29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(m) treats an employee as qualified when she meets the job’s requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Torres v. House of Representatives · filed 2012-04-16(m)

Whether an individual is qualified under the ADA is a two-step analysis. ... The employee bears the burden to show, first, that she possesses the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements for the position, and second, that she is able to perform the position’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation “and if not, whether ‘any reasonable accommodation by her employer would allow her to do so.’ ”

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual in terms of the position's job-related requirements and the person's ability to perform its essential functions.

U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. MJC, Inc. · filed 2018-01-24(m)

The court is left with no way to evaluate what the "job-related requirements of the [detailer] position" were or whether Vicari was capable of "perform[ing]" them. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual by job requirements and the ability to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Poe v. Waste Connections United States, Inc. · filed 2019-03-07(m)

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations further provide that: a "qualified individual with a disability" "satisfies the requisite skills, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (m). There are issues of fact as to whether the Plaintiff was a "qualified individual with a disability" here.

Section 1630.2(m) requires a worker to have the skill, experience, education, and other job-related qualifications for the position.

Aubrey v. Koppes · filed 2019-04-17(m)

The threshold question is whether a plaintiff has "the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position." ... In reviewing the supplied job description, the Court is satisfied that Aubrey initially had the necessary skill, experience, and education for the job.

A qualified individual must meet the employer’s job-related requirements, which can include physical and medical certifications required for the position.

Garton v. BWXT Technical Services Group, Inc · filed 2020-01-07(q)

“[O]ther job-related requirements” include, among other things, certifications concerning “physical, medical and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements for which an individual must meet in order ... to be eligible for the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q). ... It is thus undisputed that Garton lacked the requisite qualifications to work as a crane operator at the time BWXT placed him on administrative leave.

Section 1630.2(m) assesses whether a person is qualified for the position they hold or desire.

Winkfield v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2020-01-24(m)

According to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), an individual is qualified if they have the necessary skill, ... experience, education, and other requirements of the position they hold or desire. Given that Winkfield desired accommodation as an inside shop SMM, our analysis relates to that position.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone who can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of the employment decision.

Winkelman v. Continental Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC · filed 2020-09-28(m)

A “qualified individual” is one who has the requisite qualifications to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the ... time of the employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); 29 C.F.R. 1630, App. § 1630.2(m). While Winkelman does not list the essential functions of a nursing and rehabilitation facility administrator, she alleges enough facts to permit a reasonable inference that she was qualified: she increased the facility’s patient population, consistently met expectations, received a positive annual review, a merit-based raise, and was not terminated because of her performance.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual by the required qualifications and ability to perform essential functions, § 1630.2(n)(1)–(n)(3) defines and identifies evidence of essential functions, and § 1630.2(r) requires an individualized assessment to determine whether a significant, unaccommodable direct threat exists.

HILL v. GREATER PHILADELPHIA HEALTH ACTION, INC. · filed 2021-08-19(m), (n)(1), (n)(3), (r)

A “qualified” individual is someone who “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position” and can perform the “essential functions” of the position, with or without accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). ... The “essential functions” of a job consist of the “fundamental job duties of the employment position” and does not include its “marginal functions”. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Evidence as to whether a particular function is essential includes (1) the employer’s judgment, (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants, (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, and (4) the work experience of past individuals who have done the job, or (5) the experience of other individuals currently working in similar jobs, among others. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Defendant’s burden is to demonstrate Plaintiff presents “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation,” based on “an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). In making this evaluation, factors include (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of potential harm, (3) the likelihood that harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of potential harm. Id.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual by whether the person meets the position's requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without accommodation, while § 1630.2(r) requires an individualized, objective, medically grounded direct-threat assessment; conflicting medical evidence can create a triable fact issue.

Kao · filed 2025-12-05(m), (r)

“The Code of Federal Regulations divides this inquiry into two parts: (1) whether the individual has the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the position sought, and (2) whether the individual, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of that position.” ... To determine that an employee poses a direct threat to themselves or others, an employer must conduct “an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” ... Because the record contains medical evidence which both supports and diminishes Defendants’ assertion that Kao posed a significant risk to patients that could not be mitigated through reasonable accommodation, there is a genuine dispute of fact which bars summary judgment.

The regulation defines reasonable accommodation to include adjustments enabling a qualified person with a disability to perform essential job functions and lists reassignment to a vacant position; it does not require an employer to create a new position.

Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC · filed 2021-06-08(o)(1)(ii), (o)(2)(ii)

A “reasonable accommodation” includes a “[m]odification[] or adjustment[] to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... We hold today that a part-time job-share position that requires managerial approval to create is not a reasonable accommodation in the ordinary run of cases because the ADA does not require companies to create new positions to accommodate their employees with disabilities.

A reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment that enables an employee with a disability to perform essential job functions, and undue-hardship analysis considers the employer's operations and the accommodation's impact on the facility and other employees.

Greenbaum v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2021-06-25(o)(1)(ii), (p)(2)

Reasonable accommodations are “[m]odificiations or adjustments” that “enable” an employee with a disability to, inter alia, “perform the essential functions of [his] position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... The term “essential functions” means “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires” but “does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. ... In addition to the cost of purchasing any proposed accommodation, courts consider the following factors in determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on an employer: ... (iv) The type of operation or operations of the [employer], including the composition, structure and functions of the workforce of such entity, and the geographic separateness and administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the [employer]; and ... (v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility’s ability to conduct business. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as a modification or adjustment to the work environment or the manner or circumstances of work that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the position's essential functions.

Shaw v. Delaware North Companies SportService, Inc. · filed 2021-08-09(o)(1)(ii)

"Federal labor regulations define 'reasonable accommodation' as '[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held . . . is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.'" Mlsna, 975 F.3d at 637 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2 treats the interactive process as a good-faith dialogue to identify disability-related limitations and possible accommodations, and defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables a qualified employee to perform the essential functions of the position.

Griego v. Kohl's, Inc. · filed 2021-09-27(o)(3), (o)(1)(ii)

“The purpose of the interactive process is to ‘identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and [the] potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.’” ... “Based on these averments, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that, by failing to engage in an interactive dialogue with Mr. Griego about the Proposed Accommodation, Kohl’s was the party to effectively cut off the interactive process.” ... “Reasonable accommodations are “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.”” ... “Thus, the court focuses its analysis on whether Plaintiff has alleged that the Proposed Accommodation was unreasonable—i.e., that the Proposed Accommodation failed to enable him “to perform the essential functions of [his] position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii); Punt, 862 F.3d at 1051.” ... “The court cannot conclude—even construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff—that these allegations sufficiently assert that the Proposed Accommodation prevented Mr. Griego from performing the essential functions of his job so as to render the Proposed Accommodation unreasonable.”

Section 1630.2(o) defines a reasonable accommodation as an adjustment that enables a qualified employee with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Santana v. Mount Vernon City School District/ Board of Education · filed 2021-09-30(o)(1)(ii), (o)

A reasonable accommodation to a disability is one that enables the employee “with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... Defendants’ next argument appears to be that the request to work with stable students shows Santana could not perform the essential functions of his job. However, that is exactly what the reasonable accommodation is supposed to assist with. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). If the District placed Santana with special education students with stable behavior, he arguably would have to move around less, and would be less likely to reinjure his knee or neck. The Court is not willing to dismiss Santana’s reasonable accommodation claim at his stage.

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position.

Underdue v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2021-10-12(o)(1)(ii)

A reasonable accommodation is one that (1) “enables [a qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of [a] position,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii); or (2) “enable[s] [an] employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by . . . other similarly situated employees without disabilities,” id. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). ... Here, there are no facts showing that Underdue requested a specific accommodation because of her obesity disability which impacted her ability to walk and take the stairs—other than her request to be transferred to another position which is unrelated. Nonetheless, while it is unclear if Wells Fargo initiated an accommodation on its own for Underdue’s obesity, Underdue does admit that Wells Fargo changed her schedule to allow her better chances of finding handicap parking and moved her desk closer to the exit to allow her a shorter walk to her car. (DE 91-6). Thus, Wells Fargo did not fail to accommodate Underdue. In fact, the opposite is true.

Section 1630.2(o)(2) identifies job restructuring, modified schedules, reassignment, equipment changes, and similar measures as possible reasonable accommodations, whose reasonableness is assessed through a contextual and fact-specific inquiry.

Bess v. District of Columbia · filed 2021-10-15(o)(2)

A “reasonable accommodation” may include “[j]ob restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices . . . and other similar accommodations for disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2). ... Assessing whether a proposed accommodation falls within this definition “is commonly a contextual and fact-specific inquiry” and often involves assessing whether the accommodation would remove essential functions from the employee’s duties.

Section 1630.2(o)(1) defines a reasonable accommodation as one that enables an individual with a disability to perform essential job functions or enjoy equal employment benefits and privileges.

Norman v. NYU Langone Health Sys. · filed 2021-12-17(o)(1)

A “reasonable accommodation” is one that “enable[s] an individual with a disability . . . to perform the essential functions of [her] position” or “enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by [ ] other similarly situated employees without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1).

Section 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) identifies reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, so an employer need not displace another employee to provide the accommodation.

Abdelkhalek · filed 2026-02-10(o)(2)(ii)

But the ADA does not recognize reassignment to an unavailable position as a reasonable accommodation. ... A requested accommodation is simply not actionable if it “would mandate that the employer bump another employee out of a particular position.” ... Thus, the claim is not plausibly averred.

Section 1630.2(e) excludes entities with fewer than 15 employees from the ADA's definition of employer.

