11 U.S.C. § 362
Automatic stay: the cases that interpreted this section
18,759 citing cases reviewed of 33,213 in the citation index: 11,926 interpreted the section (annotated below), 6,833 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-29 may not have been reviewed yet.
Have a situation under 11 U.S.C. § 362?
These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.
Later changes in law
Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".
- 1982-07-27 Pub. L. 97-222 extended the automatic stay to Securities Investor Protection Act liquidation applications. Source
- 1984-07-10 Pub. L. 98-353 added the estate-property “exercise control” language in § 362(a)(3) and an express damages remedy for willful stay violations. Source
- 1988-01-20 United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates held that § 362(d)(1) does not compensate an undersecured creditor for the delay in foreclosing or lost use of foreclosure proceeds, and § 362(d)(2)(B) requires a reasonable prospect of successful reorganization within a reasonable time. Source
- 1990-06-25 Pub. L. 101-311 added a stay exception for a swap participant's setoff of mutual swap obligations as § 362(b)(14); the U.S. Code amendment notes record its 1994 redesignation as § 362(b)(17). Source
- 1991-12-03 Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial held that § 362(b)(4) permits the Federal Reserve Board's ongoing regulatory proceedings despite possible later effects on estate property, and 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) bars a bankruptcy court from enjoining those proceedings. Source
- 1994-10-22 Pub. L. 103-394 expanded the support, tax, and lien-perfection exceptions and added the single asset real estate deadline in § 362(d)(3). Source
- 1995-10-31 Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf held that a bank's temporary hold on an account subject to a claimed setoff while it seeks stay relief is neither a setoff under § 362(a)(7) nor, in those circumstances, a violation of § 362(a)(3) or (a)(6). Source
- 1998-10-21 Pub. L. 105-277 combined the governmental police-power and nonmoney-judgment exceptions in § 362(b)(4) and repealed former (b)(5). Source
- 2005-04-20 Pub. L. 109-8 added repeat-filing limits, in rem relief, eviction and domestic-support exceptions, and redesignated the willful-violation damages remedy as § 362(k); most provisions became effective October 17, 2005. Source
- 2006-12-12 Pub. L. 109-390 expanded the financial-contract safe harbors in § 362(b)(6), (7), (17), and (27). Source
- 2010-12-22 Pub. L. 111-327 changed § 362(d)(4) to reach a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Source
- 2020-08-21 Pub. L. 116-189 added § 362(b)(29), a further exception to the automatic stay. Source
- 2021-01-14 Chicago v. Fulton held that mere retention of property seized before bankruptcy does not itself violate § 362(a)(3). Source
Withdrawal of bankruptcy reference
Section 362(a)'s automatic stay is not jeopardized when a district court tries a claim withdrawn from bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
Waire v. Baker · filed 1992-08-10(a)
As this case will proceed as an issue withdrawn from the bankruptcy court under the district court’s discretionary power as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), the automatic stay provision set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is not being jeopardized.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Commencement and duration of stay
Section 362(a)(1) requires a filed bankruptcy petition for an automatic stay to arise, so a complaint that does not allege a petition fails to plead a stay violation.
Sporea v. Broward County Clerk of Court · filed 2023-04-03(a)(1)
However, Plaintiff does not allege that he filed a bankruptcy petition in the first place.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against a defendant when the defendant files a bankruptcy petition.
Morrelli v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2023-03-01(a)
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), all actions against a defendant who has filed a bankruptcy petition are automatically stayed once the petition is filed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) creates an automatic stay when a debtor files a Chapter 7 petition, so a motion to impose that same stay is moot while it remains in effect.
EYAJAN v. SPERO · filed 2022-06-27(a)
As a result, an automatic stay arose by operation of 11 U.S.C. §362(a). ... In essence, she has asked for imposition of a stay that was already in existence and that will remain in existence for an indeterminate period of time. ... Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Eyajan’s Motion for Imposition of a Bankruptcy Stay as moot.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 stays claims against defendants who are debtors in ongoing bankruptcy proceedings.
Trustees of the Local 806 Structural Steel and Bridge Painters of Greater New York Employee Trust Funds v. American Vent · filed 2022-06-16
The two remaining defendants in this case, American Venture Construction LLC and American Tri-venture LLC, are debtors in ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. The claims in this case against those remaining defendants are therefore stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against a debtor or estate property when a bankruptcy petition is filed.
In re CWNevada LLC · filed 2019-06-03(a)
As a result of filing a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay arose under Section 362(a), applicable to all entities, barring various acts and actions from being taken or continued against the Debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings as to a party that files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
People ex rel. Lindblom v. Sears Brands, LLC · filed 2019-04-23(a)(1), (3)
Pursuant to section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (3) (2018)), this matter has been automatically stayed as to Sears.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The automatic stay does not reach a sheriff’s sale completed before the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.
Bourgeois v. Bank of America · filed 2013-03-22(a)(3)
Given the timeline of this case, we fail to see how Bank of America could possibly have done so: The sheriff's sale took place the day before Debtor filed his petition for relief under chapter 7.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(C) terminates the automatic stay when the debtor receives a bankruptcy discharge.
In Re Abbott · filed 2011-11-18(c)(2)(C)
The automatic stay terminated no later than October 30, 2009, the date on which Abbott received a discharge in bankruptcy.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(C) terminates the automatic stay no later than the debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy.
Abbott v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC · filed 2011-11-18(c)(2)(C)
The automatic stay terminated no later than October 30, 2009, the date on which Abbott received a discharge in bankruptcy.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2) terminates the stay protecting a debtor’s property when the debtor receives a chapter 7 discharge.
In re: Richard Perez · filed 2011-12-01(c)(2)
The stay dissolved as to “property of the debtor” as a matter of law when the Debtor received his discharge on October 25, 2010.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the automatic stay when the debtor is discharged.
James Michalski, Jr. v. Coulson · filed 2011-12-21(c)(2)(C)
The automatic stay was lifted upon Michalski’s discharge from bankruptcy on February 1, 2008, and was supplanted by the order of discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). Accordingly, the LCPO could not have violated the automatic stay when it initiated criminal proceedings against Michalski over one year later.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay on transfers of estate assets when the bankruptcy case closes.
Donarumo v. Furlong (In Re Furlong) · filed 2011-11-01(c)(2)(A)
At the time of the transfer of the claims from Drew's II to the Furlongs individually, the Drew's II corporate bankruptcy case had long been closed, and thus the automatic stay on transfers of its assets was dissolved under § 362(c)(2)(A).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Under § 362(c)(2)(C), the automatic stay continues as to collection of a debt claimed to be nondischargeable until the bankruptcy court determines that the debt is nondischargeable.
In Re Storozhenko · filed 2011-09-16(c)(2)(C)
In this case, the Court has not yet made a determination that the Debtor’s debt to Findling is nondischargeable under any provision of § 523(a). As a result, the automatic stay under § 362(a) has not yet terminated under Embry and under § 362(c)(2)(C). Rather, the automatic stay continues, and precludes Findling from taking any action to collect the State Court Judgment debt of $106,144.73.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) keeps estate property under the automatic stay until it leaves the estate, even after the debtor receives a discharge.
In Re Agard · filed 2011-02-10(c)(1)
Pursuant to Section 362(c)(1), the automatic stay which protects “property of the estate,” as opposed to property of the debtor, continues until the property is no longer property of the estate regardless of the entry of the discharge.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of a pending action against the debtor when the debtor files a voluntary bankruptcy petition.
Atel Financial Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co. · filed 2001-03-09(a)(1)
This filing stayed the continued prosecution of the pending action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against estate property when that property ceases to belong to the estate.
EconoLube N' Tune, Inc. v. Frausto (In Re Frausto) · filed 2000-12-12(c)(1)
Section 362(c) provides that the automatic stay of an act against property of the estate continues only until such property is no longer property of the estate.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay ends when a Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge.
Pickering v. Stanchak, No. Lpl-Cv-95-0470124s (Aug. 6, 1998) · filed 1998-08-06(c)(2)(C)
The automatic stays which entered as a result of the filing of the bankruptcy petitions, and any orders granting relief from stay, remained in effect only until the discharges were entered.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(1) stays pending actions upon a defendant’s voluntary bankruptcy filing and can prevent those actions from being restored to the trial calendar.
Cangialosi v. Mottoros · filed 1998-06-29(a)(1)
The motion to restore the actions to the trial calendar was properly denied upon the ground that the actions are stayed by operation of the voluntary bankruptcy petition filed by Connecticut Limousine, Inc., one of the defendants in Action No. 6 (see, 11 USC § 362 [a] [1]; Klein v Rauschman, 67 AD2d 902).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is dismissed; reinstating the case does not revive the stay absent an express indication from the bankruptcy court.
Judith K. Guerra, a.k.a. Judith Harvey v. Commissioner · filed 1998-04-08(c)(2)
In accordance with the foregoing, we hold that the automatic stay was terminated as of January 21, 1997, the date that the bankruptcy court issued its order dismissing petitioner's case. Further, we hold that the automatic stay was not revived when the bankruptcy court reinstated petitioner's case on February 12, 1997.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay on property that has left the bankruptcy estate when the case closes or the debtor receives a discharge, whichever occurs first.
