Statute Annotations › Federal › 11 U.S.C. § 362

11 U.S.C. § 362

Automatic stay: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
11,926
Cited in passing
6,833
Citing cases indexed
33,213
Case dates
1979–2026
Screened through
2026-06-29
Checked for later law changes
2026-09-30
Courts' treatment: questioned
At least one reviewed case questions this section’s validity or scope. Questioned as applied — In re Medical Care Management Co. (2003-01-02) held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse-preempted application of the automatic stay to a Tennessee insurance-liquidation dispute; the court lifted the stay for cause, without declaring § 362 generally invalid.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

18,759 citing cases reviewed of 33,213 in the citation index: 11,926 interpreted the section (annotated below), 6,833 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-29 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 11 U.S.C. § 362?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1982-07-27 Pub. L. 97-222 extended the automatic stay to Securities Investor Protection Act liquidation applications. Source
  • 1984-07-10 Pub. L. 98-353 added the estate-property “exercise control” language in § 362(a)(3) and an express damages remedy for willful stay violations. Source
  • 1988-01-20 United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates held that § 362(d)(1) does not compensate an undersecured creditor for the delay in foreclosing or lost use of foreclosure proceeds, and § 362(d)(2)(B) requires a reasonable prospect of successful reorganization within a reasonable time. Source
  • 1990-06-25 Pub. L. 101-311 added a stay exception for a swap participant's setoff of mutual swap obligations as § 362(b)(14); the U.S. Code amendment notes record its 1994 redesignation as § 362(b)(17). Source
  • 1991-12-03 Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial held that § 362(b)(4) permits the Federal Reserve Board's ongoing regulatory proceedings despite possible later effects on estate property, and 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) bars a bankruptcy court from enjoining those proceedings. Source
  • 1994-10-22 Pub. L. 103-394 expanded the support, tax, and lien-perfection exceptions and added the single asset real estate deadline in § 362(d)(3). Source
  • 1995-10-31 Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf held that a bank's temporary hold on an account subject to a claimed setoff while it seeks stay relief is neither a setoff under § 362(a)(7) nor, in those circumstances, a violation of § 362(a)(3) or (a)(6). Source
  • 1998-10-21 Pub. L. 105-277 combined the governmental police-power and nonmoney-judgment exceptions in § 362(b)(4) and repealed former (b)(5). Source
  • 2005-04-20 Pub. L. 109-8 added repeat-filing limits, in rem relief, eviction and domestic-support exceptions, and redesignated the willful-violation damages remedy as § 362(k); most provisions became effective October 17, 2005. Source
  • 2006-12-12 Pub. L. 109-390 expanded the financial-contract safe harbors in § 362(b)(6), (7), (17), and (27). Source
  • 2010-12-22 Pub. L. 111-327 changed § 362(d)(4) to reach a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Source
  • 2020-08-21 Pub. L. 116-189 added § 362(b)(29), a further exception to the automatic stay. Source
  • 2021-01-14 Chicago v. Fulton held that mere retention of property seized before bankruptcy does not itself violate § 362(a)(3). Source

Withdrawal of bankruptcy reference

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay is not jeopardized when a district court tries a claim withdrawn from bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).

Waire v. Baker · filed 1992-08-10(a)

As this case will proceed as an issue withdrawn from the bankruptcy court under the district court’s discretionary power as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), the automatic stay provision set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is not being jeopardized.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Commencement and duration of stay

Section 362(a)(1) requires a filed bankruptcy petition for an automatic stay to arise, so a complaint that does not allege a petition fails to plead a stay violation.

Sporea v. Broward County Clerk of Court · filed 2023-04-03(a)(1)

However, Plaintiff does not allege that he filed a bankruptcy petition in the first place.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against a defendant when the defendant files a bankruptcy petition.

Morrelli v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2023-03-01(a)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), all actions against a defendant who has filed a bankruptcy petition are automatically stayed once the petition is filed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) creates an automatic stay when a debtor files a Chapter 7 petition, so a motion to impose that same stay is moot while it remains in effect.

EYAJAN v. SPERO · filed 2022-06-27(a)

As a result, an automatic stay arose by operation of 11 U.S.C. §362(a). ... In essence, she has asked for imposition of a stay that was already in existence and that will remain in existence for an indeterminate period of time. ... Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Eyajan’s Motion for Imposition of a Bankruptcy Stay as moot.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 stays claims against defendants who are debtors in ongoing bankruptcy proceedings.

Trustees of the Local 806 Structural Steel and Bridge Painters of Greater New York Employee Trust Funds v. American Vent · filed 2022-06-16

The two remaining defendants in this case, American Venture Construction LLC and American Tri-venture LLC, are debtors in ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. The claims in this case against those remaining defendants are therefore stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against a debtor or estate property when a bankruptcy petition is filed.

In re CWNevada LLC · filed 2019-06-03(a)

As a result of filing a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay arose under Section 362(a), applicable to all entities, barring various acts and actions from being taken or continued against the Debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings as to a party that files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

People ex rel. Lindblom v. Sears Brands, LLC · filed 2019-04-23(a)(1), (3)

Pursuant to section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (3) (2018)), this matter has been automatically stayed as to Sears.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The automatic stay does not reach a sheriff’s sale completed before the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

Bourgeois v. Bank of America · filed 2013-03-22(a)(3)

Given the timeline of this case, we fail to see how Bank of America could possibly have done so: The sheriff's sale took place the day before Debtor filed his petition for relief under chapter 7.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(C) terminates the automatic stay when the debtor receives a bankruptcy discharge.

In Re Abbott · filed 2011-11-18(c)(2)(C)

The automatic stay terminated no later than October 30, 2009, the date on which Abbott received a discharge in bankruptcy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(C) terminates the automatic stay no later than the debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy.

Abbott v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC · filed 2011-11-18(c)(2)(C)

The automatic stay terminated no later than October 30, 2009, the date on which Abbott received a discharge in bankruptcy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the stay protecting a debtor’s property when the debtor receives a chapter 7 discharge.

In re: Richard Perez · filed 2011-12-01(c)(2)

The stay dissolved as to “property of the debtor” as a matter of law when the Debtor received his discharge on October 25, 2010.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the automatic stay when the debtor is discharged.

James Michalski, Jr. v. Coulson · filed 2011-12-21(c)(2)(C)

The automatic stay was lifted upon Michalski’s discharge from bankruptcy on February 1, 2008, and was supplanted by the order of discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). Accordingly, the LCPO could not have violated the automatic stay when it initiated criminal proceedings against Michalski over one year later.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay on transfers of estate assets when the bankruptcy case closes.

Donarumo v. Furlong (In Re Furlong) · filed 2011-11-01(c)(2)(A)

At the time of the transfer of the claims from Drew's II to the Furlongs individually, the Drew's II corporate bankruptcy case had long been closed, and thus the automatic stay on transfers of its assets was dissolved under § 362(c)(2)(A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Under § 362(c)(2)(C), the automatic stay continues as to collection of a debt claimed to be nondischargeable until the bankruptcy court determines that the debt is nondischargeable.

In Re Storozhenko · filed 2011-09-16(c)(2)(C)

In this case, the Court has not yet made a determination that the Debtor’s debt to Findling is nondischargeable under any provision of § 523(a). As a result, the automatic stay under § 362(a) has not yet terminated under Embry and under § 362(c)(2)(C). Rather, the automatic stay continues, and precludes Findling from taking any action to collect the State Court Judgment debt of $106,144.73.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) keeps estate property under the automatic stay until it leaves the estate, even after the debtor receives a discharge.

In Re Agard · filed 2011-02-10(c)(1)

Pursuant to Section 362(c)(1), the automatic stay which protects “property of the estate,” as opposed to property of the debtor, continues until the property is no longer property of the estate regardless of the entry of the discharge.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of a pending action against the debtor when the debtor files a voluntary bankruptcy petition.

Atel Financial Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co. · filed 2001-03-09(a)(1)

This filing stayed the continued prosecution of the pending action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against estate property when that property ceases to belong to the estate.

EconoLube N' Tune, Inc. v. Frausto (In Re Frausto) · filed 2000-12-12(c)(1)

Section 362(c) provides that the automatic stay of an act against property of the estate continues only until such property is no longer property of the estate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay ends when a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge.

Pickering v. Stanchak, No. Lpl-Cv-95-0470124s (Aug. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-08-06(c)(2)(C)

The automatic stays which entered as a result of the filing of the bankruptcy petitions, and any orders granting relief from stay, remained in effect only until the discharges were entered.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(1) stays pending actions upon a defendant’s voluntary bankruptcy filing and can prevent those actions from being restored to the trial calendar.

Cangialosi v. Mottoros · filed 1998-06-29(a)(1)

The motion to restore the actions to the trial calendar was properly denied upon the ground that the actions are stayed by operation of the voluntary bankruptcy petition filed by Connecticut Limousine, Inc., one of the defendants in Action No. 6 (see, 11 USC § 362 [a] [1]; Klein v Rauschman, 67 AD2d 902).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is dismissed; reinstating the case does not revive the stay absent an express indication from the bankruptcy court.

Judith K. Guerra, a.k.a. Judith Harvey v. Commissioner · filed 1998-04-08(c)(2)

In accordance with the foregoing, we hold that the automatic stay was terminated as of January 21, 1997, the date that the bankruptcy court issued its order dismissing petitioner's case. Further, we hold that the automatic stay was not revived when the bankruptcy court reinstated petitioner's case on February 12, 1997.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay on property that has left the bankruptcy estate when the case closes or the debtor receives a discharge, whichever occurs first.

American National Bank & Trust Co. v. DeJournette · filed 1998-05-22(c)(2)

Pursuant to § 362(c)(2), the automatic stay was lifted upon the earlier of the closing of the case and the discharge.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) keeps estate property protected by the automatic stay until it leaves the estate, so unauthorized deductions from post-confirmation earnings that remain estate property violate the stay.

Hudson v. United States Postal Service (In Re Hudson) · filed 1997-12-22(c)(1)

The Postal Service’s deduction of the $50 administrative fees on two occasions resulted in unauthorized deductions from property of the bankruptcy estate. The deductions were unauthorized because the automatic stay continues to protect property of the estate until it “is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). There is no record of the Postal Service moving for relief from the automatic stay in this case. The deduction of the two administrative fees, therefore, was in violation of the automatic stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the stay against a debtor upon discharge, so a continuing stay concerning estate property does not prevent a tax assessment against the debtor.

McCullough v. United States (In Re Armstrong) · filed 1997-11-25(c)(2)(C)

But the stay of acts against property of the estate is not relevant. The assessment is made against the taxpayer. The stay of acts against Armstrong, the taxpayer, lifted with his discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the automatic stay when a debtor receives a discharge.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 1994-08-23(c)(2)(C)

The automatic stay imposed at the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding terminates upon the debtor’s discharge.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A judgment declaring one debt nondischargeable does not terminate the automatic stay; absent another statutory termination event or court order, the stay continues until the debtor’s discharge under § 727 is granted or denied.

Cardillo v. Moore-Handley, Inc. (In Re Cardillo) · filed 1994-08-30(c)(2)(C)

Section 523 itself does not grant or deny a discharge. By its very terms, it excepts a debt from a discharge under section 727. Therefore, when section 362(e)(2)(C) speaks of “the time a discharge is granted or denied,” it can only be speaking of the grant or denial of a discharge pursuant to section 727. Hence, the automatic stay, unless terminated by another enumerated event in section 362 or by court order, remains in effect until a discharge under section 727 is granted or denied.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is dismissed; appealing the dismissal does not automatically revive the stay.

Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul v. Ziebarth · filed 1994-07-18(c)(2)(B)

However, it is well settled that the automatic stay terminates upon dismissal of the bankruptcy petition [11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) ], and is not automatically revived by the filing of a notice of appeal from the dismissal.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the automatic stay in effect against estate property until that property leaves the estate.

United States v. Fingers (In Re Fingers) · filed 1994-07-08(c)(1)

In the instant ease, pursuant to section 362(c)(1), because the tax refunds were bankruptcy estate property, the automatic stay remained in effect against that estate property until it was no longer property of the estate. Therefore, the IRS violated the automatic stay when it seized the tax refunds.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) terminates the stay against estate property when Chapter 13 confirmation revests that property in the debtor, allowing foreclosure of a post-petition tax lien.

In Re Reamy · filed 1994-07-01(c)(1)

However, upon confirmation and the revesting of property to the Debtor, Section 362(c)(1) would automatically terminate the stay as to the tax lien foreclosure against the property.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay as to property sold by the trustee once the property leaves the estate.

In Re Parrish · filed 1994-06-28(c)(1)

In addition, the automatic stay was terminated upon sale to the Debtor. Once the property is sold and is no longer property of the estate, the stay ceases. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy proceeding closes, so the stay does not bar an action filed after closure.

National Acceptance Co. v. Regal Products, Inc. · filed 1994-04-26(c)(2)(A)

To the extent that this defense amounts to a claim that the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code bars the instant action, that defense is without merit. This is so because the automatic stay expires ... when the bankruptcy proceeding is closed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against enforcing a mechanic’s lien on property when the property leaves the bankruptcy estate.

Washington Federal Savings Bank v. William H. Metcalfe & Sons · filed 1994-01-13(c)(1)

A suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien is an action in rem, and once the property was out of the estate, pursuant to the language of 11 U.S.C. § 362, the stay against enforcement of the liens was lifted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 stays a claim against a party that has filed a bankruptcy petition, allowing the claim to be renewed if the stay is lifted.

B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha · filed 1993-12-20

North Penn Transfer, Inc. filed a petition in bankruptcy on February 10, 1992 and therefor any claim against it is stayed by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Accordingly the claim against North Penn will be dismissed without prejudice subject to renewal in the event the stay is lifted and pursuit of the claim in this court is deemed efficacious.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Dismissal of the bankruptcy case terminates the automatic stay under § 362(c)(2)(B), making an appeal over relief from that stay moot.

Northland Associates, Inc. v. United States, Internal Revenue Service (In Re Abrantes Construction Corp.) · filed 1993-11-02(c)(2)(B)

As stated above, the bankruptcy court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, In re Abrantes Constr. Corp., 132 B.R. 234, on January 7, 1993. Thus, the stay, upon which the United States’ appeals are based, is no longer in effect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the stay on acts against unscheduled estate property in force after the bankruptcy case closes, without any need to reinstate it upon reopening.

Havelock v. Taxel (In Re Pace) · filed 1993-10-22(c)(1)

As stated above, the stay of acts against "unscheduled" property of the bankruptcy estate does not terminate upon the closing of the bankruptcy case. Consequently, reinstatement of the stay was unnecessary. Whether a stay is or is not reinstated upon the re-opening of the case is wholly irrelevant with respect to the Alaska lawsuit. Actions to control this property are stayed pursuant to § 362(c)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 automatically stays an action against a defendant that files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.

Brake Shop, Inc. v. Dacey · filed 1993-09-13

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362, the action against Brake World U.S.A. is automatically stayed and this court will take no further action on this case with regard to this particular defendant.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is closed.

In re Presidio Bridge Co. · filed 1991-01-22(c)(2)(A)

Because the case is closed, this court no longer has jurisdiction over the property in issue and the automatic stay provisions are no longer in effect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings involving a Chapter 11 debtor when the debtor files for bankruptcy.

In re School Asbestos Litigation · filed 1991-01-07

The act of filing triggers the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362. Accordingly, we will stay the proceedings at No. 90-1217 in which Celotex is the petitioner.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The automatic stay terminates upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan and is not reinstated by later conversion to Chapter 7.

In Re T.S.P. Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-08-09(c)

Another effect of confirmation, although not expressly stated in section 1141, is that the automatic stay is terminated. ... Finally, nothing in the Code would reinstate the automatic stay upon conversion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) dissolves the automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is dismissed.

Middagh v. Stanal Sound Ltd. · filed 1990-05-25(c)

The bankruptcy petition of Stanal Sound Ltd. now having been dismissed, the automatic stay is dissolved.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay takes effect when a properly filed Chapter 11 petition establishes bankruptcy jurisdiction.

In Re MacOn Uplands Venture · filed 1979-11-05

Jurisdiction having been established in this court, the automatic stay provided by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362, became effective as of the time of the filing of the petition in Chapter 11 by the Debtor, October 17, 1979.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 stays issues involving the debtor but allows litigation among other parties on issues that do not involve the debtor.

Rupp v. Cloud Nine, Ltd. (In Re Cloud Nine, Ltd.) · filed 1980-01-31

Those issues which involve the Debtor and are precluded by § 362 are hereby stayed. Those issues which do not involve the Debtor may proceed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor and its co-defendants when the allegations against them arise from the same factual and legal basis.

Federal Life Insurance Co. v. First Financial Group of Texas, Inc. · filed 1980-02-13(a)(1)

In light of the above, the Court is persuaded that the automatic stay applies to judicial proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy and its co-defendants, when, as here, the allegations against them arise from the same factual and legal basis.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e), read with Rule 4001, allows the automatic stay to continue until thirty days after the final hearing begins.

First Mortgage Corp. v. Walker (In Re Walker) · filed 1980-03-12(e)

11 U.S.C. § 362 must be construed along with other sections of the Code and Rule 4001 which deals with automatic stays. This Rule provides that the stay expires thirty days after a final hearing is commenced.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 does not stay the Department of Labor from determining or periodically reevaluating a debtor’s disability status.

In Re Howell · filed 1980-03-28

However, initially it should be noted the court does not read the stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 to operate to interfere with its Congressionally imposed duties as to determination of disability or any subsequent reevaluation of disability. The regulations of the Department as to procedures for periodic reexamination or whatever to consider whether the disability of the individual has changed will not be stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. That provision, although the statutory language is extremely broadly drawn, is primarily concerned with creditor action. It should not be interpreted to affect such determinations. Congress did not so intend.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 automatically stays Tax Court proceedings when a taxpayer files for bankruptcy, but under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 that stay applies only to bankruptcy petitions filed on or after October 1, 1979.

