18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally prohibits convicted felons from possessing guns.

United States v. Hoeft · filed 2024-06-07(g)(1)

We have already held that § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing guns, is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing ammunition remains constitutional after Bruen.

United States v. Talbot · filed 2024-05-07(g)(1)

He recognizes, however, that his constitutional challenge is foreclosed by this court’s decision in Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2023) (holding that § 922(g) remains constitutional post-Bruen). ... Nevertheless, his claim is foreclosed by Vincent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional despite the argument based on Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. Garza · filed 2020-02-07(g)(1)

Appealing his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, Emilio Garza raises an argument that is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2013). In Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 145-46, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by a convicted felon is constitutional against a challenge based on non-commercial possession.

United States v. Scott · filed 2020-01-08(g)(1)

“[T]he constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(9)'s prohibition on firearms for people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence survives an equal protection challenge under rational basis review because it serves Congress’s goal of preventing domestic gun violence.

Baker v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-18(g)(9)

Congress rationally attempted to prevent domestic gun violence by categorically prohibiting those convicted of certain domestic abuse crimes from buying guns.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by previously convicted felons withstands Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges under Eighth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Jones · filed 2012-08-27(g)(1)

Jones seeks to overturn his conviction on the grounds that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting § 922(g)(1), and that § 922(g)(1) impermissibly infringes on his rights under the Second Amendment. These arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) clearly prohibits felons from possessing firearms and ammunition and gives fair notice of that prohibition.

United States v. Molina · filed 2012-07-30(g)(1)

For the same reason, we find no need to discuss void-for-vagueness principles as applied to § 922(g)(1), other than to note the plain, unambiguous language of § 922(g)(1) clearly prohibits the possession of firearms and ammunition by a felon and is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Molina and his conduct in possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional on its face after Heller.

United States v. Schwindt · filed 2010-05-12(g)(1)

Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional on its face.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a constitutional challenge based on United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Carver · filed 2009-09-30(g)(1)

Carver asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). We quickly dispatch this argument, as it has been consistently rejected by this Court.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial or as-applied challenge claiming that a firearm’s movement across state lines provides too little connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Lee · filed 2008-12-02(g)(1)

Lee also challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on its face and as applied in this case, arguing that there is an insufficient nexus between the mere movement of a firearm across state lines and interstate commerce to support federal criminal sanctions for possession of a firearm. As he concedes, however, this issue is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands the constitutional challenge the Eighth Circuit had previously rejected.

United States v. Moore · filed 2008-11-19(g)(1)

Moore also challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), making an argument this court has previously rejected. ... We therefore reject it as well.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the constitutional separation of federal and state powers.

United States v. Odom · filed 2008-10-24(g)(1)

Odom also challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as a violation of the separation of federal and...state powers clause of the Constitution. We find no merit to this contention.

A person charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a separate hearing before trial to determine whether the right to possess a firearm has been annulled.

Embrey v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2009-05-13(g)(1)

Before any person can be convicted for a violation of § 922(g)(l), that person has either had a judicial hearing on the merits -- as required by the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause _ or has waived his right to one. In the criminal context, that judicial hearing is called a trial. The complaint does not allege facts that support an inference that plaintiff was not afforded his right to a trial on the § 922(g)(l) charge. Therefore, plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To the extent that the complaint means to assert that a defendant charged with a violation of § 922(g)(l) is entitled to two, sequential, trials, the complaint makes no sense and warrants dismissal as frivolous.

Section 922(g) withstands a constitutional challenge under United States v. Lopez because Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses it.

United States v. Olivo · filed 2009-11-30(g)

§ 922(g) is unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); however, he properly concedes that this issue is foreclosed by this circuit’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to a convicted felon or the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee.

United States v. Vongxay · filed 2010-02-09(g)(1)

In sum, we hold that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment as it applies to Vongxay, a convicted felon. ... Therefore, we hold that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.

Binding circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Morris · filed 2012-02-13(g)(1)

However, because Morris’s challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by our precedent, he has not shown any error, much less plain error, with respect to his conviction.

A constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Rodriguez-Aparicio · filed 2012-02-16(g)(1)

Rodriguez’s argument regarding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g) withstands the constitutional challenge foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. McDuffie · filed 2013-12-30(g)

We also reject McDuffie’s challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 2119 as foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(3) gives a person whose drug use is regular, extended, and contemporaneous with firearm possession sufficient notice that the prohibition applies.

