18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons survives this constitutional challenge under plain error review because felons may be prohibited from possessing firearms.

United States v. Valencia · filed 2003-10-24(g)(1)

Because we specifically have recognized that it is clear that felons may be prohibited from possessing firearms, Valencia has failed to demonstrate plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) may prohibit felons from possessing firearms without plainly violating the Second Amendment.

United States v. Brown · filed 2003-11-03(g)(1)

We specifically recognized in Emerson that “it is clear that felons, infants, and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms.” Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261 (emphasis added). In light of this recognition, we conclude that Brown has failed to demonstrate plain error.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element does not violate equal protection because limiting the statute’s reach to firearms connected to interstate commerce serves a legitimate governmental purpose.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2003-11-04(g)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court rejects Defendant’s equal protection argument based upon the jurisdictional “interstate commerce” element of § 922(g). As the level of scrutiny afforded Defendant is one of “rational basis”, all that is needed is “some legitimate governmental purpose” to satisfy equal protection. As the above-discussed authorities make clear, tailoring a federal statute to include an interstate commerce jurisdictional element so that it passes constitutional muster is a legitimate governmental purpose.

Section 922(o) cannot constitutionally prohibit possession of genuinely homemade machineguns when that possession has no substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Robert Wilson Stewart, Jr. · filed 2003-11-13(o)

Based on the four-factor Morrison test, section 922(o) cannot be viewed as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. We therefore conclude that section 922(o) is unconstitutional as applied to Stewart.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Darrington · filed 2003-11-18(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(9) gives people convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence sufficient notice that their possession of firearms may be restricted.

United States v. Mills · filed 2003-11-21(g)(9)

His claim is misplaced because we have held (in circumstances similar to Mills’) that a person who has been convicted of a MCDV has sufficient notice that he may be subject to special regulation with respect to possession of firearms.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on its lack of a substantial effect requirement.

United States v. Lopez · filed 2003-12-02(g)

As we have repeatedly held, the “constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.”

An Apprendi challenge based on prior felony convictions does not render § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional because Apprendi exempts prior convictions from its jury-proof rule.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2003-12-08(g)(1)

In his supplemental pro se brief, Anderson contends that the Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), renders section 922(g) unconstitutional, because Con- gress does not require the Government to allege prior felony convic- tions in the indictment or prove their existence beyond a reasonable doubt. However, Apprendi held that any fact other than a prior con- viction that increases the penalty must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Therefore, this challenge is meritless. See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2002).

Section 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by felons, is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power and does not violate the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Newmeyer · filed 2003-12-22(g)(1)

This contention is foreclosed by our holdings that the Second Amendment does not confer on individual citizens a right to bear arms, United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 565-66 (9th Cir.2000) (upholding § 922(g)(9) under rational basis analysis against equal protection challenge), and that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 932 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1013, 122 S.Ct. 503, 151 L.Ed.2d 413 (2001), and thus does not violate the Tenth Amendment, United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1000, 116 S.Ct. 543, 133 L.Ed.2d 446 (1995).

Section 922(g)(1) imposes a civil, nonpunitive firearm disability, so applying it based on a conviction predating the Gun Control Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2003-12-30(g)(1)

The Mendozar-Martinez factors show that § 922(g) is a civil disability which does not constitute punishment. ... Because the civil disability imposed on appellant neither constitutes punishment nor punishes conduct that occurred prior to the GCA’s adoption, preventing him from purchasing or possessing firearms does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges under Seventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Gillaum · filed 2004-01-20(g)(1)

Finally, Gillaum argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise (facially and as applied to him) of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Gillaum concedes, however, that this court has previously rejected this argument. ... We note that Gillaum has raised this argument and we decline to revisit our well established precedents.

Prior Fifth Circuit decisions foreclose challenges to § 922(g) based on the Second Amendment or the absence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Townsend · filed 2004-04-20(g)

Townsend argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is an unconstitutional infringement on his fundamental Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. He also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional on its face because the statute does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. ... A panel of this court cannot overrule a prior panel’s decision in the absence of an intervening contrary or superseding decision by this court sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court. ... No such decision exists. Accordingly, Townsend’s arguments are indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands Second Amendment and facial interstate-commerce challenges under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Bermea · filed 2004-06-23(g)

Bermea argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is an unconstitutional infringement on his fundamental Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. He also argues that the statute is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce. ... No such decision exists. Accordingly, Bermea’s argument is indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felon possession of ammunition withstands the Second Amendment challenge raised here.

United States v. Mares · filed 2005-03-04(g)(1)

Finally, Mares argues that the statute of conviction in this case, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is an unconstitutional infringement on the fundamental individual right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amendment. As Mares concedes, this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 158 L. Ed. 2d 994, 124 S. Ct. 2429, (2004).

Section 922(d)(1) validly prohibits firearm sales to convicted felons, including wholly intrastate sales, under Congress’ commerce power.

United States v. Peters · filed 2005-03-24(d)(1)

Because the sale of firearms to felons is an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, we conclude that Congress acted within its commerce power in enacting § 922(d)(1), and thus that the district court committed no error in entering a judgment of conviction.

Section 922(g)’s constitutionality is settled under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Benjamin · filed 2005-04-26(g)

This court has emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.

Section 922(o)'s prohibition on machine gun possession withstands the constitutional challenge foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Brunson · filed 2005-04-29(o)

Brunson argues that the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), is unconstitutional. This argument is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because its interstate commerce requirement supplies a jurisdictional connection.