Marski v. Courier Express One, Inc. · filed 2021-09-29(e)

Additionally, even if Plaintiff could satisfy the requisite tests with respect to Dispatch, Dispatch would not constitute an employer for the purpose of Plaintiff’s Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and FMLA claims, or Plaintiff’s IHRA claims to the extent based upon age or sex discrimination, because Dispatch employed only approximately ten people. ... This number falls short of the requirements for “employers” within the meaning of Title VII, the IHRA, the ADA, the ADEA, and the FMLA. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e) (minimum of fifteen employees for ADA “employer”).

The regulation defines a qualified individual as one who meets the position’s requirements and can perform its essential functions, and identifies the employer’s judgment and other evidence as relevant to whether a function is essential.

Kierl-Allen v. Salvation Army Arkansas Oklahoma Division · filed 2021-09-30(m), (n)(1), (n)(3)

“The term ‘qualified,’ with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” ... “The ADA does not define “essential functions,” but mandates that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Tenth Circuit case law incorporates implementing regulations that define the concept to mean “the fundamental job duties of the employment position” and that identify appropriate considerations. See Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... “Upon consideration of the facts and evidence presented, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her ability to perform “essential functions” of her position as a human resources director. A reasonable inference from these facts is that Plaintiff was adequately performing the essential functions of her position but TSA simply lost faith in Plaintiff’s ability to lead the Ceridian project.”

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone who can perform a job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, while § 1630.2(n)(3) provides factors for identifying essential functions.

Crowe v. Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC · filed 2021-12-23(m), (n)(3)

A “qualified individual” is someone who “can perform the essential functions” of the job, “with or without reasonable accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2020). ... The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regulations implementing the ADA identify several factors to consider when determining what constitutes a job’s essential functions, including, but not limited to: amount of time spent on the job performing the function, consequences of not requiring the function, work experience of past incumbents, and work experience of current incumbents. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2020).

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual as someone able to perform essential job functions with or without accommodation; §§ 1630.2(n)(1) and (n)(3) identify essential functions as fundamental duties and direct consideration of specified factors.

Longmire v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission · filed 2023-08-25(m), (n)(1), (n)(3)

A qualified individual with a disability is one who can “perform the essential functions of the . . . position that such individual holds or desires” with or without accommodation. ... The Board has indicated that the core duties of a position are synonymous with the essential functions of a position under the ADA, as amended, i.e., the fundamental job duties of the position, not including marginal functions. ... In determining whether a particular function is “essential,” the Board will c onsider a number of factors, such as the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, written position descriptions, the amount of time spent performing the function, and the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.

Section 1630.2(m) asks whether an individual meets the job’s requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation; §§ 1630.2(n)(2)–(3) identify essential functions and the evidence used to establish them.

Royston v. Scottsdale, City of · filed 2024-09-24(m), (n)(2), (n)(3)

The Ninth Circuit has set forth a two-step inquiry to make this determination. See Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). First, the determination whether “the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires.” Id. Second, “whether, ‘with or without reasonable accommodation,’ the individual is able to ‘perform the essential functions of such position.’” Id. (citation omitted). ... A job function may be essential if: (i) the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) there are a limited number of employees available who can perform that function; or (iii) the function requires specialization or expertise. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). Evidence of what is essential includes the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, and the amount of time spent performing the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). ... Defendant has met its evidentiary burden in establishing these essential functions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Further, Plaintiff seeks an accommodation that would effectively exempt her from an essential function. This is not a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(m) requires consideration of a person’s qualifications and ability to perform the essential functions of the position; an employer cannot establish that the person is unqualified without evidence that the disputed duties are essential.

Freund v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc. · filed 1996-05-28(m)

In addition, no evidence has been presented which allows the Court to conclude as a matter of law that lifting, pulling, and repetitive motions were essential elements of Freund’s former position. The Court, therefore, cannot conclude that Freund was not a qualified individual.

Section 1630.2 requires an individualized assessment of substantial limitation and applies a non-demanding standard for determining disability.

GRIFFITH v. CIOX HEALTH · filed 2025-04-10(j)(1)(iv), (i)(2)

The Court assesses whether a person is “substantially limited” in a major life activity on a case-by-case basis. Matthews v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2015); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (requiring “individualized assessment”). The standard is not a demanding one, and “should not demand extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2), (j)(i), (j)(iii).

The regulation requires an individualized comparison to most people in the general population, treats “substantially limits” as a non-demanding standard, and permits an impairment substantially limiting one major life activity to qualify without limiting others.

SAGI v. J AND G SPAS, LLC · filed 2021-10-06(j)(1)(iv), (j)(1)(i), and (j)(1)(viii)

When determining whether an individual has a substantial impairment, courts conduct an individualized analysis and examine whether the plaintiff is limited in performing “a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(iv); (ii). ... The ADA’s regulations make clear that “‘[s]ubstantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... The fact that Plaintiff could continue to perform her job duties with minimal accommodation does not negate her disability claim. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(viii) (“[a]n impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not substantially limit other major life activities in order to be considered a substantially limiting impairment”); ... For these reasons, genuine questions of material fact exist as to whether Sagi was disabled.

The regulation defines substantial limitation under the ADA broadly: it need not significantly or severely restrict a major life activity, the inquiry generally needs no scientific, medical, or statistical analysis, and mitigating measures are disregarded.

Ouderkirk v. Rescue Mission Alliance of Syracuse · filed 2021-10-26(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(iii), (j)(1)(v), (j)(1)(vi)

The 2008 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) “ma[d]e clear that the clear that the substantial-limitation requirement in the definition of ‘disability’ is not an exacting one,” Hamilton, 3 F.4th at 92 (cleaned up); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), and “should not demand extensive analysis,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii); see Brtalik v. S. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 10-CV-0010, 2012 WL 748748, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012). ... An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section. ... This inquiry “usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis,” although such evidence is of course not prohibited, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v); Clark v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 15-CV-0304, 2016 WL 4408983, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2016), and is made “without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(E); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi). ... The Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA or that that Plaintiff was discriminated in any way as a result of a disability.

The regulation defines a disability as a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Emery v. Opelousas Housing Authority · filed 2021-09-20

Under the ADA, an individual suffers from a “disability” if that individual has “a physical ...impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”

Section 1630.2(j)(iii) directs courts to focus primarily on whether covered entities complied with their obligations and discrimination occurred, rather than on whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Andrews v. DeJoy · filed 2021-11-02(j)(iii)

Furthermore, “[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(iii).

Subsection (j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive ADA coverage, and episodic impairments are assessed based on their limitations when active.

Dedrick v. Abilene Motor Express, Inc. · filed 2021-11-08(j)(1)(i)

The regulations instruct that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), and “[t]he fact that the periods during which an episodic impairment is active . . . may be brief or occur infrequently is no longer relevant to determining whether the impairment substantial limits a major life activity.”

The term “substantially limits” must be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and is not a demanding standard.

Watts-Klien v. Marriot Vacation Club · filed 2022-09-28(j)(1)(i)

In light of the directive to construe the term “substantially limits” broadly in favor of expansive coverage, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), the court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Watts-Klein’s impairment substantially limited the life activity of sleep.

An impairment is a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people; a record of disability requires a history of or misclassification as having such an impairment; and an employer on notice must engage in an interactive process to identify the employee’s limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Beal v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2025-07-31(j)(1)(ii), (k)(1), (o)(3)

An impairment is a disability if it substantially limits a person’s ability to “perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Beal was disabled as a matter of law when he presented his restrictions to Supervisor Perry. ... An employee has a “record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). ... Once an employer is put on notice of a disability, the employer must “engage with the employee in an ‘interactive process’ to determine the appropriate accommodation under the circumstances.” Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (the purpose of the interactive process is to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations”).

Section 1630.2(g) identifies who is an individual with a disability, and § 1630.2(m) identifies who is a qualified individual; a failure-to-accommodate claim requires proof of both.

Gwynn v. Department of the Treasury · filed 2023-02-28(g), (m)

To prove a disability discrimination claim based on failure to accommodate, the appellant must show that: (1) he is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2 defines disability by reference to substantial limits on major life activities and provides that an individual covered only under the regarded-as prong is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation.

Favreau v. Department of the Army · filed 2023-03-09(g)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (i)(1)(i), (i)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(iv), (j)(1)(viii), (j)(1)(vii), (j)(1)(vi), (o)(4)

An individual may prove that he has a disability by showing that he suffers from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; has a record of such impairment; or is regarded as having such impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). An impairment is considered a disability if it substantially limits an individual ’s ability to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, eating, lifting, bending, concentrating, communicating, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). Major life activities also include the operation of major bodily functions . 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii). ... Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). Although not every impairment will be limiting, an impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity to be considered substantially limiting. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(viii). An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii). Determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures other than ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi). ... The appellant thus has not shown that either claimed impairment substantially limited his ability to perform any major life activit y. For the same reason, he has not shown that he has a record of having an impairment that substantially limited his ability to perform any major life activity. ... Furthermore, had the agency regarded the appellant as disabled, it would not have been obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation because he did not have a substantially limiting impairment. Carter v. Department of Justice, 88 M.S.P.R. 641, ¶ 24 (2001); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4) (a covered entity is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the “regarded as” prong).

Section 1630.2 recognizes actual, record, and regarded-as disabilities, requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly, includes temporary impairments, and requires accommodation allegations to connect the accommodation to essential job functions or equal employment benefits.