United States v. Dugan · filed 2011-09-20(g)(3)

Moreover, because Defendant "took drugs with regularity, over an extended period of time, and contemporaneously with his purchase or possession of a firearm," his drug use was sufficient to put him on notice that he fell within the statutory definition of "unlawful [drug] user" in § 922(g)(3).

Section 922(g)(1) is facially valid under the Second Amendment and the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Joos · filed 2011-05-03(g)(1)

Turning first to Joos' facial attack on his statutes of conviction, it is well settled that Congress did not violate the Second Amendment or exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause when enacting § 842(i) and § 922(g), and Joos' arguments to the contrary are foreclosed by our prior decisions.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not violate the Commerce Clause or the Second Amendment.

United States v. Jeffery Charles Nicoll, Jr. · filed 2010-10-14(g)(1)

Based on these precedents, we reject Nicoll’s Commerce Clause argument. ... Based on these precedents, we reject Nicoll’s argument that § 922(g) violates the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not facially violate equal protection because the distinction has a rational basis.

United States v. Muhammad · filed 2007-10-04(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause as made applicable to the Federal Government. There is a rational basis for penalizing convicted felons for possession of firearms while persons not convicted of felonies may possess such arms.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Second Amendment challenge under controlling circuit precedent.

United States v. Scott · filed 2007-08-21(g)(1)

For his firearm-possession convictions, Scott’s challenges based on the Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause, and his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1), are foreclosed.

Section 922(n)’s use of “receive” gives ordinary persons clear notice of the conduct it prohibits.

United States v. Rivero · filed 2007-02-28(n)

Second, we reject Rivero’s argument that the word “receive” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) is unconstitutionally vague, finding that it gives ordinary persons clear notice of what is prohibited therein.

Section 922(g)(1)’s express jurisdictional element keeps the felon-in-possession offense within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Samuel Davis, Jr. · filed 2006-03-29(g)(1)

We have rejected the argument that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power, reasoning the felon-in-possession statute has an express jurisdictional element, which would “ensure” the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Subica · filed 2006-03-14(g)

He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). This contention lacks merit.

Section 922(g)'s constitutionality is settled in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Enriquez · filed 2006-02-08(g)

As he concedes, the “constitu- tionality of § 922(g) is not open to question” in this circuit.

Section 922(g)(5) withstands the Second Amendment challenge rejected under Fourth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Romero-Pina · filed 2006-02-02(g)(5)

Romero-Pina also argues that the district court erred by denying his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5). We have reviewed this constitutional issue de novo, see United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 721 (4th Cir. 1999), and find that Romero-Pina’s argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974), in which we rejected a similar Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g).

Section 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power.

United States v. Shivers · filed 2006-01-31(g)

Moreover, both before and since our decision in Maxwell, we have held repeatedly that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is constitutional.

Section 922(o)’s machinegun possession ban is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Amuda, Suarawu O · filed 2005-12-14(o)

We, as well as the other circuits that have considered the constitutionality of § 922(o), have held that the statute is a valid exercise of Congress’s power, United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Franklin, 157 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases), so it would be frivolous for Amuda to argue that the district court committed plain error by convicting him under the statute.

Section 922(g)(3)’s prohibition on firearm possession by unlawful drug users does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Patterson · filed 2005-12-01(g)(3)

Prohibiting unlawful drug users from possessing firearms is not inconsistent with the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment as construed in Emerson and Everist.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on felons possessing firearms in or affecting commerce is within Congress's power.

United States v. Ruff · filed 2005-11-16(g)(1)

Ruff argues that the “jurisdictional hook” of section 922(g)(1), which refers to possession “in or affecting commerce,” is beyond the power of Congress, but this Court has repeatedly rejected this argument.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction consistent with the Commerce Clause when the firearm or ammunition previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Henry · filed 2005-11-22(g)(1)

We explicitly held post-Lopez that a § 922(g)(1) conviction comports with the Commerce Clause so long as the defendant “possessed a gun that previously had moved in interstate commerce.” Chesney, 86 F.3d at 572. ... Henry concedes that the government satisfied § 922(g)(1)’s jurisdictional element as interpreted by Chesney. Therefore, Henry’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) was constitutional.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, so a challenge to it raised for the first time on appeal does not establish plain error.