Sandridge v. Commissioner · filed 1980-05-01

The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 11 U.S.C. sec. 362 , now provides for an automatic stay of proceedings before the United States Tax Court when a bankruptcy action is filed by or against a taxpayer-petitioner, but the Act is effective only for those cases in which the bankruptcy petition is filed on or after October 1, 1979.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 automatically stays the continuation of proceedings against a defendant who has filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition.

Marsh Investment Corp. v. Langford · filed 1980-06-03

This court, as a preliminary matter, takes judicial notice that defendant John A. Langford has filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, pending as proceeding number 80-00015 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362, continuation of all proceedings against the bankrupt are automatically stayed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The automatic stay ends as to property when it ceases to be property of the bankruptcy estate.

White Motor Corp. v. Nashville White Trucks, Inc. (In Re Nashville White Trucks, Inc.) · filed 1980-06-20(c)(1)

11 U.S.C. § 362 provides that the filing of a petition operates as a stay of any act by an entity to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate; the stay continues until such property is no longer property of the estate. Since the court has found that the debtor had no interest in the franchise after the January 30,1980, expiration date, it is clear that the franchise was no longer property of the estate and that the stay provisions of § 362 no longer applied. Accordingly, the court finds that the automatic stay of § 362 terminated in regard to the franchise as of January 30,1980, when the property ceased to be property of the estate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(5) continues to stay enforcement of a prepetition lien against property returned to the debtor by abandonment until the stay ends under § 362(c)(2) or the court grants relief.

Hickman v. First State Bank of Cordele (In Re Motley) · filed 1981-03-24(a)(5), (c)(1), (c)(2)

In the former, this is not so because when the trustee abandons property it reverts to the debtor and the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) continues in effect because 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) includes only property of the estate and not property of the debtor. The property of the debtor is relieved from the automatic stay only by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 renders a judgment obtained after a bankruptcy case begins in violation of the automatic stay null and void.

Sunshine Bank v. Manring Auto Sales, Inc. (In Re Manring Auto Sales, Inc.) · filed 1981-04-24

Additionally, the judgment obtained by the Bank subsequent to the commencement of this proceeding was obtained in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362, and is a null and void judgment under the provisions of Title 11.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 must be construed with other Bankruptcy Code provisions to give a Chapter 11 debtor a meaningful opportunity to reorganize.

International Harvester Co. v. Kleinsasser (In Re Kleinsasser) · filed 1981-07-07

1) That 11 U.S.C. § 362 and Interim Rule 4001(a) must be construed with other provisions of the Code because it was the intent of Congress, upon enacting Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, that a debtor be given one meaningful opportunity to rehabilitate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay ceases to protect a debtor when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

In Re Saez · filed 1981-08-04

It is unquestionable that upon the dismissal of the case herein, the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code ceased to protect debtor from acts by his creditors to recover any amount of money owed to them.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) takes effect when the bankruptcy petition is filed, without service of process on creditors.

Augustino Enterprises, Inc. v. Amgro, Inc. (In Re Augustino Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1981-08-05(a)

The stay of proceedings in bankruptcy takes effect on the date of the filing of the petition and no service of process is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 does not authorize a bankruptcy court to reimpose the automatic stay after it has been lifted or modified for a specific purpose.

Stuart Motel, Inc. v. Columbia Banking Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Stuart Motel, Inc.) · filed 1981-08-19

The reasons for this conclusion are as follows: the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 is by act of Congress and even though the Bankruptcy Court is given the right to continue the stay by denying a grant of relief from stay under carefully controlled circumstances, there is no specific grant of authority to reimpose the stay once it has been lifted or modified for a specific purpose.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to leases that terminated before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Primo Resources, Inc. v. Balcones Oil Co. (In Re Balcones Oil Co.) · filed 1981-09-15

If such leases had terminated prior to the filing of the Petition, then the automatic stay relief afforded by 11 U.S.C. § 362 would not be applicable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) terminates the automatic stay by operation of law when the court does not timely hear a request for relief and order the stay continued.

Navajo Tribe v. Sandmar Corp. (In Re Sandmar Corp.) · filed 1981-12-21(e)

If the Court does not act, then the automatic stay dissolves of its own terms.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to a creditor omitted from a Chapter 13 schedule because it supersedes former Bankruptcy Rule 13-401(c).

Carter v. Van Buskirk (In Re Carter) · filed 1981-12-28

Appellant contends that no stay was in effect as to Century because Century was not listed as a creditor in the debtor’s Chapter 13 schedule. This argument is based on Rule 13-401(c), Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. This rule is incompatible with the new Bankruptcy Code, however, and has been superseded by section 362 of the Code.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(3) automatically bars a creditor from repossessing estate property after a bankruptcy petition is filed, even if the creditor has not received official notice of the case.

In Re Johnson · filed 1982-01-19(a)(3)

Chrysler has taken acts to obtain property of the estate and to enforce its lien against property of the estate since the filing of the petition by these debtors on September 24, 1981. This stay is automatically imposed, and Chrysler’s lack of “official” notification from this Court is no defense to the finding that a violation did, in fact, occur.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay protecting estate property when the property ceases to be part of the estate.

Lloyd v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Lloyd) · filed 1982-03-25(c)(1)

If the debtor does not pursue the matter under the statute, GMAC shall be entitled to take any steps deemed appropriate. The automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code will not apply because the debtor will have lost his interest in the property. As a matter of equity, the Court is extending the statutory redemption period. If the debtor does not pursue redemption, he will lose his interest in the property. The vehicle will, therefore, no longer be property of the estate which would be protected by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Matter of Solar Equipment Corp. · filed 1982-04-26(c)(2)(B)

The two foregoing statutory provisions clearly provide that when a petition pursuant to Chapter 11 is filed, an automatic stay comes into effect and continues in effect until the case is dismissed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) terminates the automatic stay if the court does not order it continued after a hearing held within 30 days of a request for relief from the stay.

Collateral Funding, Inc. v. Herrera (In Re Herrera) · filed 1982-09-08(e)

In that event, because the court did not order the stay continued in effect after a hearing held within 30 days of the request for relief, the stay terminated, 11 U.S.C. § 362(e).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) takes effect immediately when a bankruptcy petition is filed and applies to all entities regardless of their actual knowledge of the filing.

Evans v. Mid-City Jewelry, Inc. (In re Evans) · filed 1982-08-10(a)

I find that issue to be irrelevant to our inquiry because 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which becomes operative immediately upon the filing of the petition, applies to “all entitles” and is not conditioned upon actual knowledge.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay when the property and any remaining redemption right are no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Morgan (In Re Morgan) · filed 1982-10-14(c)(1)

Therefore, since neither the automobile nor the right of redemption are any longer property of the estate, GMAC is entitled, under § 362(c)(1), to a modification of the automatic stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) automatically ends the stay thirty days after a request for relief unless the court orders the stay continued or decides the request.

In Re Codesco, Inc. · filed 1982-11-17(e)

Code § 362(e) is self-executing; the stay automatically terminates thirty days after a request for relief unless the court orders it continued or renders a decision.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(1) stays the filing of a state-court lien foreclosure suit against a debtor until the automatic stay ends.

Garbe Iron Works, Inc. v. Priester · filed 1982-11-22(a)(1)

We believe plaintiff had no alternative but to delay filing of suit until the automatic stay was terminated.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since The 1984 amendment added an express damages remedy for an individual injured by a willful stay violation.

Section 362 does not imply a private damages action for violating the automatic stay, but violations may be remedied through civil contempt.

Thacker v. Etter (In Re Thacker) · filed 1982-11-30

While no private cause of action is available to the plaintiff under § 362, he is not without a remedy under that provision. The stay imposed under § 362 is comparable to an automatic injunction. Violations of that statutory injunction can be brought before the Court by way of a motion for civil or criminal contempt, as is true of any judicially-imposed injunctive order.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against the debtor and acts against the debtor’s or estate’s property, but does not protect property belonging to neither.

Foulke v. Lavelle · filed 1982-12-10(a)

The automatic stay provisions apply to proceedings against the debtor, the debtor’s property, and the property of the estate, but they do not apply to acts against property which is neither the debtor’s nor the estate’s.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) automatically terminates the stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1982-11-29(c)(2)(B)

The stay terminates automatically upon dismissal of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The automatic stay prevents enforcement of a prepetition judgment lien against estate property until the property leaves the estate through abandonment.

Harbin v. Brooks (Harbin) · filed 1982-12-23(c)

The debtor’s interest in the land in this case remained property of the estate until October 14, 1982 when the trustee abandoned his interest in the property. Thus, an injunction was in effect from when the Chapter 7 petition was filed on October 7, 1980 until the trustee abandoned the real property on October 14, 1982, and during that period Brooks could not enforce his judgment lien.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(2) and (3) stays enforcement of a judgment against estate property and acts to obtain possession of it even if the debtor need not be a party to the underlying suit.

Huntington Nat. Bank v. FIBERGLASTICS · filed 1983-01-20(a)(2), (a)(3)

Even though the Debtor may not be a necessary party in the foreclosure suit because the doctrines of lis pendens preempt the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays also enforcement of a judgment against property of the estate and any act to obtain possession of property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) and (3).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor who filed for bankruptcy, but does not extend the stay to nonbankrupt codefendants.

Pitts v. Unarco Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-01-21(a)(1)

The clear language of Section 362(a)(1) thus extends the automatic stay provision only to the debtor filing bankruptcy proceedings and not to non-bankrupt co-defendants.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not except actions under Florida financial responsibility and automobile reparations laws from the automatic stay.

In Re Taylor · filed 1983-01-27(a)

These State laws are not excepted from the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) bars a foreclosure sale after a bankruptcy petition is filed, and civil contempt for violating the stay does not require proof of willfulness.

In Re Lohnes · filed 1983-01-29(a)

In the instant proceeding, there is no question but that the automatic stay was violated by the foreclosure sale. Dimyan seeks to excuse his action by claiming that he did not intend to violate federal law. Since, however, civil contempt serves a remedial purpose by either coercing a respondent into compliance with the court’s order or compensating the complainant for losses sustained, willfulness in the offending party need not be shown for a finding of contempt.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not stay an interpleader action that is neither against the debtor nor directed at property of the bankruptcy estate.

NLT Computer Services Corp. v. Capital Computer Systems, Inc. · filed 1983-01-31(a)

The Court concludes that, for several reasons, the automatic stay does not prevent continuation of this action. First, it appears that the automatic stay is not applicable by the express terms of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362. The several subsections of Section 362(a) stay acts and judicial proceedings “against” the debtor and/or property of the estate. This interpleader action is certainly not one “against” the debtor, especially where the debtor has specifically disclaimed any interest in the funds.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the stay against a debtor when the bankruptcy case closes, allowing a landlord to pursue state-court remedies for unpaid rent.

In Re Hepburn · filed 1983-02-09(c)(2)(A)

When the case was closed, the stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) on Fairfield came to an end by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(A), if it was not terminated on the date she was discharged (11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C)). Accordingly, Fairfield is now free to pursue its remedies in New York’s housing court for Miss Hepburn’s breach of her obligation to pay rent, and reinforced by the breach arising from the trustee’s rejection of her lease.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, permitting a later state-court proceeding to go forward.

Beckley v. AVCO Financial Services, One, Inc. · filed 1983-04-01(c)(2)

This automatic stay of such proceedings, however, ceases to exist when the bankruptcy proceeding is closed, dismissed, or discharge is either granted or denied, whichever comes first. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). ... The record does not show any jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over the Beckleys after March 19, 1982; thus there was no stay of proceedings in the state circuit court, which led to the default judgment of June 18, 1982.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A debtor may waive the automatic stay by voluntarily stipulating that it ends if the debtor defaults on specified payments.

In Re Sando · filed 1983-06-03(a)

By entering into the stipulation, Sando waived the protections offered to a debtor under the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) protects the debtor and trustee through the automatic stay; a junior lienholder has no substantive or procedural rights under the stay merely because the stayed foreclosure affects its lien.

Bryce v. Stivers (In Re Stivers) · filed 1983-06-15(a)

Section 362(a) by its express terms creates a stay in favor of the debtor and of the trustee. Not even a strained reading of that subsection or of the balance of section 362 suggests that the stay operates in favor of the bank, which held a third deed of trust, and against Bryce, who held a second deed of trust.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2) keeps the stay against acts other than acts against estate property in force after abandonment until a specified terminating event occurs.

In Re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust · filed 1983-06-17(c)(2)

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) provides that the stay of an act against property of the estate under § 362(a) continues until such property is no longer property of the estate and in § 362(c)(2), the stay of any other act under § 362(a) continues until the happening of identified events — none of which are likely to occur in the near future if this case had been allowed to stay in Chapter 7.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against the debtor but does not stay claims against nonbankrupt co-defendants.

Almy v. Terrace Land Development, Ltd. · filed 1983-07-05(a)

However, such a stay does not apply to claims against non-bankrupt co-defendants.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The § 362(a) automatic stay remains in force when a debtor complies with a stipulation governing relief from the stay.

Main Line Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kalkstein (In re Kalkstein) · filed 1983-07-18(a)

We conclude that the unambiguous provisions of the stipulation have been complied with by the debtor and his wife and, therefore, the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) remain in full force and effect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay retroactively and validate actions taken against the debtor or estate property during the stay, including a state court judgment.

Mellor v. Pistole (In Re Mellor) · filed 1983-07-22(d)

Examining, first, the effect of the trial court’s approval of the state court judgment, we note that 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to “annul” the automatic stay. Therefore, it was unquestionably within the power of the trial court, in appropriate instances, to validate, after the fact, actions against the debtor and/or his property taken in violation of the automatic stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 does not stay efforts to collect rents from property in which the debtor has no rights.

Gillam v. Samuels · filed 1983-07-29

The stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are inapplicable since Samuels had no rights in the property.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362's automatic stay protects a debtor's pre-foreclosure redemption right when foreclosure on co-debtors' property would extinguish that right.

Bialac v. Bialac · filed 1983-08-04(a)

Neither of these interests are within protections afforded by a literal interpretation of section 362, yet they should be protected by the stay if the purposes of the Act, the orderly disposition of all property in which the debtor has some interest, are to be achieved.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay becomes effective when an order for relief is granted on an involuntary petition.

Chalmers v. Benson (In Re Benson) · filed 1983-09-13

In this case the automatic stay became effective when the Order for relief was granted on this involuntary petition.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) terminates the stay when no timely order continues it, and a bankruptcy court cannot use its equitable powers to reinstate the terminated stay.

Jones v. Wood (In Re Wood) · filed 1983-09-23(e)

In extraordinary circumstances the equitable powers of this Court may be utilized to prevent injury or correct errors, but nullification of the stay termination resulting from the operation of § 362(e) is not one of them.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A report of no distribution does not terminate the automatic stay.

In Re Pierson · filed 1983-10-14(c)

Finally, a report of no distribution does not terminate the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) sets forth the times when the stay ceases.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 prohibits a repairer from removing an engine installed in the debtor’s vehicle before the bankruptcy filing and permits an order restoring the status quo.

General Electric Credit Corp. v. Shoup (In re Shoup) · filed 1983-10-24

As title to the engine passed to the debtor April 30, 1982 when the repairman installed it in the vehicle under 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2401(2) which provides for such result “at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods” prior to the filing of the reorganization proceeding June 7, 1982, Great Lakes was in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 when it removed the new engine from the vehicle and will be required to make restoration of the status quo.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) ordinarily terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is dismissed.

In Re Ana J. De Jesus Saez, Debtor. Luis R. Martir Lugo v. Ana J. De Jesus Saez, George Rieckehoff · filed 1983-11-22(c)

Section 362(c) provides that the stay continue as to creditor conduct not directed against property of the estate, only until dismissal, and as to conduct directed against such property, only so long as it remains in the estate. It seems self evident that there is no “estate” and hence no “property of the estate” unless there is an existing petition. Dismissal of the petition, therefore, would ordinarily terminate the stay as well.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) ends the automatic stay for post-confirmation creditors when estate property vests in the reorganized debtor upon confirmation.

United States v. Redmond · filed 1984-02-01(c)

The IRS, as well as other post-confirmation creditors of the reorganized debtor, are no longer restrained by the automatic stay in bankruptcy which terminates when the property of the estate vests in the reorganized debtor upon confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay does not extend its protections to a non-debtor junior encumbrancer.

California Thrift & Loan Ass'n v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re Eagles) · filed 1984-02-10

Similarly, we can find no explicit statutory basis, under 11 U.S.C. § 362 or elsewhere, for extending the protections afforded by the automatic stay — whatever these might entail — to a non-debtor junior encumbrancer.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 does not undo a prior modification of the automatic stay.

Hemontolor v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association · filed 1984-03-30(c)(2)

The automatic stay provision in section 362 is triggered when a petition for relief is filed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Unless modified by the bankruptcy court, the automatic stay remains in effect until the case is closed, dismissed and a discharge is granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). Conversion of a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 does not constitute a closing, dismissal or discharge. Neither does a conversion under U.S.C. § 348(a) effect a change in the date the petition was filed, the commencement of the case or the order of relief. Thus, it is the opinion of this Court that the modification of the automatic stay is not effected by the conversion of a Chapter 7 petition to one under Chapter 13.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A confirmed reorganization plan does not keep the automatic stay in force.

In Re Telemark Management Co., Inc. · filed 1984-05-17

The plan does not keep alive the automatic stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

When an order under § 362(d) lifts the automatic stay, the parties return to their pre-stay legal relationships and applicable nonbankruptcy law governs their conduct.

