29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a job, excluding its marginal duties.

Rohr v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District · filed 2009-02-13(n)(1)

Essential functions are “fundamental job duties of the employment position ... not including the marginal functions of the position.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies seven factors for determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment and written job descriptions.

Carmichael v. Verso Paper, LLC · filed 2010-01-05(n)(3)

Under the EEOC framework, the first factor — the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential — favors Verso. ... The Court gives “substantial weight” to Verso’s view of the job requirements.

The regulation defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position, excluding merely marginal duties, and a required captain’s license can be part of such a function.

Kinneary v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-19(n)(1)

This Court has said that, “[t]he term ‘essential functions,’ which is not defined in the statutes themselves, is generally defined in ADA regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (‘EEOC’) to mean the ‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’” Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). An essential function of Kinneary’s job as a sludge boat captain was, by definition, acting as a captain, which he could only do if he held the proper license.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position.

Saunders v. Galliher and Huguely · filed 2010-10-01(n)(1)

“Essential functions” are the fundamental duties of a position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

The regulation identifies essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, and the court applied that concept to determine that loading and unloading deliveries were essential duties of the plaintiff’s job.

Saunders v. GALLIHER AND HUGUELY ASSOCIATES, INC. · filed 2010-10-01(n)(l)

“Essential functions” are the fundamental duties of a position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Courts frequently defer to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of a position, excluding functions that are merely marginal.

Pabon v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2010-05-11(n)(1)

EEOC regulations define “essential functions” as the “ ‘fundamental’ duties to be performed in the position in question, but not functions that are merely ‘marginal.’ ”

A job function may be essential when there are only a limited number of employees among whom its performance can be distributed.

Salser v. Clarke County School District · filed 2011-07-15(n)(2)(ii)

“A job function also may be essential if there are a limited number of employees among whom performance of the job can be distributed.” ... (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (effective to May 23, 2011)).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, the written job description, time spent performing the function, consequences of not requiring it, and the work experience of past incumbents.

Howard v. Fenty · filed 2011-10-20(n)(3)

In determining whether a particular function is “essential,” Courts look to a number of factors, including, among others, (1) the employer’s judgment; (2) the written job description; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring performance of that function; and (5) the work experience of past incumbents in that job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Given this framework, the District has not met its initial burden of showing offsite visits were an essential function of Plaintiff’s position.

Subsections (n)(2) and (3) direct courts to consider specified evidence and circumstances in deciding whether a job function is essential or fundamental to a position.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Autozone, Inc. · filed 2011-11-08(n)(2) and (3)

Federal regulations list other factors that may determine whether a function is essential or fundamental to a particular position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) and (3). Other than testimony about the employer’s judgment, AutoZone presented no evidence relevant to any of the other factors. In light of the reasons that the jury might reasonably have discounted AutoZone’s corporate representative’s testimony, and in light of the evidence EEOC put on with respect to the specifics of the chore of mopping, it was not unreasonable for the jury to have concluded that mopping floors was not an essential function of Shepherd’s job. With the chore of mopping set to one side as nonessential, the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Shepherd was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job.

Section 1630.2(n)(2) identifies three nonexclusive reasons a job function may be essential: the position exists to perform it, few employees can share responsibility for it, or it requires specialized expertise for which the employee was hired.

Willinghan v. Town of Stonington · filed 2012-03-07(n)(2)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has promulgated implementing regulations pursuant to the ADA that list three nonexclusive reasons a job function may be considered essential: (1) the position exists for the purpose of performing the function, (2) there are a limited number of employees among whom responsibility for the function can be distributed, and/or (3) the function is highly specialized and the incumbent was hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform it.

Section 1630.2(n)(l) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position and excludes marginal functions.

Coffman v. Robert J. Young Co. · filed 2012-05-14(n)(l)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job, and the court applied that definition to identify patient care, medication administration, and working throughout the VA’s facilities as essential nursing functions.

Dickerson v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2012-09-07(n)(1)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... Accordingly, Dickerson’s condition rendered her unable to perform the essential functions of her job as a staff nurse, which included patient care, medication administration, and working throughout the VA’s facilities.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the job, excluding marginal duties.

Wehrley v. American Family Mutual Ins. · filed 2013-01-03(n)(1)

The Department of Labor regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position,” but not “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... This evidence strongly suggests climbing ladders and working at exposed heights was an essential function of the job.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats an essential function as a job duty that is fundamental rather than marginal.

Hardenburg v. Dunham's Athleisure Corp. · filed 2013-08-09(n)(1)

According to the federal regulations interpreting the ADA, “essential functions” refer to job duties that are “fundamental” rather than “marginal.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

The regulation treats essential functions as duties that are fundamental to a particular position, rather than marginal duties, and directs courts to assess that question using the listed factors.