United States v. Sam Harris, Jr. · filed 2005-11-01(g)

Considering the precedent that has consistently held that § 922(g) is constitutional, the district court did not commit plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands the Commerce Clause challenge rejected under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Garza · filed 2005-10-26(g)(1)

This argument is unavailing. “This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2005-11-09(g)

Sanchez contends that section 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause. However, this court has rejected ... that argument.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Perry · filed 2005-11-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Yvette Perry raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Jones · filed 2005-10-13(g)(1)

In a prior opinion this court upheld Mr. Jones’s conviction, holding (1) that § 922(g)(1) is not beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and (2) that Kansas law prohibits possession of a firearm by felons within 10 years of their conviction, release, or juvenile adjudication, and that the restoration-of-civil-rights provision of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) does not apply unless the restored civil rights specifically include the right to possess a firearm. ... We now reinstate our previous opinion and affirm Mr. Jones’s sentence.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms, and retaining a defendant’s firearm pending trial on that charge does not violate due process under the circumstances here.

United States v. Grey Water · filed 2005-01-31(g)(3)

The Court further finds that although Defendant has been deprived of some of his property rights with respect to the seizure of his firearm, he has not been denied due process and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutional as applied to him.

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges raised here.

United States v. Constant · filed 2004-12-30(g)

Arguing that the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, Appellant Ivan Constant challenges his conviction under that statute. As we have previously considered and rejected an identical claim, see United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), we affirm his conviction.

Section 922(g) is constitutional as applied when the firearm and ammunition have crossed state lines; a minimal interstate-commerce nexus is sufficient.

United States v. Castillias · filed 2004-12-20(g)

Because the Scarborough “minimal nexus” test applies to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the court rejects Castillias’s contention that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case.

Section 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Bateman · filed 2004-12-21(g)

This Court has clearly held on more than one occasion that the statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) represents a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands the Commerce Clause challenges based on Lopez and Emerson.

United States v. Padilla · filed 2004-12-23(g)(1)

We are not free to revisit the Lopez claim because this court already has rejected it in prior cases. ... We also reject Padilla's claim that Emerson provides a basis for dismissal on Commerce Clause grounds.

A facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on its lack of a substantial interstate commerce effect requirement is foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Jones · filed 2004-12-23(g)(1)

Jones argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. As Jones concedes, this issue is foreclosed; he raises it to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on possession of ammunition by a convicted felon is within Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Jones · filed 2004-12-08(g)(1)

We summarily reject Defendant’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. We have repeatedly ruled to the contrary.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it does not commandeer states or their officials.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2004-12-06(g)(1)

Second, § 922(g)(1) in no way commandeers the States or their officials in order to advance a federal mandate.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional against the challenge based on Lopez, Morrison, and Jones.

United States v. Ramos · filed 2004-10-08(g)(1)

Defendant’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in light of ... has already-been considered and rejected by this Court in United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.2001). We see no reason to reconsider that holding here.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Gibbs · filed 2004-09-23(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power under binding Third Circuit precedent.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2004-09-23(g)(1)

In this appeal,1 Johnson challenges only his conviction on Count Three, contending the felon-in-possession statute is an invalid exercise of the Commerce Clause. ... Because we are bound by Singletary, we will reject Johnson’s challenge.

Section 922(g) withstands the constitutional and required-nexus challenges foreclosed by Rawls.

United States v. Dominguez · filed 2004-08-09(g)

Additionally, Dominguez asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional, or, in the alternative, if the statute is constitutional, that the Government failed to prove the requisite nexus in his case. These issues are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 241-43 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)’s requirement that firearm possession be in or affect interstate commerce satisfies the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Keller, Brian · filed 2004-07-21(g)

In short, we have recognized that the explicit jurisdictional nexus contained in § 922(g)—“in or affecting com- merce”—satisfies the Supreme Court’s requirement that Congressional action have some connection to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce requirement does not make its ban on felons possessing firearms irrational under equal protection standards.

United States v. Adams · filed 2004-07-14(g)(1)

But travel of the gun in interstate commerce was the jurisdictional hook available to Congress and the prohibition on felons having guns is rational. ... That Congress left unremedied like problems beyond its ready grasp does not make the statute irrational under equal protection standards.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands Second Amendment and interstate commerce challenges; a conviction does not require proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Chavarria · filed 2004-07-12(g)(1)

Chavarria challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) on two separate grounds. First, he argues that § 922(g)(1) violates his right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. Second, he argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because the statute does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce and that the evidence was insufficient to establish a “substantial effect.” This court has rejected both of these contentions in prior published opinions. See United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 633-34 (5th Cir. 2003); and United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, these issues are foreclosed on appeal.

