18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(o)'s ban on machinegun possession and transfer is within Congress's Commerce Clause authority because Congress could rationally conclude that the ban substantially affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Wright · filed 1997-07-24(o)

We therefore hold that Congress had a rational basis to determine that a total ban on machineguns would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Section 922(x)(2)'s prohibition on juvenile handgun possession withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Juvenile Male · filed 1997-07-24(x)(2)

A.J.C. claims that § 922(x)(2) violates the Commerce Clause because the statute: (1) is unrelated to commerce; (2) contains no jurisdictional element in relation to an unlawful possession; and (3) lacks the requisite congressional findings. We rejected a similar challenge in United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 345 (9th Cir.1996).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Williams · filed 1997-08-19(g)(1)

Williams next raises, for the first time on appeal, a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of firearm). ... In any event, there was no error; the challenged statute has been upheld by the Supreme Court, and this court.

Section 922(g)(1)'s express commerce limitation makes the felon-in-possession prohibition constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6651, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,897 United States of America v. Marvin Henson, United States of · filed 1997-08-21(g)(1)

There can be no doubt that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

A facial or as-applied constitutional challenge to § 922(o) raised for the first time on appeal did not establish plain error.

United States v. Abdelhady · filed 1997-08-20(o)

He argues for the first time on appeal that his conviction is invalid because § 922(o) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to his case. We conclude that no plain error has occurred.

Section 922(g)(1) is not invalid under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Doyle · filed 1997-08-20(g)(1)

Doyle’s challenge to Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause to enact 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress' Commerce Clause authority or violate the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Smith · filed 1997-08-28(g)(1)

The district court's rejection of Smith's constitutional challenge to section 922(g)(1) was proper. See United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir.1995) (rejecting claims that section 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause and violates the Tenth Amendment).

Section 922(g)(1) survives a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez.

United States v. Edwards · filed 1997-09-04(g)(1)

Edwards claims that under United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in that it exceeds congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The argument is precluded by our opinion in United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir.1995) ( § 922(g)(1) immune from constitutional attack under Lopez decision).

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause merely because the firearm did not recently move in interstate commerce.

United States v. Barker · filed 1997-09-15(g)(1)

Barker contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause, because the gun did not recently move in interstate commerce. Barker's claim, however, is precluded by our recent holding that " § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce clause powers." United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, No. 97-5075 (June 30, 1997).

Section 922(g) requires a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce and remains constitutional after Lopez.

United States v. Lewis · filed 1997-09-18(g)

Contrary to Lewis's contention, there is nothing in the Lopez decision that would call into question the applicability of the "minimal nexus" standard to a statute like § 922(g).

Section 922(x)(2)’s prohibition on juvenile handgun possession is enforceable under binding circuit precedent despite a constitutional challenge.

United States v. Juvenile Male · filed 1997-09-12(x)(2)

Because J.A.M.'s contention that 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) is unconstitutional is foreclosed by our opinion in United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir.1996), the district court is affirmed.

Section 922(o)'s ban on machinegun possession and transfer is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Bailey · filed 1997-09-24(o)

Accordingly, Bailey's challenge to section 922(o) under the Commerce Clause is meritless.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm has been in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Menke · filed 1997-09-26(g)(1)

Menke's contention that the felon in possession of a firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause also lacks merit because the government established that the firearm had been, at some time, in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power even though it does not define “commerce” as “interstate or foreign commerce.”

United States v. Nichols · filed 1997-10-15(g)(1)

On appeal, Nichols raises four issues: ... whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. We reject these claims and affirm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Valles · filed 1997-10-28(g)(1)

He argues that his conviction is invalid because § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Valles’s argument is foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional when applied to a felon's possession of a firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Edds · filed 1997-10-28(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) has been consistently upheld as constitutional.

Section 922(g)(9) places no requirements on states or state officials, so it does not violate the Tenth Amendment by compelling state regulation.

Fraternal Order of Police v. United States · filed 1997-10-02(g)(9)

In contrast, § 922(g)(9) places no requirements on States or state officials.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on possession of ammunition by a felon withstands a constitutional challenge under controlling Eighth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Larry · filed 1997-10-06(g)(1)

To begin, Larry’s challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1103-04 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 215 (1996).