United States v. Olson, Lawrence · filed 2005-05-16(g)(1)

We have held that the statute’s requirement that the firearm be “shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce” constitutes a jurisdictional element that justifies Congress’s passage of the provision pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). ... This court squarely rejected this argument in Lemons, 302 F.3d at 772-73, and we find no “compelling reason” to overturn our precedent here, see Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1998).

Section 922(g)(1) validly reaches a felon's possession of a firearm that previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Williams, Amin W. · filed 2005-06-09(g)(1)

It suffices to note that we have held repeatedly that section 922(g)(1), because it requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm “in or affecting commerce,” ... represents a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. ... We have also held that so long as the firearm crossed state lines at any point prior to the defendant’s possession of the gun, his possession is “in or affecting commerce.”

Section 922(g) requires an interstate nexus, and circuit precedent forecloses a challenge to its constitutionality.

United States v. Terrell · filed 2005-07-01(g)

Terrell also asserts that the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial because the government failed to prove the interstate nexus element of the offense and that § 922(g) is unconstitutional. Because this court has rejected these arguments, we need not discuss them further.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Marion · filed 2005-07-20(g)

Because section 922(g) is constitutional, we affirm Marion’s conviction.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(5) fall within Congress’s Commerce Clause power because both implicate interstate commerce on their face.

United States v. Mascak · filed 2005-08-05(a)(1)(A), (a)(5)

Neither provision exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because both implicate interstate commerce on their face.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Mince · filed 2005-08-18(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Jesse Dean Mince presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession- of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Holmes · filed 2005-08-25(g)(1)

As prior panels have rejected Holmes’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), we affirm as to this issue.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not exceed Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.

United States v. Peterson · filed 2005-08-25(g)(1)

Smalls also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, exceeds Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce and is thus unconstitutional. ... We again reject this argument.

Section 922(g)(1) makes felony possession of a firearm unlawful.

United States v. Hedrick · filed 2005-08-25(g)(1)

Hedrick’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to his case is foreclosed by our decisions in United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.2005), and United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Hubbard · filed 2005-08-29(g)(1)

Under our uniform line of controlling precedent, § 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Hubbard’s admission, in the factual resume he filed, that he possessed a gun that had traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to demonstrate the required nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, we affirm Hubbard’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce, and its jurisdictional element satisfies the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2005-08-30(g)(1)

Simply put, under our uniform line of controlling precedent, § 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Taylor’s admission, at the plea colloquy, that he possessed a gun that had traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to demonstrate the required nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, we affirm Taylor’s conviction.

Section 922(g) requires an interstate commerce nexus and is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Walker · filed 2005-09-23(g)

It is well-established that the statute, which expressly requires an interstate commerce nexus, is a valid congressional enactment under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power merely because it criminalizes conduct beyond economic activity.

United States v. Freeman, Gary E. · filed 2005-09-28(g)

Accordingly, any argument that it was plain error to prosecute him under § 922(g) would be frivolous.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Lisbon · filed 2006-02-10(g)

Second, this court consistently has upheld the constitutionality of §§ 922(g) and 924(c).

Section 922 is constitutional because the Second Amendment does not provide an absolute right to firearms.

United States v. Willaman · filed 2006-02-17

Willaman first argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922 (“section 922”) violates the Second Amendment, and that “Congress had no right to amend the Second Amendment merely by legislation,” Reply Br. at 7. Thus, in his view, the district court should have dismissed the indictment and allowed him to make a jury nullification argument. We review the district court’s order upholding the constitutionality of section 922 and refusing to dismiss the indictment or allow a jury nullification argument on a plenary basis. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 1996). We will not linger on this point inasmuch as a number of our cases, including Rybar in which we held that “this court has on several occasions emphasized that the Second Amendment furnishes no absolute right to firearms,” 103 F.3d at 286, foreclose Willaman’s Second Amendment arguments.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority on its face or as applied to possession of ammunition.

United States v. Fields · filed 2006-04-21(g)

Fields final argument is that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), under which he was charged for unlawful possession of ammunition, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting it. We squarely addressed and rejected this same argument in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), and can discern no reason to revisit the issue here.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands an as-applied challenge claiming that it exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Bledsoe · filed 2006-04-25(g)(1)

Bledsoe argues for the first time on appeal that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because such application would exceed Congress's Commerce Clause power. Several panels of this court have rejected this argument, United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955, 959 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 844 (2004); United States v. Gary, 341 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Shepherd, 284 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2002), and this panel "is not at liberty to revisit this issue."

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon in possession because it does not exceed Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Don Rodney Bledsoe, Also Known as Terry L. Bledsoe, Also Known as Don R. Bledsoe, Also Known as Jermain · filed 2006-04-25(g)(1)

Bledsoe argues for the first time on appeal that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because such application would exceed Congress's Commerce Clause power. Several panels of this court have rejected this argument, United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955, 959 (8th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 844, 125 S.Ct. 285, 160 L.Ed.2d 71 (2004); United States v. Gary, 341 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir.2003); United States v. Shepherd, 284 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2002), and this panel “is not at liberty to revisit this issue.” Leathers, 354 F.3d at 959 (citing United States v. Wilson, 315 F.3d 972, 973-74 (8th Cir.2003)).

