18 U.S.C. § 922

A jury may infer that a defendant knew of his felony status from the felony conviction itself, especially when the defendant stipulated to it.

United States v. Miller · filed 2025-08-15(g)(1)

Normally, a jury can reasonably conclude that “a defendant knew he was a felon based on the fact that he was a felon.” Id. at 509. This principle is especially true here, because Miller stipulated to the felony conviction at issue. See United States v. Door, 996 F.3d 606, 619 (9th Cir. 2021).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm; his admission of a prior felony conviction can show that knowledge.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2026-01-12(g)(1)

The jury also properly heard Johnson’s pre-arrest statement that he had a strong-arm robbery conviction, showing he knew he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of a prior felony conviction when possessing the firearm, but not that the defendant knew firearm possession was illegal.

United States v. Blanks · filed 2026-05-07(g)(1)

To satisfy the second element for a § 922(g)(1) offense, the Government must prove that the defendant knew, at the time that he possessed the firearm, that he had a prior felony conviction, i.e., not that his status as a felon precluded him from firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of firearm possession and felony status; a defendant’s admissions to both can defeat a claim of actual innocence.

Waring v. United States · filed 2020-02-25(g)(1)

Waring cannot demonstrate that he is actually innocent of knowingly and illegally possessing a firearm as a felon or that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him” of being a felon in possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm, but omission of that jury instruction did not warrant reversal on plain-error review where he had recently served more than two years for a felony.

United States v. Frye · filed 2020-09-08(g)(1)

Moreover, Frye finished serving that sentence only about five months before the date on which he was found to be in possession of a gun. We thus conclude that the error here, as in Miller, was not plain, since it did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 559.

Section 922(g)(1) and (g)(9) contain no exception for self-defense.

Nelson v. United States · filed 2024-09-24(g)(1), (g)(9)

Those provisions do not contain an exception for self-defense.

A sentence on a § 922(g)(5)(A) count must stay within the applicable statutory maximum.

United States v. Magana-Ramirez · filed 2024-11-29(g)(5)(A)

As the parties agree, that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum applicable to the § 922(g)(5)(A) count. Accordingly, we vacate the custodial sentence and supervised release term on the § 922(g)(5)(A) count and remand for the district court to enter an amended judgment imposing a sentence at or below the applicable statutory maximum for that count.

Section 922(o)’s prohibition on possessing or transferring a machinegun is facially constitutional under the Second Amendment.

United States v. Burnett · filed 2025-06-30(o)

This Court itself has already spoken on the constitutionality of Section 922(o) in a manner that forecloses Greely’s facial challenge.

Section 922(o)’s machinegun possession ban withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges because machineguns are dangerous and unusual weapons.

United States v. Jaquan Bridges · filed 2025-08-07(o)

In addition, applying Bruen’s text-and-history methodology, we conclude that § 922(o) is consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of prohibiting private possession of dangerous and unusual weapons. We thus hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Bridges.

Section 922(o)’s ban on machinegun possession withstands an as-applied Second Amendment challenge because the Second Amendment does not protect a right to possess machineguns.

United States v. Jermaine Brown · filed 2025-08-14(o)

Defendant-appellant Jermaine Brown brings an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits the transfer or possession of machineguns. As a ... matter of circuit law, the Second Amendment does not protect a right to possess machineguns. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Brown’s conviction.

Section 922(o)’s ban on machinegun possession does not violate the Second Amendment because machineguns are not protected by it.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2026-01-12(o)

In sum, Hollis continues to bind us. And because Hollis controls, Wilson’s Second Amendment challenge to his § 922(o) conviction must fail.

Section 922(o)’s prohibition on possessing machineguns does not violate the Second Amendment because the Amendment does not protect machinegun possession.

United States v. Jasper Stuckett · filed 2026-04-30(o)

And our binding precedent forecloses Stuckett’s argument that section 922(o) vio- lates the Second Amendment. In United States v. Alsenat, we re- jected the same argument and held that, under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns, so section 922(o) is consti- tutional.

Section 922(n) is not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Hicks · filed 2025-07-23(n)

The district court held that the statute underlying the indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, ... 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... Even so, the Government is correct that the district court’s dismissal runs afoul of United States v. Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713, 717-25 (5th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 29, 2025) (No. 24-7342).

Section 922(n) does not allow a defendant to challenge the validity of a predicate felony indictment as a defense to receiving a firearm while under indictment.

United States v. Russell · filed 2026-06-23(n)

Russell was free to challenge his indictment “before obtaining a firearm,” but he cannot collaterally attack the indictment as a defense to his violation of § 922.

Section 922(q)(2)(B)(ii)’s state license exception is ambiguous as applied to Montana’s statutory license; under these circumstances, lenity and fair notice preclude a school-zone possession conviction.

United States v. Metcalf · filed 2025-09-23(q)(2)(B)(ii)

Applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation—looking to the text, its context, statutory presumptions, judicial constructions, and the canons of construction—we conclude that Metcalf offers at least a plausible reading of § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii), which would qualify him for the license exception. Given this plausible reading, the government did not establish that Metcalf was at least on notice that his Montana license—which explicitly purported to comply with the federal statute—was insufficient to except him from § 922(q)(2)(A)’s prohibition.

Section 922(o)(2)(A) does not warrant an affirmative defense instruction when the defendant offers no evidence that he knew he was dealing with a government agent.

United States v. Kittson · filed 2025-12-10(o)(2)(A)

Here, Kittson does not point to any evidence in the record showing that he knew he was dealing with a government agent. ... Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Kittson was not entitled to an affirmative defense instruction.

Section 922(o)(2)(A) does not exempt an attempted illegal machinegun transfer intercepted by an undercover agent.

United States v. Kittson · filed 2025-12-10(o)(2)(A)

A defendant like Kittson, whose attempt to illegally transfer a machinegun is intercepted by an undercover agent, is not protected under § 922(o)(2)(A).

Section 922(t)(3)(B) exempts ATF-approved transfers of NFA firearms, including silencers, from the requirement that a licensed dealer contact NICS.

Burkhead · filed 2026-02-12(t)(3)(B)

On the other hand, for firearms subject to the NFA—including silencers—an FFL has no obligation to contact NICS to initiate a background check pursuant to § 922(t).

Section 922’s restrictions concerning firearms and ammunition for unlawful controlled substance users do not apply when the firearms or ammunition are issued for a police department’s use.

In the Matter of Montavious Patten, Jersey City Police Department · filed 2026-05-01(d)(3), (g)(3)

Accordingly, when firearms or ammunition are "issued for the use of" a police department, such as the JCPD, the restrictions imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 922 are eliminated.

Section 922(g)(1)’s case-by-case application in the Second Amendment context does not present a clear or obvious separation-of-powers error on plain-error review.

United States v. Celestine · filed 2026-05-14(g)(1)

Additionally, Celestine asks us to vacate his conviction because the case-by-case application of § 922(g)(1) in the Second Amendment context violates separation of powers principles. We have not previously addressed this issue, however, and find no clear or obvious error as is necessary to establish plain error.

Section 922(o)(2)(B) grandfathers lawfully possessed machine guns from the 1986 ban; that exception does not imply a restitution remedy for destroyed bump stocks.

The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States · filed 2026-06-05(o)(2)(B)

When Congress banned machine guns in 1986, it specifically exempted machine guns possessed lawfully prior to May 19, 1986, the date on which the ban went into effect. ... In other words, Slide Fire would find an implicit cause of action imposing liability when Congress has tailored the burden of the statute to limit liability. This the Court is reluctant to do.

A prior conviction qualifies under § 922(g)(1) only if the defendant could have received more than one year in prison for it.

Richardson v. United States · filed 2019-09-09(g)(1)

Although that conviction was a qualifying § 922(g) predicate at the time of sentencing, it no longer qualifies as such under Simmons. The United States therefore correctly concedes that Petitioner qualifies for relief under § 2241 and that Count (3) should be vacated.

Section 922(g)(9) does not require the domestic relationship to be an element of the predicate misdemeanor, although the relationship must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a firearms possession prosecution.

IN THE MATTER OF FRANKLIN HERNANDEZ, CITY OF PERTH AMBOY (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) · filed 2019-11-15(g)(9)

Hernandez argues that to constitute a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the predicate misdemeanor must identify as an element of a crime a domestic relationship between the aggressor and the victim. The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument and held "the domestic relationship, although it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a § 922(g)(9) firearms possession prosecution, need not be a defining element of the predicate offense."

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits people with felony records from possessing firearms or ammunition.

United States v. One Astra 2000 Cub Pistol, Serial Number 936016, One Taurus 85 Ultralite Revolver, Serial Number 73522 · filed 2019-12-23(g)(1)

Accepting the well-pled allegations in the Verified Complaint as true, the Government has established by a preponderance of evidence that Mr. Coe is an individual with a felony record and that he possessed the Defendant Property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm.

Brown v. Illinois State Police · filed 2020-06-08(g)(9)

Therefore, unless the limited exception under the FGCA applies, Brown is prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; courts assess the required domestic relationship from the circumstances and the force element through the modified categorical approach.

Scalist v. Davis · filed 2022-09-30(g)(9)

As such, when considering an appeal from the denial of an application for a handgun certificate, Nebraska courts should employ the circumstance-specific approach to the specified domestic relationship requirement, but employ the modified categorical approach to the “use of physical force” requirement.

Section 922(g) permits only one judgment of conviction for multiplicitous counts.

United States v. Briscoe · filed 2020-09-23(g)

Upon consideration, the court grants the motion, dismisses the appeal, and remand the case to district court with instructions to: A. Vacate Mr. Briscoe’s multiplicitous convictions and enter judgment on only one § 924(c) count and one § 922(g) count, see United States v. Elliott, 937 F.3d 1310, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2019) (remanding to the district court with instructions to vacate multiplicitous convictions where “it is immaterial which . . . conviction remained”); and B. In light of the parties’ joint motion for remand, conduct any and all proceedings necessary to resentence Mr. Briscoe on the three remaining convictions under criminal history category IV.