Husbands v. Financial Management Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-09-23(g)(1)(iii), (j)(1)(i), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(1)(iii), and (j)(1)(ix)

A disability under the ADA is either “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities” (the “actual disability” prong), “a record of such an impairment” (the “record” prong), or “being regarded as having such an impairment” (the “regarded as” prong). 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii). ... “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and is “not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... Plaintiff has thus failed to allege that he was disabled. ... Additionally, aside from failing to adequately allege that Plaintiff was disabled, Plaintiff further fails to allege how the requested accommodations would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of the job, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), or to “enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). ... Additionally, since the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, “disability” can include temporary impairments. Acosta v. Ingerman & Horwitz, L.L.C., No. 14-cv-1605-WDQ, 2015 WL 795108, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2015) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix)). Here, where Plaintiff has alleged that the damaged disc in his back substantially limited several major life activities and was sufficiently severe to require surgery and months of treatment, he has sufficiently alleged that he was disabled.

The regulations define disability by requiring an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Arnold v. Speedway, LLC · filed 2021-11-23(g)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

An impairment is a disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Generally, short term restrictions are not substantially limiting. ... There is no evidence that Arnold was suffering any adverse medical consequences from gallstones or the required surgery that would have limited his ability to perform major life activities when he was cleared to return to work on September 11, 2018. Thus, when Arnold was terminated, he was not disabled.

An impairment may substantially limit a major life activity even if it does not prevent or severely restrict the activity and lasts, or is expected to last, fewer than six months; whether Razmus’s wrist injury substantially limited a major life activity was a factual question.

Razmus v. Kent, County of · filed 2021-11-24(i)(2), (j)(ii), (j)(ix)

“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict . . . a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). “An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” Id. “The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.” Id. at § 1630.2(j)(ix). A comment on this regulation gives an example: “[i]f an individual has a back impairment that results in a 20-pound lifting restriction that lasts several months, he is substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting, and therefore covered under the first prong of the definition of disability.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix) (App.). That said, “not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.” Id. at § 1630.2(j)(ii).

Section 1630.2(g)(1)(i) defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a definition used to evaluate Rehabilitation Act employment-discrimination claims.

Draughn v. McCarthy · filed 2021-12-01(g)(1)(i)

A “disability” is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i) (defining “disability” for purposes of the American with Disabilities Act); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794 (stating that the standards used to determine a violation of the Rehabilitation Act for employment discrimination “shall be the standards applied” under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., Md., 789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Employment discrimination claims brought under [the Rehabilitation Act] are evaluated using the same standards as those applied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990”); Plummer v. Wright, Civil Action No. TDC-16-2957, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164283, at *23-26 (D. Md. Oct. 3, 2017).

The regulation requires that “substantially limits” be construed broadly, does not require an impairment to prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity, and calls for an individualized assessment.

Munoz v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2022-01-20(j)(1)(i) and (ii); (j)(1)(iv)

Rather, the Ninth Circuit observed the “regulations add that ‘substantially limits’ should ‘be construed broadly’ and that ‘[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.’” Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908 F.3d 428, 436 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) and (ii)); see also Munoz, 842 Fed App’x at 61 (“Congress specifically “reject[ed] the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), that the terms ‘substantially’ and ‘major’ in the definition of disability under the ADA ‘need to be interpreted strictly.’” [Doc. 80 at 2].) As the Ninth Circuit observed, according following the 2008 amendment, the corresponding regulations indicated “‘[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.’” Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). Evaluating whether an identified impairment is substantially limiting “requires an individualized assessment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv).

Section 1630.2 treats genitourinary conditions as physical impairments, recognizes bladder functions as major life activities, requires broad and non-extensive analysis of substantial limitation, and may require an informal interactive process to determine an appropriate accommodation.

Burgess v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority · filed 2025-07-07(h)(1), (i)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i), (o)(3)

The ADA defines disability, in relevant part, as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... A physical impairment includes, in relevant part, “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition … or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as … genitourinary [systems] …” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). A major life activity includes, in relevant part, “[t]he operation of a major bodily function, including functions of the … bowel [and] bladder …” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii). ... “An impairment is a disability … if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population … [and] need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Under federal regulations, the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits an individual in a major life activity should “be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... The Court finds that Burgess has plausibly alleged that she has a disability. ... Moreover, Burgess alleges that sickle cell anemia is a “disease associated with overactive bladder,” and federal regulations make clear that a physiological disorder or condition “affecting one or more body systems, such as … genitourinary [systems]” constitutes a physical impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Second, the Court finds that a major life activity includes “[t]he operation of a major bodily function, including functions of the … bowel [and] bladder …” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii); ... Third, the Court finds that Burgess’s Complaint can plausibly be construed as alleging that her sickle cell anemia is an “impairment affecting waste elimination and the operation of urinary and bladder function.” ... This is particularly true in light of federal regulations instructing that this threshold issue should “be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage … [and] should not demand extensive analysis.”10 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(iii). ... The ADA’s regulations indicate that, “[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation [for a given employee], it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee].” Kleiber v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). “[T]he interactive process requires communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations.” Id. ... The Court finds that Burgess has sufficiently alleged the denial of a reasonable accommodation at this stage. ... These allegations, taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Burgess, are sufficient.

The regulation treats “substantially limits” as a non-demanding standard and recognizes episodic impairments as disabilities when they would substantially limit a major life activity while active; sporadic episodes and no demonstrated effect on ordinary activities did not satisfy that standard here.

Holliday v. Gusman, Sheriff Orleans Parish · filed 2021-11-18(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(vii)

The EEOC has cautioned: “‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... Moreover, Holliday’s own admission that his disability has no impact on his day-to-day life negates any conclusory assertion made by him that he was substantially limited by his disability in any major life activity. ... Yet even were the Court to conclude that these three episodes over the past 10 years were caused by his PTSD, the Fifth Circuit has “decline[d] to accept the broad proposition that every temporary loss of “awareness,” no matter how brief, necessarily constitutes a substantial limitation of the major life activities of seeing, hearing, and speaking.” ... Indeed, an episodic disability that is “sporadic” and not shown to occur with any “frequen[cy]” indicates that the impairment does not affect any major life activities. ... That regulation provides, “An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii).

The regulation recognizes that determining substantial limitation usually does not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis and that an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can still be substantially limiting.

Porter v. Merakey USA · filed 2024-07-30(j)(1)(v), (j)(1)(ix)

However, medical testimony is not necessary to establish that a condition is substantially limiting. ... Additionally, the Court overlooked the fact that discrimination claims can arise from temporary disabilities under the ADAAA.

To determine whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, courts consider its severity, expected duration, and long-term impact; an unsupported assertion of autism is insufficient.

Acosta v. Y. Servin · filed 2021-02-24(j)(2)

Courts consider three factors to determine whether a disability is substantially limiting: (1) the nature and severity of the physical impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long-term impact of the impairment. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)). ... However, his Complaint states only that he “has autism,” see Compl. at 5, and he must make offer more than “bald assertions” in order to demonstrate his impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity.

Listed impairments, including major depressive disorder, are strongly presumed to substantially limit a major life activity.

Williams v. AT & T Mobility Services, LLC · filed 2016-05-16(j)(3)(ii)

The regulations, by using the words “virtually always” and “should easily be concluded,” create a strong presumption, which AT & T has not refuted, that Plaintiffs severe depressive disorder and anxiety substantially affected a wide range of major life activities as compared to persons not suffering from those same impairments.

An episodic impairment can qualify as a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity when active; the person need not be limited in other major life activities.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Crain Auto. Holdings LLC · filed 2019-04-11(j)(1)

But these facts, even if true, do not mean that Vaughan is not disabled under the EEOC laws. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(viii) ("An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not substantially limit other major life activities in order to be considered a substantially limiting impairment."); id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (if an impairment is episodic, it "is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active"); id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) ("An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.").

Section 1630.2(j)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a person's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Butrym v. Sarsick · filed 2022-04-13(j)(ii)

As to the second requirement, a plaintiff’s impairment must “substantially limit[ ] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). ... Because plaintiff has not shown that these work-induced symptoms “substantially limited [her] ability to work in a class or broad range of jobs, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that [she] has a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA.” Woolf, 949 F.3d at 95.

Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities, and § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Clouser v. Hanover Foods Corporation · filed 2022-05-02(i), (j)(1)(ii)

Major life activities include, inter alia, learning, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working. See id. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Federal regulations clarify that an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity if it “limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(ii); see also Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).

Section 1630.2(g)(2) allows an individual to establish ADA coverage under any one or more of the three disability-definition prongs, and §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) and (j)(1) define substantial limitation broadly by comparison with most people in the general population.

Lammers v. Cooperative Producers, Inc. · filed 2022-06-10(g)(2), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)

“Disability” under the ADA means that the individual (a) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (b) has a record of such an impairment; or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1102. “An individual may establish coverage under any one or more of these three prongs of the definition of disability. . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). ... “An impairment is a disability . . . if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).

Section 1630.2 applies a broad, nondemanding standard for substantial limitation without a strict duration requirement or regard to mitigating measures, and treats work modifications that enable essential functions as reasonable accommodations.

GRASTY v. DAVITA, INC. D/B/A DAVITA SOUTH BROAD STREET DIALYSIS · filed 2024-07-25(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ix), (j)(1)(vi), (o)(1)(ii)

However, Defendant has imposed a standard of disability more stringent than the one imposed by the ADA as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. ... “The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). Unlike Defendant’s position that Plaintiff was not disabled because her injuries were allegedly temporary, “the ADAAA mandates no strict durational requirement for plaintiffs alleging an actual disability,” and a jury could interpret the evidence in the record to conclude that Plaintiff’s condition was not fleeting. ... see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot have an ADA-qualifying disability when she has allegedly not sought medical treatment in recent years, but “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi), and Plaintiff’s disability status is measured at the time of her termination. ... Accordingly, the record includes sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Plaintiff had a disability under the ADA to survive summary judgment. ... A reasonable accommodation includes “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly through an individualized assessment, and defines reasonable accommodation to include modifications or adjustments such as modified work schedules that enable an employee with a disability to enjoy equal employment benefits.