Fidelity National Bank v. Winslow (In Re Winslow) · filed 1984-05-16(d)

An order which lifts the automatic stay returns the parties to the legal relationships that existed before the stay became operative. Whatever non-bankruptcy law governed the transactions and relationships of the parties prior to the application of the Bankruptcy Code is the law which controls the conduct of the parties once the stay is lifted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A bankruptcy court may reimpose the automatic stay under § 362 through its § 105(a) authority when circumstances make that order necessary or appropriate.

In Re Edward C. Pirsig Farms, Inc. · filed 1984-09-04(e)

Furthermore, the bankruptcy court may reimpose the stay in certain circumstances. The Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy courts the power under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to “issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” Under the circumstances and facts of this case, the court finds an order reinstating the stay is and would be a proper exercise of the § 105 power.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) ordinarily terminates the automatic stay upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.

In Re Ernst · filed 1985-01-15(c)

Upon confirmation of a plan of reorganization, the automatic stay is ordinarily terminated because all of the prerequisites of § 362(c) have been satisfied.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) stays post-petition execution against a debtor’s property, including the sale of vessels arrested in an admiralty foreclosure action before the bankruptcy petition.

United States v. LeBouf Bros. Towing Co., Inc. · filed 1985-01-18(a)

Congress certainly intended, and the statute clearly provides, that the automatic stay effected by § 362 prevent all post-petition executions on a debtor’s property; consequently the sale of LeBouf’s boats in this action cannot proceed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not extend the stay to co-debtors or guarantors.

Otoe County National Bank v. W & P Trucking, Inc., Charles E. Froelich, William J. Froelich, Jr., and Jack D. Cramer · filed 1985-02-11(a)

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor only and not co-debtors.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) generally terminates the automatic stay if no hearing is held within 30 days of a motion for relief, but the bankruptcy court may continue or reinstate the stay pending a final hearing under § 105(a).

John Deere Co. v. Kozak Farms, Inc. (In Re Kozak Farms, Inc.) · filed 1985-02-07(e)

After a careful review of the case law, the Court finds that a bankruptcy court may reinstate or continue an automatic stay pending a final hearing on a creditor’s motion for relief from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not stay a lessee debtor’s rejection of a lease merely because another debtor holds a mortgage on that lease.

Commercial Finance, Ltd. v. Hawaii Dimensions, Inc. (In Re Hawaii Dimensions, Inc.) · filed 1985-02-25(a)

Hawaii Dimension, Inc.’s rejection of its lease upon which Commercial Finance holds a mortgage does not violate any of section 362(a) stay protections of Commercial Finance. The Bankruptcy Court was therefore not prohibited from approving the rejection.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay operates upon bankruptcy filing and binds those aware of the bankruptcy until the stay is properly lifted.

Nlt Computer Services Corporation v. Capital Computer Systems, Inc. · filed 1985-03-04

The stay provisions of section 362 are automatic and self-operating and those who have knowledge of the pendency of a bankruptcy action and stay are bound to honor the stay unless and until it is properly lifted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not stay collection of a postpetition debt from a Chapter 13 debtor’s wages when the confirmed plan vests estate property in the debtor and the estate ceases to exist.

Mason v. Williams (In Re Mason) · filed 1985-04-02(a)

There is no dispute that this plan so provided and the plan was confirmed. As a result the bankruptcy court properly concluded that the estate did not exist and the stay could not apply.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(b) does not list foreclosure of a preferred ship mortgage among the exceptions to the automatic stay.

Coastal Production Credit Ass'n v. the Oil Screw "Santee" · filed 1985-08-02(b)

Proceedings to foreclose on a preferred ship mortgage are not one of the enumerated exceptions to the automatic stay imposed by § 362.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the bankruptcy debtor, but does not extend the stay to co-debtors in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 or to co-tort-feasors.

Gatx Aircraft Corporation v. M/v Courtney Leigh, and Bryan Dedeker, Mrs. Bryan Dedeker, Ray Loden, Mrs. Ray Loden and P. · filed 1985-08-19(a)(1)

By its terms the automatic stay applies only to the debtor, not to co-debtors under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code nor to co-tort-feasors.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 protects a party with a pending bankruptcy, and court rulings concerning that party are subject to the automatic stay.

Sims v. Inexco Oil Co. · filed 1985-08-21

The automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 protect Tomlinson as a result of the bankruptcy pending in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. Consequently, any ruling of this Court as it pertains to Tomlinson is subject to the automatic stay provisions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2) keeps the stay against collection from a debtor’s property in effect after exemption or trustee abandonment until the stay terminates or the court grants relief.

In Re Hahn · filed 1985-08-29(c)(2)

A secured creditor enforcing its rights after allowance of a debtor’s exemption and/or a trustee’s abandonment, but prior to a grant of relief from stay or the termination of the stay under § 362(c)(2), violates the stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) terminates the automatic stay when a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed, and a bankruptcy court cannot reinstate a stay that has properly terminated.

In Re Sykes · filed 1985-09-30(c)

Thus, upon confirmation, there is no longer “property of the estate” and, under the provisions of Section 362(c)(1), the stay is terminated. Furthermore, Section 1141(d)(1)(A) provides that confirmation of a Plan discharges a debtor. Consequently, under Section 362(c)(2)(C), on confirmation of the Plan, the stay would no longer be in existence. ... Upon investigation, this Court has found no authority which grants a bankruptcy court the ability to reinstate a stay which has properly terminated.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and resulting stay is sufficient to establish a knowing violation of § 362(a)(1); certified proof of the filing is unnecessary.

Rhyne v. Cunningham (In Re Rhyne) · filed 1986-04-08(a)(1)

We conclude that Feinberg’s stance is meritless since actual knowledge of the filing of the petition and concomitant knowledge of the stay are sufficient bases from which to conclude that a party knowingly violated the stay. Receipt of formal, certified documents evincing the filing of the petition is not necessary.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay against estate property when confirmation of a plan vests that property in the debtor.

In Re 12th & N Joint Venture · filed 1986-05-19(c)(1)

Section § 362(c) provides that the stay of an act against property of the estate continues until the property is no longer the property of the estate. Confirmation vests property of estate in the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b), and the automatic stay is thus terminated.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) stays nonbankruptcy court proceedings when a bankruptcy petition is filed and supports injunctive relief when a state-court judgment is entered after that filing.

France v. France (In Re France) · filed 1986-05-28(a)

Title 11, United States Code § 362(a) provides that when a bankruptcy petition is filed it “operates as a stay” of a wide range of nonbankruptcy court actions. ... Here, the petition having been filed prior to the entry of judgment, the Bankruptcy Judge acted quite properly in granting the injunctive relief sought and in ordering turnover of the title to the motor vehicle at issue.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay as to estate property when that property leaves the debtor’s estate.

Sawyer Nurseries v. Galardi · filed 1986-05-28(c)(1)

The applicable principle is that the automatic stay remains in effect as long as the property in issue remains in the debtor’s estate. When the property leaves the dominion of the bankrupt’s estate, as in this matter, by sale pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s order, and becomes the property of others, it no longer has the protection of the stay provisions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy court dismisses the case, even if an appeal is pending, absent a stay pending appeal.

Olson v. Commissioner · filed 1986-06-25(c)(2)(B)

We are satisfied that Congress intended dismissal for purposes of section 362(c)(2)(B) to mean dismissal by the bankruptcy court and not appellate action by a District Court.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay protecting estate property when that property leaves the estate upon confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.

Riddle v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 1986-07-15(c)(1)

It follows that the automatic stay created by 11 USC § 362 (a) (3) was lifted at that time and created no bar to the present action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay of foreclosure when collateral leaves the bankruptcy estate; absent a contrary Chapter 13 plan provision, confirmation vests the collateral in the debtor and ends the stay.

In Re Johnson · filed 1986-07-31(c)(1)

Section 362 applies to stay such foreclosure during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case, but it ceases to apply at such time as the collateral is no longer property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). Unless the Chapter 13 plan provides otherwise (and the instant plan does not), confirmation of the plan serves to vest all of the property of the estate in the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b). While the property may remain subject to the lien of the secured party (11 U.S.C. § 1327(c)), enforcement of the lien is no longer stayed by Section 362, and the “adequate protection” provisions of Section 362(d) are no longer applicable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not stay a postpetition action against a trustee that is not against property of the estate.

Kranzdorf v. Alter (In re Fidelity America Financial Corp.) · filed 1986-08-28(a)

Since the cause of action arose postpetition and is not against property of the estate, the automatic stay does not bar such an action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Once the automatic stay under § 362 is dissolved, a district court may proceed with all phases of litigation properly before it, including settlement.

Bostick Foundry Company v. Lindberg, a Division of Sola Basic Industries, Inc., and Third-Party v. Venetta, Inc., Third- · filed 1986-07-25

Once the bankruptcy court dissolved the automatic stay of proceedings imposed upon the district court by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, the district court was free to proceed with all phases of the litigation properly before it, including a disposition by trial or settlement.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) does not automatically terminate a stay 30 days after a motion for relief when no hearing has been scheduled; the debtor must have an opportunity for a hearing.

In Re Clark · filed 1987-02-10(e)

We therefore hold that the automatic stay may not be automatically terminated prior to the scheduling of a hearing on a Motion for relief from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 does not expressly provide for reinstatement of an automatic stay.

In Re Katherine B. Bonds A/K/A Kathy Bonds, Debtor. F.N.M.A. By National Mortgage Company v. Katherine B. Bonds A/K/A Ka · filed 1987-03-03

Although 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 does not expressly provide for the reinstatement of an automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 105(a) states that "[t]he bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions [of Title 11]."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 imposes a temporary stay in a corporate Chapter 11 case that gives way upon plan confirmation to the permanent injunction under § 524(a).

In Re Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1987-06-10

Upon confirmation, 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) replaces the temporary restraining effect of 11 U.S.C. § 362.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay of acts against estate property when the property is no longer property of the estate.

Reserves Development Corporation Rdc v. Browning · filed 1987-06-29(c)(1)

We take this action based upon 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(c)(1), which reads as follows: "[T]he stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate[.]" In light of the circumstances discussed below, the subject property, a coal-washing facility in West Virginia, is no longer "property of the estate" under section 362.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay of acts against estate property when that property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.

Jeffries v. Browning · filed 1987-06-29(c)(1)

We take this action based upon 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1), which reads as follows: “[T]he stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate[.]” In light of the circumstances discussed below, the subject property, a coal-washing facility in West Virginia, is no longer “property of the estate” under section 362.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not impose an automatic stay when an involuntary petition is facially insufficient because its petitioners lack qualifying claims; a valid stay begins when the bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction.

Broadview Savings Bank v. Royal Gate Associates, Ltd. (In Re Royal Gate Associates, Ltd.) · filed 1988-01-06(a)

The petition was insufficient on its face because it was not brought by holders of claims or general partners under section 303(b). The Bankruptcy Court had no jurisdiction over this case until the response was filed on December 17 by the general partner. There was therefore no valid stay in effect until December 17. The foreclosure sale under Broadview’s power of sale, held on December 1, 1987, was not in violation of the automatic stay because there was no valid stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The automatic stay applies to defaults after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan on a prepetition secured debt.

Far West Federal Bank v. Vanasen (In Re Vanasen) · filed 1987-12-15(a)

I find the automatic stay applies to post-confirmation defaults.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) ends the automatic stay, after which adequate protection no longer prevents a secured creditor from enforcing its contract.

In Re Mitchell · filed 1988-04-11(c)

However, this concept of “adequate protection” does not apply once the stay terminates as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). Subsequent to abandonment and discharge, the creditor may enforce the literal terms of its contract.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay begins when the bankruptcy petition is filed and does not prevent a tax lien that attached before filing.

In re United Crane & Rigging, Inc. · filed 1988-05-27

Since the automatic stay was not invoked until 1:37 p.m. on May 3, 1988, it will not operate to preclude attachment of the tax lien as the lien had already attached by operation of law upon the start of the forty-sixth day.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) keeps the automatic stay in effect for property of the estate while the trustee has not abandoned that property.

Matter of Mehrhoff · filed 1988-07-05(c)(1)

In this ease the automatic stay remains in effect as to the governmental benefits because the trustee did not abandon them from the estate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not stay a counterclaim whose cause of action arose after the bankruptcy petition.

Turboff v. United Savings Ass'n of Texas (In Re Turboff) · filed 1988-10-17(a)

In addition, even were a suit, or some part of a suit, against Jerald Turboff, Trustee to be considered subject to the 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) stay which covers Jerald Turboff individually, the stay does not apply to United’s counterclaim in state court if United’s cause of action arose after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy (in this case, after July 27, 1987).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against estate property when Chapter 13 confirmation revests that property in the debtor, unless the plan or confirmation order provides otherwise.

Laughlin v. United States Internal Revenue Service · filed 1989-03-29(c)(1)

The distinction is crucial because under section 362, “the stay of an act against property of the estate ... continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). ... I do not interpret the words, “Except as otherwise provided in the plan or order confirming the plan,” to except all property mentioned in the plan from section 1327’s rule that all property of the estate revests in the debtor.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) stays both sides from pursuing claims or defenses in state trial and appellate courts while the automatic stay remains in effect, unless the bankruptcy court lifts it.

Dyer v. Weedon · filed 1989-04-20(a)

We hold that neither the Dyers nor Weedon could proceed with their claims or defenses in either the district or appellate courts of this state absent an order of the bankruptcy court lifting the automatic stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) imposes a distinct automatic stay when a debtor files a chapter 13 case, even if a court lifted the stay in an earlier chapter 7 case.

In Re Paul Wayne Saylors, Debtor. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Paul Wayne Saylors, Jane K. Dishuck, Standing Trustee · filed 1989-04-10(a)

The order also cannot be construed as lifting the stay in the chapter 13 case that automatically became effective the next day.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the dismissal order is entered; Bankruptcy Rule 7062 does not extend it for ten days.

Weston v. Cibula (In Re Weston) · filed 1989-04-21(c)(2)(B)

Thus, the plain language of both of the above referenced code provisions serves to contradict the Debtor’s suggestion that B.R. 7062 was designed to prevent the automatic stay from lifting immediately upon the dismissal of the case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, making an appeal over an earlier order lifting the stay moot.

In Re Norman Eugene Mullins, Debtor. Estate of Richard Stearns Cutter by John Pendergast, Trustee v. Norman E. Mullins, · filed 1989-06-08(c)(2)(B)

The issue whether the stay was properly lifted in this case is moot because, even if the stay should have remained in effect, it terminated when the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) automatically terminates the stay after a creditor requests relief if the court does not order the stay continued within 30 days.

SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Thomas (In re Thomas) · filed 1989-09-15(e)

The debtors did not obtain an order from the bankruptcy court that the stay continue in force, and by virtue of a provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(e)... the stay under § 362 terminated automatically as to SouthTrust on September 3, 1987, prior to the bankruptcy court ruling on the matter. ... The last question is whether the automatic stay was lifted at the time South-Trust initiated the detinue action in state court. This Court has reviewed the district court’s findings and conclusions on this issue and concludes that the district court’s analysis is correct.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 does not stay foreclosure of property the debtor transferred before bankruptcy when the foreclosure does not affect the debtor, the estate, or reorganization.

Brancato v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A. (In Re Pestritto) · filed 1989-10-04

In the case at hand, the Bank seeks to foreclose upon property which is owned by the Plaintiffs and in which the Debtor had transferred all of its legal and/or equitable interest prior to filing bankruptcy. ... Therefore, the proposed foreclosure by Bank is not subject to the automatic stay under Section 362.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(e) terminates the automatic stay thirty days after a creditor requests relief unless the bankruptcy court orders the stay continued.

In Re Thomas · filed 1989-10-23(e)

The debtors did not obtain an order from the bankruptcy court that the stay continue in force, and by virtue of a provision of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(e) 4 , the stay under Sec. 362 terminated automatically as to SouthTrust on September 3, 1987, prior to the bankruptcy court ruling on the matter.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) does not bar a contract from lapsing under its own terms after a postpetition default when the nondebtor party takes no affirmative act to terminate it.

Hertzberg v. Loyal American Life Insurance Co. (In Re B & K Hydraulic Co.) · filed 1989-10-25(a)

For this same reason, it must also be held that the termination of the contract did not violate the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Loyal undertook no act to terminate the contract.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed; an appeal and later reversal of the dismissal do not keep the stay in effect without a stay pending appeal.

Weston v. Rodriguez (In Re Weston) · filed 1989-12-12(c)(2)

In our case, appellant’s case was dismissed and the automatic stay terminated. Although Bankruptcy Rule 8005 allows a party to seek a stay pending appeal, appellant did not avail herself of this provision and, therefore, the foreclosure sale did not violate the automatic stay.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) bar a postpetition hearing that continues a prepetition judicial proceeding and exercises control over a debtor’s legal interest in estate property.

Soliman v. Spencer (In re Spencer) · filed 1989-12-22(a)(1), (a)(3)

That interest became property of the bankruptcy estate on November 20 and is protected by the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a). The Superior Court hearing held November 21 was a continuation of a judicial proceeding prohibited under § 362(a)(1) as well as an act to exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate in violation of § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) stays claims directed against the bankruptcy estate, but does not prohibit the assertion of claims on the estate’s behalf.

R.A. Hatch Co. v. American Insurance · filed 1990-01-16(a)

By contrast, the automatic stay provision in bankruptcy does not prohibit the assertion of claims on behalf of the estate, but only claims directed against the estate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A Chapter 11 filing triggers the automatic stay under § 362, staying proceedings involving the debtor.

Celotex Corp. v. Kelly · filed 1990-12-13

The act of filing triggers the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Accordingly, we will stay the proceedings at No. 90-1217 in which Celotex is the petitioner.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362’s automatic stay does not reach a suit against a third party when the debtor and estate property are not involved, and the stay cannot support an injunction extending beyond the bankruptcy proceeding.

Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. First National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1990-12-28

The court had to rely upon its broad equitable power under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]”) as the source of its authority to issue the injunction, because LDP was not a party to the state action, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (automatic stay of proceedings “against the debtor”), LDP’s property also was not involved, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (automatic stay of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate”), and the injunction was expressly intended to continue in effect following conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (automatic stay expires when ease is closed, proceeding is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The automatic stay normally ends upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, which revests estate property in the debtor.

McKinney v. Waterman Steamship Corporation · filed 1991-01-30(a)

While the confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan on June 19, 1986 did not mention release from the automatic stay specifically, an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is normally lifted when the confirmation order is issued.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) governs the duration of the automatic stay after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

State Bank of Spring Hill v. Bucyrus Grain Co. (In Re Bucyrus Grain Co.) · filed 1991-04-22(c)

Section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c), merely provides for the duration of an automatic stay after a petition has been filed with the Bankruptcy Court.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c) ends the automatic stay that prevents postpetition real estate tax liens from attaching when plan confirmation removes the property from the bankruptcy estate.

Erie Hilton Joint Venture v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (In Re Erie Hilton Joint Venture) · filed 1991-03-22(c)

Even though foreclosure proceedings were pending, upon confirmation of Hilton’s Second Amended Plan, legal title to the Property vested in Hilton, the reorganized debtor. The Property left the bankruptcy estate. The order confirming the plan served as a grant of discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). Therefore, under § 362(c), the automatic stay which had prevented the Taxing Authorities’ liens for 1990 real estate taxes from attaching to the Property no longer remained in effect.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 generally stays proceedings against a debtor, enforcement of prepetition judgments, acts to control estate property, and collection of prepetition claims, subject to subsection (b) exceptions.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Holmes Transportation, Inc. · filed 1991-05-06(a)(1), (2), (3), (6)

Except as provided in Bankruptcy Code Sec. 362(b), section 362 stays both the commencement and the continuation of all actions and proceedings, including judicial proceedings, against the debtor, id. Sec. 362(a)(1), as well as the enforcement of a prepetition judgment against the debtor, id. Sec. 362(a)(2), "any act to obtain possession of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate," id. Sec. 362(a)(3), and any act to collect or recover a prepetition claim against the debtor, id. Sec. 362(a)(6).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 automatically stays an appeal against a defendant during that defendant’s bankruptcy.

Stafford v. Fibreboard Corp. · filed 1991-05-13

Under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, this action is automatically stayed as to Eagle-Picher during the pendency of that bankruptcy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(a) ordinarily stays proceedings against the debtor but does not extend the stay to nonbankrupt codefendants.

Cushman and Wakefield, Inc. v. Backos · filed 1991-05-23(a)

The ■ automatic stay of chapter 11 bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), is limited to debtors and ordinarily does not encompass non-bankrupt co-defendants.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362 stays proceedings against a debtor that has filed for bankruptcy, but does not stay claims against other defendants.

Connors v. Princeton Coal Group, Inc. · filed 1991-06-05

Accordingly, this matter is STAYED as to Princeton Coal only pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. Said stay does not affect the adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims against the other defendants.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) dissolves the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

In Re Fairway Missionary Baptist Church · filed 1991-09-17(c)(2)(B)

The prior case dismissal statutorily dissolved the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed.

In Re Roger W. Knight, Debtor, Roger W. Knight v. Washington Department of Social and Health Services, and Us Bancorp Ro · filed 1992-02-18(c)(2)(B)

The dismissal of the bankruptcy petition terminates the automatic stay of section 362(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan does not end the automatic stay against an individual debtor when the confirmation order postpones discharge and the case remains open.

Reisher v. International Revenue Service (In Re Reisher) · filed 1992-10-30(c)(2)(C)

The confirmation order in this case provides for discharge at the completion of the plan. The language of the order must prevail over the language of the plan. The Debtors in this case therefore have not been discharged and the automatic stay is therefore present to prohibit creditors from pursuing Debtors.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 11,926, oldest cases first.

