Statute Annotations › Federal › 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Evaluating medical opinions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
10,654
Cited in passing
2,357
Citing cases indexed
23,130
Case dates
1974–2026
Screened through
2026-06-24
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-16
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

13,011 citing cases reviewed of 23,130 in the citation index: 10,654 interpreted the section (annotated below), 2,357 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-24 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1991-08-01 SSA revised § 404.1527 to define treating sources and add detailed medical-opinion rules, including controlling weight for a well-supported treating-source opinion that is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; the older consultative-examination provisions no longer occupied this section. Source
  • 2000-03-07 SSA revised § 404.1527 to clarify medical-source terms and opinion evaluation; the agency described these clarifications as leaving its existing policy unchanged. Source
  • 2012-02-23 SSA revised § 404.1527 and moved the treating-source weight provisions from paragraph (d) to (c), with corresponding paragraph renumbering. Source
  • 2017-03-27 SSA limited § 404.1527 to claims filed before this date and made § 404.1520c govern later claims, ending the treating-source controlling-weight rule for those later claims. It also added paragraph (f) guidance for other-source opinions in older claims. Source

Authority for consultative examinations

Law changed since SSA’s August 1, 1991 revision moved § 404.1527 to evaluation of medical opinions, so its earlier consultative-examination rule is historical; Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527 gives the Secretary authority to compel a claimant to undergo a physical or mental examination when the Secretary deems it necessary, but does not require the Secretary to provide an examination at the claimant's request.

McGee v. Weinberger · filed 1974-12-16

Apparently the plaintiff misconstrues the purpose of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. That regulation gives the Secretary the right to compel a claimant to submit to physical or mental examination by a physician designated by him if he deems such an examination necessary. It does not obligate the Secretary to provide such an examination at the claimant’s request.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires a consultative physical or mental examination before disability can be denied when the record is insufficient and a qualified examination is needed to resolve unexplained pain.

Davis v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare · filed 1979-07-25

Having accepted that Mrs. Davis was suffering from unexplained pain, the administrative law judge could not simply deny the claim without obtaining a consultative examination by a psychiatrist pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 authorizes an administrative law judge to direct a claimant to undergo a medical examination at government expense when the record lacks adequate information about the duration of disability.

Memoli v. Califano · filed 1978-12-21

If in reviewing the record the ALJ did not feel that he had adequate information to determine how long Memoli continued to be disabled, he... could have directed that the claimant submit to a medical examination at the government’s expense. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
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Notice and attendance at examinations

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits a consultative examination when the record lacks sufficient facts for an informed disability decision and the examination is necessary.

Bowman v. Califano · filed 1980-01-07

The Court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.-1527 which provides for consultative examinations where warranted. ... The record does not establish that a consultative examination is necessary to enable the Administrative Law Judge to make the disability decision. Therefore, the Secretary’s decision in this regard is supported by substantial evidence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires reasonable notice of the time and place of consultative examinations and an opportunity to show good cause for failing to attend before benefits may be denied on that basis.

Wade v. Harris · filed 1980-09-19

In summary, there is no substantial evidence that plaintiff had reasonable notice of the time and place of the examinations or that he did not have “good cause” for failing to appear. Thus there is no substantial evidence to support a denial of benefits pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Under these circumstances, we must remand to the Secretary so that new consultative examinations can be given and a decision can be made on the merits of plaintiff’s claim.
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Physician opinions on disability

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(d) treats statements that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, not medical opinions entitled to special significance.

Ricci v. Berryhill · filed 2020-11-30(d)

While it would have been better if the ALJ had discussed Dr. Shappard’s statement, it consists of five sentences, the first two of which state background facts and the last of which is merely a formal pleasantry. Otherwise, he says Petitioner “has been medically unable to work … since 2003” and that “[t]his is a medical disability.” Neither assertion is a diagnosis, medical finding, assessment of functional limitation, or the like. Both assertions relate only to matters reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security. As such, per 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d), they are not “medical opinions” and they are not entitled to “any special significance.” There is no error.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that an ALJ need not give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability.

Vincent v. Saul · filed 2020-12-22(d)(1)

Moreover, an ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (3) treats whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, making a medical source's opinion on that ultimate issue a valid ground for rejection.

Lybarger v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-03-29(d)(1) & (3)

First, the ALJ discounted Guinn-Lahm’s statement on the ultimate issue of disability because that is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. (AR 23.) Lybarger does not contest this portion of the ALJ’s finding, and it was a germane reason to reject that portion of the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) & (3).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) makes a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work nonbinding on the agency’s disability determination.

Cash v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-07-14(d)(1)

see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”). The ALJ accordingly did not err by discounting that portion of Ms. Sterchi’s opinions.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not as a medical opinion, but it does not permit an ALJ to reject the source’s other assessed limitations without additional reasons.

(SS) Moy v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-10-08(e)

The ALJ is of course correct that the determination of whether a claimant is disabled is reserved for the Commissioner, and statements “by a medical source that [a claimant] is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ “ “are not medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). ... Nonetheless, the ALJ’s right to ignore Dr. Bangalore’s legal conclusions regarding disability did not entitle her to discredit all Dr. Bangalore’s assessed limitations without further rationale.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)-(3) treats opinions on administrative findings as non-medical opinions and gives no special significance to opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

(SS) Watson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-11(d)(1)-(3)

While the court recognizes that the fact that a physician opines as to the ultimate issue of disability is not a sufficient reason to discredit their opinion, here Dr. Epperson does not provide functional limitations, and so the opinion on the ultimate issue of disability is the only opinion provided. The ALJ is not required to accept Dr. Epperson’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(3) (Opinions on administrative findings are not medical opinions and “we will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner”).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as nonbinding on the disability determination, while subsection (d)(2) addresses medical-source opinions about the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairments.

Black v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-03-15(d)(1), (d)(2)

However, a “statement by a medical source that [a claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the ALJ] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Instead, the ALJ “use[s] medical sources . . . to provide . . . opinions, on the nature and severity of [the plaintiff’s] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(2).
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A physician’s conclusion that a claimant is disabled is not binding on the Secretary.

Elaine GRAY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1985-04-30

Although Dr. Gold stated that Gray appeared to be “... disabled from most activities involving use of any sort of the left arm”, that conclusion is not binding on the Secretary. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
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Section 404.1527(e) leaves the disability determination to the ALJ, who is not bound by a doctor’s statement that a claimant is disabled.

Molina v. Apfel · filed 1999-03-16(e)

The ALJ is not bound by a doctor’s statement that a claimant is disabled.
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A physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled is not binding on the Social Security Administration.

Stewart v. Apfel, Commissioner · filed 1999-07-12(e)(1)

Although none of his contemporaneous evaluations contained this diagnosis, as of 1995, Dr. Barker "assumed" that Stewart was "most likely disabled" due to multiple polyarthralgias and polymalgias in December 1992. Such an opinion is not binding on the Social Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) (1998).
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Section 404.1527(e) distinguishes a medical opinion from the Social Security Administration's determination of disability.

Marsh v. Omaha Printing Co. · filed 2000-07-12(e)

But, a medical opinion is not a determination of disability by the Social Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).
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Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of disability to the Commissioner; a medical opinion that a claimant cannot work does not bind the ALJ.

Noderer v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2024-05-21(d)(1)

The ALJ was not bound by Dr. Williams’ opinion that Plaintiff was disabled because medical opinions provide judgments about the nature and severity of the ... claimant’s impairments and the determination that an individual cannot work or is disabled is reserved for the Commissioner.
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A treating source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled receives some weight, but the disability decision is reserved for the Commissioner.

Jordan v. Apfel · filed 2001-07-11(e)(1)

Moreover, the decision whether the claimant is disabled is expressly reserved for the Commissioner, and a treating source’s opinion of disability is only entitled to some weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1).
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Section 404.1527(e)(1) does not require an ALJ to accept a treating physician’s conclusory opinion that a claimant is disabled.

Maple v. Apfel · filed 2001-07-12(e)(1)

Furthermore, the ALJ is not required to accept a treating physician’s conclusory opinion on the ultimate issue of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1).
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Section 404.1527(e)(1) does not bind an ALJ to a doctor’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability.

Roberts v. Barnhart · filed 2002-06-12(e)(1)

The ALJ was not bound by claimant’s doctors’ opinions on the ultimate issue of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1).
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A physician’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not bind the Commissioner.

MacEra v. Barnhart · filed 2004-02-20(e)(1)

It is well-established that a physician’s conclusory statements that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are not binding on the Commissioner, and the Commissioner is not required to give special significance to the source of such an opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1), (3).
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Section 404.1527(e) reserves the ultimate disability determination to the Commissioner, so an ALJ may disregard a physician’s opinion that a claimant qualifies for permanent disability status.

HOANG DO v. Astrue · filed 2011-01-21(e)

In any event, the ALJ was free to ignore the portion of Dr. Ibrahim's opinion regarding Plaintiff qualifying for "permanent disability status.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e) (The Commissioner is charged with determining the ultimate issue of disability) & 416.927(e) (same).
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A medical source’s statement that a claimant is unable to work does not determine whether the claimant is disabled.

Blankenship v. Comm'r of Social Security · filed 2015-08-26(d)(1)

As an initial matter, Dr. Daniels’ statement that Blankenship is unable to work is not dispositive of whether she possessed the RFC to perform other work besides her past relevant work (steps four and five).
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A medical source's opinion that a claimant is disabled does not bind the ALJ.

Smith v. Berryhill · filed 2019-03-31(d)(1)

Further, the ALJ, is not bound to accept the treating physicians' conclusions about whether a patient is disabled or not.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A treating physician’s bare statement that a claimant is disabled is not a medical opinion entitled to special significance or evaluation under the treating-source factors.

Rattler v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-30(d)(3)

Dr. Varghese’s September 2016 statement to the Township Trustee only states, without any explanation or supporting evidence, that Plaintiff is disabled. While Dr. Varghese’s statement may have been useful to the Township Trustee in assessing Plaintiff’s qualifications for assistance, it does not qualify as a medical opinion no matter what the ALJ may have thought. As such, the ALJ’s failure to discuss all of the Section 1527(c) factors as part of her analysis in support of discounting Dr. Varghese’s “opinion” is not a sufficient reason - standing alone – to justify remand.
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A treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work has no special significance because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Ray v. Saul · filed 2021-04-19(e)(1)

An opinion by a treating physician that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” has no special significance because it is not a medical opinion.
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Disability conclusions by medical sources

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 does not make a physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work determinative of disability.

Sherrer v. Secretary of Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1983-12-22

This duty is not inconsistent with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1983), which was relied upon by the ALJ, and which notifies a claimant that "a statement by your physician that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that a physician’s conclusion on whether a claimant is disabled is not binding on the Secretary.

Meyers v. Heckler · filed 1985-11-12

Of course, the conclusions of a plaintiff’s physician on the ultimate issue of disability are not binding on the Secretary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1985).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 does not require the Secretary to accept a treating physician’s opinion on the ultimate legal issue of whether the claimant is disabled.

Pagan v. Heckler · filed 1985-04-01

The Secretary, however, is not bound by Dr. Vazquez’s use of the word "disabled.” Because "disability” is a term of art with a narrow definition under the Social Security Act, the responsibility for deciding the ultimate issue of disability is the Secretary’s.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that a medical source's opinion that a claimant is disabled is not binding on the ALJ.

Taylor v. Heckler · filed 1984-08-17

Nor is Dr. Saunders’ opinion—that plaintiff is disabled—binding on the AU.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A physician’s conclusion that a claimant is disabled is not controlling.

Fitzpatrick v. Heckler · filed 1986-06-17

It is settled law, however, that a physician’s conclusion concerning disability is not controlling.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation permits the agency to discount a treating physician’s disability opinion when it is conclusory or unsupported by objective medical evidence.

Joyce M. JOHNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-07-14

The opinion of the treating physician regarding disability or inability to work may be discounted if it is unsupported by objective medical evidence or is merely conclusory. ... In this case, the ALJ had good cause for not according substantial weight to Dr. Ross’ statements concerning Johns’ inability to continue working because all three statements were conclusory and unsupported by objective medical findings.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A physician's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is not determinative; the Secretary must evaluate the medical findings and other evidence supporting it.

Nance v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1992-02-19

As the Appeals Council points out, such opinions are not determinative of the issue of disability; the Secretary is required to evaluate the medical findings and other evidence that support such a statement. Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 785 (7th Cir.1977); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 ("[A] statement by your physician that you are 'disabled' or 'unable to work' does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled. We have to review the medical findings and other evidence that support a physician's statement that you are 'disabled.' " ) Dr. Hanaway's previous medical findings had been fully considered during the administrative process. No new findings were submitted with the February 1, 1989, assessment. Therefore, the Appeals Council did not err in refusing to give any further consideration to the assessment.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) excludes a treating source’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability from controlling weight.

Lately v. Colvin · filed 2014-03-26(d)

Thus, Dr. Magnuson’s opinion was not entitled to controlling weight because the issue of disability is not a medical opinion subject to controlling weight, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (“[T]reating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight or special significance.”).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under § 404.1527(d)(1) and (3), a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner, so it is not a medical opinion entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Quisenberry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. · filed 2018-11-29(d)(1) and (3)

First, he noted that a doctor’s “statements that a claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work,’ or the like, are not medical opinions but are administrative findings dispositive of a case, which can never be entitled to controlling weight.” Indeed, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) and (3) now provide explicitly that no special significance will be given to the source of an opinion—such as whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work—reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability to the Commissioner.

Jones v. Commissioner, Social Secuirty Adminstration · filed 2019-08-27(d)

The court notes initially that the determination about whether a claimant has met the statutory definition of disability is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 reserves classification of a claimant’s residual functional capacity as “sedentary” to the Commissioner.

Melican v. US Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-09-09(d)

Even if Welch’s sedentary designation could be considered a medical opinion, classification of an RFC as “sedentary” is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a doctor's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as not a medical opinion and therefore not entitled to controlling weight.

Thompson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-09-24(a)(1), (c)(2), (d)

A doctor’s statement that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not a medical opinion under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Consequently, neither Dr. Anderson’s nor Dr. Pickett’s statement concerning Ms. Thompson’s ability to work is due controlling weight under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is an issue reserved to the Commissioner and is not entitled to special significance.

Lemon v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2020-01-28(d)(1), (d)(3)

As to Plaintiff’s argument regarding the opinions of Plaintiff’s providers that she was “medically disabled” or unable to work, the law is clear that they need not be given any heightened value by the court. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (3) (a statement that the applicant is “disabled” or “unable to work” invades the province of the Commissioner and does not have “any special significance”).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the ultimate determination of disability to the Commissioner, so a physician's statement that a claimant is permanently disabled is not controlling.

Post v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-09-29(d)(1)

The ALJ properly rejected the opinion to the extent Dr. Guastadisegni stated that Plaintiff is permanently disabled, because the ultimate determination of disability is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions about whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work as administrative findings reserved to the Commissioner, rather than medical opinions.

Seibert v. Saul (CONSENT) · filed 2020-10-01(d)

Opinions on some issues, such as whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work “are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d); 416.927(d); Bell v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Good cause for missed examinations

Law changed since SSA’s August 1, 1991 revision moved § 404.1527 to evaluation of medical opinions, so its earlier consultative-examination rule is historical; Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

The regulation permits the Secretary to find that a claimant is not disabled when the claimant fails or refuses to undergo a required examination without good cause.

Neumerski v. Califano · filed 1981-05-12

The regulations in effect at the time the Appeals Council rendered its decision provided “... if any .. . individual fails or refuses to present himself for any examination or test, such failure or refusal, unless the Secretary determines that there is good cause therefore, shall be a basis for determining that such individual is not under a disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1970). ... Accordingly, plaintiff had no right to have his attorney present at the ordered psychological examination.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits the Secretary to determine that a claimant is not disabled when the claimant fails or refuses to undergo a reasonably noticed physical or mental examination without good cause.

Kaminski v. Califano · filed 1979-01-04

Upon reasonable notice of the time and place thereof, any individual alleged to be under a disability shall present himself for and submit to physical or mental examinations or tests, at the expense of the Administration, by' a physician or other professional or technical source designated by the Administration or the State agency authorized to make determinations as to disability. If any such individual fails or refuses to present himself for any examination or test, such failure or refusal, unless the Secretary determines that there is good cause therefore, shall be a basis for determining that such individual is not under a disability. ... The Regulation is a valid interpretation of the Social Security Act. ... Finally, there is nothing in the administrative record to indicate that plaintiff had “good cause” not to undergo the examinations.
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Disability determinations by the Secretary; physician conclusions not determinative

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

A medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not mean that the Commissioner will determine that the claimant is disabled, because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Rios v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-08(d)(1)

“A statement by a medical source that [a claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that broad, conclusory medical opinions on whether a claimant is disabled are not determinative of the disability decision.

Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1981-12-22

These broad conclusory formulations, regarding the ultimate issue which must be decided by the Secretary, are not determinative of the question of whether or not an individual is under a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1981).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) treats a physician’s opinion about whether a person should receive disability benefits as not being a medical opinion.

Fernandez v. Massanari · filed 2001-06-28(e)(1)

A physician’s opinion about whether a person should receive disability benefits is not a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in disregarding the statement.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation does not give controlling weight to a medical source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled because that legal determination is reserved to the ALJ.

KOISCH v. Astrue · filed 2009-08-20(e)(2)

Importantly, a statement by any medical source indicating that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is not determinative of a claimant’s disability status under the law and is not entitled to automatic controlling weight or special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Soc. Sec. Reg. 98-5p, 61 Fed.Reg. 34, 471, 24,474 (1996). Whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is a legal conclusion reserved to the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) does not require an administrative law judge to adopt a medical source's conclusion that a claimant is disabled.

Ferrante v. Astrue · filed 2010-11-29(e)

First, of course, an administrative law judge is never required to adopt the conclusion of any medical source that a claimant is disabled, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e), 416.927(e), which is the practical effect of a finding at Step 3 that the claimant’s impairment meets the terms of a Listing.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) makes a treating source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work non-controlling because the ultimate disability determination is reserved for the Commissioner.

Ambrosini v. Astrue · filed 2010-07-23(e)

A medical statement or opinion expressed by a treating source on a matter reserved for the Commissioner, such as a statement that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work,” is not dispositive or controlling.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) means that a physician's opinion that a claimant is unable to work receives no special significance because the agency decides whether the claimant meets the statutory definition of disability.

Cunningham v. Commissioner Social Security · filed 2012-12-13(d)(3)

In addition, an ALJ does not give any “special significance” to a physician‟s opinion that a patient is unable to work because the agency is responsible for determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). Here, Moran‟s opinion that Cunningham was unable to work full time was not entitled by regulation to any special significance.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability to the Commissioner, so a medical-source statement that the claimant is disabled or unable to work does not control that determination.

Ahola v. SSA · filed 2017-06-01(d)(1)

And, determining whether claimant is disabled is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (The Commissioner is “responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . . A statement by a medical source that you are “disabled” or “unable to work” does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) says that an opinion that a claimant cannot work is not entitled to special significance because the disability determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Ledoux v. SSA · filed 2018-06-12(d)

Opinions even from medical sources that a claimant is unable to work are not entitled to any particular significance because that issue is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); ... Therefore, the ALJ supportably decided that Chauvette’s opinion that Ledoux could not sustain even part-time work was not binding.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Sections 404.1527(d)(1) and (d)(3) reserve the determination of disability to the Commissioner, and a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not control that determination.

MCNALLY v. SAUL · filed 2020-10-29(d)(1), (d)(3)

“We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. In so doing, we review all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source’s statement that you are disabled. A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) leaves the disability determination to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is not binding.

Higginson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-22(d)(1)

“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that you are disabled.’”
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Agency responsibility for disability findings

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability to the Commissioner.

Hammill v. Saul · filed 2021-03-24(d)(1)

Even if they had made such assertions, the decision as to whether a claimant is disabled is reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability.”).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 makes the Secretary, not a treating physician, solely responsible for determining whether a claimant is disabled based on the medical findings.

Watkins v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1982-02-04

Furthermore, Dr. Hazouri’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability — specifically that Watkins was unable to return to any gainful activity, Record, Volume 2, at 202, 213 — is not dispositive. That determination is made solely by the Secretary based on medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1981).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) reserves the determination of disability to the Commissioner, so a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability.

Bracciodieta-Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2011-04-27(e)

Further, the determination of disabled status for purposes of receiving benefits-a decision reserved for the Commissioner, only-will not be affected by a medical source simply because it states that a claimant is “disabled,” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) makes the agency, rather than a medical source, responsible for deciding whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability.

Megehee v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2022-10-24(d)(1)

Only the agency is “responsible for making the determination or decision about whether [a claimant] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability.”
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General opinion-evaluation standards

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider medical opinions with the rest of the relevant evidence and weigh them using factors including the examining relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Buckley v. Saul · filed 2020-09-24(a)(1), (b), (c)

The relevant social security regulations provide that “medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [their] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). ... “When weighing each medical opinion, the ALJ must consider whether the doctor has examined the claimant; the doctor’s relationship with the claimant; the medical evidence supporting the doctor’s opinion; how consistent the doctor’s opinion is with the record as a whole; and the doctor’s specialization.” ... Based on its review of the ALJ’s decision and the record, the Court finds that the ALJ properly applied the appropriate standard in evaluating the weight to be accorded to Dr. Demsey’s opinion regarding Buckley’s functional capacity.
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Factors for treating and other sources

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 directs ALJs to give greater weight to treating-source opinions and requires them to consider treatment-relationship factors, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors when weighing medical opinions.

Maynard v. SSA · filed 2015-10-07(c)(2)(i)-(ii), (c)(3)-(6)

Under the applicable Social Security regulations, the Acting Commissioner, and by extension the ALJ, is directed generally to give the greatest weight to medical opinions from treating sources, less weight to opinions from sources who have only examined the claimant, and the least weight to medical source who have neither treated nor examined the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... When determining the amount of weight to give a medical opinion from a treating source, the ALJ is directed to consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, along with the nature and extent of the treatment relationship. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii). When assessing any medical opinion, the ALJ should consider supportability through medical signs and laboratory findings, consistency with the record as a whole, the medical source’s specialization, and other factors, such as the source’s understanding of Social Security disability programs and his or her familiarity with information in the claimant’s case file. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3)-(6).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires adjudicators to defer generally to medical opinions about impairments and functional restrictions, weigh them using factors such as treatment relationship, consistency, and support, and not credit a physician’s ultimate conclusion that the claimant is disabled or unable to work.

Lopez v. Colvin · filed 2016-07-11(a)(2), (c), (c)(2)-(6), (d)(1)

The Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability, and need not credit a physician’s conclusion that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). But the Commissioner generally must defer to a physician’s medical opinion, such as statements concerning the nature or severity of the claimant’s impairments, what the claimant can do, and the claimant’s physical or mental restrictions. § 404.1527(a)(2), (c). ... In determining how much deference to give a physician’s medical opinion, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. ... Generally, an ALJ should give the greatest weight to a treating physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to one of a non-examining physician. ... 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective evidence).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) does not require the agency to specifically reference every listed factor when evaluating medical opinion evidence.

Harris v. Colvin · filed 2014-08-15(c)

The agency was not required to specifically reference each factor listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to weigh medical opinions by considering the examining-source preference, resolving conflicts, and factoring in supportability and the source’s familiarity with the record.

White v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2013-09-10(c)(4), (d)(3), (d)(6), and (e)(2)

Further, while the regulations state that the Commissioner will “[generally, ..give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you,” the ALJ is the one who has a duty to evaluate all of the medical opinions in the record and resolve any conflicts. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4) & (e)(2). The regulations also state that the supportability of an opinion, as well as the extent to which a source is familiar with a claimant’s other medical information of record, should also be factored into the decision of how much weight to ascribe to a medical source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3) & (6).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 makes physicians’ conclusions non-determinative and requires the Secretary to review the medical findings and other evidence before reaching a final conclusion.

Little v. Schweiker · filed 1982-11-22

The opinions of Drs. Gordon, Houser, and Wilson need not be conclusive on the issue of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 states that the conclusions of a claimant’s physicians are not determinative and that the Secretary will review the medical findings and other evidence before making a final conclusion. Where, as here, the medical evidence appears to be conflicting, it is for the Secretary, not this court, to resolve such conflicts.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 makes a physician’s conclusory statement nonbinding and gives it weight according to its clinical support and consistency with the other evidence.

Edwards v. Heckler · filed 1983-10-17

A conclusory statement of disability is, of course, not binding on the Secretary. 20 CFR § 404.1527 (1982). The weight to be given a physician’s conclusory statement depends on the extent to which it is supported by specific and complete clinical findings and is consistent with other evidence on the severity and probable duration of the individual’s impairments. ... Here, Claimant’s initial impairments were documented with an electromyogram, a myelogram and a discogram. Tr. at 110-119. No such objective medical findings support Dr. Carsner’s statement and no comparison between Dr. Carsner’s examination results and Claimant’s initial condition of disability has been made to demonstrate how Claimant’s condition is improved.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 does not make a treating physician’s conclusory opinion dispositive; the determination of disability remains the Secretary’s prerogative.

Christine HOUSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-06-14

Ultimately, the determination of disability is the prerogative of the Secretary, not the treating physician, and the brief conclusory letter from appellant’s treating physician, was not dispositive of the issue. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, supra at 538; 20 CFR § 404.1527 (1981).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives the administrative law judge discretion to determine the weight of a claimant’s medical reports, and opinions unsupported by clinical findings may be given little weight.

Poulin v. Heckler · filed 1984-09-07

The AU is vested with discretion to determine the weight to be given a medical report concerning a claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Mere opinions, unaccompanied by clinical findings, may not be ignored, but may be accorded little weight in the exercise of the AU’s discretion.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that physicians' opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work do not bind the Secretary.

Maddox v. Heckler · filed 1984-12-28

Statements by physicians that a claimant is disabled or unable to work are not binding on the Secretary, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats objective medical diagnoses and observations as more important than a doctor's conclusions, which do not bind the ALJ.

Noah v. Heckler · filed 1985-12-17

The objective diagnoses and observations are the most important part of the reports, as the doctor’s conclusions are not binding on the AU.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires substantial weight for doctors' medical findings, but not for opinions about the actual availability of jobs.

Loya v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services · filed 1983-06-16

The ALJ was required to give substantial weight to the doctors’ medical findings, not to their opinions about the actual availability of jobs for a person of limited physical ability and education.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 reserves disability determinations to the Secretary but requires the ALJ to consider physicians' opinions as evidence.

Wilson v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services · filed 1992-03-10

Decisions of disability, however, are the responsibility of the Secretary and not of doctors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Nevertheless, the ALJ must consider such evidence. Id.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 places responsibility for deciding disability with the Secretary, while requiring the ALJ to consider physicians' opinions.

Markarian v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1992-05-11

The ALJ considered and rejected several physicians' opinions that Markarian was unable to perform gainful work due to physical and mental disabilities. However, decisions of disability are the responsibility of the Secretary and not of doctors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1991). Nevertheless, the ALJ must consider such evidence. Id.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 is a valid, non-arbitrary framework that Social Security adjudicators may use to evaluate medical opinions in disability cases.

Aldrich v. Sullivan · filed 1992-08-13

For example, new § 404.1527 is titled “Evaluating medical opinions about your impairment(s) or disability.” Therefore, the Secretary has the authority to issue these regulations, and have his adjudicators use them, and we must accept these regulations unless we find them to be arbitrary and capricious. ... Having read the regulations through, we cannot say that they are arbitrary and capricious.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits the ALJ to obtain additional medical evidence and requires medical opinions to be evaluated and weighed rather than automatically given controlling weight.

Revels v. Secretary of Health & Human Services · filed 1994-01-14(c)(3)

The ALJ did not find the treating source’s opinion to be controlling in this case. However, the ALJ did exercise her authority under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), and requested a list of work restrictions from plaintiffs cardiologist and another consultative examination before she made her decision. ... The AIJ specified that she did not accept Dr. Currie’s or Dr. Beilson’s opinions, and also gave reasons for not accepting their opinions. This Court concludes that the ALJ’s analysis was proper, and given that the final determination of disability is the prerogative of the Secretary’s, the Court does not find that the ALJ’s decision was reversible error.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion when contradictory medical evidence exists and may assign it more or less weight based on the supporting explanation and whether the physician is a specialist.

Serody v. Chater · filed 1995-09-14(d)

An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion on the basis of contradictory medical evidence, and may afford a medical opinion more or less weight depending upon the degree to which supporting explanations for it are provided and whether the treating doctor is a specialist.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an administrative law judge to evaluate every medical opinion received.

Burgess v. Chater · filed 1996-09-17(d)

The administrative law judge is required to “evaluate every medical opinion” he receives. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ assessing conflicting medical opinions to consider the physician's treatment relationship, specialty, and the opinion's consistency and supportability.

Dweaine BOOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-08-01(a)-(d)

In assessing conflicting medical opinion evidence, AL Js must consider a variety of factors, including whether a physician is a treating or examining physician; the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; the physician’s specialty; and the consistency and supportability of the physician’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)-(d), 416.927(a)-(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion received.

Tolbert v. Chater · filed 1997-02-11(d)

The ALJ is required to “evaluate every medical opinion” he receives, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), and to “consider all relevant medical evidence of record in reaching a conclusion as to disability,” Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289, 291 (10th Cir. 1989).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits consideration of opinions from non-physician medical and treating sources, with weight determined by the treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, and the source’s expertise.

Stephens v. Callahan · filed 1997-07-22(d)

The ALJ and the court are not prohibited from considering the opinions of non-physician health care providers by the regulation cited by the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Section 404.1527 refers to medical and treating sources, rather than physicians. However, the weight accorded an opinion will depend on a number of factors, including: length of treatment relationship, nature and extent of treatment relationship, the existence of relevant evidence to support the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the area of expertise or specialty of the treating source.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to evaluate all medical opinions and explain why a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight.

Sullivan v. SSA · filed 1997-08-28(d)

On remand, the ALJ shall evaluate all of the medical opinions presented to him, not just that of Dr. Adams. If the ALJ determines that any of the medical opinions of plaintiff's treating physicians are not entitled to controlling weight, his explanation for such determinations shall meet the reguirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation requires the ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion and gives a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight when supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.

Knight v. Chater · filed 1997-12-10(d)(2)

The ALJ is required to “evaluate every medical opinion” he receives, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), and to “consider all relevant medical evidence of record in reaching a conclusion as to disability,” Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289, 291 (10th Cir. 1989). A treating physician’s opinion about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairment will be given controlling weight if it is supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1029.. Anything less is error which this court has censured on numerous occasions.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires the Commissioner to evaluate every medical opinion received, regardless of its source.

Rufino v. Apfel · filed 1998-04-17(d)

Pursuant to its own regulations, the Commissioner must evaluate every medical opinion it receives, regardless of its source.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ evaluating conflicting medical evidence to consider factors including the treatment relationship, the physician's specialty, and the opinion's consistency and supportability.

Hanson v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security, 1 · filed 1998-07-28(a)-(d)

The ALJ also must consider factors such as "the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; the physician's speciality; and the consistency and supportability of the physician's opinion." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)-(d), 416.927(a)-(d)).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires the Commissioner to evaluate every medical opinion and gives a well-supported treating physician's opinion controlling weight unless it is inconsistent with substantial evidence.

Gonzalez v. Apfel · filed 1999-08-25(d)

Pursuant to SSA regulations, the Commissioner must evaluate every medical opinion received, regardless of its source. ... Evaluation of medical evidence is governed by the “treating physical rule,” which states that the treating physician’s opinion as to the claimant’s disability, even if retrospective, is controlling if it is well-supported by medically acceptable techniques and is not inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion he receives.

Flores v. Apfel · filed 2000-11-13(d)

The ALJ is required to “evaluate every medical opinion” he receives, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d), and to “consider all relevant medical evidence of record in reaching a conclusion as to disability,” Baker v. Bowen , 886 F.2d 289, 291 (10th Cir. 1989).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits an ALJ to determine a claimant’s RFC from the record as a whole and to give less weight to an opinion that is inconsistent with the source’s clinical findings or the record.

Daniels v. Apfel · filed 2000-11-29(d)(4), (e)(2)

First, the ALJ has sole responsibility for determining appellant’s RFC, including his mental RFC, based upon the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4-5. Second, the PRT form is a psychiatrist’s opinion, and the ALJ is not bound by conclusions expressed in such an opinion to the extent those conclusions are inconsistent with the psychiatrist’s own clinical findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion”); cf. Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating even treating physician’s opinion may be rejected if not supported by specific findings or the evidence).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) requires the ALJ to evaluate a medical opinion in light of the record as a whole or recontact the source to resolve ambiguity or inconsistency.

