18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits knowingly making a false statement material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale, and Section 922(g)(5) prohibits an unlawfully present alien from receiving a firearm transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 1990-10-18(a)(6) and (g)(5)

Hernandez was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(6) which makes it unlawful ... Intentionally providing false information on an ATF Form 4473 constitutes a violation of Sec. 922(a)(6). ... Hernandez also was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(5) which makes it unlawful for any alien "illegally or unlawfully in the United States" to "receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." ... It is not necessary to show that the defendant actually received a weapon to prove "receipt" of a firearm under Sec. 922; receipt may be established circumstantially by proving possession. ... Had Hernandez received the pistol after filing his amnesty application, he would not have been illegally in the United States for purposes of Sec. 922(g)(5). However, because Hernandez purchased the gun before seeking amnesty, we must conclude that sufficient evidence supports his conviction under Sec. 922(g)(5).

Section 922(a)(6) does not require specific intent to deceive a firearms dealer.

United States v. Elias · filed 1991-07-02(a)(6)

Elias’ claim that no factual basis exists for a specific intent element is without merit because specific intent to deceive a dealer is not required.

Section 922(a)(6) regulates natural persons; an argument that it does not is frivolous.

Tim Rector, Samuel Paiz, Douglas Rector and Ron Rector v. United States · filed 1993-10-14(a)(6)

In a separate case, Paiz was found guilty after a jury trial of knowingly making false statements to a firearms dealer in order to obtain firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(a)(6) and 924(a). ... Paiz's argument that the statutes under which he was convicted do not regulate "natural persons" is rejected as being both untimely under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1), cf. United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1259-60 (6th Cir.1991) (challenge to court's personal jurisdiction is subject to waiver), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1217 (1992), and patently frivolous.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a person signing ATF Form 4473 knew the statement was false, even when purchasing a firearm for someone else.

United States v. Williams · filed 1994-05-18(a)(6)

Although the defendants made false statements by signing their names to ATF Form 4473, this court finds that they did not do so knowingly.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a purchaser's knowing false denial of a felony conviction to obtain a firearm.

United States v. Moore · filed 1994-09-15(a)(6)

Under the facts here, it is clear beyond question that the jury reasonably could have concluded that defendant falsified his status as a convicted felon in order to facilitate or accomplish the purchase of a firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a buyer from falsely stating on a firearm purchase application that the buyer is eligible to purchase a firearm; it is not limited to false identification.

United States v. Raymond Walker, III · filed 1995-01-10(a)(6)

The plain language of Sec. 922(a)(6), therefore, encompasses a false statement on a purchase application indicating that the buyer is not restricted from purchasing a firearm. Contrary to Walker's position on this issue, the statutory provision is not limited to display of false identification.

Evidence that a defendant bought firearms after falsely denying prior felony convictions can support convictions under § 922(a)(6) and § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Scott · filed 1995-02-21(a)(6), (g)(1)

A grand jury handed up an indictment charging Mr. Scott with two counts of making a false statement to a firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(6) and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). ... The unrefuted fingerprint evidence, handwriting evidence and driver's license evidence provided ample support for the jury's finding that it was Scott who bought the guns and that he was the same man who had previously been convicted of felonies in Florida and Ohio.

Whether a purchaser’s identity is material to the lawfulness of a firearms sale under § 922(a)(6) is a question of law for the court.

United States v. Klais · filed 1995-11-13(a)(6)

Whether the identity of the purchaser is a fact material to the lawfulness of the transaction (that is, whether the lawfulness of a firearms sale can hinge on the identity of the purchaser) is purely a question of law. It should not have been submitted to the jury.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a purchaser’s signature on a firearm purchase form as a representation that its answers are true, even if someone else filled them in.

United States v. Gonzalez · filed 1996-01-04(a)(6)

Thus, even accepting appellant’s argument that he had not actually written “no” on the BATF 4473 forms, the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to sustain his convictions under § 922(a)(6), since appellant’s signature on the BATF 4473 forms constituted a representation by him that the responses on the forms were true, even if those responses were actually filled in by someone else.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a knowing false statement in connection with a firearm purchase.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 1995-12-18(a)(6)

Sanchez argues the evidence does not show that his statement was knowing. We have reviewed the record and find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination of guilt.

Section 922(a)(6) covers an attempted firearm acquisition even if no one receives a firearm.

United States v. Brown · filed 1996-04-19(a)(6)

But § 922(a)(6) does not require that anyone receive a fire- arm, only that an attempted acquisition was made.

Section 922(a)(6) does not prohibit false statements about a third party's firearm purchase for a minor when the parent consents and the sale is lawful, because the statements are not material to the sale's lawfulness.

96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3958, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6451 United States of America v. Mary Peggy Moore, United States o · filed 1996-06-04(a)(6)

Neither can the charge that defendants violated § 922(a)(6) by making false statements material to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm. Because the purchase for the minor by Wiley was lawfully made with the consent of the minor's parent, Moore, defendants' false statements were not material to the lawfulness of the sale.

Intentionally providing false information on ATF Form 4473 can violate § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Smith · filed 1996-07-30(a)(6)

Intentionally providing false information on an ATF Form 4473 constitutes a violation of § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) requires a person to knowingly make a false statement when acquiring a firearm, but does not require knowledge that the statement violates the law.

United States v. Burton · filed 1996-11-27(a)(6)

As we have already outlined, the violation of § 922(a)(6) is a general intent crime. See Cornett, 484 F.2d at 1368. Burton admitted that he knowingly made false statements to GSI. This level of intent suffices under the statute; specific intent need not be shown.

Section 922(a)(6) permits evidence of the particular firearms dealer’s knowledge or state of mind when deciding whether a false statement was likely to deceive that dealer.

United States v. Falcon · filed 1997-02-24(a)(6)

This Court rejected the Government’s arguments, finding that the statute’s plain reference to “such dealer” required that this phrase be reflected in the instructions, and necessarily permitted evidence concerning the dealer’s knowledge and/or state of mind at the time of the transactions in dispute.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof of material misstatements to a firearms dealer, whether or not the buyer receives a firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 1997-05-16(a)(6)

Count 2 requires the Government to show that Defendant made material misstatements to a firearms dealer regardless of whether he actually received a firearm, while Count 3 requires a showing that Defendant actually did receive a firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a false statement in a firearms purchase to be intended or likely to deceive the dealer about whether the sale is lawful.

United States v. Ivey · filed 2000-06-16(a)(6)

In order to violate the statute, the false statements must be “intended or likely to deceive” the dealer into believing the firearms purchase is lawful. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find that the appellant’s statements on 12 March 1996 were intended to or likely to deceive Mr. Bernstein.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require prior felon status for a charge of inducing a false statement in the acquisition of a firearm.

United States v. Toatley · filed 2001-01-17(a)(6)

Counts I and II were unrelated to Counts III and IV insofar as felon status was not a prerequisite to inducing the making of a false statement in the acquisition of a firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) does not create a separate attempt offense for false statements made during an attempted firearm purchase.

United States v. Padilla · filed 2001-04-11(a)(6)

Padilla’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) consists of separate offenses, including a separate attempt offense, has been rejected by this court.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits aiding and abetting a knowingly false statement to a firearms dealer to deceive the dealer about the lawfulness of a firearm sale.