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. DeJournette · filed 1998-05-22(c)(2)
Pursuant to § 362(c)(2), the automatic stay was lifted upon the earlier of the closing of the case and the discharge.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) keeps estate property protected by the automatic stay until it leaves the estate, so unauthorized deductions from post-confirmation earnings that remain estate property violate the stay.
Hudson v. United States Postal Service (In Re Hudson) · filed 1997-12-22(c)(1)
The Postal Service’s deduction of the $50 administrative fees on two occasions resulted in unauthorized deductions from property of the bankruptcy estate. The deductions were unauthorized because the automatic stay continues to protect property of the estate until it “is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). There is no record of the Postal Service moving for relief from the automatic stay in this case. The deduction of the two administrative fees, therefore, was in violation of the automatic stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the stay against a debtor upon discharge, so a continuing stay concerning estate property does not prevent a tax assessment against the debtor.
McCullough v. United States (In Re Armstrong) · filed 1997-11-25(c)(2)(C)
But the stay of acts against property of the estate is not relevant. The assessment is made against the taxpayer. The stay of acts against Armstrong, the taxpayer, lifted with his discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(C) ends the automatic stay when a debtor receives a discharge.
Lewis v. Lewis · filed 1994-08-23(c)(2)(C)
The automatic stay imposed at the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding terminates upon the debtor’s discharge.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
A judgment declaring one debt nondischargeable does not terminate the automatic stay; absent another statutory termination event or court order, the stay continues until the debtor’s discharge under § 727 is granted or denied.
Cardillo v. Moore-Handley, Inc. (In Re Cardillo) · filed 1994-08-30(c)(2)(C)
Section 523 itself does not grant or deny a discharge. By its very terms, it excepts a debt from a discharge under section 727. Therefore, when section 362(e)(2)(C) speaks of “the time a discharge is granted or denied,” it can only be speaking of the grant or denial of a discharge pursuant to section 727. Hence, the automatic stay, unless terminated by another enumerated event in section 362 or by court order, remains in effect until a discharge under section 727 is granted or denied.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is dismissed; appealing the dismissal does not automatically revive the stay.
Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul v. Ziebarth · filed 1994-07-18(c)(2)(B)
However, it is well settled that the automatic stay terminates upon dismissal of the bankruptcy petition [11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) ], and is not automatically revived by the filing of a notice of appeal from the dismissal.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) keeps the automatic stay in effect against estate property until that property leaves the estate.
United States v. Fingers (In Re Fingers) · filed 1994-07-08(c)(1)
In the instant ease, pursuant to section 362(c)(1), because the tax refunds were bankruptcy estate property, the automatic stay remained in effect against that estate property until it was no longer property of the estate. Therefore, the IRS violated the automatic stay when it seized the tax refunds.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) terminates the stay against estate property when Chapter 13 confirmation revests that property in the debtor, allowing foreclosure of a post-petition tax lien.
In Re Reamy · filed 1994-07-01(c)(1)
However, upon confirmation and the revesting of property to the Debtor, Section 362(c)(1) would automatically terminate the stay as to the tax lien foreclosure against the property.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay as to property sold by the trustee once the property leaves the estate.
In Re Parrish · filed 1994-06-28(c)(1)
In addition, the automatic stay was terminated upon sale to the Debtor. Once the property is sold and is no longer property of the estate, the stay ceases. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy proceeding closes, so the stay does not bar an action filed after closure.
National Acceptance Co. v. Regal Products, Inc. · filed 1994-04-26(c)(2)(A)
To the extent that this defense amounts to a claim that the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code bars the instant action, that defense is without merit. This is so because the automatic stay expires ... when the bankruptcy proceeding is closed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against enforcing a mechanic’s lien on property when the property leaves the bankruptcy estate.
Washington Federal Savings Bank v. William H. Metcalfe & Sons · filed 1994-01-13(c)(1)
A suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien is an action in rem, and once the property was out of the estate, pursuant to the language of 11 U.S.C. § 362, the stay against enforcement of the liens was lifted.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 stays a claim against a party that has filed a bankruptcy petition, allowing the claim to be renewed if the stay is lifted.
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha · filed 1993-12-20
North Penn Transfer, Inc. filed a petition in bankruptcy on February 10, 1992 and therefor any claim against it is stayed by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Accordingly the claim against North Penn will be dismissed without prejudice subject to renewal in the event the stay is lifted and pursuit of the claim in this court is deemed efficacious.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Dismissal of the bankruptcy case terminates the automatic stay under § 362(c)(2)(B), making an appeal over relief from that stay moot.
Northland Associates, Inc. v. United States, Internal Revenue Service (In Re Abrantes Construction Corp.) · filed 1993-11-02(c)(2)(B)
As stated above, the bankruptcy court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, In re Abrantes Constr. Corp., 132 B.R. 234, on January 7, 1993. Thus, the stay, upon which the United States’ appeals are based, is no longer in effect.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) keeps the stay on acts against unscheduled estate property in force after the bankruptcy case closes, without any need to reinstate it upon reopening.
Havelock v. Taxel (In Re Pace) · filed 1993-10-22(c)(1)
As stated above, the stay of acts against "unscheduled" property of the bankruptcy estate does not terminate upon the closing of the bankruptcy case. Consequently, reinstatement of the stay was unnecessary. Whether a stay is or is not reinstated upon the re-opening of the case is wholly irrelevant with respect to the Alaska lawsuit. Actions to control this property are stayed pursuant to § 362(c)(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 automatically stays an action against a defendant that files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
Brake Shop, Inc. v. Dacey · filed 1993-09-13
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362, the action against Brake World U.S.A. is automatically stayed and this court will take no further action on this case with regard to this particular defendant.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is closed.
In re Presidio Bridge Co. · filed 1991-01-22(c)(2)(A)
Because the case is closed, this court no longer has jurisdiction over the property in issue and the automatic stay provisions are no longer in effect.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 automatically stays proceedings involving a Chapter 11 debtor when the debtor files for bankruptcy.
In re School Asbestos Litigation · filed 1991-01-07
The act of filing triggers the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362. Accordingly, we will stay the proceedings at No. 90-1217 in which Celotex is the petitioner.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The automatic stay terminates upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan and is not reinstated by later conversion to Chapter 7.
In Re T.S.P. Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-08-09(c)
Another effect of confirmation, although not expressly stated in section 1141, is that the automatic stay is terminated. ... Finally, nothing in the Code would reinstate the automatic stay upon conversion.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) dissolves the automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is dismissed.
Middagh v. Stanal Sound Ltd. · filed 1990-05-25(c)
The bankruptcy petition of Stanal Sound Ltd. now having been dismissed, the automatic stay is dissolved.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay takes effect when a properly filed Chapter 11 petition establishes bankruptcy jurisdiction.
In Re MacOn Uplands Venture · filed 1979-11-05
Jurisdiction having been established in this court, the automatic stay provided by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362, became effective as of the time of the filing of the petition in Chapter 11 by the Debtor, October 17, 1979.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 stays issues involving the debtor but allows litigation among other parties on issues that do not involve the debtor.
Rupp v. Cloud Nine, Ltd. (In Re Cloud Nine, Ltd.) · filed 1980-01-31
Those issues which involve the Debtor and are precluded by § 362 are hereby stayed. Those issues which do not involve the Debtor may proceed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor and its co-defendants when the allegations against them arise from the same factual and legal basis.
Federal Life Insurance Co. v. First Financial Group of Texas, Inc. · filed 1980-02-13(a)(1)
In light of the above, the Court is persuaded that the automatic stay applies to judicial proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy and its co-defendants, when, as here, the allegations against them arise from the same factual and legal basis.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e), read with Rule 4001, allows the automatic stay to continue until thirty days after the final hearing begins.
First Mortgage Corp. v. Walker (In Re Walker) · filed 1980-03-12(e)
11 U.S.C. § 362 must be construed along with other sections of the Code and Rule 4001 which deals with automatic stays. This Rule provides that the stay expires thirty days after a final hearing is commenced.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 does not stay the Department of Labor from determining or periodically reevaluating a debtor’s disability status.
In Re Howell · filed 1980-03-28
However, initially it should be noted the court does not read the stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 to operate to interfere with its Congressionally imposed duties as to determination of disability or any subsequent reevaluation of disability. The regulations of the Department as to procedures for periodic reexamination or whatever to consider whether the disability of the individual has changed will not be stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. That provision, although the statutory language is extremely broadly drawn, is primarily concerned with creditor action. It should not be interpreted to affect such determinations. Congress did not so intend.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 automatically stays Tax Court proceedings when a taxpayer files for bankruptcy, but under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 that stay applies only to bankruptcy petitions filed on or after October 1, 1979.