Bibbs v. Apfel · filed 2001-01-19(c)(3)

Even if it were, the regulations call for the ALJ to evaluate Dr. Sikka’s opinion in light of the record as a whole or recontact Dr. Sikka to explain any ambiguity or inconsistency in his opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions, generally give greater weight to treating sources, give controlling weight to a well-supported and consistent treating-source opinion, and explain the reasons for the weight assigned.

Valdez v. Apfel · filed 2000-07-17(d)

The ALJ is required to evaluate every medical opinion she receives. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). More weight is generally given to opinions from treating sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). If a treating source’s opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record, [it] will [be] give[n] controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); ... The ALJ must give good reasons for the weight given to a treating source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines medical opinions as statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about an impairment's nature and severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, what the claimant can still do, and physical or mental restrictions.

McKinney v. Barnhart · filed 2003-04-04(a)(2)

The determination of disability rests on medical opinions. Medical opinions are “statements from . . . acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). Acceptable medical sources are defined at § 404.1513(a). Medical journal articles are not included as acceptable medical sources. We cannot give persuasive authority to an attorney’s extrapolation of a medical article to his client’s condition. See, generally, Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *4 (clarifying that medical source statements must be submitted by acceptable medical sources and are to be based on the medical sources’ personal knowledge of the claimant). While medical literature can be cited and relied on to support a claimant’s position, it cannot be the only evidence showing disability.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to apply specified factors when evaluating medical-source opinions.

Cuthbertson v. SSA · filed 2003-06-20(d)

The ALJ must apply the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) to evaluate the opinions of medical sources.2 SSR 96-5P, 1996 WL 374183, * 3 .
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 guides the ALJ's evaluation of medical opinions, including the selection of the opinion most informed and consistent with the record.

Winfield v. Barnhart · filed 2003-07-01

The ALJ’s decision was supported by the testimony of every medical expert and by all objective medical tests, both past and present. The ALJ’s process of evaluating the medical testimony followed the guidelines of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The ALJ found that the analysis by Dr. Newman was the most informed and consistent with the record.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) and (e) do not make a conclusory doctor’s statement that a claimant cannot work controlling when it lacks medical support, and the ultimate disability determination remains for the Commissioner.

Irizarry-Sanchez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2003-03-31(d) and (e)

Irizarry points to Dr. del Rio’s note stating that Irizarry “can’t work; facial keratitis.” Notwithstanding, this conclusory opinion was not supported medical evidence describing the way in which that condition precluded Irizarry from engaging in any work. ... With respect to the medical evidence, the determination of total disability is an issue reserved for the Commissioner.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an administrative law judge to evaluate state-agency physicians' findings as other medical-opinion evidence when assessing residual functional capacity.

Reeves v. Barnhart · filed 2003-05-12(f)

In determining whether a claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform the requirements of her past relevant work, an administrative law judge must consider any medical opinions from acceptable medical sources which reflect judgments about the nature and severity of the impairments and resulting limitations. ... State agency physicians are experts in the evaluation of the medical issues in disability claims, and administrative law judges must evaluate their findings as they do other opinion evidence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to consider medical opinions from acceptable medical sources that address the nature and severity of impairments and resulting limitations.

Bush v. Barnhart · filed 2003-08-28

The ALJ also correctly noted that the regulations mandate that he consider any medical opinions from acceptable medical sources which reflect judgments about the nature and severity of the impairments and resulting limitations.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate a physician's expert opinion using the regulatory evidentiary factors, without treating substance-use disorders as a probative factor in the initial disability determination.

Brueggemann v. Barnhart · filed 2003-11-03

The ALJ must base this disability determination on substantial evidence of Brueggemann's medical limitations without deductions for the assumed effects of substance use disorders. The inquiry here concerns strictly symptoms, not causes, and the rules for how to weigh evidence of symptoms remain well established. Substance use disorders are simply not among the evidentiary factors our precedents and the regulations identify as probative when an ALJ evaluates a physician's expert opinion in the initial determination of the claimant's disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) identifies five principal factors for evaluating the weight of a medical opinion, including the examining relationship, treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Doud v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2003-10-28(d)

There are five principal factors involved in evaluating the weight of a medical opinion; namely, (1) the examining relationship; (2) the treatment relationship; (3) supportability; (4) consistency; and (5) specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2003). Although Dr. George is not a mental health specialist, it is undisputed that he had examined and treated Doud for over five years. As her long-time physician, he had more experience with Doud’s physical, emotional, and psychological condition than any other health professional. His observations and conclusions were also consistent with the other medical evidence in this case, including the opinions of Laura Alton (psychotherapist), Drs. Ron Melvin and Mumtaz Suleman (psychiatrists), and Dr. George Pestrue (psychologist). Based upon this record, Dr. George’s opinion should have been given “deferential weight.” Magistrate Judge’s Report at 10.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)-(6) identifies the factors relevant to evaluating the weight of a medical opinion and does not include a claimant's testimony as a listed reason to reject the opinion.

Higgins v. Barnhart · filed 2003-12-04(d)(1)-(6)

The regulations provide a list of acceptable reasons to reject a doctor’s opinion; the list does not include a claimant’s testimony.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits an ALJ to consider and rely on opinions from nonexamining medical sources as opinion evidence, including when weighing conflicting medical opinions.

Moody v. Comm Social Security · filed 2004-11-16(f)

Although it is true that treating physicians are generally given more weight, an ALJ is not foreclosed from relying upon a non-examining physician’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The Regulations allow the ALJ to rely upon medical opinions and specifically provide that “all evidence from nonexamining sources [is] opinion evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation requires the ALJ to consider six listed factors when weighing a medical opinion.

Brown v. Barnhart · filed 2005-03-24(d)(2)-(6)

In weighing any medical opinion, the ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) the “length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination”; (2) the “nature and extent of the treatment relationship”; (3) the amount of relevant evidence supporting the physician’s opinion; (4) how consistent that opinion is with the rest of the record; (5) whether the physician is a specialist; and (6) other factors tending to support or contradict the opinion.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider medical opinions but allows the ALJ to reject them after evaluating the expert’s specialty, expertise, supporting evidence, and explanations.

Haynes, Richard v. Barnhart, Jo Anne · filed 2005-07-26(f)(2)

While it is true that the regulations require an ALJ to consider opinions offered by medical experts, an ALJ is not bound by those opinions and must evaluate them in the context of the expert’s medical specialty and expertise, supporting evidence in the record, and other explanations regarding the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f)(2); 416.927(f)(2).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires adjudicators evaluating medical source opinions to apply the applicable regulatory factors.

Dutil v. Barnhart · filed 2005-12-09(d)

When evaluating any medical source opinion-treating or non treating source, the ALJ is required to consider the factors listed in the regulations. Social Security Ruling 96-5p reaffirms the need for adjudicators to apply the applicable factors in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 directs courts to weigh medical opinions using factors including examination, treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Johnson v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-12-12

Courts evaluate and weigh medical opinions pursuant to the following nonexclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician’s opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (2005). Courts often accord “greater weight to the testimony of a treating physician” because the treating physician has necessarily examined the applicant and has a treatment relationship with the applicant.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ evaluating a treating source’s medical opinion to consider and discuss the prescribed factors, even when the opinion is not given controlling weight.

Moore-Gibbon v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-04-26(c)

The list of factors in § 404.1527 does not exist to occupy space. Indeed, even if an ALJ articulates a good reason for refusing to give a treating source controlling weight, remand can be based on the ALJ’s failure to discuss the “required checklist of factors.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, the ALJ failed to consider any factors other than the consistency of Dr. Payne’s opinion. True, this is one of the most important factors. However, the Commissioner points to no authority that permits the ALJ to consider this factor to the exclusion of the others.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider the listed factors—including the examining and treatment relationships, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, and source specialization—when deciding how much weight to give a medical opinion.

Hunter v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-02-24(c)

To determine the weight to give a medical opinion, an ALJ must consider several factors, including the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, the evidence presented to support the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with other evidence, and the specialization of the medical professional. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). ... The ALJ stated with particularity the weight he gave Dr. Nichol’s opinion; considered the entire medical record along with that opinion; and found that Dr. Nichol’s opinion was only entitled to some weight. The court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in assessing Dr. Nichols’ opinion and that substantial evidence supports the weight he gave to that opinion.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ who declines to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to consider the treatment relationship, supporting explanation, consistency with other evidence, and physician specialty.

Love v. Saul · filed 2022-05-23(c)

For claims filed before March 27, 2017, as Plaintiff’s claim was, Section 404.1527(c) of the Social Security regulations provides that if an ALJ does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must consider the following factors in deciding what weight to give the physician’s opinion: the length, nature, and extent of the treating relationship; the opinion’s supporting explanation and consistency with other evidence; and any specialty of the physician.
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Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ evaluating a pre-March 27, 2017 application to explain the weight given to each medical-source opinion and consider factors including the treating relationship, examination frequency, treatment relationship, and supportability.

(SS) Warecki v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-22(c)(2)–(6)

When evaluating applications filed before March 27, 2017, as here, the ALJ must explain the weight he gives to all medical source opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... However, in doing so, the ALJ must also “consider factors such as the length of the treating relationship, the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, or the supportability of the opinion.” Treviso v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 2017) (ALJ’s failure to consider treating physician factors under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) “alone constitutes reversible legal error.” (emphasis added)).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats a medical source who treats or evaluates a claimant and has an ongoing treatment relationship as a treating source at the top of the medical-opinion hierarchy.

Dabney v. O'Malley · filed 2025-03-18(a)(2)

At the top are treating physicians––or medical sources who treat or evaluate the claimant and have an ongoing treatment relationship with her. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2); Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1036–38 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Section 404.1527(c)’s treating-source rules apply to medical doctors and other acceptable medical sources, but not physician assistants.

Alvarez v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-01-05(c)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff incorrectly characterizes PA Reeves as a treating provider under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), which only applies to medical doctors ... and “acceptable medical sources.”
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Medical-expert source weight

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) directs adjudicators to evaluate medical opinions under six specified factors.

Washington v. Barnhart · filed 2006-01-06(d)

Finally, his decision reflects that he evaluated plaintiffs subjective complaints in accordance with the seven factors specified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and he evaluated Dr. Walkes’s opinions in accordance with the six factors specified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The court, therefore cannot find an error in methodology that might deprive the decision of substantial eviden-tiary support.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 directs decisionmakers to weigh medical opinions using factors including examination, the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization.

Johnson v. Barnhart, Comm · filed 2006-01-26

Courts evaluate and weigh medical opinions pursuant to the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician’s opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physi-cian is a specialist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (2005).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to consider specified factors when evaluating medical opinions and explain the weight given to them.

Keys v. Barnhart · filed 2006-04-25(d)

The ALJ properly considered the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) and explained why she gave more credit to Dr. An’s opinion.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(b) requires medical opinions to be considered together with all the relevant evidence.

Lopez v. Barnhart · filed 2006-06-13(b)

Second, the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Primer’s opinion in the context of the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) (stating that medical opinions must be considered with all the relevant evidence); White, 287 F.3d at 907 (explaining that a treating physician’s opinion should be consistent with other substantial evidence).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate and weigh medical opinions using non-exclusive factors such as examination, treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization.

Hines v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-07-11

The ALJ was obligated to evaluate and weigh medical opinions “pursuant to the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician’s opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally gives greater weight to the opinions of examining rather than non-examining physicians, treating rather than non-treating physicians, and specialists in their areas of expertise rather than non-specialists.

Davis v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart · filed 2006-07-21(d)(1), (2) & (5)

Generally, the opinions of examining physicians are given more weight than non-examining, treating more than non-treating, and specialists on issues within their areas of expertise more weight than non-specialists. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (2) & (5). ... Having clearly noted the little weight he gave to Doctors Crum and Tocci’s opinions, the ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Smith that Davis’s depression was not grave. The ALJ articulated his reasons for discrediting the other evaluating doctors’ opinions, which is supported by the record.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion and generally give more weight to opinions from examining sources than from nonexamining sources.

Babcock v. Barnhart · filed 2006-02-06(d)

The regulations inform claimants that “we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive,” and that “[generally, we give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits an ALJ to request and consider medical-expert opinions about the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments and whether they equal a listed impairment, but does not require the ALJ to do so.

Hardee v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-07-25

Social Security regulations permit—but do not require—an ALJ to “ask for and consider opinions from medical experts on the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s),” and whether they equal the requirements of a listed impairment.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)’s factors for evaluating medical opinions do not apply to an opinion from a consultative examiner who is not a treating physician.

Lewis v. Barnhart · filed 2006-09-26(d)

The factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) are not applicable in this instance because Dr. Scott-Gurnell is not a treating physician.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats statements from acceptable medical sources as medical opinions and permits an ALJ to give less weight to an opinion that conflicts with more convincing medical opinions.

Arnold, Steven v. Barnhart, Jo Anne · filed 2007-01-16(a)(2), (d)(2)

While one neighbor testified that he had worked in special education administration for twenty years and “interacted in one way or another . . . with probably 500 people with brain injury,” and the other testified that he had been the Director for Senior Housing and Handicapped Housing for Catholic Charities for approximately twenty years, neither neighbor’s experience qualified either of them to render a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2) (defining “medical opinions” as statements by “acceptable medical sources”), 404.1513(a) (medical sources include physicians, psychologists, optometrists, podiatrists, and qualified speech-language pathologists). ... Because Dr. Hoffman’s opinion was in conflict with the more convincing opinions of the other medical experts, the ALJ was entitled to disregard it. See White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions and explain the reasons for the resulting determinations well enough to permit meaningful review.

Cohen v. Barnhart · filed 2006-11-17

These regulations set the framework by which an ALJ is to evaluate medical opinions and explain the reasons for his or her determinations in order to allow meaningful review.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires medical opinions to be considered and evaluated under the factors specified in the regulations.

Ferran v. Astrue · filed 2007-09-14(d)

Medical opinions must not be ignored, and will be evaluated in accordance with factors contained in the regulations. ... Moreover, the ALJ need not give reasons for rejecting Dr. Preston’s report because he did not reject it.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ weighing medical opinions to consider factors including the examining and treatment relationships, supportability, consistency with the record, and the doctor’s specialization.

Tina Music Gordon v. Astrue · filed 2007-10-04(d)(1)-(6)

The ALJ considers many factors when weighing medical opinions, including the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, how supported an opinion is, whether an opinion is consistent with the record, and a doctor’s specialization. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1)-(6); 416.927(d)(2-6).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 directs the ALJ to give more weight to treating-source opinions and to consider state-agency medical and psychological consultants' findings as opinion evidence.

Hoffman v. Astrue · filed 2007-12-13

In determining disability, the Commissioner “give[s] more weight to opinions from . . . treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of . . . medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). ... Additionally, an ALJ “must consider findings of [non-examining] State agency medical and psychological consultants . . . as opinion evidence, except for the ultimate determination about whether [the claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(i). ... Here, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinions of Drs. Warriner and Billingsley. Neither of these physicians was a treating physician, and thus their opinions were entitled to less weight than the opinions of Hoffman’s treating physicians. Moreover, the medical records do not support the opinions given by Warriner and Billingsley.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires the ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion regardless of its source.

Vitela v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2007-08-23(d)

Further, the ALJ had to provide at least some reason supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the opinion of the reviewing DSS physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) ("Regardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive.”).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When a treating-source opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the Commissioner must still weigh it using the regulatory factors and explain the weight assigned.

Ruff v. Astrue · filed 2007-10-24(d)

No medical opinion may be ignored and, unless a treating source opinion is given controlling weight, all such opinions will be evaluated by the Commissioner in accordance with certain regulatory factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); ... In evaluating medical opinions, an ALJ must first determine whether the treating source(s) opinions are worthy of controlling weight. ... If not, the treating source(s) opinions are “still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 416.927.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an administrative law judge to evaluate medical opinions under a regulatory framework that generally gives greater weight to treating and examining sources than to non-treating and non-examining sources.

Pfeiffer v. Astrue · filed 2008-05-30(d)

The commissioner has established a regulatory framework that explains how an administrative law judge is to evaluate medical opinions, including opinions from state agency medical or psychological consultants. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Generally, opinions from sources who have treated the plaintiff are entitled to more weight than non-treating sources, and opinions from sources who have examined the plaintiff are entitled to more weight than opinions from non-examining sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) and (2), 416.927(d)(1) and (2).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation requires the Commissioner to evaluate every medical opinion and consider enumerated factors when weighing it unless a treating-source opinion receives controlling weight.