Samuels v. The Urban Assembly, Inc. · filed 2024-08-30(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(iv), (o)(1)

For example, as set forth in the statute’s implementing regulations, the term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting,” and “the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether . . . discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)–(iv). ... To determine whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she is disabled, courts must instead conduct a “fact-specific inquiry.” Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity depends on “the totality of the circumstances”); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (“The determination . . . requires an individualized assessment.”). ... Samuels plausibly alleges that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. ... The term “reasonable accommodation” is defined as “[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a[n] . . . employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities,” which can include “[j]ob restructuring[,] part-time[,] or modified work schedules.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)–(2). Courts “have concluded that a leave of absence may be a reasonable accommodation where it is finite and will be reasonably likely to enable the employee to return to work.” Graves, 457 F.3d at 186 n.6 (collecting cases). ... Given that Samuels’ requested leave was “finite” and was “reasonably likely to enable [her] to return to work,” Graves, 457 F.3d at 186 n.6, she plausibly alleges a reasonable accommodation with which she would have been able to perform the essential functions of her job.

An impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months may substantially limit a major life activity if it is sufficiently severe; duration is a factor in assessing substantial limitation, not an absolute bar to coverage.

Gibbs v. Tri Cities Senior Housing, LLC · filed 2022-07-07(j)(1)(ix)

That does not mean that any impairment of a major-life activity constitutes a disability. The text still requires that the impairment “substantially limit[] one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). And the duration of the impairment is a factor that should inform answering whether the impairment imposes a substantial limitation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (“The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.”); id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (app.) (“Impairments that last only for a short period of time are typically not covered, although they may be covered if sufficiently severe.”). Gibbs alleged that her “injury severely impeded her mobility, including but not limited [to] her ability to walk, run, life, and stand.” (Doc. 14 at 2 ¶ 9 (emphasis added)). That allegation, if true, could support a finding that she was disabled under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) permits an impairment of short duration to qualify as a disability; short duration alone does not foreclose disability status.

Peskar v. Department of Labor · filed 2024-05-15(j)(1)(ix)

However, under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, a condition of short duration may be considered a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). However, we find that a different outcome is not warranted here.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) is specific to EEOC matters and did not establish that a prisoner’s 38-day recovery from foot surgery was a qualifying disability under Title II of the ADA.

(PC) Muhammad v. Seibel · filed 2020-07-13(j)(1)(ix)

These citations do not support plaintiff’s threshold contention that he had a qualifying disability under the Acts. The cited regulation is specific to EEOC matters; application of that regulation by the court in Bob-Maunuel (a Title VII action premised, inter alia, on alleged violations of the ADA) focused on the lower threshold for assessing “substantial limitations” to lifting after enactment of the ADAAA.

An impairment lasting fewer than six months can substantially limit a major life activity and qualify as a disability.

Deister v. AAA Auto Club · filed 2015-03-05(j)(1)(ix)

But this requirement does not apply to an impairment that qualifies under the “actual disability” or “record of disability” prongs of the definition; as to those, “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). ... In light of the low threshold for a qualifying disability under the amended ADA, the evidence is sufficient that a reasonable finder of fact could find that Deister has an episodic disability that substantially limits a major life activity when active, and therefore he meets the definition of disabled.

An impairment may substantially limit a major life activity without preventing or significantly or severely restricting its performance, but an impairment is transitory and minor when its actual or expected duration is six months or less.

Christophe v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2022-08-08(j)(ii); (g)(1)(iii)

With respect to whether Plaintiff’s alleged physical impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the SAC alleges that Plaintiff cannot lift in excess of 25 pounds. Viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds such allegations sufficient to show that Plaintiff’s ability to lift was substantially limited as compared to the general population, and thus she has plausibly alleged that she suffered from an actual disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i) (“’Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) ("An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limited.") ... However, an individual cannot be regarded as having an impairment if that impairment is "transitory and minor," i.e., an impairment with an actual or expected duration of six months or less. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g)(1)(iii), (j)(1)(ix). ... The approximate dates alleged in the SAC are close enough to the six-month time period so as to prevent dismissal at this stage of the proceeding. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts showing that Defendant regarded her as disabled.

Section 1630.2(n) identifies essential job functions by considering whether removing them would fundamentally alter the position and by weighing factors such as the employer’s judgment, the written job description, time spent performing the function, the consequences of omission, and work experience.

Wedlake v. INEOS ABS (USA) LLC · filed 2024-08-22(n)(1), (n)(2), (n)(3), (n)(2)(i), and (n)(3)(iii)

The inclusion of the “rotating shift schedule” in the job description reinforces an essential function finding. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i) (“The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function.”) ... Each relevant factor points toward the same conclusion: rotating shift is an essential function of the Supervisor position. ... Thus, rotating shift is an essential function for the Supervisor position.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential job functions as fundamental duties and directs courts to consider factors including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent on the function, and the experience of current or former employees.

Sherman v. ConAgra Foods Inc · filed 2024-07-31(n)(1), (n)(2)(i), (n)(3)

Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to . . . because the reason the position exists is to perform that function” or “because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)–(ii). “To determine whether a job function is essential, [courts] look to the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, and the experience of those who previously or currently hold the position.” Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)); Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001)). ... Here, the undisputed evidence shows that lifting and performing line checks are fundamental jobs duties of the process control technician position. ... Other evidence reinforces the company’s judgment. For example, the job description Conagra gave Sherman during the hiring process indicates that process control technicians “[m]ust be able to lift up to 60 lbs. on an occasional basis.” Ex. 5, at 3. ... Finally, Stephanie Craig, another process control technician at the time Sherman worked at Conagra, said she spent more than half her time performing line checks and that the checks required bending, twisting, and lifting more than ten pounds. See Craig Decl. ¶¶ 6–14. ... Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that bending, twisting, and lifting more than ten pounds were not essential functions of the process control technician position.

Section 1630.2 treats essential functions as the job’s fundamental duties, allows the employer’s judgment and a contemporaneous written job description to support that determination, and requires an otherwise qualified applicant to satisfy the position’s skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements.

Williams v. MTA Bus Co. · filed 2022-08-12(n)(1) (n)(3) (m)

As discussed above, a “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). We have found the term “essential functions” equivalent to “the fundamental job duties of the employment position,” as the EEOC has defined the term in its regulations. McBride, 583 F.3d at 98 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). The statute and associated regulations direct that evidence of whether a particular job duty constitutes an “essential function[]” may include “the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential” and any “written description [prepared by the employer] before advertising or interviewing applicants,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3), and “a court must give substantial deference to an employer’s judgment as to whether a function is essential to the proper performance of a job,” McBride, 583 F.3d at 98. To be “otherwise qualified” for the job, a plaintiff must also “satisf[y] the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position.” Id. (brackets in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that “the identified position [is] one for which she was qualified.” Id. at 96–98.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) treats “substantially limits” as a nondemanding standard, while § 1630.2(r) requires a direct-threat defense to rest on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and an individualized assessment of the person's present ability to perform essential job functions, considering the imminence and severity of the risk.

Sanders v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 2022-08-17(j)(1)(i), (r)

Under the ADAAA’s definition of “disability,” “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). “An impairment need not prevent, or [even] significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id. ... U.P. has not presented evidence of the sort of conduct necessary to establish a business necessity or direct threat defense. It has not shown it exercised “reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,” nor did it employ an “individualized assessment” of Sanders’s “present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job” based on “the imminence of the risk and the severity of the harm portended.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 536 U.S. at 86 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).

Section 1630.2(g) requires a qualifying impairment, record of impairment, or regarded-as impairment for ADA disability coverage, while § 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Buss · filed 2026-05-07(g), (r)

To be disabled under the ADA, a plaintiff must show (A) she had “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities[;]” or (B) “a record of such an impairment;” or (C) “[was] regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); ORS 659A.104. ... On this record, no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff had a vaccine contraindication that limited a major life activity or that she had a record of such impairment or was “regarded as having” such impairment. ... A direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). ... PeaceHealth determined, based on the “most current medical knowledge” and “best available objective evidence,” that unvaccinated employees, regardless of accommodation, posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of others in the workplace. Plaintiff offers no evidence that ivermectin treatment would have eliminated or reduced that risk. On this record, no reasonable juror could conclude that PeaceHealth could have reasonably accommodated Plaintiff and the hundreds of other similarly situated unvaccinated employees without causing a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of others in the workplace. Accordingly, PeaceHealth is also entitled to summary judgment on its direct threat defense to Plaintiff’s ADA and Oregon disability accommodation claims.

Section 1630.2 treats working and lifting as major life activities, identifies listed evidence—including pre-interview job descriptions—for determining essential job functions, and requires an individualized direct-threat assessment considering the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of the risk.

Roper v. Knoxville Assisted Living Retirement Community, LLC (TV2) · filed 2022-07-11(i)(1)(i), (n)(3), (n)(3)(ii), (r)

Working and lifting are “major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). ... And there is a dispute of fact as to whether plaintiff’s hernia substantially limited his major life activities because lifting is a major life activity and plaintiff’s evidence suggests his hernia prevented him from lifting over 10 pounds [Doc. 83-1 pp. 40, 62–63, Doc. 83-6 p. 2]. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); Henschel v. Clare Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 2013). ... The Court finds a dispute of fact exists as to whether the ability to lift over 10 pounds was an essential function of plaintiff’s positions and all other positions. ... See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii) (noting that “descriptions prepared before . . . interviewing applicants” is evidence as to whether a job function is essential). ... When conducting this individualized assessment, the employer should consider: “(1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). ... The Court finds a dispute of fact exists as to whether defendants properly determined that plaintiff presented a direct threat.

