18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(a)(1) covers a person who has firearms on hand or can procure them for sale to customers the person chooses to accept.

United States v. Jackson · filed 1972-11-09(a)(1)

In view of the purpose of the Gun Control Act of 1968 to assist crime control, we conclude that anyone is engaged in the business of dealing in firearms if they have guns on hand or are ready and able to procure them, in either case for the purpose of selling some or all of them to such persons as they might from time to time conclude to accept as customers.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits unlicensed intrastate dealing in firearms or ammunition without requiring proof that the dealing occurred in interstate or foreign commerce.

Mandina v. United States · filed 1973-02-08(a)(1)

We hold that § 922(a)(1) prohibits unlicensed intrastate dealing in firearms or ammunition and that a showing that Mandina’s dealings in firearms were in interstate or foreign commerce was not required.

Section 922(b)(3), (b)(5), and (m) cover intrastate firearm transactions without requiring the indictment to allege a connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Lebman · filed 1972-07-05(b)(3), (b)(5), (m)

Because, as we have held, Congress could constitutionally regulate an intrastate transaction under 18 U.S.C. §§, 922 (b) (3), 922(b) (5), and 922(m), Lebman’s contention that the indictment was constitutionally defective, in that it failed to allege a relationship between the proscribed transaction and interstate commerce, must fail.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require the government to allege or prove an interstate commerce nexus for each firearms transaction.

United States v. Garner · filed 1972-07-27(a)(6)

After reviewing the cases which have discussed the necessity of alleging and proving interstate commerce in an illegal firearms transaction under § 922(a) (6), we conclude that a nexus with interstate commerce need not be alleged and proven in each case.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require the Government to plead or prove a connection between the alleged conduct and interstate commerce.

United States v. O'Neill · filed 1972-09-21(a)(6)

Accordingly we conclude that § 922(a)(6) represents a valid exercise of Congressional power and that the indictment suffices without having to plead or prove that the alleged conduct was connected with commerce.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require the Government to allege or prove a connection between interstate commerce and the defendant to obtain a conviction.

United States v. Nichols · filed 1972-09-29(a)(6)

The sole question on appeal is whether under the statute referred to it is necessary that the Government allege and prove a connection between interstate commerce and the defendant in order to obtain a conviction. We reaffirm our prior holding in United States v. Nelson, 5 Cir., 1972, 458 F.2d 556, that such an allegation or proof is unnecessary.

Section 922(a)(1) requires an interstate or foreign commerce nexus for shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition in the course of business, but not for unlicensed importing, manufacturing, or dealing.

United States v. Redus · filed 1972-10-12(a)(1)

The “in interstate or foreign commerce” requirement, the stumbling block in Bass, is an element only of one of the offenses defined: The shipping, transporting or receiving of firearms or ammunition in the course of business. The other prohibited activity, the importing, manufacturing or dealing in firearms or ammunition without a license, does not require an interstate commerce nexus.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require an indictment to allege that the firearm was shipped in interstate commerce.

United States v. Green · filed 1972-12-20(a)(6)

We reject the reasoning of the district court and hold that the indictment against Green did not have to allege that the pistol was shipped in interstate commerce.

Section 922(a)(6) covers transactions with licensed dealers without requiring proof that the particular firearm moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Cassity · filed 1973-04-23(a)(6)

This section of the Firearms Act has been considered by several Circuits and we adopt the construction which holds that any transaction with a licensed dealer involving a violation of § 922(a)(6) itself affects interstate commerce and there is no requirement that the particular firearm in question be one which has moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(a)(1) covers unlicensed firearms dealing even when it is not the dealer’s primary business or a source of substantial profit.

United States v. Wilkening · filed 1973-09-26(a)(1)

Appellant cites no case and we have found none holding that dealing in firearms must be a defendant’s primary business or that he must make a certain amount of profit from it. ... The evidence here suffices to show Wilkening as one who engaged in the business of dealing in firearms within the purview of § 922(a)(1).

Section 922(a)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague and covers a person whose firearm sales and related conduct show that he is engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.

United States v. Kowalski · filed 1974-11-26(a)(1)

We hold that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague; that Kowalski was engaged 'in the business of . . . dealing in firearms . . .' in violation thereof; and that there is no merit in the remainder of his points.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license; evidence of firearm sales and inventory can support a jury finding that a defendant engaged in that business.

United States v. Posey · filed 1974-09-05(a)(1)

Whether Posey had engaged in the firearms business in violation of the statute was a question of fact for the determination of the jury. ... There was substantial evidence to justify the jury in arriving at its verdict that Posey was guilty of violating the statute.

For the dealer offenses charged under § 922, the government need not charge or prove an interstate nexus for the firearms involved.

United States v. Petrucci · filed 1973-12-10

It is conceded by the government that it has not charged nor proved that the firearms in question have any interstate nexus. ... Accordingly, there is no merit to the contention that the conviction is invalid for failure to charge and prove interstate nexus.

Section 922(a)(1) covers unlicensed intrastate firearm dealing without proof of an interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Hornbeck · filed 1974-04-01(a)(1)

That it applies to intrastate as well as interstate firearm activities is quite clear. ... Accordingly, proof of an interstate nexus was not necessary for conviction under the statute.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require proof that a particular firearm transaction had an interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Calhoun · filed 1975-04-28(a)(6)

Count IV charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). As to this section, it seems clear Congress intended to exercise all its power in connection with sales of firearms to ex-felons.

Section 922(a)(1) does not require proof that a person made a profit from dealing in firearms.

United States v. Swinton · filed 1975-09-23(a)(1)

We hold that Section 922(a)(1) does not require that the Government establish that a person engaged in the business of dealing in firearms make a profit, even though the “dealing” activity requires time, attention and effort.

Section 922(a)(1) does not require proof of an interstate nexus for unlicensed firearms dealing.

