29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(i) defines disability to include a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Connor v. Maryland Department of Health · filed 2025-04-22(g)(1)(i)

First, Plaintiffs and members of the putative class are individuals with disabilities—specifically, mobility impairments. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 75, 87, 103, 125, 144; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i), (i)(1)(i) (defining “disability” to include “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual[,]” such as “[c]aring for oneself” and “walking”).

Section 1630.2(g)(1) treats a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities as a disability.

Rock v. Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage, Inc. · filed 2025-07-01(g)(1)

Regarding element one, Mr. Rock plausibly alleges that he is a qualified individual with a disability. “[T]he ADA defines a ‘disability’ as including ... aphysical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.””” Akbar-Hussain v. ACCA, Inc., No. 1:16CV1323 (ICC/ADD), 2017 WL 176596, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2017) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) and citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)@)H{iii)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(3)(iii) (“[A]pplying the principles set forth [herein], it should easily be concluded that the following types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated: . .. major depressive order . . . substantially limit[s] brain function.”). Here, Mr. Rock alleges that his Major Depressive Disorder is a condition that “affects [his] ability to sleep, concentrate, think, communicate” if left untreated. (ECF No. 26 | 30 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(a).) As such, Mr. Rock plausibly alleges that he has a disability under the ADA and the VHRA.

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Baldwin v. Cole · filed 2025-09-09(g)

But the complaint does not reasonably include any facts that would indicate whether the alleged neck injury “substantially limits one or more major life activities” within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act for a sufficient period of time so as to qualify as a disability. Cf. Bedford v. Michigan, 722 Fed. Appx. 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2018); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (defining “disability” as “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual”).

Section 1630.2(g)’s definition of disability is distinct from the VA concept of a service-connected disability.

Krafft v. Department of Transportation · filed 2026-01-22(g)

However, a service-connected disability is not the same as a disability for purposes of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

Section 1630.2(g) defines an individual with a disability as someone with a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having one.

Garedo · filed 2026-05-06(g)

An “individual with a disability” is defined as one who: (1) has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;” (2) has “a record of such an impairment;” or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... Thus, Plaintiff has not established that they have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity to be considered an individual with a disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

A foot injury that substantially limits major life activities such as walking can qualify as a disability.

Evans v. Runyon · filed 1997-05-14

Plaintiff has offered evidence that she injured her left foot and could not walk, drive, stand for long periods of time, and so forth. This qualifies as a disability under the law, which defines a disabled person as someone whose “Major Life Activities such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working” are substantially limited.

Under the pre-2009 definition, disability includes an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having one.

Kurowski v. Shinseki · filed 2014-02-18(g)

The ADA defines “disability” as: “(1) [a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) [a] record of such an impairment; or (3) [b]eing regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2007)).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability to include a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, including working.

Olson v. Chao · filed 2019-09-30(g)

The Rehabilitation Act defines "disability" as either "(a) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment." Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)). ... Plaintiff has met her burden of establishing that she suffered physical and mental impairments, and the impairments substantially limited her ability to work, which is a "major life activity."

Deafness qualifies as a disability under the ADA.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. · filed 2020-01-16(i)

As to the first element of the prima facie case, Kess has a recognized disability under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau, 923 F.Supp. 720, 743 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that “hearing loss approaching deafness” is a disability under the ADA).

An impairment must substantially limit a major life activity for it to qualify as a disability under the ADA.

Witcher v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2023-03-23(j)(1)(ii)

Having reviewed this portion of the R&R, this Court finds no clear error in Judge Netburn’s conclusion that Witcher has not adequately alleged that her anxiety and depression were disabling within the meaning of the ADA, much less that anyone at DOE was aware that she suffered from such disabilities. There is no indication in any of Witcher’s numerous pleadings that when she mentioned her anxiety and depression to Superintendent Sherman, she indicated that these conditions rose to the level of a disability under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; evidence of such a limitation can raise a fact issue.

Hagood v. County of El Paso · filed 2013-05-22(g)

A “disability” is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). ... Viewing, as we must, the evidence in Hagood’s favor, Dr. Penninck’s form presents more than a scintilla of evidence that Hagood suffers from a physical impairment that substantially impairs a major life activity.

Qualification for FMLA leave alone does not establish that a person has a disability under § 1630.2(g).

Hardy v. United States Postal Service · filed 2014-11-07(g)

Contrary to the appellant’s apparent assumption on review, the fact that she qualified for FMLA leave does not establish that she was an ... individual with a disability, i.e., that she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity, that she has a record of such an impairment, or that she was regarded as having such an impairment.

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(i) covers an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Miller v. Department of Defense · filed 2023-08-02(g)(1)(i)

We disagree, and we find that the appellant has shown that he is disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i), because his knee condition substantially limits him in one or more major life activities.

For an actual impairment, § 1630.2(g) requires facts showing a substantial limitation of a major life activity; alleging a permanent medical condition alone is insufficient.

Mamaril · filed 2026-04-13(g)

Although Plaintiff states his disability is a “[p]ermanent medical condition,” he does not plead any details about his medical condition nor does he allege that it limits any major life activities.

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Osborne v. Elmer · filed 2004-08-05(g)

The Court finds that plaintiffs disability discrimination claims must be dismissed as a matter of law because plaintiffs condition does not meet, nor does it come within, the definition of “disability” under the Rehabilitation Act. ... Having a disability under the Act means either (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.

Section 1630.2(g) requires an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity to qualify as a disability.

Pinto v. Massapequa Public Schools · filed 2011-10-19(g)

Upon review of the facts in this case, the court holds that Plaintiffs failure to make the requisite showing as to substantial limitation is fatal to her claim.

Section 1630.2(g)(1) defines disability to include a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; allegations of spinal cord damage, wheelchair use, and limited walking sufficiently plead a disability.

Lugo v. 141 NW 20th Street Holdings, LLC, Plum Park, II, LLC · filed 2012-06-29(g)(1)

Plaintiff has alleged that he is disabled due to permanent damage to his spinal cord and a broken neck, uses a wheelchair to ambulate, and is substantially limited in performing the major life activity of walking. (Compl. ¶ 3.) The Court finds that this allegation meets the pleading requirement of demonstrating that Plaintiff is a disabled individual. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)® (“disability means, with respect to an individual!,] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual”); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“major life activities include ... walking. .. .”).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability to include a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; severe dyslexia and ADHD can meet that definition.

Karlik v. Colvin · filed 2014-03-18(g)

The Court agrees that Plaintiffs diagnoses render him disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff suffers from extreme dyslexia and ADHD, among other mental impairments. A disability is defined as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

Section 1630.2(g)(1) defines disability to include a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; an allegation that a person can walk only ten to fifteen feet without rest or assistance sufficiently pleads disability.

Ferguson v. CHC VII, Ltd. · filed 2014-11-16(g)(1)

Ferguson has alleged that he is disabled and is “only capable of walking very short distances and is only able to ambulate about ten to fifteen feet at a time without resting or requiring assistance.” (Doc. # 1 at 2). The Court finds that this allegation meets the pleading requirement of demonstrating that Plaintiff is a disabled individual. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)® (“disability means, with respect to an individual^] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual”); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“major life activities include ... walking ....”).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability; a claimant relying on a physical condition must establish a physical impairment.

ElHelbawy v. Department of Commerce · filed 2015-06-16(g)

We find, moreover, that the administrative judge properly held that the appellant did not prove her disability discrimination claim because, based on the medical reports in the record from the appellant’s various medical providers, she ... failed to show that she was suffering from a physical impairment and thus she did not establish that she was an individual with a disability under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

Section 1630.2(g) defines disability to include a substantially limiting impairment, a record of one, or being regarded as having one; an alleged visual impairment can suffice at the pleading stage without specifying the category.

Harrison v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2021-03-09(g)

Despite this lack of detail, the Court, reading Harrison’s pleadings liberally—and noting that Wells Fargo does not contest whether Harrison has a disability as defined by the ADA—finds that he has alleged facts that suffice, at this procedural posture, to show his “visual impairment” constitutes a disability under the ADA.

The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly, and a permanent knee impairment restricting bending or squatting can create a factual dispute over whether a person is disabled.