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g) based on the claim that firearm possession must substantially affect interstate commerce is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Coffman · filed 2006-05-02(g)

For the first time on appeal, Coffman contends that the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it criminalizes the possession of firearms that do not substantially affect interstate commerce. Coffman correctly concedes that this argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g) may be applied to a firearm possession offense when the evidence sufficiently connects the firearm to interstate commerce.

United States v. Harrison · filed 2006-05-08(g)

The as-applied challenge also fails. The evidence adduced at trial of the connection between interstate commerce and the firearm that Harrison allegedly possessed is more than sufficient to establish that the statute’s application to the appellant does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a constitutional challenge.

United States v. Brown · filed 2006-05-12(g)(1)

As Brown acknowledges, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons does not exceed Congress's Commerce Clause power on its face or as applied to Stewart.

United States v. Carl Stewart, Jr. · filed 2006-06-19(g)(1)

Stewart’s constitutional challenge, facial and as applied, that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power, has also been rejected.

Section 922(g) is not facially invalid under controlling circuit precedent.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2006-06-23(g)

The felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is facially invalid; ... Appellant’s second challenge is foreclosed by several of our decisions, including United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001).

Section 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power on its face.

United States v. Buenrostro · filed 2006-06-29(g)(1)

First, Buenrostro’s constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) must fail. We have consistently upheld the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

A constitutional challenge to § 922(g) is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.

United States v. Cervantes · filed 2006-08-16(g)

Cervantes’ claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional is precluded by Supreme Court precedent.

Supreme Court precedent forecloses a constitutional challenge to § 922(g).

United States v. Vivas · filed 2006-08-16(g)

Vivas’s claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional is precluded by Supreme Court precedent.

Section 922(o)(2)(A)’s law enforcement exception is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a state police officer possessing a machine gun in the course of his duties because it gives inadequate guidance about authority to possess the weapon and permits arbitrary enforcement.

United States v. Vest · filed 2006-08-30(o)(2)(A)

The Court finds that all three Counts against Vest as stated in the Superceding Indictment (Doc. 30) must be dismissed on the grounds that § 922(o)(2)(A), and §§ 5861(b) and (d), are unconstitutionally vague as applied to Vest for his possession of a machine gun while serving as a police officer, equipment officer and/or lead rifle instructor for the Illinois State Police.

Section 922(g)(3) survives equal protection and substantive due process challenges under rational basis review because drug users lack a fundamental right to keep and bear arms.

United States v. Roach · filed 2006-10-06(g)(3)

A drug user does not have a fundamental right to keep and bear arms, so § 922(g)(3) must only survive rational basis review, and it does.

Section 922(o) may be applied to a State Guard member whose private machinegun possession was unauthorized and had no reasonable relationship to the Guard’s preservation or efficiency.

United States v. Hamblen · filed 2007-06-21(o)

Hamblen appeals his conviction for unlawfully possessing machineguns under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), claiming that this statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because it violates his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. ... Hamblen has failed to show that his machinegun possession was reasonably related to the State Guard’s preservation or efficiency. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on Hamblen’s Second Amendment claim.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a person convicted of a felony withstands a Second Amendment challenge under Lewis.

United States v. Campbell · filed 2008-02-22(g)(1)

Campbell’s contention that his conviction under section 922(g) violates his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment is foreclosed by Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980).

Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(5).

United States v. Sanchez-Caceres · filed 2008-03-24(g)(5)

Sanchez asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unconstitutional search and that § 922(g)(5) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in his case. As Sanchez acknowledges, the latter argument is ... foreclosed by our precedent.

A constitutional challenge to § 922(g) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Castro · filed 2008-04-11(g)

Castro’s constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is likewise foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges.

United States v. Brunson · filed 2008-09-11(g)(1)

Brunson asserts that the firearm statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause and violated the Second Amendment. ... Accordingly, Brunson’s constitutional challenges to the firearm statute are meritless.

Section 922(g)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons survives the Second Amendment, due process, and equal protection challenges considered by the court.

United States v. Miller · filed 2009-02-26(g)

Thus, the Court rejects the Defendant’s argument that § 922(g) deprives him of a Second Amendment liberty interest in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional under Heller.

United States v. Stuckey · filed 2009-03-18(g)(1)

Stuckey’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional under Columbia v. Heller, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), is unavailing.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession by people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, and the Second Amendment does not require a home-defense exception on these facts.

United States v. Engstrum · filed 2009-04-17(g)(9)

The right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment is a fundamental right, so the Court must determine whether an exception to § 922(g)(9) must be allowed for home defense, under the narrow facts of this case. The Court concludes that no such exception is constitutionally required.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Ninth Amendment challenges to its felon-in-possession prohibition.

United States v. Hunt · filed 2011-03-29(g)(1)

First, we have binding precedent squarely concerning 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that precludes his challenges to the statute’s constitutionality on Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment grounds. ... In addition, since the Ninth Amendment does not provide an inherent right to self defense, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) cannot be unconstitutional on ... these grounds.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) is not unduly vague as applied when its standards sufficiently inform the defendant that his firearms dealing is illegal.

United States v. Skiles · filed 2013-04-16(a)(1)(A)

Skiles also claims that § 922(a)(1)(A) is unconstitutionally vague. On this record,6 we are unable to say that as applied to the facts and circumstances of this case,7 the statute is unduly vague. Skiles was sufficiently informed of its standards; indeed, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he knew that his activities were illegal.