Quintanilla v. Astrue · filed 2008-06-27(d)

Federal regulations require the Commissioner to evaluate every medical opinion received, regardless of its source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). When weighing medical opinions, the Commissioner is required to consider a number of enumerated factors unless he gives controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits an ALJ to give less weight to a medical opinion when its findings are inconsistent with other evidence in the record.

Gallagher v. SSA · filed 2009-04-03

Further, the ALJ’s decision not to give weight to M s . Chauvette’s limitation findings was not inappropriate because the findings were inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. In particular, D r . Jaffe and D r . Cylus found that Gallagher had no manipulative limitations and had greater standing and walking capabilities than found by M s . Chauvette.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to consider the listed factors when deciding what weight to give a medical opinion, but does not require the ALJ to explicitly discuss every factor if the decision permits meaningful review.

Lauxman v. Astrue · filed 2009-04-15(d)

Nevertheless, the ALJ was still obligated to consider the factors of §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). Yet contrary to Ms. Lauxman’s contention, his failure to “explicitly discuss all the factors . . . does not prevent this court from according his decision meaningful review.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires the ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion, regardless of its source.

Henderson v. Astrue · filed 2009-06-10(d)

The regulations require that every medical opinion will be evaluated, regardless of its source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats as medical opinions statements from acceptable sources that reflect judgments about what a claimant can still do despite impairments or about the claimant's physical or mental restrictions; a statement containing no functional limitations need not be weighed.

Gibson v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2020-03-12(a)

Medical opinions are statements from acceptable sources that reflect judgments about what you can still do despite impairments and about your physical or mental restrictions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The ALJ did not err in not weighing Dr. Kamel’s statement because it does not appear to be an opinion within the administration’s regulatory definition. Moreover, while Dr. Kamel’s statement is on a form entitled Headaches RFC Questionnaire, it contains no opinion on functional limitations. Even if the ALJ erred in not assigning weight to Dr. Kamel’s statement, such error is harmless where Dr. Kamel did not opine to any functional limitations and no effect on the outcome can be shown.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source's judgment about the nature and severity of an impairment, including its symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and physical or mental restrictions.

Tajkowski v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-23(a)(1)

Social Security regulations define “medical opinions” as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (a)(1). ... Although most of Dr. Kaiser’s treatment notes do not necessarily reflect “judgments” about Plaintiff’s work capabilities, one note, dated June 21, 2011, states “Disability?” /d. at PagelD#613.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a) defines medical opinions as judgments by acceptable medical sources about an impairment and its resulting abilities or restrictions, including mental restrictions.

Celestine v. Saul · filed 2020-03-26(a)

“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a), 416.927(a). ... Second, a review of Dr. Billings’ mental medical source statement shows that Dr. Billings listed “repeating directions” as a capability that was affected by Plaintiff’s impairments. Tr. 1072. This was an opinion about Plaintiff’s mental restrictions, and thus, the ALJ was required to address this specific functional limitation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a), 416.927(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) treats as a medical opinion an acceptable medical source’s statement reflecting a judgment about the nature and severity of an impairment, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, or physical or mental restrictions.

Blankenship v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not shown, however, that Dr. Nielsen provided a “medical opinion,” as that term is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. “Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [her] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [she] can still do despite impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). ... Dr. Nielsen did not provide a judgment concerning the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s impairments, her abilities, or her physical restrictions. ... As such, his medical evaluation is not a medical opinion.
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Regulatory factors for weighing opinions

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ evaluating a contradicted treating or examining doctor’s opinion to apply the listed treatment-relationship and other relevant factors.

Mercado v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-02-08(c)(2)(i)–(ii) and (c)(3)–(6)

The ALJ must also apply the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)–(ii) and (c)(3)–(6). ... Here, the ALJ failed to provide the specific and legitimate reasoning required. ... Assuming the ALJ’s reference to “Dr. Beach’s treatment relationship with the claimant” refers to the fact that Dr. Beach did not have an extensive history of treating Claimant, that is but one of several factors the ALJ was required to consider. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)–(6).
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Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ evaluating a claim filed before March 27, 2017, to address the relevant regulatory factors when weighing medical opinions.

Nielsen v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-28(c)

Despite the Court’s clear instructions, the ALJ did not properly address the relevant regulatory factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(ii)–(c)(4); did not address the evidence the Court cited regarding Plaintiff’s memory problems, ability to work, and ability to learn that appeared consistent with Dr. Brietzke’s opinion; and did not provide an analysis of Plaintiff’s daily activities that complied with Seventh Circuit precedent. This was reversible error.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ weighing medical opinions to consider all regulatory factors, including supportability and consistency with the record.

McClodden v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2024-02-05(c)

Considering the ALJ’s decision and the records relied on by the ALJ, the ALJ properly considered all of the factors for weighing an opinion in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The ALJ’s discussion addresses the factors of the supportability and consistency of the source’s opinion with respect to all of the evidence of record.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ who gives a treating physician’s opinion less than controlling weight to consider all of the regulation’s medical-opinion factors, not merely supportability and consistency.

Dorsey v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-08-01(c)

Given all the above, the ALJ erred when, after deciding to give Dr. Guss’s opinion less than controlling weight, he failed to consider any factors under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) beyond supportability and consistency, and he failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Guss’s medical opinion.
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Regulatory factors and supportability

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) directs adjudicators to consider specified factors when determining the weight to give a medical opinion.

Lusardi v. Astrue · filed 2009-10-30(d)(1)-(6)

The ALJ did not expressly address all of the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) — (6) in determining the weight to be given to Dr. Zoubek’s opinion regarding Lusardi’s likely excessive absenteeism. However, in his decision, the ALJ specifically stated that he considered the § 404.1527(d) factors. His opinion also shows that he knew Dr. Zoubek was a specialist (urologist), considered the infrequency of Lusardi’s visits to Dr. Zoubek, noted the lack of support for the opinion in the medical records, and found an inconsistency between Dr. Zoubek’s opinion concerning Lusardi’s likely absenteeism and other opinions he had rendered.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits greater weight for medical opinions consistent with the record and from specialists in the relevant area, while conclusory disability opinions may be discounted.

Gant v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2010-04-07

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion.”). ... Because the record adequately supports the finding that Dr. Watson’s medical opinion was not supported by her own treatment notes and was inconsistent with the record as a whole, the ALJ was warranted in discrediting her opinion. ... Conclusory medical opinions are properly discounted as only the Commissioner can make the ultimate determination of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). ... See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5) (more weight should be given to a specialist about medical issues to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist). ... Because Dr. McGee’s medical opinion about sleep apnea was inconsistent with the record as a whole and related to a matter outside his area of expertise, the ALJ was warranted in not accepting his opinion.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) directs an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions using specified factors and give good reasons for the weight assigned to a treating source's opinion.

Dumensil v. SSA · filed 2010-08-04(d)

Regardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive. Unless we give a treating source's opinion controlling weight under paragraph (d)(2) of this section, we consider all of the following factors in deciding the weight we give to any medical opinion. ... We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give vour treating source's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (emphasis supplied). ... Given the particular facts of this case, the court concludes that the Administrative Law Judge was obligated to provide a more detailed explanation for his decision to reject the opinions of the physician assistant, Ms. Spelma - the medical professional with arguably the most detailed knowledge of claimant's condition, her treatment, and her response to that treatment. ... Here, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting Ms. Spelma's opinions are not sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate review.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires medical opinions to be weighed by considering the examining relationship, supporting objective findings, and consistency with the record as a whole.

O'DELL v. Astrue · filed 2010-09-08(d)

Several factors determine the weight that a medical opinion is due, including (a) the nature, length, and specialty of the examining relationship, (b) the amount of objective medical signs and laboratory findings supporting the opinion, and (c) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. I will analyze these factors in turn.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to evaluate a medical consultant's opinion in light of the consultant's qualifications and the medical evidence reviewed before assigning it weight.

Herron v. Astrue · filed 2010-12-22(a)-(e), (f)(2)(ii)

The ALJ also gave “great weight” to the non-treating State agency consultant’s opinion even though the consultant’s identity and specialty were unknown and the consultant did not review a substantial portion of the relevant medical evidence, including the records from Herron’s treating physicians and nurse practitioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)-(e), (f)(2)(ii).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an administrative law judge to evaluate medical opinions using relevant factors, including the treating relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other factors bearing on the opinion’s weight.

Sitsler v. Astrue · filed 2011-01-10(d)

Even if a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, it is still entitled to deference and must be weighed using the relevant factors. See id. The factors include the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treating relationship; the extent to which the opinion is supported by relevant evidence, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings; the extent to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole; the doctor’s specialization; and other factors tending to support or contradict the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must still weigh it using the treatment relationship, examination frequency, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, specialty, and other relevant factors.

Karger v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2011-02-10(d)(2)-(6)

Even if the ALJ does not give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, he must still consider how much weight to give it . . . . In doing so, the ALJ must take into account the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, the extent of the source’s knowledge of the impairments, the amount of relevant evidence supporting the source’s opinion, the extent to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole, whether or not the physician is a specialist in the relevant field, and any other relevant factors tending to support or contradict the opinion.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats a statement about the nature and severity of an impairment as a medical opinion only when it comes from an acceptable medical source; a social worker’s assessment is not a medical opinion that the ALJ must consider.

Dube v. SSA · filed 2011-02-24(a)(2)

Social workers are not “medical sources,” see Anderson v . Astrue, 682 F. Supp. 2d 8 9 , 96 (D. Mass. 2010); see generally, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(1)-(5), and therefore do not generate a “medical opinion” that must be considered by an ALJ. See Evans v . Barnhart, N o . 02-459-M, 2003 WL 22871698, at *5-*6 (D.N.H. Dec. 4 , 2003); see generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 404.1513(a)(1)-(5), (d)(1).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to give substantial weight to a treating physician's opinion, diagnosis, and medical evidence unless good cause supports giving it less weight.

Brunson v. Astrue · filed 2011-03-07(d)

Substantial weight must be given to the opinion, diagnosis, and medical evidence of a treating physician unless there is good cause to do otherwise.
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Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844). The 2012 rule moved the former treating-source provisions from § 404.1527(d) to (c) (77 FR 10651).

Section 404.1527(d)(2) gives a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight when it is supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and requires good reasons before the opinion is discounted.

Packham v. Astrue · filed 2011-01-04(d)(2)

A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is supported by the medical findings and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. ... An ALJ must offer good reasons before discounting a treating physician’s opinion.
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Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

When a treating physician’s opinion is not well supported or conflicts with substantial evidence, § 404.1527(d) requires the Commissioner to weigh it using specified factors, including the treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, specialization, and other relevant considerations.

Vincent v. Astrue · filed 2010-09-07(d)

In the event the treating physician’s opinion is not well supported or is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, the Commissioner must apply the following factors to determine the proper weight to give the opinion: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) how much supporting evidence is provided; (4) the consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether the treating physician is a specialist; and (6) any other factors brought to the attention of the Commissioner.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A treating physician’s opinion gets controlling weight only when well-supported and consistent with substantial evidence; otherwise, an ALJ may weigh it against the treatment relationship, the record’s consistency, and the physician’s specialty, while explaining the weight given.

LaBreque, Jr. v. SSA · filed 2011-01-28(d)(2), (4), (5)

In the present case, the ALJ did not err by failing to give controlling weight to Dr. Batlivala’s opinion, and giving “substantial weight” to Dr. Ahn’s opinion. First, substantial evidence in the record conflicted with Dr. Batlivala’s opinion, such that his opinion was not entitled to controlling weight. Standing in contrast to Dr. Batlivala’s opinion that claimant could only do less than sedentary work was Dr. Ahn’s opinion, the opinion of the Agency medical consultant, and evidence of claimant’s daily activities. Second, based on factors relevant under the regulations (20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), (4),(5)), the ALJ was entitled to discount Dr. Batlivala’s opinion and give greater weight to Dr. Ahn’s opinion, regardless of the fact that Dr. Batlivala was a pain specialist.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion received, and failing to identify a treating source prevents review of whether the required consideration was given.

Dennis v. Commissioner of Social SEC. · filed 2011-03-29(d)

However, the job of the ALJ is to consider all the medical evidence submitted to it. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) ("[W]e will evaluate every medical opinion we receive."). When the ALJ fails to mention a treating source by name or even acknowledge that the plaintiff underwent a relevant medical procedure, the Court has no way of determining whether proper consideration was given to the relevant factors in deciding the disability question.
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Notes 1–150 of 10,654, oldest cases first.