Thomas v. City of Annapolis, Maryland · filed 2021-03-12(j)(1)(i)

“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and is “not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... But under the broader definition of disability under the ADAAA, the record evidence shows that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Thomas is disabled under the ADA. Three of the four doctors who examined Thomas determined that he had a permanent knee impairment and should, at a minimum, avoid bending and squatting. Thus, the district court erred in holding that Thomas wasn’t disabled as a matter of law.

An impairment is a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Ulloa v. Nevada Gold Mines LLC · filed 2024-02-22(j)(1)(ii)

“[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii). ... There was no information available on October 16 indicating that he suffered from a physical impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, such as his ability to work.

Section 1630.2(r)(1)-(4) requires a direct-threat determination to consider the duration, nature and severity, likelihood, and imminence of the risk, making mitigating measures relevant to that analysis.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2025-09-18(r)(1)-(4)

Analyzing a defendant’s “direct threat” defense is a multifactored undertaking, considering (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the possible harm; (3) the likelihood of the harm materializing; and (4) the imminence of the harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)(1)-(4). Complete consideration of these factors—particularly the likelihood and imminence of the potential harm occurring—cannot be done without discovery on mitigating measures. It would be impossible for a court or jury to analyze Union Pacific’s “direct threat” defense without also knowing whether there were other safeguards in place to protect against missed-signal train accidents.

Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and an individualized assessment of the person’s present ability to perform the job’s essential functions.

Lisby v. Tarkett, Inc. · filed 2020-03-31(r)

An employer must decide whether an employee poses a direct threat “‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job,’ reached after considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (quoting 29 CFR § 1630.2(r)). ... So a reasonable jury could doubt that Tarkett relied on the “best available objective evidence” or an “individualized assessment of [Mr. Lisby’s] present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the [cycle counter] job” in deciding that he posed a direct threat. See 29 CFR § 1630.2(r); Lowe v. Alabama Power Co., 244 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that “particularized facts using the best available objective evidence as required by the regulations” did not support that an employee posed a direct threat because the employer relied in part on a doctor’s “assumption that all double amputees have the same limitations,” the doctor did not assess the employee’s “actual capabilities through a physical examination or functionality test,” and conducted only a “‘cursory’ examination of the employee”).

The direct-threat defense requires an individualized, objectively supported assessment of whether the employee can safely perform the job without significant risk of harm.

Campbell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2020-09-04(r)

Employers must make an individualized assessment to determine whether an individual has a “present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... The Court finds that there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether Union Pacific conducted a sufficiently individualized assessment of Campbell’s ability to perform the essential functions of the Trainman position. ... Campbell’s expert opinion evidence “is itself sufficient to create a genuine issue of disputed fact” as to whether Union Pacific’s decision that Campbell posed a direct threat was “based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1270; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).

Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized assessment supported by reasonable medical judgment and the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of potential harm.

ANDERSON v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY · filed 2021-03-31(r)

The four factors to consider in the direct threat analysis are: “(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Upon consideration of the objective evidence, the Court finds that these factors support the finding that Anderson was a direct threat and, therefore, not otherwise qualified.

The direct-threat defense requires an individualized assessment of the person's present ability to safely perform essential job functions, based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.

Baker v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2022-01-18(r)

The defense “must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job,’ reached after considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended.” Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86 (quoting 29 CFR § 1630.2(r) (2001)). ... The Court finds that there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether Union Pacific conducted a sufficiently individualized assessment of Baker’s ability to perform the essential functions of his position and whether its restrictions were reasonable.

Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment of the individual's ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job when evaluating a direct threat.

Huntley v. Watts Electric Company · filed 2022-07-13(r)

A direct threat evaluation requires "an individual assessment of the individual's ability to perform safely the essential functions of the job." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... Although a direct threat to the safety of Huntley may be a nondiscriminatory reason for ending the employment, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the safety concerns were merely pretext for disability discrimination.

Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm and requires an individualized assessment based on reasonable medical judgment, current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, and four specified factors.

Baldwin v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2024-09-25(r)

Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: ... (1) The duration of the risk; ... (4) The imminence of the potential harm. ... Taken as a whole, this is sufficient to demonstrate that Union Pacific undertook a timely, individualized assessment and concluded Baldwin posed a direct threat to safety based on the required factors.

Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability, current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence, and the specified risk factors; a slightly increased, speculative, or remote risk is insufficient.

Hurd v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2025-03-04(r)

The direct threat assessment must be “based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job” and “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. In making this judgment, U.P. must have considered: “(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). It is not enough for U.P. to show “slightly increased risk” or a “speculative or remote risk” when applying these factors. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Instead, U.P. must show Hurd “poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of substantial harm.” Id.

Section 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation and requires an individualized, medically supported assessment of the person's present ability to perform essential job functions.

Johnson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2025-04-30(r)

“Direct threat” means “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). A determination that an individual poses a direct threat requires an “individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job” and this assessment must also “be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. ... While Union Pacific is correct that an in-person exam is not mandatory, whether or not Union Pacific physicians personally examined Johnson may be relevant to whether the fitness-for-duty process was sufficiently “individualized,” see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), and thus, the Court will not prohibit Johnson from referencing the lack of an in-person evaluation as a factor in this inquiry.

Section 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat determination to rest on an individualized, evidence-based assessment and four specified risk factors.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hospital Housekeeping Systems, LLC · filed 2026-05-06(r)

The determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). ... However, HHS fails to explain anywhere in its filings which part(s) of the lengthy chain shows an individualized assessment of Mr. Springfield’s blindness and the impact it might have on his ability (at that time) to safely perform the essential functions of his job. In the absence of any such analysis, HHS fails to show summary judgment should be granted on this basis as a matter of law or fact.

Section 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment of whether an employee posed a direct threat at the time of removal.

West v. BNSF Railway Co · filed 2024-11-01(r)

But even if the Court agreed with BNSF, BNSF was still required to make an individualized assessment that West posed a direct threat at the time of removal.

An individualized direct-threat assessment may require a medical examination when regular workplace bleeding makes the assessment impossible without one.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Prevo's Family Market, Inc. · filed 1998-04-23(r)

As we stated earlier, there was evidence at trial that the type of assessment authorized in the statute and regulation of an employee in an environment in which there was bleeding could not have been made without a medical examination.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) directs courts to focus primarily on whether covered entities met their obligations and discrimination occurred, rather than on whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Sullivan v. Storer Transit Systems · filed 2020-03-31(j)(1)(iii)

This is not an overly demanding standard—since amendments to the ADA in 2008, “‘[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred,’ rather than ‘whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.’” Hoppman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 774 F. App’x 418, 419 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)). Even so, some allegation regarding the effects of Sullivan’s impairments is necessary to determine whether she is disabled within the meaning of the statute, and also to determine whether the driver’s refusal to allow her to sit in the section of the bus reserved for people with disabilities constituted denial of equal access to a public accommodation.

Broad construction of the term “substantially limits” does not eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff allege facts showing an actual substantial limitation qualifying as a disability.

Moore v. Centralized Management Services, LLC · filed 2020-04-28(j)(1)(i)

Moore’s argument is unavailing. To be sure, the Court in its Order & Reasons expressly acknowledged that “[t]he ADA’s implementing regulations explain that the phrase ‘substantially limits’ is broadly construed in favor of expansive coverage.”26 But the directive that the ADA “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage” does not absolve a plaintiff from alleging facts as would satisfy the basic threshold requirement of qualifying as disabled under the ADA. Plaintiffs cannot merely assert they are disabled or assert that alcoholism is a disability per se under the ADA, as Moore did in his complaint,27 and expect that the ADA’s broad coverage will reach them.

The regulation calls for a broad construction of “substantially limits” when determining whether an impairment is a disability.

Andrews v. Tri Star Sports and Entertainment Group, Inc. · filed 2023-07-06(j)(1)(i)

Under the 2008 amendments to the ADA, Congress made clear that the definitions of both a “disabled person” and “substantially limits” are to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage. See § 12102(4)(A), (B); see also 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... The Court agrees with the reasoning in Gergen, however, that sporadic episodes of difficulty breathing due to asthma when the individual is exposed to an irritant is not sufficient to demonstrate that the asthma substantially limited the individual’s breathing so as to qualify as a disability under the ADA.

The regulation measures substantial limitation against most people in the general population and requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Moore v. Centralized Management Services, LLC · filed 2020-02-28(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i)

The phrase “substantially limits” is interpreted with respect to a person’s ability “‘to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’” Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). ... The ADA’s implementing regulations explain that the phrase “substantially limits” is broadly construed in favor of expansive coverage, but that whether an individual’s “impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) & (iv).