Section 922(g)(1)’s restriction on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Second Amendment or exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it requires a nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Theramene · filed 2013-04-23(g)(1)

Although the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2799, 171 L.E.2d 637 (2008), held that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms, statutory restrictions of firearm possession with respect to felons, like § 922(g)(1), do not violate the Second Amendment. ... Further, § 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because the statute has a jurisdictional element requiring the firearm at issue to have a nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require individual notice that a felon is prohibited from possessing a firearm, and the absence of such notice does not violate due process.

United States v. Lapier · filed 2013-08-01(g)(1)

Lapier contends that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates his right to due process because section 922 does not require that he be provided notice that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. As Lapier acknowledges, this court has previously rejected such arguments. ... Lapier’s contention that recent Supreme Court decisions undermine this precedent is unpersuasive.

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands the constitutional challenge raised by the defendants.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2013-07-22(g)(1)

Second, both Johnson and Warren contest the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922, an argument foreclosed by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010).

An unpreserved constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A)’s firearm prohibition for unlawfully present aliens did not establish plain error.

United States v. Burciaga-Alcantar · filed 2013-08-28(g)(5)(A)

Regardless, we conclude that any error is not plain: “Federal statutes that classify based on alienage need only a rational basis.” United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 289 (2012) (rejecting Second Amendment and equal protection challenges to § 922(g)(5)(A)).

Section 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a person who uses marijuana while possessing firearms.

United States v. May · filed 2013-08-08(g)(3)

Because an ordinary person would understand that May’s use of marijuana while in possession of firearms established him as an “unlawful user” in violation of § 922(g)(3), the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to May.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon who possessed a firearm manufactured outside the state that traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Reverio · filed 2014-01-09(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) is also constitutional as applied to Reverio, who admitted in his factual stipulation that the firearm he possessed was “manufactured outside the State of Florida and therefore traveled in interstate and/or foreign commerce.” See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1189; Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274.

Section 922(g)(5) withstands a facial constitutional challenge under binding Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Rangel-Hernandez · filed 2015-03-06(g)(5)

Even assuming Defendant’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5) survived his guilty plea, Defendant concedes that binding precedent of this Court forecloses relief on his claim.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a constitutional challenge based on Lopez and Morrison under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Joel Sanchez, Jr. · filed 2015-02-06(g)(1)

Finally, Sanchez urges us to reconsider our jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in the light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). His challenge is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) and (j) remain constitutional under the Fifth Circuit’s precedent despite NFIB.

United States v. Delgado · filed 2015-10-22(g)(1), (j)

As Delgado acknowledges, his challenge to § 922(g)(1) and (j) is foreclosed by our jurisprudence, and, as explained in Alcantar, NFIB does not change this result.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent despite the decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. Fisk · filed 2015-10-22(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Raymond Easias Fisk raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013). In Alcantar, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Challenges to Section 922(g)(1) based on Sebelius are foreclosed, and Flores-Figueroa does not alter the proof required under the section.

United States v. Tanksley · filed 2016-08-16(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Dantana Tanksley raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013), United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Ford, 509 F.3d 714, 716-17 (5th Cir. 2007). ... In Alcantar, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the ... constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 733 F.3d at 145-46. In Rose, we held that Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), did not alter the proof required in a § 922(g)(1) case.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent despite Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. Pina · filed 2016-06-21(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Tommy Pina raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145- 46 (5th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2010). In Alcantar, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

A constitutional challenge to § 922(j) based on Sebelius fails because the provision is substantially similar to § 922(g).

United States v. Brice · filed 2016-06-21(j)

Because § 922(j) is substantially similar to § 922(g), the same result is reached with respect to Brice’s challenge to it.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent despite the challenge based on Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. Williams · filed 2017-05-30(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, James Paris Williams raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145- 46 (5th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Trejo, 610 F3d 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2010). In Alcantar, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

An unpreserved Second or Fifth Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A)’s prohibition on firearm possession by an illegal alien did not establish plain error.

United States v. Salazar · filed 2017-08-21(g)(5)(A)

We review for plain error Salazar’s arguments that § 922(g)(5)(A) violates the Second Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause with respect to his equal protection rights, as he did not raise them in the district court. See United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 155 (5th Cir. 2012). Salazar fails to show plain error.

Section 922(g) withstands challenges based on Congress’s interstate commerce power and the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Lesley John · filed 2018-02-21(g)

John concedes that his constitutional arguments are foreclosed by our precedent. ... foreclose his argument that § 922(g) is unconstitutional); ... We therefore affirm on all three of these constitutional challenges.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent despite the argument based on Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. Vela · filed 2018-08-20(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Daniel Vela raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2010). In Alcantar, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons survives a constitutional challenge based on noncommercial possession.

United States v. Tamaris Weaver, Jr. · filed 2019-10-09(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... In view of the foregoing, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition does not violate the Constitution.

Danmola v. United States · filed 2020-10-19(g)(1)

On September 14, 2016, movant was named in a one-count indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... To the extent he maintains that the statute under which he was convicted violates the Constitution, he is wrong.

Section 922(j) withstands facial and as-applied constitutional challenges foreclosed by binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Meza · filed 2021-01-22(j)

Finally, Meza argues the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. As Meza concedes, both arguments are foreclosed by binding Fifth Circuit precedent. ... So we reject Meza’s constitutional arguments under our rule of orderliness.

Section 922(j) withstands facial and as-applied constitutional challenges foreclosed by binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Meza · filed 2021-02-09(j)

Finally, Meza argues the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. As Meza concedes, both arguments are foreclosed by binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

A challenge to § 922(g)’s constitutionality under United States v. Lopez is foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Bowling · filed 2022-02-03(g)

Finally, as Bowling correctly concedes, his challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), is foreclosed, and he raises it only to preserve it for possible further review.