2,357 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Leech v. Bisignano, the cited regulation frames the review of medical opinions in older claims, but the quoted ruling concerns the weight of a VA disability rating under a different rule. opinion →
Maher v. Weinberger, section 404.1527 appears only in a footnote identifying regulations quoted by the administrative judge in letters to the claimant; the court did not interpret or independently apply this section. opinion →
Rayborn v. Weinberger, the regulation is cited only in passing to support the characterization of Administration consultants as independent evaluators; the court does not interpret or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Whittle v. Weinberger, the court only mentions § 404.1527 in passing to note that examinations may be provided at Administration expense and on reasonable notice; it does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Keef v. Weinberger, the regulation is cited only in reporting the Administrative Law Judge’s order for a psychiatric examination; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Adams v. Califano, the court cites § 404.1527 only in describing the agency’s initial claims-review process; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Alvarado v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the court cites § 404.1527 only while noting that the Secretary could have obtained further medical evidence; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Buzzeo v. Harris, the regulation appears only in a footnote parenthetical describing its examination requirement; the court decided the case on substantial-evidence grounds and did not interpret or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Hogan v. Schweiker, the regulation is cited in a footnote only to support the general point that a doctor's conclusion of inability to work does not alone establish disability; the court does not construe or apply § 404.1527's requirements. opinion →
Holndoner v. Schweiker, the regulation is cited as background for the court's discussion of medical-opinion evidence; the court's actual remand ruling imposes an explanation requirement based on case law and does not interpret or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Chappell v. Schweiker, the court cites § 404.1527 in describing the governing regulations and noting that the administrative law judge correctly stated the weight given to a physician’s disability conclusion, but the remand rests on inadequate findings and evidence regarding pain, not on a construction or application of § 404.1527. opinion →
Bettye H. Coats v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the regulation appears only in a footnote supplying a general citation for the weight given to a doctor's statement; the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1527 as the basis of its ruling. The holding concerned the ALJ's failure to give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted medical opinion. opinion →
Bilby v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cites § 404.1527 as authority for a general statement about the evidentiary weight of medical opinions, but does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its ruling instead rests on the case-law requirement that the ALJ give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting uncontroverted medical opinions. opinion →
Flam v. Califano, the court cites § 404.1527 only to direct the plaintiff to submit to an examination if ordered and reproduces the regulation in a footnote; it does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Summers v. Heckler, the court merely cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 after stating that the reports are not conclusive; it does not explain, construe, or apply the regulation. opinion →
United States v. Murray Bowman Brown, United States of America v. Murray Bowman Brown, A/K/A Bowman Brown, (Two Cases), the court cited 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1527 only to state that treating-physician conclusions are not dispositive in administrative disability-benefits cases, then distinguished that context from the district court's discretion; it did not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Ernest E. NOLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, Incidental: the court only reports that the district court cited 20 CFR §§ 404.1527, 416.927; it does not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527 in its own holding. opinion →
Wright v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Incidental: the court cites § 404.1527 only in a string cite supporting Sixth Circuit treating-physician precedent; it does not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Palmer v. Secretary HHS, the court identified § 404.1527 only as part of the claimant's remand argument and declined to assess how the revised regulations applied because the claimant's showing was conclusory; it expressly found resolution of the retroactivity question unnecessary and made no holding about the statute. opinion →
Baez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the regulation is mentioned only to describe the court’s earlier remand order; this opinion decides the issuance of judgment and EAJA timing, not what 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Flecha v. Shalala, the court mentions § 404.1527(e)(3) only while describing the Secretary’s record-development duty; it does not construe or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Lockhart v. Shalala, the court cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 only as a general reference while affirming the ALJ’s evidentiary assessment; it does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Oliveras v. Shalala, the court cites § 404.1527(e)(1) only in a general statement that disability determinations are reserved to the Secretary; it does not interpret or apply the regulation, and its treating-source analysis relies on § 416.927. opinion →
Maxmilliano VILLARREAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the court merely cites § 404.1527 in a string cite supporting its conclusion that the Appeals Council could discount an unsupported and inconsistent medical report; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Bruce W. KEATING, Sr., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the court cited § 404.1527 only in support of its broader conclusion that contradictory medical-advisor evidence can justify rejecting a treating physician’s disability conclusion; it did not construe or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Kathleen EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-App, the court merely cites § 404.1527 as authority for affirming the rejection of an unsupported physician disability opinion; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Laird v. Ramirez, the court merely reports § 404.1527 in the complaint’s list of challenged policies; it does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Armstead v. Chater, the statute is mentioned only to report the petitioner’s argument about the treating-physician opinion rule. The court did not decide that issue; it remanded because the Commissioner inadequately explained the Listing 1.12 analysis. opinion →
Keefe ex rel. Keefe v. Shalala, the court mentioned § 404.1527 only while discussing the unresolved question whether the treating-physician rule applies in Medicare cases; it did not construe or apply the regulation to a Social Security disability claim. opinion →
E.L. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee, the court cited § 404.1527 only in passing while concluding that the doctor’s bare assertion did not establish the claimant’s listed spinal impairment; it did not decide what the regulation means or independently apply its requirements. opinion →
Smolen v. Chater, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(3) only as one authority for the ALJ’s duty to inquire into the basis of a physician’s opinion; it did not interpret or apply that regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Rowden v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited parenthetically as a general reference for evaluating medical opinions; the court's reasoning rests on Cutlip and substantial-evidence review, not on interpreting or applying § 404.1527. opinion →
Dodson v. Chater, the court merely cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) as additional authority after applying the Polaski standard; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Diana DODSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-A, the court merely cited § 404.1527(c) alongside Polaski to support its conclusion that the ALJ properly evaluated subjective complaints; it did not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Massimino v. Shalala, the court mentions § 404.1527(d) while explaining the plaintiff’s record-development argument and then resolves whether the ALJ developed the record; it does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Saari v. Merck & Co., Inc., the court expressly said the regulation was not relevant to its decision and cited it only in a footnote while commenting on the favorable Social Security disability decision. opinion →
Russell v. Chater, Commissioner, the court merely stated that the ALJ properly applied the treating physician rule in accordance with the regulation; it did not interpret, explain, or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Balsamo v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, the court discussed § 404.1527(d)(2) and an unresolved question about chiropractors, but expressly declined to resolve that issue and stated that it did not rely on the regulation; the decision instead rested on the absence of contrary medical opinion. opinion →
Calsadillas v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1527 as supporting authority while reviewing the ALJ’s rejection of a treating physician’s disability opinion; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
King v. Apfel, Commissioner, the court merely cited § 404.1527(d)(2) in a footnote while finding that the ALJ had adequately considered the physicians' opinions; it did not explain, construe, or substantively apply the regulation. opinion →
Olson v. Apfel, the court merely suggested that medical-advisor testimony might have helped the ALJ; it did not interpret, apply, or decide what § 404.1527 requires. opinion →
Bridges v. Callahan, the court expressly declined to decide whether Dr. Lehman’s opinion was controlling under § 404.1527(d)(2) and resolved the appeal on the separate ground that no contrary medical opinion supported the ALJ’s sedentary-work finding. opinion →
Parker v. Callahan, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) while reciting the treating-physician rule as part of its substantial-evidence review; it did not construe or independently decide the regulation's meaning or application. opinion →
Richardson v. Apfel, the regulation appears only in the defendant’s argument about who should decide whether the impairment warrants benefits; the court did not adopt that argument or construe § 404.1527. opinion →
Feild v. Apfel, the opinion recites treating-source weighting rules while discussing subjective complaints, but it does not decide whether 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 required a particular weighing or apply that regulation to resolve the appeal; it affirmed the ALJ’s pain finding and remanded on education and vocational-expert grounds. opinion →
Regennitter v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1527 only in a parenthetical describing the distinction between treating and examining sources; it did not construe or apply the regulation as a legal issue in the case. opinion →
Daniel REGENNITTER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation supporting the general distinction between examining and treating physicians; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527 itself, and its decision rested on the ALJ's unsupported reasons for discounting the psychologist's opinion. opinion →
Townsend v. Apfel, the court recites the general treating- and consulting-physician standard under § 404.1527, but expressly declines to determine whether the ALJ violated it; the decision instead rests on the lack of a significant difference between the physicians’ opinions and the ALJ’s adoption of the treating physician’s functional limitations. opinion →
Johnson v. Virginia Retirement System, the court mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) only as part of Johnson's argument; it neither interprets nor applies the federal regulation, deciding instead whether Virginia law required a treating-physician rule. opinion →
Schafer v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(1) in a parenthetical while affirming because the treating physician’s conclusory opinion lacked testing and was unsupported; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Baguer v. Apfel, the court recites general treating-physician rules under Section 404.1527, but does not apply or decide that regulation as to any particular medical opinion. The reversal rests on the Listing 12.06 analysis and the claimant’s ability to perform past relevant work. opinion →
Freeman v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a parenthetical identifying a prior case that applied it; the court did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Freeman v. Apfel, the opinion cites § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a parenthetical to Prosch while affirming the substantial-evidence determination; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
McLaurin v. Apfel, the statute is cited only while recounting the court’s earlier remand decision; this fee-award opinion does not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
James W. Marsh, and Other Similarly Situated Persons v. Omaha Printing Company, the court cited § 404.1527(e) in a footnote as support for distinguishing a medical opinion from an SSA disability determination; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527(a); it appears only in Burnett’s argument as a citation accompanying her combined-impairments contention, while the court’s own discussion relied on § 404.1545. opinion →
Piscottano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6) through Durr only as nonbinding Social Security standards that may be instructive in an ERISA case; it did not construe or apply the regulation as governing law. opinion →
Karanda v. Connecticut General Life Insurance, the regulation is cited only in a footnote as authority for factors used by analogy in an ERISA case; the court does not interpret or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Carey v. Apfel, the court mentions § 404.1527(f) only in describing the administrative hearing and the ALJ’s solicitation of medical-expert testimony; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Denson v. Virginia Retirement System, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) only to contrast federal disability law with Virginia law; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the federal regulation. opinion →
Converse v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) only to support the background proposition that the ALJ has final responsibility for deciding residual functional capacity; it did not interpret or apply that regulation, and the remand rested on the ALJ’s failure to discuss the medical assessment under Social Security Ruling 96-8p. opinion →
Shimkus v. Apfel, the regulation appears only in a footnote discussing and rebutting plaintiff's citation; the court's decision rests on treating-physician precedent and the record evidence, not on construing or applying § 404.1527. opinion →
Williams v. Halter, the court recited § 404.1527(d) and related provisions in its general discussion of treating-physician opinions, but the appeal was decided on the need for vocational-expert testimony and the use of the grids; it did not apply or decide the regulation. opinion →
Higgins v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) as part of a general statement of the treating-physician-opinion standard, but its holding turned on the substantial-evidence support for the ALJ's pain-credibility determination rather than on interpreting or applying this regulation. opinion →
Huff v. Halter, the court cited § 404.1527 only alongside a general proposition about weighing physician opinions; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Freeman v. Halter, the court cited § 404.1527(d) in a footnote while addressing an unchallenged decision to discount a doctor's opinion; it did not interpret the regulation or decide a question about what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Brophy v. Halter, the regulation appears only in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, which the district court did not independently construe or apply; the court treated rejection of Dr. White’s opinion as potentially proper and remanded on other evidentiary issues. opinion →
Drysdale v. Woerth, the opinion mentions § 404.1527 only to distinguish Social Security disability hearings from civil trials; it does not construe or apply the regulation in deciding the motion. opinion →
Perkins v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1527 only as an alternative rationale the ALJ could have used for discounting the physician’s opinion; it did not interpret or apply the regulation in deciding the appeal, instead affirming because the opinion lacked evidentiary support. opinion →
Lewis v. Massanari, the court cited § 404.1527 only in passing as a general reference supporting a statement about weighing examining versus non-examining physicians; it did not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Ezell v. Massanari, the court cites § 404.1527 only as see-also support for a general physician-opinion rule and does not interpret or apply the regulation; its remand rests on the ALJ's failure to address medication side effects and the need for vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Perez v. Massanari, the court declined to consider the statute-related argument because it was raised for the first time on appeal; it did not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Earp v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the regulation is mentioned only in the plaintiff’s argument concerning the treating physician’s opinion; the court did not interpret or decide what § 404.1527 requires. opinion →
Gister v. Massanari, the statute appears only in the plaintiff’s list of alleged errors; the court did not analyze, adopt, or decide what § 404.1527 requires. opinion →
Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, the regulation is cited only in the dissent's background comparison of the Social Security and ERISA regulatory schemes. The court's decision addressed the ERISA plan's standard of review and did not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Corber v. Massanari, section 404.1527(e)(2) appears only in a string citation supporting the general proposition that RFC is an administrative assessment; the court did not interpret or specifically apply this regulation. opinion →
Daniels v. Social Security Administration, the court only reports Daniels’s unpreserved due-process argument and declines to address it because it was not raised below; it does not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Jackson v. Metropolitan Life Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., the court cites § 404.1527(e)(1) only to state a Social Security rule while deciding the ERISA claim; it does not construe or apply the regulation as governing law. opinion →
Siedlecki v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1527 in explaining the ALJ’s discretion and responsibilities, but the decision did not construe or decide an issue under that regulation; remand rested on the unsupported RFC finding and the need for vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Willis v. Baxter International, Inc., the court cited § 404.1527(d)(4) only as supporting authority for an ERISA benefits-review discussion; it did not construe or decide the regulation’s application as the governing standard. opinion →
Hernandez v. Massanari, the court cited § 404.1527 only in passing as support for its conclusion that the ALJ had legitimate reasons to reject a psychologist’s disability opinion; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Matoba v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(3) only in passing to support its conclusion that an unsigned and unsupported medical record deserved little weight; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Kieser v. Barnhart, the regulation appears in the opinion's general recitation of treating-physician law. The court did not decide how § 404.1527 applies to Kieser's medical opinions; the remand rested on the ALJ's inadequate pain and credibility analysis and improper exclusive reliance on the grids. opinion →
Fontanez Ex Rel. Fontanez v. Barnhart, the opinion recites § 404.1527’s treating-physician weighting rules in a general legal-standard section, but the court’s remand decision rests on the ALJ’s failure to develop standardized-test evidence and does not decide an issue about § 404.1527. opinion →
Hancock v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1527 only in a footnote identifying where the standard for weighing treating physicians opinions is set forth; it does not apply, interpret, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Kamerling v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the opinion merely reports the ALJ’s use of § 404.1527 in the procedural history; the appellate court did not construe or apply the regulation in deciding the appeal. opinion →
Edgerton v. CNA Insurance, the opinion cites § 404.1527(d)(2) as the source of the treating-physician rationale, but uses that rationale by analogy to decide an ERISA claim; it does not construe or apply the regulation as governing law. opinion →
Ridge v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(f)(2) only as support for the general point that an ALJ may rely on state examining physicians; it did not interpret or apply the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Dirnberger v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) to describe the Social Security treating-physician rule, but it did not interpret or apply that regulation; its ruling concerned the ERISA plan administrator’s consideration of medical opinions. opinion →
Hawker v. Barnhart, section 404.1527 appears only in a footnote's parenthetical recounting another court's statement, which Hawker does not analyze or adopt. The opinion's holding concerns 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 and the Appeals Council's duty to explain its treatment of additional evidence. opinion →
Leahy v. Raytheon Corporation, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only to describe the Social Security treating-physician rule as background and expressly reserved whether that rule applies in ERISA cases; it did not decide anything about this regulation. opinion →
Barraza v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) only as additional support for its treatment of a VA disability rating; it did not interpret or independently rule on the regulation. opinion →
Brown v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the regulation appears only in the ALJ’s reported finding and a related footnote; the court did not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, and remanded on other grounds concerning the RFC explanation and medical evidence. opinion →
Johnson v. Continental Casualty Co., the court cited § 404.1527(d)(4) only for a general proposition about weighing a treating physician’s opinion in an ERISA benefits dispute; it did not construe or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Brennan-Kenyon v. Barnhart, the opinion cites § 404.1527(f)(2)(iii) only parenthetically for the proposition that an ALJ may ask for and consider medical-expert opinions; the court relies on Green and its own analysis for the remand requirement and does not construe or independently apply this regulation. opinion →
Martin v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1527(f) only for a general proposition about considering nonexamining consultants; it did not interpret or apply the regulation, and its holding concerned the deference owed to treating physicians. opinion →
Hawkins, Mark C. v. First Union Corp, the regulation is cited only as support in a discussion of the treating-physician presumption in Social Security cases; the court decides an ERISA plan issue and does not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Hawkins v. First Union Corporation Long-Term Disability Plan, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only as an example of Social Security cases applying a treating-physician presumption; it did not construe or apply the regulation, and instead analyzed the ERISA plan’s contractual terms. opinion →
The Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, the Court merely describes the Social Security regulation while deciding whether ERISA requires a similar treating-physician rule; it does not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, the Court mentions § 404.1527 only to describe the Social Security treating-physician rule as background for its ERISA analysis; it does not decide what the regulation means or how it applies. opinion →
Jeffrey Benton, on Behalf of Lynn Benton v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court did not decide the meaning or application of § 404.1527; it cited subsection (d)(1) in a discussion of the separate treating-source regulation, § 404.1502, and remanded for that regulation’s application. opinion →
Calvert v. Firstar Finance, Inc., the court merely described the treating-physician rule used in Social Security disability determinations and then decided that an ERISA plan administrator was not bound by it; it did not construe § 404.1527 or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Briggs v. SSA, the court cites § 404.1527(e)(2) while reciting the general RFC framework, but it does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about its requirements; the remand rests on the ALJ’s inadequate explanation of the medical evidence and RFC assessment. opinion →