The regulation requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, comparing its impact with that on the general population, and usually does not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.

Watkins v. Shriners Hospitals for Children, Inc. · filed 2020-05-08(j)(1)(iv), (j)(1)(v)

Nevertheless, “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). ... The relevant inquiry is how the impairment impacts the claimant’s life activity, in comparison with the general population. Barlia, 721 F. App’x at 446. “[U]sually [this comparison] will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v)); cf. Baum v. Metro Restoration Servs., Inc., 764 F. App’x 543, 546 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the plaintiff could not establish an actual disability without expert testimony “because his impairments, unlike more common or less complicated ones, require[d] medical knowledge to understand”).

The regulation requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity; a cancer diagnosis alone does not establish disability.

Helwig · filed 2026-01-15(j)(1)(iv), (j)(3)

However, to show a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether a medical diagnosis limits a major life activity, a plaintiff must perform an individualized assessment, evidencing specific facts as to why plaintiff’s disability substantially limits a major life activity, even when the limitation seems self-explanatory. ... Even though cancer will qualify as a disabling disability in most cases, an individual assessment is nevertheless necessary to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity or body function. Alston, 679 F. App'x at 172; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). It is insufficient to merely state that cancer qualifies as a disability. ... Helwig fails to specify how her melanoma limited one or more of her life activities, only that cancer substantially limits a major life activity “on its face” according to regulations implementing the ADAAA. (Doc. 1, ¶ 15–16; Doc. 57, at 25); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). ... Helwig fails to provide even minimal evidence that her cancer diagnosis substantially limited any major life activity at all times relevant to this litigation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv); see Alston, 679 Fed. App’x at 172–73; see Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 567; see also Lloyd, 288 Fed. Appx. at 788 (citations omitted). Therefore, there is no genuine issue of disability discrimination or harassment for trial, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgement on Counts I and VI is GRANTED. (Doc. 42).

The regulation recognizes musculoskeletal impairments as potential disabilities and provides that regarded-as coverage does not require a substantial limitation, but requires the employer to actually perceive a physical impairment; mere knowledge of symptoms is insufficient.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. LOFLIN FABRICATIONS, LLC · filed 2020-05-22(h)(1), (g)(3), (l)

Conditions that affect the musculoskeletal system are among the impairments that can give rise to a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1); ... If Ms. Shrock proceeds under the “regarded as” prong, the EEOC need not show an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3), but an employer’s “[m]ere knowledge of symptoms alone is not sufficient proof that an employer regarded an employee as disabled.” ... The employer must actually perceive that the employee has a physical impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l). In other words, the focus remains on the employer’s perception of Ms. Shrock’s functional limits, even if these limits would not otherwise amount to an actual disability. ... An employer’s knowledge that an employee has neck pain and takes medication for it is insufficient to prove that the employer “regarded” the employee as disabled.

Section 1630.2 recognizes disability coverage for an actual disability or a record of disability, defines when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and directs that “substantially limits” be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.

Watson v. Kelloggs Co. · filed 2020-05-26(g)(2), (j)(2), (j)(1), (k)(1)

“Disability” under the ADA means that the individual (a) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (b) has a record of such an impairment; or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). “An individual may establish coverage under any one or more of these three prongs of the definition of disability....” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). ... “An impairment is a disability … if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). ... “An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1).

Section 1630.2(g)(2) covers an employee whom the employer regards as having a physical or mental impairment, without requiring proof that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

EEOC v. West Meade Place, LLP · filed 2021-02-08(g)(2)

Accordingly, to state the threshold condition of a ‘regarded as’ ADA claim, an employee need only show that their employer believed they had a ‘physical or mental impairment,’ as that term is defined in federal regulations.

Section 1630.2(l) covers a person whom a covered entity treats as having a substantially limiting impairment, even when the person has no such impairment or the impairment does not substantially limit major life activities.

UMBRIA v. VALLEY FORGE CASINO RESORT · filed 2022-02-18(l)

Under the ADA, person is “regarded as” disabled if the person: (1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by the covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) Has [no such impairment] but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)) (alterations in original). ... Plaintiff does not point to additional facts in the record to support the argument that Defendants treated Plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially limits major life activities. Additionally, Plaintiff points to no evidence that Defendants perceived Plaintiff as being unable to perform his job duties. ... As Plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute of fact with respect to whether Plaintiff has a disability under the ADA’s definition, Plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case as a matter of law.

The regulation treats placement on involuntary leave as an adverse action, but does not extend that rule to refusal to reinstate after voluntary leave or continued paid leave.

Carter v. Ascend Performance Materials Holdings, Inc. · filed 2022-09-26(l)(1)

However, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) provides that “placement on involuntary leave” is an adverse action but provides no guidance with respect to an employer’s refusal to reinstate after voluntary leave or continued paid leave, nor is the court aware of any case law extending this regulation’s prohibition on “placement on involuntary leave” to such circumstances. Therefore, even if the magistrate judge had analyzed Plaintiff’s claim under all three definitions of disability, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) provides no safe harbor for Plaintiff and the magistrate judge’s ultimate finding that continued paid leave does not constitute an adverse employment action would have been the same.

A person claiming disability under the regarded-as definition does not have to show that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Allstate Beverage Company, LLC · filed 2023-01-11(j)(2)

And, unlike an individual alleging an actual disability or record of impairment, an individual alleging a regarded-as disability does not have to show that his “impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).

Subsection (l)(1) treats an individual as having a disability when a covered entity regards an impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity, even if it does not actually do so.

Williams v. Spire · filed 2023-10-05(l)(1)

“To be regarded as disabled under the ADA, an individual must show that she has an impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation.” Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1). ... Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she was regarded as being disabled because her supervisors believe she was “slow.” Being perceived as slow at one’s job does not equate to being perceived as intellectually disabled or substantially limited in a major life activity, such as thinking or learning. Plaintiff also alleges that a supervisor raised her voice when speaking to her. Again, this allegation is insufficient to draw an inference that Spire regarded Plaintiff as disabled. The fact that a supervisor used a raised voice does not signify Defendant believed Plaintiff was deaf or mentally impaired, or that Plaintiff was substantially limited in a major life activity, such as hearing, thinking, or learning. Even liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint and accepting the allegations as true, the Court cannot draw a reasonable inference from the Complaint that Spire regarded Plaintiff as being disabled.”

The current version of § 1630.2(l) does not require that an employer perceive an impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity for the employee to be regarded as having a disability.

Bardell v. Banyan Delaware LLC · filed 2023-10-16(l)

The current version of the applicable regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l), does not include any of the language that the defendants quote from the regulation. It appears that the defendants quotation at page 7, paragraph 17, of their motion to dismiss is quoting the pre-amendment version of the regulation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (1996).

The regarded-as prong covers an employee subjected to an ADA-prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not both transitory and minor; it does not require that the impairment actually or apparently substantially limit a major life activity.

Lemay v. UCMS, LLC · filed 2024-05-21(g)(iii), (l)

An individual is considered “disabled” if she is “regarded as having such an impairment . . . This means that the individual has been subjected to an action prohibited by the ADA as amended because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not both ‘transitory and minor.’” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(iii). Under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of “disability,” it is the perception of an action or perceived physical impairment that matters, not whether the plaintiff actually has an impairment that “substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l).

An individual is regarded as having a disability when an employer takes prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment, whether or not the employer perceives it to limit a major life activity.

Rocha v. Coastal Carolina Neuropsychiatric Crisis Services, P.A. · filed 2013-10-16(l)(1)

Under section 12102(3), which Congress added in the ADAAA, an individual bringing' a “regarded as” claim need only show that an employer subjected him to an action that the ADA prohibits because of an actual or perceived impairment regardless of whether the employer perceived the impairment to limit the individual in a major life activity.

An employee is regarded as disabled when an employer acts because of an actual or perceived impairment; remarks that an employee is not 100% and should write things down do not establish a perceived mental impairment.

You v. Longs Drugs Stores California, LLC · filed 2013-03-27(l)(1)

You thus fails to identify any qualifying perceived disability for purposes of her ADA claim. That is, being told you are not 100% and that you need to write things down is insufficient to establish that Longs or McKeown regarded her as having a. mental disability for purposes of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(ix) treats the six-month duration limit as the “transitory” part of the separate “transitory and minor” exception, so an impairment must also be independently minor.