Section 922(j)’s prohibition on possessing a stolen firearm remains constitutional under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Reed · filed 2004-06-23(j)

Reed argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), which prohibits the possession of a stolen firearm, is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). ... No such decision overruling Luna exists. Accordingly, Reed’s argument is indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges under Seventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Gillaum, Durriel E. · filed 2004-06-23(g)(1)

Finally, Gillaum argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise (facially and as applied to him) of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. ... We note that Gillaum has raised this argument and we decline to revisit our well-established precedents.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands this Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2004-06-24(g)(1)

In Rawls, this court held that the reasons the Supreme Court gave in Lopez for holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) unconstitutional do not apply to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Rawls, 85 F.3d at 242. More recently, this court has emphasized that the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not open to question. United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 2001). Because Thomas’ argument is foreclosed by this court’s precedent, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) complies with the Commerce Clause because it requires a connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Vallejo, Jose · filed 2004-06-29(g)(1)

This Court, and our sister Circuits, have consistently held that, because of its jurisdictional element, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) comports with the requirements of the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(o) is a permissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Rice · filed 2004-06-07(o)

In United States v. Wilks, we upheld § 922(o) as a permissible exercise of the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause. ... In sum, we conclude that the statute under which Defendant was convicted is constitutional, that Defendant was properly sentenced as a “prohibited person” for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and that the district court did not err in refusing to grant a downward departure based on Defendant’s claim of sentencing factor manipulation.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under binding Third Circuit precedent.

United States v. Goney · filed 2004-05-18(g)(1)

Because we are bound by our previous holdings in United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2002) and United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 200, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2001), we reject the defendant’s argument and once again hold that the statute is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is consistent with the Second Amendment.

United States v. Everist · filed 2004-04-27(g)(1)

It is not in- consistent with the Second Amendment to lim- it the ability of convicted felons to keep and possess firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Stevenson · filed 2004-04-23(g)(1)

Stevenson’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional is foreclosed by prior precedent to the contrary.

Section 922(g)'s constitutionality is settled under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Wallace · filed 2004-04-08(g)

This court has repeatedly held that the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not open to question.

Section 922(g) prohibits firearm possession by a felon only when the possession is in or affecting commerce, making it a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power.

United States v. Couch · filed 2004-04-06(g)

However, § 922(g) deals with economic activity because it prohibits only possession by a felon that is “in or affecting commerce,” making it a constitutionally valid exercise of the commerce power.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands Thompson’s Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Sixth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Rufus A. Thompson III Gregory Potter · filed 2004-03-17(g)(1)

Because Napier supplies the governing legal precedent and because the Government presented evidence at trial that the constituent parts used to make these Molotov cocktails — the beer bottles and gasoline — had moved in interstate commerce, we reject Thompson’s constitutional challenge.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied challenges based on the absence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Lytle · filed 2004-03-02(g)(1)

Lytle argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because the statute does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce and because his possession of the ammunition was not shown to have an effect on interstate commerce. He acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent, but he seeks to preserve the issue for possible review. As Lytle concedes, this issue is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) survives a facial Commerce Clause challenge to its prohibition on firearm possession by a felon.

United States v. Kitsch · filed 2004-03-02(g)(1)

The Court of Appeals rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(l)’s constitutionality, so we must also reject Kitsch’s challenge to that statute.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional under Third Circuit precedent.

United States v. Davis · filed 2004-02-23(g)(1)

We have specifically upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce when applied to a felon’s possession of ammunition.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2004-02-23(g)(1)

We agree with Mr. Thompson that the issue of whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce has been decided against him. Indeed, we have considered and rejected the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Lopez renders the statute unconstitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause despite requiring no substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Perales · filed 2004-02-17(g)(1)

This argument is unavailing. “This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1) withstands Second Amendment, Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Equal Protection challenges in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Underwood · filed 2004-02-17(g)(1)

Underwood argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause. In United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 633-35 (5th Cir. 2003), this court soundly rejected the same arguments that ... Underwood raises. Darrington is binding on this panel.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands Commerce Clause, Second Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause challenges.

United States v. Shepherd · filed 2004-02-17(g)(1)

Shepherd argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an overly broad assertion of Commerce Clause power that unconstitutionally burdens the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Shepherd further argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Equal Protection Clause. ... Shepherd’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s holding in United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2003).

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Lastrapes · filed 2004-02-17(g)(1)

Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional.

Section 922(g) remains constitutional after Morrison and Jones.