Echazabal v. Chevron Usa, Inc. Irwin Industries, Inc., the regulation appears only in a footnote reporting that Black & Decker declined to apply the Social Security treating-physician rule to ERISA; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Eastover Mining Co v. Williams, the court mentioned § 404.1527(d)(2) only to contrast Social Security’s treating-physician rule with the black-lung regulatory scheme; it did not decide the provision’s meaning or apply it. opinion →
Eastover Mining Co. v. Dorothy S. Williams and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Departm, the opinion mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only to contrast Social Security’s treating-physician rules with the black-lung regulations at issue; it does not construe or apply § 404.1527 to the dispute. opinion →
Henderson v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) only in passing while discussing the weight of physician observations; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Lincoln Hockey, LLC v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, the court discussed § 404.1527 only in a footnote as comparative background about the Social Security treating-physician rule; it did not apply, interpret, or decide any issue under the regulation. opinion →
Hurse v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance, the court mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) as part of the Social Security treating-physician rule, but does not interpret or apply that regulation; it decides only that the rule does not govern ERISA benefit decisions. opinion →
Bonuchi v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(3)-(4) in affirming the ALJ’s handling of Dr. Morse’s opinions, but does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires; the citation is incidental to the case’s resolution. opinion →
Dellinger v. Barnhart, the court mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) only parenthetically as authority cited in Castellano for a general treating-physician rule; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Matthews v. Barnhart, the court quotes § 404.1527(d)(2) only as general background about treating-source opinions; it does not construe or apply the subsection, and its ruling rests on a separate circuit rule concerning the examining psychologist’s opinion. opinion →
Norris v. Comm Social Security, the regulation appears only in a string citation supporting the court’s discussion of the treating physicians’ opinions; the court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Hynes v. SSA, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) only for the general proposition that RFC determination is the Commissioner’s administrative responsibility; it did not construe or apply that provision, and its ruling instead addressed the ALJ’s explanation of the RFC and incomplete vocational-expert hypotheticals. opinion →
Hynes v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) only while reciting that determining residual functional capacity is the Commissioner’s responsibility. It did not interpret or apply the regulation’s standards for evaluating medical opinions. opinion →
Sneed v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(5) for the general proposition that a specialist’s opinion receives greater weight, but the citation was only part of its reasoning on whether the ALJ should have ordered IQ testing; the court did not construe or decide the regulation itself. opinion →
Harris v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1527(f)(2)(iii) only as support for a general statement while evaluating the medical advisor’s credibility; it did not interpret or apply the regulation’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
McDaniel v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only in the ALJ reported findings. The court did not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; its discussion of treating-physician opinions relies on Ninth Circuit precedent and concerns the ALJ evidentiary reasoning. opinion →
James L. Batson, Sr. v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the regulation is cited only in the dissent to criticize the ALJ's treatment of Dr. Keenen's opinion; the majority did not adopt that reasoning or construe § 404.1527. opinion →
Snead v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527 only in support of its discussion of the ALJ’s failure to develop the record and remand; it did not construe or decide the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Folsom v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in the ALJ’s reported findings; the court did not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Hector v. Barnhart, the opinion cites § 404.1527(f) only in a string cite alongside the parallel SSI provision, § 416.927(f), and cites § 404.1527(c)(2) only through Greenspan; its actual application and ruling concern the SSI provision, § 416.927(d), not § 404.1527. opinion →
Young, James v. Barnhart, Jo Anne, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only while distinguishing the treating-physician rule; it held that no expert was a treating physician and did not decide the regulation’s meaning or application. opinion →
Young v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the regulation is only cited while distinguishing the treating-physician rule; the court notes that none of the medical experts was a treating physician and does not construe or apply § 404.1527(d)(2). opinion →
Brockway v. Barnhart, the court merely cites § 404.1527 in passing while affirming the Appeals Council’s substantial-evidence conclusion; it does not explain what the regulation means or decide what it requires. opinion →
Robison v. Barnhart, the court merely reports the ALJ’s finding that medical opinions were considered and does not decide what § 404.1527 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Saiz v. Barnhart, the citation to § 404.1527(f) appears only in a parenthetical describing the Commissioner’s brief and the agency physician’s opinion; the court did not construe or apply the regulation, deciding instead whether the ALJ properly accounted for a reaching limitation when relying on the grids. opinion →
Moore v. Barnhart, Incidental: the court quoted § 404.1527(d)(2) as a general treating-source preference but expressly said its analysis need not reach the good-cause question; the decision rested on the ALJ’s deference to the medical opinions and the supporting evidence, not on a construction or application of the regulation. opinion →
McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only while identifying the treating physician’s opinion as evidence supporting severity at step two; it did not interpret or apply the regulation’s treating-source weighting rule. opinion →
DEFORD v. Barnhart, Incidental: the court quoted § 404.1527(d)(2) as a general treating-source preference but expressly did not reach whether the ALJ had good cause to discount the treating physician; the decision rested on the severity analysis and the ALJ’s deference to Dr. Reddy. opinion →
Hill v. Barnhart, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(3) only in stating that the ALJ owed no deference to a vocational opinion; it did not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Elbert v. Barnhart, the court mentioned § 404.1527(c)(3) only in a See also parenthetical while discussing consultative examinations; it did not construe or apply that subsection, and its remand analysis relied on 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a instead. opinion →
Hospital Service District No. 1 of the Parish of Lafourche v. Thompson, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) to describe the treating-physician rule in Social Security disability cases, but it did not decide whether that rule applies to Medicare determinations; it expressly proceeded only on the assumption that it might apply. opinion →
Eiseler v. Barnhart, the court states the treating-source standard only as general background in its standard-of-review discussion; it does not construe or apply § 404.1527, and the remand rests on the flawed vocational hypothetical and impairment findings. opinion →
Cervantes v. Barnhart, the court merely cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 as support for the ALJ’s decision to discount a physician’s opinion; it did not explain, construe, or decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Hinders v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in the Commissioner’s quoted request for a remand and is not interpreted, applied, or decided by the court. opinion →
Ross v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1527(e)(2) only parenthetically through Diaz while discussing the general RFC principle that the determination is reserved to the SSA; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation in deciding Ross’s claim. opinion →
Lyons v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely reports that the ALJ stated it evaluated the treating source under § 404.1527; it does not construe the regulation or independently decide its requirements. opinion →
Barringer v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court discusses and applies the parallel SSI provisions in § 416.927. Section 404.1527 appears only in a parenthetical string citation to Diaz v. Shalala about chiropractors as other sources, so the court does not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Harris v. Kemper Insurance Companies, the court does not interpret or apply § 404.1527; it cites §§ 404.1527(d)(2) and 416.927(d)(2) only to identify the Social Security treating-physician rule while deciding that an ERISA administrator need not give that rule special weight. opinion →
Wright v. Barnhart, the regulation is mentioned only in the ALJ’s findings, which the court merely reports; the court does not interpret or decide anything about § 404.1527. opinion →
King v. Barnhart, the statute appears only in the court’s recitation of the ALJ’s findings; the court does not interpret or independently apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Monteiro v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the concurrence mentions § 404.1527(d)(5) only in a parenthetical citation to Holohan and does not construe or apply the regulation as its holding. opinion →
Jones v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1527 in reporting the ALJ’s findings and cites § 404.1527(e) only as authority for the general proposition that equivalence is reserved to the Commissioner; it does not interpret or apply the regulation concerning evaluation of medical opinions. opinion →
Henson v. Barnhart, the court mentioned § 404.1527(d)(1) only in an explanatory footnote and reported that the ALJ cited § 404.1527(f); it did not construe or apply the regulation, deciding instead that substantial evidence supported the Step 2 severity finding. opinion →
Wind v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the regulation is mentioned only while recounting the ALJ’s reasoning below; the appellate court did not construe or decide anything about § 404.1527. opinion →
BOROWKA v. Barnhart, the opinion mentions § 404.1527 only in recounting the ALJ’s finding; the court neither interprets nor applies the regulation. opinion →
Pearson v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1527 in a string of authorities while describing the ALJ’s consideration of medical opinions; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Tom v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only in a see-also citation after the court quotes factors from Branum and Watkins; the court applied those precedents to uphold the ALJ’s treating-physician analysis without construing or independently applying § 404.1527. opinion →
Dass v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in the opinion’s report of the ALJ’s findings below; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Grier v. Goetz, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) as a standard the parties should consider while revising a TennCare consent decree, but it does not interpret or apply the regulation; the citation is incidental to the court’s ruling. opinion →
Williams v. Barnhart, the court merely included § 404.1527(f)(1) in a passing citation after discussing whether the claimant's condition equaled a listing; it did not interpret, explain, or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Maharajh v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(e) only in stating that the equivalence determination is reserved to the Commissioner; it did not construe or apply the regulation, and its ruling instead addressed whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s disability determination. opinion →
Young v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only as an example in a general discussion of articulation requirements for treating-physician opinions; it did not interpret or apply that regulation, deciding instead that other regulations governing self-employment income were ambiguous. opinion →
Rush v. Barnhart, the court recited § 404.1527(d)(2), (e)(1), (e)(2), and (a)(2) in a general summary of treating-physician rules, but the provided opinion’s analysis addressed the incomplete administrative record and credibility rather than interpreting or applying those regulatory provisions. opinion →
Washington v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1527(e) only in a general statement that equivalence is reserved to the Commissioner, without construing or applying the regulation; its other reference merely reports the ALJ’s finding that he considered the medical opinions. opinion →
Grier v. Goetz, the court used § 404.1527(d)(2) as a model in reviewing revisions to a TennCare consent decree; it did not construe or apply the Social Security regulation as the basis for its ruling. opinion →
Stephens v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited as support for the court’s conclusion that the ALJ properly considered state agency medical consultants’ opinions in determining RFC; the court does not interpret or independently decide an issue about § 404.1527. opinion →
Brewerton v. Barnhart, the court recited the treating-source weighting standards and cited § 404.1527(d)(2) and (d)(4), but it did not construe or apply those provisions; the remand ruling rested on new medical evidence and good cause for presenting it later. opinion →
Wright v. Barnhart, the court merely cited § 404.1527(d) in passing while upholding the ALJ’s disability determination; it did not construe or independently decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Leech v. Comm Social Security, the court cites § 404.1527(f)(2)(I) only to identify the state agency physician as a highly qualified expert while assessing the evidence supporting Leech’s residual functional capacity; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Force v. SSA, the court cites § 404.1527(f) generally in support of its discussion of the ALJ’s RFC assessment, but does not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Caldwell v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in the plaintiff’s argument; the court did not adopt or construe § 404.1527(b), instead remanding on whether the ALJ considered Listing 12.04 and the plaintiff’s ability to maintain regular attendance. opinion →
Nguyen v. Barnhart, the court's ruling concerned whether the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons for rejecting treating and examining physicians under Lester and related precedent; § 404.1527(d)(2) appears only in a see-also parenthetical and was not construed or independently applied. opinion →
Beynum v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(f) only while recounting that the ALJ relied on agency medical consultants’ findings; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation, and its decision instead addressed the ALJ’s compliance with the Social Security rulings and the substantial-evidence standard. opinion →
Lumpkin v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in a see-also citation supporting a general statement about the weight given to physicians’ opinions; the court does not construe or decide anything about § 404.1527. opinion →
Janas v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1527(d) while reciting a general treating-physician rule, but it does not apply or decide that regulation; the remand rests on the ALJ’s unsupported credibility findings and treatment of subjective pain complaints. opinion →
Clay v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in plaintiff’s argument as one of several authorities. The court did not construe or independently apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; it upheld the decision based on the ALJ’s assessment of the medical evidence and substantial evidence. opinion →
Witt v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1527(f)(2) only in its general description of who bears final responsibility for deciding residual functional capacity; it does not construe or decide the regulation, and its remand rests on other deficiencies in the ALJ’s mental assessment and hypotheticals. opinion →
Woods v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1527(e) only in a background statement that equivalence is reserved for the Commissioner; it did not construe or apply the regulation, and the remand rested on the conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. opinion →
Norris v. Barnhart, the opinion mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only to explain that it is not the regulation applicable to Norris’s Title XVI SSI claim; the court applies and discusses the parallel § 416.927 regulations instead. opinion →
Daic v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, the court mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only in footnote 9 while quoting Black & Decker to describe the Social Security treating-physician rule; it does not construe or apply the regulation, and its holding concerns the separate ERISA benefits standard. opinion →
Gantt v. Commissioner Social Security, the court recited the treating-physician standards while reviewing the ALJ’s decision and then affirmed substantially for the district court’s reasons; it did not construe or independently apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Berg v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) only to identify factors for weighing medical opinions while resolving the treating physician’s RFC argument on the evidence; it did not construe or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
Keith, Peggy v. Barnhart, Jo Anne, the court cited § 404.1527 only to describe an ALJ’s authority to employ a medical expert while deciding whether the ALJ’s conduct showed bias; it did not construe or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Keith v. Jo Anne Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527 only to describe an ALJ’s authority to employ a medical expert while deciding whether the ALJ’s conduct showed bias; it did not construe or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Arnold v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court merely cites § 404.1527(d)(2) in support of the ALJ’s disposition of Dr. Hoffman’s conflicting opinion, without interpreting or applying the regulation’s requirements; its discussion of lay witnesses likewise only cites § 404.1527(a)(2) in a footnote. opinion →
Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentioned § 404.1527(f) only in a footnote describing the regulatory treatment of state agency physicians and psychologists. It did not construe or decide an issue about § 404.1527; its holding concerned the use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in the presence of nonexertional limitations. opinion →
Goodwater v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited only in the ALJ’s list of findings; the court reports that finding but does not interpret or decide what § 404.1527 requires. opinion →
Mathious v. Barnhart, the opinion cites § 404.1527 only in a footnote to a discussion borrowed from Brueggemann; the court’s decision concerns the order and evidentiary support for evaluating substance-abuse materiality, not what § 404.1527 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Grieves v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1527(f) only in a footnote as support for its separate conclusion that the ALJ considered the medical evidence; it does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Morales-Alejandro v. Medical Card System, Inc., the regulation appears only in a footnote as a citation supporting a general statement about treating-physician opinions in Social Security claims; the court did not decide what § 404.1527 means, requires, or how it applies to the case. opinion →
Palomino v. Barnhart, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 only in a footnote supporting the ALJ’s general description of medical opinions from acceptable medical sources; it did not interpret the regulation or decide how its opinion-weighting requirements applied. opinion →
Esteves v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1527(a) only in recounting the plaintiff’s argument that a treating source’s opinion may receive special significance; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation in its ruling. opinion →
Alexander v. Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts Long Term Disability Coverage, the regulation is cited only to support the court’s discussion of the nonbinding SSA ALJ assessment in an ERISA benefits case; the court did not adjudicate § 404.1527 or review the ALJ’s compliance with it. opinion →
Valiquette v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only while reciting the general treating-physician opinion-weight rule in its discussion of recontacting Dr. Warren. It did not construe or apply that provision to decide the case; the recontact claim was rejected because it was not preserved and the attorney reported an updated RFC from a new source. opinion →
Sloan v. Michael J. Astrue, etc., the court recites § 404.1527 in describing the regulatory distinction between acceptable and other medical sources, but its remand was based on applying SSR 06-3p; it did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 404.1527. opinion →
Lamb v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527 only as support for a general physician-opinion weighting rule and does not construe or independently apply the regulation; its remand rests on the lack of substantial evidence after the ALJ rejected the only medical opinion specifically addressing the claimant's abilities. opinion →
Jenkins v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) and (d)(5) while explaining why the ALJ could disregard vocational-expert testimony; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Ramirez v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1527(e)(1) only to identify that whether the claimant can work is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. The court’s directive to consider medical-source opinions is attributed to Social Security Ruling 96-5p, so the regulation is not construed or applied as the court’s holding. opinion →
Sloan v. Astrue, the court recites § 404.1527 in describing the regulatory distinction between acceptable and other medical sources, but its remand was based on applying SSR 06-3p; it did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 404.1527. opinion →
Donathan v. Astrue, the court discussed § 404.1527(d)(2) in evaluating the dissent’s challenge to the ALJ’s use of ACR criteria, but it assumed any error and affirmed on harmless-error grounds without deciding whether the regulation authorized that use. opinion →
Bennett v. Kemper National Services, Inc., the regulation appears only in Judge Cook's concurrence as part of a criticism that Darland imported the SSA treating-physician rule into ERISA cases; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Ruiz v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentioned § 404.1527(e) only while recounting the ALJ’s treatment of a treating physician’s opinion in the background; it did not construe or apply the regulation in deciding the EAJA fee issue. opinion →
Bowie v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1527 only in a string citation supporting its statement that the ALJ used the proper standard; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Hicks v. Astrue, the regulation is cited in a parenthetical identifying factors for weighing a treating physician’s opinion and alongside precedent supporting the ALJ’s decision; the court does not construe § 404.1527 or decide how any particular factor applies. opinion →
Zaccaria v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(f)(2)(iii) only as general support for its conclusion that the ALJ was not required to call a medical expert; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation, resolving the issue through Newell and the evidentiary record. opinion →
Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) only to describe the treating-physician rule in Social Security cases as background for contrasting ERISA review; it does not construe or apply the regulation, and its ruling concerns the ERISA plan administrator’s denial of benefits. opinion →
McNair v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the regulation is cited only while characterizing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Wilson; this court does not interpret or apply § 404.1527(d)(2). opinion →
Shafer v. Astrue, the citation appears in the opinion's account of the earlier appeal and supports a reported procedural error; this decision addresses EAJA substantial justification and does not decide what § 404.1527 means or requires. opinion →
Shafer v. Astrue, the opinion merely reports an earlier panel's conclusion that the ALJ violated governing regulations and cites § 404.1527(d); this court does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Maxwell v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6) only to identify the factors used in weighing medical opinions, then expressly declines to reach that part of the analysis; it does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Garrett v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) only for the general proposition that the ALJ is responsible for determining RFC while reviewing whether Garrett’s RFC was supported by substantial evidence; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Newton v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527 only to identify state agency medical and psychological consultants as experts while affirming the ALJ’s findings and RFC; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation’s requirements for evaluating medical opinions. opinion →