Henschel v. Clare County Road Commission · filed 2013-12-13(n)(1), (n)(3)

Essential functions are those that are fundamental to a particular position, not marginal functions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... Thus, there exists a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether hauling the excavator is an essential function of the excavator operator position, and summary judgment is not appropriate.

Section 1630.2(n) defines an essential function as a fundamental job duty and permits consideration of specified evidence, including the employer’s judgment and written job descriptions, with the list being illustrative rather than exhaustive.

Griffin v. Holder · filed 2013-09-13(n)(1), (n)(2)(iii), (n)(3)

An “essential function” is defined as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). Although not an exhaustive list, a job function may be viewed as essential if: (1) “the reason the position exists is to perform that function;” (2) there are a “limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed;” and/or (3) “the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular [highly specialized] function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(iii). ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (recognizing the list of potential evidence is illustrative rather than comprehensive).

Section 1630.2(h)(2) includes mental or psychological disorders as impairments; alleged stress may qualify if it stems from a documented disorder.

Rohm v. Homer · filed 2005-05-03(h)(2)

A “mental impairment” is “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). ... Because it is possible that Rohm will prove that her stress stemmed from a “documented physiological or mental disorder,” the court rejects defendants’ argument.

Common personality traits such as poor judgment do not qualify as mental impairments unless they are symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder.

Greenberg v. New York State · filed 1996-04-03(h)

While plaintiff alleges that he was perceived to have a mental disability, the findings of the psychologist are tantamount to a finding that plaintiff has poor judgment in certain situations. Because such personality character traits do not amount to a disability under the ADA, plaintiffs claim must fail.

Professionally diagnosed severe depression qualifies as a mental impairment, but an impairment alone does not establish a disability.

Vincent J. Krocka, Cross-Appellee v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Municipal Corporation · filed 2000-02-08(h)

Because Krocka’s severe depression is a medical condition diagnosed by a health professional, it qualifies as an impairment under the ADA.

An impairment need not be permanent to qualify as substantially limiting.

Aldrich v. Boeing Company · filed 1998-07-01(j)(2)(iii)

The regulations and the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines clearly state that an impairment need not be permanent in order to rise to the level of a disability.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) addresses whether a short-lived impairment can substantially limit a major life activity in EEOC matters; the court held that it did not establish a qualifying disability under Title II on these facts.

(PC) Muhammad v. Kesterson · filed 2020-07-13(j)(1)(ix)

The cited regulation is specific to EEOC matters; application of that regulation by the court in Bob-Maunuel (a Title VII action premised, inter alia, on alleged violations of the ADA) focused on the lower threshold for assessing “substantial limitations” to lifting after enactment of the ADAAA.

A temporary impairment is not automatically excluded from disability; its duration is relevant to whether it substantially limits a major life activity.

Witt v. Northwest Aluminum Co. · filed 2001-03-21(j)(2)

First, not all temporary impairments are excepted from the definition of “disability.” If no temporary condition could render a person disabled, it would make no sense for a court to consider the “duration or expected duration of the impairment” to determine whether the impairment is a disability.

An impairment lasting fewer than six months can substantially limit a major life activity and qualify as a disability.

Newman v. Gagan LLC · filed 2013-03-28(j)(1)(ix)

The apparently transitory nature of Plaintiffs lifting impairment does not automatically negate the conclusion that he qualified as disabled under the ADAAA standard, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (“The effects of an impairment lasting ... fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.”), and Defendants have not persuaded the Court that it should in this particular case.

An impairment can substantially limit a major life activity even if it is temporary or lasts fewer than six months.

Khan v. Midwestern University · filed 2015-11-30(j)(1)(ix)

This Court agrees with the analysis in Heatherly and finds that, based on Section 1630.2(j)(ix), the temporary nature of Plaintiffs impairment does not bar her claim here.

An impairment can substantially limit a major life activity even if it lasts fewer than six months; a temporary label alone does not rule out disability.

Mullenix v. Eastman Chemical Co. · filed 2017-02-15(j)(1)(ix)

More importantly, the EEOC regulations following the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 instruct that “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. '§ 1630.2(j)(l)(ix). Thus, the pertinent inquiry is not whether plaintiffs restrictions were labelled “temporary” or “permanent” or the precisq length of time she was under restrictions, but whether she was substantially limited in a major life activity.

An impairment lasting fewer than six months can qualify as an actual disability if it substantially limits a major life activity.

Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC · filed 2024-09-04(j)(1)(ix)

Accordingly, the temporary nature of an injury is not dispositive. ... Plaintiffs still must demonstrate that the resulting impairment substantially limits major life activities.