Section 922(g)(1)’s requirement that firearm possession be in or affect interstate commerce places its prohibition on possession by felons within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Williams · filed 1997-10-30(g)(1)

Our Circuit has already held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to pass § 922(g)(1) because subsection (g) contains its own provision that the possession must be “in or affecting interstate commerce.” ... We reject Williams’ challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(o) constitutionally prohibits machine gun possession, including intrastate possession, because that activity substantially affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Robert Franklyn, Also Known as Robert Franklin, and Ralph Gonzalez, Also Known as Raphael Quinones · filed 1998-09-11(o)

We conclude that § 922(o) (unlike the statute in Lopez) regulates activity that may rationally be viewed as substantially affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(8) requires proof that the firearm has at least a minimal nexus with interstate commerce and is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Wilson · filed 1998-11-16(g)(8)

Since § 922(g)(8) requires the government to prove that the firearms at issue have at least a minimal nexus with interstate commerce, the statute was enacted within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and we find that it is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional under Congress's Commerce Clause authority because its jurisdictional element limits the offense to firearm possession in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Cunningham · filed 1998-12-04(g)(8)

We hold that section 922(g)(8) is constitutional, and AFFIRM the defendant's conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Martin · filed 1998-12-11(g)(1)

He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Martin’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from possessing firearms, and a firearm's prior interstate travel establishes the required commerce nexus.

United States v. Jackson · filed 1998-12-11(g)(1)

In Rawls, this court held that the reasons the Supreme Court gave in Lopez for holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) unconstitutional do not apply to § 922(g). ... Rawls is binding precedent.

Section 922(j) makes it unlawful to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of a stolen firearm that is moving in or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it was stolen.

United States v. Luna · filed 1999-01-15(j)

We agree with our colleagues in the Eighth Circuit and likewise hold that § 922(j) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing or receiving a firearm with the required interstate-commerce connection.

United States v. Boyd · filed 1999-03-30(g)(9)

In short, the court is compelled by binding precedent to find that § 922(g)(9), just like the other provisions of § 922(g), is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power, and the court is convinced that § 922(g)(9) can be implemented by federal authorities without im-permissibly infringing on the States’ rights to regulate domestic relations.

Section 922(g)(9) applies to firearm possession after its enactment even if the domestic violence conviction and firearm purchase occurred earlier.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 2000-03-27(g)(9)

As it is undisputed that Mitchell possessed the firearm after the enactment of § 922(g)(9), the law's application to Mitchell does not run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after its enactment even when the domestic violence conviction and firearm purchase occurred before enactment.

United States v. Winston Eugene Mitchell, Sr. · filed 2000-03-27(g)(9)

It is immaterial that Mitchell’s firearm purchase and domestic violence conviction occurred prior to § 922(g)(9)’s enactment because the conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(9) is the possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(9) gives fair notice that a person convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor may not possess a firearm; ignorance of the prohibition does not make a conviction a due process violation.

United States v. Boyd · filed 2000-04-26(g)(9)

The same doctrine obtains in the instant case. Mr. Boyd may not argue that his ignorance of the law renders his conviction a violation of due process.

Section 922(g)(1) validly prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm that previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bowens · filed 2000-06-29(g)(1)

Section 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority to regulate category two activities.

Section 922(g) requires a link to interstate commerce and is valid under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Wesela, Louis J. · filed 2000-08-03(g)

Nothing in either case casts doubt on the validity of sec. 922(g), which is a law that specifically requires a link to interstate commerce.

Section 922(o)(1)’s prohibition on possessing a machine gun is within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Smith · filed 2000-06-29(o)(1)

We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) does not exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

Section 922(g)(9) permits conviction for firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction even when the defendant did not know of the prohibition, because that conviction gives notice that firearm possession may be regulated.

United States v. Hutzell · filed 2000-07-05(g)(9)

The district court observed (correctly, we believe) that an individual's domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be subject to regulation.

Section 922(o)’s machine gun ban may apply to possession wholly within one state without exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Bournes · filed 2000-07-18(o)

Consequently, the constitutionality of § 922(o) is not undermined through its application to wholly “intrastate” possession of machine guns.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands the constitutional challenge rejected by this circuit’s precedent.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2000-07-26(g)(1)

Jackson contends that § 922(g)(1) is uncon- stitutional but recognizes that we have rejected ... the same challenge in United States v. Kuban, ... 94 F.3d 971 (5th Cir. 1996), and United States ... v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996). Ac- ... cordingly, this issue has no merit.

Section 922(g)(8) requires proof that the firearm moved in interstate commerce, and that requirement supports its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Visnich · filed 2000-08-10(g)(8)

Section 922(g)(8) contains an express jurisdictional element which requires the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearms in the Defendant’s possession moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition is a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce.

United States v. William J.R. Embrey · filed 2001-05-22(g)

Embrey's assertion regarding the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute is foreclosed by United States v. Larry, 126 F.3d 1077, 1078 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding section 922(g) a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce) (per curiam).

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2001-05-24(g)(1)

The resolution of this appeal is controlled by our recent decision in United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.2001), in which we specifically held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Warren · filed 2001-05-30(g)(1)

Warren contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). As Warren concedes, however, this court’s rejection of that argument in United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514-15 (9th Cir.2000) is dispositive.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause when applied to a felon possessing a firearm.