Sandridge v. Commissioner · filed 1980-05-01
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 11 U.S.C. sec. 362 , now provides for an automatic stay of proceedings before the United States Tax Court when a bankruptcy action is filed by or against a taxpayer-petitioner, but the Act is effective only for those cases in which the bankruptcy petition is filed on or after October 1, 1979.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 automatically stays the continuation of proceedings against a defendant who has filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition.
Marsh Investment Corp. v. Langford · filed 1980-06-03
This court, as a preliminary matter, takes judicial notice that defendant John A. Langford has filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, pending as proceeding number 80-00015 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362, continuation of all proceedings against the bankrupt are automatically stayed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The automatic stay ends as to property when it ceases to be property of the bankruptcy estate.
White Motor Corp. v. Nashville White Trucks, Inc. (In Re Nashville White Trucks, Inc.) · filed 1980-06-20(c)(1)
11 U.S.C. § 362 provides that the filing of a petition operates as a stay of any act by an entity to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate; the stay continues until such property is no longer property of the estate. Since the court has found that the debtor had no interest in the franchise after the January 30,1980, expiration date, it is clear that the franchise was no longer property of the estate and that the stay provisions of § 362 no longer applied. Accordingly, the court finds that the automatic stay of § 362 terminated in regard to the franchise as of January 30,1980, when the property ceased to be property of the estate.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(5) continues to stay enforcement of a prepetition lien against property returned to the debtor by abandonment until the stay ends under § 362(c)(2) or the court grants relief.
Hickman v. First State Bank of Cordele (In Re Motley) · filed 1981-03-24(a)(5), (c)(1), (c)(2)
In the former, this is not so because when the trustee abandons property it reverts to the debtor and the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) continues in effect because 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) includes only property of the estate and not property of the debtor. The property of the debtor is relieved from the automatic stay only by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 renders a judgment obtained after a bankruptcy case begins in violation of the automatic stay null and void.
Sunshine Bank v. Manring Auto Sales, Inc. (In Re Manring Auto Sales, Inc.) · filed 1981-04-24
Additionally, the judgment obtained by the Bank subsequent to the commencement of this proceeding was obtained in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362, and is a null and void judgment under the provisions of Title 11.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 must be construed with other Bankruptcy Code provisions to give a Chapter 11 debtor a meaningful opportunity to reorganize.
International Harvester Co. v. Kleinsasser (In Re Kleinsasser) · filed 1981-07-07
1) That 11 U.S.C. § 362 and Interim Rule 4001(a) must be construed with other provisions of the Code because it was the intent of Congress, upon enacting Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, that a debtor be given one meaningful opportunity to rehabilitate.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay ceases to protect a debtor when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.
In Re Saez · filed 1981-08-04
It is unquestionable that upon the dismissal of the case herein, the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code ceased to protect debtor from acts by his creditors to recover any amount of money owed to them.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) takes effect when the bankruptcy petition is filed, without service of process on creditors.
Augustino Enterprises, Inc. v. Amgro, Inc. (In Re Augustino Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1981-08-05(a)
The stay of proceedings in bankruptcy takes effect on the date of the filing of the petition and no service of process is required.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 does not authorize a bankruptcy court to reimpose the automatic stay after it has been lifted or modified for a specific purpose.
Stuart Motel, Inc. v. Columbia Banking Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Stuart Motel, Inc.) · filed 1981-08-19
The reasons for this conclusion are as follows: the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 is by act of Congress and even though the Bankruptcy Court is given the right to continue the stay by denying a grant of relief from stay under carefully controlled circumstances, there is no specific grant of authority to reimpose the stay once it has been lifted or modified for a specific purpose.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay does not apply to leases that terminated before the bankruptcy petition was filed.
Primo Resources, Inc. v. Balcones Oil Co. (In Re Balcones Oil Co.) · filed 1981-09-15
If such leases had terminated prior to the filing of the Petition, then the automatic stay relief afforded by 11 U.S.C. § 362 would not be applicable.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) terminates the automatic stay by operation of law when the court does not timely hear a request for relief and order the stay continued.
Navajo Tribe v. Sandmar Corp. (In Re Sandmar Corp.) · filed 1981-12-21(e)
If the Court does not act, then the automatic stay dissolves of its own terms.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay applies to a creditor omitted from a Chapter 13 schedule because it supersedes former Bankruptcy Rule 13-401(c).
Carter v. Van Buskirk (In Re Carter) · filed 1981-12-28
Appellant contends that no stay was in effect as to Century because Century was not listed as a creditor in the debtor’s Chapter 13 schedule. This argument is based on Rule 13-401(c), Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. This rule is incompatible with the new Bankruptcy Code, however, and has been superseded by section 362 of the Code.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(3) automatically bars a creditor from repossessing estate property after a bankruptcy petition is filed, even if the creditor has not received official notice of the case.
In Re Johnson · filed 1982-01-19(a)(3)
Chrysler has taken acts to obtain property of the estate and to enforce its lien against property of the estate since the filing of the petition by these debtors on September 24, 1981. This stay is automatically imposed, and Chrysler’s lack of “official” notification from this Court is no defense to the finding that a violation did, in fact, occur.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay protecting estate property when the property ceases to be part of the estate.
Lloyd v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In Re Lloyd) · filed 1982-03-25(c)(1)
If the debtor does not pursue the matter under the statute, GMAC shall be entitled to take any steps deemed appropriate. The automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code will not apply because the debtor will have lost his interest in the property. As a matter of equity, the Court is extending the statutory redemption period. If the debtor does not pursue redemption, he will lose his interest in the property. The vehicle will, therefore, no longer be property of the estate which would be protected by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.
Matter of Solar Equipment Corp. · filed 1982-04-26(c)(2)(B)
The two foregoing statutory provisions clearly provide that when a petition pursuant to Chapter 11 is filed, an automatic stay comes into effect and continues in effect until the case is dismissed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) terminates the automatic stay if the court does not order it continued after a hearing held within 30 days of a request for relief from the stay.
Collateral Funding, Inc. v. Herrera (In Re Herrera) · filed 1982-09-08(e)
In that event, because the court did not order the stay continued in effect after a hearing held within 30 days of the request for relief, the stay terminated, 11 U.S.C. § 362(e).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) takes effect immediately when a bankruptcy petition is filed and applies to all entities regardless of their actual knowledge of the filing.
Evans v. Mid-City Jewelry, Inc. (In re Evans) · filed 1982-08-10(a)
I find that issue to be irrelevant to our inquiry because 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which becomes operative immediately upon the filing of the petition, applies to “all entitles” and is not conditioned upon actual knowledge.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) permits relief from the automatic stay when the property and any remaining redemption right are no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Morgan (In Re Morgan) · filed 1982-10-14(c)(1)
Therefore, since neither the automobile nor the right of redemption are any longer property of the estate, GMAC is entitled, under § 362(c)(1), to a modification of the automatic stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) automatically ends the stay thirty days after a request for relief unless the court orders the stay continued or decides the request.
In Re Codesco, Inc. · filed 1982-11-17(e)
Code § 362(e) is self-executing; the stay automatically terminates thirty days after a request for relief unless the court orders it continued or renders a decision.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(1) stays the filing of a state-court lien foreclosure suit against a debtor until the automatic stay ends.
Garbe Iron Works, Inc. v. Priester · filed 1982-11-22(a)(1)
We believe plaintiff had no alternative but to delay filing of suit until the automatic stay was terminated.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since The 1984 amendment added an express damages remedy for an individual injured by a willful stay violation.
Section 362 does not imply a private damages action for violating the automatic stay, but violations may be remedied through civil contempt.
Thacker v. Etter (In Re Thacker) · filed 1982-11-30
While no private cause of action is available to the plaintiff under § 362, he is not without a remedy under that provision. The stay imposed under § 362 is comparable to an automatic injunction. Violations of that statutory injunction can be brought before the Court by way of a motion for civil or criminal contempt, as is true of any judicially-imposed injunctive order.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) stays proceedings against the debtor and acts against the debtor’s or estate’s property, but does not protect property belonging to neither.
Foulke v. Lavelle · filed 1982-12-10(a)
The automatic stay provisions apply to proceedings against the debtor, the debtor’s property, and the property of the estate, but they do not apply to acts against property which is neither the debtor’s nor the estate’s.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) automatically terminates the stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.
Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1982-11-29(c)(2)(B)
The stay terminates automatically upon dismissal of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The automatic stay prevents enforcement of a prepetition judgment lien against estate property until the property leaves the estate through abandonment.
Harbin v. Brooks (Harbin) · filed 1982-12-23(c)
The debtor’s interest in the land in this case remained property of the estate until October 14, 1982 when the trustee abandoned his interest in the property. Thus, an injunction was in effect from when the Chapter 7 petition was filed on October 7, 1980 until the trustee abandoned the real property on October 14, 1982, and during that period Brooks could not enforce his judgment lien.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(2) and (3) stays enforcement of a judgment against estate property and acts to obtain possession of it even if the debtor need not be a party to the underlying suit.
Huntington Nat. Bank v. FIBERGLASTICS · filed 1983-01-20(a)(2), (a)(3)
Even though the Debtor may not be a necessary party in the foreclosure suit because the doctrines of lis pendens preempt the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays also enforcement of a judgment against property of the estate and any act to obtain possession of property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) and (3).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor who filed for bankruptcy, but does not extend the stay to nonbankrupt codefendants.