Eshleman v. Patrick Industries Inc · filed 2020-05-29(j)(ix)

In addition, the regulations refer to the time limitation as “[t]he six-month ‘transitory’ part of the ‘transitory and minor’ exception,” making absolutely clear the distinction between “transitory” and “minor.”

Section 1630.2 treats a concussion that is both transitory and minor, with no lasting limitations, as outside regarded-as disability coverage.

DOMINGUEZ v. EAGLE RIVER HOMES, LLC · filed 2025-04-15

“Examples of temporary, non-disabling impairments include: broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. ... Accordingly the evidence shows that Dominguez’s impairment was both transitory and minor, precluding her regarded-as claim as a matter of law.

An impairment that substantially limits a major life activity can qualify as a disability even if it is transitory and minor.

Gogos v. AMS-Mechanical System, Incorpo · filed 2013-12-16(j)(1)(ix)

Under the 2008 amendments, a person with an ... impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or a record of one, is disabled, even if the impairment is “transitory and minor” (defined as lasting six months or less). See id. § 12102(3)(B) (Only paragraph (1)(C) of the definition of disability “shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).

Section 1630.2(j) requires that “substantially limits” be construed broadly and defines an impairment as a disability when it substantially limits an individual's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Smith-Haynie v. United States Veterans Initiative · filed 2020-06-01(j)(1)(i) and (j)(1)(ii)

The “term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). An impairment is a disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Smith-Haynie fails to plead any facts to show that her shoulder injury substantially limits a major life activity. She pleads only that she attended weekly physical therapy sessions after her shoulder injury, and no other limitations on her life.

Section 1630.2 defines major life activities and directs that bipolar disorder should ordinarily be found to substantially limit brain function; an episodic impairment qualifies if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.

Robles v. Medisys Health Network, Inc. · filed 2020-06-19(i)(1)(i), (j), (j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(iii), (j)(1)(iv), (j)(1)(vii), (j)(3)(ii), (j)(3)(iii)

In this case, Robles has alleged sufficient facts to make it plausible that he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA—that is, that he has a mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). ... Moreover, the EEOC regulations instruct that I should “easily” conclude that bipolar disorder substantially limits brain function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). Especially considering that this case is at the pleading stage—where the face of the First Amended Complaint need only permit me to draw the reasonable inference that Robles was disabled—and considering the regulations’ direction, I conclude that the First Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Robles has an ADA-covered disability. ... Accordingly, it is plausible that Robles’s impairment is at least “episodic,” in which case it “is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) treats post-traumatic stress disorder as an impairment that will, at a minimum, substantially limit major life activities.

Tennant v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-08-03(j)(3)(iii)

That workplace stressors trigger episodic symptoms of plaintiff’s PTSD does not disqualify that disorder as a disability under the ADA. Moreover, EEOC regulations make clear that “it should be easily be concluded” that “post-traumatic stress disorder” is in the class of impairments that “will, at a minimum substantially limit . . . major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

Section 1630.2(j)(ii) requires an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity to qualify as a disability, while §§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) and (o)(3) define reasonable accommodations and contemplate an informal interactive process to identify limitations and possible accommodations.

JANE DOE v. DUNKIN' DONUTS · filed 2020-07-16(j)(ii), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

“While “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered limiting,” it is also the case that “not every impairment will constitute a disability” under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii); see Koller, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (“[E]ven under the relaxed ADAAA standards, a plaintiff is still required to plead a substantially limiting impairment.”). ... However, at this stage of the litigation, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court will accept that her HIV diagnosis constitutes a disability under the ADA. ... “Reasonable accommodations” are defined as “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... The applicable regulations further provide that [t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). ... Doe has adequately pleaded claims of failure to accommodate based on disability. ... Finally, the Court is satisfied that Doe has alleged that she could have been accommodated.

A person with a learning disability may be substantially limited in reading, writing, speaking, or learning despite high academic achievement when extra time or effort is required.

Ramsay v. National Board of Medical Exam · filed 2020-07-31(j)(4)(iii)

Nonetheless, DOJ has issued an identical regulation. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 36.105(d)(3)(iii), with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(iii). Thus, there was no legal error “infecting” the Court’s weighing of experts.

Section 1630.2 defines physical impairment by reference to specified body systems, treats an impairment as substantially limiting without requiring severe restriction, recognizes cancer as substantially limiting normal cell growth, and defines a record of disability as a history of an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity.

STEPANOVICH v. KEN CORBETT FARMS LLC · filed 2020-12-17(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(3)(iii), and (k)(1)

The ADA defines a physical or mental impairment as a disorder or condition affecting one or more of the following body systems: “neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory . . ., cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... To be considered substantially limiting, the impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) “The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.” Id. at § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). ... The parties agree that Plaintiff’s prostate cancer diagnosis qualifies as a physical impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“[C]ancer substantially limits normal cell growth. . . .”). However, Plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to establish that this impairment limited his ability to perform any major life activity. ... Federal regulations provide, “An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of . . . a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). ... Plaintiff thus has not demonstrated a record of a physical impairment to satisfy the first prong of his prima facie case.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines a physical impairment as a physiological disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, and § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires substantial-limitation analysis to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.

Innes v. County of Warren · filed 2023-05-23(h)(1), (j)(1)(i)

A physical impairment is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... In determining whether a physical impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity, courts must “construe[] [the term] broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... However, Plaintiff does not specify which medical condition causes the allergic reactions, nor does she offer symptoms caused by the allergic reaction other than her face swelling. Such allegations do not “nudge[] [her] claim[]” that she has a physical impairment “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines a physical impairment by reference to a physiological disorder or condition affecting a body system, while § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) requires the impairment to substantially limit a major life activity to constitute a disability.

SWANSON v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY · filed 2024-11-15(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

A physical impairment means "any physiological disorder or condition… affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal… respiratory (including speech organs) …, immune, [and] circulatory" systems. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Conditions that are episodic or in remission may qualify if they "would substantially limit a major life activity when active." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii). Although an impairment that "substantially limits" is construed broadly, not every impairment constitutes a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The impairment must limit a "major life activity."

Section 1630.2 treats physiological or anatomical conditions affecting body systems as physical impairments and requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly, so a plaintiff need not show that an impairment prevents or severely restricts a major life activity to plead a disability.

Dixon v. City of New York · filed 2025-01-07(h), (j)(1)(i)

First, although impairment is not defined in the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, guidance issued by the EEOC provides that physical and mental impairments include: (1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability (formerly termed “mental retardation”), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h); see also, e.g., Laface, 2020 WL 2489774, at *10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) in determining whether a plaintiff suffered from an “impairment”). ... In this case, the plaintiff alleges that she suffered from a physical impairment within the meaning of the ADA. She allegedly experienced an “anatomical loss affecting” her “musculoskeletal system” when she initially injured her hand. Specifically, she alleges that three fingers of her middle hand were “impacted” and “crushed” by a door and that her arm was in a splint. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 44. Subsequently, in attempting to open the control room door, she sustained further injuries to her back, neck, spine, right hand, right wrist, and right shoulder and rotator cuff. Id. ¶ 45. ... In light of EEOC guidance providing that the term, “substantially limits,” “shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage,” the plaintiff has alleged plausibly that her ability to work was substantially limited. See § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) treats “substantially limits” as a non-demanding standard, while §§ 1630.2(k)(1) and (k)(2) define a record of impairment and require broad construction to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA.

Weaver v. Vistra Corp. dba Luminent Mining · filed 2025-03-25(j)(1)(i), (k)(1), (k)(2)

Indeed, “‘[s]ubstantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... The Complaint therefore inferences that Plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited a major life activity. ... An individual has a “record of [] an impairment” if he “has as a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1); see also Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1998). Additionally, courts must broadly construe the term “to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). ... The Court understands that Sherrod supports—not negates—a finding of a record of impairment if a plaintiff takes a disability-related leave of absence. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff adequately pled that he has a “record” of impairment.

The regulation defines physical impairment broadly and treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a major life activity compared with most people, without requiring prevention or severe restriction.