United States v. Patten · filed 2001-05-25(g)(1)

Citing to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), Patten contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause. We have repeatedly rejected this argument, United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir.1996), and do so here. See United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514-15 (9th Cir.2000).

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is within Congress's Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Mabini · filed 2001-05-30(g)(1)

Mabini contends that the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is invalid because Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to deem such possession criminal. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 922(g)(9)’s commerce element makes its prohibition a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. President · filed 2001-06-05(g)(9)

However, the statute contains a specific juris- dictional requirement that the possession be "in or affecting com- merce." 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g). Because of that additional element, lacking in the statutes in question in the authority President cites, § 922(g)(9) is an appropriate exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Rodriquez · filed 2001-06-19(g)

He appeals claiming, first, that Congress exceeded its authority under the Com- merce Clause in enacting § 922(g), relying primarily upon United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)). This claim has been considered and rejected by this court.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional under Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Mattox · filed 2001-07-02(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... The cases cited by Mattox do not affect this determination.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional because its express jurisdictional element satisfies the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Jimmy L. Stuckey, Jr · filed 2001-07-06(g)(1)

Because § 922(g)(1) contains an express jurisdictional element that satisfies the Commerce Clause, a long line of post-Lopez Eighth Circuit decisions have rejected claims that the statute is unconstitutional. ... Nothing in Morrison changes our mind about the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional because its express jurisdictional element satisfies the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Jimmy Lee Stuckey, Jr. · filed 2001-07-06(g)(1)

For the reasons stated, we reject Stuck-ey’s constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and hold that his renewed challenge to the supplemental jury instruction is barred by the law of the case doctrine.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause when the firearm has previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. John Leonard Rousseau, Jr. · filed 2001-07-03(g)(1)

In the circumstances we hold that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition is a permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Baroni · filed 2001-07-06(g)

Finally, Baroni’s challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) fails in light of the binding precedent from this Circuit.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied when the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Torres · filed 2001-07-13(g)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Lack of Federal Jurisdiction will be denied as the Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional on its face, or as applied.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by felons, and section 922(g)(9) prohibits it for people convicted of qualifying domestic violence crimes.

United States v. Hemmings, Rodney E. · filed 2001-07-12(g)(1) and (g)(9)

Hemmings’ various Constitutional challenges to subsections (1) and (9) of 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g) also fail. ... This circuit has rejected claims that sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(g)(9) violate the Commerce Clause, noting that the jurisdictional element of sec. 922(g) provides the required nexus with interstate commerce. ... Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(g)(9) are not ex post facto laws. ... Nor is sec. 922(g) a bill of attainder, which would be "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." ... The statute does not determine guilt based on a previous felony conviction, nor does it remove the protections of a trial.

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession by felons, and § 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession by people convicted of domestic violence crimes; both provisions withstand the constitutional challenges addressed here.

United States v. Hemmings · filed 2001-07-12(g)(1), (g)(9)

Hemmings’ various Constitutional challenges to subsections (1) and (9) of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) also fail. ... This circuit has rejected claims that § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(9) violate the Commerce Clause, noting that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) provides the required nexus with interstate commerce. ... Hemmings has failed to make any showing that the statute in this case violates the Second Amendment, see Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 710-11, or the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 707-08. ... Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(g)(9) are not ex post facto laws. ... Nor is § 922(g) a bill of attainder, which would be “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.” ... The statute does not determine guilt based on a previous felony conviction, nor does it remove the protections of a trial.

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it requires a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. DeJesus · filed 2001-07-19(g)(1)

This Court holds that § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional on its face in light of existing precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional.

United States v. White · filed 2001-08-08(g)(1)

Further, White’s contention regarding the sufficiency of the factual basis and his challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is likewise unavailing. “This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional after Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Legard · filed 2001-08-08(g)(1)

The cases cited by Legard do not affect this determination and, therefore, cannot serve to support a challenge to a conviction under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(5) relies on the same nexus between a firearm and interstate commerce as § 922(g)(1) for purposes of the constitutional challenge.

United States v. Baltazar-Lopez · filed 2001-08-17(g)(5)

For purposes of this appeal, we view 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) as indistinguishable from 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for both rely on the same jurisdictional nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s constitutionality remains settled despite Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Holmes · filed 2001-08-23(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(1) may bar firearm purchases after its 1986 enactment based on a felony conviction that predates the amendment without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2001-08-17(g)(1)

Further, Brady and Barrett clearly control situations where an individual, who had been legally in possession of a firearm or who could formerly purchase a firearm legally under the GCA, may not buy or possess a firearm after the 1986 and 1996 amendments to the GCA. That window has been closed and that right extinguished by Congress.

Section 922(b)(2) validly regulates firearm sales, including wholly intrastate sales, because those transactions substantially affect interstate commerce.