Pitts v. Unarco Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-01-21(a)(1)
The clear language of Section 362(a)(1) thus extends the automatic stay provision only to the debtor filing bankruptcy proceedings and not to non-bankrupt co-defendants.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not except actions under Florida financial responsibility and automobile reparations laws from the automatic stay.
In Re Taylor · filed 1983-01-27(a)
These State laws are not excepted from the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) bars a foreclosure sale after a bankruptcy petition is filed, and civil contempt for violating the stay does not require proof of willfulness.
In Re Lohnes · filed 1983-01-29(a)
In the instant proceeding, there is no question but that the automatic stay was violated by the foreclosure sale. Dimyan seeks to excuse his action by claiming that he did not intend to violate federal law. Since, however, civil contempt serves a remedial purpose by either coercing a respondent into compliance with the court’s order or compensating the complainant for losses sustained, willfulness in the offending party need not be shown for a finding of contempt.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not stay an interpleader action that is neither against the debtor nor directed at property of the bankruptcy estate.
NLT Computer Services Corp. v. Capital Computer Systems, Inc. · filed 1983-01-31(a)
The Court concludes that, for several reasons, the automatic stay does not prevent continuation of this action. First, it appears that the automatic stay is not applicable by the express terms of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362. The several subsections of Section 362(a) stay acts and judicial proceedings “against” the debtor and/or property of the estate. This interpleader action is certainly not one “against” the debtor, especially where the debtor has specifically disclaimed any interest in the funds.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(A) ends the stay against a debtor when the bankruptcy case closes, allowing a landlord to pursue state-court remedies for unpaid rent.
In Re Hepburn · filed 1983-02-09(c)(2)(A)
When the case was closed, the stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) on Fairfield came to an end by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(A), if it was not terminated on the date she was discharged (11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C)). Accordingly, Fairfield is now free to pursue its remedies in New York’s housing court for Miss Hepburn’s breach of her obligation to pay rent, and reinforced by the breach arising from the trustee’s rejection of her lease.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, permitting a later state-court proceeding to go forward.
Beckley v. AVCO Financial Services, One, Inc. · filed 1983-04-01(c)(2)
This automatic stay of such proceedings, however, ceases to exist when the bankruptcy proceeding is closed, dismissed, or discharge is either granted or denied, whichever comes first. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). ... The record does not show any jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over the Beckleys after March 19, 1982; thus there was no stay of proceedings in the state circuit court, which led to the default judgment of June 18, 1982.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
A debtor may waive the automatic stay by voluntarily stipulating that it ends if the debtor defaults on specified payments.
In Re Sando · filed 1983-06-03(a)
By entering into the stipulation, Sando waived the protections offered to a debtor under the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) protects the debtor and trustee through the automatic stay; a junior lienholder has no substantive or procedural rights under the stay merely because the stayed foreclosure affects its lien.
Bryce v. Stivers (In Re Stivers) · filed 1983-06-15(a)
Section 362(a) by its express terms creates a stay in favor of the debtor and of the trustee. Not even a strained reading of that subsection or of the balance of section 362 suggests that the stay operates in favor of the bank, which held a third deed of trust, and against Bryce, who held a second deed of trust.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2) keeps the stay against acts other than acts against estate property in force after abandonment until a specified terminating event occurs.
In Re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust · filed 1983-06-17(c)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) provides that the stay of an act against property of the estate under § 362(a) continues until such property is no longer property of the estate and in § 362(c)(2), the stay of any other act under § 362(a) continues until the happening of identified events — none of which are likely to occur in the near future if this case had been allowed to stay in Chapter 7.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) stays proceedings against the debtor but does not stay claims against nonbankrupt co-defendants.
Almy v. Terrace Land Development, Ltd. · filed 1983-07-05(a)
However, such a stay does not apply to claims against non-bankrupt co-defendants.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The § 362(a) automatic stay remains in force when a debtor complies with a stipulation governing relief from the stay.
Main Line Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kalkstein (In re Kalkstein) · filed 1983-07-18(a)
We conclude that the unambiguous provisions of the stipulation have been complied with by the debtor and his wife and, therefore, the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) remain in full force and effect.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to annul the automatic stay retroactively and validate actions taken against the debtor or estate property during the stay, including a state court judgment.
Mellor v. Pistole (In Re Mellor) · filed 1983-07-22(d)
Examining, first, the effect of the trial court’s approval of the state court judgment, we note that 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) permits a bankruptcy court to “annul” the automatic stay. Therefore, it was unquestionably within the power of the trial court, in appropriate instances, to validate, after the fact, actions against the debtor and/or his property taken in violation of the automatic stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 does not stay efforts to collect rents from property in which the debtor has no rights.
Gillam v. Samuels · filed 1983-07-29
The stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 are inapplicable since Samuels had no rights in the property.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362's automatic stay protects a debtor's pre-foreclosure redemption right when foreclosure on co-debtors' property would extinguish that right.
Bialac v. Bialac · filed 1983-08-04(a)
Neither of these interests are within protections afforded by a literal interpretation of section 362, yet they should be protected by the stay if the purposes of the Act, the orderly disposition of all property in which the debtor has some interest, are to be achieved.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay becomes effective when an order for relief is granted on an involuntary petition.
Chalmers v. Benson (In Re Benson) · filed 1983-09-13
In this case the automatic stay became effective when the Order for relief was granted on this involuntary petition.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) terminates the stay when no timely order continues it, and a bankruptcy court cannot use its equitable powers to reinstate the terminated stay.
Jones v. Wood (In Re Wood) · filed 1983-09-23(e)
In extraordinary circumstances the equitable powers of this Court may be utilized to prevent injury or correct errors, but nullification of the stay termination resulting from the operation of § 362(e) is not one of them.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
A report of no distribution does not terminate the automatic stay.
In Re Pierson · filed 1983-10-14(c)
Finally, a report of no distribution does not terminate the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) sets forth the times when the stay ceases.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 prohibits a repairer from removing an engine installed in the debtor’s vehicle before the bankruptcy filing and permits an order restoring the status quo.
General Electric Credit Corp. v. Shoup (In re Shoup) · filed 1983-10-24
As title to the engine passed to the debtor April 30, 1982 when the repairman installed it in the vehicle under 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2401(2) which provides for such result “at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods” prior to the filing of the reorganization proceeding June 7, 1982, Great Lakes was in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 when it removed the new engine from the vehicle and will be required to make restoration of the status quo.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) ordinarily terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy petition is dismissed.
In Re Ana J. De Jesus Saez, Debtor. Luis R. Martir Lugo v. Ana J. De Jesus Saez, George Rieckehoff · filed 1983-11-22(c)
Section 362(c) provides that the stay continue as to creditor conduct not directed against property of the estate, only until dismissal, and as to conduct directed against such property, only so long as it remains in the estate. It seems self evident that there is no “estate” and hence no “property of the estate” unless there is an existing petition. Dismissal of the petition, therefore, would ordinarily terminate the stay as well.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) ends the automatic stay for post-confirmation creditors when estate property vests in the reorganized debtor upon confirmation.
United States v. Redmond · filed 1984-02-01(c)
The IRS, as well as other post-confirmation creditors of the reorganized debtor, are no longer restrained by the automatic stay in bankruptcy which terminates when the property of the estate vests in the reorganized debtor upon confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay does not extend its protections to a non-debtor junior encumbrancer.
California Thrift & Loan Ass'n v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re Eagles) · filed 1984-02-10
Similarly, we can find no explicit statutory basis, under 11 U.S.C. § 362 or elsewhere, for extending the protections afforded by the automatic stay — whatever these might entail — to a non-debtor junior encumbrancer.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 does not undo a prior modification of the automatic stay.
Hemontolor v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association · filed 1984-03-30(c)(2)
The automatic stay provision in section 362 is triggered when a petition for relief is filed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Unless modified by the bankruptcy court, the automatic stay remains in effect until the case is closed, dismissed and a discharge is granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2). Conversion of a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 does not constitute a closing, dismissal or discharge. Neither does a conversion under U.S.C. § 348(a) effect a change in the date the petition was filed, the commencement of the case or the order of relief. Thus, it is the opinion of this Court that the modification of the automatic stay is not effected by the conversion of a Chapter 7 petition to one under Chapter 13.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
A confirmed reorganization plan does not keep the automatic stay in force.
In Re Telemark Management Co., Inc. · filed 1984-05-17
The plan does not keep alive the automatic stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
When an order under § 362(d) lifts the automatic stay, the parties return to their pre-stay legal relationships and applicable nonbankruptcy law governs their conduct.
Fidelity National Bank v. Winslow (In Re Winslow) · filed 1984-05-16(d)
An order which lifts the automatic stay returns the parties to the legal relationships that existed before the stay became operative. Whatever non-bankruptcy law governed the transactions and relationships of the parties prior to the application of the Bankruptcy Code is the law which controls the conduct of the parties once the stay is lifted.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
A bankruptcy court may reimpose the automatic stay under § 362 through its § 105(a) authority when circumstances make that order necessary or appropriate.