Section 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) defines a reasonable accommodation in part as one that enables a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the job, while § 1630.2(o)(3) provides for an interactive process to determine the appropriate accommodation; an employer need not initiate that process when no reasonable accommodation has been shown.

Edwards v. Wellstar Medical Group, LLC · filed 2022-07-29(o)(1)(ii), (o)(3)

see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (defining a reasonable accommodation partly as an action that “enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position”). ... For an accommodation to be reasonable, it must “enable” Edwards to perform her job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). ... The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regulations provide that, “[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). ... Edwards failed to show that she requested any reasonable accommodation. As a result, WellStar had no obligation to initiate an interactive process.

The cited provisions define disability to include an actual impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, including bowel function, with substantial limitation assessed against most people in the general population under a broad, nondemanding standard.

Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget · filed 2022-09-12(g)(1), (i)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i)

She may prove that she has a disability by showing that she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); Thome, 122 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶ 24; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). Major life activities include the operation of major bodily functions, such as bowel functions. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii). The determination of whether a condition is substantially limiting is made by comparing the ability of the allegedly disabled individual to the abilities of “most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The “substantially limits” standard is not “demanding,” and is intended to “be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant met her burden to prove she was an individual with a medical condition that substantially limits her bowel function as compared with most people in the general population. As such, she is an individual with an actual disability.

When determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration or expected duration, and its permanent or long-term impact may be considered.

Pasha v. Grosse Pointe Public School System · filed 2022-09-14(j)(4)(i)

In making this determination, it may be useful to consider the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and the permanent or long term impact resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(i).

Section 1630.2 treats a physiological condition affecting a body system as an impairment, treats the impairment as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people, and generally does not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis to make that comparison.

Sugg v. City of Sunrise · filed 2022-09-19(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(v)

An impairment includes “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more body systems,” including “cardiovascular.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). An impairment rises to the level of a disability “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). This comparison “usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v). ... As the regulations accompanying the ADA do not require medical evidence to establish disability, we conclude that a plaintiff’s own testimony is sufficient where it would allow a jury to reasonably determine that the plaintiff was disabled under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(h)(2) defines mental impairment to include mental or psychological disorders, and § 1630.2(l)(1) treats placing an employee regarded as disabled on involuntary leave because of the disability as a prohibited action, even when the leave is not disciplinary.

Allen v. Macoupin County Public Health Department · filed 2022-09-22(h)(2), (l)(1)

Under the ADA’s implementing regulations, the term “mental impairment” means “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability (formerly termed ‘mental retardation’), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilit[y].” ... However, under the ADA’s implementing regulations, “[p]rohibited actions include but are not limited to refusal to hire, demotion, placement on involuntary leave, termination, exclusion for failure to meet a qualification standard, harassment, or denial of any other term, condition, or privilege of employment.” ... The prohibition against being placed on involuntary leave is not limited to when such leave is disciplinary. The regulation simply states that placing an employee who is regarded as disabled on involuntary leave because of the disability is prohibited.

Section 1630.2(o) recognizes that permitting an employee to use accrued paid leave can be a reasonable accommodation.

Gearhart v. The Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2022-09-30(o)

As discussed in the analysis of Gearhart’s discrimination and retaliation claims, the court views the liberal use of paid sick leave as a reasonable accommodation while Gearhart’s reasonable accommodation was pending. See Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (Appendix) (2011)); E.E.O.C. v. Manuf. and Traders Trust Co., 429 F. Supp. 3d 89, 103 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2019).

An impairment such as diabetes that substantially limits endocrine function will virtually always substantially limit a major life activity, making the individualized disability assessment particularly simple and straightforward.

Ways · filed 2026-03-19(j)(3)(ii)-(iii)

The first element of Plaintiff’s prima facie case is that she is disabled. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a type 1 diabetic and is thus disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. See Ocampo v. Brennan, No. CCB-19-2875, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11763, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2021) (explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopts the definition of disability found in the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment [].”). “Because ‘diabetes substantially limits endocrine function,’ it is one of those impairments which will ‘[virtually] always’ substantially limit a major life activity and for which ‘the necessary individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.’ Ocampo, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11763, at *8 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)-(iii)).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) provides that diabetes is a physical impairment that will, at a minimum, substantially limit endocrine function.

Renney v. Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2024-09-13(j)(3)(iii)

Mr. Renney alleges that under the ADA, his diabetes is a physical disability. (Doc. 76, p. 39, ¶ 39); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (under the ADA, diabetes is a physical impairment that “will, at a minimum, substantially limit . . . endocrine function”). Because Mr. Renney has a physical disability, the Braggs consent decree applies to him and his medical care.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) provides that diabetes substantially limits endocrine function, thereby establishing a substantial limitation of a major life activity.

Chin v. Department of Defense · filed 2022-10-07(j)(3)(iii)

As set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), however, the term “major life activity” includes the operation of the endocrine function. Moreover, the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) advises that “it should easily be concluded that . . . diabetes substantially limits endocrine function.” Therefore, we modify the initial decision to conclude that the appellant has an impairment that substantially limits him in a major life activity, and we conclude that he is disabled.

The regulation sets a broad, nondemanding standard for substantial limitation and provides that diabetes substantially limits endocrine function.

Thompson v. The Harris Center for Mental Health · filed 2025-05-16(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), and (j)(3)(iii)

“‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict” performance of major life activities, but rather, the standard is whether it “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Of particular importance to this case is the fact that endocrine function was included in the definition of major bodily functions. ... The Fifth Circuit has therefore referred to diabetes as “a condition covered by the [ADA].” Gosby v. Apache Industrial Services, Inc., 30 F.4th 523, 524–25 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“it should easily be concluded that the following types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated: . . . diabetes substantially limits endocrine function”)). ... Whether a plaintiff has a disability under the ADAAA is ordinarily a question of fact.

The regulation construes “substantially limits” broadly and below the pre-ADAAA severity standard, while the regarded-as prong does not require that an impairment limit or be perceived to limit a major life activity.

Gray v. Fleetpride, Inc. · filed 2022-10-17(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(iv), (j)(2)

“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” ... “The question is whether a plaintiff is limited ‘as compared to most people in the general population.’” ... “Considering the more lenient post-ADAAA standards and the post-ADAAA case law, a condition that prevents an employee from lifting more than 35 pounds with a restriction on pushing and pulling at 150 pounds may substantially limit a major life activity.” ... “See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (“[T]he term 'substantially limits' shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for 'substantially limits' applied prior to the ADAAA.”).” ... “To begin, a plaintiff “meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if . . . he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major lift activity.””

Whether a job function is essential must be determined case by case by considering a wide range of job characteristics; no single factor is controlling.

EASTERLING v. COUNTY OF DELAWARE · filed 2025-05-21(n)(3)

As the court charged, a jury must consider a wide range of job characteristics in order to conclude whether a job function is essential and no one factor is controlling. Our Court of Appeals has emphasized that such determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis and has overturned determinations by the district court on summary judgment that a job’s function is essential. ... The jury was correctly instructed on the various factors to consider in determining whether eight hours of mandatory overtime following a regular eight-hour shift was an essential function of the job of a correctional officer at the Delaware County prison. Our Court of Appeals has explained that no one factor is controlling and that the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Deane, 142 F.3d at 148. It was reasonable for the jury to find that working sixteen hours at a stretch is not an essential function of Easterling’s job and that there were other ways to solve any employee shortage besides mandating that Easterling, a model employee, work such extended hours.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) lists seven nonexclusive categories of evidence relevant to deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer's judgment, job descriptions, time spent performing the function, consequences of not performing it, collective-bargaining terms, and the experience of past and current incumbents.

WEBSTER v. MHM HEALTH PROFESSIONALS LLC · filed 2025-03-24(n)(3)

To determine whether working over forty hours per week when necessary is an essential function, the ADA identifies seven "non-exclusive" categories of evidence for the Court to consider: (1) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents; and/or (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 794 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). The evidence before the Court shows no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether working over forty hours per week when needed is an essential function of the HSA job.

The regulation identifies the amount of time spent performing a job function as evidence relevant to whether that function is essential.

Galette v. Avenue 365 Lending Services LLC · filed 2025-02-07(n)(3)

True, evidence that may be considered in determining the essential functions of a position includes “[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function.” Turner, 440 F.3d at 612 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) permits consideration of specified evidence to determine whether a job function is essential, and that determination is factual and case-specific.

ANDREWS v. HIGHMARK HEALTH · filed 2022-10-25(n)(3)

The Regulations also include a list of evidence that a Court may consider in determining whether a particular function is essential: ... (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Whether a particular function of a job is essential is “a factual determination that must be made on a case by case basis.” ... Under the second element of the prima facie case, Ms. Andrews’s Complaint must show that she is a qualified individual who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. Again, Ms. Andrews’s Complaint does not allege adequate information about her associate representative job duties and responsibilities. Although she presents conclusory allegations that she could satisfy her job requirements with a reasonable accommodation, her Complaint contains no allegations about the position, its essential functions, or her ability to perform such functions.

Section 1630.2(j)(l)(ii) treats an impairment as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people, while § 1630.2(k)(l) covers a history of or misclassification as having such an impairment.

Jorgenson v. Conduent Transport Solutions, Inc. · filed 2023-02-02(j)(l)(ii), (k)(l)

“An impairment is a disability . . . if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). ... “An individual has a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(l); Reynolds v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 153 (4th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege any history of impairment. ... But Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating that Conduent classified him as having any impairment that limits a major life activity. ... Merely requiring Plaintiff to follow a COVID-19 safety policy applicable to all employees does not support the inference that Conduent classified Plaintiff as disabled under ADA. ... Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

The seven regulatory factors for identifying essential job functions are not individually dispositive, and some may be irrelevant in a particular case.