United States v. Meienberg · filed 2001-08-27(b)(2)

Because firearms transactions, even those which are purely intrastate, substantially affect interstate commerce in firearms, § 922(b)(2) is a valid exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional when the firearm has a minimal nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Scott · filed 2001-08-28(g)(1)

For these reasons, we reaffirm McAllister’s holding that as long as the weapon in question has a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

Section 922(o)'s ban on machinegun possession does not violate the Second Amendment or the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Haney · filed 2001-08-29(o)

We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is constitutional and does not violate either the Second Amendment or the Commerce Clause, and therefore we AFFIRM Haney’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Powell · filed 2001-09-07(g)(1)

Defendant contends that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this case because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeds the authority granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is overruled.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.

United States v. Price · filed 2001-09-11(g)

Thus, the constitutionality of § 922(g) is controlled by circuit precedent, and Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in the Fifth Circuit despite Jones and Morrison.

United States v. Greathouse · filed 2001-09-18(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” See United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999). The cases cited by Greathouse are distinguishable and do not affect this determination.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge because it covers possession of firearms that have moved through interstate commerce.

United States v. Gardner · filed 2001-09-13(g)(1)

Defendant concedes that his facial challenge is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Dorris , 236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1635 (2001), which, indeed, resolved the exact challenge raised by defendant. See id. at 585-86 (holding that Lopez , Morrison , and Jones did not implicate prior cases upholding § 922(g)(1) as a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and explaining that the statute is valid because it regulates the possession of goods moved through interstate commerce and because its jurisdictional element limits the statute to firearms that are the subject of interstate trade).

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate a felon’s Second Amendment right to bear arms and has an adequate nexus to interstate commerce.

Gorley v. Snyder · filed 2001-11-02(g)(1)

Gorley’s § 922(g)(1) conviction does not violate his Second Amendment right to bear arms, ... and § 922(g)(1) possesses an adequate nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a convicted felon remains constitutional under Lopez, Jones, and Morrison.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2002-04-12(g)(1)

This court has also recently held that neither Jones nor Morrison affects or undermines the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... Because the arguments raised on appeal are foreclosed by this court’s precedent, the district court judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2002-04-18(g)(1)

Wilson also argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001), we held that § 922(g)(1) was a valid exercise of Congressional power and rejected the same arguments Wilson advances. Therefore, Wilson’s contention lacks merit.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Third Circuit precedent.

United States v. Dixon · filed 2002-04-22(g)

Rather, we need only state that the defendant’s Commerce Clause claim is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001), and his Apprendi argument is foreclosed by the language of Apprendi itself (excluding the situations, like the defendant’s, where enhancement results from a prior conviction), and the Supreme Court’s subsequent clarification of Apprendi in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Connor · filed 2002-04-24(g)

As Connor acknowledges, this Court has upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g) against the same arguments Connor advances. See United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001). Connor’s appeal therefore lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Powell · filed 2002-04-24(g)(1)

First, he argues that his conviction should be reversed because § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586 (10th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 986, 121 S.Ct. 1635, 149 L.Ed.2d 495 (2001).

Section 922(g)(1) satisfies the Commerce Clause when the firearm has traveled across state lines.

United States v. Shepherd · filed 2002-05-02(g)(1)

The evidence at trial established that the firearm Shepherd possessed traveled across state lines, satisfying the Commerce Clause requirement.

Section 922(g)(1) regulates only firearms that affect interstate commerce and withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Shorter · filed 2002-05-03(g)(1)

In United States v. Singletary, we considered the precise challenge to the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that is brought by Shorter. ... There we found that the statute, by its terms, regulates only those weapons that affect interstate commerce, and thus avoids the constitutional infirmity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) found in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995).

Section 922(g)(9) does not violate the Second Amendment when applied to a person previously convicted of domestic violence.

United States v. Woods · filed 2002-05-22(g)(9)

Under this reasoning, Woods’ argument that § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment cannot succeed. If the statute is constitutional when applied to someone who has been ordered not to use force against his wife, it is certainly constitutional when applied to a person who has already been convicted of using such force.

Section 922(g)(9) punishes firearm possession after its enactment by a person with a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor conviction, even if the conviction predates the law.

United States v. Pfeifer · filed 2002-05-24(g)(9)

Courts, however, have concluded that the activity prohibited by § 922(g)(9) is the post-enactment possession of a firearm, not the pre-enactment misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. ... Consequently, this statute does not impose an additional or more severe penalty for Pfeifer’s prior assault conviction, but rather punishes him for criminal conduct that he engaged in after passage of the law.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Rowland · filed 2002-06-13(g)(1)

Rowland contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). We have repeatedly rejected this contention, see United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 513-15 (9th Cir. 2000), United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1162-63 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,—U.S.—, 122 S.Ct. 178, 151 L.Ed.2d 123 (2001), and United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,—U.S.—, 122 S.Ct. 503, 151 L.Ed.2d 413 (2001), and do so here.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce at any time in the past.