Bayley v. Astrue, the regulation is cited parenthetically as background authority for the factors used to weigh a treating physician’s opinion; the court did not decide what the regulation means or how it applies. opinion →
Weary v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(1) and (e)(3) only parenthetically through Frank v. Barnhart while stating that a physician’s opinion on whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work is a legal conclusion reserved for the ALJ. It did not interpret, explain, or independently apply those regulatory provisions. opinion →
Gritzmacher v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in a string citation supporting the statement that an adjudicator may ask for a medical-expert opinion. The court did not interpret or apply § 404.1527; its holding concerned the sufficiency of the evidence and substance-abuse materiality under § 416.935. opinion →
Bowie v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentioned § 404.1527(d)(2) only to contrast its clear explanatory requirement with the regulation actually at issue, § 404.1563(b), while distinguishing Wilson; it did not decide an issue about § 404.1527. opinion →
Henning v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) parenthetically through Diaz v. Chater while stating that RFC assessment is reserved to the SSA; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Griffis v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(2) in accepting a general point from the defendant, but did not construe or apply the regulation; it remanded because the ALJ failed to address the erosion of the sedentary occupational base and did not support the vocational-evidence finding with substantial evidence. opinion →
Sanders v. Astrue, the court merely cited the regulation while describing the ALJ’s reasoning; it did not interpret or apply the statute as an issue decided by the court. opinion →
Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely reports the ALJ’s rationale in the procedural history and does not decide what § 404.1527(e) means or requires. opinion →
Bowie v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only to distinguish Wilson’s treating-physician procedural issue from the borderline-age regulation it was construing; it does not decide an issue about § 404.1527 itself. opinion →
Schutter v. Astrue, the regulation is cited only as authority in a string cite while the opinion reports the ALJ’s rationale; the court affirmed the result without construing or independently applying § 404.1527. opinion →
Malloy v. Commissioner of Social Security., the court cites § 404.1527(e)(1)-(3) only to recite the general rule that the Commissioner retains final responsibility for the disability determination; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation, and its ruling rests on substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Scroggins v. Astrue, the court merely cites § 404.1527(d) parenthetically for the general subject of the weight accorded to medical opinions and does not decide what the provision means or how it applies. opinion →
Wall v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d) in passing to support its assessment of the relative weight of two psychologists’ opinions, but it did not interpret the regulation or state a rule about what it requires. opinion →
Everngam v. SSA, the court merely recited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) and (c)(2) and described the claimant’s treating-source argument; it did not decide what those provisions mean or apply them to resolve the case. The holding rested on the listing elements and the continuous twelve-month duration requirement. opinion →
Burton v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) as support for the treating-physician standard while resolving Burton’s argument, but it did not interpret the regulation or decide what its requirements mean or how they independently apply. opinion →
Hunter v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527(b), (d) only in passing to support its conclusion that the ALJ properly explained the weight assigned to medical opinions; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Bowens, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only to explain that the federal treating-physician rule arose from federal regulations, while deciding that Kentucky's disability scheme did not authorize that rule; it did not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Knox v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1527(b) only in describing Knox’s argument and does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; it resolves the issue based on Knox’s failure to identify the treating physicians and the consistency of the RFC with the medical opinions. opinion →
Huizar v. Astrue, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the ALJ's description of the authorities used in assessing residual functional capacity; the court does not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
O'Bier v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) parenthetically while stating background standards; it decides whether the claimant’s depression was severe at step two and does not construe or apply this regulation. opinion →
Rockwood v. Astrue, the court recited § 404.1527(d)(2)’s treating-source controlling-weight rule only as background; its decision turned on whether the providers were treating sources under § 404.1502, not on interpreting or applying § 404.1527. opinion →
VOONG v. Astrue, the court mentioned § 404.1527 only in a footnote listing general factors for weighing medical opinions; its decision concerned whether the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Finkel’s examining-psychologist opinion under Ninth Circuit standards and did not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Kirkland v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in a footnote as a citation supporting a general statement about the weight of a treating physician’s opinion; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
DiBlasi v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recited the treating-physician standard in its general disability-determination standards and did not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 to decide the appeal. opinion →
Delker v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited as support for a general proposition in the discussion of medical opinions; the opinion’s operative determination concerns the ALJ’s reliance on non-examining consultants and does not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Adkins v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) only for the general proposition that RFC determinations are reserved to the Commissioner; it did not construe or apply the regulation, and its remand rested on SSR 96-8p and the ALJ’s failure to consider bipolar disorder. opinion →
Williams v. Astrue, the court merely reported the regulation while recounting the ALJ’s rationale for discounting a physician’s opinion; it did not construe or apply § 404.1527, and its ruling rested on the lack of substantial evidence supporting the RFC finding. opinion →
McGahey v. Harvard University Flexible Benefits Plan, the court mentioned § 404.1527(d)(2) in a footnote as background for the treating-physician rule under Social Security, while deciding whether the ERISA plan administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously; it did not construe or apply this regulation as the basis of its holding. opinion →
Brown v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d) parenthetically as identifying factors for weighing medical opinions, but did not interpret or independently construe the regulation; the decision turned on the ALJ’s evidentiary reasons and the consistency of the medical assessments. opinion →
Edwards v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation appears only in a footnote’s parenthetical citation to Pethers supporting the general statement that a GAF score is not a medical opinion; the court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1527, and its ruling rested on substantial evidence concerning alcohol abuse and disability. opinion →
Kittelson v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) only to note that a treating provider's opinion might receive controlling weight, but it holds that Kreuger provided no opinion for the ALJ to evaluate and does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Kittelson v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only while noting that a treating source opinion might have been entitled to controlling weight; because Kreuger supplied no opinion, the court did not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Calderon v. Astrue, the opinion mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only while recounting the court’s earlier 2000 decision and quoting Schaal’s statement of the regulations; the present court does not construe or apply the provision. opinion →
Gray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) only in a footnote to explain that Dr. Greif’s statement was unrelated to IQ testing and concerned an issue reserved to the Commissioner; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Moreno v. Comm. Michael J. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527(c) only for a general statement that an ALJ weighs inconsistent evidence; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and its ruling rests on substantial-evidence review of the ALJ’s decision. opinion →
Somogy v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions §§ 404.1527(d)(2) and (5) in a footnote while noting factors the ALJ apparently failed to consider, but it does not construe or independently apply those provisions; the remand rests on the treating-physician rule and the ALJ’s failure to articulate good cause. opinion →
Terreri v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in plaintiff’s appellate argument; the court does not construe or apply § 404.1527 and instead affirms substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court. opinion →
Terreri v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in describing plaintiff’s argument; the court affirmed without deciding what § 404.1527(d)(2) means or requires. opinion →
Terreri v. Astrue, the regulation appears only as the basis of the plaintiff's argument. The summary order does not interpret or apply § 404.1527 and instead affirms for the reasons stated by the District Court. opinion →
BOLLAS v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d) only as a general standard while reviewing whether the ALJ’s RFC finding was supported by substantial evidence; it did not construe or independently decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited in a parenthetical to support the description of the ALJ’s consideration of medical opinions; the court does not construe or independently decide anything about § 404.1527. opinion →
Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited in a parenthetical to support the description of the ALJ’s consideration of medical opinions; the court does not construe or independently decide anything about § 404.1527. opinion →
Executive Director of the Office of Vermont Health Access v. Sebelius, the regulation is cited only as support for describing the treating-physician rule in Social Security disability cases; the court did not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 in deciding this Medicare coverage dispute. opinion →
Mejia v. Astrue, the court recites § 404.1527(d)(2)’s treating-physician rule as general background, but it does not decide the weight owed to Dr. Huber’s opinion or apply the regulation’s factors; the judgment rests on substantial-evidence review of the disability determination. opinion →
Goble v. Astrue, the regulation is cited only in the court's account of Goble's argument. The court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1527; its decision relied on broader evidentiary principles and cited case law instead. opinion →
YTTRIE v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) only in stating the general RFC review framework. It did not construe or independently decide the regulation; the ruling instead addressed whether the ALJ’s RFC date and Step Five determination were supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Rivera-Tufiño v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(d) only in passing for the general proposition that treating-physician opinions are not automatically entitled to controlling weight. It did not construe or decide the regulation; the decision instead addressed substantial evidence and vocational testimony. opinion →
Russell Ex Rel. C.G. v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Brandt, and the court expressly says it makes no definitive conclusion on the issue and cites Brandt only for illustration; it does not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
BONSANTO v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(5) in a footnote supporting a general observation about the weight given to specialists’ opinions, but the decision itself turns on whether the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinions was supported by substantial evidence; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Bristol v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court described the regulation and rejected the need for further analysis because the ALJ’s findings were consistent with the doctor’s opinion; it did not decide what § 404.1527 requires or resolve its application. opinion →
Thompson v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(5) only for the general rule that specialist opinions receive more weight; it did not interpret or apply the regulation as a basis for its ruling. opinion →
Fleischer v. Astrue, the court mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2) only within a citation to Baltazar and its parenthetical quotation of SSR 96-8p; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation, and its remand rested on the ALJ’s failure to consider the RFC assessment. opinion →
McCawley v. Astrue, the court merely cited subsection (d)(5) parenthetically while affirming the ALJ’s stated reason concerning specialization; it did not discuss, construe, or apply the regulation’s requirements as a holding about the statute. opinion →
Pedro v. Astrue, the citation appears only in the court's summary of the ALJ's residual-functional-capacity findings. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, so this is procedural history and an incidental citation. opinion →
Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, the court cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) only to describe the Social Security treating-physician rule by analogy; it decides an ERISA benefits dispute and does not construe or apply this regulation. opinion →
Hutchens v. Cssa, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4) without explaining or applying what the regulation means or requires; its holding concerned whether the ALJ gave adequate reasons for rejecting the doctor's opinion. opinion →
McLeod v. Astrue, the opinion cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) in footnotes as support for the general proposition that the Commissioner, not a treating physician, makes the ultimate disability determination, but it does not construe or decide what this regulation means or requires. opinion →
Dolbow v. Astrue, the court recites § 404.1527 in its general regulatory-framework discussion but does not apply or decide any issue under the regulation; its remand rests on the medical-improvement analysis under § 404.1594. opinion →
Paul v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Allen within a string cite. The court does not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527; its discussion of the nonbinding effect of a VA rating is presented as a general rule supported by precedent. opinion →
Rahe v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a parenthetical quotation of Teague’s general treating-physician rule while rejecting an unsupported argument about the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Pruitt’s opinion; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Perez v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527(e)(2) in passing to support a general statement about residual functional capacity; it does not construe, explain, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Clark v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1527 only in a general regulatory-framework recitation; it does not construe or apply the provision in resolving plaintiff’s claims. opinion →
Ratliff v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation appears only in the procedural history as the legal basis cited for the district court’s remand; this appellate opinion decides the EAJA fee issue and does not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Kahle v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation appears only in a footnote reporting its good-reasons requirement. The court’s remand rested on Eleventh Circuit standards concerning the ALJ’s articulation of reasons for rejecting an examining physician’s opinion, without construing or independently applying § 404.1527(d)(2). opinion →
Fuller v. Astrue, the court merely reported that the ALJ cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5) when noting disagreement among medical specialists; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(f)(2)(iii) only as a supporting authority for its conclusion that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion; it did not explain, construe, or decide what the regulation requires or how its terms apply. opinion →
Couitt v. SSA, the court mentions § 404.1527 only in a string citation and does not interpret or apply it; the discussion relies on other regulations and SSR 06-03p. opinion →
Libby v. Astrue, the regulation is cited only to support the ALJ’s substantial-evidence assessment of conflicting psychological reports; the court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Thomas v. Astrue, the court mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(ii) while reporting the magistrate judge’s remand reasoning in the procedural history; the appellate court did not construe or independently apply the regulation, and instead decided whether EAJA attorney’s fees should be awarded. opinion →
Warner v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a general string citation while stating a treating-physician rule drawn from case law; it did not construe or apply the regulation, and expressly declined to reach the related issue of the Appeals Council’s reasons for rejecting the opinion. opinion →
Esslinger v. Astrue, the opinion cites § 404.1527(b) only parenthetically through Tommasetti while holding that the ALJ failed to address or evaluate Dr. Amin’s opinion; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Sastre v. Astrue, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) only in a footnote while describing a Second Circuit decision and a circuit split; it did not construe or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Londono v. Comm., SSA, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 only in passing after finding the ALJ's explanation insufficient; it did not state or apply what the regulation requires. opinion →
United Medical Healthcare, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Services, the court mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a parenthetical citation to a separate case’s general treating-physician rule; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation in deciding this Medicare coverage dispute. opinion →
Rabbat v. Standard Insurance, the court cited § 404.1527(c) only to identify Social Security’s treating-physician regulations as a comparison to ERISA; it did not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Austin v. Continental Casualty Co., the court cites § 404.1527(d)(4) only as supporting authority for a treating-physician rule in its ERISA benefits analysis; it does not interpret or apply the regulation as a Social Security regulation. opinion →
Norris v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only to correct the claimant's citation, expressly stating that the SSI claim is governed by Part 416; its holding therefore concerns § 416.927, not § 404.1527. opinion →
Negrón v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1527(d) only to state that the Secretary weighs evidence and determines disability; it did not interpret or apply the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Levie v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court quoted § 404.1527(c)(2) while evaluating whether new evidence warranted Appeals Council review; it did not decide the meaning or standalone application of § 404.1527. opinion →
Carroll v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance, the court cited the regulation only to describe the Social Security treating-physician rule in comparing Social Security and ERISA reviews; it did not construe or apply the regulation as governing the case. opinion →
Krum v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance, the court merely reported Supreme Court dicta about § 404.1527(d)(2) and expressly stated that it did not apply a treating physician rule here; the regulation was not interpreted or independently applied to resolve the ERISA dispute. opinion →
Bhatia v. Retirement Board, Longterm Disability Program, the statute is mentioned only as authority for the SSA treating-physician rule; the court does not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and decides the case under Utah law. opinion →
Morris v. Colvin, SSA, the court cited § 404.1527(c) only to support the statement that the ALJ acted within her purview; its analysis and holding concerned the separate clarification requirement in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e), and it did not construe or independently apply § 404.1527(c). opinion →
Glenda Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(4) only in passing to support its statement that the ALJ properly credited more recent, record-consistent medical evidence; it did not construe or apply the regulation as an issue of law. opinion →
Orienti v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1527(c)(3) while distinguishing Barnett and addressing the record-development issue; it does not construe or independently apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Minutello v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance, the court mentioned § 404.1527 only in contrasting Social Security regulations with the discretion of an ERISA plan administrator; it did not decide a claim under, or otherwise construe the application of, § 404.1527. opinion →
Wells v. Astrue, the court used § 404.1527(c)(4) only in a Cf. citation supporting a general statement about rejecting medical opinions; it did not interpret or apply the regulation as a legal holding. opinion →
Rogers v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527(d) and (d)(2)(i) while reciting Ninth Circuit standards for weighing examining and non-examining medical opinions. Its remand rests on the ALJ’s failure to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, without construing or independently applying the regulation. opinion →
Bernard v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in Bernard's argument. The court did not adopt or construe that assertion about the regulation. opinion →
Fleming v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1527(a)(2) only to recite the regulatory definition of medical opinions as background; it did not construe or apply that provision, and its remand instead concerned the ALJ’s failure to explain the weight assigned to several opinions. opinion →
Gustafson v. Comm'r of Social Security, the court merely cites the regulation in passing to support its conclusion that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s weighing of medical opinions; it does not interpret or independently decide what § 404.1527 requires. opinion →
Olsen v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527(c)(3) in a string citation supporting its assessment of Dr. Kanuru’s form, but does not interpret or independently decide what the regulation requires; the citation is incidental to the court’s resolution of the medical-evidence issue. opinion →
Ronning v. Colvin, the regulation appears only as one citation in a string cite supporting the ALJ’s credibility discussion; the court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527, so the citation is incidental. opinion →
Max v. Astrue, the court merely reports that the ALJ considered opinion evidence under § 404.1527; it does not decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Burnette v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a parenthetical quotation of Green-Younger while discussing the evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC determination. It did not independently interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Smith v. Colvin, section 404.1527 appears only in a parenthetical citation to Richardson; the court's analysis and ruling apply the corresponding § 416.927 provisions and do not decide anything about § 404.1527. opinion →
Petty v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(1) only for the general background proposition that disability opinions are reserved to the Commissioner; it did not construe or apply that provision, and its ruling instead addressed the ALJ’s reasons for discounting examining psychologists’ opinions. opinion →
Forester v. Colvin, the court merely cites the regulation as authority for a general rule and decides the case under judicial standards governing the ALJ's rejection of a treating physician's opinion; it does not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 itself. opinion →