United States v. Cantu · filed 2004-02-16(g)

Cantu concedes that his argument is foreclosed by our opinion in United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which ... rejected the contention that either Morrison or Jones affected or undermined the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... No such decision overruling Daugherty exists. Accordingly, Cantu’s argument is indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is not invalid under the Commerce Clause merely because the prohibited conduct does not substantially affect interstate commerce, and an indictment need not allege such an effect for the specific offense.

United States v. Sheridan · filed 2003-04-24(g)(1)

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Sheridan argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Alternatively, he argues that his indictment was defective for failing to allege that his specific offense substantially affected interstate commerce. ... As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands the Commerce Clause challenge raised here under existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Williams · filed 2003-04-24(g)(1)

Williams raises his argument solely to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his argument is foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on the claim that the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce.

United States v. Velasquez · filed 2003-04-24(g)(1)

Velasquez raises his arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(9)’s restriction on firearm ownership does not violate the Ninth Amendment.

United States v. Finnell · filed 2003-04-10(g)(9)

Yet, circuit courts across the country have consistently held that the Ninth Amendment does not impinge upon Congress’ authority to restrict firearm ownership, as it has done through the enactment of § 922(g)(9). Given this, defendant’s Ninth Amendment claim fails.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional because its requirement that firearm possession be in or affect commerce supplies a jurisdictional element.

United States v. Bass · filed 2003-04-07(g)(1)

In light of the fact that the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that the jurisdictional element saves 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) from the fate of the one struck down in Lopez, we decline Bass’s invitation to overrule our own precedent and affirm the district court’s holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause when a felon's ammunition has crossed state lines.

United States v. Wolvin · filed 2003-03-27(g)(1)

Because the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is well settled in the Seventh Circuit, we affirm.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a constitutional challenge based on the minimal interstate-commerce connection required for the firearm.

United States v. Watkins · filed 2002-03-28(g)(1)

Watkins also contends that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because of the minimal showing necessary to establish that the firearm had a nexus with ...interstate commerce. He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 2002 WL 233543 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002), but that he raises it to preserve it for Supreme Court review. This latter argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power despite a challenge based on its application to intrastate firearm possession.

United States v. Williams · filed 2002-03-15(g)(1)

In Singletary, we considered the precise constitutional challenge to that statute raised by Williams here, and concluded that Congress did not exceed its power to regulate interstate commerce when it enacted § 922(g)(1). ... The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

Section 922(g)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2002-03-20(g)

This Motion raises the issue of defense counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to raise the constitutionality of the statute forbidding the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... The constitutional challenge has been rejected. The statute is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) satisfies the Commerce Clause when the firearm has traveled across state lines.

United States v. Shepherd · filed 2002-03-29(g)(1)

The evidence at trial established that the firearm Shepherd possessed traveled across state lines, satisfying the Commerce Clause requirement.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on a firearm’s past travel in interstate commerce.

United States v. Flores · filed 2002-02-25(g)(1)

We have previously rejected Commerce Clause challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and have held that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.” United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 20, 2001) (No. 01-7524).

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Beatty · filed 2002-02-25(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

The constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Bell · filed 2002-02-25(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional for failing to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2002-02-25(g)(1)

He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As this court recently held, “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.”

Circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) based on intrastate possession of firearms manufactured outside the state.

United States v. Toman · filed 2002-02-25(g)(1)

Miroslav Toman appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) both on its face and as applied to him. ... As Toman suspects, circuit precedent forecloses the issue.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2002-02-25(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1) validly prohibits a felon’s intrastate possession of a firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Malloy · filed 2002-02-08(g)(1)

The conclusions in Davis and Carrasco that Congress lawfully exercised its authority to regulate interstate commerce when it enacted § 922(g)(1) apply with equal force in this case.

Section 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment or the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Hanneman · filed 2002-01-09(g)(8)

Section 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment, United States v. Emerson, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001), 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22386, *146, nor does it violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Blair · filed 2002-01-08(g)(1)

Finally, Blair also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, but we have already rejected that argument.

Section 922(o)’s ban on intrastate possession of machine guns is valid under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Swida · filed 2002-01-15(o)

Accordingly, Swida’s Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(o) must be rejected.

Section 922(g) withstands a challenge that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power in enacting it.

United States v. Lough · filed 2001-12-28(g)

As Lough concedes, however, the argument that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 178, — L.Ed.2d-(2001).

Section 922(g)(8) does not violate the Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment, or the Second Amendment.

United States v. Witherspoon · filed 2001-12-17(g)(8)

Witherspoon’s contentions are unavailing –- 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not violate the Commerce Clause, ... does not violate the Fifth Amendment, ... and does not violate the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied constitutional challenges under circuit precedent.

