential-functions ruling was under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B and relied on the case record and state-law authorities. opinion →
Watts v. United Parcel Service, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical string citation to Wysong supporting the broad-jobs standard; this court did not interpret or independently apply 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. opinion →
Wilkerson v. Shinseki, the court cited § 1630.2(h)(1) and (2) while reciting the disability standard, but expressly assumed rather than decided whether the plaintiff was disabled; the citation was not necessary to the holding. opinion →
Fromm v. MVM, Inc., the court cited § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii) parenthetically as one consideration while deciding that the evidence created a factual dispute about whether unaided hearing was an essential job function. It did not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Trammell v. RAYTHEON MISSILE SYSTEMS, the regulation is cited parenthetically as an authority for the disability definition stated in the plaintiff’s response. The court did not construe or independently decide the meaning or application of § 1630.2(g); it granted summary judgment because Raytheon lacked knowledge of the plaintiff’s depression. opinion →
Emmons v. City University of New York, the court recited examples of major life activities while stating the general ADA and Rehabilitation Act disability framework. It did not construe or independently apply § 1630.2; the dismissal rested on the complaint’s failure to plausibly allege substantial limitations and on the temporary nature of the restrictions. opinion →
Davis v. Nissan North America, Inc., the court mentions 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 only while quoting and summarizing the reasoning of Bennett, a different Tennessee Disability Act case; Davis does not construe or independently apply the regulation to decide this workers’ compensation retaliation appeal. opinion →
Mogenhan v. Napolitano, the regulation appears only in a “See also” footnote quoting the interactive-process language. The court decided the accommodation claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, without construing or independently applying § 1630.2(o)(3); the citation was supporting background on the way to resolving the claim. opinion →
Marrazzo v. Leavitt, the court cites § 1630.2(k) only as secondary authority ('see also') for a formulation taken from Walton while deciding a Rehabilitation Act claim; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
…and 492 more.

Rulemaking authority

Authority for 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 (REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT), which contains this section:

42 U.S.C. 12116 and 12205a of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended.

From the part's authority statement in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR).

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