Stephenson v. Pfizer, Incorporated · filed 2016-03-02(n)(3)

None of those seven factors is dispositive, and not all of them will be relevant in every case.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) permits courts to consider written job descriptions as evidence of essential functions even if they were not prepared before advertising or interviewing for the job.

Basith v. Cook County · filed 2001-03-06(n)(3)(ii)

It does not limit the court’s consideration of written job descriptions to ones prepared before advertising or interviewing for the job.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) permits written job descriptions and collective bargaining agreements as evidence of a job’s essential functions.

Bonner v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. · filed 2002-03-28(n)(3)

“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential” may include “written job descriptions” and “[t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement.” ... The collective bargaining agreement between NYSEG and its employees outlines the duties and responsibilities of a first-class gas fitter. The agreement summarizes the essential functions of the job.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) treats the work experience of past job incumbents and current incumbents in similar jobs as evidence of whether a function is essential.

Moore v. HEXACOMB CORP. · filed 2009-11-06(n)(3)

In light of Moore’s performance record and the testimony of Moore’s supervisor that he adequately performed the duties of the forklift driver position, Keown’s time study does not conclusively show that Moore was not qualified to perform the duties of the forklift driver position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to ... (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.”).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats a history of or misclassification as having a substantially limiting impairment as a record of disability, while §§ 1630.2(k) and (j)(ii) require an actual impairment and a substantial limitation compared with most people in the general population.

Johnson v. Mount Sinai Hospital Group, Inc. · filed 2023-02-22(k)(1), (k), (j)(ii)

A plaintiff has a “record” of a disability if she “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). ... As noted above, it is not clear whether the plaintiff is arguing that she actually had a disability, but in light of her pro se status, the Court reads the complaint liberally and construes the complaint as alleging that she had a “history of impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... Even if the plaintiff had alleged a real impairment, she does not plausibly allege that she was substantially limited in any major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (an impairment must “substantially limit[] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population”).

Section 1630.2(k)(1) defines a record of impairment as a history of, or misclassification as having, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC · filed 2023-04-18(k)(1)

Similarly, Morgan cannot establish that he has a record of any such impairment, as he does not have “a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1).

Section 1630.2(k) defines a record of impairment as a history of a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Gage v. Midwestern University · filed 2023-08-08(k)

To have a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity means to have a history of “a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). “The record must be of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.” Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2003). No such evidence was presented here.

Section 1630.2(k)(1) treats an individual as having a record of an impairment when the individual has a history of, or was misclassified as having, an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity.

Duncan v. North Broward Hospital District · filed 2024-03-06(k)(1)

A plaintiff has a “record of” an impairment where he or she “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii). Plaintiff includes forms and doctors’ reports about her condition, thus establishing a record of her impairment. ECF Nos. [27-5], [27-7], [27-10], [27-11]], [27-14].

Section 1630.2(k)(2) covers a person with a history of an impairment that substantially limited major life activities compared with most people, or who was misclassified as having such an impairment.

Bereznak v. Arrow Electronics, Inc. · filed 2024-08-12(k)(2)

To state a claim for disability discrimination based on a “record of” a disability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he has “a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2).

(k)(2) covers a person who has a record of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, or who was misclassified as having such an impairment.

Koch v. California Water Service Company · filed 2024-11-12(k)(2)

A plaintiff must plausibly allege that he has “a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). ... Plaintiff provides no basis to conclude that Defendant classified him as having “an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant ever classified him as having a COVID-19 infection that was severe enough to substantially limit one of his major life activities.

A record of a substantially limiting impairment can qualify an employee as disabled when the employer relied on that history in making employment decisions.

Norden v. Samper · filed 2007-08-03(k)

Even if Dr. Norden could not establish that, in 2003 -2004, she had an impairment that substantially restricted one or more major life activities, she may still establish that she was disabled under the Rehabilitation Act by demonstrating that she had a “record of such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(ii); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... Thus, it is beyond dispute that when Dr. Norden attempted to return to work a third time in 2003 she had a well-documented history of a major disability that substantially restricted her in the major life activities of learning and working, and that the Smithsonian had relied on her record of impairment in making several employment decisions. This is sufficient to render her disabled under the Rehabilitation Act.

A record of impairment requires a past or perceived disability that substantially limited a major life activity.

Jordan v. Kellwood Company · filed 1999-07-13(k)

A plaintiff has a record of a disability only after having had (or when being perceived as having had) a “disability” as the ADA uses that term. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... Nothing in evidence suggested that Jordan had a record of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Section 1630.2(k) treats a history of a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity as a record of impairment.

Jordan v. City of Baton Rouge · filed 1999-08-06(k)

First, Jordan has a “record” of impairment if he has a history of having a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his life activities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

A claimant asserting a record of impairment must provide evidence of that record beyond the claimant’s own affidavit and deposition.

Stone v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department · filed 2001-10-11(k)

As with the first theory of disability, a successful claimant under this theory must provide evidence beyond self-serving affidavits and depositions. He must, as the ADA regulations state, provide a record of impairment. Stone does not do this. He provides nothing but his own affidavit and deposition. This is not enough to survive summary judgment.

An employee’s unvaccinated status does not establish a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

Librandi v. Alexion Pharm., Inc. · filed 2024-08-19(k)(2)

Second, we held that “[a] record that an employee is not vaccinated does not imply that the employee has ‘a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population.’” Id. at 170 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2)). ... She also contends that Alexion’s policy established a record of her having a disability. ... Our court considered and rejected each of these arguments in Sharikov, and we are bound by that precedent to reject the same arguments here.

A record of impairment must indicate an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity and must have been relied on by the employer.

Drwal v. BOROUGH OF WEST VIEW, PA · filed 2009-03-20(k)

Plaintiff must show that “[t]he impairment indicated in the record must be an impairment that would substantially limit one or more of the individual’s major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). The letter relates that plaintiff is fit for duty and does not meet this criteria. Under these circumstances no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that this “record” was relied upon by defendant. The court finds that plaintiff can not establish a prima facie case based upon a “record of such impairment” claim.

A history of asthma qualifies as a record of impairment only if it shows that the asthma substantially limited a major life activity.

Ellis v. Georgetown University Hospital · filed 2010-07-12(k)

Yet the evidence Ellis offers in support of her contention that she has a record of impairment establishes only that she has a history of asthma. There is nothing in her medical or family history that indicates that her asthma substantially impairs her breathing. And the Court has already found there is no other evidence in the record to demonstrate that this is the case. Accordingly, Ellis has not demonstrated that she qualifies as disabled pursuant to a record of impairment.

A record of impairment requires a past impairment, or classification as having one, that substantially limited a major life activity.

Spence v. Donahoe · filed 2013-02-21(k)

Although the “record of impairment” prong encompasses plaintiffs who have recovered from their injuries, and therefore contemplates injuries that are not permanent, it nevertheless requires that a plaintiff at one point had (or was classified as having) an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2005).

Section 1630.2(n) allows full-time attendance to be an essential job function when the duties and staffing of the position require it.

Ross v. Terracon Consultants, Inc. · filed 2025-08-18(n)

In sum, the Court finds that Terracon has demonstrated that an essential function of the Dispatcher job is its full-time nature.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position and identifies the employer’s judgment and written job descriptions as evidence of whether a function is essential.

William v. Fort Myer Construction Corp. · filed 2025-09-30(n)(1), (n)(3)(i), (n)(3)(ii)

Under EEOC regulations, “[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (emphasis omitted). “In determining whether a function is essential to a particular position,” the Court grants the employer “substantial deference.” McNair v. District of Columbia, 11 F. Supp. 3d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2014). Evidence of a function’s essentiality includes “[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i), and “[w]ritten job descriptions,” id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position.

Mena · filed 2025-11-06(n)(1)

The ADA regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2018). Whether a plaintiff can perform the essential functions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation requires a “fact-intensive inquiry.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3)(iii) directs courts to consider the amount of time spent performing a job function when deciding whether that function is essential.

Apoleon v. Garland · filed 2025-09-16(n)(3)(iii)

Because no one factor is determinative, even if certain duties are defined as essential by the employer or mandated by written job descriptions, see factors (i) and (ii) supra, they may be outweighed by the realities of the job. ... Plaintiff has plausibly shown in both her own experience, and the experience of other staff psychologists, that there are rarely, if ever, events that require MDC psychologists to perform law enforcement duties. Apoleon Decl. ¶ 8; Schlessinger Depo. 14:23–25; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii), (vii).

The regulation distinguishes essential functions from marginal duties, requires a fact-intensive assessment of what functions are essential, and defines the interactive process as identifying disability-related limitations and potential reasonable accommodations.

Harter v. Franklin County Department of Sanitary Engineers · filed 2025-08-19(o), (n)(1), (n)(3), (o)(3)

“Put another way, essential functions are the core job duties, not the marginal ones.” Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 854 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... But “it is not unconditionally so; courts must perform a fact-intensive analysis” to determine what functions are essential, including consideration of the time spent on a particular function, the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions prepared before interviewing, and “the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the particular function.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... “The purpose of this process is to ‘identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.’” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). The interactive process “is mandatory and ‘requires communication and good faith exploration of possible accommodations.’” Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 929 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871).

The regulation defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job and directs consideration of the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs when identifying those functions.

Smith v. District of Columbia · filed 2025-08-13(n)(1), (n)(3)(vii)

“Essential functions are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position.’” Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). In determining what duties are “fundamental,” the ADA expressly provides that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). And “if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” Id. Also relevant are the “work experience of past incumbents in the job,” Taylor, 451 F.3d at 906 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vi)), and “[t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs,” id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vii)).