United States v. Lynch · filed 2001-05-29(a)(6)

First, to sustain the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), the evidence would have to establish that Lynch (1) aided and abetted Ferensic, (2) in making a knowingly false statement to a firearms dealer, (3) in the acquisition of a firearm, (4) so as to deceive the dealer as to the lawfulness of the sale.

Section 922(a)(6)'s knowledge element can be satisfied when the firearms form defines “information” and the buyer's court appearances support a finding that he knew he was under information.

United States v. Ausbon · filed 2001-05-18(a)(6)

Because the very form signed by Ausbon specifically defined “information” as “a formal accusation of a crime made by a prosecuting attorney,” and because the evidence showed that Ausbon had made many court appearance with respect to these charges, the jury was authorized to determine that Ausbon was well aware that he was under “information” at the time.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a false street address as material to a firearm sale because the dealer must record the buyer’s correct residence address.

United States v. Norris · filed 2002-04-29(a)(6)

By falsifying his address, Norris caused the dealers to fail to record the buyer’s “place of residence,” which, as the BATF’s Form 4473 interprets it, includes the buyer’s street address. The firearms sales to Norris were thus illegal under §§ 922(b)(5) as implemented by §§ 923, 178.124, and Form 4473. Norris’s correct residence address was therefore material to the lawfulness of the gun sales.

Section 922(a)(6) treats the true firearm purchaser’s identity as material to the lawfulness of the sale, even if that purchaser could lawfully buy the firearm.

United States v. Phanphil · filed 2002-06-28(a)(6)

A second approach, which we adopt, is that the identity of the true purchaser is a “fact” material to the lawfulness of the sale, regardless of the eligibility of the true purchaser.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a knowingly false statement to a licensed firearms dealer that is intended or likely to deceive the dealer about whether a firearm can lawfully be sold.

United States v. Kelly · filed 2002-07-01(a)(6)

Based upon our review, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that: the seller was a licensed firearms dealer; Kelly made a false statement; he knew it was false; and it was intended, or likely, to deceive the seller into believing the firearm could be lawfully sold to Kelly.

Section 922(a)(6)’s knowledge requirement is satisfied when a person deliberately disregards whether a firearm acquisition statement is false with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.

United States v. Blosser · filed 2002-12-17(a)(6)

Mr. Blosser knowingly made a false statement to acquire a firearm after being convicted of a crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). He possessed the necessary mens rea by deliberately disregarding whether his answer was true or false, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.

A false statement about drug use can be material to a firearm sale under § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Spencer · filed 2002-12-27(a)(6)

The government put on evidence at trial showing that a misrepresentation as to drug use was material to the sale.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits knowingly making false statements when acquiring firearms, and evidence that a buyer purchased guns with another person’s money can support a conviction.

United States v. Narcisse · filed 2003-03-28(a)(6)

In light of trial testimony supporting the jury’s verdict, including evidence that Narcisse purchased fifteen guns from federally licensed firearm dealers with money given to him by Rayshawn Rucker; that Rucker could not purchase the guns himself because he was on probation; and that several of the guns were recovered in various cities along the East Coast in connection with crimes, Narcisse’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence fails.

A buyer’s admissions can establish that he knowingly made a false statement intended or likely to deceive a firearm dealer under § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Petry · filed 2003-06-10(a)(6)

Petras voluntary admissions, in and of themselves, are sufficient to support the verdict that he knowingly made a false statement intended or likely to deceive the firearms dealer, especially when viewed in the prosecution’s favor.

A person may be convicted of aiding false statements in firearm purchases when the evidence shows he knew the purchasers would make the statements and recruited, directed, and paid them.

United States v. Steele · filed 2003-11-10(a)(6)

We think a rational trier of fact could have a concluded that Steele knew that the three purchasers would have to make false statements. And Steele’s contention that he did not provide any affirmative assistance to the making of false statements is frivolous. He recruited and compensated his cohorts, instructed them to buy particular guns, and paid for the guns. Certainly a rational trier of fact could conclude that he provided some assistance to their acts of making false statements.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a firearm purchase in which another person falsely claims to be the actual purchaser while the defendant pays for and takes possession of the guns.

United States v. Parks · filed 2004-04-14(a)(6)

She testified that after the purchase–and again, contrary to her attestation that she was the actual purchaser–Parks took possession of both newly-acquired firearms. ... Parks, however, provided the funds for Tindall's purchase of the handguns and took possession of the guns after Tindall completed each purchase. Given Tindall's testimony, the jury's verdict rests on evidence that is more than sufficient to support the gun-related convictions.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a gun buyer from giving a false street address on ATF Form 4473 because the address is material to the lawfulness of the sale.

United States v. Queen, Matthew · filed 2005-05-12(a)(6)

Lying about a street address on an ATF Form 4473 is a material misrepresentation that violates § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a straw buyer from falsely identifying himself as the actual purchaser on a firearms form and is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to that conduct.

United States v. Moore · filed 2005-06-15(a)(6)

Moore’s challenge to the statute and his indictment is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Blake, 394 F.3d 1089, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss indictment charging him under § 922(a)(6) for representing on ATF form that he was actual buyer of firearms; district court properly held that statute was not unconstitutionally vague and defendant’s “straw purchases” of firearms on behalf of others who provided purchaser money clearly violated § 922(a)(6)); United States v. Kirchoff, 387 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 2004) (denial of motion to dismiss indictment reviewed de novo), petition for cert. filed, No. 04-9167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2005).

Section 922(a)(6) does not require proof that the defendant had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Brigman · filed 2005-08-03(a)(6)

Although it is true, as asserted by Brigman, that evidence of a prior felony conviction was not an element of the charged offense, such evidence was relevant to the issues of motive and intent.

Section 922(a)(6) makes it unlawful to knowingly make a false statement about a material fact when acquiring a firearm from a licensed dealer.

United States v. Christian · filed 2006-02-22(a)(6)

We conclude that in the light most favorable to the Government, this evidence is sufficient to meet the deceptive conduct requirement of § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6)’s licensed-dealer element can be supported by evidence that the defendant completed ATF Form 4473 when acquiring a firearm.

United States v. Milian · filed 2006-06-21(a)(6)

Milian admitted at the plea colloquy that, when he went to reacquire the firearm at the University Gun and Pawn Shop, he filled out an ATF Form 4473. This fact was sufficient for the district court to have reasonably concluded that University Gun and Pawn Shop was federally licensed, as federally licensed firearms dealers use this form.

Section 922(a)(6)’s licensed dealer element can be established through testimony from the dealer’s owner and an ATF agent.

United States v. Frye · filed 2006-08-23(a)(6)

Sagarra’s and Morales’s testimony provided a sufficient predicate for the jury’s finding that Daddy’s was a licensed dealer.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a firearm buyer’s false statement that he is not under indictment for a felony; the offense does not depend on a restraining order.

United States v. Mallory · filed 2007-08-21(a)(6)

Instead, the instant federal offense stems directly from Dr. M allory’s false statement he was not under indictment for a felony crime at the time he attempted to purchase a gun. As a result, his instant offense is not related to the mandatory restraining order.