Section 922(g)(1) remains subject to binding Fifth Circuit precedent rejecting Commerce Clause challenges, and its application after Bruen was not plain error on an unpreserved Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Jones · filed 2023-11-21(g)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that Jones has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s ap- plication of § 922(g)(1) constitutes plain error.

A Bruen-based Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails on plain-error review under Fifth Circuit precedent, and its Commerce Clause validity is settled in that circuit.

United States v. Williams · filed 2024-01-12(g)(1)

We recently rejected the argument, on plain error review, that § 922(g)(1) infringes the Second Amendment under Bruen. ... We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional.

United States v. Bull · filed 2024-02-01(g)(1)

But we have already held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

An alleged constitutional defect in § 922(g)(1) after Bruen is not clear under current law and does not establish plain error on an unpreserved challenge.

United States v. Brillon · filed 2024-02-02(g)(1)

Therefore, although we recognize that there are multiple pending cases before prior panels in this Circuit raising the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) following Bruen, see, e.g., United States v. Thawney, 22-1399; Zherka v. Garland, 22-1108, we need not address the merits of that argument here because we conclude, at a minimum, that the constitutional infirmity alleged by Brillon as to his Section 922(g)(1) conviction is not clear under current law.

On plain-error review, a Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g) is foreclosed, and a Second Amendment challenge shows no clear or obvious violation.

United States v. Vargas · filed 2024-03-18(g)

For the first time on appeal, Vargas also asserts that § 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. ... Vargas’s Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed. See United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2023). Any Second Amendment violation is not clear or obvious. See id.

Unpreserved Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed on plain-error review by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Jimenez · filed 2024-04-03(g)(1)

Both arguments are foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 573–74 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (rejecting Bruen challenge to § 922(g)(1) on plain error); id. at 573 (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) on plain error).

Unpreserved Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed under the applicable standards of review.

United States v. Tejada-Cruz · filed 2024-05-06(g)(1)

Second, he presents two unpreserved constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Commerce Clause and under the Second Amendment based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... Tejada-Cruz correctly concedes that his arguments are foreclosed under the applicable standards of review.

A constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails plain-error review when no binding precedent holds the provision unconstitutional.

United States v. Ogidi · filed 2024-05-30(g)(1)

At this time, no binding precedent holds that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. There was thus no plain error.

An unpreserved Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails under plain error review, and circuit precedent forecloses a Commerce Clause challenge to the provision.

United States v. Smiley · filed 2024-08-09(g)(1)

As Smiley concedes, his unpreserved Bruen challenge based on the Second Amendment is foreclosed by our opinion in United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1081 (2024), which rejected another such challenge on the ground that any error was not plain. Jones also rejected the argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 573. ... Because “there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” summary affirmance is appropriate.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Whitaker · filed 2024-08-14(g)(1)

... Whitaker’s challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by our binding precedents.

An unpreserved constitutional challenge to a § 922(g)(1) conviction fails plain-error review under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Gonzales · filed 2024-09-09(g)(1)

Last, there is no reason to disturb our earlier conclusion that Gonzales’s constitutional challenge to his Section 922(g)(1) conviction fails under plain error review.

A constitutional challenge to § 922(o)’s machinegun prohibition is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Ovalle · filed 2024-11-05(o)

Ovalle raises the issue to preserve it for further review, conceding that his challenge is foreclosed by Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436 ... (5th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, Ovalle’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

An as-applied constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) does not establish plain error without a clear or obvious error.

United States v. Linan · filed 2024-12-24(g)(1)

Linan is unable to demonstrate the requisite clear-or-obvious error for his as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g).

A facial Second Amendment or Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) cannot establish plain error in the Fifth Circuit because circuit precedent rejects both challenges.

United States v. Bell · filed 2025-01-10(g)(1)

We have previously rejected preserved Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1). ... Accordingly, Bell cannot show plain error.

In the Fifth Circuit, a facial Second Amendment challenge and a Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by precedent.

United States v. Martinez · filed 2025-01-28(g)(1)

Ray Benjamin Martinez contends that the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). He also asserts that, as interpreted by this court, the statute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... The Government is correct that Martinez’s challenges are foreclosed.

Binding Eighth Circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1)’s ban on felons possessing firearms.

Misfit Coffee Company, LLC v. Donatell · filed 2025-02-10(g)(1)

For now, it is clear that the relief Mr. Turner seeks remains foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit’s Jackson decisions. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss. However, Mr. Turner’s arguments regarding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) are preserved should the Supreme Court provide further relevant guidance.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing ammunition withstands facial and as-applied constitutional challenges under binding Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Talbot · filed 2025-02-13(g)(1)

Given all this, this court stands in the same position as when it previously resolved Talbot’s appeal: the decision in Vincent III forecloses Talbot’s facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g). Thus, the district court’s judgment must be affirmed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Second Amendment challenge and an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge based on a firearm’s out-of-state manufacture and importation.

United States v. Dean · filed 2025-02-20(g)(1)

Ladarius Dean argues for the first time on appeal that his statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Additionally, Dean raises a new argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because it exceeds the power ... of Congress under the Commerce Clause by permitting a conviction based solely on evidence that the firearm he possessed was manufactured outside of and then imported into Texas and without regard to his involvement in the transportation or economic activity associated with the purchase or sale of the firearm. ... The Government is correct that Dean’s arguments are foreclosed.