United States v. Willie D. King, Fred Lee Jones and Tellis Jones · filed 1976-06-01(a)(1)

Tellis Jones next claims that, absent an interstate nexus, Congress exceeded its power in enacting 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1) and 924(a), and that, moreover, the evidence established no interstate nexus. We hold that the enactment was constitutional and that no evidence of an interstate nexus was required.

An aiding and abetting conviction for unlicensed firearms dealing requires proof that the people who conducted the business lacked licenses; proof that the aider lacked a license is insufficient.

United States v. Barker · filed 1976-10-06(a)(1)

This necessarily entailed a proof that the persons who conducted the business had no license to do so.

Section 922(a)(1) covers unlicensed firearms dealing shown by repeated offers and sales over time.

United States v. 57 Miscellaneous Firearms · filed 1976-11-19(a)(1)

In the instant case the offerings for sale and the sales ranging over a period of time from March 14, 1972, through April 18, 1972, demonstrate defendant was during that time a dealer in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits unlicensed dealing in firearms even when a licensed dealer records the transfers.

United States v. Buss · filed 1978-11-22(a)(1)

The statute forbids an unlicensed person from dealing in firearms and makes no exception for illegal dealing which is recorded by a licensed dealer.

Section 922(a)(1) covers helping gun owners sell firearms by delivering the guns and receiving payment, through principal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2.

United States v. Caron · filed 1978-12-29(a)(1)

Defendant’s admissions that he helped the owners of guns sell them, by delivering the guns and receiving the money for them, are certainly sufficient to convict him as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2 under the first count, charging dealing in firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).

Section 922(a)(1) generally requires a regular course of firearms dealing; one sale is ordinarily insufficient, though a sufficiently large transaction may qualify.

United States v. Tarr · filed 1978-12-20(a)(1)

While we can conceive of a single transaction sufficiently large enough in number of guns and the price paid to constitute engaging in the business of dealing in firearms, ordinarily one sale will not be sufficient to meet the statutory requirement. The use of the word “dealing” connotes a regular course of conduct carried on over a period of time or, at least, on more than one or two unrelated occasions.

Section 922(a)(1) covers unlicensed firearms transactions regularly undertaken in expectation of profit, rather than occasional sales by a hobbyist.

United States v. Van Buren · filed 1979-03-20(a)(1)

The distinction between collecting as a hobby and dealing as a business is not unknown to the law and it is recognized that where transactions of sale, purchase or exchange of firearms are regularly entered into in expectation of profit, the conduct amounts to engaging in business.

Section 922(a)(1) does not require proof of a profit motive to show that a person is engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.

United States v. Vitale · filed 1979-06-08(a)(1)

Vitale next argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict because the government failed to prove that he was in the business of selling guns for profit. ... This is an incorrect interpretation of Shirling’s impact on the prior law. Shirling simply confirmed that a particular jury instruction on the absence of a profit motive “correctly represented the controlling law.”

Section 922(a)(1) does not require proof of actual profit to establish unlicensed firearms dealing, though profit motive is a factor to consider.

United States v. Angelini · filed 1979-11-09(a)(1)

His point was that there was no proof of profit, asserted to be essential to proof of engaging in business. The same theory supported appellant’s objections to the court’s rejection of proposed instructions. There was no error. Although profit motive is a factor to be considered, actual profit need not be shown.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license; the government need not prove sales or profit to establish dealing.

United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms · filed 1980-12-30(a)(1)

A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) does not require that the Government establish dealing as the equivalent of selling; nor does it require that the Government establish that the person engaged in the business of dealing in firearms make a profit.

Section 922(a)(1) requires proof that selling firearms occupied the defendant’s time, attention, and labor for livelihood or profit; no minimum number of sales is required.

United States v. Lloyd Perkins, United States of America v. Lowell W. Wheeler · filed 1981-01-09(a)(1)

In Williams we agreed with our brethren on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1971), that the proper focus in ascertaining “business” is whether the pursuit “occupies time, attention and labor for the purpose of livelihood or profit” by the person and not merely the number of sales. ... The instruction given by the trial court was consistent with this definition. We hold the trial court did not err in giving this instruction.

Section 922(a)(1) requires proof of firearms dealing beyond a hobbyist’s occasional sales.

United States v. Wilmoth · filed 1981-02-06(a)(1)

In order to show a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), the Government must prove the status of the accused as one engaged in the business of dealing in firearms. To do so, the Government must show a greater degree of activity than the occasional sale of a hobbyist.

Section 922(a)(1) requires proof that an unlicensed person was willing to deal in firearms and did more than make occasional sales; a person is engaged in the business when they have guns on hand or are ready and able to obtain them for sale from time to time.

United States v. Donald H. Berry, Gregory A. Stripling and Robert Walser · filed 1981-05-11(a)(1)

However, the test in the fifth circuit for determining whether an accused is engaged in the business of dealing in firearms is whether he has guns on hand or is ready and able to procure them for the purpose of selling them from time to time to such persons as might be accepted as customers.

Section 922(a)(1) does not require a registered firearms exporter to hold a dealer license for activities aimed solely at exporting firearms.

United States v. Mowad · filed 1981-02-17(a)(1)

In view of all the factors advanced by Mowad indicating the correctness of his interpretation of the statutory language, and the Government’s failure to adduce any information to the contrary, we conclude that Mowad’s activities in this case do not constitute illegal dealing in firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), and that his conviction on that charge must be reversed.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits unlicensed firearms dealing; buying thirty guns over four months and reselling them for profit satisfies its dealing requirement.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 1981-10-23(a)(1)

However, the proof showed conclusively that appellant had no license, purchased thirty guns from dealers in El Paso during a four month period and sold them for a profit in this country and Mexico. This evidence amply satisfied the definition of dealing in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant engaged in the business of dealing in firearms or ammunition during the charged period without the required license.