In Re Edward C. Pirsig Farms, Inc. · filed 1984-09-04(e)
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court may reimpose the stay in certain circumstances. The Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy courts the power under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to “issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” Under the circumstances and facts of this case, the court finds an order reinstating the stay is and would be a proper exercise of the § 105 power.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) ordinarily terminates the automatic stay upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.
In Re Ernst · filed 1985-01-15(c)
Upon confirmation of a plan of reorganization, the automatic stay is ordinarily terminated because all of the prerequisites of § 362(c) have been satisfied.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) stays post-petition execution against a debtor’s property, including the sale of vessels arrested in an admiralty foreclosure action before the bankruptcy petition.
United States v. LeBouf Bros. Towing Co., Inc. · filed 1985-01-18(a)
Congress certainly intended, and the statute clearly provides, that the automatic stay effected by § 362 prevent all post-petition executions on a debtor’s property; consequently the sale of LeBouf’s boats in this action cannot proceed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not extend the stay to co-debtors or guarantors.
Otoe County National Bank v. W & P Trucking, Inc., Charles E. Froelich, William J. Froelich, Jr., and Jack D. Cramer · filed 1985-02-11(a)
Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor only and not co-debtors.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) generally terminates the automatic stay if no hearing is held within 30 days of a motion for relief, but the bankruptcy court may continue or reinstate the stay pending a final hearing under § 105(a).
John Deere Co. v. Kozak Farms, Inc. (In Re Kozak Farms, Inc.) · filed 1985-02-07(e)
After a careful review of the case law, the Court finds that a bankruptcy court may reinstate or continue an automatic stay pending a final hearing on a creditor’s motion for relief from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not stay a lessee debtor’s rejection of a lease merely because another debtor holds a mortgage on that lease.
Commercial Finance, Ltd. v. Hawaii Dimensions, Inc. (In Re Hawaii Dimensions, Inc.) · filed 1985-02-25(a)
Hawaii Dimension, Inc.’s rejection of its lease upon which Commercial Finance holds a mortgage does not violate any of section 362(a) stay protections of Commercial Finance. The Bankruptcy Court was therefore not prohibited from approving the rejection.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay operates upon bankruptcy filing and binds those aware of the bankruptcy until the stay is properly lifted.
Nlt Computer Services Corporation v. Capital Computer Systems, Inc. · filed 1985-03-04
The stay provisions of section 362 are automatic and self-operating and those who have knowledge of the pendency of a bankruptcy action and stay are bound to honor the stay unless and until it is properly lifted.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not stay collection of a postpetition debt from a Chapter 13 debtor’s wages when the confirmed plan vests estate property in the debtor and the estate ceases to exist.
Mason v. Williams (In Re Mason) · filed 1985-04-02(a)
There is no dispute that this plan so provided and the plan was confirmed. As a result the bankruptcy court properly concluded that the estate did not exist and the stay could not apply.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(b) does not list foreclosure of a preferred ship mortgage among the exceptions to the automatic stay.
Coastal Production Credit Ass'n v. the Oil Screw "Santee" · filed 1985-08-02(b)
Proceedings to foreclose on a preferred ship mortgage are not one of the enumerated exceptions to the automatic stay imposed by § 362.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the bankruptcy debtor, but does not extend the stay to co-debtors in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 or to co-tort-feasors.
Gatx Aircraft Corporation v. M/v Courtney Leigh, and Bryan Dedeker, Mrs. Bryan Dedeker, Ray Loden, Mrs. Ray Loden and P. · filed 1985-08-19(a)(1)
By its terms the automatic stay applies only to the debtor, not to co-debtors under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code nor to co-tort-feasors.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 protects a party with a pending bankruptcy, and court rulings concerning that party are subject to the automatic stay.
Sims v. Inexco Oil Co. · filed 1985-08-21
The automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 protect Tomlinson as a result of the bankruptcy pending in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. Consequently, any ruling of this Court as it pertains to Tomlinson is subject to the automatic stay provisions.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2) keeps the stay against collection from a debtor’s property in effect after exemption or trustee abandonment until the stay terminates or the court grants relief.
In Re Hahn · filed 1985-08-29(c)(2)
A secured creditor enforcing its rights after allowance of a debtor’s exemption and/or a trustee’s abandonment, but prior to a grant of relief from stay or the termination of the stay under § 362(c)(2), violates the stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) terminates the automatic stay when a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed, and a bankruptcy court cannot reinstate a stay that has properly terminated.
In Re Sykes · filed 1985-09-30(c)
Thus, upon confirmation, there is no longer “property of the estate” and, under the provisions of Section 362(c)(1), the stay is terminated. Furthermore, Section 1141(d)(1)(A) provides that confirmation of a Plan discharges a debtor. Consequently, under Section 362(c)(2)(C), on confirmation of the Plan, the stay would no longer be in existence. ... Upon investigation, this Court has found no authority which grants a bankruptcy court the ability to reinstate a stay which has properly terminated.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and resulting stay is sufficient to establish a knowing violation of § 362(a)(1); certified proof of the filing is unnecessary.
Rhyne v. Cunningham (In Re Rhyne) · filed 1986-04-08(a)(1)
We conclude that Feinberg’s stance is meritless since actual knowledge of the filing of the petition and concomitant knowledge of the stay are sufficient bases from which to conclude that a party knowingly violated the stay. Receipt of formal, certified documents evincing the filing of the petition is not necessary.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay against estate property when confirmation of a plan vests that property in the debtor.
In Re 12th & N Joint Venture · filed 1986-05-19(c)(1)
Section § 362(c) provides that the stay of an act against property of the estate continues until the property is no longer the property of the estate. Confirmation vests property of estate in the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b), and the automatic stay is thus terminated.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) stays nonbankruptcy court proceedings when a bankruptcy petition is filed and supports injunctive relief when a state-court judgment is entered after that filing.
France v. France (In Re France) · filed 1986-05-28(a)
Title 11, United States Code § 362(a) provides that when a bankruptcy petition is filed it “operates as a stay” of a wide range of nonbankruptcy court actions. ... Here, the petition having been filed prior to the entry of judgment, the Bankruptcy Judge acted quite properly in granting the injunctive relief sought and in ordering turnover of the title to the motor vehicle at issue.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay as to estate property when that property leaves the debtor’s estate.
Sawyer Nurseries v. Galardi · filed 1986-05-28(c)(1)
The applicable principle is that the automatic stay remains in effect as long as the property in issue remains in the debtor’s estate. When the property leaves the dominion of the bankrupt’s estate, as in this matter, by sale pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s order, and becomes the property of others, it no longer has the protection of the stay provisions.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) ends the automatic stay when the bankruptcy court dismisses the case, even if an appeal is pending, absent a stay pending appeal.
Olson v. Commissioner · filed 1986-06-25(c)(2)(B)
We are satisfied that Congress intended dismissal for purposes of section 362(c)(2)(B) to mean dismissal by the bankruptcy court and not appellate action by a District Court.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay protecting estate property when that property leaves the estate upon confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.
Riddle v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 1986-07-15(c)(1)
It follows that the automatic stay created by 11 USC § 362 (a) (3) was lifted at that time and created no bar to the present action.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay of foreclosure when collateral leaves the bankruptcy estate; absent a contrary Chapter 13 plan provision, confirmation vests the collateral in the debtor and ends the stay.
In Re Johnson · filed 1986-07-31(c)(1)
Section 362 applies to stay such foreclosure during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case, but it ceases to apply at such time as the collateral is no longer property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). Unless the Chapter 13 plan provides otherwise (and the instant plan does not), confirmation of the plan serves to vest all of the property of the estate in the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b). While the property may remain subject to the lien of the secured party (11 U.S.C. § 1327(c)), enforcement of the lien is no longer stayed by Section 362, and the “adequate protection” provisions of Section 362(d) are no longer applicable.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not stay a postpetition action against a trustee that is not against property of the estate.
Kranzdorf v. Alter (In re Fidelity America Financial Corp.) · filed 1986-08-28(a)
Since the cause of action arose postpetition and is not against property of the estate, the automatic stay does not bar such an action.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Once the automatic stay under § 362 is dissolved, a district court may proceed with all phases of litigation properly before it, including settlement.
Bostick Foundry Company v. Lindberg, a Division of Sola Basic Industries, Inc., and Third-Party v. Venetta, Inc., Third- · filed 1986-07-25
Once the bankruptcy court dissolved the automatic stay of proceedings imposed upon the district court by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, the district court was free to proceed with all phases of the litigation properly before it, including a disposition by trial or settlement.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) does not automatically terminate a stay 30 days after a motion for relief when no hearing has been scheduled; the debtor must have an opportunity for a hearing.
In Re Clark · filed 1987-02-10(e)
We therefore hold that the automatic stay may not be automatically terminated prior to the scheduling of a hearing on a Motion for relief from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 does not expressly provide for reinstatement of an automatic stay.