United States v. Sweet · filed 2002-01-02(g)(1)

Sweet next contests the validity of his conviction by challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on its face and as applied to this case. This contention is foreclosed by our recent decisions in United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 503, — L.Ed.2d — (2001) and United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1162 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 178, — L.Ed.2d — (2001).

An ex post facto challenge to § 922(g)(9) fails without a showing that it applies to events before enactment or increases punishment for prior conduct.

United States v. Rivera · filed 2001-11-21(g)(9)

His second challenge, that § 922(g)(9) violates the constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto punishment, also fails because he does not show either that the law applied to events occurring before its enactment, see, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.2000), or that it increased the punishment for prior conduct, see, e.g., Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120, 1122 (D.C.Cir.1987); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960).

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause after United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Bryan · filed 2001-11-19(g)

This circuit has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Adams · filed 2001-11-27(g)(1)

Finally, Mr. Adams raises a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), claiming that enactment of the possession statute exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause. ... Our decision in United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 2000), resolved this issue and now forecloses Mr Adams’s facial challenge to the statute.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Shaffer · filed 2001-11-13(g)(1)

First, “it is now well-settled that Congress did not violate the Second Amendment in enacting [§ 922(g)(1)].” United States v. Waller, 218 F.3d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional when the firearm’s prior interstate travel is the only interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Evans · filed 2001-11-09(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g) remains constitutional under the Fifth Circuit’s precedent despite Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Perez-Hernandez · filed 2001-11-14(g)

The Jones and Morrison cases cited by Perez are distinguishable and do not affect our long-standing and consistent position on § 922(g)’s constitutionality.

Section 922(g)(1)'s constitutionality is settled in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2001-10-25(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional after Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Brown · filed 2001-10-26(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... The cases cited by Brown are distinguishable and do not affect this determination.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional despite the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Williams · filed 2001-10-26(g)(1)

The cases cited by Williams do not affect this determination and, therefore, cannot serve to support a challenge to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

The constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is settled under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Elorreaga · filed 2001-10-30(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional when the firearm's only interstate commerce connection is that it previously traveled between states.

United States v. Horton · filed 2001-10-09(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority under controlling Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Owens · filed 2001-10-03(g)(1)

Finally, Owens contends that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in light of the Supreme Court decisions Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). ... We decline to revisit our Dorris decision, and affirm the district court’s ruling on this issue.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional even when the firearm’s only connection to interstate commerce is that it previously traveled between states.

United States v. Hampton · filed 2001-05-07(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” See United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 156 (1999). Recent decisions by the Supreme Court do not alter this ruling.

A vagueness challenge to § 922(g)(9) raised for the first time on appeal fails plain-error review when the defendant shows no obvious constitutional error.

United States v. Barrett · filed 2001-04-26(g)(9)

Because there is no “obvious” error, there is no “plain error” with respect to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9).

Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2001-04-09(g)

Tim Wooten challenges his conviction in count 12 for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He acknowledges that this court’s precedent affords no relief, but raises constitutional issues, albeit for the first time on appeal, merely to preserve review. They are in any event foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Davis · filed 2001-03-20(g)(1)

Congress did not exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause in the Fifth Circuit; Jones and Morrison do not support a challenge to a conviction under it.

United States v. Sierra · filed 2001-03-20(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” See United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 156 (1999). The cases cited by Sierra do not affect this determination and, therefore, cannot serve to support a challenge to a conviction under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(9) applies to firearm possession after its enactment even when the predicate domestic violence conviction predates it, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.

United States v. Thomson · filed 2001-02-21(g)(9)

Defendant claims 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) should not apply to him because it was passed in 1996 and his prior conviction for battery was in 1993. ... The Boyd court further reasoned that “this statute does not impose a heavier or additional penalty for the earlier domestic violence conviction, but rather imposes authorized punishment for criminal conduct that has occurred after the passage of the law.” ... This court agrees with the reasoning in Boyd. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on ex post facto grounds is denied.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent despite Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Loredo · filed 2001-02-13(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(n) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2001-02-13(n)

The cases cited by Johnson do not affect this determination and, therefore, cannot serve to support a challenge to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).

Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses the interstate commerce and constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) raised in this appeal.

United States v. Lawson · filed 2001-02-13(g)(1)

He contends that the Government did not demonstrate that the firearms had the requisite effect on interstate commerce. Lawson also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. Lawson concedes that his arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent, and he raises the arguments to preserve them for Supreme Court review. These issues are foreclosed.