United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, National Rifle Association of America, Amicus Curiae · filed 1982-01-26(a)(1)

To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) the government must prove two essential elements: First: that the defendant, between the dates specified in the indictment, engaged in the business of dealing in firearms (or ammunition); and second: that at the time he engaged in that business he was not a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant engaged in the business of dealing in firearms or ammunition during the charged period without the required license.

United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, National Rifle Association of America, Amicus Curiae · filed 1982-08-23(a)(1)

To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) the government must prove two essential elements: First, that the defendant, between the dates specified in the indictment, engaged in the business of dealing in firearms (or ammunition); and second, that at the time he engaged in that business he was not a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1) requires an overall pattern of unlicensed gun dealing; an individual gun sale alone does not establish the offense.

United States v. Hooton · filed 1981-11-30(a)(1)

An individual gun sale is not a crime in itself, unless it is part of an overall pattern of unlicensed gun dealing.

Section 922(b)(2) restricts certain sales by licensed firearms dealers but does not set qualifications for obtaining a dealer’s license.

National Coalition to Ban Handguns v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms · filed 1983-08-23(b)(2)

Even assuming, however, that this provision is meant to federalize violations of ordinary zoning and commercial laws unrelated to gun control, it only makes certain actions illegal when performed by a licensed dealer; it does not spell out the conditions for receipt of a license.

Section 922(a)(1) requires firearms dealing activity beyond the occasional sale of a hobbyist; a large supply of guns and a willingness to sell and ship them can satisfy that requirement.

United States v. Burgos · filed 1983-12-12(a)(1)

The government must show a greater degree of activity than the occasional sale of a hobbyist. In this case the record establishes appellant’s possession of a large supply of illegally purchased firearms and his willingness to sell and ship these firearms. This indicates a type of activity far greater than that engaged in by a hobbyist.

Section 922(a)(1) sets no minimum number of sales or dollar volume for proving that someone is engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.

United States v. Ellis · filed 1984-11-06(a)(1)

The statute does not specify a minimum number of sales or dollar volume of sales, and courts have refused to draw bright lines specifying what number of sales sufficiently constitutes a “business” of dealing in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license, but does not prohibit merely intending to do so.

United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms · filed 1984-02-22(a)(1)

But § 922(a)(1), the substantive criminal provision under which Mulcahey was prosecuted, does not render unlawful an intention to engage in the business of dealing in firearms without a license; only the completed act of engaging in the prohibited business is made a crime.

Section 922(a)(1) does not require a pattern of sales of the same type of firearm; repeatedly holding oneself out as a source of firearms can establish dealing.

United States v. William Carter, Richard Doyle, Anthony Host, and Randy Wolfgang · filed 1986-09-11(a)(1)

Thus, in order to prove a violation of § 922(a)(1), the government need not prove a pattern of dealing in a single type of weapon. If the defendant repeatedly holds himself out as a source for any type or types of weapon falling within the Gun Control Act’s definition of firearm, the requisite pattern may be established.

Section 922(a)(1) liability for conduct before the 1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act is measured under the pre-amendment standard for unlicensed firearms dealing.

United States v. Breier · filed 1987-03-23(a)(1)

Donald Breier appeals from his conviction of five violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), unlicensed dealing in firearms. Breier argues that the recently-enacted Firearms Owners’ Protection Act should apply retroactively to his case, thereby warranting a new trial. Because we find that the federal savings clause, 1 U.S.C. § 109, mandates non-retroactivity, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

A single firearms transaction can constitute engaging in the business of dealing in firearms when its quantity, price, and length of negotiation are sufficiently large.

United States v. Noel Murphy, A/K/A Noel O'murchu, United States of America v. Ciarin Hughes · filed 1988-07-07(a)(1)(A)

In striking contrast, this single transaction was sufficiently large in quantity, price and length of negotiation to constitute dealing in firearms.

The 1986 definition of “engaged in the business” applies prospectively to unlicensed firearms dealing under § 922(a)(1); conduct predating the amendment is governed by the earlier law.

United States v. Schumann ex rel. Estate of Schumann · filed 1988-12-19(a)(1)

We join the Ninth Circuit in our agreement that the further definition of “engaged in the business” as it appears in the 1986 Act has prospective application only.

Section 922(b)(5) does not require a firearms dealer to know that the actual purchaser is ineligible to buy a firearm.

United States v. James S. Chapman, United States of America v. Donald P. Percival · filed 1991-06-21(b)(5)

The most compelling assertion of error concerns Percival's contention that the district court should have instructed the jury that a licensee cannot have violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(b)(5) unless he knew that the actual purchaser was in fact ineligible to purchase the firearm. Yet on examination of that contention, such particularized knowledge does not constitute a part of the violation.

Section 922 does not require licensed dealers to train employees to recognize signs of mental incompetence.

Phillips v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1991-10-02

Although K-Mart failed to give its employees elementary training "concerning manifestations of mental incompetence", no such duty is imposed by the Gun Control Act on licensed dealers.

Aiding and abetting unlicensed firearms dealing requires knowledge that the principal was dealing without a license.

United States v. Cummings · filed 1991-11-19(a)(1)(A)

Clearly, the trial court's instructions conveyed to the jury that Cummings had to know her husband was dealing in firearms without a license.

Section 922(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and purposefully intended to commit an act forbidden by law.

United States v. Collins · filed 1992-02-25(a)(1)

Based on these expressed concerns and on the floor debate in the Senate, we believe that the element of willfulness now contained in § 922(a)(1) was meant to be read broadly to require only that the government prove that the defendant’s conduct was knowing and purposeful and that the defendant intended to commit an act which the law forbids.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) requires proof that the defendant lacked a firearms dealer license and willfully engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.

United States v. Obiechie · filed 1993-07-01(a)(1)(A)

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), the government must prove: (1) that defendant was not a licensed dealer, and (2) willfully engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) permits occasional firearm sales from a personal collection for a hobby, but a collector's license does not authorize engaging in the business of dealing without a dealer's license.