Section 922(a)(6) requires knowledge that a statement made when attempting to purchase a firearm is false, not knowledge that the buyer is prohibited from owning a firearm.

Hart v. Gaione · filed 2007-11-20(a)(6)

Hart’s statement to Gaioni in an interview that he believed that he was not prohibited from owning a firearm based on a prior interaction with state police does not undermine this conclusion because the relevant inquiry is whether Hart knew the statement was false, not whether he knew that he was prohibited from owning a firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) permits conviction for a knowingly false statement likely to deceive a firearms dealer about a fact material to the sale, even without deceptive intent.

United States v. Edgerton · filed 2007-12-06(a)(6)

The trial judge’s instructions closely tracked the language of Section 922(a)(6) and properly informed the jury that it could convict if Edgerton knowingly made a false statement to a licensed firearms dealer and his statement was likely to deceive. Deceptive intent is not required if this standard is met.

Section 922(a)(6) requires an indictment to charge that a false statement was intended or likely to deceive.

United States v. Houston · filed 2008-03-25(a)(6)

Although the indictment is plainly erroneous because it fails to charge the “intended or likely to deceive” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed- ings.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require an explicit willful blindness instruction on demand when the jury charge correctly explains the knowledge requirement.

United States v. Whitney · filed 2008-04-28(a)(6)

Having reviewed those cases, however, it is clear that none of them stands for Whitney’s proposition that an explicit willful blindness instruction in § 922(a)(6) cases must be given on demand.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a straw purchaser’s false claim to be the actual buyer because the buyer’s identity is material to the lawfulness of the firearm sale.

United States v. Alwali · filed 2011-07-22(a)(6)

Because the purchaser’s identity as the “actual buyer” is material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale and must be recorded on the Form 4473, the jury reasonably concluded that Cleveland’s misrepresentation of herself as the actual buyer constituted a violation of §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A).

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof of only one material false statement when a single count alleges two.

United States v. Delbert Holley, Jr. · filed 2013-05-07(a)(6)

The government was only required to prove one of the two alleged material false statements to obtain Holley’s conviction.

Under § 922(a)(6), a false answer on a firearm purchase form can be likely to deceive a dealer despite the dealer’s knowledge of an earlier purchase denial, if the dealer could believe the buyer’s right to purchase firearms had been restored.

United States v. Gerlt · filed 2014-01-30(a)(6)

We reject Gerlt’s argument that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that his false statements on the ATF Form 4473 completed on September 2, 2009, were intended or likely to deceive Russ. Russ testified that in December 2008 he had given Gerlt the forms needed to appeal the firearm-purchase denial and that he was unaware of whether Gerlt had appealed. A reasonable jury could find that Russ inferred from Gerlt’s September 2009 attempt to purchase firearms that Gerlt had appealed his denial and had his right to purchase firearms restored between December 2008 and September 2009.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a knowing false statement made in connection with acquiring a firearm that is material to the legality of the sale.

United States v. Edward Purry, II · filed 2017-08-02(a)(6)

The offense of which Purry was convicted requires that (1) a defendant knowingly, (2) make a false statement, (3) in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, (4) that relates to facts material to the legality of the firearm sale.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a knowingly false written statement connected to a firearm purchase, intended or likely to deceive a licensed dealer and material to the purchase’s lawfulness.

United States v. Saffioti · filed 2019-11-25(a)(6)

To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), the government must show that (1) the defendant knowingly made (2) a false written statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm (3) intended or likely to deceive a licensed firearms dealer and (4) the false statement was material to the lawfulness ... of the purchase.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a defendant knowingly made a false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer.

Com. v. Gross, E. · filed 2020-04-29(a)(6)

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a defendant knowingly made a false statement to a federally licensed arms dealer.

For a § 922(a)(6) charge, a jury may infer that a firearm buyer knew of a prior commitment order from the evidence.

United States v. Pearson · filed 2020-08-28(a)(6)

A review of the record indicates that a rational jury could infer from the Government’s evidence that Pearson had knowledge of his prior commitment order when he attempted to acquire the firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits making a false statement when purchasing a firearm, including failing to disclose a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Wade · filed 1977-12-09(a)(6)

Wade also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he made a false statement at the time of the purchase of the pistol and that he knowingly possessed the pistol. Those arguments are without merit.

Section 922(a)(6) can cover a firearm buyer’s denial of a pending indictment when a plea agreement calls for dismissal of the charges but the prosecutor has not yet dismissed them.

United States v. Moody · filed 2000-12-05(a)(6)

Accordingly, even though the State agreed to dismiss two counts of the indictment, that dismissal did not actually take effect, and therefore Moody was still under indictment, until the prosecution filed its nolle prosequi.

Section 922(a)(6)’s knowledge requirement is met when a gun buyer recklessly fails to learn what Form 4473 asks and answers without regard to whether the answers are truthful.

United States v. Santiago-Fraticelli · filed 1984-03-26(a)(6)

Contrary to the defendant’s arguments, Wright is not limited to situations in which an accused knew he was lying. Wright holds that the scienter requirement of § 922(a)(6) is met when a person recklessly fails to ascertain the meaning of the questions contained in Form 4473, and simply answers the questions without regard to whether the answers are truthful.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits falsely certifying that one is the purchaser of a firearm when another person is the actual purchaser.

Fulkerson v. Lynch · filed 2017-06-07(a)(6)

Cindy falsified ATF 4473 forms by certifying that she was the purchaser of firearms that were actually purchased for Charles Fulkerson in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A).

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits knowingly making a false statement material to the lawfulness of a firearm purchase from a licensed dealer, including a false residence address.

United States v. Colt Government Pistol CAL:45 SN:SCGA5964 · filed 2022-01-19(a)(6)

No issues of material fact exist, and the allegations of the Complaint are established as a matter of law. The property is subject to forfeiture because law enforcement can demonstrate that the defendant property is: i. any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1); ii. any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) and is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1); and iii. any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) and is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1).

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits false statements made in connection with an attempted firearm acquisition from a licensed dealer.

United States v. Barrett Firearms MFG CO 82A1, Rifle CAL:50 BMG, SN: AA013938 · filed 2023-01-04(a)(6)

Taken as true, as they must be here, the factual allegations establish that the defendant property was used in a knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A). These provisions prohibit false statements made in connection with the attempted acquisition of a firearm from a licensed dealer.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a material false statement to a firearms dealer even when the constitutionality of the law affecting the sale remains unresolved.

United States v. Holden · filed 2023-06-16(a)(6)

The word “material” in §922(a)(6) does not create a privilege to lie, when the answer is material to a stat- ute, whether or not that statute has an independent constitu- tional problem.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a buyer’s knowingly false current address as material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale.

United States v. Dallas Terrell Smith · filed 2023-08-02(a)(6)

Gudger makes clear that providing a false address is “material to the lawful- ness of the sale” under § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) covers acquiring a firearm by knowingly giving a false address on ATF Form 4473.