Nelson v. AETNA Life Insurance Co., the court mentions § 404.1527(c)(2) only in a footnote to describe the SSA treating-physician rule and contrast it with ERISA; it does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Burbridge v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is mentioned only in a dissenting footnote as background support for statements about the Commissioner’s role and medical opinions. The majority did not construe or apply § 404.1527; its remand concerned the ALJ’s analysis of Listing 12.05. opinion →
Compton v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527(d) only in a general statement of the standard of review and does not construe or apply the regulation to decide the case. opinion →
Greek v. Colvin, the statute is mentioned only in Plaintiff’s unadopted argument, and the Court expressly declines to address that argument. opinion →
Jaramillo v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(1) only as supporting authority for giving more weight to an examining consultant; it did not construe or apply the regulation as the basis of its disposition. opinion →
Cline v. Colvin, section 404.1527 is discussed only in the dissent, while the majority affirmed under the parallel § 416.927 provision; the dissent's discussion therefore is not a holding of the court about this statute. opinion →
Jacoby v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527(e)(1) only to recite the general rule that disability determinations are reserved to the Commissioner; it does not interpret or apply that provision, and its decision instead addresses the reasons for discounting a treating physician’s opinion. opinion →
Raid Elfadly v. Commissioner Social Security, the citation appears in the court’s account of the District Court’s conclusion about the ALJ’s treatment of the treating physician’s opinion. The appellate court did not independently construe or apply § 404.1527(c), but only generally agreed with the lower court and summarily affirmed. opinion →
Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the statute appears only in a parenthetical citation within a footnote describing Benecke's reasoning; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Davis v. Carolyn Colvin, Acting Cmsnr, the Fifth Circuit only reported the district court’s remand instruction citing § 404.1527(d)(2); it did not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Woll v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the court mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) parenthetically as authority for treating relationship length as a consideration; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation, and its ruling instead concerns the inadequacy of the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Griffith’s opinion. opinion →
Kalloch v. SSA, the court cited § 404.1527 parenthetically as one of the regulations cited by § 404.1508, but decided the case under the rules concerning medically determinable impairments and symptoms, not the evaluation of medical opinions under § 404.1527. opinion →
Lewen v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) and § 404.1527(a)(2) only to describe the general framework and definition of medical opinions. It did not construe or decide the case under a specific requirement of the regulation; the affirmance rested on the ALJ's RFC assessment, substantial-evidence review, and Eleventh Circuit precedent. opinion →
Evans v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentioned § 404.1527(d) only as a regulation cited in Evans’s argument; it did not construe or apply the regulation, instead deciding whether the ALJ’s explanation warranted remand. opinion →
Rice v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited only as a general background proposition; the court did not construe or decide the regulation’s requirements, and resolved the appeal based on substantial evidence and the ALJ’s stated reasons. opinion →
Cadet v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only while reciting the treating-physician rule from Swanson as background to its record-development analysis; it did not decide the regulation’s meaning or application. opinion →
Walker v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527(d) only in a parenthetical to support its discussion of the VA determination; it does not independently interpret or apply the regulation as the basis of a holding. opinion →
Rock v. Colvin, the court cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) only through Poupore as supporting authority for discounting a GAF score; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Henry v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(d) only for a general statement about evaluating medical opinion evidence; its decision turned on SSR 96-7p, the failure to consider explanations for lack of treatment, and inadequate record development, without construing or applying § 404.1527(d). opinion →
Vega v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(b) only while reciting general standards attributed to Wagner; it did not interpret or independently apply that subsection. The court instead decided whether the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence and relied on state-agency consultants. opinion →
Hart v. Colvin, the court was deciding class certification, not the merits of whether 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 permits or requires consideration of a disqualified examiner’s report; it merely described the regulation and treated the alleged violation as a common question raised by the plaintiffs. opinion →
Hart v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) only in a parenthetical listing factors in its general legal standard; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and its ruling rested on Ninth Circuit standards for rejecting medical opinions. opinion →
McKinzie v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527 only as support for a general statement about weighing physician opinions; it did not interpret the regulation or decide an issue under it. opinion →
Quintero v. Colvin, the court mentions 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) only in recounting the earlier appeal’s reasoning; this opinion decides whether the government’s position was substantially justified for EAJA purposes and does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Beard v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(c) only in a string cite at the end of its remand discussion; it relied on Clifton and Chapo for the explanation requirement and did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Maniscalco v. Colvin, the court merely reported the ALJ’s regulatory framework for weighing medical opinions, including a citation to § 404.1527(a)(2); the court did not construe or apply that regulation, and its remand instead addressed the unsupported RFC assessment. opinion →
Bisceglia v. Colvin, the court mentions § 404.1527(a) in a footnote giving the regulations’ general definition of medical opinions, but it does not interpret or independently apply that provision in deciding the case. opinion →
Eaton v. Colvin, the court mentions § 404.1527(f)(2)(i) only within a parenthetical quotation from cited precedent in a string cite; it does not independently construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Glasco v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1527(c) only parenthetically to identify factors for weighing medical opinions; it does not construe or apply the regulation in deciding the remand issue. opinion →
Siegmund v. Colvin, the court mentioned § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a footnote describing the treating-physician rule; it did not apply or construe the regulation in resolving the case, which was remanded for failure to develop the record. opinion →
Payne v. SSA, the court merely cited § 404.1527 in discussing review of the magistrate judge’s observations, then characterized that discussion as extraneous and struck it; it did not decide what the regulation means or requires or apply it in a holding. opinion →
Monroe v. Colvin, the regulation appears only in a footnote as a general description of how medical opinions are weighed; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527(c), and its remand rested on inadequate explanation of the ALJ's reasoning. opinion →
Miller v. Colvin, the court mentions § 404.1527(a)(2) only while quoting an administrative message that characterizes GAF ratings as medical opinions; the court does not independently construe or apply § 404.1527, and its analysis instead relies on parallel § 416.927 provisions. opinion →
Lee v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527(e)(1) only as part of a general statement of the governing medical-opinion standards; it does not interpret or apply that provision, and its decision rests on treating-physician principles and the evidence. opinion →
Sorrell v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court quoted § 404.1527(d) while recounting the parties’ dispute over whether the discharge summary was a medical opinion, but expressly declined to decide that issue because it was not raised in the district court; the regulation was therefore not construed or applied. opinion →
Alvarado v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(e)(2) as support while reviewing the ALJ’s weighing of a medical opinion; it did not construe § 404.1527 or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Gutierrez v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527 only in a general statement that the ALJ must consider testimonial and objective medical evidence; it does not interpret or apply the regulation, and its ruling concerns lay-witness testimony under different regulations. opinion →
Discher v. Colvin, the regulation appears only in a citation within Claimant’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider the treatment relationship; the court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527, instead relying on separate Ninth Circuit standards for evaluating the treating physician’s opinion. opinion →
Villarreal v. Colvin, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural summary as a requirement the ALJ said he followed; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1527, and the remand rested on inconsistencies in the RFC and light-work analysis. opinion →
Ortiz v. Colvin, the regulation appears only in a string citation supporting a general RFC-evidence proposition; the court did not interpret or specifically apply § 404.1527(e)(2). opinion →
Morales v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1527(c)(5) only in a footnote quoting the general specialist-weight principle; it does not construe or independently apply the subsection, and its ruling rests on separate reasons for rejecting the ALJ’s evaluation of the treating physician’s opinion. opinion →
Visinaiz v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a reminder of the treating-physician rule; it expressly stated that the case was being remanded for other reasons and did not construe or decide the regulation. opinion →
Wright v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in the ALJ’s quoted rationale; the district court reviewed the evidentiary weighing and remand issue but did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Gardner v. Berryhill, the court mentioned § 404.1527(d)(1)–(2) only in a parenthetical citation supporting a general proposition from Orn; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Greathouse v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recites § 404.1527(b) and (d)(2) as general background, but it does not interpret or apply those provisions to resolve the dispute. Its ruling turns on the separate acceptable-medical-source provisions for physical therapists. opinion →
Glover v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1527(c) only for the general background proposition that an ALJ should consider factors when weighing a medical opinion; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation, and its ruling instead concerns whether the ALJ adequately addressed the doctors’ opinions and the residual functional capacity finding. opinion →
Stauffer v. Internal Revenue Serv., the court cited § 404.1527(a)(2) only as comparative support for what the Social Security Administration permits, while deciding whether the IRS's Revenue Procedure 99-21 interpretation and application of 26 U.S.C. § 6511(h) were adequately justified; it did not construe or apply this regulation. opinion →
Leon v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1527 only in a parenthetical describing opinion-evidence evaluation for pre–March 27, 2017 claims; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Leon v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical explanatory citation about the filing-date framework; the court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527, and its holding concerned the ALJ’s handling of fatigue and lay testimony under the credit-as-true analysis. opinion →
Farr v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1527 only in a parenthetical citation to Orn and does not interpret or apply the regulation; it decides that the ALJ properly weighed the treating physician’s opinion based on the record. opinion →
Wellington v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a footnote reporting Social Security Administration guidance about GAF scores; the court does not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Leon v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation supporting the court’s discussion of nurse-practitioner evidence; the court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Marsh v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(1) as background while holding that the ALJ improperly failed to consider the physician's opinion; it does not construe or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Rousey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the court recited § 404.1527(c)(2) in a footnote as background for why a consulting source's opinion was not entitled to controlling weight; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and the remand rested on the ALJ's failure to account for non-severe mental impairments in the RFC. opinion →
Carter v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recited § 404.1527(a)(2)'s definition as background and did not decide the regulation's meaning or application; its disposition rested on the treating-physician rule and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Riding v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1527 in a general recitation defining medical opinions and listing factors for weighing them, but it does not decide an issue under that regulation. Its ruling concerns whether an assessment by a single decisionmaker was a medical opinion and whether the resulting error was harmless, under § 404.906 and related precedent. opinion →
Petersen v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(4) as one authority in a string cite while affirming the ALJ’s weighing of conflicting medical opinions; it did not independently interpret or decide the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Decker v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1527(c) only while reporting the prior judge’s remand instructions in the procedural history. Its own discussion cites § 416.927 and does not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Cardenas v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)–(ii) only as additional support for its application of Ninth Circuit precedent when reviewing the ALJ’s decision to give limited weight to the treating physician’s opinion; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Souto v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1527 only in a footnote about the effective date of amended regulations; it does not interpret or apply the regulation to decide the case. opinion →
Herring v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a parenthetical quoting the regulation through Orn; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, deciding instead whether the ALJ gave sufficient reasons under Ninth Circuit precedent. opinion →
Hofsommer v. Berryhill, the court recited the treating-physician rule and its factors but expressly declined to decide whether the ALJ complied with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; the remand was based on the RFC analysis. opinion →
Dimartino v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in the Plaintiff's quoted, copied-and-pasted objection; the Court found those objections improper, reviewed the R & R for clear error, and adopted it without deciding the regulation's requirements. opinion →
Carlson v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(1) only while describing the Commissioner's argument and then decided the case on the ALJ's inadequate explanation and impermissible post hoc reasoning; it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Barber v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only as a citation in the Commissioner’s argument; the court’s analysis does not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. opinion →
Incorvia v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1527(c)(3) only in a parenthetical quoting Papesh while discussing the ALJ’s weighing of medical opinions; it did not interpret or apply the regulation independently. opinion →
Lapuzz v. Berryhill, the court merely noted that the ALJ addressed the regulation’s listed factors while affirming the decision on the medical-opinion evidence; it did not interpret or decide what § 404.1527 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Gonzalez v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1527 only as support for a general standard about accepting or rejecting medical evidence; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation, and its ruling rested on the ALJ’s failure to apply SSR 83-20 to the disability onset date. opinion →
Wheatman v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1527(d)(2) only within a supporting string cite for the general treating-physician rule; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Brock v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1527(a)(2) only in a parallel citation to the general definition of medical opinions; its analysis of the factors for weighing opinions relied on § 416.927, so it did not decide what § 404.1527 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
McGee v. Berryhill, the court recited the treating-physician rule and cited § 404.1527(d), but did not decide the weight of any medical opinion under that regulation; it found disability at the listing step and expressly deemed the residual-functional-capacity issue unnecessary to address. opinion →
Holdridge v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the court cites § 404.1527 only in a see-also reference supporting the general proposition that disability is a determination reserved to the Commissioner; it does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Vay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the court mentions § 404.1527(c)(4) only in a parenthetical citation to authority quoted from Maldonado; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Johnson v. Berryhill, the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1527(d)(2); it cited the provision in passing to support its separate analysis of whether the claimant met Listing 12.05. opinion →
Johnson v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) for the general proposition that the Commissioner decides legal disability, but it does not construe, explain, or decide the regulation's requirements or application. opinion →
Johnson v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1527(d)(2) only for the general proposition that the Commissioner decides legal disability; it does not interpret or apply the regulation's requirements to resolve the appeal. opinion →
Sorber v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., the court mentions § 404.1527 in a footnote about which version of the regulations applies and cites it as supporting authority in the medical-opinion discussion, but it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its ruling concerns the ALJ's treatment of the medical evidence under Ninth Circuit precedent. opinion →
Walling v. Berryhill, the regulation is cited in a footnote to support an inference about what the ALJ considered when weighing Dr. Crall's opinion; the court does not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 as a legal rule. opinion →
Ryan v. Berryhill, the opinion recites the treating-source controlling-weight standard and notes that Dr. Lake’s opinions are consistent with the regulation, but it expressly declines to decide whether the ALJ properly weighed those opinions; the remand rests on the separate subjective-symptoms analysis. opinion →
Pike v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., the court merely reports Plaintiff's argument, including her citation to § 404.1527(c), and does not adopt, construe, or apply the regulation. opinion →
Joe R. v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1527(a)(2) at the end of a string cite supporting a quoted definition from another case, while explaining why the doctor’s letter was not a disability opinion; it did not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Redding v. Berryhill, section 404.1527(a)(2) appears only as the last citation in a string cite; the court did not analyze, construe, or apply the regulation independently. opinion →
Dole v. Berryhill, the regulation is cited as part of the general RFC framework, but the court does not analyze its factors or decide a dispute about what § 404.1527 requires. The ruling on the medical statement rests on the claimant’s credibility, so the citation is incidental. opinion →
Miller v. Berryhill, the statute is cited only in plaintiff’s argument about the ALJ’s treatment of a treating physician’s opinion; the court does not adopt or decide that argument. opinion →
Joanna Lynn F. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the court cited § 404.1527(d)(3) parenthetically for a general statement about the weight of nonexamining physicians' opinions, but its ruling addressed whether the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons for rejecting examining physicians' opinions; it did not interpret or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Y. Chatham v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court quotes § 404.1527(a)(2) only to define medical opinions in a footnote; its holding that the ALJ need not give a one-time examiner treating-physician weight relies on McSwain and does not decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Martin v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court expressly declined to conduct an in-depth analysis of the medical-opinion issue and offered only observations for the parties moving forward; its citation to § 404.1527(c) and filing-date applicability statement were incidental rather than a holding about the regulation. opinion →
Bingaman v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1527(d)(2) only in a quotation of Defendant’s argument; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation in its holding. opinion →
Phillips v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(c) only in a string citation supporting a general description of RFC review; it did not interpret the regulation or decide a dispute under it. opinion →
Storey v. Berryhill, the court recited the treating-physician standards and cited § 404.1527, but expressly declined to resolve whether the ALJ had good cause to reject the opinions. The decision instead remanded because the RFC determination was unsupported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Storey v. Berryhill, the court recited the regulation’s general standards but expressly declined to resolve whether the ALJ had good cause to reject the treating physicians’ opinions. Its remand rested on the RFC determination’s lack of substantial evidence, so the statute was cited as background rather than construed or applied as the basis of the ruling. opinion →
Hendrix v. Berryhill, the court mentioned § 404.1527(f)(1) only in a citation supporting the ALJ's treatment of lay and objective evidence; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Carr v. Social Security Administration, the regulation appears only in a string citation supporting a general statement about responsibility for determining RFC; the court did not interpret or otherwise decide anything about § 404.1527. opinion →
SPINELLI v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, the court mentioned § 404.1527(c) only while reciting general factors for weighing medical-source evidence; its remand decision addressed the ALJ’s treatment of obesity under other authorities and did not construe or apply § 404.1527. opinion →
Daugherty v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1527(c) only in a general description of the RFC assessment and did not construe the regulation or decide whether it was satisfied; the decision instead addressed the evidentiary support for the RFC. opinion →
Vargas v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion mentions § 404.1527 only to identify the regulation as applicable based on the claim-filing date while describing the disability-evaluation framework; it does not interpret or apply the regulation's medical-opinion requirements. opinion →
Green v. Saul, the court mentions § 404.1527(c)(2)-(3) only in a parenthetical citation to Filus supporting a general statement about discounting a doctor’s opinion; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation, and its ruling rests on the ALJ’s explanation and substantial evidence. opinion →
Green v. Saul, the court mentions § 404.1527 only in a parenthetical citation to precedent supporting a general statement about discounting a doctor’s opinion; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
…and 1,957 more.

Rulemaking authority

Authority for 20 C.F.R. Part 404 (FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE (1950- )), which contains this section:

Secs. 203, 205(a), 216(j), and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 403, 405(a), 416(j), and 902(a)(5)) and 48 U.S.C. 1801.

From the part's authority statement in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR).

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