A Bruen challenge to § 922(g)(1) does not establish plain error while binding precedent upholding the provision remains in force.

United States v. Disla · filed 2025-02-25(g)(1)

We upheld the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1) in United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013), and neither Bruen nor any other binding precedent has reached a contrary holding. ... Because the error asserted by Disla is not “clear under current law,” Napout, 963 F.3d at 183, we cannot say that his conviction was plainly erroneous.

Section 922(g)(1) remains enforceable against Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Patino · filed 2025-02-27(g)(1)

As Patino concedes, his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed. See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2024). Patino also concedes that his Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Matlock · filed 2025-03-13(g)(1)

Because both of Matlock’s challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed, summary affirmance is appropriate.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Bradley · filed 2025-03-13(g)(1)

The Government is correct that Bradley’s facial Second Amendment challenge is foreclosed, see United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2024), as is his Commerce Clause claim, see United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 573 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1081 (2024).

In the Fifth Circuit, facial and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by precedent.

United States v. Joubert · filed 2025-05-13(g)(1)

Joubert’s contention that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 18, 2025) (No. 24-6625). Moreover, as Joubert correctly concedes, his Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2013).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a person with a felony conviction withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges by a person serving supervised release for a prior felony.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2025-05-20(g)(1)

On appeal, he argues that § 922(g)(1) ... violates the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to him, in light of the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... The Government is correct that Mendez’s arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Turner · filed 2025-05-28(g)(1)

Turner’s Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed.

Controlling Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses the facial and as-applied Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) raised here.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2025-05-23(g)(1)

On appeal, he renews his arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), both on its face and as applied to him, violates the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment in light of the test set forth ... in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... Thomas’s arguments are indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction withstands Commerce Clause and facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Olivas · filed 2025-05-28(g)(1)

He argues that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause and that the statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him, in light of New York State ... Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... The Government is correct that Olivas’s arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to a felon whose firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Michel · filed 2025-06-09(g)(1)

Because the Government is clearly correct as a matter of law that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to Michel, we GRANT its motion for summary affirmance.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction withstands the Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges raised here under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Pena · filed 2025-06-27(g)(1)

Frank Pena pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, he argues that the statute of conviction violates the Commerce Clause and violates the Second Amendment, on its face and as applied to him, in light of the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... The Government is correct that Pena’s arguments are foreclosed.

A facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) under Bruen is foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit by Diaz.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2025-07-02(g)(1)

He argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, ... Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... As the Government asserts and Thomas concedes, the sole issue raised on appeal is foreclosed by Diaz. ... Therefore, summary affirmance is appropriate.

Controlling Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Contreras · filed 2025-07-17(g)(1)

Stevie Gomez Contreras appeals following his conviction for possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... The parties are correct that Contreras’s facial and as-applied challenges are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. McMaryion · filed 2025-08-05(g)(1)

The parties are correct that McMaryion’s facial and as-applied challenges are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional and is not subject to as-applied challenges.

United States v. Espinal · filed 2025-08-11(g)(1)

We recently addressed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and affirmed that the felon-in-possession law is facially constitutional and held that it is not subject to as-applied challenges. ... Accordingly, we conclude the district court was correct to deny his motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment, Fifth Amendment equal protection, and Commerce Clause challenges foreclosed by circuit precedent.

United States v. Stanfield · filed 2025-09-05(g)(1)

Stanfield raises four challenges to § 922(g)(1) on appeal. As Stanfield concedes, all of his arguments are foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by people with felony convictions withstands facial Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Smith · filed 2025-09-16(g)(1)

As Smith correctly concedes, his facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) and his Commerce Clause arguments are foreclosed. ... As for Smith’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), his argument fails in light of our recent decision in United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308, 309, 317-18 (5th Cir. 2025), as well as United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363, 375 (5th Cir. 2017).

Challenges to § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment, vagueness doctrine, and Commerce Clause were foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Pfetzer · filed 2025-09-17(g)(1)

On appeal, he argues § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment under the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), both as applied to him and on its face. He ... also argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional both for vagueness and under the Commerce Clause. ... We conclude that all of Pfetzer’s claims are foreclosed by prior precedent from this court.

Under Fifth Circuit precedent, § 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges of the kind raised here.

United States v. Garmon · filed 2025-09-19(g)(1)

Buddy Floyd Garmon pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... He argues that the ... statute of conviction violates the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to him, in light of the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... Garmon correctly concedes that each argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) remains enforceable against facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges and a Commerce Clause challenge foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Acosta · filed 2025-09-25(g)(1)

Convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Frankie Acosta raises three issues that he correctly concedes are foreclosed by circuit precedents but raises to preserve for further review. ... Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction withstands Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Swarn · filed 2025-10-15(g)(1)

Swarn contends that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment and that, as interpreted by this court, it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. As he acknowledges, these arguments are foreclosed. Swarn cannot prevail on his Second Amendment challenge in view of United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025). See United States v. Contreras, 125 F.4th 725, 729 (5th Cir. 2025). His Commerce Clause challenge is likewise at odds with our precedent. See United States v. Perryman, 965 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2020).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied constitutional challenges foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Garner · filed 2025-10-29(g)(1)

We agree with the parties that Garner’s facial challenge, which we review for plain error, and his as-applied challenge, which we review de novo, are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a defendant who does not show that he is not dangerous.