Federman · filed 2026-03-16(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

A physical impairment is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems.” 4 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... To qualify as a disability, an impairment must “substantially limit[] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population”; but “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Reading the Complaint to “rais[e] the strongest arguments it suggests,” Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that arthritis in his hands is a physical impairment and that this impairment substantially limits his ability to type.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) defines a physical impairment as a physiological disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, and § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) requires that the impairment substantially limit a major life activity compared with most people while not requiring prevention or severe restriction of that activity.

McNeill · filed 2026-03-24(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

A physical impairment is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... To qualify as a disability, an impairment must “substantially limit[] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population;” but “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) requires consideration of the time spent performing a function, while § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) recognizes job restructuring as a possible reasonable accommodation without requiring removal or reassignment of essential functions.

Copenhaver v. Baxter International, Inc. · filed 2021-01-05(n)(3), (o)(2)(ii)

The statute provides that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of the job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (requiring consideration of the amount of time spent performing the function). ... Regulations under the ADA provide that “job restructuring” may be a “reasonable accommodation” required of the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). The ADA does not require an employer to exempt an employee from performing essential functions or to reallocate essential functions to other employees. See 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. (“An employer or other covered entity may restructure a job by reallocating or redistributing nonessential, marginal job functions.”); Dark, 451 F.3d at 1089.

Section 1630.2(n)(2) identifies circumstances showing that a job function is essential, and § 1630.2(o) does not require an employer to reallocate essential functions to other employees.

Jones v. Fairfax County School Board · filed 2025-10-03(n)(2), (o)

“A job function is essential when the reason the position exists is to perform that function, when there aren’t enough employees available to perform the function, or when the function is so specialized that someone is hired specifically because of his or her expertise in performing that function.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 579 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)). ... In other words, an employer cannot be forced to “reallocate essential functions” to other employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) app. (2024); see also Tartaro-McGowan, 91 F.4th at 165; EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, 616 F. App’x 588, 593 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). But that is exactly what Appellant asserts the school should have done. Thus, this argument fails.

Section 1630.2(o)(4) places the burden on the employer to respond to an employee's request for a reasonable accommodation.

Burnett v. Ocean Properties, Ltd. · filed 2021-02-02(o)(4)

Appellants point the finger at Burnett for not following up on his request for push-button, automatic doors despite seeing Darsaoui regularly at work, but the burden is on the employer to respond to the request for an accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential functions as fundamental job duties, excludes marginal functions, and uses nonexclusive, non-dispositive factors to assess whether a function is essential.

Meyer v. DynCorp International, LLC · filed 2020-09-14(n)(1), (n)(2)(i)-(iii), (n)(3)(i), (n)(3)(iii), (n)(3)(vi)

None of the seven factors is dispositive, and not all of them will be relevant in every case.

The regulation defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job, excludes marginal duties, and treats the employer’s judgment and written job description as evidence of those functions.

Wolf v. Discover Financial Services Incorporated · filed 2021-02-08(n)(1), (n)(2)(i)-(iii)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” ... “Examining all the evidence, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute that phone work is an essential function of the Senior Fraud Analyst position. Thus, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform phone work to be considered qualified for the job in question.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position.

Rose v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2021-02-22(n)(1)

The “‘essential functions’ are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position.’” McBee v. Team Indus., Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222, 230-31 (Minn. 2019) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential functions as fundamental job duties, excludes marginal duties, and makes a written job description one factor among several types of evidence rather than dispositive.

Thompson v. Hendrickson USA, LLC · filed 2021-03-05(n)

In addition, the regulations are clear that a job description is one type of evidence that can be submitted (for mandatory consideration by the court), and that other evidence also can be submitted and considered. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).

Essential functions are the fundamental duties of a job, rather than marginal tasks, and the court evaluates them using the regulation’s relevant factors.

Egan v. Local 363, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union · filed 2021-03-22(n)(1) (n)

Essential functions constitute “‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’” Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1996)).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines a job’s essential functions as its fundamental duties, rather than marginal functions.

DEPACE v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY · filed 2021-04-12(n)(1)

In general terms, the “essential functions” of a position are the “fundamental job duties,” as opposed to the “marginal functions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

A job function may be essential when the limited number of available employees prevents distributing that function among them.

Scioneaux v. Southeastern Grocers · filed 2021-06-11(n)(2)(ii)

Morris’s testimony highlights that plaintiff’s lifting functions were essential because of the limited number of employees available to perform them. See also R. Doc. 54-10 at 38 (Lashouto Deposition at 143:6-13) (referring to the “already lean staff” at Winn-Dixie); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (“[A] function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.”).

The regulation defines reasonable accommodation as modifications or adjustments that provide equal employment benefits and privileges, gives examples such as modified schedules, and contemplates an informal interactive process to assess accommodation when an initial request is denied.

Limauro v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. · filed 2021-02-09(o)(1)(iii), (o)(2), and (o)(3)

A “reasonable accommodation” generally means, “Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o) (1) (iii). It may include, “Job restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position” or “other similar accommodations.” Id. at § 1630.2 (o) (2). ... If an employer denies a plaintiff’s initial request for accommodation, “it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process,” with the employee, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o) (3), whereby the two “work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated.” Jackan v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000). Whether the employer definitively failed to accommodate a reasonable request will be evaluated in light of the interactive process.

Section 1630.2(o)(1) defines reasonable accommodation as modifications or adjustments enabling a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position, including job restructuring or reassignment to a vacant position.

Carr v. United States Steel Corporation · filed 2021-03-15(o)(1)

According to the amended ADA’s implementing regulations, “[t]he term reasonable accommodation means . . . [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment . . . that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position,” and may include job restructuring or reassignment to a vacant position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)-(2).

Section 1630.2(o) does not make an accommodation reasonable if it requires eliminating an essential job function.

Brownlow v. Alfa Vision Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-22(o)

A request for an accommodation “is not reasonable if it requires eliminating an ‘essential’ function of the job.” Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1039 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).

An accommodation is reasonable when it enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Robinson v. County of Cook, IL · filed 2021-03-26

Under the ADA, an accommodation is “reasonable” if it “enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position” to perform them. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014).

The regulation identifies major life activities and physical or mental impairments, and an impairment qualifies as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity; not every impairment qualifies.

Cochran v. Boar's Head Provisions Company Inc · filed 2021-02-10(i), (j)(1)(ii), (h)(1)

The definition of disability “is virtually the same in both [the ADA and ACRA]: substantial limitation in a major life activity.” ... ‘Major life activities’ includes ‘caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working,’ Conant v. City of Hibbing, 271 F.3d 782, 784 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)), as well as “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). ... Though the ADA and the ACRA have broad definitions of disability, “not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of [the ADA and its regulations].” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Cochran alleged a chronic or remitting/relapsing condition that qualifies as a “physical or mental impairment” because it is a “physiological . . . condition . . . or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems,” including Ms. Cochran’s neurological and musculoskeletal systems (Dkt. No. 10, at 11). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have presented sufficient allegations to support a finding that Ms. Cochran had an actual disability under the ACRA. At this stage of the litigation, the Court determines that plaintiffs have plead plausibly that Ms. Cochran is actually disabled under the ACRA.

An impairment can qualify as a disability even when it does not completely or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity.

Tennyson v. County of Sacramento · filed 2021-05-26(j)(1)(ii)

An impairment may be a “disability” under the ADA even if it does not completely or even “significantly or severely” restrict a “major life activity.” Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908 F.3d 428, 436 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2 defines physical or mental impairment to include disorders affecting body systems and treats operation of an individual organ within a body system as a major life activity, supporting broad ADA coverage.

Ridley v. Northwest Louisiana Technical College · filed 2021-06-01(h)(1), (i)

“EEOC regulations clarifying the statute’s key definitions echo the broad coverage envisioned for the ADA. ... “Major life activities” now also includes “the operation of an individual organ within a body system.” § 1630.2(i).”

The substantial-limitation standard is not demanding.

Martin v. Teleperformance Inc. · filed 2021-02-23(j)(1)(i)

Although this is not a “demanding standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), Martin has “failed to argue or present evidence” that her anemia “substantially limited” any major life activities, Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998).

Section 1630.2(o)(3) requires an interactive process to identify appropriate, feasible accommodations once the employer has adequate notice that the employee wants disability-related assistance.

Jacoby v. Bethlehem Suburban Motor Sales · filed 2011-05-17(o)(3)

The ADA requires that employers and employees engage in an interactive process to identify the employee’s limitations resulting from a disability and the kinds of accommodation which would be both appropriate and feasible. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o )(3). ... Based on Plaintiffs own testimony, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff or a representative of Plaintiff provided Defendant with adequate notice to trigger Defendant’s obligations under the interactive process.