United States v. Palmieri · filed 1994-05-11(a)(1)(A)

Section 922(a) requires inquiry into both the defendant's conduct and status. If the conduct constituted engaging in the business of dealing in firearms, then it is illegal unless the defendant is a licensed dealer. On the other hand, sales by a licensed or unlicensed collector from a personal collection in furtherance of a hobby are not illegal. Once the conduct is deemed equivalent to the business of dealing, however, collector status will not shield a defendant from liability under Sec. 922(a).

Section 922(a)(1)(A) requires the government to prove that a defendant charged with unlicensed firearms dealing knew of the licensing requirement.

United States v. Obiechie · filed 1994-10-14(a)(1)(A)

Because we agree that knowledge of the law is an element of the government’s proof under section 922(a)(1)(A), we reverse Obiechie’s conviction.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) requires proof that a defendant charged with unlawfully dealing in firearms intended to violate a known legal duty.

United States v. Young · filed 1995-02-06(a)(1)(A)

The court now holds that for purposes of § 922(a)(1)(A), willfulness requires a showing that the defendant intended a violation of a known legal duty.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license; a willful violation requires knowing that a license is required, knowing one lacks it, and intentionally dealing anyway.

United States v. Sanchez-Corcino · filed 1996-06-17(a)(1)(A)

To prove a willful violation of § 922(a)(1)(A), the Government must prove that a defendant (1) knew that he was required to have a license in order to deal in firearms, (2) knew that he did not have the requisite license, and (3) nonetheless voluntarily, intentionally engaged in the business of dealing in firearms, knowing that such conduct violated the licensing requirement.

Section 922 covers unlicensed firearms dealing when repeated sales amount to a business rather than a hobby.

United States v. Hatton · filed 1996-10-24(a)(1)(A)

The record establishes that Hatton did not have a federal license to deal firearms during 1994 and 1995. ... The evidence established that Hatton sold firearms on numerous occasions and that his dealings constituted more than a mere hobby.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license.

United States v. Southern · filed 1998-12-09(a)(1)

Dealing in firearms without a license to do so is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license; evidence of repeated firearms transactions can support a conviction.

United States v. Conn, Bill S. Sr. · filed 2002-07-16(a)(1)(A)

On the basis of this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that Mr. Conn was willfully dealing in firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D).

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license, and a conviction requires proof that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful.

United States v. Fridley · filed 2002-08-06(a)(1)(A)

It is unlawful for any person except a licensed dealer to “engage in the business” of dealing in firearms. ... In order to support a conviction for dealing in firearms without a license, the government must show that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) permits a finding of unlicensed firearms dealing based on a person's readiness and ability to procure weapons for resale, even when the evidence arguably shows only one sale.

United States v. Shan · filed 2003-10-28(a)(1)(A)

Although the Government provided evidence of the sale of weapons—arguably in only one transaction—it also submitted evidence of Shan’s disposition as a person “ready and able to procure” additional weapons.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license, and repeated sales supported the conviction here.

United States v. Kubowski · filed 2003-12-30(a)(1)(A)

Only a federally licensed dealer may engage in the “business of selling firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1). ... “After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,” we conclude that a rational trier of the facts could have found, as the jury did, that the essential elements of the crime charged in Count 1 were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the record supports Defendant’s conviction on Count 1.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license; repeated sales for profit can support probable cause of a violation.

United States v. Fifty-Two Firearms · filed 2005-02-10(a)(1)

There is probable cause to believe that the 52 firearms are subject to civil forfeiture because Holt was dealing in firearms without a federal license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).

Section 922(a)(1)(A) supports a conviction when the evidence permits a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant dealt in firearms without a license.

United States v. Paye · filed 2005-04-26(a)(1)(A)

From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Woods was guilty of dealing in firearms without a federal license.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) treats a federally licensed firearms dealer as unlicensed when the dealer conducts business outside the locations covered by the license without other federal authorization.

United States v. Ogles · filed 2005-04-27(a)(1)(A)

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that to the extent an otherwise federally licensed firearms dealer conducts business at loca- tions not specified on his or her license and in a manner not otherwise authorized by federal law, he or she exceeds the scope of his or her license and acts as an unlicensed dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not make a federal firearms dealer’s license location-specific.

United States v. Ogles · filed 2006-03-09(a)(1)(A)

The district court properly understood the statute. See Caldwell, 49 F.3d at 252 (holding that a gun dealer’s license under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) is not location-specific). In this respect, we agree with Judge Rymer’s dissent in the three-judge panel opinion concerning the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922. Ogles, 406 F.3d at 598-600 (Rymer, J., dissenting). If the government believes that additional conduct should be penalized, then its remedy lies with Congress, not with the courts.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits a person from engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal firearms license.

United States v. White · filed 2006-04-14(a)(1)(A)

Section 922(a)(1) of title 18 U.S.C. provides, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful “for any person, except a ... licensed dealer, to engage in the business of ... dealing in firearms.” Section 921(a)(11) explains that a “dealer” is “any person engaged in the business of selling firearms ... at wholesale or retail.”

Section 922(b)(3) applies to licensed collectors selling firearms other than curios and relics.

United States v. Brown · filed 2006-06-16(b)(3)

Section 922(b)(3) forbids “any ... licensed collector to sell ... any firearm.” The plain language does not limit the statute’s application only when a licensed collector sells curios and relics.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not require a person dealing in firearms without a license to know that a buyer has a felony conviction or pending felony charge.

United States v. McConnel · filed 2006-09-25(a)(1)(A)

The nature of these counts requires us to analyze the issue separately as to Count 1, which charged dealing in firearms without a license, and as to Counts 2 and 3, which charged that defendant on separate occasions had sold firearms to Schuppan, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that Schuppan had been previously convicted of a felony or was under indictment for a felony. As to Count 1, such knowledge is not an element of the offense of dealing in firearms without a license, and thus a deliberate ignorance instruction would be, on its face, inapplicable to that count.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits unlicensed firearms dealing, including a regular course of selling others’ firearms and retaining the proceeds.