6,833 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Mt. Hawley Insurance Company v. Sheila O. Aninipok, the recommendation interprets an earlier stay-relief order while resolving insurance coverage; it decides no rule under § 362. opinion →
Lizardi Buonomo v. Metro Caguas Incorporated, the appellate court affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the bankruptcy sale order; it cited the automatic stay as part of that jurisdictional background without deciding § 362’s own rules. opinion →
Henderson v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the court lifted its procedural stay after defendants reported that a Chapter 11 plan ended the bankruptcy stay; it did not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
Betty Owen Schools, Inc. v. United States Department of Education (In Re Betty Owen Schools, Inc.), a footnote recounts this court’s prior hearing ruling under § 362(b)(16); the opinion decides a separate HEA dispute. opinion →
In Re Duval Manor Associates, the opinion recounts the same court’s earlier stay hearing while deciding plan confirmation; it does not decide § 362(d)(2) in this opinion. opinion →
In re Bel Air Chateau Hospital, Inc. and National Labor Relations Board v. FDI, the court decided the stays under former Bankruptcy Rule 11-44, cited § 362 only as later, harmonious law, and expressly reserved whether Board proceedings fall within § 362(b)(4). opinion →
State Bank of Towner, Inc. v. Rauh, the court applied the bankruptcy stay under former 11 U.S.C. § 29, identifying § 362 only as its later counterpart; it did not decide § 362’s own rules. opinion →
In re Allen, No. The court decided the stay under Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 and expressly stated that the Bankruptcy Code was not applicable; its discussion of § 362 was only informative analogy. opinion →
Morford v. City of Omaha, the court decided the stay issue under the former Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29; its discussion of § 362 described a later, inapplicable code. opinion →
In Re Fredrickson, the court dismisses the Chapter 13 case under § 1307 and adds a stay-lifting order, without deciding any rule or basis for relief under § 362. opinion →
Day v. Boteler (In Re Boteler), the court terminated the stay in its order, but its analysis decides only the debtor’s exemption and judicial-lien avoidance under § 522; it states no rule or standard under § 362. opinion →
Beatrice Foods Co. v. Hart Ski Mfg. Co. (In Re Hart Ski Mfg. Co.), the court decides the effect of a subordination agreement under § 510(a), not any rule of § 362; § 362(a) only identifies the stay in the complaint. opinion →
Matter of JJ Bradley & Co., Inc., the court only said it would have stayed a hypothetical N.A.S.D. proceeding; no such proceeding existed, and its actual decision concerned attorney compensation under §§ 329 and 330. opinion →
In Re Al-Wyn Food Distributors, Inc., the court orders the automatic stay lifted after dismissing an unauthorized corporate bankruptcy petition, but does not decide any rule of § 362. opinion →
Graham v. Commissioner, the court decides Tax Court jurisdiction under the tax and former bankruptcy statutes; its footnote mentions the § 362 stay only as a premise for a hypothetical case under the later Bankruptcy Code. opinion →
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Frigitemp Corp. (In Re Frigitemp Corp.), the court reviewed the stay under former bankruptcy law and Rule 401; it mentioned § 362 only while describing the automatic stay’s purpose, not as the governing provision. opinion →
FIRST FEDERAL S & L ASS'N OF LITTLE ROCK v. Pettit, the automatic stay of actions against the debtors is background; the court decides whether § 105 permits an injunction against their co-debtors. opinion →
In Re Eury, the court decided whether lack of insurance was an objection to plan confirmation under § 1325(a); it only mentioned possible relief under § 362 and did not decide a stay relief request or a rule of § 362. opinion →
Theobald Industries, Inc. v. Local 786, International Chemical Workers Union (In Re Theobald Industries, Inc.), the court expressly rested its holding on other grounds, treating its § 362(b)(4) analysis as an inclination rather than the basis of its decision. opinion →
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp v. Twelves (In Re Utah Agricorp Inc.), the court applied the old Bankruptcy Act to the filing and tolling issue and cited § 362(b)(3) only as a later codification, not as the governing provision. opinion →
National Hospital & Institutional Builders Co. v. Goldstein, the court decides the earlier Bankruptcy Act and Rule 12-43; it discusses § 362 only to reject using the later Code to interpret the applicable stay. opinion →
Alsop v. Alaska (In Re Alsop), the court mentions the automatic stay as background to its § 548 fraudulent-transfer analysis, but does not decide any rule or application of § 362. opinion →
Roach v. First National Bank of Anchorage, the court decides the pre-1979 bankruptcy stay under Rule 11-44(a) and cites § 362 only to identify where earlier provisions were later codified. opinion →
Whitlock v. Worrall (In Re American Aluminum Window Corp.), the court uses the stay as an example of the nationwide reach of bankruptcy law while deciding jurisdiction over the preference action; it does not adjudicate a § 362 issue. opinion →
Whitinsville Savings Bank v. Grundstrom (In Re Grundstrom), the court decides that reconsideration is moot after an unstayed foreclosure under Bankruptcy Rule 805; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
Santa Fe Development & Mortgage Corp. v. McCormack (In Re Santa Fe Development & Mortgage Corp.), the majority decides the extension of time under § 108(b), not a rule of § 362; the trial court’s § 362 ruling and the concurrence do not count as this court’s holding. opinion →
Swayne v. Washington, Washington State Parks & Recreation Commission (In re Crum), the § 362 violation is stated in a hypothetical discussion of a private-party suit; the court dismisses this suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds. opinion →
Miles Employee Federal Credit Union v. Griffin (In Re Griffin), the court only makes a hypothetical observation about post-petition stay relief; it decides a prepetition objection to discharge, not an actual § 362 issue. opinion →
New York v. O'Neill (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), the court decides whether § 554 permits abandonment; it invokes § 362 only to reject an analogy and decides no automatic-stay issue. opinion →
Morris v. Philadelphia Electric Co. (In Re Morris), the court resolved the stay claim through its determination that the assistance grant was not estate property under § 541 and the grant program; it did not decide a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
First Commercial Bank, N.A. v. B.T. Wilson Drywall Construction, Inc. (In Re B.T. Wilson Drywall Construction, Inc.), the court continued the existing stay using its stated authority under § 105(a) and decided withdrawal of reference under General Order 24(c)(2), without deciding a rule of § 362; it only reported the creditor’s thirty-day argument. opinion →
In Re Loop Hospital Partnership, the court describes a Section 362 procedure for a hypothetical security agreement but finds a true lease and grants relief under Section 365; it does not decide a stay issue. opinion →
Jack GOLD, et al. v. JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORP., the court decided whether the denial of a stay was immediately reviewable and expressly deferred review of the district court’s ruling on § 362’s application to nondebtors. opinion →
In Re Johns-Manville Corp., the discussion of § 362(d)(1) reports the motion and rulings in Comcoach; this court decides representation of future claimants under § 1109(b), not an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
Thomas, Inc. v. Stanhope Street Associates (In re Thomas, Inc.), the court enjoins adjudication of the debtor’s asserted property rights in another forum, but cites § 362 only alongside the exclusive-jurisdiction statute without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Bramham v. Nevada First Thrift (In Re Bramham), the court decides adequate protection under §§ 361 and 363(e), while § 362 supplies the existing stay and the context for the stipulation. opinion →
In Re White Farm Equipment Co., the court mentions the automatic stay as background, but decides where and how the product liability claims will be determined under other provisions. opinion →
Matter of Chin, the court considered the failure to extend the stay when reviewing attorney fees under § 329; it did not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Whisenton, the court decides avoidance under § 522(h), using the automatic stay only as context for voluntariness and expressly reserving any stay-violation claim. opinion →
City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp., the court cited § 362’s police power exception as evidence about the limits of § 554 abandonment, without deciding an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
Matter of Bricker Systems, Inc., the court grants modification of the stay but analyzes the proposed future assignment under § 365(f), without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Ohio v. Kovacs, the Court decided dischargeability, while the § 362 stay rulings were made by lower courts in a separate dispute that the Court remanded; its footnote distinguishing another stay case did not decide that dispute. opinion →
BFC Chemicals, Inc. v. Smith-Douglass, Inc., the court identifies the stay motion and cites § 362 for its framework, but decides priority under North Carolina consignment law rather than any rule of § 362. opinion →
Cunard SS Co., Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Services, AB, the court decides whether to grant comity to a Swedish bankruptcy proceeding; it invokes the domestic automatic stay only as a policy analogy, while the express § 362 citation appears in a quotation from another opinion. opinion →
In Re Polzin, this court decides a § 363 cash-collateral motion and mentions § 362 only to compare adequate-protection standards; the attached stay-termination order is a different court’s ruling. opinion →
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corporation, the court only tentatively raises the stay’s possible effect on allocating liability and expressly leaves the issue for development on remand; it does not decide a rule under § 362. opinion →
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., the court only suggested a possible effect of § 362(a)(6) on a future liability allocation; it did not decide that issue and left further development to remand. opinion →
In Re Starns, the court expressly declined to decide § 362(d) requirements; the disputed issue was exemption under Texas law, and the debtor agreed to stay relief for nonexempt property. opinion →
In Re Blanchette, the court decides whether the Chapter 7 case should be dismissed under § 707 because discharge is unavailable under § 727; its reference to stay protection does not decide any rule of § 362. opinion →
Guess v. Chenault, the cited stay was ordered by the bankruptcy court and is reported here as background; this order decides magistrate jurisdiction and severance. opinion →
American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., the opinion reports the bankruptcy court’s suspension of the automatic stay; this court does not decide a rule under § 362. opinion →
In Re Farnham, the court identifies Vermont-law perfection as the only question before it; § 362(d)(2) supplies the stay-relief setting rather than a rule the court decides. opinion →
In Re: Quael Corp., a Michigan Corporation, F/k/a Nautilus Enterprises, Inc., Debtor, the majority reports the debtor’s § 362 contention and affirms the injunction on the contract issue without deciding a rule of § 362; the express analysis of § 362(a)(6) and (a)(3) appears only in a concurrence. opinion →
Matter of Kalpana Electronics, Inc., the court decides contempt for disobeying its surrender orders; its discussion of § 362 supplies background about the earlier stay ruling, rather than deciding the stay’s rules in this proceeding. opinion →
In Re Continental Air Lines, Corp., the court schedules a hearing to consider lifting the stay but does not decide any rule, standard, or remedy under § 362; its decision concerns estimation of a claim under § 502(c). opinion →
In Re Intran Corp., the court decided whether the lessor had an administrative expense under § 503; it mentioned § 362(d) as an available alternative but did not decide a stay-relief request or construe its requirements. opinion →
Wilson v. First National Bank, the court cites the automatic stay as the policy behind preventing a last-minute grab, but orders return of the post-petition transfer under § 549 without deciding a rule or remedy under § 362. opinion →
In Re Green, the reference to § 362(d)(1) is a footnote observation; the court decides lien avoidance under § 522(f) and makes no ruling on the automatic stay. opinion →
Matter of LaLonde, the court cites the purpose of the automatic stay while calculating a Chapter 13 mortgage arrearage, but does not decide a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
In Re SINKING OF, the court reports the § 362 stay as procedural history; its own rulings concern appellate finality and the interpleader bond, without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Ass'n v. Imperial Sugar Co., the court decides appellate finality and the surety’s liability; it does not decide the automatic stay’s rules under § 362. opinion →
LaSalle v. Endicott (In Re Endicott), the court dismissed an untimely appeal; it expressly labeled its discussion of § 362(b)(2) dictum, and the stay ruling came in an earlier order. opinion →
Kenny v. Block (In Re Kenny), the court mentions the automatic stay as background to its decision that the plaintiffs alleged no Fifth Amendment deprivation; it does not decide a disputed rule or remedy under § 362. opinion →
In Re Sherman, the court decides the status of the creditor’s security interest under other law and grants stay relief as a consequence, without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Casey, the discussion of § 362 appears only in Justice Wilson’s special concurrence, which says it addresses issues not discussed in the majority opinion. opinion →
Freeland v. Kaye (In re Kaye), the stay violation is recited as background to an earlier state-court judgment and stay-relief order; this decision resolves whether the trustee can use that judgment through collateral estoppel in a § 544(b) action, without deciding a § 362 issue. opinion →
Kiriluk v. Chester Water Authority (In Re Kiriluk), the court decides the utility’s restoration and deposit duties under § 366; its statement about § 362(a)(6) is background, with no decision on an automatic-stay rule or violation. opinion →
Windsor Communications Group, Inc. v. Havertown Printing Co. (In Re Windsor Communications Group, Inc.), the court expressly said its observation about the automatic stay was not a factor in its decision; it decided the setoff dispute under § 553. opinion →
LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc. v. United States, Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (In re LaSalle Rolling Mi, the court cites § 362 as evidence about congressional intent while deciding whether the Tax Anti-Injunction Act bars an injunction; it does not decide the automatic stay’s application. opinion →
Bianco v. Coles, the court decides the foreclosure-sale consummation date under RPAPL 1371 (2); the stay explains why the deed was held, and its nonapplication had already been determined. opinion →
Fisher v. First Union Mortgage Corp. (In Re Fisher), the court treats relief from the § 362 stay as a prior event and decides the availability of relief under § 548(a) and § 105, rather than a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
In Re Conroe Forge & Manufacturing Corp., the court decided whether sale proceeds could be distributed before plan confirmation and whether escrow adequately protected the creditor; no relief from the automatic stay was sought or decided. opinion →
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Robbins (In Re Interstate Motor Freight System, IMFS, Inc.), the court invokes the stay-relief procedure to reject an argument about whether liened collateral is estate property; it decides distribution and standing issues, not a rule or request for relief under § 362. opinion →
Coggins Granite, Inc. v. Georgia Granite Co. (In Re the Georgia Granite Co.), the § 362(e) reference describes earlier hearing scheduling; the present analysis decides lien validity and collateral estoppel rather than the automatic-stay provision’s own rules. opinion →
Matter of Burrell, the court decides whether a deficiency notice satisfies the proof-of-claim process; it mentions § 362(b)(9) only to reject an inference from the stay exception. opinion →
In Re Association Center Ltd. Partnership, Q1: The court notes the automatic stay as background, but decides the rent-perfection dispute under Washington law and § 546(b), without ruling on a § 362 issue. opinion →
Flader Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Callas, the court cites § 362 as background to its decision on whether bankruptcy tolled the Illinois mechanic’s-lien filing period; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Stein and Day, Inc., the court recounts the earlier stay violation as background to its decision on appointment of a trustee under § 1104; it does not decide a § 362 issue in this opinion. opinion →
United States v. Vanguard Inv. Co., Inc., the § 362 statement recounts the court’s earlier preliminary-injunction ruling in the procedural history; this opinion decides dissolution and whether to permit a Chapter 11 filing. opinion →
In Re Bracey, the court mentions the automatic stay as context for the debtor’s delay, but decides reconsideration under filing deadlines and excusable neglect rather than a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re McLean Industries, Inc., the court decides whether the bank has a setoff right under § 553 and New Jersey contract law; it mentions § 362 only as the stay that requires permission before setoff. opinion →
Whittaker v. Philadelphia Electric Co., the court decides whether a violation of § 366 supports contempt; it mentions § 362 only as a comparison and does not decide the automatic stay’s rules. opinion →
Stadium Management Corp. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., N.A. (In Re Stadium Management Corp.), the court decided that section 105(a) authorized an injunction against foreclosure on a nondebtor subsidiary’s property; it did not decide a rule of section 362. opinion →
In Re Storberg, the court mentions the stay exception as a practical reason for allowing separate treatment of support claims under § 1322, but decides no issue under § 362. opinion →
Gibraltar Savings, Cross-Appellant v. Ldbrinkman Corp., Cross-Appellee, and Lloyd D. Brinkman, Defendant-Cross, the court expressly declines to review the § 362(d) stay order because its appeal was dismissed; its decision concerns the posture of the appeal, not the section’s rules. opinion →
In Re Norman, the court cited the automatic-stay exceptions as support for its ruling that criminal fines and penalties are not dischargeable in Chapter 13; it did not decide whether § 362 stayed any action in this case. opinion →
Virtual Network Services Corp. v. Brook Furniture (In Re Virtual Network Services Corp.), the court cites § 362(e) while distinguishing another court’s automatic-stay decision; its own decision concerns the preclusive effect of a § 365 lease-assumption order, not a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Ballard, the court decides whether the creditor perfected a security interest under Nevada law and § 544; § 362 only frames the requested stay relief. opinion →
Matter of Lassiter, the court decided the treatment of exempt property and the IRS lien under sections 522 and 506; its conditional footnote about stay relief did not decide a section 362 issue. opinion →
Maxfield v. Rushton, the express § 362 statement is in Judge Orme’s separate concurrence; the court’s majority decides dismissal for failure to prosecute under Utah Rule 41(b). opinion →
McKnight v. Morgan (In re Morgan), the current decision resolves the preclusive effect of the state court fraud finding under § 523(a); the discussion of § 362 recounts the court’s earlier order and the subsequent lifting of the stay, without deciding a § 362 rule in this order. opinion →
Urbanco, Inc. v. Urban Systems Streetscape, Inc., the express § 362(a)(1) ruling is attributed to the Fifth Circuit, while this court decided whether denying a motion to reopen under § 350(b) was an abuse of discretion. opinion →
Epps v. Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc. (In Re Epps), the court states the automatic-stay rule as background; its decision concerns HUD assignment-program rights and the Chapter 13 cure under § 1322(b)(5), with no stay dispute decided. opinion →
Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc. v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission (In Re Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc.), the court cited § 362(b)(4) as part of its Supremacy Clause analysis, but did not decide whether the automatic stay applied to a proceeding or construe the exception’s limits. opinion →
In Re Orient River Investments, Inc., the court mentions § 362(d) as a possible remedy while deciding immediate payment under § 365(d)(3), without deciding a stay-relief request or a rule of § 362. opinion →
Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. Ass'n v. Wood, the court decides whether the mortgagee perfected its interest in rents through a Sec. 546(b) notice under Oklahoma law; the Sec. 362 discussion supplies background on the stay and its exception, without deciding a disputed rule of Sec. 362. opinion →
In Re Williamsburg Suites, Ltd., the § 362 reference reports the state judge’s ruling; this court decides dismissal under § 305, not a § 362 issue. opinion →
In Re Shelton, the court decides the timeliness of a proof of claim and mentions § 362(a) only as a possible constraint on forcing repayment; it does not decide a rule or application of the automatic stay. opinion →
In Re Park Place Associates, the court decides whether the bankruptcy filing warrants sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011; it mentions the automatic stay to explain why a debtor may need time to develop a reorganization plan, without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
N.R. Guaranteed Retirement, Inc. v. Firstmark Standard Life Insurance (In Re N.R. Guaranteed Retirement, Inc.), the court decided whether creditor prejudice supported dismissal of the Chapter 11 petition; its § 362 reference describes the existing stay without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
In the Matter of Robert E. Penn and Patsy S. Penn, Debtors-Appellants. Parke State Bank, the court decided the finality of a stay-lifting order for appellate review and then dismissed the appeal as moot; it did not decide § 362’s own rules. opinion →
In Re Gaskin, the court accepted that § 362(a) stayed foreclosure, but decided how the FmHA interest-credit regulation affected the claim amount; it did not decide a disputed rule of § 362. opinion →
Arkansas Real Estate Commission v. Veteto, the court uses § 362 to contrast the breadth of the automatic stay with the discharge injunction, but decides the effect of § 524 and Arkansas fund law after discharge, not a rule governing § 362. opinion →
In Re Frg, Inc., Frp Limited Partnership A/K/A Franklin Realty Partners v. Manley, the court resolves the validity of the security interest under Pennsylvania law and due process, then remands for the bankruptcy court to decide whether section 362(d) permits relief; it does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
CFC 78 Partnership B v. Casa Loma Associates (In Re Casa Loma Associates), the court denied the stay-relief motion without prejudice because it transferred venue at an early stage; it did not decide a rule or standard under § 362. opinion →
In Re Aqua Associates, the court decides adequate protection for a priming loan under § 364(d); its reference to § 362(d)(2)(A) is only a contrast, and it does not decide an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
Moran v. G. & W.H. Corson, Inc., the opinion only reports an earlier order dismissing another appeal under the automatic stay; it does not decide § 362 in this appeal. opinion →
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Cushman & Wakefield of Penna., Inc. (In re Shapiro), Q2: The court vacated its stay-relief order because the complaint was timely filed under its own conditional order, without deciding a rule of § 362. Its separate § 362(a) reference about a possible post-petition transfer was expressly conditional. opinion →
In Re G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., the court mentions § 362(b)(4) only to reject an analogy while deciding whether Oregon liquor law prevails over § 365 under the Twenty-First Amendment; it does not decide an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
In Re 1020 Warburton Avenue Realty Corp., the court decides whether the involuntary petition should be dismissed under § 303 and whether it circumvents New York foreclosure law; it mentions § 362(a) only as background to explain why the petition is not a foreclosure proceeding. opinion →
In Re Reiser Ford, Inc., the court dismissed the bankruptcy case for bad faith under § 1112(b) and terminated the automatic stays in its order, without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Broomall Printing Corp., the court describes the Timbers stay-relief rule while deciding the creditor’s recovery under § 506(b); it does not decide a § 362 stay-relief request. opinion →
In Re Miller, the court decides entitlement to rents under state law and §§ 363 and 552; § 362 appears as the debtors’ argument and background to the bankruptcy procedure, without a decision construing the stay. opinion →
Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., this statement appears only in a concurrence in the denial of rehearing, not in the court’s own decision. opinion →
In Re French, the court cites the criminal-action exception to support its decision about employment of counsel under § 327; it does not decide an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
In re Mark Enterprises, Inc., the court only states what it would decide if required for appellate purposes; dismissal rendered the stay motion moot. It makes no operative decision under § 362. opinion →
Kimco Leasing, Inc. v. Knee, the court mentions the automatic stay only to explain its replacement by the discharge injunction; it decides contempt for violating § 524, not any disputed rule of § 362. opinion →
Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the statement about § 362(a) reports the Ninth Circuit’s ruling; this court decides whether to vacate its earlier judgment, not the stay’s scope. opinion →
Dover Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the court mentions a hypothetical automatic stay while deciding whether preliminary injunctive relief is needed; it does not decide any disputed rule or application of § 362. opinion →
Sundial Asphalt Co. v. V.P.C. Investors Corp. (In Re Sundial Asphalt Co.), although this court restores the automatic stay, its reasoning decides executory-contract rejection and reconsideration under § 365 and Rule 59, without deciding any rule or standard under § 362. opinion →
Lomas Mortgage USA v. Wiese, the court expressly declined to apply § 362(d) and resolved the stay-relief appeal under § 1327(a) confirmation preclusion. opinion →
Grabek v. Worldwide Specialty Merchandise, Inc., the discussion of § 362 is in a specially concurring opinion, not the court’s own holding. opinion →
Simmons v. Simmons (In Re Simmons), the court dismissed the case under § 1307(c) and expressly declined to rule on the alternative § 362(d)(1) motion for relief from the stay. opinion →
In Re Stoecker, the court mentions when the automatic stay began only as background to its decision on willful nonpayment under Illinois tax law; it does not decide a disputed rule, scope, or remedy under § 362. opinion →
Thomas M. Germain, Trustee for the Estate of O'sullivan's Fuel Oil Co., Inc. v. The Connecticut National Bank, the court decides whether the trustee’s lender liability claims carry a jury-trial right; it mentions § 362 only to explain that the complaint does not allege an automatic-stay violation, without deciding the stay’s rules. opinion →
Kraft v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. (In Re Kraft), the court mentions when the stay ends only as background to its decision about the timing of a student-loan hardship complaint under § 523(a)(8); it does not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
In Re Plum Run Service Corp., the court only identifies a possible automatic-stay claim; it does not decide a § 362 rule or whether the Navy violated the stay. Its ruling concerns assumption under § 365 and discrimination under § 525. opinion →