In Re Katherine B. Bonds A/K/A Kathy Bonds, Debtor. F.N.M.A. By National Mortgage Company v. Katherine B. Bonds A/K/A Ka · filed 1987-03-03
Although 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 does not expressly provide for the reinstatement of an automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 105(a) states that "[t]he bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions [of Title 11]."Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 imposes a temporary stay in a corporate Chapter 11 case that gives way upon plan confirmation to the permanent injunction under § 524(a).
In Re Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1987-06-10
Upon confirmation, 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) replaces the temporary restraining effect of 11 U.S.C. § 362.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the automatic stay of acts against estate property when the property is no longer property of the estate.
Reserves Development Corporation Rdc v. Browning · filed 1987-06-29(c)(1)
We take this action based upon 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(c)(1), which reads as follows: "[T]he stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate[.]" In light of the circumstances discussed below, the subject property, a coal-washing facility in West Virginia, is no longer "property of the estate" under section 362.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay of acts against estate property when that property is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.
Jeffries v. Browning · filed 1987-06-29(c)(1)
We take this action based upon 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1), which reads as follows: “[T]he stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate[.]” In light of the circumstances discussed below, the subject property, a coal-washing facility in West Virginia, is no longer “property of the estate” under section 362.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not impose an automatic stay when an involuntary petition is facially insufficient because its petitioners lack qualifying claims; a valid stay begins when the bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction.
Broadview Savings Bank v. Royal Gate Associates, Ltd. (In Re Royal Gate Associates, Ltd.) · filed 1988-01-06(a)
The petition was insufficient on its face because it was not brought by holders of claims or general partners under section 303(b). The Bankruptcy Court had no jurisdiction over this case until the response was filed on December 17 by the general partner. There was therefore no valid stay in effect until December 17. The foreclosure sale under Broadview’s power of sale, held on December 1, 1987, was not in violation of the automatic stay because there was no valid stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The automatic stay applies to defaults after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan on a prepetition secured debt.
Far West Federal Bank v. Vanasen (In Re Vanasen) · filed 1987-12-15(a)
I find the automatic stay applies to post-confirmation defaults.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) ends the automatic stay, after which adequate protection no longer prevents a secured creditor from enforcing its contract.
In Re Mitchell · filed 1988-04-11(c)
However, this concept of “adequate protection” does not apply once the stay terminates as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). Subsequent to abandonment and discharge, the creditor may enforce the literal terms of its contract.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay begins when the bankruptcy petition is filed and does not prevent a tax lien that attached before filing.
In re United Crane & Rigging, Inc. · filed 1988-05-27
Since the automatic stay was not invoked until 1:37 p.m. on May 3, 1988, it will not operate to preclude attachment of the tax lien as the lien had already attached by operation of law upon the start of the forty-sixth day.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) keeps the automatic stay in effect for property of the estate while the trustee has not abandoned that property.
Matter of Mehrhoff · filed 1988-07-05(c)(1)
In this ease the automatic stay remains in effect as to the governmental benefits because the trustee did not abandon them from the estate.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not stay a counterclaim whose cause of action arose after the bankruptcy petition.
Turboff v. United Savings Ass'n of Texas (In Re Turboff) · filed 1988-10-17(a)
In addition, even were a suit, or some part of a suit, against Jerald Turboff, Trustee to be considered subject to the 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) stay which covers Jerald Turboff individually, the stay does not apply to United’s counterclaim in state court if United’s cause of action arose after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy (in this case, after July 27, 1987).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(1) ends the stay against estate property when Chapter 13 confirmation revests that property in the debtor, unless the plan or confirmation order provides otherwise.
Laughlin v. United States Internal Revenue Service · filed 1989-03-29(c)(1)
The distinction is crucial because under section 362, “the stay of an act against property of the estate ... continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). ... I do not interpret the words, “Except as otherwise provided in the plan or order confirming the plan,” to except all property mentioned in the plan from section 1327’s rule that all property of the estate revests in the debtor.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) stays both sides from pursuing claims or defenses in state trial and appellate courts while the automatic stay remains in effect, unless the bankruptcy court lifts it.
Dyer v. Weedon · filed 1989-04-20(a)
We hold that neither the Dyers nor Weedon could proceed with their claims or defenses in either the district or appellate courts of this state absent an order of the bankruptcy court lifting the automatic stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) imposes a distinct automatic stay when a debtor files a chapter 13 case, even if a court lifted the stay in an earlier chapter 7 case.
In Re Paul Wayne Saylors, Debtor. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Paul Wayne Saylors, Jane K. Dishuck, Standing Trustee · filed 1989-04-10(a)
The order also cannot be construed as lifting the stay in the chapter 13 case that automatically became effective the next day.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the dismissal order is entered; Bankruptcy Rule 7062 does not extend it for ten days.
Weston v. Cibula (In Re Weston) · filed 1989-04-21(c)(2)(B)
Thus, the plain language of both of the above referenced code provisions serves to contradict the Debtor’s suggestion that B.R. 7062 was designed to prevent the automatic stay from lifting immediately upon the dismissal of the case.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed, making an appeal over an earlier order lifting the stay moot.
In Re Norman Eugene Mullins, Debtor. Estate of Richard Stearns Cutter by John Pendergast, Trustee v. Norman E. Mullins, · filed 1989-06-08(c)(2)(B)
The issue whether the stay was properly lifted in this case is moot because, even if the stay should have remained in effect, it terminated when the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) automatically terminates the stay after a creditor requests relief if the court does not order the stay continued within 30 days.
SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Thomas (In re Thomas) · filed 1989-09-15(e)
The debtors did not obtain an order from the bankruptcy court that the stay continue in force, and by virtue of a provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(e)... the stay under § 362 terminated automatically as to SouthTrust on September 3, 1987, prior to the bankruptcy court ruling on the matter. ... The last question is whether the automatic stay was lifted at the time South-Trust initiated the detinue action in state court. This Court has reviewed the district court’s findings and conclusions on this issue and concludes that the district court’s analysis is correct.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 does not stay foreclosure of property the debtor transferred before bankruptcy when the foreclosure does not affect the debtor, the estate, or reorganization.
Brancato v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A. (In Re Pestritto) · filed 1989-10-04
In the case at hand, the Bank seeks to foreclose upon property which is owned by the Plaintiffs and in which the Debtor had transferred all of its legal and/or equitable interest prior to filing bankruptcy. ... Therefore, the proposed foreclosure by Bank is not subject to the automatic stay under Section 362.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(e) terminates the automatic stay thirty days after a creditor requests relief unless the bankruptcy court orders the stay continued.
In Re Thomas · filed 1989-10-23(e)
The debtors did not obtain an order from the bankruptcy court that the stay continue in force, and by virtue of a provision of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(e) 4 , the stay under Sec. 362 terminated automatically as to SouthTrust on September 3, 1987, prior to the bankruptcy court ruling on the matter.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) does not bar a contract from lapsing under its own terms after a postpetition default when the nondebtor party takes no affirmative act to terminate it.
Hertzberg v. Loyal American Life Insurance Co. (In Re B & K Hydraulic Co.) · filed 1989-10-25(a)
For this same reason, it must also be held that the termination of the contract did not violate the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Loyal undertook no act to terminate the contract.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed; an appeal and later reversal of the dismissal do not keep the stay in effect without a stay pending appeal.
Weston v. Rodriguez (In Re Weston) · filed 1989-12-12(c)(2)
In our case, appellant’s case was dismissed and the automatic stay terminated. Although Bankruptcy Rule 8005 allows a party to seek a stay pending appeal, appellant did not avail herself of this provision and, therefore, the foreclosure sale did not violate the automatic stay.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) bar a postpetition hearing that continues a prepetition judicial proceeding and exercises control over a debtor’s legal interest in estate property.
Soliman v. Spencer (In re Spencer) · filed 1989-12-22(a)(1), (a)(3)
That interest became property of the bankruptcy estate on November 20 and is protected by the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a). The Superior Court hearing held November 21 was a continuation of a judicial proceeding prohibited under § 362(a)(1) as well as an act to exercise control over property of the bankruptcy estate in violation of § 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) stays claims directed against the bankruptcy estate, but does not prohibit the assertion of claims on the estate’s behalf.
R.A. Hatch Co. v. American Insurance · filed 1990-01-16(a)
By contrast, the automatic stay provision in bankruptcy does not prohibit the assertion of claims on behalf of the estate, but only claims directed against the estate.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
A Chapter 11 filing triggers the automatic stay under § 362, staying proceedings involving the debtor.
Celotex Corp. v. Kelly · filed 1990-12-13
The act of filing triggers the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Accordingly, we will stay the proceedings at No. 90-1217 in which Celotex is the petitioner.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362’s automatic stay does not reach a suit against a third party when the debtor and estate property are not involved, and the stay cannot support an injunction extending beyond the bankruptcy proceeding.
Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. First National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1990-12-28
The court had to rely upon its broad equitable power under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]”) as the source of its authority to issue the injunction, because LDP was not a party to the state action, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (automatic stay of proceedings “against the debtor”), LDP’s property also was not involved, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (automatic stay of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate”), and the injunction was expressly intended to continue in effect following conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (automatic stay expires when ease is closed, proceeding is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The automatic stay normally ends upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, which revests estate property in the debtor.
McKinney v. Waterman Steamship Corporation · filed 1991-01-30(a)
While the confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan on June 19, 1986 did not mention release from the automatic stay specifically, an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is normally lifted when the confirmation order is issued.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) governs the duration of the automatic stay after a bankruptcy petition is filed.
State Bank of Spring Hill v. Bucyrus Grain Co. (In Re Bucyrus Grain Co.) · filed 1991-04-22(c)
Section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c), merely provides for the duration of an automatic stay after a petition has been filed with the Bankruptcy Court.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c) ends the automatic stay that prevents postpetition real estate tax liens from attaching when plan confirmation removes the property from the bankruptcy estate.
Erie Hilton Joint Venture v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (In Re Erie Hilton Joint Venture) · filed 1991-03-22(c)
Even though foreclosure proceedings were pending, upon confirmation of Hilton’s Second Amended Plan, legal title to the Property vested in Hilton, the reorganized debtor. The Property left the bankruptcy estate. The order confirming the plan served as a grant of discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d). Therefore, under § 362(c), the automatic stay which had prevented the Taxing Authorities’ liens for 1990 real estate taxes from attaching to the Property no longer remained in effect.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 generally stays proceedings against a debtor, enforcement of prepetition judgments, acts to control estate property, and collection of prepetition claims, subject to subsection (b) exceptions.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Holmes Transportation, Inc. · filed 1991-05-06(a)(1), (2), (3), (6)
Except as provided in Bankruptcy Code Sec. 362(b), section 362 stays both the commencement and the continuation of all actions and proceedings, including judicial proceedings, against the debtor, id. Sec. 362(a)(1), as well as the enforcement of a prepetition judgment against the debtor, id. Sec. 362(a)(2), "any act to obtain possession of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate," id. Sec. 362(a)(3), and any act to collect or recover a prepetition claim against the debtor, id. Sec. 362(a)(6).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 automatically stays an appeal against a defendant during that defendant’s bankruptcy.
Stafford v. Fibreboard Corp. · filed 1991-05-13
Under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, this action is automatically stayed as to Eagle-Picher during the pendency of that bankruptcy.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(a) ordinarily stays proceedings against the debtor but does not extend the stay to nonbankrupt codefendants.
Cushman and Wakefield, Inc. v. Backos · filed 1991-05-23(a)
The ■ automatic stay of chapter 11 bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), is limited to debtors and ordinarily does not encompass non-bankrupt co-defendants.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362 stays proceedings against a debtor that has filed for bankruptcy, but does not stay claims against other defendants.
Connors v. Princeton Coal Group, Inc. · filed 1991-06-05
Accordingly, this matter is STAYED as to Princeton Coal only pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. Said stay does not affect the adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims against the other defendants.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) dissolves the automatic stay when the bankruptcy case is dismissed.
In Re Fairway Missionary Baptist Church · filed 1991-09-17(c)(2)(B)
The prior case dismissal statutorily dissolved the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 362(c)(2)(B) terminates the automatic stay when the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed.
In Re Roger W. Knight, Debtor, Roger W. Knight v. Washington Department of Social and Health Services, and Us Bancorp Ro · filed 1992-02-18(c)(2)(B)
The dismissal of the bankruptcy petition terminates the automatic stay of section 362(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan does not end the automatic stay against an individual debtor when the confirmation order postpones discharge and the case remains open.
Reisher v. International Revenue Service (In Re Reisher) · filed 1992-10-30(c)(2)(C)
The confirmation order in this case provides for discharge at the completion of the plan. The language of the order must prevail over the language of the plan. The Debtors in this case therefore have not been discharged and the automatic stay is therefore present to prohibit creditors from pursuing Debtors.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Notes 1–150 of 11,926, oldest cases first.
6,833 more cases cited this section only in passing
These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.
Statutory history
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2570; Pub. L. 97–222, §3, July 27, 1982, 96 Stat. 235; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §§304, 363(b), 392, 441, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 352, 363, 365, 371; Pub. L. 99–509, title V, §5001(a), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1911; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §§257(j), 283(d), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3115, 3116; Pub. L. 101–311, title I, §102, title II, §202, June 25, 1990, 104 Stat. 267, 269; Pub. L. 101–508, title III, §3007(a)(1), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–28; Pub. L. 103–394, title I, §§101, 116, title II, §§204(a), 218(b), title III, §304(b), title IV, §401, title V, §501(b)(2), (d)(7), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4107, 4119, 4122, 4128, 4132, 4141, 4142, 4144; Pub. L. 105–277, div. I, title VI, §603, Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–886; Pub. L. 109–8, title I, §106(f), title II, §§214, 224(b), title III, §§302, 303, 305(1), 311, 320, title IV, §§401(b), 441, 444, title VII, §§709, 718, title IX, §907(d), (o)(1), (2), title XI, §1106, title XII, §1225, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 41, 54, 64, 75, 77, 79, 84, 94, 104, 114, 117, 127, 131, 176, 181, 182, 192, 199; Pub. L. 109–304, §17(b)(1), Oct. 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1706; Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2), Dec. 12, 2006, 120 Stat. 2696; Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12), Dec. 22, 2010, 124 Stat. 3558; Pub. L. 116–189, §9, Oct. 30, 2020, 134 Stat. 970.)
- 2020—Subsec. (b)(29). Pub. L. 116–189 added par. (29).
- 2010—Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(A), substituted "tax liability of a debtor that is a corporation" for "corporate debtor's tax liability".
- Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(B)(i), inserted "a" after "against" in introductory provisions.
- Subsec. (c)(4)(A)(i). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(B)(ii), inserted "under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal" after "refiled".
- Subsec. (d)(4). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(C), substituted "hinder, or" for "hinder, and" in introductory provisions.
- Subsec. (l)(2). Pub. L. 111–327, §2(a)(12)(D), substituted "nonbankruptcy" for "nonbankrupcty".
- 2006—Subsec. (b)(6), (7). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2)(A), added pars. (6) and (7) and struck out former pars. (6) and (7) which read as follows:
- "(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761 of this title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741 of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;
86 earlier amendment entries
- "(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant or financial participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741 or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741 of this title, arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such repo participant or financial participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements;".
- Subsec. (b)(12). Pub. L. 109–304, §17(b)(1)(A), substituted "chapter 537 of title 46 or section 109(h) of title 49" for "section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936".
- Subsec. (b)(13). Pub. L. 109–304, §17(b)(1)(B), substituted "chapter 537 of title 46" for "section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936".
- Subsec. (b)(17). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2)(B), added par. (17) and struck out former par. (17) which read as follows: "under subsection (a), of the setoff by a swap participant or financial participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection with one or more swap agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment or other transfer of property due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant or financial participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such swap participant or financial participant to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle any swap agreement;".
- Subsec. (b)(27). Pub. L. 109–390, §5(a)(2)(C), added par. (27) and struck out former par. (27) which read as follows: "under subsection (a), of the setoff by a master netting agreement participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection with one or more master netting agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment or other transfer of property due from the debtor under or in connection with such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements against any payment due to the debtor from such master netting agreement participant under or in connection with such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements or against cash, securities, or other property held by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such master netting agreement participant to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle such agreements or any contract or agreement subject to such agreements, to the extent that such participant is eligible to exercise such offset rights under paragraph (6), (7), or (17) for each individual contract covered by the master netting agreement in issue; and".
- 2005—Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 109–8, §709, substituted "a corporate debtor's tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this title" for "the debtor".
- Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 109–8, §214, added par. (2) and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section—
- "(A) of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for—
- "(i) the establishment of paternity; or
- "(ii) the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support; or
- "(B) of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;".
- Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(A), (o)(1), substituted "financial institution, financial participant," for "financial institutions," in two places and inserted ", pledged to, under the control of," after "held by".
- Subsec. (b)(7). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(B), (o)(2), inserted "or financial participant" after "repo participant" in two places and ", pledged to, under the control of," after "held by".
- Subsec. (b)(17). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(C), added par. (17) and struck out former par. (17) which read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a swap participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with any swap agreement that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property of the debtor held by or due from such swap participant to guarantee, secure or settle any swap agreement;".
- Subsec. (b)(18). Pub. L. 109–8, §1225, amended par. (18) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (18) read as follows: "under subsection (a) of the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax imposed by the District of Columbia, or a political subdivision of a State, if such tax comes due after the filing of the petition;".
- Subsec. (b)(19). Pub. L. 109–8, §224(b), added par. (19).
- Subsec. (b)(20), (21). Pub. L. 109–8, §303(b), added pars. (20) and (21).
- Subsec. (b)(22) to (24). Pub. L. 109–8, §311(a), added pars. (22) to (24).
- Subsec. (b)(25). Pub. L. 109–8, §401(b), added par. (25).
- Subsec. (b)(26). Pub. L. 109–8, §718, added par. (26).