United States v. Feltus · filed 2025-11-06(g)(1)

Feltus’s as-applied challenge fairs no better. Williams held that § 922(g)(1) “is constitutional as it applies to dangerous individuals.” 113 F.4th at 662. The court thus left open the possibility of an as-applied challenge for defendants who are not dangerous. But the court made clear in Williams that, when a defendant challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him, “the burden rests on [the defendant] to show he’s not dangerous.” Id. Here, Feltus makes no argument in favor of his non-dangerousness.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons withstands the constitutional challenges Bonner raised under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Bonner · filed 2025-11-14(g)(1)

On appeal, he argues § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), both facially and as applied to him. Bonner also argues § 922(g)(1) is ... unconstitutionally vague, exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and violates the Equal Protection Clause. ... We agree with the Government: All Bonner’s challenges are now foreclosed in this circuit.

Section 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession charges remain subject to binding Ninth Circuit precedent after the Duarte panel decision was vacated.

United States v. Allen · filed 2025-11-17(g)(1)

Allen’s motion to dismiss his two felon-in-possession counts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010). Vongxay remains binding law after the panel decision in United States v. Duarte was vacated.

Section 922(g)(1) remains enforceable against an as-applied constitutional challenge foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Brown · filed 2025-12-17(g)(1)

Brown also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. He correctly concedes that this argument is foreclosed to him by our holdings in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 468-70 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 155 S. Ct. 2822 (2025), and United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863, 866-67 (5th Cir. 2025).

Section 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional because it can constitutionally apply to people on parole, probation, or supervised release.

United States v. Jones · filed 2026-02-04(g)(1)

Jones cannot make that showing because this Court has held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional in at least some circumstances, such as when it is applied to those on parole, probation, or supervised release.

Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses the facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges and Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) raised here.

United States v. Moreno · filed 2026-02-27(g)(1)

The parties are correct that Moreno’s facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges are foreclosed, as is his Commerce Clause challenge.

Section 922(g)(1) remains enforceable against facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges and a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2026-03-12(g)(1)

Jackson concedes that his Second Amendment challenges are foreclosed. ... He likewise concedes that his Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed. ... Accordingly, the district court’s final judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) remains enforceable against facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges and a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Vecera · filed 2026-04-10(g)(1)

The parties are correct that Vecera’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed. ... His as-applied challenge is likewise foreclosed. ... And his Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed as well.

Unpreserved Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(o)'s machinegun prohibition fail on plain-error review.

United States v. Watts · filed 2026-04-13(o)

Watts’s unpreserved constitutional challenges to § 922(o) under the Second Amendment and the Commerce Clause fail on plain error review.

Existing Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses Bruen and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on possession of ammunition by a convicted felon.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2026-05-29(g)(1)

On appeal, he argues for the first time that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and because it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... The parties are correct that both of Thomas’s claims are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands the Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Kelly · filed 2026-06-10(g)(1)

Second, Kelly contends that § 922(g)(1) as currently interpreted violates the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. As he correctly concedes, his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under controlling Fourth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Nolan · filed 2026-06-23(g)(1)

Nolan first asserts that his conviction violates the Second Amendment and that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. However, Nolan rightfully concedes that his constitutional challenges are foreclosed by circuit precedent. ... We therefore reject Nolan’s challenges to his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Challenges to Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element and its validity under the Commerce Clause and Second Amendment are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Hunter · filed 2026-06-23(g)(1)

Hunter additionally contends that the court misadvised him on the interstate commerce element of Section 922(g)(1) and that the statute violates the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment. As he correctly concedes, however, each of those arguments is foreclosed.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm seller was a licensed dealer.

United States v. Diaz · filed 2021-03-01(a)(6)

Because § 922(a)(6) does not require the government to prove such knowledge, that notion has no merit for the same reasons provided above.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license, and evidence that a dealer knew the sales were unlawful can support a conviction for a willful violation.

United States v. Simmons · filed 2006-01-10(a)(1)(A)

Together, all of the evidence from the investigation clearly indicates that Simmons knew he was acting in violation of the law and was more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Simmons willfully violated § 922(a)(1)(A) when he sold firearms without a license.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not require proof that firearms dealing was the defendant’s primary business or that the defendant made a particular number of sales; a gun sale in the course of a hobby does not violate the section.

United States v. Ortiz-Zayas · filed 2004-09-27(a)(1)(A)

Turning to the first issue, the District Court charged the jury that “the government does not need to prove that dealing in firearms was the defendant’s primary business. Nor is there any magic number that has to be established, number of firearms purchased that must be proven. Nor does a gun sale in the course of a hobby violate the statute.” The District Court correctly identified the standard for defining “engaged in the business.”

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits dealing in firearms without a license; repeated offers and sales for profit can support a conviction.

United States v. Orum · filed 2004-08-16(a)(1)(A)

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly denied Orum’s motions for a judgment of acquittal because sufficient evidence was presented for a reasonable juror to find him guilty of dealing in firearms without a license. First, it is undisputed that Orum did not have a license to deal in firearms. Second, the evidence presented at trial indicates that Orum engaged in the business of dealing firearms. This evidence included testimony by confidential informants that Orum frequented flea markets and gun shows where he displayed and sold firearms; that he offered to sell firearms to them on several occasions and actually sold them three different firearms on two different occasions; and that he bought and sold firearms for a profit.