United States v. Sanger · filed 2002-06-17(g)(1)

All of these contentions are foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 502 (2001) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) constitutional as applied to any defendant found in possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce at any time in the past).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains constitutional after Morrison and Jones.

United States v. Sherfield · filed 2002-06-20(g)(1)

Sherfield’s reliance on Morrison and Jones is misplaced. In United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1113 (2002), this court recently determined that Morrison and Jones were distinguishable from an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) case like this one, emphasizing that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.”

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after its enactment even when the predicate domestic violence conviction occurred before its enactment.

United States v. Denis · filed 2002-07-23(g)(9)

The difficulty with that argument is that the conduct for which Denis is punishable under § 922(g)(9) is not the conviction for domestic assault in 1996, but the possession of a firearm in 2000.

Section 922(g)(8)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a person subject to a restraining order does not violate the Second Amendment merely because the order lacks a specific finding that the person poses a threat.

United States v. Hinostroza · filed 2002-07-23(g)(8)

Hinostroza argues that this Court should reverse his conviction because it violates his individual rights under the Second Amendment by prohibiting him from possessing firearms without specific findings that he was a threat to his former wife, Lucia. ... Hinostroza’s argument is foreclosed by our prior holding that the Second Amendment only confers upon states a collective right to bear arms. ... We therefore reject Hinostroza’s Second Amendment challenge.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement makes the felon-in-possession prohibition a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Deandre Mitchell, United States of America v. Jerry L. Peete · filed 2002-08-05(g)(1)

Until the Supreme Court overrules Bass, we will continue to adhere to our view that section 922(g) was a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. We therefore affirm the judgments against Mitchell and Peete for their violations of section 922(g).

Section 922(o)’s machinegun possession ban remains constitutional under binding Fifth Circuit precedent despite Morrison.

United States v. Rivera · filed 2002-08-23(o)

Rivera’s constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) consequently is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on Lopez, Morrison, and Jones.

United States v. Kendricks · filed 2002-09-16(g)(1)

Kendricks contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). We have repeatedly rejected this contention, ... and do so here.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on an allegedly insufficient connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Street · filed 2002-09-18(g)(1)

Street’s Commerce Clause challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Hall · filed 2002-09-19(g)(1)

Hall contends that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. This court has repeatedly rejected this contention, as well as Hall’s contention ... that ... impliedly overruled prior authority finding section 922(g) constitutional.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element does not exceed Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2002-09-25(g)

Finally, Robinson argues that under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, and thus, his conviction should be overturned. This court has rejected this argument.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority when applied to a firearm that previously crossed a state line.

United States v. J.R. Gonzales · filed 2002-09-30(g)(1)

Finally, Gonzales argues that a prosecution under 18 U.S.G. § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, where the only link to commerce is the fact that the firearm once crossed a state line. ... Therefore, we reject Gonzales’s argument.

Section 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons, withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Shuford · filed 2002-10-02(g)(1)

But we have repeatedly rejected similar challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g) invoking Lopez, Morrison, and Jones, and Shuford has offered no reason why we should depart from our previous holdings.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Serna · filed 2002-10-11(g)(1)

He argues that in enacting § 922(g)(1), Congress exceeded the scope of its power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Serna concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our precedent. ... Accordingly, we also affirm his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on its application to purely intrastate firearm possession.

United States v. Myers · filed 2002-10-11(g)(1)

Myers also argues that 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as it improperly proscribes purely intrastate possession of a firearm and therefore lacks the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. However, that argument is clearly foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), and we therefore reject it without discussion.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional on its face and as applied here.

United States v. Willingham · filed 2002-10-21(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional, either facially or as applied to Willingham.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a felon's firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce when the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Lee · filed 2002-10-28(g)(1)

Here, as in Daugherty, there is stipulated evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state of Texas and, therefore, that the firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce. Because we are bound by our prior precedent, Lee’s argument regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g) must fail.

Section 922(g)(1) remains a valid exercise of Congress’s interstate commerce power after Morrison.

United States v. Carnes · filed 2002-10-29(g)(1)

The felon-in-possession statute survives Morrison.

An equal-protection challenge to § 922(g) fails without a showing that similarly situated people receive disparate treatment without a rational basis.

United States v. Levi · filed 2002-10-29(g)

Because § 922(g) is a federal statute, Levi’s equal-protection challenge to the constitutionality of the statue would involve the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). To succeed on his claim, Levi must demonstrate that similarly situated persons are subject to disparate treatment without a rational basis. United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1996). Levi has made no such showing.