Jacobson v. Robert Speece Properties, Inc. (In Re Speece), the court mentions the stay’s termination as a consequence of denying discharge while deciding whether to approve a settlement; it does not decide a dispute about § 362’s own rules. opinion →
Ross Controls, Inc. v. United States, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, the court decides successor liability under the wrongful levy statute; its reference to § 362(b)(9) is background for that analysis, not a decision applying the automatic stay or its exception. opinion →
Holmstrom v. Jo Betsy Lewallen Terry Mitchell Holmstrom And Hearne, Knolle, Lewallen, Livingston and Holcomb, the court cites § 362 to explain an earlier pause in the appeal; it decides dismissal under Texas appellate filing rules, not any rule of § 362. opinion →
Owen v. Treadway (In Re Owen), the court mentions § 362(h) by analogy while deciding punitive damages for a claimed violation of § 524’s discharge injunction; it does not decide an automatic-stay claim. opinion →
Federal Trade Commission v. American Standard Credit Systems, Inc., this summary judgment opinion reports an earlier scheduling ruling after the FTC raised § 362, but does not decide the stay exception or apply its terms to the action; the footnote only recites statutory text. opinion →
In Re St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc., the debtor did not raise a § 362 stay claim in this case; the opinion only recounts this court’s ruling on recoupment in an earlier case. opinion →
Gore v. United States (In Re Gore), the court mentions the later § 362(b)(9)(D) amendment in a footnote while addressing tax assessment timing under 26 U.S.C. § 6503(h); it does not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
Turner v. United States (In Re Turner), the court mentions a prospective exception in a footnote while discussing tax assessment, but does not decide how § 362 applies to this case. opinion →
In Re Union Meeting Partners, the court decides how post-petition rents affect a secured claim under § 552(b); it mentions § 362 only while explaining the Supreme Court’s distinction between rents and lost use value. opinion →
United States v. Birchem, the court mentions § 362(c) only to explain the background of FmHA notice regulations. It decides whether FmHA gave sufficient notice under agricultural credit law, not whether the automatic stay applied or ended. opinion →
In Re Midway Investments, Ltd., the court expressly says the single asset stay amendment is inapplicable here; its decision dismisses the case for bad faith under § 1112(b), while stay relief was granted earlier. opinion →
Parsons v. Plotkin (In Re Pacific Land Sales, Inc.), the panel quotes § 362(a)(3) as supporting background for bankruptcy court authority, but decides the scope of an injunction under the court’s power and FCC jurisdiction without deciding whether the automatic stay covers the challenged conduct. opinion →
Brothers v. Tremaine, the court mentions the automatic stay only as procedural history while deciding whether to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1); it does not adjudicate a rule or dispute under § 362. opinion →
Oregon Ex Rel. SAIF Corp. v. Harmon (In Re Harmon), the court decides whether the disability payments may be set off or recouped; it mentions § 362(a)(7) only as a general restriction and does not decide the stay’s own operation. opinion →
Underwood v. Russian Space Agency (In Re Rimsat, Ltd.), the district court decides discretionary withdrawal of the bankruptcy reference, citing only a potential conflict involving the automatic stay; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
MacAlma v. Bank United of Texas, the court decided notice requirements for a postponed foreclosure sale under California law and other bankruptcy provisions; § 362 supplied the background stay, not a rule the court construed. opinion →
In Re John H. Gledhill and Gloria K. Gledhill, Debtors, State Bank of Southern Utah v. John H. Gledhill and Gloria K. Gl, the court decides the procedure and grounds for vacating a stay-relief order under Bankruptcy Rules 7001, 9024, and Civil Rule 60(b), rather than a rule of § 362 itself; the brief § 362(e) reference rejects a claimed limit only as a consequence of that Rules holding. opinion →
In Re MacIas, the court decides whether to allow a late secured claim; its discussion of possible relief from the automatic stay is a hypothetical consequence, not a decision on a stay request. opinion →
In Re Bonneville Pacific Corp., the court mentions the automatic stay as background to its decision about counsel’s fiduciary duties and fees, without deciding a rule under § 362. opinion →
Butler v. Biven Software, Inc., the statement about § 362(a) appears only in a special concurrence, not in the court’s holding. opinion →
Jauregui v. Ricci (In Re Jauregui), the court decides whether the postponed foreclosure sale required further notice under California law; § 362 supplies the background stay but its own rules are not decided. opinion →
In Re Garfinckels, Inc., the court mentions § 362(a)(6) only as an analogy while deciding when property taxes are assessed under § 507(a)(7)(B); it does not decide an automatic-stay rule. opinion →
Thompson v. Board of Trustees, the section-specific ruling is reported as the bankruptcy court’s decision; this court gives only a general affirmance and states no rule of § 362 in its own words. opinion →
In Re Wilcox, the court denied stay relief because Chapter 13 permits repayment of the mortgage under §§ 1322 and 1325; it did not decide a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
High Plains Oil, Ltd. v. High Plains Drilling Program-1981, Ltd., the court determines the effect of the bankruptcy court’s particular stay order and then applies Kansas tax-priority law; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
California Federal Bank v. Romano, the court uses the automatic stay as a premise for deciding whether the mortgage contract permits attorneys’ fees; it does not decide a rule under § 362. opinion →
In Re Lush Lawns, Inc., the court decided sovereign immunity and jurisdiction under § 106 and the Eleventh Amendment, and expressly declined to decide whether § 362 was violated. opinion →
Beneficial New York, Inc. v. Bushey (In Re Bushey), the court considers stay modification as a remedy for a violation of § 521(2)(B), but decides no rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
Matter of DiCamillo, the court used § 362(b)(10) to interpret § 365(a); it granted stay relief because the debtor could not promptly cure under § 365(b)(1), without deciding a disputed rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Nepil, the court denies stay relief as a consequence of its construction of § 1322(c)(2) and § 1325(a)(5), without deciding a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
In Re William Winston Waugh, Debtor. William Winston Waugh v. Internal Revenue Service, the court uses the automatic stay as the factual basis for tolling the tax priority period under §§ 507 and 108; it does not decide a disputed rule of § 362. Its discussion of the 1994 stay exception is hypothetical because that amendment did not apply. opinion →
In Re Kleather, the court grants limited stay relief based on its analysis of setoff under § 553 and cash collateral under § 363, without deciding a rule of § 362 itself; its discussion of § 362 quotes or describes Strumpf. opinion →
In Re Castillo, the court decides the debtor’s statement-of-intention duties under § 521(2); it mentions the stay’s expiration under § 362(c) only as background to the creditor’s possible remedies. opinion →
Turner v. DeKalb Bank (In Re Turner), the court decides estate property and turnover under §§ 541 and 542; it reports the stay-damages request but does not decide a § 362 violation or remedy. opinion →
Matter of National Gypsum Co., the court decides whether a discharge-injunction dispute must be arbitrated; its references to § 362 are background and do not decide the automatic-stay provision. opinion →
Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra, the court assumes possible stay violations without deciding whether § 362 was breached; it decides good faith under § 363(m), using § 362 remedies only to support that decision. opinion →
LaSonde v. A & E Real Estate Sales & Management, Inc., the court applies the missing-transcript presumption to an implicit trial-court determination; it does not decide a rule or coverage issue under § 362(a). opinion →
Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the court describes § 362 as background while deciding the effect of a § 1110 agreement on lease obligations; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
FAMILY FEDERAL SAV. AND LOAN ASS'N v. Huckaby, the court uses the undisputed bankruptcy stay to calculate abandonment under Louisiana procedural law; it does not decide a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
In Re Hill, the court decides the remedy for a violation of the § 524(a)(2) discharge injunction and uses § 362(h) only as an analogy; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
N. Parent, Inc. v. Cotter & Co. (In Re N. Parent, Inc.), the court classified the automatic-stay claim as a core proceeding for purposes of forum selection and jurisdiction; it did not decide any rule of § 362 or whether the alleged conduct violated the stay. opinion →
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. AVCO Financial Corp., this opinion only reports the court’s earlier § 362(b)(4) ruling; it makes no present decision about the automatic stay. opinion →
Swoboda v. Wilshire Credit Corp., the court applied Texas limitations tolling to a bankruptcy stay; it did not decide a disputed rule of § 362. opinion →
Fankhanel v. Commissioner, the opinion recounts earlier stay orders as procedural history while deciding tax deficiencies and a section 6673 penalty; it does not decide a rule of section 362. opinion →
Davis v. Davis, the court mentions § 362(a) as background to its analysis of § 522(c) and state homestead exemptions; it does not decide any rule of the automatic stay. opinion →
Robert L. v. Danzig (In Re Howard J.), the court decides how § 108(c) affects the deadline for reviving a judgment; § 362 is mentioned only as a source of a stay and its own rules are not decided. opinion →
Krass v. Tri-County Security, Inc, the § 362 citation appears in plaintiff’s quoted brief; the court only limits its consideration to Tri-County and does not decide a rule of the automatic stay. opinion →
Stewart v. United States Trustee (In Re Stewart), the § 362 citation recounts Barbara’s motion for stay relief in the background; the court’s own decision concerns § 707(b). opinion →
McDaniel v. Commissioner, the opinion only reports that the bankruptcy court granted relief from the automatic stay; this court does not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
In Re Steeley, the opinion poses the annulment issue but reports other courts’ rulings without stating this court’s own decision. opinion →
Bankruptcy Recovery Network v. Brown (In re Brown), the court remands for clarification of contempt under § 524 and cites § 362 cases only as a possible comparison, without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Sumrall v. Green Tree Financial, the court dismissed the appeal as moot after the collateral was resold; it did not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
Command Electric, Inc. v. Saxe (In Re Manousos), the court denies stay relief based on its decision about the attorney’s lien and does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
French v. Jack R. Duckworth, and United States of America, Intervenor-Appellant, the court uses § 362 as an analogy while deciding the meaning and constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), rather than deciding § 362’s own rules. opinion →
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. O'Brien, the court decides Iowa law and general bankruptcy preemption, but expressly declines to decide whether the letters violated § 362(a)(6); the § 362 ruling is reported from the bankruptcy court. opinion →
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Bonnie Patricia O'brien, Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Lois M. Siverly, the § 362(a)(6) violation was a bankruptcy court ruling reported by this court; this court expressly declined to decide whether the letters violated federal bankruptcy law. opinion →
In Re Munkwitz, the court decides the 180-day filing bar under § 109(g)(2); it mentions § 362 only to identify the earlier request for stay relief. opinion →
In Re Ludwig Realty Corp., the court denies stay relief because Oklahoma law gives the creditors no lien or fee entitlement; it does not decide a rule of § 362(d). opinion →
Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Brady (In Re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.), the court decides core jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157; it identifies a § 362 claim but does not decide any rule of the automatic stay. opinion →
Woods v. Passodelis (In Re Passodelis), the court decides the removal deadline under Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(2)(B); the § 362 stay and its partial termination provide the facts that trigger that rule. opinion →
Provost v. Commissioner, the court decides the tax assessment limitation period under sections 6501 and 6503(h), using section 362 only as a supporting citation; it states no independent rule about the automatic stay. opinion →
Sanford v. Martin, the § 362 citation supports only a reported admission in the Agreed Judgment; this court resolves the appeal on forfeiture of the challenge and does not decide a § 362 rule. opinion →
Behrens v. Original Graphics, Inc., the court decided whether denying a trial continuance was an abuse of discretion; it did not decide what § 362(a)(1) means or requires. opinion →
In Re: William Stoecker, Debtor, the court cites § 362(g) only as an example of a Code provision addressing burden of proof; it decides the burden for a state tax claim, not any rule of § 362. opinion →
Michelson v. Camp, the opinion only recounts the lenders’ bankruptcy motion and the bankruptcy court’s prior stay relief; this court decides tort damages under the full credit bid rule, not § 362. opinion →
Oakview Treatment Centers of Kansas, Inc. v. Garrett, the § 362 violation is an allegation in another action, while this court decides the scope of a contractual indemnity agreement. opinion →
Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader, the court declined to consider the asserted stay error because the appellants could not raise it for Lucas; it did not decide a rule under § 362. opinion →
In Re Dipzinski, the court decides whether the debtor may amend her exemptions after concealing an asset; its footnote describes an automatic-stay violation without adjudicating a § 362 issue. opinion →
Alston v. State Board of Medical Examiners (In Re Alston), the § 362 sentence is quoted from In re Kidd; this court decides sovereign immunity and injunctive relief for claims under §§ 524 and 525, not the automatic stay. opinion →
Solomon v. Barman (In Re Barman), the court decides the willfulness requirement for denial of discharge under § 727(a)(6), using § 362(h) only as an analogy; its § 362(a) reference merely describes the stay of a related proceeding. opinion →
In Re Lair, the court decides the effect of § 521(2) and abandonment on the parties’ post-bankruptcy rights; it treats the automatic stay as background and says it served no purpose here, without deciding a contested rule under § 362. opinion →
Reogas v. Gray, the Court remands for further consideration in light of § 362 but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Singley v. American General Finance (In re Singley), the court denied reconsideration while expressly leaving unresolved whether the creditor’s conduct was prohibited by § 362; its discussion of possible coverage did not decide the section’s rule. opinion →
In Re Freeman, the court decides whether the annuity payments are estate property and exempt; § 362 appears only in a citation supporting the comparison of burdens between the earlier sanctions motion and the current exemption objection. opinion →
Dinatale v. United States (In Re Dinatale), the court found no record basis to rule on a pre-discharge automatic-stay violation; its actual analysis and judgment concern the discharge injunction under § 524(a), not § 362’s rules. opinion →
Boullioun Aircraft Holding Co. v. Smith Management Western Pacific Airlines, Inc., the court mentions § 362(d) only to distinguish an automatic-stay appeal from the issues before it; it decides no rule of § 362. opinion →
Parker v. Grant (In Re Grant), the court denied a fee request after finding the dischargeability complaint substantially justified; it did not decide any rule of the automatic stay under § 362. The § 362(d) reference appears in the conclusion to that fee discussion. opinion →
In Re Cambridge Biotech Corporation Institut Pasteur and Genetic Systems Corporation v. Cambridge Biotech Corporation, D, this sentence only reports why the appellants filed in bankruptcy court; the court does not decide a rule under § 362. opinion →
In Re Chicago Partnership Board, Inc., the opinion only reports the District Court’s protective decree; this court makes no decision under § 362. opinion →
Washington State Bank v. Medalia Healthcare L.L.C., the reference to § 362 reports Medalia’s position in correspondence; this court does not decide any rule under the automatic stay. opinion →
Reyes v. FCC National Bank (In Re Reyes), the court decides whether § 524 permits a private action; the § 362(h) discussion in the incorporated brief serves only as a comparison. opinion →
Johns v. Steege (In Re National Industrial Chemical Co.), the § 362 reference describes relief sought in a dismissed count; this opinion decides only the remanded res judicata issue concerning Count I. opinion →
Wachovia Bank v. Jarvis, the § 362(f) stay-relief ruling was the bankruptcy court’s; this court only affirmed dismissal of the appeal as moot. opinion →
Fogiel v. Federated Financial Company, Successor-In-Interest and Assignee of Franklin Federal Bankcorp., a Federa, the court mentions the automatic stay as procedural history and dismisses the appeal after the bankruptcy court lifted it; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Charge Trucking, Inc., the court resolves the bank’s setoff entitlement under § 553 and the account agreements; it identifies § 362 as the stay to be lifted but does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re: O'Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., Debtor Calpine Corporation v. O'Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., Now Known a, the court cites § 362 as part of the Bankruptcy Code framework while deciding whether break-up fees are recoverable under § 503; it does not decide § 362’s own rules. opinion →
Morgan v. United States, the court decides whether the tax priority period may be tolled under §§ 507(a)(8)(A)(i) and 105(a); it mentions § 362(a)(6) only as the reason collection was impeded during the earlier case. opinion →
Savage v. Savage, the citation describes an attorney’s prior filing and procedural history, not this court’s decision about § 362. opinion →
National American Insurance Company Gulf Insurance Company v. Ruppert Landscaping Company, Incorporated, the § 362 ruling was the bankruptcy court’s, reported only as procedural history; this court decided creditor standing. opinion →
Vaughan v. First Union National Bank of Florida, the discussion of § 362 appears only in Judge Parker’s dissent, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
Orthopaedic Surgery & Sports Medicine, P.C. v. U.S. Physicians, Inc. (In re U.S. Physicians, Inc.), the court expressly says the plaintiffs do not invoke § 362(d) and decides ownership of the receivables under the parties’ agreement, without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Watkins v. Guardian Loan Co. of Massapequa (In Re Watkins), the court used automatic-stay remedies as an analogy when deciding sanctions for a violation of the § 524 discharge injunction; it did not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
Morgan v. United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service, the court treats the automatic stay as a premise while deciding whether § 105(a) permits tolling of the § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) priority period; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
Reogas v. Gray, the court remands for further consideration in light of § 362 but does not decide any rule of the section; question 3: no sentence states such a rule. opinion →
Reogas v. Gray, the court directs further consideration in light of § 362 but decides no rule under that section. opinion →
Washington State Bank v. MEDALIA, the section appears only in Medalia’s reported assertion, which this court does not adopt or decide. opinion →
Segal v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the court mentions the automatic stay only as procedural background and decides the discrimination, arbitration, and Rule 60(b) issues without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Beeler v. Stanton (In Re Stanton), the court states the stay’s general scope as background, but the available opinion text does not decide whether any conduct violated § 362 or otherwise apply its rules. opinion →
In Re Blan, this opinion only reports an earlier stay-relief ruling; its present decision addresses dismissal under § 707(a), not § 362. opinion →
Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In Re Cybernetic Services, Inc.), the panel decided whether the patent security interest was perfected under patent law and the UCC; relief from the automatic stay followed the parties’ stipulation, without a decision about § 362’s own rules. opinion →
United States v. Mazzeo, the court decides tolling of the tax collection limitations period under Title 26; it does not decide a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
In Re Tornheim, the court treated use of the automatic stay as evidence of bad faith supporting dismissal of the Chapter 13 case; it did not decide a rule, remedy, or limit under § 362. opinion →
Tibbetts v. Gagliardi, the court decided the effect of a Texas Insurance Code receivership stay and used § 362(a)(1) only as an analogy. opinion →
United States Lines, Inc. v. American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass'n, the court quotes § 362(a)(1) as background on bankruptcy policy while deciding whether the bankruptcy court could decline to enforce arbitration clauses; it does not decide the automatic stay’s application or limits. opinion →
In Re Just for Feet, Inc., the court recites § 362(a)(6) as background and decides whether § 105(a) permits payment of pre-petition trade-vendor claims. opinion →
D.J. Malatesta Associates, Inc. v. Century 21 Rueter, Inc., this reports a Bankruptcy Judge’s earlier stay ruling; this court decided claims under Pennsylvania’s Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, not § 362. opinion →
Au-Yang v. Barton, the court mentions the automatic stay only as background; it decides the notice requirement under California Code of Civil Procedure section 594(a), not a rule of § 362. opinion →
Verholek v. Verholek, the court mentions the automatic stay as procedural background, but decides whether Pennsylvania law allowed reinstatement of alimony; it does not decide any rule of § 362. opinion →
Southern Co. Energy Marketing, L.P. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., the court assumes the bankruptcy stay makes PCA unavailable, but decides joinder under Rule 19 rather than any rule of § 362(a). opinion →
In Re Davis, the court cites the stay exception only as public-policy background while deciding whether to extend a proof-of-claim deadline under Rule 3002(c)(2); it does not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
Parrin v. Helms, the court affirms by reference to the BAP but states no rule about § 362 in its own words; the only stated automatic-stay rationale is attributed to the bankruptcy court. opinion →
LifeUSA Insurance v. Green (In Re Green), the court mentions § 362 only as procedural history and does not decide any disputed rule of the automatic stay. opinion →
Massachusetts Casualty Insurance v. Green (In Re Green), the court mentions the automatic stay only as procedural history and does not decide any rule under § 362. opinion →
In Re Marriage of Adamson and Cosner, the § 362 point is petitioner's argument, which the appellate court did not adopt or decide; its analysis addresses jurisdiction and dischargeability under § 523. opinion →
In re Marriage of Adamson, the section 362 point is only petitioner’s argument; the court decides jurisdiction and dischargeability under section 523, without ruling on the automatic stay. opinion →
Skaggs v. Stanfield, No. The opinion cites § 362 as background for an earlier suspension, then reinstates and dismisses the appeal under Texas appellate rules without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re DeBaggis, the court mentions the automatic stay only as procedural background and decides dischargeability under § 523 and state-law contribution and indemnity, not any rule of § 362. opinion →
Araps v. Debaggis (In re Debaggis), the court mentions the automatic stay only as background to the dischargeability dispute and does not decide any rule under § 362. opinion →
CIT Group/Sales Financing, Inc. v. Lord (In Re Lord), the opinion only reports an earlier order granting relief from the automatic stay; its present decision concerns discharge under § 727. opinion →
Smith v. Lachter (In Re Smith), the stay ruling was made by the bankruptcy court below, and this panel expressly declined to address it. opinion →
United States v. Robert W. Kubick, United States of America v. William D. Herron, United States of America v. Robert W., the § 362 statement is quoted from Michalek, while this court decides whether a sentencing-guidelines enhancement applies to bankruptcy fraud. opinion →
Baldwin Sod Farms, Inc. v. Corrigan, the stay relief was a bankruptcy court ruling reported by this appellate court; this court decided Florida jurisdiction and jury-trial issues, not § 362. opinion →
In Re Redding, the opinion only recounts the debtors’ agreement at an earlier stay hearing; this court’s present decision concerns attorney fees and disgorgement. opinion →
In Re Tarullo, the court mentions the automatic stay as background to deciding whether prior bankruptcies toll the tax priority period under § 507; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
Pik-Coal Co. v. Big Rivers Electric Corp., the court reports releasing Big Rivers from the appeal in accordance with a stipulation following its bankruptcy filing, but does not decide any rule or application of § 362. opinion →
Pik-Coal Co. v. Big Rivers Electric Corp., the court mentions § 362 only to explain its stipulated release of a bankrupt appellee; it does not decide the section's rules. opinion →
Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, the passage appears in Justice Stevens's dissent, so it is not this Court's own decision; it also uses § 362(a) only as an example. opinion →
In Re Chinosorn, the court cites § 362(d) only as background while deciding exemption and lien avoidance under § 522; it does not decide a § 362 rule. opinion →
In Re Brown, the court mentions § 362(g)(1) only as a hypothetical contrast while deciding the burden of proof for collateral valuation in Chapter 13 plan confirmation. opinion →
In Re Penny, the court refers to the § 362 stay as evidence of bad-faith serial filing, but decides dismissal and sanctions under other provisions without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re R & C Petroleum, Inc., the court quantified and applied a gas imbalance credit under recoupment principles and an agreed order; it did not decide an automatic-stay issue under § 362. opinion →
Horwitz Ex Rel. Rainer v. Green Tree Financial Corp. (In Re Rainer), the court returned the § 362 violation claim to the calendar and did not decide any rule or violation under that section. opinion →
Malone v. Norwest Financial California, Inc., the court expressly declined to decide the § 362(h) jury-trial issue; its discussion of § 362(h) only compares its remedy with § 524 while deciding the latter section. opinion →
In Re Brown, the discussion of § 362 reports the Third Circuit’s ruling in James; this court decides relief under §§ 525(a) and 105(a) and the Anti-Injunction Act. opinion →
Mandanici v. Slygh (In Re Slygh), No. The court decides dischargeability under § 523(a)(15)(B) and cites § 362(b)(2) only as an example of the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of spousal obligations; it decides no automatic-stay rule. opinion →
Tips Iron & Steel Co., Inc./300 Baylor, Inc. v. 300 Baylor Inc. Steve Wimberly and Wimberly Erection Company/Tips Iron &, the court reports that the stay was terminated and reinstates the appeal, without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Northbrook Partners LLP v. County of Hennepin (In Re Northbrook Partners LLP), the court mentions the automatic stay as undisputed background while addressing tax adjudication; it does not decide a rule under § 362. opinion →