United States v. Harmon Strunk, Jr. · filed 2014-01-14(a)(1)(A)

To convict a defendant of illegally ... dealing in firearms, the Government must prove that he was not a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer of firearms and that he wilfully engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) covers unlicensed firearms brokers who hold themselves out as sources of firearms.

United States v. Ochoa · filed 2018-06-14(a)(1)(A)

On the contrary, § 922(a)(1)(A) reaches those who hold themselves out as sources of firearms.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not require firearms sales to be the defendant’s primary source of income.

United States v. McGowan · filed 2018-08-20(a)(1)(A)

Selling firearms need not have been McGowan’s primary source of income.

Section 922(g)(5) does not require proof that a person acted willfully or with specific intent in possessing a firearm.

United States v. Mendoza · filed 2016-09-30(g)(5)

First, a § 922(g)(5) offense is not a specific intent crime.

Section 922(k) requires knowledge that a possessed firearm has an obliterated serial number, and §922(o) requires knowledge that a possessed weapon is a machine gun.

United States v. Cobbs · filed 2007-05-25(k), (o)

This offense requires knowledge on the part of the defendant that the firearm he possessed had an obliterated serial number. ... The government must show that Cobbs was aware that the weapon was a machine gun. ... Cobbs’s convictions for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number and a machine gun are supported by the evidence.

Section 922(k) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. McCowan · filed 2006-11-01(k)

To prove a violation under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), the government must show, among other elements, that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence allows a reasonable jury to find that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Nevarez-Sanchez · filed 2006-04-10(g)(1)

This evidence, combined with the trial testimony of the vehicle's owner that he did not own a firearm or keep one in the vehicle and the testimony of Nevarez-Sanchez which conflicted with his prior statements to Okamoto, is sufficient to sustain his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Jasper Moore · filed 2006-04-05(g)(1)

Similar to the facts in Taylor, the charge at issue here was a § 922(g)(1) offense; the government, therefore, had the burden of proving that Moore knowingly possessed a firearm.

Officer testimony identifying a felon as possessing a gun can support a § 922(g)(1) conviction even when the gun has no fingerprints.

United States v. Henderson · filed 2006-03-30(g)(1)

As the district court found, both officers actually identified Henderson as possessing a gun, although only Jones testified that he saw Henderson handling the gun. Although Henderson also argues that there were no fingerprints on the gun, the lack of fingerprints on the gun does not negate the officers’ testimony.

Evidence of firearm possession, a stipulated prior felony conviction, and manufacture outside the state can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Cook · filed 2006-03-31(g)(1)

The parties also stipulated that Cook had previously been convicted of a felony in New Jersey state court and that the two firearms at issue—the Bryce .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol and the Mossberg 500C 20-gauge shotgun—had been made outside of New York State. ... This evidence clearly permitted a rational jury to find Cook guilty of each of the above offenses.

Section 922(g)(1) does not make the drug or violent nature of a prior felony conviction an element of the offense.

United States v. Dunlap · filed 2005-11-17(g)(1)

However, Dunlap’s prior convictions for drug or violent crimes are not elements of the § 922(g)(1) offense.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires that an illegal alien knowingly possess a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce; possession may be actual or constructive.

United States v. Aleman-Ramos · filed 2005-11-28(g)(5)(A)

The elements for conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) are: (1) the defendant was an illegal alien, (2) who knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. The first and third elements are not in dispute. The second element, knowing possession, may be sustained by evidence of “either actual or constructive possession.” Arnold, 410 F.3d at 904.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm but does not require proof that the defendant knew firearm possession was prohibited.

United States v. Griffin · filed 2004-11-17(g)(1)

Conviction under § 922(g)(1) therefore does not require proof that a defendant knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant specifically intended to own the firearm.

United States v. Singh · filed 2004-07-29(g)

Singh was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which contains no scienter requirement; ergo, the government did not have to show that Singh specifically intended to own the gun in question.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from knowingly possessing a firearm and does not require separate proof of intent.

United States v. Linares, Harold · filed 2004-05-18(g)(1)

Although Rule 404(b) lists intent as one of the purposes for which other-acts evidence may be admissible, the New Haven evidence was inadmissible for that purpose because under section 922(g)(1), the government had no obligation to prove intent. That section makes it unlawful for felons to possess a firearm knowingly. It says nothing about intent.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require a firearm buyer to know the legal definition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

United States v. Rodriguez-Deharo · filed 2002-03-14(a)(6)

The false application for purchase of a firearm statute does not contain a requirement that the defendant “know” the legal definition of a crime of domestic violence.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of the legally relevant facts, but not knowledge that federal law prohibits firearm possession.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2002-03-26(g)(1)

However, the required mens rea for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not knowledge of the law but merely of the legally relevant facts.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful.

United States v. Howard · filed 2001-11-16(g)

Defendant’s knowledge of the unlawful nature of his acts is not an element of a § 922(g) offense.

Section 922(g)(1)’s intent element is adequately conveyed in a charging document that says the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Parker · filed 2001-03-12(g)(1)

The information, which charges that Parker “willfully and unlawfully” kidnapped the victim, “willfully transported [her] in interstate commerce,” and “knowingly possessed] a firearm,” accurately conveys the statutory elements of the offenses to which Parker was pleading.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved with evidence of drug trafficking close in time and place to the firearms.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2001-03-09(g)(1)

We hold, however, that the evidence of his drug trafficking was in sufficiently close proximity, temporally and physically, to be relevant to proving that he knowingly possessed the weapons. The fact that Thomas was engaged in selling crack from his home is relevant evidence from which to infer that he knowingly possessed rifles found in the closet of that home and in his truck parked in the driveway of that home.