United States v. One Smith and Wesson SDV9VE Pistol, 9 MM SN FEC0557 · filed 2024-03-04(a)(6)

The Government’s verified complaint alleges a sufficient basis for forfeiture. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1), any firearm acquired in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) may be seized by and forfeited to the United States. The statute thus encompasses firearms acquired by knowingly providing false information in ATF Form 4473. ... Thus, based on the Government’s allegation that Mr. Cisneros provided a false address on ATF Form 4473 to purchase the Defendant Pistol, it is subject to forfeiture.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a person buying firearms for someone else from falsely claiming to be the true purchaser.

United States v. Manney · filed 2024-08-19(a)(6)

Based on this evidence and other evidence adduced at trial, a rational trier of fact could find that Manney’s statement claiming to be the true purchaser of the firearms violated § 922(a)(6) beyond a ... reasonable doubt.

Section 922(a)(6) requires truthful statements when attempting to acquire a firearm from a licensed dealer, even if the buyer challenges the firearm restrictions as unconstitutional.

United States v. McDougal · filed 2025-11-13(a)(6)

McDougal’s constitutional challenge does not relieve him of his statutory duty to tell the truth—specifically under § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a firearm buyer from knowingly giving a licensed dealer false answers about facts that disqualify the buyer from purchasing a firearm.

United States v. Otis Rollins, Jr. · filed 2026-06-17(a)(6)

Rollins stipulated that, at the time, he knew that he had been convicted of a felony, that he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance, that he was subject to a court order restraining him from harassing a child, and that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, all contrary to his responses to questions on the form asking about those firearm-purchasing disqualifiers. In light of this and other evidence, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Rollins’s motion for judgment of acquittal, or abuse its discretion in denying his alternative request for a new trial.

Section 922(a)(5) requires proof that the defendant was not a licensed dealer.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2012-05-18(a)(5)

One element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) is that defendant was not a licensed dealer.

Section 922(a)(5) prohibits transferring a firearm to someone the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe lives outside the transferor’s state, including a foreign resident.

United States v. Sprenger · filed 2010-11-22(a)(5)

The statutory language is clear: it prohibits transfer to someone the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in the same state. Contrary to Mr. Sprenger’s suggestion, there is no requirement that the transferee be a resident of a state in the United States.

Section 922(b)(3) requires a licensed dealer to know that a firearm buyer lives out of state, but does not require the dealer to know that the buyer lacks a federal firearms license.

United States v. Kelly · filed 2007-08-14(b)(3)

The willfulness (and knowledge) requirement does not apply to the “dealer to dealer” provision in section 922(b), which is an exception to the statute’s application and not an element of the offense. Accordingly, there was no error in the instruction because the government was not required to prove that Kelly knew that the transferee was not a federally licensed firearms dealer.

Aiding and abetting an illegal firearms transfer under § 922(a)(5) requires proof that the defendant knew the transferor was unlicensed.

United States v. Hilliard · filed 2004-12-28(a)(5)

Thus, the fact that Hilliard had knowledge that gun sales in Chicago were prohibited does not satisfy the elements of the charged offense, which required proof that Hilliard knew Baskerville was not licensed to make firearms transfers.

An agreement to sell a machine gun can establish intent to violate § 922(a)(4).

United States of America, -Appellee v. Tommy R. Scarbrough and Lars A. Brannholm · filed 1993-03-29(a)(4)

Tommy’s agreement to sell. Brannholm the Mac-10 established his intent to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4), unlawful transfer of gun ownership.

Section 922(b)(3) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling firearms to a nonresident through a resident straw purchaser; evidence that the dealer knew the nonresident was the actual buyer can support a conviction.

United States v. Straach · filed 1993-03-19(b)(3)

While the evidence supporting defendant’s conviction on count two was adequate, the evidence supporting his conviction on count five was overwhelming. ... The nonresident then told Straach that he only had an Oklahoma license, and asked whether his Texan friend should therefore complete the necessary paperwork. Straach told the nonresident that he should give the purchase money to the resident, who should fill out the Form 4473.

Section 922(b)(3) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling a firearm to a nonresident through a resident acting as a straw purchaser when the dealer knows the transaction is a sham.

U.S. v. Straach · filed 1993-03-22(b)(3)

Nevertheless, Straach had every reason to know what a strawman transaction was, that this was just such a transaction, and that it was illegal.

A conviction under § 922(a)(5) can rest on credited testimony that the buyer told the seller he lived in another state.

United States v. Stamas · filed 1971-06-04(a)(5)

Defendant’s initial contention is that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he knew Lindquist came from Maine. Indeed, Lindquist testified that he was initially introduced to defendant as Stanley Clark from Revere, Massachusetts. However, Lindquist also testified that he later told defendant that he used to reside in Revere but was now living in Maine, and the jury was certainly entitled to believe that testimony.

Section 922(a)(5) requires the transferor to know or have reasonable cause to believe that the firearm recipient resides in another state; an intermediary’s ignorance does not defeat proof of the transferor’s knowledge.

United States v. Rispo · filed 1972-02-11(a)(5)

Defendants also assume that the government relied upon the testimony of Martin Percarsky to prove that the ten handguns were transferred to persons residing in another state. This is another ridiculous assumption since, at trial Percarsky denied such knowledge. It is evident from the facts brought out at trial that although Percarsky was ignorant of the ultimate destination of the handguns, the Rispos were not. Clearly, Percarsky’s ignorance is not determinative of the defendant’s knowledge and intentions. Defendant’s contention is without merit.

Section 922(a)(5) requires the firearm purchaser to actually reside in another state; reasonable cause to believe the purchaser does so addresses proof of the seller’s knowledge.

United States v. Kraase · filed 1973-07-16(a)(5)

Therefore, we interpret the statutory language to mean that the purchaser must in fact be a non-resident and that the “reasonable cause to believe” clause serves merely to lighten the Government’s burden of proving subjective intent.

Section 922(b)(3) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling firearms to an alien who has not established residence in the dealer’s state.

The United States of America v. Hector G. Camacho, the United States of America v. Jose Dolores Raygoza · filed 1976-05-24(b)(3)

An alien who has not established residence in the state where the licensed dealer is located falls within the class of persons to whom the dealer is not permitted to sell firearms under § 922(b)(3).

Section 922(d) does not foreclose prosecution of firearm transferors who fall outside its coverage.

United States v. Falletta · filed 1975-11-28(d)

First, we cannot view § 922(d) as purporting to foreclose prosecution of any transferors of firearms who are not covered therein.

Section 922(b)(3) does not prohibit a firearm sale between residents of the same state, even if the dealer reasonably believes the buyer lives elsewhere.

United States v. Plyman · filed 1977-05-04(b)(3)

We concur that Congress did not intend to regulate sales of firearms between residents of the same state.

Section 922(b)(2) permits a licensed dealer to rely on the prescribed identification and firearms form procedures to establish reasonable cause to believe a sale complies with state law, unless the dealer knows of contrary circumstances.

Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1978-01-27(b)(2)

Compliance with the procedures prescribed -in the regulations constitutes sufficient proof that a dealer has “reasonable cause to believe” that a purchase is not in violation of state law, at least when he is unaware of other circumstances which would detract from that conclusion.

Section 922(b)(2) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling firearms without permits required by a published local ordinance when the dealer has no reason to believe the sales are lawful.