Sections 922(g) and 922(k) require a nexus with interstate commerce and withstand a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Baer · filed 2000-12-19

Lopez is distinguishable from cases addressing statutes such as sections 922(g) and 922(k) because those statutes, unlike the one at issue in Lopez, require a nexus with interstate commerce in order to establish jurisdiction.

Section 922(g)(1) regulates a felon’s possession of firearms that have moved in interstate commerce and is within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Dorris · filed 2000-12-22(g)(1)

The jurisdictional element in § 922(g)(1) puts it into a different category of analysis than the laws considered in Lopez and Morrison. Section 922(g)(1) by its language only regulates those weapons affecting interstate commerce by being the subject of interstate trade.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Agu · filed 2000-12-26(g)(1)

As Agu acknowledges, this court rejected the arguments Agu now advances regarding the unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) in United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding statute did not violate commerce clause because “in or affecting commerce" element was satisfied if firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce). ... Therefore, Agu’s challenge is without merit, and he has failed to show that the district court erred, plainly or otherwise, in applying the statute in this case.

Section 922(g)(8) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it requires a connection between firearm possession and interstate commerce.

United States v. Jones · filed 2000-11-02(g)(8)

Accordingly, we hold that § 922(g)(8) does not offend the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon remains constitutional despite recent Supreme Court decisions.

United States v. Alaniz · filed 2000-10-19(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(o)’s prohibition on machinegun possession and transfer is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Furrow · filed 2000-09-19(o)

In sum, Rambo is valid, controlling authority that dictates this court’s conclusion that Section 922(o) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional when the firearm’s interstate commerce connection is that it traveled between states in the past.

United States v. Castro · filed 2000-09-14(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... Recent decisions by the Supreme Court do not alter this ruling.

Section 922 withstands a challenge to its interstate commerce element under the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment, as required by controlling Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Miles · filed 1999-12-17

The defendant contends that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause and offended the Tenth Amendment when it enacted § 922. ... Bound by Tenth Circuit precedent, see Farnsworth and United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1137, 116 S.Ct. 966, 133 L.Ed.2d 887 (1996), the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied.

Section 922(g) constitutionally applies to possession of a functioning gun that has traveled across state lines.

United States v. Holman · filed 1999-12-08(g)

We also conclude Holman’s Lopez challenge to section 922(g) is foreclosed by our prior decisions and by evidence at trial that the functioning gun traveled across state lines.

Section 922(j) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Castillo · filed 1999-12-29(j)

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(8) was not plainly unconstitutional on an unpreserved challenge.

United States v. Stuebing · filed 1999-11-09(g)(8)

The defendant did not argue to the district court that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional. The district court ... committed no plain error in failing to find the statute unconstitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a convicted felon is not unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Gomez · filed 1999-10-20(g)(1)

In Rawls, this court held that the reasons the Supreme Court gave in Lopez for holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) unconstitutional do not apply to § 922(g). Rawls, 85 F.3d at 242. Because the sole argument raised on appeal is foreclosed by this court’s precedent, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(8)’s interstate commerce element keeps its firearm prohibition within Congress’s commerce power.

United States v. Baker · filed 1999-11-23(g)(8)

In accord with our holding in Chesney, we find that the jurisdictional element applicable to § 922(g)(8) insulates the statute from a Commerce Clause challenge.

Section 922(g)(9) could not be applied to a defendant who continued possessing hunting firearms after a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction that predated the ban, without actual notice or a reasonable opportunity to learn of it.

United States v. Ficke · filed 1999-07-16(g)(9)

Section 922(g)(9) criminalizes behavior that for two years following this defendant’s misdemeanor conviction was entirely innocent under both federal and state law. The defendant therefore received no warning during the underlying misdemeanor proceedings, at which he appeared pro se, that continued possession of his hunting weapons would subject him to a federal felony prosecution. The defendant had no actual notice of the enactment of this obscure, hard-to-find provision, nor would he have had a reasonable opportunity to discover it.

Sections 922(g)(8) and (9) are valid exercises of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because each includes an interstate commerce element.

United States v. Myers · filed 1999-06-29(g)(8), (g)(9)

We therefore conclude, as have other circuits addressing the issue, that Congress validly exercised its Commerce Clause power in enacting subsections 922(g)(8) and (9).

Section 922(q)(2)(A), as amended to require a connection between the firearm and interstate or foreign commerce, is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Danks · filed 1999-08-13(q)(2)(A)

We hold that the amended Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

Sections 922(d)(1) and (n) restrict firearm sales to, and receipt by, people under felony indictment; those restrictions do not constitute bills of attainder because they lack the required specificity.