- Subsec. (b)(27). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(1)(D), added par. (27).
- Subsec. (b)(28). Pub. L. 109–8, §1106, added par. (28).
- Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 109–8, §305(1)(A), substituted "(e), (f), and (h)" for "(e), and (f)" in introductory provisions.
- Subsec. (c)(3), (4). Pub. L. 109–8, §302, added pars. (3) and (4).
- Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–8, §303(a), added par. (4) and concluding provisions.
- Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 109–8, §444(1), inserted "or 30 days after the court determines that the debtor is subject to this paragraph, whichever is later" after "90-day period)" in introductory provisions.
- Subsec. (d)(3)(B). Pub. L. 109–8, §444(2), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: "the debtor has commenced monthly payments to each creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), which payments are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate; or".
- Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109–8, §320, designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
- Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 109–8, §305(1)(C), added subsec. (h). Former subsec. (h) redesignated (k).
- Subsecs. (i), (j). Pub. L. 109–8, §106(f), added subsecs. (i) and (j).
- Subsec. (k). Pub. L. 109–8, §441(1), designated existing provisions as par. (1), substituted "Except as provided in paragraph (2), an" for "An", and added par. (2).
- Pub. L. 109–8, §305(1)(B), redesignated subsec. (h) as (k).
- Subsecs. (l), (m). Pub. L. 109–8, §311(b), added subsecs. (l) and (m).
- Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 109–8, §441(2), added subsec. (n).
- Subsec. (o). Pub. L. 109–8, §907(d)(2), added subsec. (o).
- 1998—Subsec. (b)(4), (5). Pub. L. 105–277 added par. (4) and struck out former pars. (4) and (5) which read as follows:
- "(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
- "(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;".
- 1994—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(A), (B)(i), struck out "(15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3))" after "Act of 1970" in introductory provisions.
- Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 103–394, §304(b), amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;".
- Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 103–394, §204(a), inserted ", or to maintain or continue the perfection of," after "to perfect".
- Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(2)(A), substituted "section 761" for "section 761(4)", "section 741" for "section 741(7)", "section 101, 741, or 761" for "section 101(34), 741(5), or 761(15)", and "section 101 or 741" for "section 101(35) or 741(8)".
- Subsec. (b)(7). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(b)(2)(B), substituted "section 741 or 761" for "section 741(5) or 761(15)" and "section 741" for "section 741(8)".
- Subsec. (b)(9). Pub. L. 103–394, §116, amended par. (9) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (9) read as follows: "under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency;".
- Subsec. (b)(10). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(ii), struck out "or" at end.
- Subsec. (b)(12). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(iii), substituted "section 31325 of title 46" for "the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.)" and struck out "(46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively)" after "Act, 1936".
- Subsec. (b)(13). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(iv), substituted "section 31325 of title 46" for "the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.)" and struck out "(46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively)" after "Act, 1936" and "or" at end.
- Subsec. (b)(14). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(vii), amended par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement by substituting "; or" for period at end, redesignating par. (14) as (17), and inserting it after par. (16).
- Subsec. (b)(15). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(v), struck out "or" at end.
- Subsec. (b)(16). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(vi), struck out "(20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.)" after "Act of 1965" and substituted semicolon for period at end.
- Subsec. (b)(17). Pub. L. 103–394, §501(d)(7)(B)(vii)(II), (III), redesignated par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement as (17) and inserted it after par. (16).
- Subsec. (b)(18). Pub. L. 103–394, §401, added par. (18).
- Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 103–394, §218(b), added par. (3).
- Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 103–394, §101, in last sentence substituted "concluded" for "commenced" and inserted before period at end ", unless the 30-day period is extended with the consent of the parties in interest or for a specific time which the court finds is required by compelling circumstances".
- 1990—Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 101–311, §202, inserted reference to sections 101(34) and 101(35) of this title.
- Subsec. (b)(12). Pub. L. 101–508, §3007(a)(1)(A), which directed the striking of "or" after "State law;", could not be executed because of a prior amendment by Pub. L. 101–311. See below.
- Pub. L. 101–311, §102(1), struck out "or" after "State law;".
- Subsec. (b)(13). Pub. L. 101–508, §3007(a)(1)(B), which directed the substitution of a semicolon for period at end, could not be executed because of a prior amendment by Pub. L. 101–311. See below.
- Pub. L. 101–311, §102(2), substituted "; or" for period at end.
- Subsec. (b)(14) to (16). Pub. L. 101–508, §3007(a)(1)(C), added pars. (14) to (16). Notwithstanding directory language adding pars. (14) to (16) immediately following par. (13), pars. (14) to (16) were added after par. (14), as added by Pub. L. 101–311, to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
- Pub. L. 101–311, §102(3), added par. (14) relating to the setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with a swap agreement. Notwithstanding directory language adding par. (14) at end of subsec. (b), par. (14) was added after par. (13) to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
- 1986—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–509 inserted sentence at end.
- Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(1), substituted ", financial institutions" for "financial institution," in two places.
- Subsec. (b)(9). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(2), (3), struck out "or" at end of first par. (9) and redesignated as par. (10) the second par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property, which was added by section 363(b) of Pub. L. 98–353.
- Subsec. (b)(10). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(3), (4), redesignated as par. (10) the second par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property, added by section 363(b) of Pub. L. 99–353, and substituted "property; or" for "property.". Former par. (10) redesignated (11).
- Subsec. (b)(11). Pub. L. 99–554, §283(d)(3), redesignated former par. (10) as (11).
- Subsec. (b)(12), (13). Pub. L. 99–509 added pars. (12) and (13).
- Subsec. (c)(2)(C). Pub. L. 99–554, §257(j), inserted reference to chapter 12 of this title.
- 1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(a)(1), inserted "action or" after "other".
- Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(a)(2), inserted "or to exercise control over property of the estate".
- Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(1), inserted "or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title".
- Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(2), inserted "or due from" after "held by" and "financial institution," after "stockbroker" in two places, and substituted "secure, or settle commodity contracts" for "or secure commodity contracts".
- Subsec. (b)(7) to (9). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(3), (4), in par. (8) as redesignated by Pub. L. 98–353, §392, substituted "the" for "said" and struck out "or" the last place it appeared which probably meant "or" after "units;" that was struck out by Pub. L. 98–353, §363(b)(1); and, in par. (9), relating to notices of deficiencies, as redesignated by Pub. L. 98–353, §392, substituted a semicolon for the period.
- Pub. L. 98–353, §392, added par. (7) and redesignated former pars. (7) and (8) as (8) and (9), respectively.
- Pub. L. 98–353, §363(b), struck out "or" at end of par. (7), substituted "; or" for the period at end of par. (8), and added par. (9) relating to leases of nonresidential property.
- Subsec. (b)(10). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(b)(5), added par. (10).
- Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(c), substituted "or" for "and".
- Subsec. (d)(2). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(d), inserted "under subsection (a) of this section" after "property".
- Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(e), inserted "the conclusion of" after "pending" and substituted "The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing." for "If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing—
- "(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section; and
- "(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after such preliminary hearing."
- Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 98–353, §441(f), substituted "Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or" for "The court,".
- Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 98–353, §304, added subsec. (h).
- 1982—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–222, §3(a), inserted ", or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3))," after "this title" in provisions preceding par. (1).
- Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 97–222, §3(b), inserted ", or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3))," after "this title" in provisions preceding par. (1).
- Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 97–222, §3(c), substituted provisions that the filing of a bankruptcy petition would not operate as a stay, under subsec. (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity, forward, or securities contracts that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin or settlement payment arising out of commodity, forward, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by any of the above agents to margin, guarantee, or secure commodity, forward, or securities contracts, for provisions that such filing would not operate as a stay under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of any mutual debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts, forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, warrants, rights to purchase or sell commodity futures contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities or securities.
Enactment and amendment notes are the official text of the United States Code, 2024 edition (laws through 2025-01-06), Office of the Law Revision Counsel, via govinfo.gov.
References in text
Section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is classified to section 78eee(a)(3) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
The Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(2)(D) to (G), (28), is act Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. Titles IV, XI, and XVIII of the Act are classified generally to subchapters IV (§601 et seq.), XI (§1301 et seq.), and XVIII (§1395 et seq.), respectively, of chapter 7 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. Sections 464, 466, and 1128B of the Act are classified to sections 664, 666, and 1320a–7b, respectively, of Title 42. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tables.
The National Housing Act, referred in subsec. (b)(8), is act June 27, 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, which is classified principally to chapter 13 (§1701 et seq.) of Title 12, Banks and Banking. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1701 of Title 12 and Tables.
The Higher Education Act of 1965, referred to in subsec. (b)(16), is Pub. L. 89–329, Nov. 8, 1965, 79 Stat. 1219, which is classified generally to chapter 28 (§1001 et seq.) of Title 20, Education. Section 435(j) of the Act is classified to section 1085(j) of Title 20. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1001 of Title 20 and Tables.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (b)(19), is classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
Section 408(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (b)(19)(A), is classified to section 1108(b)(1) of Title 29, Labor.
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