Service Arms Co. v. United States, Department of Treasury · filed 1978-05-05(b)(2)

Evidence before the court establishes that Plaintiff sold and delivered four hundred sixteen handguns in Midwest City, Oklahoma, between November 29, 1973, and October 15, 1974. One hundred ninety-two of these guns were sold without the required permit first being obtained from the Midwest City Chief of Police. There is nothing in the record herein to indicate that Plaintiff (or Young) knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the sale of these guns without the necessary permits would not be in violation of the applicable Midwest City ordinances. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that Young was aware of the permit requirements of the ordinances. Therefore, the Court finds and concludes that the Regional Director’s decision concerning this violation was correct.

Section 922(h) covers receipt of a firearm that crossed state lines before the section took effect.

United States v. Agnes · filed 1978-07-07(h)

Section 922(h) does not require that the interstate transportation occur after its effective date. Rather, the language of the statute suggests by using the present perfect tense (“has been shipped or transported”) that Congress intended § 922(h) to apply to interstate commerce which has occurred at some indefinite time in the past.

Section 922(h) covers a felon’s receipt of a firearm previously transported in interstate commerce, even after intervening intrastate transactions and a lapse of time.

United States v. Quay C. Kilburn · filed 1979-03-19(h)

Nothing in Barrett diminishes our holding that a firearm previously transported in interstate commerce which has been the subject of more than one intrastate transaction and which is remote in time to its previous interstate movement is covered by § 922(h) of the Act.

Section 922(h)(1) does not require the government to prove that a convicted felon received a firearm before any intervening intrastate movement.

United States v. Wynde · filed 1978-07-24(h)(1)

We adopt the conclusion, restricted to this issue, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Haddad, supra, (C.A.9, 1977) 558 F.2d 968, and hold that the Government is not required under § 922(h) to prove that the defendant received the firearm prior to any intervening intrastate movement of it.

Section 922(g)'s interstate transportation element may be proved by circumstantial evidence that defendants acted in concert to move firearms between states.

United States v. Donald G. Beardslee and Robert W. Gorman · filed 1979-11-27(g)

We find that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the reasonable inference that, acting in concert, the two had transported the firearms from Florida to Missouri.

Section 922(b)(3) prohibits a sham sale to a resident when the transaction is really with a nonresident.

United States v. Brooks · filed 1980-02-11(b)(3)

The quick answer to both arguments is that the statute is violated by a sham sale made to a resident when the transaction is really with a nonresident, and it is for the jury to decide, on all the relevant evidence and with proper instructions, whether such a charade occurred or whether there was a bona fide sale to a resident.

Section 922(b)(3) covers a sale to a resident intermediary when the purchase is a subterfuge for a nonresident real buyer.

United States v. Scannapieco · filed 1980-02-11(b)(3)

The instruction was properly limited to the “real buyer” who is a nonresident and to a purchase made as a subterfuge by a resident intermediary. There was no error in this instruction.

Section 922(a)(3) does not prohibit a person from transporting a firearm obtained in one state of residence to another state of residence.

United States v. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, Etc., Appeal of Don McBain · filed 1980-08-28(a)(3)

Because § 922(a)(3) on its face does not speak directly to the situation in which an individual has more than one residence, we think that it should be construed in the light of this legislative history not to prohibit the transport of a firearm obtained in one state of residence to another.

Section 922(a)(5) requires proof that the firearm was transferred to a person known to reside in another state.

United States v. Rok Gjurashaj and Gjon Dushaj · filed 1983-04-18(a)(5)

In the context of the present case, if there was no evidence that GX 31 was found in Berisha’s possession, there was no proof as to its transfer to a person known to reside outside of California — an essential element of the offense charged under § 922(a)(5), see note 2 supra — and the defendants were entitled to acquittals on count 31.

Section 922(a)(3) requires proof that the defendant resided in the state into which the firearm was transported.

United States v. Simontov Yakobov, A/K/A "Yakov Yakubov," · filed 1983-06-30(a)(3)

Count 3 of the indictment charged Yakobov with having violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), which makes it unlawful for an unlicensed person to receive in or transport into the state where he resides a firearm he has obtained outside the state. The indictment alleged that Yakobov violated that provision by causing guns to be transported from Florida to New York. Accordingly, the government was obligated to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Yakobov resided in the State of New York.

Section 922(a)(3) does not exempt unlicensed interstate firearm trafficking because the person claims residence in both states.

United States v. Matteo · filed 1983-10-04(a)(3)

A rule giving effect to the defendant’s interpretation of § 922(a)(3) would seriously hamper the effective enforcement of Title IV; all one would need to do to circumvent the plain meaning of the statute would be to establish residency in two states between which he intended to “run guns.” Such an interpretation would, as Representative Corman was careful to warn against, frustrate the purpose of the bill. We therefore hold that the defendant’s actions fall squarely within the literal sweep of § 922(a)(3).

Circumstantial evidence can establish that a convicted felon transported a firearm across state lines under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Marshall · filed 1983-10-26(g)(1)

Marshall’s conviction for receiving the rifle, which he does not appeal, indicates that the jury believed Marshall’s companion, who said that Marshall took possession of the rifle in Wisconsin. The police discovered the same rifle in Cannon’s apartment in Illinois about four months later. ... The evidence against Marshall was circumstantial, but that alone does not mean the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. ... The district court did not err in denying Marshall’s motions for judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(h)(1) does not require proof of whether the firearm crossed state lines before or after the Gun Control Act took effect.

United States v. Ronald Michael Goerlich, Jr. · filed 1984-03-16(h)(1)

The government is not required to prove whether interstate movement occurred before or after 1968, when the Gun Control Act went into effect.

Purchasing firearms in another state alone does not establish probable cause of unlawful interstate transportation under § 922(a)(3) or misrepresentation of residence under § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Laferrera · filed 1984-10-25(a)(3), (a)(6)

Section 922(a)(3) prohibits the transportation of firearms into a person’s state of residence from a place outside thereof, if the person is not a federally licensed importer, manufacturer or collector of firearms. To extract from defendant’s statement a finding of probable cause of unauthorized interstate transportation of firearms requires a quantum leap. Nor does the fact that the items were purchased in Florida rise to the level of probable cause to believe the defendant misrepresented his residence when purchasing the weapons in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(b)(2) treats a firearm purchase as illegal when the corresponding sale violates state law, even if that law penalizes only the seller.

United States v. Cerri · filed 1985-01-11(b)(2)

The sale was illegal under paragraph 83-3(a) of the Illinois gun law because the card was not displayed, and therefore the purchase was also illegal. Sale and purchase are the same transaction looked at from the seller’s and the buyer’s side, respectively. It is true that Illinois law visits criminal sanctions for the illegal sale (or purchase) just on the seller.

Section 922(a)(5) requires proof that the defendant knowingly transferred firearms to a resident of another state.

United States v. Bauer · filed 1985-05-24(a)(5)

Defendant also asserted that there was insufficient evidence to show that he knowingly transferred firearms to a person who resided in another state or that he even transferred firearms, both of which are necessary elements to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(5). A thorough review of the record, however, discloses that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict.

Section 922(a)(4) does not prohibit taking a machine gun from the United States into the contiguous zone and back without entering a foreign state.

United States v. One Colt Machine Gun · filed 1986-01-16(a)(4)

This court is likewise compelled to find that absent evidence that the defendants departed from the United States and entered into a foreign state, Title 18 U.S.C., section 922(a)(4) was not violated by the claimant.