Section 922(g)’s possession element may be proved by evidence of actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Larry Jack Nation · filed 2001-03-16(g)

The only issue before the jury in this case was whether Nation knowingly possessed the firearm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence introduced at trial proved that police located the firearm in an open armoire in Nation’s bedroom. The gun itself was in an open case, and numerous letters addressed to Nation were located in the room. This evidence, in addition to testimony suggesting that Nation initially asked Wright to obtain the gun, is sufficient to establish either actual or constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; drug trafficking close in time and place to the firearm may help prove that element.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2001-02-23(g)(1)

We hold, however, that the evidence of his drug trafficking was in sufficiently close proximity, temporally and physically, to be relevant to proving that he knowingly possessed the weapons.

Section 922(g)(8) does not require proof that a person subject to a domestic violence order knew of the firearm prohibition.

United States v. Napier · filed 2000-11-21(g)(8)

His status alone, as one subject to a domestic violence order, was sufficient to preclude him from claiming a lack of fair warning with respect to the requirements of § 922(g)(8).

Section 922(g)(9) does not require proof that a defendant knew the statute prohibited firearm possession.

United States v. Hancock · filed 2000-10-26(g)(9)

Consistent with Pasillas-Gaytan, we decline to read the element of actual knowledge of the statute into 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knew its serial number had been removed or obliterated.

United States v. King · filed 2000-09-11(k)

The district court instructed the jury that to convict King of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), the government was required to prove several elements, one of which was that King knowingly possessed a firearm and was aware that the serial number on that firearm had been removed or obliterated. ... We are satisfied that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to sustain King’s conviction for knowingly receiving and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number.

Section 922(g)(4) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but not that he knew the possession was wrongful or unlawful.

United States v. Lamb · filed 1998-07-23(g)(4)

The district court correctly reasoned that, to establish mens rea for the violation of section 922(g), the government needed to prove only that Lamb knew he was in possession of a firearm, and not that he knew that such possession was wrongful or unlawful.

Section 922(g)(5) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Velasquez-Tello · filed 1998-01-07(g)(5)

Similarly, for his two remaining firearms convictions, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (illegal alien in possession of a firearm) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (possession of an unregistered firearm), the government was required to prove Mr. Velasquez "knowingly" possessed the shotgun.

A conviction for a willful violation of § 922(a)(5) requires knowledge of the law.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 1997-12-31(a)(5)

Thus, we find that knowledge of the law is required for a conviction under §§ 922(a)(5) and 924(a)(1)(D).

When a firearm’s type determines whether a prior conviction counts under § 922(g)(1), the jury must be instructed that the defendant knew the facts giving the firearm its disqualifying character.

United States v. Tomlinson · filed 1995-10-23(g)(1)

For purposes of a Sec. 922(g)(1) prosecution, when a defendant's status as a convicted felon turns on the possession of a particular type of firearm, a jury must be instructed that a defendant is not a convicted felon if, despite possessing such a firearm, he did not know it had the particular nature on which his "convicted" status turns. We emphasize, however, that this does not mean knowledge that, as a matter of law, the firearm was, as defined in the North Carolina statute, a "weapon of mass death and destruction," but only knowledge of those facts that bring the firearm within that legal definition.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a felon knew the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Privett · filed 1995-10-16(g)(1)

We follow the Fourth Circuit’s view that Dancy is still good law, and hold that the government does not have to prove that a felon knew a firearm was in or affected interstate commerce to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(n) requires proof that a person receiving a firearm knew they were under indictment.

United States v. Forbes · filed 1995-09-13(n)

The defendant must have knowledge of the fact or facts that convert this innocent act into a crime. Here, that fact is the existence of a pending indictment.

Section 922(n) requires proof that the defendant knew or deliberately disregarded being under an indictment or information and knew the firearm purchase was unlawful.

United States v. Hayden · filed 1995-08-28(n)

In sum, the government must prove Hayden knew or deliberately disregarded the fact that he was under an ... information and that his purchase of a firearm was unlawful.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant knew possessing a firearm was unlawful.

United States v. Kevin R. Dockter, Also Known as Kevin R. Docktor, United States of America v. Floyd Wesley Shulze · filed 1995-08-22(g)

Section 922(g) is not one of those rare statutes which requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was violating the law when his actions violative of the statute were accomplished.

Section 922(g) does not require a felon to know the possessed firearm was a machine gun.

United States v. Scrivner · filed 1995-07-06(g)

Under section 5845 the fact that the gun was fully automatic was relevant, while in this case, the gun was illegally possessed not because of the type of gun it was, but because Scrivner was a convicted felon possessing any gun. Therefore, Staples is not determinative in this case and the jury instruction was proper.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant knew the weapon had the characteristics of a machinegun.

United States v. Heavilin · filed 1995-07-05(o)

Taken as a whole, these instructions stated that the defendant must have knowingly possessed an item falling within the statutory definition of a machinegun.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Mara Kirsh & Joseph Kirsh · filed 1995-05-17(g)(1)

A defendant’s knowledge or ignorance of the interstate nexus is irrelevant.

Section 922(g) does not require the government to prove that the defendant intended to violate federal firearms law.

United States v. Indelicato · filed 1995-05-02(g)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), however, there is no requirement that the government prove an intent to violate the law.

Section 922(o) requires the defendant to know the features that make the possessed item a machinegun, but does not require knowledge that possession is illegal.

United States v. Woodbridge · filed 1995-04-13(o)

Taken as a whole, the instructions properly stated that the defendant must have knowingly possessed an item falling within the statutory definition of machinegun--i.e., an item possessing the "features" of a machinegun. Defendant's suggestion that he must also have known of the illegality of his conduct is nothing more than an argument that his ignorance of the law should have excused him from liability.

Section 922(a)(6) requires knowledge of a false statement, and ignorance of the cited firearms prohibitions can negate that element.

United States v. Squires · filed 1971-03-25(a)(6)

Inasmuch as knowledge is a specific element of the crime proscribed by 922(a) (6), the maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no defense' has no relevance here with reference to Squires's purported ignorance of the provisions of Chapter 44 of Title 18 and of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that a defendant knew a transported starter gun could be converted to fire a projectile.