United States v. Munsterman · filed 1999-05-25(d)(1), (n)

We conclude that §§ 922(d)(1) and (n) do not meet the specificity requirement of a bill of attainder.

Section 922(g)(9)’s firearm ban for people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors remains valid even when the conviction is old.

United States v. Lewitzke · filed 1999-05-12(g)(9)

Lewitzke’s observation that the ban applies to anyone convicted of domestic violence, no matter how long ago, does not undermine the validity of the statute.

Section 922(g)(9) may prohibit firearm possession based on a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction that predates the provision without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.

McHugh v. Rubin · filed 1999-04-23(g)(9)

Having found that section 922(g)(9) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, this Court next must determine whether it has jurisdiction to review the ATF’s refusal to consider plaintiffs application for relief from federal firearms disabilities.

Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second and Fifth Amendments by criminalizing firearm possession under a domestic restraining order without particularized findings of threatened violence or adequate notice.

United States v. Emerson · filed 1999-04-07(g)(8)

Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) violates the Second and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Court GRANTS Emerson’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a valid exercise of congressional power.

United States v. Hadrick · filed 1998-08-20(g)(1)

As to Hadrick's claim that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitu- tional in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), it is clearly established that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of congressio- nal power.

Section 922(g) withstands the constitutional challenge foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rawls.

United States v. Shubin · filed 1998-06-08(g)

Shubin’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional is foreclosed by this court’s holding in United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(9) regulates individuals’ firearm possession and does not require states to enforce the prohibition.

Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis · filed 1998-06-05(g)(9)

Unlike the statutes struck down in New York and Printz, § 922(g)(9) regulates the behavior of private individuals, not states, for individuals will be prosecuted for violation of the statute and there is no federal mandate for states to assist in regulation and enforcement.

Section 922(g)(3)'s term "unlawful user" is not unconstitutionally vague.

United States v. Oberlin · filed 1998-05-21(g)(3)

Oberlin argues that the phrase "unlawful user" in § 922(g)(3) is impermissibly vague. We rejected that same argument in United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (9th Cir.1977) (reviewing predecessor statute). There, we held that the term "unlawful user" was not impermissibly vague and was intended by Congress "to keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them...." Id. at 1365. We are not persuaded by Oberlin's arguments that Ocegueda is distinguishable, or that § 922(g)(3) violates other constitutional protections.

Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it requires a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Pierson · filed 1998-04-17(g)(8)

Our decisions in Rawls and Wallace necessitate the same result for § 922(g)(8). As such, we hold that “neither the holding in Lopez nor the reasons given therefor constitutionally invalidate” § 922(g)(8).

Section 922(g)(1) punishes a felon's act of possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce, not the status of being a felon alone.

United States v. Ricky W. Jester · filed 1998-04-06(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) does not punish a person solely for his or her status as a convicted felon; the statute does not empower federal law enforcement officials to arrest a person merely because that person was once convicted of a felony. Rather, the statute is triggered only when the felon commits the volitional act of possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges foreclosed by circuit precedent.

United States v. Vallejo · filed 1998-03-30(g)

Vallejo also argues that the statute of his conviction, § 922(g) is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to his case. Vallejo’s argument is foreclosed by this Court’s holding in United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1) survives a Commerce Clause challenge to its regulation of a felon’s possession of a firearm.

United States v. Sapp · filed 1998-03-03(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) has been upheld consistently as constitutional.

Section 922(g) has a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to withstand a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Clark · filed 1998-03-11(g)

The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g), holding that § 922(g) contains an adequate nexus with interstate commerce and is not an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause. ... These holdings defeat defendant’s argument that § 922(g) is unconstitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is within Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate firearms.

United States v. Niemeier · filed 1998-02-27(g)(1)

It is well-established in every federal circuit that Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate firearms under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez in the Eighth Circuit.

United States v. Pollard · filed 1998-02-05(g)(1)

We conclude Pollard&s Lopez challenge to section 922(g) is foreclosed by this court&s prior decisions.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, even if the conviction predates the statute, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause or due process notice requirements.

United States v. Hicks · filed 1997-12-12(g)(9)

Section 922(g)(9) only criminalizes Hicks’ possession of a firearm following his misdemeanor conviction for a crime of domestic violence. The statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, nor does it violate due process by failing to provide adequate notice of the acts which it makes criminal. Section 922(g)(9) plainly sets forth the conduct which it prohibits and to whom it applies.