Section 922(l) prohibits importing firearms into the United States when no statutory exception applies, including when a police department orders firearms for a dealer’s commercial inventory.

United States v. Goodman · filed 1986-02-12(l)

18 U.S.C. § 922(Z) specifically declares it to be unlawful, with certain limited exceptions as heretofore noted, to import firearms into the United States. Such an exception is not presented here.

Section 922(g) covers a felon who causes a firearm or ammunition to move interstate by setting the delivery process in motion, even without handling it during shipment.

United States v. Petty · filed 1986-10-24(g)

Although Petty was neither at the point of shipment nor receipt and had no contact with the gun or ammunition until its interstate movement was complete, such contacts are not essential for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). All that is necessary for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is that the defendant “set the entire delivery process in motion.”

Section 922(g)’s interstate transportation element may be proved by circumstantial evidence sufficient to show that the defendant carried the firearm across state lines.

United States v. Buck · filed 1986-11-03(g)

Thus, given the extensive surveillance, and given the style and contents of Buck’s description of the period following her crossing of the New York-Connecticut borders, the evidence as a whole, taken in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to allow a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Buck transported the weapon across state lines.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the firearm possessed by a convicted felon travelled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. James Gilliard A/K/A Jimmy Gillard · filed 1988-05-26(g)

Gilliard’s last argument is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence; he claims that the government failed to prove that the weapon in question travelled in or affected interstate commerce, a prerequisite for liability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... The evidence presented amply supports the ... jury finding that the weapon travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a convicted felon's possession of a gun that previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. John J. Gillies, Jr. · filed 1988-07-07(g)(1)

We therefore hold that this statutory language applies to a possession of a gun that previously moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Lowe · filed 1988-10-17(g)(1)

It is firmly established that under § 922(g), proof of a gun’s manufacture outside of the state in which it was allegedly possessed is sufficient to support the factual finding that the firearm was “in or affecting commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sherbondy · filed 1988-12-15(g)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the Scarborough minimal nexus standard applies to section 922(g) and that a past connection with commerce is enough.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Hoffman · filed 1989-02-21(g)(1)

In the present case, the government established at trial that the Raven .25 caliber pistol found in Hoffman's possession was manufactured outside North Carolina, purchased in Virginia, and found in Hoffman's possession in North Carolina. The evidence presented at trial clearly met the nexus requirement set forth in Scarborough.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some time, and an indictment may charge that element by alleging possession “in and affecting commerce.”

United States v. McCarty · filed 1988-11-14(g)(1)

The language “did knowingly possess in and affecting commerce” adequately charged the interstate commerce element of § 922(g) and was sufficient to allow McCarty to prepare a defense to that charge. To prove the required nexus between a defendant’s possession and interstate commerce, the government only has to show that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some time.

Circumstantial evidence can establish that a firearm was transported across state lines under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Roberts · filed 1988-12-13(g)(1)

As in Beardslee, we are satisfied that this is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that “acting in concert the [three] had transported the firearms from [Iowa to Missouri].”

Section 922(a)(5) prohibits firearm transfers between unlicensed residents of different states regardless of which state the transfer occurs in.

United States v. Schwab · filed 1989-04-27(a)(5)

The language of § 922(a)(5) contains no reference or limitation with respect to where such a transfer or delivery takes place. Thus, the unlawfulness of the conduct does not turn on the state in which the transfer or delivery occurs, but on the states of residence of the participants in the transaction.

Section 922(o) does not require proof that the particular prohibited conduct affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Evans · filed 1989-05-16(o)

18 U.S.C. § 922(o) regulates a class of activities without requiring proof that the particular intrastate activity proscribed had a demonstrable effect upon interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing ammunition connected to interstate commerce, including ammunition previously transported across state lines.

United States v. Giannetta · filed 1989-07-07(g)

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) makes it a crime for a convicted felon to possess ammunition that has been transported in interstate commerce. ... Based on a recent opinion by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the Court reads the statute more broadly. ... Given the broad reading of the statute, the Court is satisfied to the extent necessary for this proceeding that Defendant violated section 922(g).

Section 922(a)(3) prohibits an unlicensed person from bringing a firearm obtained outside their state of residence into that state.

United States v. Jerry Prusan and David Vives · filed 1992-06-12(a)(3)

In order to prove that Prusan and Vives violated this statute, therefore, the government must demonstrate that they (1) purchased or obtained a firearm outside New York, their state of residence, (2) transported that firearm into New York, and (3) were unlicensed.

Section 922(a)(5) prohibits transferring a firearm to a person the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe lives outside the transferor's state.

United States v. Murrell Clifford Cox Leroy Figgures · filed 1996-02-20(a)(5)

The statute at issue prohibits the transfer of firearms to anyone "who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in ... the State in which the transferor resides." 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5). We are satisfied that the Government presented sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that Cox had reasonable cause to believe the Intratec-9's were being sold to an out-of-state recipient. Accordingly, Cox's conviction on Count 2 is affirmed.

Section 922(a)(5) creates a single offense for an unlicensed person transferring a firearm to an unlicensed person who lives in another state, regardless of the means of transfer.

United States v. James · filed 1999-03-31(a)(5)

We find it imperative in this situation to distinguish between a statute creating several offenses and a statute merely enumerating several ways of committing the same offense. See United States v. Street, 66 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 1995). The statute at issue falls within the latter category of statutes. In section 922(a)(5), Congress created the single offense of transferring (by any one of several different means) a firearm by an unlicensed person to any other unlicensed person who resides in a different state than the state in which the defendant resides. In one sentence, the statutory language defines a single crime broadly prohibiting the transfer of firearms by unlicensed persons to other unlicensed persons who reside in a different state, and that transfer may be accomplished by a number of related but different specified means.

Section 922(g)(1) and (2) treats placing a firearm or ammunition package in the mail for transport as shipping it.

United States v. Quentin Hinton, AKA Ronnie Baldwin · filed 2000-07-25(g)(1) and (g)(2)

By bringing his package to the post office and beginning the mailing process, Hinton definitely caused the package to be transported by the United States postal system. Consequently, Hinton shipped the package as that term is used in § 922(g)(1) & (2).

Section 922(a)(3) prohibits obtaining firearms outside one's state of residence through an out-of-state agent.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 2003-05-12(a)(3)

Section 922(a)(3) applies to firearms “purchased or otherwise obtained” outside of an individual’s state. By using the term “or otherwise obtained,” Congress communicated its intent to have the statute’s proscription reach beyond straightforward, one-on-one purchases to cover those illegal firearms transactions effected through the use of agents or straw men. Here, the proof established that Mitchell conspired with Lotto, a New York resident, to obtain guns for Lotto outside of Lotto’s state of residence. Lotto gave Mitchell $2,300 to buy guns in Texas; Mitchell bought the guns and transported them to Lotto in New York. In this manner, Lotto, while not the direct purchaser of the weapons, “otherwise obtained” them, and Mitchell conspired with Lotto to violate § 922(a)(3) by serving as his -agent. In reaching this conclusion, we join the First Circuit in characterizing the employment of out-of-state agents to purchase firearms as “otherwise obtaining]” such firearms pursuant to § 922(a)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 952 F.2d 591, 593-94 (1st Cir.1991) (defendant guilty under section 922(a)(3) where he wired money to Georgia resident to buy guns in Georgia). Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to violate this statute was proper.