Section 922(a)(1)(A)’s prohibition on engaging in the firearms business ordinarily contemplates more than one isolated gun sale.

United States v. Carter · filed 2000-02-16(a)(1)(A)

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) ordinarily contemplates more than one isolated gun sale. ... Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) criminalizes being “engaged in the business” of selling guns.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) permits conviction for unlicensed firearms dealing when the defendant knew the conduct was unlawful, even if the defendant did not know of the federal licensing requirement.

Bryan v. United States · filed 1998-06-15(a)(1)(A)

The § 922(a)(1)(A)7 offense at issue in this case is an "other provision” in the “willfully” category. ... Thus, the willfulness requirement of § 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) requires proof that the defendant knew he lacked the license required to deal in firearms.

United States v. Stone · filed 1998-04-22(a)(1)(A)

After the trial, this court held that the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he did not have the requisite license to engage in the business of dealing in firearms. United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549 (11th Cir.1996). Because the instruction given the jury did not contain this knowledge requirement, it was defective.

A conviction for dealing in firearms without a license requires proof that the defendant knew the conduct was unlawful, but not that the defendant knew the specific licensing requirement.

United States v. Jose v. Andrade, Jr. · filed 1998-03-09(a)(1)(A)

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) provides that a number of weapons offenses, including the offense of dealing without a license, require that the proscribed conduct be willfully undertaken. ... Nothing in the traditional willfulness instruction, nor in its underlying purpose, requires that the defendant possess specific knowledge of the statutory provision that makes his conduct unlawful.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not treat a licensed firearms dealer as unlicensed merely because the dealer sells firearms away from the licensed premises.

United States v. Caldwell · filed 1995-03-14(a)(1)(A)

A licensed firearm’s dealer is not unlicensed for liability under § 922(a)(1)(A), yet licensed for purposes of record-keeping requirements.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) covers unlicensed firearms dealing when the evidence supports an inference of a regular business pursued for profit.

United States v. Lenard Ray Beecham, United States of America v. Lenard Ray Beecham · filed 1993-06-02(a)(1)(A)

It is sufficient that the evidence supports an inference that dealing in firearms was a regular business to which the defendant devoted time and effort and from which he intended to obtain a profit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit a licensed gun dealer from possessing firearms while winding down operations under a valid license pursuant to section 925(b).

United States v. Douglas · filed 1992-10-14(g)(1)

As a matter of law, a gun dealer who is winding down his operations under section 925(b) pursuant to a valid license cannot be convicted of possession of firearms under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(a)(1) requires firearms dealers to be licensed for both intrastate and interstate trade.

United States v. Gross · filed 1970-06-24(a)(1)

The Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act replaced the Federal Firearms Act, in part, with the section now in question, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1), which, in addition to requiring a license for interstate commerce in firearms, also requires that all persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing or dealing in firearms be licensed. It was Congress’ intent to license both intrastate and interstate trade in firearms under the 1968 Act.

Section 922(a)(1) requires firearms dealers to be licensed even when their dealings are entirely intrastate.

United States v. Fancher · filed 1970-12-01(a)(1)

The relevant language contained in § 922(a) (1), as set out above, viewed together with the legislative history of such section, indicates beyond logical dispute that the intention of Congress was that all dealers in firearms must comply with the federal licensing requirements.

Section 922(a)(1) imposes a firearms dealer licensing requirement distinct from the Internal Revenue registration requirement, permitting convictions under both for the same course of dealing.

United States v. Richard A. Lauchli, Jr. · filed 1971-06-10(a)(1)

Under Count I, Lauchli was charged with engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without being licensed by the Secretary of the Treasury (18 U.S.C. §§ 923(a) and 922(a) (1)) while in Count II, Lauehli was charged with dealing in firearms without registering with the District Director of Internal Revenue of the Internal Revenue Service. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5802 and 5861(a). Congress undoubtedly intended that these statutes, enacted under different titles of the United States Code, be treated as imposing distinct and separate requirements.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits unlicensed firearms dealing, and evidence of sales or offers involving six weapons can support a finding that a person is engaged in that business.

United States v. Zeidman · filed 1971-06-30(a)(1)

Evidence was introduced by the Government from which the trier of fact could conclude that defendant was engaged in the business of dealing in firearms and we will not here try the case de novo.

Section 922(a)(1)'s unlicensed dealing offense does not require proof of a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Franke · filed 1971-08-18(a)(1)

The possession of firearms offense under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 requires as a substantive part of the crime proof of a prior felony conviction by a defendant. The unlicensed dealing offense does not.

Section 922(a)(1) covers unlicensed firearms dealing when selling firearms occupies a person’s time, attention and labor for livelihood or profit.

United States v. Gross · filed 1971-11-02(a)(1)

There appears to be little doubt that “dealer” means anyone who is engaged in any business of selling firearms, and that “business” is that which occupies time, attention and labor for the purpose of livelihood or profit.

Section 922(a)(1) prohibits unlicensed firearms dealing even when the dealing is entirely intrastate.

United States v. John J. Ruisi and Dorothy C. Korn · filed 1972-05-22(a)(1)

It is impossible to read the statute except as demonstrating that Congress intended to make unlawful unlicensed dealing in firearms whether interstate or intrastate.

Section 922(a)(1) requires a license to deal in firearms even when the sales occur entirely within one state.

United States v. Day · filed 1973-04-05(a)(1)

There can be no doubt that the Congress intended, and through its words accomplished, the regulation of unlicensed intrastate sales of firearms.