United States v. Robert Julian Quiroz, United States of America v. William Henry Alsup · filed 1971-10-06(g)

The statute violated by the appellants, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), does not contain a scienter element. It was not necessary to allege or prove that the appellant Alsup knew the .22 caliber starter gun could be converted so as to fire a projectile.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a person knew transporting ammunition in interstate commerce was wrongful.

United States v. Ezio Giannini and Charlotte Giannini · filed 1972-01-27(g)(1)

Although appellants do not fully define “specific intent” with respect to either statute, they argue that as to both offenses the statutes should be read to require knowledge that the doing of the proscribed acts was wrongful. ... The language of these statutes, together with the judicial gloss added to statutes that are a part of the same legislative scheme, leaves no room for the appellants’ construction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the Gun Control Act prohibited interstate firearm transportation.

United States v. Weiler · filed 1972-04-12(g)(1)

In short, we construe Section 922(g) (1) as a Congressional determination (1) that the transportation of firearms in interstate commerce by persons previously convicted of, or charged with, serious crime presents a serious hazard to the public welfare without regard to whether the one doing the transporting knows of the Gun Control Act, and (2) that criminal sanctions are an appropriate way to cope with the problem.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a person knowingly made a false statement, but does not require proof that the person knew the statement violated the law.

Cody v. United States · filed 1972-05-10(a)(6)

Section 922(a) (6) does not require a showing that appellant “knowingly” violated the law; it simply requires proof that appellant “knowingly” made a false statement.

Section 922(a)(3) does not require the scienter needed for a false statement offense under § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Robert Jones, Jr. · filed 1973-07-03(a)(3)

There is no comparable element of scienter required under 18 U.S. C. § 922(a)(3), the applicable statute here.

Section 922(a)(6) allows a buyer’s knowledge that a firearm purchase statement is false to be proved through circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Garcia · filed 1973-05-31(a)(6)

Proof of knowingly making a false statement is necessarily circumstantial in the great majority of cases. In this case the trier of fact, presented with the evidence we have described, could conclude beyond reasonable doubt that appellant’s statements were knowingly false although he testified that he only misunderstood.

Section 922(h)(1) requires proof that a person receiving firearms while under indictment knew the indictment was pending.

United States v. Renner · filed 1974-05-29(h)(1)

Such instruction was error. The jury should have been' instructed to consider Renner’s knowledge of the indictment as an element of the alleged § 922(h)(1) violations.

Section 922(m) is directed at intentional recordkeeping violations by licensed firearms dealers.

Rich v. United States · filed 1974-06-06(m)

The thrust of § 922(m) dealing with sales and record-keeping by licensed dealers is clearly directed at intentional violations.

Section 922(a)(1) does not require proof that a person dealing in firearms knew the conduct was unlawful.

The United States v. Powell · filed 1975-04-21(a)(1)

Specific intent or knowledge of the defendant that he is violating the law is not an essential element of the crime of unlawful firearms dealing under section 922(a)(1).

Section 922(a)(6)’s knowledge requirement can be met by reckless disregard for the truth and a conscious purpose to avoid learning it.

United States v. Wright · filed 1976-06-22(a)(6)

But this scienter requirement can be met when there is a reckless disregard as to the truth of the statements to which one subscribes and when there is a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearms dealer was federally licensed.

United States v. Green · filed 1976-11-17(a)(6)

We affirm the conviction, because knowledge that the dealer has a federal license is not an essential element of the crime. The fact that the dealer was licensed serves only to establish a basis for federal jurisdiction.

Section 922(h) does not make ignorance of the law a defense to a prosecution for receiving a firearm.

United States v. Turcotte · filed 1977-07-19(h)

Congress did not make ignorance of the law a defense in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), cf. 18 U.S.C. § 922(f), and Congress will not be presumed to have required scienter as an element of a crime where the purpose of the statute, as is the case here, is regulation of dangerous or harmful objects.

Section 922(h)(1) does not require the government to prove that a convicted felon knew the firearm he received had moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Manley · filed 1977-11-23(h)(1)

Contrary to appellant’s contention, the law is well settled that the government is not required to prove appellant’s knowledge of the interstate nexus in these circumstances.

Section 922(a)(6) requires specific intent to deceive.

United States v. Mongiello · filed 1977-12-21(a)(6)

Since § 922(a)(6) does contain the words “intended ... to deceive,” there is no doubt that such a specific intent is required for a violation of that section.

Section 922(h)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the maximum penalty for the crime of which he was previously convicted.

United States v. Williams · filed 1978-12-08(h)(1)

By its terms, § 922(h)(1) does not require proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant as to the maximum penalty which might have been imposed on the charge made in a pending indictment or on a past conviction.

Section 922(h) does not require proof that a defendant specifically intended to violate the law.

United States v. Holmes · filed 1979-03-16(h)

As previously stated the law is clear that specific intent is not required in this offense, and we do not regard it as error that the trial court refused to instruct the jury otherwise.

Section 922(h) requires a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce but does not require proof that the defendant knew of that nexus.

Lambert v. United States · filed 1979-08-06(h)

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the facts included description of a nexus between the weapon and interstate commerce. The government was not required to demonstrate that the defendant was aware of the interstate character of the weapon.

Section 922(h)(1) does not require proof that a firearm recipient knew a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Pruner · filed 1979-10-15(h)(1)

We therefore conclude that scienter is not an element and that the court did not err in not allowing the jury to consider this defense.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant acted willfully.

United States v. Lehmann · filed 1980-03-10(g)

We see no sound policy reason for this court to read into section 922(g) a willfulness requirement that Congress itself did not mandate.

Section 922(m) requires proof that the dealer knew the required forms were not completed, but does not require proof that the dealer knew the omission was illegal.

United States v. Currier · filed 1980-03-25(m)

The use of the word “knowingly” in § 922(m) does mean that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he did not complete the required forms. Appellant, however, reads too much into the word in asserting that the government must also prove a specific intent to violate the law.