The regulation defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, excludes marginal functions, and identifies the employer’s judgment and specified job-related evidence as factors in deciding whether a function is essential.

Bongiovanni v. City and County of Denver/Probation · filed 2025-07-03(n)(1), (n)(3)(i), (n)(3)

Essential functions are “fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “Marginal functions” of the position are not included in the term “essential function.” Id. “In determining whether a function is essential,” courts are directed to rely “in part, on what the employer tells us those fundamental duties are.” Hampton v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 87 F.4th 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)). ... “Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to,” information concerning the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the time spent performing the function, the consequences if the individual cannot perform the function, the work experience of those in the position in the past, and the current work experience of those in similar positions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Importantly, “an employee’s request to be relieved from an essential function of her position is not, as a matter of law, a reasonable or even plausible accommodation.” Unrein, 993 F.3d at 878 (quoting Punt, 862 F.3d at 1051).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job and excludes marginal duties.

Lonergan v. Gallagher Sharp, LLP · filed 2025-07-10(n)(1)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position … [and] does not include the marginal functions of the position.” ... “A job function is essential if its removal would fundamentally alter the position.” ... Finally, the Court rejects the notion that eliminating the billing requirement all together would be a reasonable accommodation. ... Lonergan offers no explanation, nor can the Court find any, to even suggest that removing the billing requirement would not fundamentally alter his position.

Under § 1630.2(n)(1)-(3), essential functions are fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions, and whether a duty is essential depends on the listed reasons and evidence, including whether a limited number of employees can perform it.

Rodriguez v. Utah County Health Department · filed 2023-02-28(n)(1) (n)(2) (n)(3)

Under the ADA, “[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). The term “does not include the marginal functions of the position.” Id. Some of the reasons that a job function may be deemed essential include, but are not limited to: (1) “the reason the position exists is to perform that function,” (2) “the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed,” and (3) the function is “highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... Thus, Utah County implicitly suggests that, while working in the cancer clinic is not an essential function per se, it was an essential function for Rodriguez because her supervisor chose to assign her to that that particular clinic. But a function may not be deemed essential as to a particular employee just because the employer says so. A function shared amongst a group of employees may be essential if there are a “limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). But whether a function can be allocated to other employees generally may not be resolved on summary judgment. ... Thus, disputes of material fact preclude the court from determining as a matter of law that working in the Women’s Cancer Clinic was an essential function of Rodriguez’s job position due to the limited number of employees that could be assigned to the task. See Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1191–92 (holding that disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on the issue of whether a job function was essential).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) lists seven criteria for deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences of omission, collective-bargaining terms, and employee experience.

Li v. Northeastern University · filed 2023-05-30(n)(3)

Aside from that, the federal regulations enumerate seven criteria to consider when determining which job functions are “essential”: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions; (3) the amount of time spent performing the function at issue; (4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function at issue; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the experience of past employees in the job; and (7) the experience of current employees in similar jobs. Dedman, 989 P.2d at 1218 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).

Section 1630.2(n)(2)(i) identifies as one basis for determining that a job function is essential whether the position exists because of that function.

Larice Cooper v. Department of the Navy · filed 2023-04-13(n)(2)(i)

One of the bases for finding that a function is essential is that it is the “reason the position exists.” Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position held or desired; applying that definition, the court treated lifting, handling, and carrying up to forty pounds as essential to the automotive-worker job.

Tapia v. McCarthy · filed 2023-06-26(n)(1)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2012). ... Thus, the Court finds that the essential functions of an automotive worker include the ability to lift, handle, and carry objects weighing up to forty pounds.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors courts use case by case to decide whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the consequences of not performing the function, and the time spent performing it.

Hunt v. Licking County Sheriff Randy Thorp · filed 2023-04-27(n)(3)

The determination of whether a function is essential “should reflect the actual functioning and circumstances of the particular enterprise involved.” ... Courts, therefore, conduct a case-by-case analysis of the relevant EEOC factors. ... But here, all relevant EEOC factors point to the essential nature of dispatch duties for the Data Entry Specialist position. ... Thus, both the LCSO’s judgment as to the Data Entry Specialist’s essential functions and the written job description prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants weigh in favor of finding dispatch duties an essential function of a Data Entry Specialist. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(ii). ... Next, the consequences of not requiring Plaintiff to perform the dispatch duties of her position also weighs in favor of finding such duties essential. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). ... Turning to the next EEOC factor—the amount of time Plaintiff spent performing dispatch duties—this factor also indicates that such duties are essential. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii).

Section 1630.2(n)(2) makes the employer’s judgment about whether a job function is essential significant but not conclusive, allowing the issue to remain fact-dependent.

Bley v. Independent School District No I-041 of Oklahoma County · filed 2023-05-09(n)(2)

Although the employer’s judgment as to what is essential is significant, it is not conclusive. Davidson, 337 F.3d at 11914; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). Given that there were no students in the classroom, Plaintiff successfully conducted virtual instruction from her home on previous occasions, and the District initially expressed a willingness to implement work-at-home accommodations, a reasonable juror viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff could conclude that physical attendance was not an essential function of Plaintiff’s job for the 2020-2021 school year. See Pl. Ex. 1 at p. 2, ¶ 5; Ex. 3, Ex. 5, Ex. 10.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position held or desired by the individual with a disability.

Braa v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2023-08-08(n)(1)

Generally, “[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... The Court finds that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the essential function issue in this case. ... For summary judgment purposes, Plaintiff has sufficiently raised several triable issues of fact regarding whether five-day availability was an essential function of her part-time refund cashier position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies nonexclusive evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, job descriptions, time spent, consequences of omission, collective bargaining agreements, and work experience.

Gailey v. Electric Boat Corporation · filed 2023-09-20(n)(3)

“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) the written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Here, while Electric Boat could have provided more robust support for its position, it has done enough to shift the burden to Plaintiff. ... Most significantly, Electric Boat has demonstrated its good-faith view that critical inspections are an essential function of the position. ... An employer must do more than just say it is so. Its position must be taken in good faith and be buttressed. ... Given this, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Electric Boat’s opinion must be ignored as self-serving and concludes that Electric Boat’s position is in good faith.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, and the court applied that definition to conclude that onsite supervision of mobile blood drives and mask-wearing were essential job functions.

Phillips v. American Red Cross Blood Services Western Lake Erie Region · filed 2023-09-27(n)(1)

“Essential functions are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.’” Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1039 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). ... “Plaintiff’s job during this time required her to manage and supervise mobile blood drives on site. ... This essential and primary job function required wearing a mask. ... Given the nature of Plaintiffs’ work, there was no alternative job that she could have done without being masked. ... It is clear to me that Plaintiff could not perform her actual job with or without a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, she is not a “qualified individual” with a disability.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties of the position a person with a disability holds or desires.

Lewis v. Union Home Mortgage Corp. · filed 2023-10-10(n)(1)

Essential functions include “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Whether a function is essential “is evaluated on a case-by-case basis,” and factors to consider include: (1) the employer’s judgment regarding which functions are essential; (2) the posted job descriptions; (3) the time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not performing the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past employees; and (7) the current work experience of employees in similar jobs. Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1182 (quoting D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position and excludes marginal duties.

Salcedo v. Penn State Health Milton S. Hershey Medical Center · filed 2024-02-26(n)(1)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term essential functions does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (internal quotations omitted).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats a job duty as an essential function when it is fundamental to the position, not marginal, and section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies non-exhaustive evidence relevant to that determination.

Gardner v. KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY · filed 2024-03-27(n)(1), (n)(3)

Whether a job duty is an "essential function" turns on whether it is "fundamental" to the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); Turner, 440 F.3d at 612 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). The term "essential function" does not include the "marginal" functions of the position. Id. ... The regulations further set forth a non-exhaustive list of seven examples of evidence that are designed to assist a court in identifying the `essential functions' of a job. They include: (1) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents in the jobs; and/or (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Skerski, 257 F.3d at 279 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) provides the standard for determining whether a job function is essential, including whether removing it would fundamentally alter the position and consideration of the consequences, job description, time spent, and incumbent experience.

Turner v. United States Postal Service · filed 2024-04-05(n)(1)

The central determination is “whether removing [a so-called essential] function would fundamentally alter that position.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Courts thus consider “[t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function,” as well as “written job descriptions, the amount of time spend on the function, and the experience of those who previously or currently hold the position.” Id. (citations omitted).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats a job function as essential when it is a fundamental duty rather than a marginal one, evaluated through the employer’s judgment, job description, actual performance, staffing consequences, and related circumstances.

Di Iorio v. The County Of Suffolk · filed 2024-05-01(n)(1)

“Essential functions,” is “generally defined in ADA regulations promulgated by the [EEOC] to mean the ‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’” Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1996)) (“A job function may be considered essential” because: (i) “the reason the position exists is to perform that function[;] (ii) “of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed[;]” and/or (iii) “[the] function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.”). ... “But ultimately, the question whether a task constitutes an essential function depends on the totality of the circumstances.” ... Accordingly, as all seven factors weigh in favor of a finding that overtime is an essential function of a PSD I, and, “the evidence [otherwise] establishes that the demands of plaintiff's position necessitated her working more than eight hours per day on a regular basis[,]” the Court concludes that working more than eight hours per day was an essential function of Plaintiff’s PSD I position.

Section 1630.2 treats the fundamental duties of a job as essential functions and identifies limited staffing and the position’s purpose as reasons a function may be essential.