A reasonable accommodation addresses a disability that prevents an employee from performing the essential functions of a present or desired position; the employer must know of that limitation and the employee must seek assistance.

Thompson v. Rice · filed 2008-12-30(o)(1)(ii)

This means that the employer must know that the employee has a disability that prevents her from performing the essential functions of her present or desired position, see Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171-72 (10th Cir.1999); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir.1996); Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 953-54 (D.C.Cir.2008) (dictum); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), and that the employee is seeking assistance from the employer, see Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir.1999).

Section 1630.2(o)(3) permits, and may require, an employer to seek information and clarification needed to identify an employee’s precise disability-related limitations during the accommodation process.

Monroe v. Jewel Osco · filed 2021-02-12(o)(3)

Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s request for information about the days he was available to work, but Defendant was entitled, perhaps even required, to seek information and clarifications so that it could “identify the precise limitations” resulting from Plaintiff’s disability. Coleman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2017 WL 3840423, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2017) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).

An agency need not begin an informal interactive process when the employee has not provided enough information to identify a request for reasonable accommodation.

Savage v. United States Postal Service · filed 2023-06-22(o)(3)

Because the appellant failed to inform his supervisors and manager s that he had a disability, he also failed to supply the agency with sufficient information for it to determine that he was making a request for a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Thus, the agency had no obligation to follow up with him, requesting more information about his accommodation needs through an informal interactive process.

An impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can still be substantially limiting and qualify as a disability under the ADA.

Owens v. Northern Tier Retail LLC · filed 2021-03-24(j)(1)(ix)

Temporary injuries and resulting limitations like Owens’s can constitute a disability under the ADA’s widened standard. See Gardea v. JBS USA, LLC, 915 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[L]ifting restrictions may qualify as a disability under the ADA Amendments Act ... which relaxed the requirements for showing a disability.”); Burnell v. Tealwood Care Ctrs., Inc., No. 16-cv-3001, 2018 WL 4293150, at *8 (D. Minn. July 10, 2018) (“[T]he ADA does not require a specified minimum duration that an impairment must last in order to be substantially limiting.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (“The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.”); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (“For example, as noted above, if an individual has a back impairment that results in a 20-pound lifting restriction that lasts for several months, he is substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting, and therefore covered under the first prong of the definition of disability.”). As a result, the court will assume for purposes of this motion that Owens was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

The court treated the employer's interactive-process duty as arising after an accommodation request and recognized that a reasonable accommodation cannot exempt an employee from essential job functions; it held that thirty days of leave could be a facially reasonable accommodation.

LeBarron v. Interstate Group, LLC · filed 2021-03-26(o)(3); (o)(2)(ii)

Because it is genuinely disputed whether LeBarron requested indefinite leave and because thirty-days leave would be a facially reasonable accommodation, summary judgment for Interstate on LeBarron’s failure to accommodate claim is DENIED.

An impairment lasting fewer than six months can qualify as an actual disability if it substantially limits a major life activity.

Consedine v. Willimansett East SNF · filed 2016-09-30(j)(1)(ix)

Moreover, Defendant cites 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) as requiring the impairment to last at least six months, but that provision only applies to “regarded-as” disabilities, and the statute "imposes no such durational requirement for ‘actual’ disabilities.” Summers, 740 F.3d at 332; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).

The six-month transitory limitation does not apply to actual-disability or record-of-disability claims; an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months may still be substantially limiting.

Skerce v. Torgeson Electric Company · filed 2021-04-20(j)(ix); (j)(1)(ix)

But the new regulations explain that “[t]he six-month ‘transitory’ part of the ‘transitory and minor’ exception to ‘regarded as’ coverage . . . does not apply to the definition of ‘disability’ under . . . the ‘actual disability’ prong . . . or . . . the ‘record of’ prong . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). Instead, “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.” Id. (emphasis added).

An impairment is substantially limiting only when it substantially limits a major life activity, and major life activities include working.

Elsherif v. Mayo Clinic · filed 2021-04-27(j)(1)(ii), (i)

An impairment is substantially limiting if it renders a person unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012). See also Heisler, 339 F.3d at 627, Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester Div., 246 F.3d 1083, 1088 (8th Cir.2001). The impairment need not prevent or severely restrict the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting; however, not every impairment will constitute a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012). Major life activities include functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2012).

The regulation identifies major depressive disorder as an impairment that should generally be found to substantially limit brain function, supporting its treatment as a disability under the ADA.

Grelle v. City of Windcrest · filed 2021-05-12(j)(3)(iii)

This evidence is sufficient to establish that Chief Ballew regarded Plaintiff as suffering from depression, which generally qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Williams v. Tarrant Cnty. College Dist., 717 F. App’x 440, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that the ADA’s implementing regulations promulgated by the EEOC identify major depressive disorder as among the list of impairments that should “easily be concluded” to substantially limit brain function); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) recognizes that major depressive disorder substantially limits brain function, satisfying the disability prong.

Parrish v. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2026-04-03(j)(3)(iii)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regulations recognize that major depressive disorder substantially limits brain function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii); see McNab v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 7 (2014). Therefore, the appellant satisfied the first prong, and we modify the remand initial decision accordingly.

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)–(iii) treats modifications or adjustments that enable a qualified person with a disability to perform essential job functions or enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as reasonable accommodations.

Baker v. The Boeing Company Inc · filed 2021-05-19(o)(1)(ii), (o)(1)(iii)

A “modification[] or adjustment[] that enable[s] . . . [an] employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment” is also a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii); see also Clark v. Sch. Dist. Five of Lexington & Richland Counties, 247 F. Supp. 3d 734, 744 (D.S.C. 2017). ... Here, Plaintiff does not concede that the QSS1 position would have provided an “opportunity to attain the same level of performance available to nondisabled employees having similar skills and abilities,” id., or allowed him “to enjoy equal benefits and privileges” as similarly situated non-disabled employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). ... In the instant case, there is an issue of material fact as to whether this QSS1 position constitutes an effective reasonable accommodation offered to Plaintiff. See Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 416 (citing Pandazides, 13 F.3d at 833) (“Whether an accommodation is reasonable is generally a question of fact for the jury.”).

The regulation defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification or adjustment to the work environment or manner of performing a position that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform its essential functions.

Feringa v. Andrews · filed 2021-05-20(o)(1)(ii)

A reasonable accommodation includes “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... Accordingly, an accommodation need not be perfect, or exactly what plaintiff was looking for, nor can it eliminate an essential function of a job. Frantti, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 286. ... Feringa alleges that Walmart failed to accommodate her by classifying at least some of her COPD-related absences as “authorized” and therefore not charging her an occurrence point. ... Because plaintiff has evidence both that her COPD caused some of her absences and that those absences were never classified as authorized, she has successfully established a prima facie case for her failure to accommodate claims. Pl. Aff. ¶ 4; Dkt. 72-2, pp. 185-86.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) recognizes that major depressive disorder should easily be found to substantially limit a major life activity and therefore qualify as a disability.

Romine v. Department of the Army · filed 2024-05-28(j)(3)(iii)

Based on the appellant’s diagnosis of major depressive disorder, we find that she established that she has a disability. See McNab, 121 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶¶ 7-8; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

Section 1630.2(j)(3) does not eliminate the need for expert evidence linking alleged symptoms to PTSD, while § 1630.2(l)(2) permits a regarded-as claim when an employer acts because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not transitory and minor.

Neri v. Board of Education Albuquerque · filed 2021-06-14(j)(3)(ii), (l)(2)

But we are not persuaded that in this case the general provisions of § 1630.2(j)(3) overcome the need for expert medical evidence to connect Mrs. Neri’s alleged symptoms to her PTSD. ... Except where an impairment is transitory and minor, “an individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ any time a covered entity takes a prohibited action against the individual because of an actual or perceived impairment, even if the entity asserts, or may or does ultimately establish, a defense to such action.”

The regulation defines reasonable accommodation as adjustments that enable a qualified disabled employee to perform essential functions and requires an employer to provide it; the court held that the employer's efforts to adjust duties did not amount to a refusal.