Section 922(a)(1) does not require proof that a defendant specifically intended or knew that he was violating the law.

United States v. Prentice C. Miller, United States of America v. Carl Dixon · filed 1981-03-27(a)(1)

Secondly, specific intent or knowledge of the defendant that he is violating the law is not an essential element of the crime of unlawful firearms dealing under section 922(a)(1).

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the buyer knew his statement was false, but not that he knew it violated the law.

United States v. Williams · filed 1982-08-24(a)(6)

The government need only show that Williams made a statement he knew to be false not that he knew he was violating the law.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a knowingly false statement intended or likely to deceive a firearms dealer, but does not require specific intent.

United States v. Harrelson · filed 1983-05-06(a)(6)

Specific intent is not an essential element of a § 922(a)(6) offense; the government need only prove that the defendant imparted “false information, with the general intention of deceiving or likely to deceive” the dealer.

Section 922(e) requires knowing delivery of firearms or ammunition to a carrier, but does not require knowledge that the delivery violates the law.

United States v. Udofot · filed 1983-08-11(e)

We hold that the Government did not have to prove that appellant “knowingly” violated the law, but only that appellant “knowingly” delivered firearms or ammunition to the carrier. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that specific intent is an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(e).

Section 922(h)(1) does not require proof that a person receiving a firearm knew of his status as a convicted felon.

United States v. Delaney · filed 1984-04-23(h)(1)

Counts II and III charged Delaney with receipt of a firearm by a felon and, as the Government points out, knowledge of one’s status as a felon is not an element of this offense.

Section 922(e) does not require specific intent.

United States v. Shakir W. Al-Khafaji · filed 1986-03-24(e)

We similarly conclude that specific intent is, in fact, not a requirement of section 922(e).

Section 922(a)(6) does not require proof of specific intent to violate the law.

United States v. Hawkins · filed 1986-07-21(a)(6)

We agree with the Cornett case that specific intent is not required by §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a).

Section 922(h)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew firearm possession while under indictment was prohibited.

United States v. Indelicato · filed 1986-09-30(h)(1)

Under the rationale of Pruner there is no reason to arrive at a different conclusion with respect to possession while under indictment. ... Indelicato’s offer of proof that this provision of the statute is not well known therefore was properly rejected.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a knowingly false statement; an honest but mistaken belief about residency prevents conviction.

United States v. Reid · filed 1986-10-08(a)(6)

It is inconceivable that this jury was not fully aware that under the law as instructed by the court, they could not convict Reid if, in line with her defense, they entertained any reasonable doubt as to whether she acted under an honest, if mistaken, belief in this North Carolina residency.

Section 922(g) recognizes constructive possession and treats control and knowledge separately in jury instructions.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 1988-09-30(g)

The court declined to give this instruction — § 922(g) is not an Illinois statute —and instead gave the definition of possession contained in this circuit’s pattern instructions. This was the right thing to do. The Illinois instruction is circular (defining possession in terms of possession), omits reference to principles of constructive possession, and conflates control (the usual element of possession) and knowledge. The knowledge element of the federal crime was defined in a separate instruction. Keeping the instructions concerning control and knowledge separate assists lay jurors.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew firearm possession was prohibited.

United States v. Brady · filed 1989-04-06(g)(1)

It also is no defense that he did not know he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) is a general intent offense, so voluntary intoxication cannot negate the required intent.

United States v. Williams · filed 1989-12-26(g)(1)

It has been held repeatedly, however, that the crime defined in section 922(g) is a crime of general intent. ... For general intent crimes, evidence of voluntary intoxication is not an acceptable method of negating the required intent.

Section 922(b)(5) has no intent requirement for a licensed dealer’s recordkeeping violation.

United States v. Percival · filed 1990-01-09(b)(5)

Section 922(b)(5) is devoid of any intent element or requirement.

Section 922(g) defines a general intent offense, so voluntary intoxication cannot negate the required intent.

United States of America v. Williams · filed 1990-01-25(g)

It has been held repeatedly, however, that the crime defined in section 922(g) is a crime of general intent. ... For general intent crimes, evidence of voluntary intoxication is not an acceptable method of negating the required intent. ... The district court was thus correct in excluding evidence of Williams' intoxication introduced for the purpose of negating mens rea.

Section 922’s charged firearm offenses require proof that the defendant knew he possessed or transported the firearm.

United States v. Hastings · filed 1990-11-09

Because we conclude that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury improperly allowed it to convict without finding that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm, but find that the evidence of knowing possession was sufficient to warrant submission to the jury, we reverse and remand for a new trial without reaching the sentencing issues.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a false statement to be made knowingly; actual knowledge or deliberate disregard of its truth can satisfy that requirement.

United States v. Bodden · filed 1991-04-25(a)(6)

A conviction under Sec. 922(a)(6) requires the defendant's false statements to be "knowingly" made. We have held that this element may be satisfied either by actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement or when the false statement is made "with deliberate disregard for whether it was true or false and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." ... In view of this evidence, there is enough evidence to persuade a rational jury that the knowledge element of Sec. 922(a)(6) was established beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed the firearms, but not that he knew the possession was illegal.

United States v. Edward T. Smith, Jr. · filed 1991-07-16(g)

The government need only prove that Smith knew he possessed the firearms, not that he understood that such possession was illegal.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from receiving a firearm regardless of the intended use; the Government need not prove an intent to use it illegally.

United States v. Prator · filed 1991-07-29(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) makes the act of receipt of a firearm by a felon a crime without regard to his motive for such possession. To obtain a conviction, the Government need not prove that the defendant intended to use the firearm for an illegal purpose.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm was present; a jury may infer that knowledge from the contents of a briefcase holding the firearm.

United States v. Townsend · filed 1991-12-12(g)(1)

We find there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a jury to have reasonably concluded that Townsend knew the gun was in the briefcase.