Bassa v. Alliance Healthcare Services · filed 2024-06-05(n)(1), (n)(2)

Generally, “essential functions” are the job’s “fundamental” duties—not the “marginal” ones. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); ... The regulations provide several reasons a job function may be considered essential, including because (1) the position exists to perform that function; (2) there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and (3) the function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2); ... In sum, Defendant judged front desk coverage to be an essential function of the Clinic Assistant position, and that conclusion was “job-related, uniformly-enforced, and consistent with business necessity.” ... Therefore, because Plaintiff's requested accommodation would have eliminated an essential function of the Clinic Assistant position, the requested accommodation was not reasonable.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, so safely operating a commercial truck was an essential function of King’s truck-driver job.

King v. Lazer Spot Inc. · filed 2024-07-24(n)(1)

Essential functions are “fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). In this case, Lazer Spot employed King as a truck driver, so the ability to safely operate a commercial truck was undeniably essential to her position.

The regulation identifies the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the consequences of not requiring a function, and the work experience of past and similar-job incumbents as factors relevant to whether a job function is essential.

PARRISH v. COUNTY OF DELAWARE · filed 2024-07-03(n)(3)

Evidence that a particular function is essential includes, among other things, “[t]the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; . . . [t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or [t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” Skerski, 257 F.3d at 279 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... So is the experience of her former correctional officer colleagues. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). And considering these factors on Ms. Parrish’s record, a reasonable juror could decide that mandatory overtime was not an essential function of the correctional officer position.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and identifies circumstances relevant to determining whether duties are essential.

Malusky v. Schuylkill County · filed 2024-08-28(n)(1), (n)(2)

The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” but not “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function,” because “of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed,” or because “[t]he function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). ... The court concludes that the additional duties, as alleged, were not essential. ... Further, several considerations listed in the regulations—that performance of the additional duties could be distributed to more than just a limited number of employees, and that the additional duties did not require specialized expertise that Plaintiff was specifically hired to provide—suggest that the additional duties were not essential functions.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job, excludes marginal duties, and provides that a function may be essential for various reasons.

Tornabene v. City of Blackfoot · filed 2024-09-11(n)(1)

The “essential functions” of the job refer to the “fundamental job duties” of the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). A job function is essential if removing it would fundamentally alter the position. Cripe, 261 F.3d at 884. Essential functions do not “include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “A job function may be considered ‘essential’ for various reasons.” Dark, 451 F.3d at 1087 (citing § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii)).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines an essential function as a fundamental duty of the position, and determining whether a function is essential requires a factual inquiry that considers the employer’s judgment and written job description.

Lindsey v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education · filed 2025-01-31(n)(1)

The term “essential function” is defined as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” Davidson, 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Determining whether a particular function is essential is a factual inquiry. Id. In making this determination, courts must give consideration to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, including those functions contained in a written job description. Id.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties of the position held or desired by an individual with a disability.

Cruz v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2025-02-19(n)(1)

“Essential functions” are the “fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2012); accord Brown v. Triboro Coach Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 172, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position the individual with a disability holds or desires.

Manokey v. Reliable Contracting Company, Inc. · filed 2025-02-28(n)(1)

The applicable regulations further provide that “[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). For example, a function is essential if “the reason the position exists is to perform that function.” Id. at § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).

A job function may be essential based on the time spent performing it, the consequences of not requiring it, and the work experience of past incumbents.

Yalda v. Republic National Distributing Company · filed 2025-03-17(n)(3)

In determining whether a job duty is essential, courts look to the EEOC’s regulations, which state that a job function may be considered essential for reasons including the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform that function, and the work experience of past incumbents in the job. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 762, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential job functions as the fundamental duties of a position, excluding marginal duties.

Donahue v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2025-05-13(n)(1)

The essential functions of a job are the “the fundamental job duties of the employment position” not including “the marginal functions of the position.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). It is an essential function of conductors to “distinguish between the colors of railroad signals,” see 49 C.F.R. § 242.117(h)(3), so as to “safely perform as a conductor,” conductors must successfully complete color vision testing in accordance with the scheme set forth by FRA regulations.

Section 1630.2 identifies the evidence relevant to deciding whether a job duty is essential and distinguishes fundamental job duties from marginal functions.

Pietrzak v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation · filed 2025-06-26(n)(3), (n)(1)

To determine whether a particular task is an essential function, courts engage in a fact-based inquiry. "[T]he employer's judgment, the amount of time performing the function at issue, the work experience of prior employees in the same position, and written job descriptions are among the relevant evidence that can be considered to determine the essential functions of a position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)." AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d at 919. "[E]ssential functions are the fundamental job duties of the position, as opposed to the marginal functions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) lists nonexclusive evidence relevant to determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences of nonperformance, collective bargaining terms, and the experience of current and past incumbents.

MULLARKEY v. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY · filed 2025-06-30(n)(3)

“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (4) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; ... (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 CER. § 1630.2(n)(3).”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, excluding marginal functions, and distinguishes them from qualification standards.

DeFries v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2025-07-31(n)(1)

As noted earlier, a job’s “essential functions” are “fundamental job duties of the employment position . . . not includ[ing] the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see also id. § 1630.2(n)(2)-(3) (elaborating on reasons and evidence relevant to an essential function showing). “Essential functions” are not to be confused with “qualification standards,” which an employer may establish for a certain position. Whereas “essential functions” are basic “duties,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1), “qualification standards” are “personal and professional attributes” that may include “physical, medical [and] safety” requirements. Id. § 1630.2(q). The difference is crucial.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position.

Pratt v. Science Applications International Corporation · filed 2025-09-24(n)

The term “essential functions” refers to the “fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). ... These facts establish that Plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability because one of the essential functions of Plaintiffs job was to work with classified information at the NRO site and Plaintiff was not permitted on the NRO grounds without masking.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job, rather than marginal duties.

Granas · filed 2025-12-01(n)(1)

A “qualified individual” is defined as “an individual” with a disability “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “[E]ssential functions” are “fundamental job duties of the employment position,” not merely “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) distinguishes fundamental job duties from marginal functions, while § 1630.2(n)(3) makes employer judgment and job descriptions relevant evidence of essential functions without giving them automatic greater weight.

PA PUC v. PA HRC · filed 2026-01-09(n)(1), (n)(3)

“[w]hether a particular function is essential is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case basis. In determining whether or not a particular function is essential, all relevant evidence should be considered.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n). An employer’s position regarding a job’s putatively essential functions and the formal description of that job “are two possible types of evidence for determining the essential functions of a position, but . . . such evidence is not to be given greater weight simply because it is included in the non-exclusive list set out in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).” Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 (emphasis in original). ... The record thus reflects that meeting and hearing attendance is a requirement in name only, as well as that in-person physical file review and mail sorting duties are nothing more than “marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Accordingly, the HRC did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law when it ruled that in-office work was not an essential function of Robbins’ position.

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and directs consideration of factors including work experience; applying that framework, the court held that employee training was an essential function of Plaintiff’s position.

Helton · filed 2026-01-20(n)

“Past and current job experiences” is more helpfully defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “[t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job” and “[t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(vi-vii). Little evidence has been presented on these fronts, but the testimony of Duesterhaus describing the training responsibilities makes clear that they were not unique to Plaintiff, but applied to all Drivers Facility Manager I’s generally.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties of the employment position.

McGinnis · filed 2026-01-28(n)(1)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as a position’s fundamental job duties and excludes marginal functions.

Orr · filed 2026-03-04(n)(1)

“Essential functions” means a position’s “fundamental job duties” but “does not include the marginal functions of the position.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies seven nonexclusive types of evidence relevant to determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences of not requiring the function, collective-bargaining terms, past holders’ experience, and current similar-job holders’ experience.

Gennari · filed 2026-03-30(n)(3)

In this regard, the Court has also held that evidence to show whether a function of the position is essential includes, but is not limited to: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the person to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past holders of the job in question; and (7) the current experience of holders of similar jobs. Id. at 698–99 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).

Section 1630.2(n)(1)-(3) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and identifies factors for determining whether a function is essential.

Conroy · filed 2026-04-14(n)(1)-(3)

“[T]he United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations provide that the essential functions are the ‘fundamental job duties’ of a position, rather than the position's ‘marginal functions,’ and that courts should examine several factors to determine essential functions.” Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 807 F.3d 849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)-(3)). ... Those factors include: “(i) the employer's judgment; (ii) written job descriptions; (iii) amount of time spent performing the function; (iv) consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function; (v) terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) work experience of prior employees in the position; and (vii) current work experience of employees in similar jobs.” Id. at 854, n.1 (citing § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... Here, the evidence presented raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the Plaintiff’s proposed accommodation would permit her to perform the essential functions of the job.

Section (n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job, and applying that definition requires facts about the job duties and the individual's functional limitations.

Hanchey · filed 2026-04-17(n)(1)

The ADA regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Whether a plaintiff can perform the essential functions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation requires a “fact-intensive inquiry.”

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines an essential function as a fundamental job duty and excludes marginal functions.

Sheehan v. Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania · filed 2026-06-26(n)(1)

A job duty is an “essential function” if it is “fundamental” to the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Marginal functions are not essential. Id. ... There is no genuine dispute that the tasks just described are essential functions of Sheehan’s position.

Essential functions are fundamental job duties, rather than marginal duties, and may include the job presence and service a position requires.

Davis v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2003-06-05(n)(1)

Properly understood, an “essential function” is a job duty that is fundamental, basic, necessary, and indispensable to filling a particular position, as opposed to a marginal duty divorced from the essence or substance of the job.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as a position’s fundamental duties and excludes marginal duties.

Thoms v. ABF Freight System, Inc. · filed 1998-06-30(n)

“Essential functions” are the fundamental job duties of the employment position; the term does not include marginal functions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). ... I find that in light of all these factors, driving a motor vehicle to pick up and deliver products in interstate commerce is an essential component of the driver/dock laborer job.