Barrett-Taylor v. Birch Care Community, LLC · filed 2021-06-15(o)(1)(ii), (o)(4)

It means “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position . . . is customarily performed, that enable [a qualified disabled employee] to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). An employer is required to provide reasonable accommodation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4), and the failure to do so is a form of unlawful ADA discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). ... The evidence shows that Defendant attempted to adjust Plaintiff’s dining hall job duties in a way compatible with the clinic’s work restrictions. ... The record evidence does not establish and Plaintiff shows no genuine fact dispute over whether Defendant refused reasonable accommodation. The Court grants Defendant’s request for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim.

A proposed accommodation is not facially reasonable if it would not enable the employee to perform an essential job function.

Johnson v. Norton County Hospital · filed 2021-07-23(o)(1)(ii)

“A proposed accommodation is not reasonable on its face if it would not enable the employee to perform the essential function at issue.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification or adjustment to the work environment or the manner of performing a position that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform its essential functions.

Fitzgerald v. Lincare Inc · filed 2021-08-03(o)(1)(ii)

“The term ‘reasonable accommodation,’ means ‘[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of that position[.]’” Hizer, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 993 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2(0)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification or adjustment to the work environment or to how a position is customarily performed that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the position's essential functions.

Coon v. UNC Rex Hospital · filed 2021-08-16(0)(1)(ii)

In relevant part, federal regulations define “reasonable accommodation” as “[mJodifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held . . . is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1)(ii); see Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 580 (4th Cir. 2015) (“A reasonable accommodation is one that ‘enables [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of [a] position.’” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) requires a history of a substantially limiting impairment for a record of disability, while §§ 1630.2(l)(1)–(2) treat prohibited action because of an actual or perceived impairment as regarded-as coverage even if the employer asserts a defense.

Alsbrook v. International Paper Company · filed 2021-09-29(k)(1), (l)(1), (l)(2)

Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(B), Plaintiff can establish he is disabled by showing a record of his impairment. “An individual will be considered to have a record of a disability if the individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(k)(1)–(2) (West). ... This part of the definition is satisfied where evidence establishes that an individual has had a substantially limiting impairment. The impairment indicated in the record must be an impairment that would substantially limit one or more of the individual’s major life activities. There are many types of records that could potentially contain this information, including but not limited to, education, medical, or employment records. 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App., § 1630.2(k)(1) (2016). While Plaintiff has submitted multiple affidavits that state he has PTSD and depression, he did not submit any medical, employment, or other records that establish either of his disabilities. As such, there is insufficient documentation submitted to show that Plaintiff has a history of a mental impairment for the Court to find he has a record of mental impairments under 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(B). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish a record of an impairment under the ADA, as defined by the EEOC. ... Finally, under 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(C), Plaintiff can also establish he is disabled by showing he has been regarded as having his mental impairment by Defendant. ... The EEOC has stated “an individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ any time a covered entity takes a prohibited action against the individual because of an actual or perceived impairment, even if the entity asserts, or may or does ultimately establish, a defense to such action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2). Thus, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, for the purpose of this motion, the Court assumes, without deciding, Defendant regarded Plaintiff as having a mental impairment and, therefore, meets the first prong of his prima facie case in that he qualifies as “disabled” as defined by the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, while § 1630.2(h)(1) broadly identifies physiological disorders or conditions affecting body systems as physical or mental impairments.

Huelett v. Louisville Paving Company, Inc. · filed 2025-02-19(j)(1)(ii), (h)(1)

Under the first prong of the ADA’s definition of disability, Huelett must show not only that he actually has a mental impairment but also that the “impairment substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 186 F. Supp. 3d 816, 823 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). ... Under the expanded ADAAA, an impairment is a disability within the meaning of the ADA if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. ... The ADAAA broadly define “physical or mental impairment” as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, [or] endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Therefore, the relevant inquiry for establishing an employee was regarded as disabled is an examination of whether the Defendant regarded Plaintiff as possessing one of the listed impairments.

The regulation defines disability broadly, including short-duration impairments that substantially limit a major life activity, and treats qualification and essential functions as inquiries based on prerequisites, ability with accommodation, and all relevant evidence.

WILSON v. INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CLEANING GROUP, INC. · filed 2021-07-28(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(ix), (m), (n)(1), (n)(3)

The ADA Regulations provide that “[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). “Substantially limits” should be construed broadly and should not demand extensive analysis. ... There is nothing in the ADA that delineates chronic from non-chronic impairments. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (noting that “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially-limiting within the meaning of this section.”). ... Here, there is enough evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff suffers from a disability under the ADA. ... Therefore, pursuant to “the stated intent of the ADAAA” and “the statute’s command to construe ‘disability’ broadly,” we are satisfied that Plaintiff has established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she is disabled under the ADA. ... The determination of whether an individual with a disability is “qualified” is a two-part inquiry. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) app. The first question is whether the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position. Id. The second question is whether the individual can perform the essential functions of the position, with or without a reasonable accommodation. Id. ... Indeed, the determination of what is an essential function “is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case basis [based upon] all relevant evidence,” and a job description alone is not dispositive. ... Here, Plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether it was an essential function of her position as a SEPTA Trash & Debris Laborer to work outside in all conditions. ... Construing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, a juror could conclude that Plaintiff’s request for protective equipment was a reasonable accommodation.

The regulation includes mental or psychological disorders, including emotional or mental illness, within physical or mental impairments and recognizes substantial limits on concentrating, thinking, communicating, and interacting with others as limits on major life activities.

HAMZA v. UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, LLC · filed 2021-07-29(h)(2), (i)-(j)

Taking the allegations in the SAC as true, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he suffered from a disability, which Defendant does not appear to dispute in its Motion to Dismiss. The ADA defines a disability as, inter alia, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” includes “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability . . ., organic brain syndrome, [or] emotional or mental illness.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). Plaintiff’s allegations that he “was diagnosed with manic depression . . . [and] PTSD,” ECF No. 40 ¶216, satisfy this standard. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations that his mental impairments substantially limit his ability to concentrate, think, communicate, and interact with others are sufficient to demonstrate that these impairments substantially limit one or more major life activities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)-(j).

Section 1630.2(m) requires an employee's qualification for a position to be assessed at the time of the adverse employment action, rather than at an earlier or later time.

Hilliard v. Twin Falls County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-10-14(m)

An employee asserting an ADA claim must show he or she was qualified for the position at the time of the adverse employment action, rather than some earlier or later time. See Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).

Subsection (m) defines a qualified individual as someone who meets the position’s job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Callaway v. Lee Memorial Health System · filed 2022-01-10(m)

“The term ‘qualified,’ with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.”

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual in two parts: meeting the job's qualifications and being able to perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Colon v. The Davey Tree Expert Company · filed 2022-01-19(m)

The relevant regulation divides the “qualified individual” analysis into two prongs: first, “the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires,” and second, “with or without reasonable accommodation, [the individual] can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual through a two-step inquiry: satisfying the job's prerequisites and being able to perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Lee v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc. · filed 2022-01-31(m)

The EEOC promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) to further elaborate upon the meaning of the term “qualified.” That subsection sets forth a two-step inquiry for determining whether the individual is qualified. We first determine whether the individual satisfies the prerequisites of the job; more specifically, whether “the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires.” At step two, we determine whether, “with or without reasonable accommodation,” the individual is able to “perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

Section 1630.2(m) treats a person as qualified when the person meets the job’s skill, experience, education, and other requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Winkfield v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2022-04-07(m)

When determining whether an individual is a “qualified individual,” courts consider (1) whether an individual possesses “the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of his employment position, and (2) can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Budde v. Kane Cnty. Forest Pres., 597 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).

Under § 1630.2(m), a qualified individual must meet the position’s skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements and, with or without reasonable accommodation, be able to perform its essential functions.

Rice-Smith v. Misericordia Convalescent Home · filed 2022-06-21(m)

The relevant regulations divide the “qualified individual” analysis into two prongs: first, “the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires,” and second, “with or without reasonable accommodation, [the individual] can perform the essential functions of such position.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... For these reasons, we conclude Rice-Smith had the “skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements” to obtain her position at Misericordia, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), and that she “possessed the minimal objective qualifications for the position,” see Fowler, 19 F.4th at 303.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone with the requisite skill, education, experience, and training who can perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Zimmerman v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc. · filed 2022-08-25(m)

To be considered a “qualified individual,” the plaintiff must “(1) possess the requisite skill, education, experience, and training for the position; and (2) be able to perform the essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Moritz, 147 F.3d at 786-87 (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); and then citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). However, SkyWest does not appear to dispute that Zimmerman possesses the requisite skill, education, experience, and training for the position at this point in the proceedings. See Doc. No. 10 pp. 4-6. And, accepting the factual allegations in the amended complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Zimmerman has plausibly pleaded that he was able to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodations.

(m) defines a qualified individual as someone who meets the job's requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Castle v. Wilkie · filed 2022-09-01(m)

For an accommodation to stay on unpaid leave, Mr. Castle would have had to be a “qualified individual.” A “qualified individual” is one who “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” Here, Mr. Castle could not have been a “qualified individual” because his job required someone to be at the SLC VA treating patients.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as one who meets the position’s job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Johnson v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. · filed 2022-11-14(m)

Under the ADA, a qualified individual is one who “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position . . . and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). ... At issue here is whether Johnson made out a prima facie claim by establishing that she was a qualified individual. We agree with the district court that the answer is no.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone with the required job qualifications who can perform the position’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Der Sarkisain v. Austin Preparatory School · filed 2022-12-06(m)

To be a “qualified individual,” Mrs. Der Sarkisian must show “first, that she ‘possess[es] ‘the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements' for the position, and second, [that she is] able to perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation.’” García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 646 (1st Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). ... Accordingly, by being unable to attend school in person, Mrs. Der Sarkisian was not able to, at the time of her termination, nor did she represent she could, fulfill an essential function of her position.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as one who meets the job’s requirements and can perform its essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.

KOGAN v. T-M AUTOMOTIVE, INC. · filed 2023-03-20(m)

“The term ‘qualified,’ with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.”

Section 1630.2(m) treats an employee as qualified when the employee can perform the job’s essential functions and meets the applicable skill, experience, education, and other job requirements.

Berner v. Metropolitan Council · filed 2023-05-10(m)

Mr. Berner’s ADA claim turns on his qualification to operate a Metro Transit bus. To be qualified under the ADA, an employee must demonstrate the ability to perform the job’s essential functions and meet the job requirements, including skill, experience, and education. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999).

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as one who meets the position’s job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Catley v. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. · filed 2023-07-11(m)

“‘[Q]ualified,’ . . . means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (emphasis added).

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as a person with a disability who can perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation.

Valli v. Mayorkas · filed 2023-12-15(m)

Under the ADA and, therefore, the Rehabilitation Act, a “qualified individual” is an individual with a disability “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of [the] position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

Section 1630.2(m) requires the otherwise-qualified inquiry to determine whether an individual satisfies the prerequisites for each required position and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Newton v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2024-01-09(m)

Then, after directing the jury to resolve whether the position was nested, the instruction should have addressed Newton’s ability to hold any identified position under the two-step inquiry for the otherwise-qualified element of a § 504 claim. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(m). So, in the absence of a stipulation by the parties, the jury should have been instructed to determine first whether Newton was qualified for any required position (trooper, PSO, or both) and second whether Newton could perform the essential functions of any such position (or positions) with or without reasonable accommodations.

Section 1630.2(m) treats an individual as qualified when the individual can perform the position’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Tavakkol v. United States Postal Service · filed 2024-01-09(m)

An agency is required to reasonably accommodate an employee’s medical conditions if he can otherwise perform his job. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m) (defining a “qualified” individual as one who can perform the essential functions of the position in question with or without reasonable accommodation), 1630.9(a) (setting forth the requirement to provide reasonable accommodation to an “otherwise qualified” employee).

Sections 1630.2(g) and (m) identify the disability and qualified-individual requirements for a failure-to-accommodate claim.

Fernandez v. Department of Interior · filed 2024-02-22(g), (m)

In order to establish disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate, an employee must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. ... Here, as discussed, the appellant is disabled as she suffers from migraines which substantially limit her major life activities of concentrating and working. ... we explicitly find that she was qualified because a required element of a disability discrimination claim is that an individual be “qualified.”

Section 1630.2(m) treats a qualified individual as one who has the necessary job-related skills and can perform the job’s essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Cenanovic v. Hamdard Center for Health and Human Services · filed 2024-03-28(m)

Specifically, Cenanovic must present evidence that as of November 30, 2018, she both possessed the necessary skills to perform her job, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), and—more importantly—that she was “willing and able to demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.”

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as one who meets the position's job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation; the court applied that definition to the required security clearance.

Ibeh v. Secretary Department of Navy · filed 2024-05-28(m)

A “qualified” individual under the Rehabilitation Act is an individual with “the requisite skill, experience, education[,] and other job-related requirements of the . . . position” who, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... Here, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Secretary on Ibeh’s disability-discrimination claim because it correctly found that he failed to show that he was otherwise qualified for the job. Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326. While he was required to obtain a security clearance, Ibeh failed to meet this requirement because he made substantial changes to his application, raising questions about the truthfulness of the answers. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). As such, Ibeh failed to show that he would have received the required security clearance.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as one who meets the position's job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Erickson v. Department of the Army · filed 2024-07-08(m)

A “qualified” individual “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to show by preponderant evidence that he is a qualified individual with a disability because he could not perform the essential functions of his PPM position with or without reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone who meets the position’s job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Wojtowicz v. Gichner Shelter Systems · filed 2024-12-30(m)

As stated above, an individual with a disability is a qualified individual when he can “perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires” with or without a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Determining whether a plaintiff is a “qualified individual” requires determining “(1) whether the individual has the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the position sought, and (2) whether the individual, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of that position.” Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). “The determination of whether an individual with a disability is qualified is made at the time of the employment decision, not at the time of the lawsuit.” Id.

Section 1630.2(m) treats a qualified individual as someone who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Reyna v. Epiroc Drilling Solutions LLC · filed 2025-01-28(m)(1994)

“with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”

Subsection (g)(1) identifies qualifying impairments and other bases for disability status, while subsection (m) covers a qualified individual who can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Hallett v. Department of Agriculture · filed 2025-01-29(g)(1), (m)

To prove that an appellant is an individual with a disability, she must show that she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). ... Therefore, contrary to the agency’s position, IAF, Tab 12 at 42, 117, Tab 21 at 117-18, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant is a disabled individual. RID at 11. However, contrary to the administrative judge’s findings, we find that the appellant is a qualified individual with a disability. RID at 16. ... Accordingly, we find that the appellant could have performed the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation, and therefore, she is a qualified individual with a disability.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual by the requisite job-related qualifications and the ability to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation; the majority treated required job licensing or certification as part of that qualification.

Turner v. BNSF Railway · filed 2025-05-14(m)

To be a “qualified individual” one must possess the licensing and certification that is required for their job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); Part 1630 Appendix; Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1997).

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as one who meets a position’s job-related requirements and can perform its essential duties with or without reasonable accommodation.

Gordon v. National Aeronautics and Space Admin · filed 2014-08-21(m)

With exceptions not applicable here, the term “qualified” means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the position the individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential duties of such position.

A qualified individual must meet the position’s prerequisites and be able to perform its essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Ayala v. Lederle Parentals, Inc. · filed 1998-09-18(m)

The requirement that the plaintiff be “qualified” involves, in turn, a two-part inquiry: (1) the plaintiff must show that she satisfies the skills, training and experience prerequisites of the position, and (2) that she could perform the essential functions of her job, either with or without reasonable accommodation.

A qualified individual meets the position’s prerequisites and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Griel v. Franklin Medical Center · filed 1999-11-23(m)

Under the ADA, the qualification prong of the prima fade case is met by showing (1) that the employee satisfied the prerequisites for the position such as experience, education, and other job-related requirements, and (2) that she, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position held or desired.

Section 1630.2(m) requires a qualified individual to meet a position’s skill, experience, and education requirements and to be able to perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Johnson v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. · filed 2000-02-05(m)

Determining whether an individual is qualified involves a two step analysis. First, the individual must satisfy the skill, experience, and educational requirements for the position. ... Second, the individual must be able to perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. ... Johnson apparently possessed the skill, experience, and educational requirements for the Assembler A position because Loram itself promoted Johnson from an Assembler B to an Assembler A in June 1993.

Section 1630.2(m) uses a two-step analysis to decide whether an individual is qualified under the ADA.

Colon-Fontanez v. Municipality of San Juan · filed 2011-10-12(m)

Whether an individual is qualified under the ADA is a two-step analysis. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).