Ward v. Board of Equalization of California (In re Woodworkers), the court mentions the automatic stay as background but decides whether post-petition interest on nondischargeable tax debt survives discharge under § 523(a)(1)(A), without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Jim LaChance and Debbie LaChance v. Heather Alison Hardy, Robert C. Hardy, Tri-Level Properties, James E. Jurgens and Ro, the court cites § 362(a) to explain the appeal’s prior inactivity, but decides dismissal for want of prosecution under the Texas appellate rules. opinion →
Irwin v. Beloit Corp. (In Re Harnischfeger Industries, Inc.), No. The only § 362(a) reference is a See also citation quoting the statute in a footnote about commencement of a bankruptcy case; the court does not decide any automatic-stay rule. opinion →
Lester v. United States, the court decided the proper forum for the stay violation claim under the district court’s bankruptcy referral order, without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Hua Nan Commercial Bank, Ltd. v. Albicocco, the section 362 violation and voidness ruling was made by the Supreme Court below; this court reversed the reargument order on procedural grounds without deciding the automatic-stay issue. opinion →
Cherry v. Arendall (In Re Cherry), the court uses the § 362 stay standard by analogy to decide willfulness under the § 524 discharge injunction, rather than deciding § 362’s own rules. opinion →
Huffine v. California State University-Chico (In Re Huffine), the court mentions § 362 in a footnote to illustrate the possible effect of sovereign immunity on bankruptcy proceedings; it decides jurisdiction over a student loan dischargeability action, not any rule of the automatic stay. opinion →
Trinh v. Intertex Inc, the opinion only reports the bankruptcy court’s termination of the automatic stay; the appellate court does not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
Lesniewski v. Kamin (In Re Lesniewski), No. The court decides whether § 1983 supports attorney’s fees for claims under §§ 524 and 525; it discusses § 362(h) only to compare remedial schemes, without deciding an automatic-stay claim. opinion →
Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV, the court decided the effect of the section 363 sale on setoff; it did not apply or decide section 362. Its statement naming section 362 is an unused alternative, and its discussion of the automatic stay on prebankruptcy setoffs reports another court’s ruling. opinion →
Folger Adam Security, Inc. v. Dematteis/Macgregor, Jv, the court decided the effect of a section 363 sale on setoff rights, without deciding any rule of section 362. opinion →
Wilson v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (In Re Wilson), the court mentions § 362 only as an example of federal bankruptcy law binding states; it decides sovereign immunity and a requested injunction concerning an allegedly discharged restitution debt, not the automatic stay’s rules. opinion →
In Re Alpern, the opinion recounts Judge James’s earlier ruling under § 362; this court decides motions about the trustee and an accounting, not the automatic stay. opinion →
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. R.D. Kushnir & Co., the court only reports in its background that the arbitration proceedings were stayed; its own decision concerns disqualification of counsel, not the stay. opinion →
Molloy v. Primus Automotive Financial Services, the court describes § 362 as background and refers the alleged stay violations for bankruptcy court resolution; its own substantive ruling concerns § 524, not § 362. opinion →
Meadowbrook Estates v. McElvany, Inc. (In Re Meadowbrook Estates), the court mentions the automatic stay as background while deciding the effect of an unfiled proof of claim and abstention; it does not decide a rule or dispute under § 362. opinion →
LNC Investments, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank, the court decides eligibility for superpriority under § 507(b), while § 362 supplies the stay and a cross-reference in that analysis. opinion →
Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Bartmann (In Re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.), the court decides when to withdraw the reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), citing a prior protective order concerning the automatic stay only as background for its discovery schedule. opinion →
Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Jones (In Re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.), the § 362(b) statement reports a conclusion in an earlier protective order; this opinion does not itself decide that section’s rules. opinion →
In Re: Cool Fuel,incorporated,debtor. Cool Fuel, Incorporated, a California Corporation v. Board of Equalization of the, the court treats the automatic stay as background and decides the California limitations period and allowance of the tax claim, not any rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re: Stuart J. Atlas, Vicki K. Atlas, Debtors. James O. Guy v. Patricia Dzikowski, Trustee, the court decides appellate finality when damages remain unassessed, rather than the rules of § 362 itself. opinion →
Schultz v. United States (In re Schultz), the court treats the stay as background for its decision on tolling the tax priority period under §§ 108(c) and 507(a)(8)(A)(i); it does not decide a disputed rule of § 362. opinion →
United States v. Acadiana Treatment, the opinion reports the bankruptcy judge’s ruling under § 362(B)(4); this court dismisses the appeal for lack of standing without deciding that section. opinion →
Zabel v. Schroeder Oil, Inc. (In Re Zabel), the court mentions § 362(h) only as a comparison while deciding whether to award sanctions under § 524; it does not decide an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
Straight v. Wyoming Department of Transportation (In Re Straight), the court decided whether § 106(a) constitutionally abrogated state sovereign immunity for suits alleging a § 362 violation; it did not decide § 362’s own rules. The bankruptcy court’s finding of a stay violation was reported, not adopted as this court’s holding. opinion →
Shaw v. United States, the § 362 point is Shaw’s argument reporting another court’s ruling; this court did not adopt or decide an automatic-stay rule. opinion →
In Re McNichols, the court decides Chapter 13 plan confirmation and adequate protection under §§ 1322 and 1325; § 362(d)(1) appears only as background about where adequate protection issues commonly arise. opinion →
Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, the Court decides the burden of proof on a bankruptcy tax claim; its discussion of lifting an automatic stay is a hypothetical illustration, not a decision applying or construing § 362. opinion →
Snyder v. Rockland Trust Co. (In Re Snyder), the court decides the procedure and valuation for lien avoidance under § 522(f); it mentions relief from the automatic stay only as an analogy and does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Frank A. Wolfe, Jr. And Lexie D. Wolfe, the court mentions § 362 only in the litigation history; its own decision concerns ripeness of a declaratory judgment action, not the automatic stay. opinion →
In Re Brown, the court denies stay relief based on the debtor’s ability to cure the contract under Chapter 13 and Illinois law; it does not decide a rule of § 362. The lone § 362(b)(1) citation appears in a discussion of lease assumption and cure under § 365. opinion →
Orix Credit Alliance v. Wolfe, the § 362 discussion only recounts OCAI’s stay-relief motions and the bankruptcy court’s ruling; this court decides the ripeness of a declaratory judgment action. opinion →
Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n (In Re Thrifty Oil Co.), the court mentions § 362(b)(17) only as background on the Swap Amendments while deciding a § 502(b)(2) claim objection; it does not decide an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
In Re Benge, the court decided attorney discipline for failures in representing the creditor; it did not decide any rule of § 362. The cited sentence reports the bankruptcy complaint. opinion →
Chu v. Sabratek Corp., the opinion reports that the case against Sabratek was already stayed under an earlier order; it makes no new decision about § 362. opinion →
Miller v. French, the reference to § 362(d) appears only in Justice Breyer’s dissent, as an analogy for interpreting the PLRA stay. opinion →
Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Insurance Brokerage, Inc., the court mentions the automatic stay only as procedural history; it decides whether bankruptcy and corporate status bar the suit under other law, without adjudicating a rule of § 362. opinion →
Federal Insurance v. Gilson (In Re Gilson), the court decides the preclusive effect of the district court judgment; the earlier stay modification is a procedural premise, not a decision about § 362’s rules. opinion →
Reeves v. Vaughn, the court held the § 362(a) argument waived for inadequate appellate briefing; it did not decide the automatic stay’s own rules. opinion →
GAF Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, the only discussion of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362 appears in a dissenting footnote, not in the court’s majority decision. opinion →
GAF Corp. v. Commissioner, the sole reference to § 362 appears in a dissenting footnote, not in the court’s own decision. opinion →
Colden v. State, the statement about § 362 reports a holding from Jennings Enterprises. This court decides the effect of its own trial-court stay of a forfeiture proceeding, not § 362. opinion →
In Re Gooch, the court decides attorney discipline under local rules and mentions § 362(h) only in a footnote about counsel’s awareness of stay-violation procedures. opinion →
In Re: Kimball Trdg, the court decided whether the redelivery obligation was a debt eligible for setoff under § 553(a), not a rule of § 362; the § 362(d) reference identifies the motion. opinion →
In Re: Jerasimos Papapanayotou, Esq., Jerasimos Papapanayotou, Esq. v. Jeffrey Sapir, Esq., as Chapter 7 Trustee, the court mentions the automatic stay only as background to the foreclosure; it decides sanctions, not any rule under § 362. opinion →
IDA v. Department of Treasury, the court mentions the automatic stay only in its statement of undisputed background facts; its ruling addresses how the IRS could allocate a bankruptcy trustee payment, not a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Hunt, the court decided New York setoff and exemption law, then denied relief from the stay as a consequence; it did not decide a rule of § 362. The debtors withdrew their stay-violation sanctions request. opinion →
In Re: James Curtis Palmer, Debtor. James Curtis Palmer v. United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, the automatic stay is background; the court decides whether a prior bankruptcy tolls the tax look-back period under §§ 507 and 523, not any rule of § 362. opinion →
Mann v. Waste Management of Ohio, Inc., the court mentions the automatic stay as procedural background but decides abstention and remand under other statutes, not any rule of § 362. opinion →
Thomas v. Lytle, the opinion reports the existing stay of claims against other defendants; it does not make a decision under § 362. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Davidson v. Hoke, the court mentions the automatic stay as procedural background but decides whether to issue a writ of prohibition concerning insurance coverage, not any rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Collins, the court considers the automatic stay as context for Rule 9011 sanctions, without deciding a rule under § 362; its earlier stay modification is only procedural history. opinion →
In Re Sills, the court mentions the automatic stay as background to its sanctions decision under § 105(a) and Rule 9011, but does not decide any rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Regional Building Systems, Inc., the court invokes § 362(a) only as an analogy while deciding whether § 1141(c) requires a proof of claim; it does not decide an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
Shaker v. the Russian Tea Room, Unpublished Decision (7-27-2000), the opinion only reports another court's stay and does not itself decide Section 362. opinion →
Nationwide Life Insurance Company v. Annarino, 99-4256 (2000), the court mentions § 362(a) only as background to the delayed tax sale; it decides the effect of the confirmed plan and § 1141(c) on the tax lien. opinion →
Internal Revenue Service v. McIver (In Re McIver), the § 362(a)(6) ruling is attributed to the bankruptcy court; this court decides only whether the annuity rights are estate property and secure the IRS claim under §§ 541 and 506. opinion →
Simpson v. Putnam County National Bank of Carmel, No. The court recounts the earlier bankruptcy stay as background to a sanctions motion; it makes no decision under § 362. opinion →
In Re Khoe, the § 362 statement is quoted from In re Anderson; this court decides dischargeability of the tax debt under §§ 507 and 523, not a rule of § 362. opinion →
United States v. Bishop, the court did not decide whether § 362(d)(2) warranted relief from the stay; it referred that issue to the bankruptcy court and decided estate property and referral issues under other provisions. opinion →
In Re O'Shaughnessy, the court decides the debtor’s duty to list and notify creditors under § 521 and the bankruptcy rules; it mentions § 362(a) only as a benefit of filing. opinion →
Welt v. Leshin (In re Warmus), this order decides collateral estoppel based on the prior judgment; it does not decide any rule of § 362. opinion →
Welt v. Leshin (In Re Warmus), the § 362 ruling appears only as a report of an earlier Final Judgment; this court decides jury-trial and counterclaim issues in this opinion. opinion →
Welt v. Shalala (In re Hospital Staffing Services, Inc.), the § 362(h) citation describes the trustee’s complaint, not this court’s decision; the court decides jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). opinion →
Andreiu v. Janet Reno, Attorney General, the only discussion of § 362 appears in a dissenting footnote, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
Garcia v. Amaranto (In Re Amaranto), the court mentions the automatic stay only as background and decides dischargeability under § 523(a)(6), without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Mullin v. Orthwein, the sole § 362(h) mention is a passing citation within a quoted Ninth Circuit discussion in a separate concurrence; the majority does not decide § 362. opinion →
Domond v. Great American Recreation, Inc., the court mentions the automatic stay as background but decides personal jurisdiction, relief from default judgment, and transfer of venue, without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Matima v. Celli, the court only recounts that the action was stayed after the bankruptcy filing; it does not itself decide any § 362 issue. opinion →
Matima v. Celli, the court only reports a procedural stay that occurred below; it does not itself decide an issue under § 362. opinion →
Callaway v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court explains the purpose of converting partnership items under the tax rules; it does not decide the rules or application of § 362. opinion →
Value Recovery Group, Inc. v. Hourani, the court used the bankruptcy stay as a comparison while deciding whether a state appellate stay tolled the removal deadline; it did not decide any rule or application of § 362. opinion →
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Cross v. Anthony Vartuli, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, Avco Financial Corp., the opinion reports the district court’s § 362(b)(4) ruling, but the appellate court does not decide that issue itself. opinion →
Womack v. Mays (In Re Womack), the court dismisses the suit on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds; it mentions § 362 only in a general statement that state agencies remain bound by the Bankruptcy Code, without deciding the stay’s rules or whether a violation occurred. opinion →
In Re Tri-Union Development Corp., the court mentions the automatic stay as a consequence for California royalty owners and hypothetically discusses lifting it, but decides the state-law lien and preconfirmation payment issues rather than any contested rule or relief under § 362. opinion →
Terry and John B. v. Dalton, the court only reports that the aunt and uncle were no longer defendants after declaring bankruptcy; it does not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
Terry B. And John B., 1 v. P. H. Gilkey and Cynthia Mahomes, in Their Individual and Official Capacities, the footnote only explains why the aunt and uncle were absent from trial; the court does not decide any rule under § 362(a)(1). opinion →
Mosley v. Henderson (In Re Mosley), the court decided whether the refund mooted the lawsuit, not whether § 362(a)(3) was violated or what that provision requires. opinion →
United States Ex Rel. Federal Communications Commission v. GWI PCS 1 Inc. (In Re GWI PCS 1 Inc.), the court expressly says it does not decide the applicability of § 362(b)(4); its decision concerns equitable mootness and fraudulent transfer. opinion →
No. 99-11294, the court expressly says it does not decide whether § 362(b)(4) applies; the other mention is only in a quotation of § 106. opinion →
In Re: Sahnica Denise Nolan, Debtor. Chrysler Financial Corporation v. Nolan, the court decides the limits of § 1329(a) plan modifications; § 362 appears only in a footnote as an example of the Code’s use of “payments,” without a decision about the automatic stay. opinion →
Citibank (South Dakota), N. A. v. Morrissey, the § 362 point is plaintiff’s conclusion, while the court dismisses the appeal for lack of an entered order under state procedural law. opinion →
Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court decides whether Rule 23(b)(2) permits class certification for the asserted § 362 claims; it does not decide a rule of the automatic stay itself. opinion →
Hanno v. TCF National Bank (In Re Hanno), the court only recounts an earlier order modifying the automatic stay; its own decision resolves jurisdiction and post-dismissal relief, not § 362. opinion →
CDS Recoveries, L. L. C. v. Davis, the court decides timeliness under the New York limitations and tolling statutes; it cites § 362(c) as the bankruptcy-stay predicate without deciding a rule of that section. opinion →
In Re Gi Nam, the court only describes other courts’ automatic-stay decisions; its own decision concerns discharge under § 523(a)(7). opinion →
Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California, the court recounts the bankruptcy stay and relief as background, while deciding California foreclosure and antideficiency law rather than any rule of § 362. opinion →
Freedman, Levy, Kroll & Simonds v. Mendelson, the court recounts an earlier ruling about the automatic stay but decides only whether to supplement the appellate record under Rule 10(e) in this opinion. opinion →
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Claussen, the court mentions the automatic stay as background but decides whether the lawyer violated disciplinary rules, not any rule or limit of § 362. opinion →
Sabratek Corp. v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. (In Re Sabratek Corp.), the court mentions possible consensual stay relief only as an alternative way for the Debtors to be heard in the state action; it does not decide the rules or application of § 362. opinion →
United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Joseph W. Kennedy, Jr., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, the court construes the sentencing guideline; § 362 appears only in a quotation from another circuit cited in a footnote, and the court does not decide the automatic stay provision’s rules. opinion →
Dowdy v. Charter Financial Group, Inc., the court mentions the automatic stay only as case history and decides lien priority under other law; it does not decide any rule of § 362. opinion →
Banc of America Commercial Financial Corp. v. CGE Shattuck, LLC (In Re CGE Shattuck, LLC), the court decides whether an order denying stay relief is final for appellate jurisdiction, not a rule of § 362 itself. opinion →
Vogt v. Dynamic Recovery Services (In Re Vogt), the court mentions § 362 as an analogy while deciding whether § 524(a) provides a remedy; it does not decide a rule under § 362. opinion →
Taylor v. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp. (In Re Taylor), the court recounts a party’s claim objection and decides arbitration issues, without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
BankBoston, N.A. v. Desmond, the § 362(d) reference reports the bankruptcy court’s ruling; this court remands for evidence about lien perfection without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
In re IM, the court denies stay relief based on Pennsylvania equitable estoppel and lease law, without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Harris, the court accepts termination of the automatic stay upon dismissal as a premise but decides its continuing power to distribute trustee-held funds, rather than a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Mmg LLC, the court mentions § 362(a) only to compare the immediate U.S. automatic stay with the Cayman Islands stay while deciding whether relief under § 304 is fair; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Townsend, the court denies a § 362(d) motion, but its reasoning decides Chapter 13 lien stripping under §§ 1325, 506, and 1322 without deciding any rule of § 362. opinion →
Van Wert Co. Hospital v. French (In re Cummings), the court expressly declined to decide whether the automatic stay was violated after resolving the dispute under §§ 541 and 547. opinion →
Gateway Communications, Inc. v. John R. Hess, Inc., the court mentions the automatic stay only as procedural history and does not decide any rule of § 362. opinion →
Eaves v. County of Cape May, the court uses its earlier construction of § 362(b)(5) to decide when interest begins under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a); it does not decide § 362’s rules here. opinion →
Eaves v. County Of Cape May, the discussion of § 362(b)(5) reports this court’s earlier Penn Terra decision; this opinion decides when post-judgment interest begins under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). opinion →
In Re Tolbert, the court enjoins future bankruptcy filings as a sanction for abuse of the bankruptcy process; it does not decide a rule, remedy, or limit of § 362 itself. opinion →
Ultimate Sportsbar, Inc. v. United States, the § 362 stay ruling was made by the District Court and is only recounted here; this court decides a Fifth Amendment takings claim. opinion →
In Re Trapp, the court denied the motion to modify the stay, but its analysis decided whether the mortgage claim could be cured through a Chapter 13 plan under § 1322, not a rule of § 362. opinion →
SMI/USA, INC. v. Profile Technologies, Inc., this sentence only reports that the suit was stayed during bankruptcy; the appellate court makes no decision about § 362. opinion →
American Savings Bank v. Appletree, No. Cv 99-0594286 (Feb. 9, 2001), this sentence reports the bankruptcy court’s stay ruling; this court decides whether the foreclosure bidder should recover his deposit. opinion →
Stoltz v. Brattleboro Housing Authority, the court reinstates the stay by deciding the protection afforded by § 525(a), without deciding § 362’s own rules. opinion →
Access Now, Inc. v. Holland America Line-Westours, Inc., the court reports that a different case was stayed under § 362; its own order lifts a separate stay and does not decide this section. opinion →
Bank of New York v. Treco (In re Treco), the discussion of § 362(a)(7) appears only in a parenthetical describing the Supreme Court’s Strumpf holding; this court decides turnover under § 304 and expressly limits its conclusion to secured status. opinion →
In Re Alison J. Treco & David Patrick Hamilton, this court cites Strumpf’s ruling about § 362(a)(7) as a comparison while deciding whether a setoff could make the claim secured for § 304 turnover. opinion →
Green v. LifeUSA Insurance, the opinion only reports that the bankruptcy court stayed the state-court case under § 362; this court decides no issue under that section. opinion →
In Re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation, the statement about § 362 reports defendants’ position; the court decided whether to designate lead counsel under the PSLRA, without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
In Re Newman, the court only offers a tentative footnote observation about § 362 while deciding Chapter 13 eligibility under § 109(e); it does not decide an automatic-stay issue. opinion →
In Re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., the court mentions the automatic stay as a possible consequence of bankruptcy while assessing settlement fairness, but does not decide a rule or dispute under § 362. opinion →
Crefisa, Inc. v. Colegio Bautista Bethel, Inc., the court decides the effect of a reorganization plan on a mortgage debt under novation law, not any rule of § 362. Its own reference is to § 362 et seq. as general bankruptcy background; the later specific § 362 reference appears in a quoted stipulation. opinion →
Government of Rwanda v. Rwanda Working Group, the footnote reports the procedural status of the action against Uwimana; the court does not decide a § 362 issue. opinion →
Cummings v. Cummings, the court identifies a possible future request for stay relief but does not decide one; its ruling concerns dischargeability under § 523(a)(5). opinion →
Cummings v. Cummings, the court mentions § 362(d) only as a possible procedure on remand; it decides whether the debt is support under § 523(a)(5), without ruling on stay relief. opinion →
Hope v. United Companies Funding, Inc. (In Re Holder), the court decided whether perfection violated the § 1301 codebtor stay and was void; it cited § 362 only as a comparison and analogy, without deciding a § 362 issue. opinion →
Opinion Number, this is a Louisiana Attorney General advisory opinion, not a court's own decision. opinion →
Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgen Corp., the § 362 discussion recounts another case and a party’s position there; this court decided intervention and vacatur of its patent claim construction order. opinion →
Lankford v. Texas, Comptroller of Public Accounts (In Re Lankford), the court cites § 362(b)(4) as background to its decision on state sovereign immunity under § 106(a) and the Eleventh Amendment; it does not decide a rule of § 362. opinion →
3V, INC. v. JTS Enterprises, Inc., the statement about the bankruptcy stay reports another Texas court's ruling; this court rejects a party's analogy while deciding the effect of a Texas abatement, not § 362. opinion →
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Advance Cellular Systems, Inc. (In Re Advance Cellular Systems, Inc.), the stay ruling is attributed to the bankruptcy court below; this court dismissed the appeal for violations of bankruptcy appellate rules without deciding § 362. opinion →
In Re Fiels, the court decides whether a prior bankruptcy tolls the tax priority period under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i); it treats the § 362 stay as the reason collection was unavailable, without deciding a rule of § 362. opinion →
Kolodge v. Boyd, the discussion of § 362(d) reports the bankruptcy proceedings in Michelson, another case. This court decides appraisal reliance and the full credit bid rule, not § 362. opinion →
Kolodge v. Boyd, this sentence reports the bankruptcy stay relief obtained in Michelson, another case; this court decides appraisal reliance and the full credit bid rule, not § 362(d). opinion →
In Re Jones, the only discussion mentioning § 362 is quoted from the First Circuit in Burr; this court decides the debtor’s duties under § 521(2), not an automatic-stay rule. opinion →
Aida Dayton Technologies Corp. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, the court mentions the automatic stay only as background to the filing date and does not decide any rule under § 362. opinion →
Frosch v. United States (In Re Frosch), the footnote comments on possible future claims by nonparties; the court did not decide an automatic-stay dispute. opinion →
Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, the court recounts its assumption in West Electronics; this opinion decides the scope of property of the estate under § 541, not § 362. opinion →
Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. James R. Walsh, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Life Service Systems, Inc., the § 362 passage recounts an assumption in the court’s earlier West Electronics decision; this court decides the estate-property issue for the HUD grant, not the automatic stay. opinion →
Lembo v. Read (In re Lembo), the court decides abstention and keeps the stay-violation claim pending; it does not decide the rules or application of § 362(b)(2). opinion →
…and 6,433 more.