Section 922(a)(3) does not require proof that the defendant trafficked in firearms or intended to sell them.

Joseph v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2006-10-02(a)(3)

It is not necessary to prove that a defendant engaged in trafficking to sustain a conviction under any of the subsections of § 922(a)(3) and thus we do not have occasion to look to the charging document, or any other facts.

Section 922(a)(5) does not treat a person as a business entity merely because the person sells his labor.

United States v. Bacon · filed 2008-05-05(a)(5)

The agent was not, contrary to Bacon’s contention, a “corporation or business entity” under the meaning of § 922(a)(5) simply by virtue of selling his labor.

Section 922(a)(3) does not bar receipt in Texas of a firearm obtained in Texas, and subsection (b)(3) does not restrict delivery by an unlicensed person.

Crider v. Crider · filed 2011-07-07(a)(3), (b)(3)

We hold that the trial court’s order can be complied with without violation of this statute because, although the order requires Mary to receive the Browning handgun in Texas, Mary did not purchase or obtain the handgun outside of Texas. ... We hold that the trial court’s order can be complied with without violation of this statute because Bruce is not a licensed importer, manufacturer, dealer or collector of firearms with a place of business outside of Texas.

Section 922(a)(9) limits firearm receipt by people who reside in no state to lawful sporting purposes, and § 922(b)(3) prohibits firearm sales to them.

Dearth v. Holder · filed 2012-09-27(a)(9), (b)(3)

Thus, Section 922(a)(9) prohibits one who does not reside in any State to receive any firearms unless such receipt is for “lawful sporting purposes.” Section 922(b)(3) prohibits the sale of any firearm to one who does not reside in any State.

Section 922(a)(5) prohibits an unlicensed person from transferring a firearm to another unlicensed person who resides outside the transferor’s state.

United States v. Tovar · filed 2013-03-13(a)(5)

It is unlawful for an unlicensed person in Louisiana, which one could reasonably infer Landry to be, to trade (whether or not for drugs) a firearm to ... an unlicensed person who did not reside in Louisiana, as one could reasonably infer of Landry’s crystal methamphetamine dealer in Mexico.

Section 922(a)(5) prohibits completed firearm transfers to out-of-state residents but does not criminalize an attempt to transfer.

United States v. Joseph · filed 2013-09-23(a)(5)

We agree with the parties that Count 3 of Joseph’s indictment failed to allege an offense. Count 3 charged Defendant Joseph with an “attempt to transfer” firearms to an out-of-state resident, in violation of § 922(a)(5). However, § 922(a)(5) only makes it illegal “to transfer, sell, trade, give, transport, or deliver any firearm” to an out-of-state resident.

Section 922(b)(3) restricts firearm sales to out-of-state residents, but a magazine packaged with a rifle is not part of the firearm subject to those restrictions.

in Re Academy, Ltd. D/B/A Academy Sports + Outdoors · filed 2021-06-25(b)(3)

First, we reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the packaging of the Model 8500 rendered the Magpul magazine part of the “firearm” that is subject to section 922(b)(3)’s restrictions.

Section 922(a)(5) requires a completed firearm transfer to an unlicensed recipient who resides outside the transferor’s state; an attempted transfer is insufficient.

United States v. Duroseau · filed 2022-02-24(a)(5)

To summarize, we hold that, because § 922(a)(5) does not proscribe attempts to violate the statute, conviction under § 922(a)(5) requires a completed transfer of firearms from an unlicensed person to an unlicensed person who does not reside in the defendant’s state of residence. A defendant charged with transporting firearms under § 922(a)(5) need not himself directly transfer the firearms to the unlicensed recipient, but the transfer must be complete before there is criminal liability under the statute.

Section 922(j) permits a conviction when the evidence supports finding that the defendant possessed a firearm and knew or had reason to believe it was stolen.

United States v. Smith · filed 2021-05-07(j)

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, also supports the conclusion that Victor and Michael possessed the firearms found in the apartment and knew or had reason to believe that they were stolen. See id.; § 922(j).

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen.

United States v. Ridolfi · filed 2014-10-06(j)

For this element, the government was required to prove that Ridolfi knew or had reasonable cause to ... believe that the firearms were stolen.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm was stolen; a low purchase price and an undocumented sale can support that finding.

United States v. Arteaga · filed 2011-08-09(j)

The defendant confessed to purchasing it for $130, 26% of that market value. Moreover, Arteaga admitted to purchasing it from an unlicensed seller who neither claimed that he had lawfully acquired the firearm, nor produced documentation indicating that he had lawfully purchased the firearm. And, as noted above, Arteaga’s confession was corroborated by other evidence. This evidence establishes that Arteaga’s conviction for knowingly possessing a stolen firearm was not a miscarriage of justice.

Section 922(j) prohibits selling a stolen firearm when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe it was stolen.

United States v. McBane · filed 2005-12-30(j)

Applying the relevant language from § 922(j), and evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, Smith’s testimony – combined with the testimony of the Director and the admissions and testimony of McBane himself – quite reasonably could be construed as proof that McBane sold a stolen rifle that he knew or should have known was stolen.

Under § 922(j), obliterated serial numbers can support an inference that a person knew the firearm was stolen.

United States v. Brown · filed 2004-08-12(j)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, ... a rational trier of fact could conclude that a man of ordinary intelligence would have known that he was in possession of a stolen firearm based on the obliterated serial numbers.

Section 922(j) requires proof that it would have been reasonable for the particular defendant to believe the firearm was stolen.

United States v. Chase Alone IronEyes · filed 2004-05-10(j)

But the better reading, we believe, requires proof that a defendant possessed a gun that it would have been reasonable for him or her, in particular, to believe was stolen.

Section 922(j) covers possession of a stolen firearm.

United States v. Clark · filed 2004-04-01(j)

Constru- ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, violating § 924(c), and that Clark possessed a stolen firearm, violating § 922(j).

Section 922(j) requires receipt or possession of stolen firearms that moved in interstate commerce, with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe they were stolen.

United States v. Roalin · filed 2003-04-01(j)

The elements for receiving stolen firearms under § 922(j) are: 1) the receipt or possession of stolen firearms; 2) which moved or were shipped in interstate commerce before or after being stolen; and 3) knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that they were stolen.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a stolen firearm, knew or had reasonable cause to believe it was stolen, and that it traveled in interstate commerce before or after the theft.

United States v. Purcell Provost · filed 2001-01-12(j)

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (elements of possession of a stolen firearm include: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm, (2) the firearm was stolen, (3) the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen, and (4) the firearm was shipped or transported in interstate commerce either before or after it was stolen).

Section 922(j) permits a conviction for receiving or possessing a stolen firearm even without proof that the defendant disposed of it.

United States v. Himes · filed 1997-12-16(j)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), it is unlawful "for any person to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm" in interstate commerce knowing that the firearm has been stolen. The firearm in question was the shotgun stolen in November 1995 from the truck in the UPS parking lot. The evidence showed that Himes possessed and received the shotgun when he took it from the truck he had broken into. Thus, even if Himes did not dispose of the weapon, his conviction must stand because the evidence is sufficient to show that Himes received and possessed the weapon.