Section 922(g) withstands the constitutional challenges Clark raised under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Clark · filed 2002-11-04(g)

Clark’s challenges to his conviction are based on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Clark concedes that his arguments are foreclosed and that they are being raised to preserve them for possible further review. Clark’s arguments challenging his conviction are indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)’s prohibition on possession by a felon withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fourth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Liverman · filed 2002-11-13(g)

Liverman claims the indictment pursuant to § 922(g) violated his rights under the Commerce Clause. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. As the district court correctly concluded, Liverman’s claim is foreclosed by our decisions in United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant’s firearm possession had an individualized substantial effect on commerce when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Carter · filed 2002-12-05(g)(1)

In the alternative, Carter contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied because the government failed to prove his possession of firearms had an individualized substantial effect on commerce. This argument is unpersuasive. See Rousseau, 257 F.3d at 932-33 (holding § 922(g) constitutional as applied to any defendant found in possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce at any time in the past).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands the constitutional challenge raised here.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2002-11-13(g)

We thus reject Richardson’s contentions that ... (5) 18 U.S.C. S 922(g) is unconstitutional.

Section 922(g) is facially constitutional under Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Price · filed 2002-11-14(g)

Mr. Price also contends that one of the statutes under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is facially unconstitutional. However, Tenth Circuit precedent overwhelmingly establishes the constitutionality of that statute.

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied despite Commerce Clause and Second Amendment objections, and its penalty may be imposed alongside a § 924(c)(1) penalty.

United States v. Bouman · filed 2002-11-21(g)(1)

We have similarly held that the Commerce Clause sustains both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), see United States v. Arocho, 305 F.3d 627, 641-42 (7th Cir.2002), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), see United States v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769, 772-73 (7th Cir.2002). And as for Bouman’s suggestion that § 922(g) violates the Second Amendment, that position has been rejected as well, United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir.2001), as has his contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits cumulative penalties for violations of §§ 924(c)(1) and 922(g)(1), see United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir.1990). Accordingly, an argument that it was plain error to apply these statutes would be frivolous.

Section 922(g)(4) gives constitutionally adequate notice of its firearm ban to people committed to a mental institution, even without a separate warning about the ban.

United States v. Milheron · filed 2002-11-20(g)(4)

Because section 922(g)(4) does not legislate conduct and circumstances so innocent as to fall within the narrow confines of Lambert, the Court concludes that the statute affords adequate notice, in conformance with the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority under binding Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Warren · filed 2002-11-27(g)(1)

On appeal, Mr. Warren reasserts that his conviction should be reversed because § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. ... Be that as it may, Dorris nonetheless compels us to AFFIRM Mr. Warren’s conviction and sentence in the instant case.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Banyavong · filed 2002-12-04(g)(1)

Since United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), we have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The Supreme Court’s most recent Commerce Clause rulings have not changed our view.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Dill · filed 2002-12-09(g)(1)

Since United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), we have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The Supreme Court’s most recent Commerce Clause rulings have not changed our view.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on a felon's intrastate possession of a firearm.

United States v. Binion · filed 2002-12-27(g)(1)

But as counsel correctly notes, we have repeatedly rejected Commerce Clause challenges to the felon-in-possession statute.

Facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g) are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Hairston · filed 2002-12-11(g)

Hairston first challenges his conviction, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional on its face or, alternatively, is unconstitutional as applied. ... Hairston’s arguments are indeed foreclosed by this court’s decisions in United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, (U.S. Oct. 7, 2002) (No. 02-5348) and United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief.

A constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Salas · filed 2002-12-13(g)(1)

Salas challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm. ... Salas’s arguments challenging his conviction are indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon withstands the constitutional challenge rejected under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Slaughter · filed 2002-12-17(g)(1)

Defendant-Appellant Jerron Cyril Slaughter appeals the judgment of the district court following his conviction on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He first asserts that the statute of conviction is unconstitutional, but his position is without merit. As Slaughter concedes, we have previously rejected this contention, and we are bound by our prior decisions.

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally applies to a felon’s possession of a firearm manufactured abroad and imported into the United States.

United States v. Smith · filed 2002-12-20(g)(1)

The constitutionality of § 922(g), in circumstances such as these, was most recently considered and affirmed in United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). Smith’s claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when a firearm possessed by a felon previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Parker · filed 2002-12-13(g)(1)

Parker concedes that the court has upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and has rejected his argument that the mere movement of a firearm across state lines does not constitute a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). He argues that he is raising these issues to preserve them for further review. This court is bound by its precedent absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a subsequent en banc decision. See United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999). Parker’s conviction is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce nexus is satisfied when a felon possesses a firearm manufactured outside the state, even if the possession occurs entirely within the state.

United States v. Rios-Amaya · filed 2002-12-13(g)(1)

He argues for the first time on appeal that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Rios's claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(j) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on the claim that the firearm possession does not substantially affect interstate commerce.

United States v. Beauford · filed 2003-01-06(j)

Beauford further asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) is unconstitutional as violative of the Commerce Clause because it extends federal control to firearm possession that does not substantially affect interstate commerce. However, as Beauford concedes, this argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g) constitutionally applies to intrastate possession of a firearm manufactured out of state.