An impairment lasting fewer than six months can substantially limit a major life activity under the actual-disability definition.

Hardy v. D&D Management 2 · filed 2025-09-03(j)(ix)

Defendant misunderstands the requirements for alleging a disability under the ADA, the limitation on transitory and minor impairments only applies to subsection (C), “being regarded as having such an impairment.”

An impairment lasting fewer than six months can substantially limit a major life activity and qualify as a disability.

BROWNING · filed 2026-03-18(j)(1)(ix)

While a temporary impairment lasting fewer than six months can be substantially limiting ... for purposes of a “disability” under the ADA, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix), Browning’s allegations about her restrictions as to daily activities are vague as to time (i.e., when she told Hodge or what if anything she told Hodge about how long the restrictions were expected to last).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i)'s standard for substantial limits on working does not apply to Title III claims.

Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners · filed 2000-08-22(j)(3)(i)

We decline to transplant this definition from the Title I regulations into the Title III regulations.

Section 1630.2(e)(1) does not make supervisors individually liable under the ADA solely because they act as an employer’s agents.

Fedor v. Illinois Department of Employment Security · filed 1996-12-31(e)(1)

Caruso and Seiler, as supervisors, do not meet the definition of “employer.” Thus, their motion to dismiss with prejudice is granted.

Reasonable accommodation may include unpaid medical leave, but indefinite leave is not reasonable when the employee provides no evidence of the impairment’s expected duration.

Lance v. University of Tennessee · filed 1999-05-05(o)(2)

The courts have also recognized that an allowance of unpaid leave time for medical care or treatment may constitute a reasonable accommodation. ... However, an indefinite unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation where the plaintiff fails to present evidence of the expected duration of his impairment. ... Under the circumstances, I conclude that although the plaintiff suggested an accommodation to the defendant, a jury could not reasonably find that he suggested a reasonable accommodation.

A request for short medical leave to adjust medication can be a request for reasonable accommodation.

Shepherd v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc. · filed 2001-07-31(o)(1)(ii)

In this case, the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation for her disability. In particular, the Defendant was aware by virtue of Dr. Levy’s June 18 letter that Plaintiff required additional leave time until June 26 in order to adjust her medication.

A substantial limitation in performing manual tasks can be assessed by whether an impairment restricts a broad range or class of manual activities.

Williams v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. · filed 2000-08-29(j)(1)(ii)

The concept of “manual tasks” requires a disability analysis to come before the life activity of working is considered and includes looking at a person’s ability to use their limbs in a way called for by a broad range or class of manual activities that, as in this case, require the gripping of tools and arms to be kept overhead or at shoulder level repetitively for an extended period of time.

The broad-class-of-jobs test applies to limitations on working; a claimed limitation on hearing does not require proof of disqualification from a broad class of jobs.

Fink v. City of New York · filed 2001-03-01(j)(3)(i)

Their second mistake — which is even greater-is to fail to realize that this entire line of argument only applies to cases where the disability alleged is an impairment in the major life activity of working. But here, the disability alleged impairs the major life activity of hearing.

Section 1630.2(r) permits an employer to assess whether a worker poses a direct threat to their own safety through an individualized assessment based on reasonable medical judgment.

Bennett v. Nissan North America, Inc. · filed 2009-03-27(r)

We find Nissan presented sufficient evidence to negate an essential element of Mr. Bennett’s TDA claim — that Mr. Bennett was “qualified” for the position of production technician at Nissan — because Nissan determined through an individualized assessment based on reasonable medical advice that he presented a direct threat to his own safety if he continued working in the position.

Section 1630.2(r) calls for an individualized assessment of whether an employee poses a direct threat, considering the duration, severity, likelihood, and imminence of the risk.

Grosso v. UPMC · filed 2012-03-09(r)

With respect to the direct threat issue, no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff was not a direct threat to defendants’ patients. Applying the four factors provided by the regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)(l)-(4), the risk would exist whenever plaintiff was working; the severity of the harm would be high, including risked loss of human life; and it is fairly likely, given plaintiffs own testimony regarding the frequency with which she loses consciousness, that plaintiff would pass out at some point in the imminent future during a bypass procedure (see PL’s Dep. (ECF No. 38-1) at 104-06).

Reasonable accommodation may include adjustments to an employer’s policies.

Cleveland v. Prairie State College · filed 2002-07-12(o)(2)(ii)

While under the ADA, “[a]n employer is not obligated to change the essential functions of a job to accommodate an employee,” Emerson v. Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir.2001), reasonable accommodation may include “appropriate adjustment or modifications” of an employer’s policies.