Section 922(j)'s stolen firearm element can be proved without testimony from the firearm's owner when other testimony and the defendant's admission establish ownership.

United States v. McLoone · filed 1995-09-28(j)

We reject McLoone's argument that the government was required to establish ownership by calling Kelly to the stand. The testimony of Avalos, combined with McLoone's admission on cross-examination, sufficed to establish this point.

Section 922(j) does not require proof that the defendant knew the specific source from which a firearm was stolen.

United States v. Sullivan · filed 1995-06-06(j)

The trial court's initial instructions and its response to the jury's inquiry were entirely consistent with the allegations in Count Three and with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(j), neither of which required the government to prove Sullivan knew the guns were stolen from the MPD.

Section 922(i) prohibits anyone from shipping a firearm interstate when they know it is stolen; it is not limited to felons.

United States v. Edmund Miller Goodell · filed 1993-04-05(i)

Moreover, § 922(i) forbids interstate shipment by anyone of a firearm that is known to be stolen, not just shipment by a felon.

Section 922(i)'s requirement that a defendant know transported firearms were stolen may be proved through circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Ness · filed 1992-11-19(i)

Ness first argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he knew the firearms he possessed were stolen, and thus he did not "knowingly" transport stolen firearms across state lines, an essential element for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(i). ... This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to withstand the Rule 29 Motion.

For offenses under § 922(i) and (j), a jury may infer knowledge that guns were stolen from unexplained possession of recently stolen guns; possession in another state may also support an inference of interstate transportation.

Mac McAbee v. United States · filed 1970-11-20(i), (j)

Among the elements of the offenses charged, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew that the guns were stolen and that he knowingly transported them in interstate commerce or caused them to be thus transported. The inferences of which he complains were relevant to prove both the knowledge and transportation elements. ... The inferences appellant challenges meet the Leary-Turner due process test.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon who transports a firearm in interstate commerce to own it.

Mauney v. United States · filed 1971-07-14(g)(1)

He was indicted, tried and convicted by a jury under a statute which renders it unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to transport a firearm in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). All of the elements of this crime were proven by competent evidence. It was unnecessary to a conviction for the jury to have found that Mr. Mauney owned the gun in question; he was convicted, as a felon, of having transported the firearm in interstate commerce.

Section 922(k) requires proof of interstate transportation of a firearm with a removed or altered serial number; an uncorroborated admission alone cannot establish that element.

United States v. Henderson · filed 1972-10-13(k)

Appellant Henderson was convicted of knowingly transporting in interstate commerce a firearm that had had its manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated or altered. This is a violation of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (1970). An essential element of the crime, interstate transportation, was established only by defendant’s uncorroborated extra-judicial statements, and accordingly we reverse.

Section 922(h)(1) covers receipt of a firearm in interstate transportation, not mere possession.

United States v. Craven · filed 1973-05-08(h)(1)

Therefore, we conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) speaks only of receipt of firearms or ammunition in interstate trans-portations and does not concern possessions at all.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of interstate firearm transportation, and evidence of the accused’s travel may establish that element even if it also suggests another crime.

United States v. Roe · filed 1974-04-26(g)(1)

To establish the offense charged in the third count of the indictment, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that Roe transported interstate the firearm described therein. The evidence pertaining to the use of the credit cards in California and during the trip through Arizona and into New Mexico was admissible for this purpose, even though it incidentally tended to establish another crime.

Section 922(h) prohibits a convicted felon from receiving a firearm that has been transported interstate; the government need not prove receipt from the common carrier.

United States v. Pearl Barrett · filed 1975-02-18(h)

Barrett did indeed receive a firearm which had been transported in interstate commerce. Such receipt violated the plain language of the statute. It was not necessary for the Government to prove that Barrett received the firearm from the common carrier.

Section 922(h) covers intrastate receipt of a firearm that previously moved in interstate commerce.

Barrett v. United States · filed 1976-01-13(h)

We conclude that § 922 (h) covers the intrastate receipt, such as petitioner’s purchase here, of a firearm that previously had moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a convicted felon and transported a firearm in interstate commerce.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1975-12-05(g)

Under this section the government must establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) defendant was a convicted felon; and 2) defendant transported a firearm in interstate commerce. We find that the government also met its burden in this regard.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the defendant knowingly made a false statement intended or likely to deceive the firearms dealer.

United States v. Bledsoe · filed 1976-02-24(a)(6)

In order to establish an offense under § 922(a)(6), the prosecution was required to prove “ * * * that appellant knowingly made a false statement, ... and that the statement was intended or likely to deceive the dealer.”

Section 922(g) prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from transporting firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce; a jury may infer that transportation from circumstantial evidence.

Garner v. United States · filed 1976-07-23(g)

No one saw appellant transport the arms and ammunition in interstate commerce, but the inferences of his conduct in this regard could not be stronger.

Section 922(i) prohibits interstate transportation of stolen firearms, and evidence that a defendant planned the theft, loaded the guns, and funded the trip can support a conviction.

United States v. Dingle · filed 1976-12-27(i)

The evidence shows that Dingle induced both Bianco and Bean to participate in the gun theft and transportation by “casing” the gun store and devising the plan to steal the guns. Dingle loaded the guns in the cars and supplied the money for travel expenses from Iowa to Colorado. This evidence amply supports Dingle’s conviction of transportation of stolen firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(i).

Section 922(h) punishes a felon's receipt of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce, including on a federal enclave, and prevents use of state law to broaden that federal offense.

United States v. Butler · filed 1976-09-02(h)

In summary, we hold that the generic conduct of acquisition and receipt- of firearms by felons is punishable under § 1202(a)(1) and § 922(h), and the fact that the federal statutes are narrower in scope does not allow the federal government to use state law to broaden the definition of a federal crime.

Section 922(h)(1) permits a charge against a convicted felon who receives a firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Lee · filed 1976-12-28(h)(1)

But, when the prosecution had learned of evidence that the gun had traveled previously in interstate commerce and that Mr. Lee, a convicted felon, had received it within this district thereafter, the evidence was sufficient to state a felony claim to a grand jury of his violation of the National Firearms Act.

Section 922(a)(4) covers a person who causes a machine gun to be transported interstate even if federal agents intervene in the transportation.

United States v. Smith · filed 1976-10-07(a)(4)

We are not inclined to conclude, therefore, based on the circumstances herein, that the means by which the weapon was transported to Chicago or the fortuitous intervention of the F.B.I. into the transportation process served to absolve appellant or lend credence to his “attempt” theory. It is clear to this court, as it apparently was to the jury, that, based on the evidence adduced, appellant was guilty of a violation of § 922(a)(4).

Section 922(g) allows interstate transportation of a firearm by a convicted felon to be proved through circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Powless · filed 1977-01-04(g)

There was no evidence that defendant’s wife was a passenger in the van trip to South Dakota. The transportation of the gun from Milwaukee to South Dakota is not disputed. The evidence in our view is adequate to support an inference that defendant transported the gun in interstate commerce.