Statutory history

(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2570; Pub. L. 97–222, §3, July 27, 1982, 96 Stat. 235; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §§304, 363(b), 392, 441, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 352, 363, 365, 371; Pub. L. 99–509, title V, §5001(a), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1911; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §§257(j), 283(d), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3115, 3116; Pub. L. 101–311, title I, §102, title II, §202, June 25, 1990, 104 Stat. 267, 269; Pub. L. 101–508, title III, §3007(a)(1), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–28; Pub. L. 103–394, title I, §§101, 116, title II, §§204(a), 218(b), title III, §304(b), title IV, §401, title V, §501(b)(2), (d)(7), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4107, 4119, 4122, 4128, 4132, 4141, 4142, 4144; Pub. L. 105–277, div. I, title VI, §603, Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–886; Pub. L. 109–8, title I, §106(f), title II, §§214, 224(b), title III, §§302, 303, 305(1), 311, 320, title IV, §§401(b), 441, 444, title VII, §§709, 718, title IX, §907(d), (o)(1), (2), title XI, §1106, title XII, §1225, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 41, 54, 64, 75, 77, 79, 84, 94, 104, 114, 117, 127, 131, 176, 181, 182, 192, 199; Pub. L. 109–304, §17(b)(1), Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1706; Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2), Dec. 12, 2006, 120 Stat. 2696; Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12), Dec. 22, 2010, 124 Stat. 3558; Pub. L. 116–189, §9, Oct. 30, 2020, 134 Stat. 970.)

  • 2020—Subsec. (b)(29). Pub. L. 116–189 added par. (29).
  • 2010—Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(A), substituted "tax liability of a debtor that is a corporation" for "corporate debtor's tax liability".
  • Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(B)(i), inserted "a" after "against" in introductory provisions.
  • Subsec. (c)(4)(A)(i). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(B)(ii), inserted "under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal" after "refiled".
  • Subsec. (d)(4). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(C), substituted "hinder, or" for "hinder, and" in introductory provisions.
  • Subsec. (l)(2). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(D), substituted "nonbankruptcy" for "nonbankrupcty".
  • 2006—Subsec. (b)(6), (7). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2)(A), added pars. (6) and (7) and struck out former pars. (6) and (7) which read as follows:
  • "(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761 of this title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741 of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;
86 earlier amendment entries
  • "(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant or financial participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741 or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741 of this title, arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such repo participant or financial participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements;".
  • Subsec. (b)(12). Pub. L. 109–304, §17(b)(1)(A), substituted "chapter 537 of title 46 or section 109(h) of title 49" for "section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936".
  • Subsec. (b)(13). Pub. L. 109–304, §17(b)(1)(B), substituted "chapter 537 of title 46" for "section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936".
  • Subsec. (b)(17). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2)(B), added par. (17) and struck out former par. (17) which read as follows: "under subsection (a), of the setoff by a swap participant or financial participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection with one or more swap agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment or other transfer of property due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant or financial participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such swap participant or financial participant to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle any swap agreement;".
  • Subsec. (b)(27). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2)(C), added par. (27) and struck out former par. (27) which read as follows: "under subsection (a), of the setoff by a master netting agreement participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection with one or more master netting agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment or other transfer of property due from the debtor under or in connection with such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements against any payment due to the debtor from such master netting agreement participant under or in connection with such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements or against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such master netting agreement participant to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements, to the extent that such participant is eligible to exercise such offset rights under paragraph (6), (7), or (17) for each individual contract covered by the master netting agreement in issue; and".
  • 2005—Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 109–8, §709, substituted "a corporate debtor's tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this title" for "the debtor".
  • Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 109–8, §214, added par. (2) and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section—
  • "(A) of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for—
  • "(i) the establishment of paternity; or
  • "(ii) the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support; or
  • "(B) of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;".
  • Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(A), (o)(1), substituted "financial institution, financial participant," for "financial institutions," in two places and inserted ", pledged to, under the control of," after "held by".
  • Subsec. (b)(7). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(B), (o)(2), inserted "or financial participant" after "repo participant" in two places and ", pledged to, under the control of," after "held by".
  • Subsec. (b)(17). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(C), added par. (17) and struck out former par. (17) which read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a swap participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with any swap agreement that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property of the debtor held by or due from such swap participant to guarantee, secure or settle any swap agreement;".
  • Subsec. (b)(18). Pub. L. 109–8, §1225, amended par. (18) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (18) read as follows: "under subsection (a) of the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax imposed by the District of Columbia, or a political subdivision of a State, if such tax comes due after the filing of the petition;".
  • Subsec. (b)(19). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(b), added par. (19).
  • Subsec. (b)(20), (21). Pub. L. 109–8, §303(b), added pars. (20) and (21).
  • Subsec. (b)(22) to (24). Pub. L. 109–8, §311(a), added pars. (22) to (24).
  • Subsec. (b)(25). Pub. L. 109–8, §401(b), added par. (25).
  • Subsec. (b)(26). Pub. L. 109–8, §718, added par. (26).
  • Subsec. (b)(27). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(D), added par. (27).
  • Subsec. (b)(28). Pub. L. 109–8, §1106, added par. (28).
  • Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 109–8, §305(1)(A), substituted "(e), (f), and (h)" for "(e), and (f)" in introductory provisions.
  • Subsec. (c)(3), (4). Pub. L. 109–8, §302, added pars. (3) and (4).
  • Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–8, §303(a), added par. (4) and concluding provisions.
  • Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 109–8, §444(1), inserted "or 30 days after the court determines that the debtor is subject to this paragraph, whichever is later" after "90-day period)" in introductory provisions.
  • Subsec. (d)(3)(B). Pub. L. 109–8, §444(2), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: "the debtor has commenced monthly payments to each creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), which payments are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate; or".
  • Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109–8, §320, designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
  • Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 109–8, §305(1)(C), added subsec. (h). Former subsec. (h) redesignated (k).
  • Subsecs. (i), (j). Pub. L. 109–8, §106(f), added subsecs. (i) and (j).
  • Subsec. (k). Pub. L. 109–8, §441(1), designated existing provisions as par. (1), substituted "Except as provided in paragraph (2), an" for "An", and added par. (2).
  • Pub. L. 109–8, §305(1)(B), redesignated subsec. (h) as (k).
  • Subsecs. (l), (m). Pub. L. 109–8, §311(b), added subsecs. (l) and (m).
  • Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 109–8, §441(2), added subsec. (n).
  • Subsec. (o). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(2), added subsec. (o).
  • 1998—Subsec. (b)(4), (5). Pub. L. 105–277 added par. (4) and struck out former pars. (4) and (5) which read as follows:
  • "(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
  • "(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;".
  • 1994—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(A), (B)(i), struck out "(15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3))" after "Act of 1970" in introductory provisions.
  • Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 103–394, §304(b), amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;".
  • Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 103–394, §204(a), inserted ", or to maintain or continue the perfection of," after "to perfect".
  • Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(2)(A), substituted "section 761" for "section 761(4)", "section 741" for "section 741(7)", "section 101, 741, or 761" for "section 101(34), 741(5), or 761(15)", and "section 101 or 741" for "section 101(35) or 741(8)".
  • Subsec. (b)(7). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(2)(B), substituted "section 741 or 761" for "section 741(5) or 761(15)" and "section 741" for "section 741(8)".
  • Subsec. (b)(9). Pub. L. 103–394, §116, amended par. (9) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (9) read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency;".
  • Subsec. (b)(10). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(ii), struck out "or" at end.
  • Subsec. (b)(12). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(iii), substituted "section 31325 of title 46" for "the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.)" and struck out "(46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively)" after "Act, 1936".
  • Subsec. (b)(13). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(iv), substituted "section 31325 of title 46" for "the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.)" and struck out "(46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively)" after "Act, 1936" and "or" at end.
  • Subsec. (b)(14). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(vii), amended par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement by substituting "; or" for period at end, redesignating par. (14) as (17), and inserting it after par. (16).
  • Subsec. (b)(15). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(v), struck out "or" at end.
  • Subsec. (b)(16). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(vi), struck out "(20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.)" after "Act of 1965" and substituted semicolon for period at end.
  • Subsec. (b)(17). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II), (III), redesignated par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement as (17) and inserted it after par. (16).
  • Subsec. (b)(18). Pub. L. 103–394, §401, added par. (18).
  • Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 103–394, §218(b), added par. (3).
  • Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 103–394, §101, in last sentence substituted "concluded" for "commenced" and inserted before period at end ", unless the 30-day period is extended with the consent of the parties in interest or for a specific time which the court finds is required by compelling circumstances".
  • 1990—Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 101–311, §202, inserted reference to sections 101(34) and 101(35) of this title.
  • Subsec. (b)(12). Pub. L. 101–508, §3007(a)(1)(A), which directed the striking of "or" after "State law;", could not be executed because of a prior amendment by Pub. L. 101–311. See below.
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §102(1), struck out "or" after "State law;".
  • Subsec. (b)(13). Pub. L. 101–508, §3007(a)(1)(B), which directed the substitution of a semicolon for period at end, could not be executed because of a prior amendment by Pub. L. 101–311. See below.
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §102(2), substituted "; or" for period at end.
  • Subsec. (b)(14) to (16). Pub. L. 101–508, §3007(a)(1)(C), added pars. (14) to (16). Notwithstanding directory language adding pars. (14) to (16) immediately following par. (13), pars. (14) to (16) were added after par. (14), as added by Pub. L. 101–311, to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
  • Pub. L. 101–311, §102(3), added par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement. Notwithstanding directory language adding par. (14) at end of subsec. (b), par. (14) was added after par. (13) to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
  • 1986—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–509 inserted sentence at end.
  • Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(1), substituted ", financial institutions" for "financial institution," in two places.
  • Subsec. (b)(9). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(2), (3), struck out "or" at end of first par. (9) and redesignated as par. (10) the second par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property, which was added by section 363(b) of Pub. L. 98–353.
  • Subsec. (b)(10). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(3), (4), redesignated as par. (10) the second par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property, added by section 363(b) of Pub. L. 99–353, and substituted "property; or" for "property.". Former par. (10) redesignated (11).
  • Subsec. (b)(11). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(3), redesignated former par. (10) as (11).
  • Subsec. (b)(12), (13). Pub. L. 99–509 added pars. (12) and (13).
  • Subsec. (c)(2)(C). Pub. L. 99–554, §257(j), inserted reference to chapter 12 of this title.
  • 1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(a)(1), inserted "action or" after "other".
  • Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(a)(2), inserted "or to exercise control over property of the estate".
  • Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(1), inserted "or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title".
  • Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(2), inserted "or due from" after "held by" and "financial institution," after "stockbroker" in two places, and substituted "secure, or settle commodity contracts" for "or secure commodity contracts".
  • Subsec. (b)(7) to (9). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(3), (4), in par. (8) as redesignated by Pub. L. 98–353, §392, substituted "the" for "said" and struck out "or" the last place it appeared which probably meant "or" after "units;" that was struck out by Pub. L. 98–353, §363(b)(1); and, in par. (9), relating to notices of deficiencies, as redesignated by Pub. L. 98–353, §392, substituted a semicolon for the period.
  • Pub. L. 98–353, §392, added par. (7) and redesignated former pars. (7) and (8) as (8) and (9), respectively.
  • Pub. L. 98–353, §363(b), struck out "or" at end of par. (7), substituted "; or" for the period at end of par. (8), and added par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property.
  • Subsec. (b)(10). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(5), added par. (10).
  • Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(c), substituted "or" for "and".
  • Subsec. (d)(2). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(d), inserted "under subsection (a) of this section" after "property".
  • Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(e), inserted "the conclusion of" after "pending" and substituted "The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing." for "If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing—
  • "(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section; and
  • "(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after such preliminary hearing."
  • Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(f), substituted "Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or" for "The court,".
  • Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 98–353, §304, added subsec. (h).
  • 1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–222, §3(a), inserted ", or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3))," after "this title" in provisions preceding par. (1).
  • Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–222, §3(b), inserted ", or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3))," after "this title" in provisions preceding par. (1).
  • Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 97–222, §3(c), substituted provisions that the filing of a bankruptcy petition would not operate as a stay, under subsec. (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity, forward, or securities contracts that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin or settlement payment arising out of commodity, forward, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by any of the above agents to margin, guarantee, or secure commodity, forward, or securities contracts, for provisions that such filing would not operate as a stay under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of any mutual debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts, forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, warrants, rights to purchase or sell commodity futures contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities or securities.

Enactment and amendment notes are the official text of the United States Code, 2024 edition (laws through 2025-01-06), Office of the Law Revision Counsel, via govinfo.gov.

References in text

Section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is classified to section 78eee(a)(3) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

The Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(2)(D) to (G), (28), is act Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. Titles IV, XI, and XVIII of the Act are classified generally to subchapters IV (§601 et seq.), XI (§1301 et seq.), and XVIII (§1395 et seq.), respectively, of chapter 7 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. Sections 464, 466, and 1128B of the Act are classified to sections 664, 666, and 1320a–7b, respectively, of Title 42. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tables.

The National Housing Act, referred in subsec. (b)(8), is act June 27, 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, which is classified principally to chapter 13 (§1701 et seq.) of Title 12, Banks and Banking. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1701 of Title 12 and Tables.

The Higher Education Act of 1965, referred to in subsec. (b)(16), is Pub. L. 89–329, Nov. 8, 1965, 79 Stat. 1219, which is classified generally to chapter 28 (§1001 et seq.) of Title 20, Education. Section 435(j) of the Act is classified to section 1085(j) of Title 20. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1001 of Title 20 and Tables.

The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b)(19), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.

Section 408(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (b)(19)(A), is classified to section 1108(b)(1) of Title 29, Labor.

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace