18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(9) may use a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction predating its enactment as a predicate because it penalizes later firearm possession.

United States v. Meade · filed 1997-12-17(g)(9)

The Court follows this reasoning, and holds that Section 922(g)(9) penalizes the possession of the firearm after the date of enactment of the statute and does not therefore constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to Hendrickson’s conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon.

United States v. Hendrickson · filed 1997-12-11(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the provision under which Hendrickson pleaded guilty, is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Hendrickson.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Antwan E. Brown · filed 1997-11-20(g)

Brown contends his firearm conviction must be vacated because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. We reject this claim in light of United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir.1995) and United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is valid under the Commerce Clause and can be constitutional as applied.

United States v. Crow · filed 1997-03-06(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to the instant case.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Sanders · filed 1997-03-06(g)(1)

The law in this circuit is clear that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Jay · filed 1997-03-06(g)(1)

Further, because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is constitutional, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Jay's motion to dismiss the first count of the indictment.

Section 922(a)(1)(A)'s prohibition on unlicensed firearms dealing is within Congress's Commerce Clause power because firearms dealing is commercial activity that affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Boone · filed 1997-03-06(a)(1)(A)

We had no difficulty upholding the constitutionality of § 922(a)(1)(A) in United States v. Hornbeck, 489 F.2d 1325, 1326 (7th Cir.1973) (per curiam), by a straightforward application of the Supreme Court's holding in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), a decision that recognized Congress's commerce power to regulate intrastate loansharking because of its demonstrated link to interstate crime. Lopez did not question the validity of Perez, nor does it now lead us to question Hornbeck.

Section 922(g)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is within Congress's authority despite the challenge based on Lopez.

United States v. Scott · filed 1995-10-12(g)

Dorian Scott appeals his conviction from the district court 1 following his plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). Relying on United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), Scott argues that Congress lacks authority to make a felon's possession of a weapon a federal crime. Scott's argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent holding in United States v. Rankin, No. 95-1406, 1995 WL 445716 (8th Cir. July 28, 1995) (per curiam).

Section 922(g)(1) survives a Commerce Clause challenge because it requires a connection between firearm possession and interstate commerce.

United States v. Snow · filed 1995-10-05(g)(1)

The requirement of § 922(g) that the defendant’s possession of the firearm or ammunition must have been “in or affecting commerce,” then, supplies the critical element that rendered § 922(q) constitutionally infirm in Lopez.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it requires the firearm to have been in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. John W. Bolton, A/K/A Gino · filed 1995-10-17(g)

“Section 922(g)’s requirement that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.” ... We, therefore, reject Defendant’s argument that § 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(a)(1)(A)’s firearms licensing requirement is valid under the Commerce Clause because the business of dealing in firearms substantially affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Boone · filed 1995-10-30(a)(1)(A)

Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and § 924(m) are both valid exercises of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, Boone’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment is DENIED.

Section 922(g) is tied to interstate commerce and withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez.

United States v. Ralph · filed 1995-11-01(g)

Finally, Ralph's challenge to section 922(g) is foreclosed by this court's recent opinion in United States v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (rejecting Lopez challenge and holding Sec. 922(g) is clearly tied to interstate commerce).

Section 922(g)'s requirement that the firearm have traveled in interstate commerce at some time is sufficient to sustain the statute under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Taylor · filed 1995-09-05(g)

This court concludes, as have many courts that have addressed the issue in the wake of Lopez, that the jurisdictional requirement in § 922(g) that the firearm at some time had traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is within Congress's constitutional authority.

United States v. Perkins · filed 1995-09-25(g)(1)

Reginald Perkins pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). Relying on United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), Perkins argues that Congress lacks authority to make a felon's possession of a weapon a federal crime. Perkins's argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent holding in United States v. Rankin, No. 95-1406, 1995 WL 445716 (8th Cir. July 28, 1995).

Section 922(n)’s prohibition on receiving a firearm previously shipped in interstate commerce is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. McCord · filed 1995-07-31(n)

Inasmuch as Judge Piester has fully, carefully, and correctly found the facts and applied the law, I need only state that the indictment against Defendant should not be dismissed for the reasons that the provisions under which the Defendant is charged (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n) and 924(a)(1)(A)) are constitutional exercises of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause and are neither overbroad nor vague.

Section 922(g) is constitutional because its jurisdictional element limits its application to firearm possession with a nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Bell · filed 1995-08-14(g)

Accordingly, because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) contains a jurisdictional element limiting the statute’s application to those cases that contain the requisite nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce, the statute is readily distinguishable from § 922(q). Consequently, the Court finds § 922(g) constitutional.

Section 922(g) is not a bill of attainder because it does not determine guilt or remove the protections of a trial.

United States v. McClain · filed 1995-07-26(g)

Section 922(g) does not determine guilt; it does not remove the protections of a trial. It therefore is not a bill of attainder.

Section 922(a)(6) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a purchaser who falsely denies drug use on Form 4473 while regularly using cocaine during the firearm transactions.

United States v. Berry · filed 1995-07-10(a)(6)

This vagueness argument must be considered here in the context of the evidence presented in this case. ... Here, the defendant freely admitted that he was a regular cocaine user during the precise period covered by the charge in the indictment, and the various Forms 4473 which had been submitted to the firearms dealers were indeed false. Thus, any vagueness claim fails.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a connection to interstate commerce, so the Commerce Clause ruling in Lopez does not invalidate it.

United States v. Campbell · filed 1995-06-28(g)(1)

Significantly, the Court cited in support of this reason the predecessor section to section 922(g)(1) and, as noted above, section 922(g)(1), like its predecessor, contains this jurisdictional element. Because sections 922(g)(1) and 922(q)(1)(A) are different in this material respect, Lopez cannot control here.

Section 922(o)'s prohibition on transferring or possessing machineguns is a permissible exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Wilks · filed 1995-07-06(o)

We therefore join the Eighth Circuit in concluding § 922(o) represents a permissible exercise of the authority granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)'s requirement that the firearm have been in interstate commerce at some time sufficiently establishes its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Pelkey · filed 1995-07-20(g)

Because Sec. 922(g) requires that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce, its constitutionality is sufficiently established under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)'s interstate commerce requirement makes its prohibition on firearm possession by felons a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Bramble · filed 1995-07-21(g)

Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) specifically requires a jurisdictional nexus between possession of a firearm and commerce, this court finds that Congress’ regulation of felons in possession of firearms under Section 922(g) is a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) falls within Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because it requires a felon’s firearm possession to be in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Brown · filed 1995-05-23(g)(1)

Consequently, under the tenets of Bass and Scarborough, § 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power because it requires a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Hart · filed 1995-06-07(g)(1)

In contrast, Section 922(g)(1) on its face requires a nexus with interstate commerce. ... As such, this court finds that Section 922(g) does not suffer from any of the constitutional infirmities that the Supreme Court found in Section 922(q).

Section 922(o)’s regulation of machine gun possession is within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Hale · filed 1992-11-20(o)

We conclude, as did the Ninth Circuit on similar grounds, that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is within the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(a)(6) is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power even though it reaches some intrastate firearm transactions.

United States v. Trioli · filed 1970-01-23(a)(6)

I rule that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (6) is not unconstitutional but, on the contrary, is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g) does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination by allowing a public record to prove a defendant’s prior felony conviction.

United States v. Phillips · filed 1970-09-21(g)

First, it should be noted that the production of a public record of prior conviction against a defendant, to establish his status as member of a class to which the interstate transportation of firearms has been prohibited, clearly does not constitute any furnishing of evidence by such a defendant to the Government.

Section 922(a)(1) may be enforced without violating the Second, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments.

United States v. Wilson · filed 1971-04-19(a)(1)

Appellant was convicted and sentenced pursuant to a jury verdict on a two-count indictment of dealing in firearms and possessing a sawed off shot gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) (1), 924(a), as amended in 1968, and 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871, as amended in 1968, respectively. ... Appellant contends that enforcement of the aforementioned statutes violates his Second, Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. We do not agree.

Section 922(m), read with the dealer definition and recordkeeping provision, gave firearms dealers clear notice of their duty to keep records and was not unconstitutionally vague.

United States v. Decker · filed 1971-07-21(m)

Here, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a) (11), 922(m) and 923(g) clearly establish that the defendant was a “dealer” in firearms and, as such, was required to keep records. The nature and form of those records is clearly and understandably set in 26 CFR § 178.121, et seq. We can find no reasonable basis for finding the statutes and regulations involved in this case to be unconstitutionally vague.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on interstate transportation of firearms and ammunition by people convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year in prison does not violate Fifth Amendment equal protection because states classify crimes differently.

United States v. Weatherford · filed 1973-01-17(g)(1)

We have no difficulty in holding that the section under consideration is not constitutionally infirm as a denial of equal protection to appellants under the Fifth Amendment.

Section 922(a)(6) does not violate the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.

United States v. Furem · filed 1975-02-10(a)(6)

The defendant next contends that the statutory basis for the indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), operates as an ex post facto law or as a bill of attainder in violation of U.S.Const. art. I, § 9. The reasoning of the court in Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010, 93 S.Ct. 454, 34 L.Ed.2d 303 (1972), persuades me that § 922(a)(6) does not run afoul of article I, § 9 of the Constitution.

Section 922(m) makes it unlawful for licensed firearms dealers to fail to keep the records required by section 923; the Fifth Amendment does not excuse compliance with those recordkeeping requirements.

United States v. Cubeta · filed 1974-01-11(m)

Section 923 prescribes the licensing and record keeping procedures necessary to engage in the firearms and ammunition business; section 922(m) declares it unlawful to fail to keep the records required by section 923; and section 924(a) sets forth the penalty which may be imposed for a violation of the record keeping provisions of the Act. ... Under these circumstances the “required records” doctrine, see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948), is applicable; the protection of the Fifth Amendment does not apply.

Section 922(a)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague for lacking minimum sales, revenue, or employee thresholds; dealing in firearms means engaging in a business of selling them for livelihood or profit.

United States v. Williams · filed 1974-09-03(a)(1)

As to contention (1) and the projection of it against the indictment, ... we agree with what was held by the District Court in United States v. Gross, 313 F.Supp. 1330, 1333 (D.C.S.D.Ind. 1970) and by the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in its affirmance, 451 F.2d 1355, 1357. ... There appears to be little doubt that “dealer” means anyone who is engaged in any business of selling firearms, and that “business” is that which occupies time, attention and labor for the purpose of livelihood or profit.

Section 922(h) may be used to prosecute conduct also covered by § 1202(a) without violating due process or equal protection.

United States v. Stapleton · filed 1979-07-16(h)

The Supreme Court’s decision in ... forecloses Stapleton’s constitutional claim. The Court found §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) unambiguous and the overlapping reach of the sections non-violative of due process and equal protection.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction may stand even when § 1202(a)(1) permits a shorter sentence for substantially the same offense.

United States v. Girst · filed 1979-12-26(g)(1)

Since the Supreme Court has held that there is no ambiguity in the two statutes and no implied repeal of § 922(h), § 924 by § 1202(a)(1), and that the Government may prosecute under either statute, we cannot strike down the judgment of conviction based on § 922(g)(1), § 924 because a harsher sentence was authorized.

Section 922(h)(1) constitutionally bars firearm receipt after a nonviolent crime punishable by more than one year because the restriction rationally furthers Congress’s goal of preventing crime.

United States v. Giles · filed 1981-03-23(h)(1)

For substantially the reasons set out in these prior cases, we conclude that section 922(hXl) bears a rational relationship to the goal Congress sought to promote; accordingly, Giles’ first challenge to the constitutionality of that statute, based on grounds that it fails to discriminate between those convicted of violent and nonviolent crimes, must fail.

Section 922(h)(4)'s prohibition on receiving firearms after commitment to a mental institution has a rational basis under equal protection principles.

United States v. Jones · filed 1983-07-13(h)(4)

This court cannot find the classification of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(4) irrational, when considered in light of the Congressional intent to keep firearms away from persons considered as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.

Section 922(h)(1)'s firearm receipt prohibition withstands an equal protection and due process challenge on the facts presented.

United States v. Austin · filed 1983-09-15(h)(1)

Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) are unconstitutional as applied to him, is DENIED without prejudice.

Section 922(e)'s notice requirement does not violate the Fifth Amendment merely because a common carrier might give incriminating information to the government.

United States v. Wilson · filed 1983-11-04(e)

The mere possibility that a common carrier might provide Incriminating information to the government, we find, does not render convictions for failure to give notice under § 922(e) unconstitutional.

Section 922(e)'s firearm shipment notice requirement does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

United States v. Shakir Wadi Alkhafaji · filed 1985-02-06(e)

Section 922(e) is not inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

Section 922’s restriction on firearms for convicted felons has a rational relationship to reducing lawlessness and violent crime and withstands the constitutional challenges raised here.

United States v. Land · filed 1990-12-26(g)(1)

Land argues that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922 abridges his second amendment right to bear arms and violates equal protection by failing to distinguish rationally between violent and nonviolent felons. ... We have previously rejected a second amendment claim similar to the one raised here by Land, see United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.1974), and we see no reason to change our views expressed in Johnson. ... There is clearly a rational relationship between prohibiting the possession of firearms by persons convicted of serious crimes and attaining a legitimate government goal: reduction of lawlessness and violent crime.

Section 922(o)’s ban on machine gun possession is within Congress’s Commerce Clause power without proof of an interstate commerce nexus in an individual case.

United States v. Creed Miles Evans · filed 1991-03-20(o)

The statutes at issue in this case easily meet this standard. Congress specifically found that at least 750,000 people had been killed in the United States by firearms between the turn of the century and the time of the Act’s enactment. It was thus reasonable for Congress to conclude that the possession of firearms affects the national economy, if only through the insurance industry. Since Evans does not contend that any specific Constitutional rights are implicated, this rather tenuous nexus between the activity regulated and interstate commerce is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement does not violate equal protection by treating felons differently based on where firearms are manufactured.

United States v. Walker · filed 1991-04-10(g)(1)

The defendant argues that because § 922(g)(1) only applies to firearms that have been involved in interstate commerce, it violates the equal protection clause by discriminating against convicted felons who live in states without firearms manufacturers. ... We therefore see no merit in his argument.

Section 922(o)’s prohibition on machine gun possession is a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power.

United States v. Pearson · filed 1993-11-01(o)

Accordingly, the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) represents a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce clause power.

Section 922(q)(1)(A)'s prohibition on possessing firearms within 1,000 feet of a school is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Ray Harold Edwards, III · filed 1993-12-21(q)(1)(A)

The addition of the condition in section 922(q)(l)(A) that the firearms be possessed within 1000 feet of a school does not in any way diminish Congress’ power to regulate firearms under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by allowing relevant state law to determine whether a defendant’s civil rights have been restored.

Carl Edward Neisler, Jr. v. United States · filed 1994-05-17(g)(1)

The statute under which Neisler was convicted, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it permits referral to relevant state law for determining whether the defendant has had his civil rights restored to him.

The district court held § 922(o)'s ban on machinegun possession unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Bownds · filed 1994-08-18(o)

In light of the Fifth Circuit’s recent holding in Lopez, this Court finds 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) unconstitutional and orders the indictment against Defendant Charles Bownds dismissed.

Section 922(g)(1) is tied to interstate commerce and withstands a Lopez challenge to Congress’s authority to prohibit felons from possessing firearms.

United States v. Bobo · filed 1995-11-03(g)(1)

Bobo's argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent holding in United States v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (rejecting Lopez challenge and holding Sec. 922(g) is clearly tied to interstate commerce).

Section 922(o)'s prohibition on transferring or possessing post-1986 machineguns is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Kirk · filed 1995-11-04(o)

Therefore, we hold that the prohibition of transfer or possession of post-1986 machineguns in 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is a rational exercise of the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is tied to interstate commerce and withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez.

United States v. Merrifield · filed 1995-11-17(g)(1)

Merrifield's argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent holding in United States v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (rejecting Lopez challenge and holding Sec. 922(g) is clearly tied to interstate commerce).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce and withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez.

United States v. Bell · filed 1995-11-17(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) does not suffer from the same infirmities. It contains an explicit requirement that a nexus to interstate commerce be established. ... For these reasons, we find 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it a federal offense for a felon to possess a firearm, to be immune from constitutional attack under Lopez.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge because it is tied to interstate commerce.

United States v. Malone · filed 1995-11-27(g)(1)

Malone's argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent holding in United States v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (rejecting Lopez challenge and holding Sec. 922(g) is clearly tied to interstate commerce), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-6563 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1995).

Section 922(g) requires proof that the firearm was shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce or possessed in or affected commerce.

United States v. Sorrentino · filed 1995-12-26(g)

The statute before us avoids the constitutional deficiency identified in Lopez because it requires a legitimate nexus with interstate commerce. To obtain a conviction under Section 922(g), the government must show that the weapon at issue was “ship[ped] or transport[ed] in interstate or foreign commerce” or was “possess[ed] in or affect[ed] commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(x)’s restrictions on handgun transfers to and possession by juveniles are within Congress’ Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Cardoza · filed 1996-01-16(x)

Upon reflection, therefore, this Court imports the analytical approach used in Heart of Atlanta Motel and rules that Congress acted within its constitutional authority when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922(x), regulating the handgun market and excluding juveniles from participation in it.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from shipping or transporting, possessing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition in the circumstances specified by the statute.

United States v. Wesley · filed 1996-02-28(g)(1)

The requirement of § 922(g) that the defendant’s possession of the firearm or ammunition must have been “in or affecting commerce,” then, supplies the critical element that rendered § 922(q) constitutionally infirm in Lopez. ... The Lopez decision does not mandate a different result. ... I am not persuaded by this contention. Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a felon “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Thus, “receipt and possession are simply two means of violating the same provision ...” ... By charging defendant with both receipt and possession of a firearm, then, “the indictment charges the commission of a single offense by different means, and thus is not duplicitous.”

Section 922(d) permits regulation of intrastate firearm disposals as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Monteleone · filed 1996-02-29(d)(1)

As such, we determine that section 922(d) represents a legitimate exercise of Congress’ commerce power.

Section 922(g)(1) survives the Commerce Clause challenge rejected in Bell.

United States v. Sherry · filed 1995-12-19(g)(1)

Less than two weeks prior to the date set for oral argument in this case, we upheld 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1) against a Commerce Clause challenge identical to the one asserted by Sherry. ... The appellant has not offered a compelling reason for overturning the clear and very recent precedent in Bell. We therefore decline to do so.

Section 922(o) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Roy RAMBO, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-01-25(o)

We hold that section 922(o) is a proper exercise of the authority granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s requirement that a felon's firearm possession be in or affecting commerce provides the nexus needed for the provision to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Turner · filed 1996-03-04(g)(1)

Requiring the government in each case to prove that a felon has possessed a firearm “in or affecting commerce” ensures that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce and saves § 922(g) from the jurisdictional defect that doomed § 922(q). Accordingly, we hold that § 922(g)(1) represents a valid exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause.

A court’s failure to address § 922(g)’s constitutionality when the defendant did not raise it was not plain error after Lopez.

United States v. Spires · filed 1996-03-22(g)

We do not decide whether this case falls within the parameters of Griffith or Knowles because, even after Lopez, the failure to address the constitutionality of § 922(g) when not raised by defendant is not plain error.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because a minimal connection between firearm possession and interstate commerce is sufficient.

United States v. Mobley · filed 1996-03-28(g)

A minimal connection with interstate commerce is sufficient to allow Congress to assert its broad regulatory powers in the area of firearm possession. ... We find that Congress properly enacted § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) and its application in this case survived Commerce Clause challenges.

United States v. McAllister · filed 1996-03-08(g)(1)

We hold that § 922(g)(1) is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, nor is its application unconstitutional in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional and is not vague.

United States v. Smith · filed 1996-03-26(g)(1)

We held in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n. 2 (9th Cir.1995), that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional, notwithstanding United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). It also isn't vague in any way.

Section 922(g) withstands a constitutional challenge based on United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Young · filed 1996-03-27(g)

Young argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). We have rejected this contention in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1995) and are bound by that decision.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Corbett · filed 1996-04-05(g)(1)

Corbett's argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent opinion in United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (rejecting Lopez challenge to § 922(g)), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-8099 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996).

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez.

United States v. Dotson · filed 1996-04-23(g)(1)

Finally, we conclude that Dotson's Lopez challenge to section 922(g) is foreclosed by our recent opinion in United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (rejecting Lopez challenge to § 922(g)), cert. denied, 1996 WL 97336 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1996) (No. 95-8099); see also United States v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding § 922(g)(1) clearly tied to interstate commerce), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 577 (1995).

Section 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Howard · filed 1996-05-07(g)

In Turner, this court held that § 922(g) was "a valid exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause." Turner, 77 F.3d at 889. Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power because it requires firearm possession to be in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Kenneth Gateward, A/K/A Kenneth Carr · filed 1996-05-24(g)(1)

We therefore join eight courts of appeals in upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as a valid exercise of the commerce power.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power because it requires a felon's firearm possession to be in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Lemmo · filed 1996-05-13(g)(1)

For all of the above reasons, we hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' legislative power under the Commerce Clause.

Convictions under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(a)(6) do not violate the Commerce Clause.

Thomas v. United States · filed 1996-05-16(g)(1), (a)(6)

Lastly, Thomas's convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(a)(6) do not violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) is within Congress's constitutional authority.

United States v. Jimmy W. Sluder, Bobby E. Baker, Paul L. McCaleb Brandon B. Bowling, 1 · filed 1996-05-24(g)(1)

Citing Lopez v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), appellants argue that Congress is without authority to pass § 922(g)(1) and that the law is therefore unconstitutional. ... This court having held that passage of the statute in question was within the Congress' constitutional authority, affirmance of convictions is required in these cases.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is within Congress's authority despite Lopez.

United States v. Robertson · filed 1996-06-07(g)(1)

Relying on United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), Robertson argues that Congress lacks the authority to make a felon's mere possession of a firearm a federal crime. Robertson's argument is foreclosed, however, by our holding in United States v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338, 339 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 577 (1995).

Section 922(g)(5) is within Congress's Commerce Clause authority because section 922(g) requires proof that the firearm was shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Maldonado · filed 1996-06-07(g)(5)

We reject Maldonado's argument that Congress had no authority to pass 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). See United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). In contrast to the statute at issue in Lopez, section 922(g) requires the government to prove the firearm "has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm travels from the state where it was manufactured into another state, and that requirement supports the provision's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Audia · filed 1996-06-14(g)(1)

There is no question that the weapon travelled in interstate commerce in accordance with the § 922(g)(1) requirement. ... Thus, we reject Audia's argument that his conviction under § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional.

Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(k) require an interstate commerce nexus and fall within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 1996-06-11(g)(1), (k)

Given the statutorily required nexus between interstate commerce and the firearms possessions prohibited by §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(k), we conclude that Congress acted within its constitutional authority when it enacted these provisions.

Section 922(x)(2)’s prohibition on juvenile possession of handguns and suitable ammunition is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL R., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-07-08(x)(2)

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that enactment of section 922(x)(2) is a valid, constitutional exercise of Congressional commerce powers.

Section 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Hart · filed 1996-07-09(g)(1)

This court held that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. ... In light of this law of the circuit, we reject defendant's attack on the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and we AFFIRM the judgment.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Harkrider · filed 1996-07-12(g)

He contends that Section 922 is unconstitutional because it is beyond Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. We disagree. Joining several other circuits, we held, in United States v. Rawls, slip op. 3899 (5th Cir. June 17, 1996) (per curiam), Section 922(g) to be constitutional.

Section 922(o) constitutionally prohibits machine gun possession, including local possession, under Congress’s power to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Kenney · filed 1996-07-30(o)

In sum, both the nature of the statute and the history of federal firearms legislation support the conclusion that § 922(o) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Adams · filed 1996-08-14(g)(1)

However, in United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir.1996), we upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in the face of a Lopez challenge identical to Adams'. Accordingly, we reject his argument.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because its interstate commerce element requires a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Polanco · filed 1996-08-15(g)(1)

This jurisdictional element is a key distinction between § 922(g)(1) and § 922(q), the statute invalidated in Lopez, for it insures, on a case-by-case basis, that a defendant’s actions implicate interstate commerce to a constitutionally adequate degree. Because Hanna indisputably governs this issue, Polanco’s Commerce Clause challenge must fail.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it requires proof that the firearm possession was in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Raymond Burrow, Also Known as Jeffrey Love, Also Known as Raymond Burrows · filed 1996-08-16(g)(1)

Requiring the government in each case to prove that a felon has possessed a firearm "in or affecting commerce" ensures that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce and saves § 922(g) from the jurisdictional defect that doomed § 922(q). Accordingly, we hold that § 922(g)(1) represents a valid exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s commerce power on its face.

United States v. Hudson · filed 1996-08-22(g)(1)

Relying on United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), Hudson contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it exceeds the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (9th Cir.1995).

Section 922(g)'s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez.

United States v. Richard James Witherow, Jr. · filed 1996-08-26(g)

Because this court has already decided that § 922(g) is not unconstitutional, and because we find that the district court did not err in denying Witherow's motion to suppress, we affirm.

Section 922(o)'s ban on machine gun possession survives a constitutional challenge based on United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Copus · filed 1996-08-08(o)

Copus’ argument that the logic of Lopez also requires the invalidation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is directly foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7th Cir.1996).

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a convicted felon who possesses firearms shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. Kuban · filed 1996-08-29(g)(1)

Kuban’s challenges to the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1) as applied to him have been resolved adversely to his ... contentions by our recent decision in United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996), which is binding on this panel.

Section 922(o)'s prohibition on possessing or transferring machineguns acquired after May 19, 1986 is a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power.

United States v. Beuckelaere · filed 1996-09-06(o)

Because we believe there is a rational basis for the legislative judgment that possession and transfer of machineguns acquired after 1986 have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and because Congress has the power to regulate machineguns as things in interstate commerce, moving in the channels of interstate commerce, we find that § 922(o) is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce.

Section 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Smith · filed 1996-09-20(g)

Unfortunately for Smith, shortly after the briefs were filed in this appeal, we joined the courts in several other circuits in holding that § 922(g) does represent a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. See United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 889 (6th Cir.1996). That decision is binding in this case.

Section 922(g) requires firearm possession to affect or have a link with interstate commerce, so Lopez did not invalidate it.

United States v. Clontz · filed 1996-09-23(g)

Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, there is a jurisdictional element in § 922(g). Section 922(g) requires that possession of the firearm affect or have a link with interstate commerce. ... Therefore, we agree with other circuits that have addressed this issue, finding that Lopez did not invalidate § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons remains valid under the Commerce Clause after Lopez.

United States v. Murphy · filed 1996-09-27(g)(1)

As the reasoning of Turner makes plain, there is no question that Lopez’s treatment of section 922(q) simply does not speak to the wholly different circumstances presented by section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(x)(2) is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Juvenile Male · filed 1996-10-11(x)(2)

This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 345 (9th Cir.1996), in which this court held that "enactment of section 922(x)(2) is a valid, constitutional exercise of Congressional commerce powers."

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on a firearm's prior interstate travel.

United States v. Mickey Dean Beaty · filed 1996-10-11(g)(1)

A panel of this court not sitting en banc lacks authority to overturn prior Ninth Circuit precedent. See United States v. Lucas, 963 F.2d 243, 247 (9th Cir.1992). Moreover, this court has rejected the Commerce Clause challenge to section 922(g) in post-Pappadopoulos decisions.

Section 922(x)(2) does not exceed Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Juvenile Male · filed 1996-10-11(x)(2)

We recently held that the Youth Handgun Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), does not exceed Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 345 (9th Cir.1996). 3 Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's dismissal order and REMAND for further proceedings.

Section 922(x)(2) does not exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Juvenile Male (a.e.f.) · filed 1996-10-11(x)(2)

We recently held that the Youth Handgun Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), does not exceed Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. ... Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's dismissal order and REMAND for further proceedings.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally apply to a felon's possession of firearms that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Barry · filed 1996-10-17(g)(1)

"we find the application of section 922(g)(1) to [Barry's] conduct eminently constitutional."

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands the constitutional challenge previously rejected by the Ninth Circuit.

United States v. Reed Barries, III · filed 1996-10-11(g)

Reed Barries, III appeals his jury conviction for the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) on the ground the statute is unconstitutional. This contention is foreclosed by this court's recent opinion in United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir.1996), rejecting an identical challenge under United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995).

Section 922(g)(1) defines the federal offense by the punishment for a prior crime, so relying on state law to determine convictions does not improperly delegate Congress’s authority.

United States v. McKenzie · filed 1996-10-17(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) does not include “felony” as an element of the offense. Rather, it prohibits firearm possession by those “convicted of a crime punishable by imprisoninent for a term exceeding one-year.” Congress, not the states, has defined the elements of the federal offense described in § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands the as-applied constitutional challenge addressed here.

United States v. Patton · filed 1996-11-05(g)(1)

Dwayne Patton has appealed his conviction of having violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His contention that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons survives a constitutional challenge based on United States v. Lopez.

United States v. McCrary · filed 1996-11-06(g)(1)

He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). McCrary’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g) is valid under the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Ferrell · filed 1996-11-15(g)

Third, Ferrell asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is invalid under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We have rejected this argument. United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir.1995).

Section 922(g) is constitutional and does not violate the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Curtin · filed 1996-12-06(g)

Curtin's Lopez challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is foreclosed by our opinion in United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1103-04 (8th Cir.) (§ 922(g) is constitutional and not violative of Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 215 (1996).

Section 922(g)(1) regulates a felon's possession of a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce and is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Garner · filed 1996-12-09(g)(1)

Conversely, Section 922(g) expressly limits its application to interstate activity. ... Indeed, this Court has consistently held that Lopez did not disturb the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1). United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 87 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 864 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Sanders, 1996 WL 577153 (6th Cir.1996). As this Court stated in Chesney, "Lopez also did not disturb the Supreme Court's precedents which indicate that a firearm that has been transported at any time in interstate commerce has a sufficient effect on commerce to allow Congress to regulate the possession of that firearm pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers." Chesney, 86 F.3d at 570-71. ... Here, the government offered expert testimony that the gun possessed by Garner was manufactured in California. It naturally follows that the weapon had to have been transported in interstate commerce. Therefore, Section 922(g) is constitutional on its face and as applied to Garner.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress's legislative power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Tobias · filed 1996-12-09(g)(1)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional.

Section 922(g) does not violate the Commerce Clause and requires proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some point.

United States v. McAllister · filed 1996-12-19(g)

He acknowledges that this court has ruled that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) does not violate the commerce clause, United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294, 296-97 (2d Cir.1995), and only requires proof that at one point the firearm traveled in interstate commerce to satisfy the interstate commerce element, United States v. Carter, 982 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir.1992), to which McAllister stipulated at trial. ... With respect to this part of McAllister's argument, we affirm on the basis of Sorrentino and Carter.

Section 922(o)'s ban on transferring or possessing a machinegun withstands Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges.

United States v. Rybar · filed 1996-12-27(o)

Appellant Raymond Rybar, Jr. was convicted following a conditional guilty plea to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which makes it "unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun." On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in rejecting his challenge to that provision as beyond Congress' commerce power and as violating the Second Amendment. Neither challenge is persuasive.

Section 922(o)’s ban on machine gun possession and transfer is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Raymond Rybar, Jr. · filed 1996-12-30(o)

It follows, and we hold, that the authority of Congress to enact § 922(o) under the Commerce Clause can be sustained under the third category identified by the Supreme Court: as a regulation of an activity that "substantially affects" commerce.

Section 922(g) requires the firearm to have traveled in interstate commerce at some point, satisfying the Commerce Clause requirement for the felon-in-possession prohibition.

United States v. Broomfield · filed 1997-01-13(g)

Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Section 922(g) requires that the firearm have been at some time in interstate commerce. ... Following Hanna, we reject Broomfield's contention that Section 922(g) is unconstitutional.

Section 922(x)(2) is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power.

United States v. Juvenile Male · filed 1997-01-27(x)(2)

We recently held that "enactment of section 922(x)(2) is a valid, constitutional exercise of Congressional commerce powers." See United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 345 (9th Cir.1996). 1 Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Miles · filed 1997-01-27(g)(1)

Defendant contends that the statute under which he was convicted, § 922(g)(1), is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, in light of United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). We have, however, held otherwise. United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 405 (1996); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n. 2 (9th Cir.1995). We therefore reject this contention.

Section 922(g)(1) is within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.

United States v. Anderson · filed 1997-01-31(g)(1)

We have held that Congress possesses the power to enact § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Lewis, 100 F.3d 49 (7th Cir.1996), and adhere to that position.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald BRAMBLE, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1997-02-14(g)(1)

The district 'court correctly upheld the felon in possession of a firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power because it requires proof that the firearm was possessed in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Lester · filed 1997-02-13(g)(1)

Lester's argument that § 922(g)(1) suffers under the same infirmities as § 922(q) lacks merit. The Sixth Circuit has squarely addressed this issue in similar cases holding that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress' commerce powers.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard BONAT, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1997-02-14(g)(1)

In United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995), we determined that Lopez did not affect our prior decision in United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.1988) that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce clause powers. Hanna, 55 F.3d at 1462 & n. 2. We need not reconsider this settled issue.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a constitutional challenge.

United States v. Walker · filed 1997-03-27(g)(1)

Steven Walker appeals his conviction for being a felon in possesion of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His contention that the statute is unconstitutional lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce, satisfying the Commerce Clause’s minimum nexus requirement.

United States v. White · filed 1997-04-07(g)(1)

In Wells, we concluded that "[t]he existence of this jurisdictional element [in § 922(g) ], requiring the Government to show that a nexus exists between the firearm and interstate commerce to obtain a conviction under § 922(g), distinguishes Lopez and satisfies the minimal nexus required for the Commerce Clause." 98 F.3d at 811. Therefore, White's argument fails.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Turner · filed 1997-04-24(g)(1)

Turner’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a constitutional challenge based on Lopez.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1997-04-09(g)(1)

Johnson’s challenge to the constitutionality of the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) weapons charges based on Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), is foreclosed by our recent decisions.

Section 922(g)(1) is valid under the Commerce Clause and constitutional as applied to the facts of this case.

United States v. Estes · filed 1997-04-24(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to the instant case.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional.

United States v. Aguilera · filed 1997-04-24(g)(1)

His contention that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutionally valid under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Trollinger · filed 1997-04-24(g)(1)

He argues that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in enacting § 922(g)(1). Trollinger’s claims are without merit.

Section 922(o) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated machinegun conduct substantially affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Knutson · filed 1997-05-05(o)

We hold that Congress could have had a rational basis for concluding that § 922(o) regulates conduct that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and that § 922(o) is not unconstitutional.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Ninth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Jones · filed 1997-05-15(g)

His argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995), a case decided after United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).

Section 922(o) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Knutson · filed 1997-05-16(o)

We hold that Congress could have had a rational basis for concluding that § 922(o) regulates conduct that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and that § 922(o) is not unconstitutional.

A vagueness challenge to § 922(g)(3) that does not implicate the First Amendment must address the statute as applied to facts established at trial; a pretrial evidence proffer is insufficient.

United States v. Reed · filed 1997-06-02(g)(3)

We conclude that the district court erred in treating defendant’s motion to dismiss as an “as applied” challenge when the motion clearly raised only an invalid facial attack. We also conclude that the district court erred in using the government’s mere proffer of evidence as a foundation on which the application of the statute could be analyzed and the vagueness challenge could be determined.

Section 922(x)(1)(A) is a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power even though it contains no interstate-commerce requirement.

United States v. Josh M. Kocourek · filed 1997-06-10(x)(1)(A)

Section 922(x)(1)(A) does not contain an interstate-commerce requirement. We conclude, however, that it may be sustained as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce and is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Leak · filed 1997-06-13(g)

In United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996), this court held that, unlike the Gun Free School Zone statute at issue in United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the felon-in-possession statute requires the government to prove a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce. Thus, the statute is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition does not violate the Commerce Clause under Lopez.

United States v. Daly · filed 1997-06-19(g)(1)

Daly's contention that sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e) violate the commerce clause in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549( 1995), is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir.1997).

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands the constitutional challenge foreclosed by circuit precedent.

United States v. Young · filed 1997-06-20(g)(1)

Young's argument regarding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is foreclosed by this court's recent decision in United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389-90 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 262, 136 L.Ed.2d 187 (1996).

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under United States v. Lopez.

United States v. Harkey · filed 1997-06-23(g)(1)

Harkey contends that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). We expressly rejected this contention in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1995).

Section 922(g) remains a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power after Lopez.

United States v. Jackson · filed 1997-07-18(g)

This contention is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995), where we held that the Supreme Court decision United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) did not affect our prior holdings that section 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce clause powers.

Section 922(u) requires proof that the firearms moved across state lines; that requirement makes it a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Darvin Darnell Hardy · filed 1997-07-18(u)

A weapon’s having moved across state lines satisfies the jurisdictional element of the Commerce Clause. Section 922(u) requires the government to prove the movement of the weapons in order to obtain a conviction. Hardy neither disputes this nor does he deny that the weapons he possessed traversed state lines. We therefore conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) represents a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.