United States v. Fobbs · filed 2003-01-07(g)

Further, on numerous occasions —— both before and after United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) —— this court has held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and that § 922(g) is constitutionally applied to a defendant who evidences entirely intrastate possession of a firearm that is manufactured out-of-state.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied challenges based on its lack of a substantial-effect-on-interstate-commerce requirement.

United States v. Henderson · filed 2003-01-08(g)(1)

He argues first that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce. ... As Henderson concedes, this issue is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon withstands a constitutional challenge based on United States v. Lopez under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Blackmon · filed 2003-01-08(g)(1)

Blackmon contends that this court should reconsider its jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Blackmon’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(9) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Second Amendment, or the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.

Blackburn v. Jansen · filed 2003-01-14(g)(9)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Second Amendment or the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied constitutional challenges under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Martin · filed 2003-01-16(g)(1)

Martin first argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. Martin acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent, but he raises them to preserve review by the Supreme Court. Martin’s arguments are indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Martin Wilson, Jr. · filed 2003-01-10(g)(1)

However, as Wilson acknowledges, this Circuit's established ... precedent upholds the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). ... We decline to do so and affirm the District Court's decision to deny his motion to dismiss.

Section 922(g)(9) survived a Second Amendment challenge under the Ninth Circuit precedent applied by the court.

United States v. Cline · filed 2003-01-10(g)(9)

Finally, Cline’s Second Amendment argument to dismiss the indictment on grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional must be rejected under Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557 (9th Cir.2000), and Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial constitutional challenge based on its failure to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Alexander · filed 2003-01-28(g)(1)

This Court has held that “the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” United States v. DeLeon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999). ... Because this Court is bound by its own precedent, Alexander’s arguments relating to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), both facially and as applied, are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional despite challenges based on Lopez, Jones, and Morrison.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2003-02-20(g)(1)

Thomas’ arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent. “[N]either the holding in Lopez nor the reasons given therefore constitutionally invalidate § 922(g)(1).” United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996). “Neither Jones nor Morrison affects or undermines the constitutionality of § 922(g).” United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002).

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Lopez, Jones, and Morrison.

United States v. Jesse · filed 2003-02-20(g)(1)

Jesse’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent. “[N]either the holding in Lopez nor the reasons given therefore constitutionally invalidate § 922(g)(1).”

Facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Castillo · filed 2003-02-20(g)(1)

He argues that his conviction should be reversed because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. ... Castillo’s argument is indeed foreclosed by this court’s decisions in United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 253 (2002) and United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands the Commerce Clause challenge that the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce.

United States v. Reyes · filed 2003-02-20(g)(1)

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Reyes argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s ... Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Reyes raises his argument solely to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his argument is foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by a felon, is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Zemba · filed 2003-02-28(g)(1)

Similarly, we reject Zemba’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

Section 922(g) withstands a facial or as-applied challenge to Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to enact it under Third Circuit precedent.

United States v. Sarvey · filed 2003-03-19(g)

Ricky Lynn Sarvey conditionally pled guilty to the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), preserving his right to appeal the question whether § 922(g) “is unconstitutional on its face or as applied in this case because Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause in passing the statute.” ... Pursuant to Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, the District Court correctly rejected Sarvey’s constitutional challenge. We therefore affirm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment under controlling Eighth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Martin G. Wilson, Jr. · filed 2003-03-05(g)(1)

However, as Wilson acknowledges, this Circuit’s established precedent upholds the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). ... Wilson admittedly seeks reversal of clearly established precedent. We decline to do so and affirm the District Court’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss.

Section 922(g) is constitutional despite a challenge to its interstate-commerce nexus.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2003-03-19(g)

As this court has repeatedly recognized, the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not open to question.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Goodnight · filed 2003-04-29(g)(1)

Defendant acknowledges that this Court has held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not exceed the scope of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... Because defendant’s conviction at Count Three comports with the current state of the law, we will uphold it.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Jackubowski · filed 2003-04-30(g)(1)

Neither of these arguments has merit. ... Jackubowski’s contention that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is equally flawed.

Section 922(g)(1) validly prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm, including when the possession is intrastate, under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Thornton · filed 2003-05-07(g)(1)

As recognized by Thornton, his arguments are foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 976 (2002), which upheld the constitutionality of the statute against a similar attack.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Price · filed 2003-05-16(g)(1)

Finally, Price argues that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional. A basic problem with this argument is that we have previously found that statute to be constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by felons does not plainly violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Williams · filed 2003-05-30(g)(1)

We specifically recognized in Emerson that "it is clear that felons, infants, and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms." Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261 (emphasis added). In light of this recognition, we conclude that Williams has failed to demonstrate plain error.