Section 922(g)(3) covers a person whose unlawful drug use is ongoing and contemporaneous with firearm possession; the person need not be under the influence when possessing the firearm.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2020-10-27(g)(3)

In turn, § 922(g) designates as a prohibited person someone who is “an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” like marijuana. ... In applying the prohibited-person base offense level premised on unlawful drug use, we have held that a defendant is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance so long as his use is “ongoing and contemporaneous with the commission of the offense.”

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm or ammunition possession after a conviction punishable by more than one year, but restored civil rights can remove that federal disability if state law does not expressly limit firearms privileges.

State v. Hunt · filed 2021-04-23(g)(1)

We will note that under federal law, 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, to possess any firearm or ammunition. ... Thus, if state law has restored civil rights to a felon without expressly limiting the felon’s firearms privileges, that felon is not subject to federal firearms disabilities. Therefore, the trial court’s attempt at an advisement of the federal law was not accurate.

A trial on a § 922(g)(1) charge need not separate the prior-felony element from possession when evidence of prior convictions does not create prejudice requiring bifurcation.

United States v. Jafferson · filed 2021-12-30(g)(1)

As explained above, the jury may well learn of Jefferson’s prior felony convictions as part of the government’s case-in-chief or in impeachment of defendant should he testify; but any prejudice resulting from the jury learning of Jefferson’s felony convictions will not be so overwhelming as to require bifurcation, given that the Court has already concluded that there is not substantial unfair prejudice under Rule 403.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits people previously convicted of a felony from possessing firearms, ammunition, or destructive devices.

United States v. Garcia-Marcelo · filed 2022-08-25(g)(1)

That’s because, as a matter of federal law, individuals who have previously been convicted of a felony are prohibited from possessing firearms, ammunition, or destructive devices. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, ammunition, or destructive devices.

United States v. Woodson · filed 2024-11-08(g)(1)

Federal law prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, ammunition, or destructive devices. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(t)(2)(B)(ii) permits a licensed firearms dealer to complete a transfer after three business days without a proceed response if no further notice arrives.

Regina v. State of California · filed 2023-03-17(t)(2)(B)(ii)

Contrary to Regina’s contention, the Brady Act does not require a licensed dealer to await an explicit “proceed” response to complete the transfer. When a dealer receives a “delayed” response after something is found during a background check, the dealer must wait three business days and then, if no further communication is forthcoming, it may, if it wishes, complete the sale without receiving a proceed response.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant had a prior felony conviction and knew of that status; when the defendant declines to stipulate, evidence of prior convictions may be admitted to prove those elements, subject to limits on unfair prejudice.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2023-05-23(g)(1)

For prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove both that a defendant has a prior felony conviction and that he knew he had previously been convicted of a felony. ... Here, Johnson declined to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon or to his knowledge of that status, and we see no basis on this record to distinguish this case from our precedent. ... The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Johnson’s prior convictions after concluding that the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from possessing firearms and ammunition, including destructive devices as firearms, but does not prohibit possession of other dangerous weapons.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2023-06-09(g)(1)

As a felon, Nelson is prohibited under federal law from possessing firearms, ammunition, and destructive devices. ... However, the district court must modify this condition “to the extent this condition broadens the statutory restriction by prohibiting the possession of other dangerous weapons.”

Section 922(g)(1) restricts certain persons from shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition, and did not apply to the allegations in this complaint.

MOUZONE v. CITY OF PASSAIC · filed 2024-01-08(g)(1)

Moreover, Plaintiff cites a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as a purported cause of action (see Compl. at 10), which concerns certain persons being ineligible to “ship or transport . . . any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Based on the face of the Complaint, however, the statute does not appear to apply.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a supervised release condition barring firearms, ammunition, and destructive devices, but not other dangerous weapons.

United States v. Day · filed 2025-04-29(g)(1)

This condition is partially consistent with the statutorily required condition that Day not commit another federal, state, or local offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Accordingly, standard condition 10 need only be stricken in part by removing the reference to other “dangerous weapon[s].”

Section 922(g)(1) does not automatically entitle a defendant to a bifurcated trial on firearm possession and felony status.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2025-07-24(g)(1)

A defendant is not automatically entitled to bifurcation of a felon-in- possession charge. ... The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’s motion to bifurcate proof for Count I.

Section 922(g)(1) makes a person subject to its firearm prohibition ineligible to possess or purchase a firearm.

People v. Brown · filed 2026-04-02(g)(1)

The court also providently imposed condition 11, prohibiting defendant from purchasing or possessing firearms, and to surrender the same, since he is not eligible to possess or purchase a firearm under both federal and state law (see 18 USC § 922[g][1]; Penal Law § 400.00[1][c]; People v Pacha, — AD3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 00982, *1 [1st Dept 2026]).

Section 922’s firearms and ammunition restrictions do not apply when the firearms or ammunition are issued for a police department’s use.

In the Matter of Norhan Mansour · filed 2026-05-01

Accordingly, when firearms or ammunition are "issued for the use of" a police department, such as the JCPD, the restrictions imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 922 are eliminated.