Section 922(g) withstands challenges under the Tenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

United States v. Ayers · filed 2003-06-02(g)

Ayers also asserts that § 922(g) violates the Tenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We have rejected similar claims in United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 724 (4th Cir. 1999) (Tenth Amendment), and United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 2000) (Fifth Amendment).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Bell · filed 2003-06-03(g)(1)

Finally, Bell interposes a Commerce Clause challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g) but that challenge is squarely foreclosed by United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), which upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against a Commerce Clause challenge.

Section 922(g) is not subject to a successful Commerce Clause challenge in the Seventh Circuit.

United States v. Massie · filed 2003-06-05(g)

Counsel first examines whether Massie could mount a constitutional challenge based on the Commerce Clause to § 922(g). Although Massie preserved this argument for appeal in his plea agreement, ... our repeated rejections of this challenge foreclose it, ... United States v. Mitchell, 299 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 123 S.Ct. 908, 154 L.Ed.2d 817 (2003).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement satisfies the Commerce Clause, including after Morrison and Jones.

United States v. Ellis · filed 2003-06-25(g)(1)

His argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that Morrison and Jones do not affect our decisions regarding the constitu- tionality of § 922(g)), and United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810-11 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the jurisdictional requirement of § 922(g) satisfied Commerce Clause).

Section 922(g) is not facially unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in the Fourth Circuit.

United States v. Graham · filed 2003-07-14(g)

Graham next claims that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is facially unconstitu- tional inasmuch as Congress exceeded its authority under the Com- merce Clause in enacting it. ... Graham’s claim is foreclosed by our decisions in United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on intrastate firearm possession.

United States v. Hillard · filed 2003-07-16(g)(1)

Hillard also argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. In his view, Congress exceeded its authority by enacting the provision because the intrastate possession of a firearm does not substantially affect commerce. But this court has repeatedly rejected similar challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and Hillard cites no authority nor gives any novel reason to justify departing from those decisions.

Section 922(g)(1) bars all convicted felons from possessing firearms regardless of current dangerousness, and due process does not require an individualized dangerousness hearing before the ban applies.

Black v. Snow · filed 2003-07-23(g)(1)

Accordingly, the holding of Doe applies equally here: due process does not entitle plaintiff to a hearing to determine whether he is currently dangerous because the results of such a hearing would have no bearing on whether he is subject to the disability imposed by § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not exceed Congress’ Commerce Clause power or violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Hill · filed 2003-07-28(g)(1)

Hill’s claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause has been rejected by this Court, see United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir.2001), as has his claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly restricts a person’s individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, see Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 922(g) withstands the constitutional challenge rejected by Sixth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2003-07-30(g)

Lewis argues that § 922(g) is unconstitutional, but that argument was rejected in United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 889 (6th Cir.1996).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Cole · filed 2003-08-15(g)(1)

Defendant’s claim that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment is rejected by the vast weight of authority.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Kruger · filed 2003-08-21(g)(1)

He concludes that any such argument would be frivolous, and we agree: § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, see United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (7th Cir.1997) (collecting cases), and § 5861(d) is a legitimate exercise of the congressional power to tax because it promotes the registration and taxation of firearms in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, see United States v. Copus, 93 F.3d 269, 275-76 (7th Cir.1996).

A challenge to § 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by felons shows no plain Second Amendment error where precedent recognizes that felons may be prohibited from possessing firearms.

United States v. Florence · filed 2003-09-03(g)(1)

We specifically recognized in Emerson that “it is clear that felons, infants, and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms.” ... In light of this recognition, we conclude that Florence has failed to demonstrate plain error.

Section 922(g) remains constitutional under the Commerce Clause despite Jones, Morrison, and Lopez.

United States v. Grandison · filed 2003-09-11(g)

None of these cases renders 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000), the precursor to a stat- ute pursuant to which Grandison was convicted, unconstitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Fernandez · filed 2003-09-11(g)(1)

Fernandez’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g) lacks merit. ... Thus, Fernandez’s argument is unavailing because it is now clear that the enactment of § 922(g)(1) “represents a valid exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause.”

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial or as-applied constitutional challenge based on its lack of a substantial-effect-on-interstate-commerce requirement.

United States v. Carter · filed 2003-09-17(g)(1)

He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it does not require a showing of a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. ... Carter’s claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Dunn · filed 2003-09-19(g)

Dunn concedes that there is binding caselaw in this circuit foreclosing his Commerce Clause argument, and that he is raising this claim only for the purpose of pursuing it in the context of en banc review or in a petition for a writ of certiorari. His assessment of our law is correct. See United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Neither Morrison nor Jones modifies our decision in McAllister, upholding the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), under Congress’ Commerce Clause power.” (citing United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996))) (other citations omitted), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1166, 122 S. Ct. 1182, 152 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2002).