18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Evans · filed 1991-12-18(g)(1)

Knowledge of possession is an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (count 1), see United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir.1988); knowledge of use is an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (count 3), United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 177-79 (5th Cir.1989).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; a gun found in the defendant’s pants and his statement that he had it for protection can support that finding.

United States v. Gardner · filed 1992-01-17(g)(1)

The evidence favoring the Government, outlined above, is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Gardner knowingly possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm is unlawful, even if state officials led the defendant to believe it was permitted.

United States v. Blackburn · filed 1992-03-20(g)(1)

The net result of Santiesteban and Etheridge is that ignorance of the illegality of one's possession of weapons, even when based upon statements by state officials, is not a defense, incomplete or otherwise, to charges under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew possessing a firearm violated federal law.

United States v. Ramos · filed 1992-04-21(g)(1)

We find no error in the district court's ruling. This court, and every court to have considered the issue, has held that the government need not prove the defendant knew he was violating the federal firearms law nor would "ignorance of the law" be a defense in such a prosecution.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly transported a firearm in interstate commerce, even when the enhanced penalty under § 924(e) applies.

United States v. Richards · filed 1992-06-22(g)(1)

Therefore, we hold that, in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the ordinary usage of the word “transport” requires the government to establish that the defendant acted knowingly, as the indictment and the instructions here required.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; ownership and specific intent are unnecessary.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 1992-08-07(g)(1)

We held that conviction for this crime did not require a showing of specific intent. Consequently, here, as in Johnson, the fact that Hernandez may not have owned the gun is irrelevant to the issue of whether he possessed it. The evidence that Hernandez knowingly possessed the gun is more than sufficient to sustain his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) makes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon a general intent crime for which voluntary intoxication is not a defense.

United States v. Bennett · filed 1992-09-21(g)(1)

The defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the degree of intoxication somehow negates intent for a general intent crime. Nor is the defendant able to support his alternative argument that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a specific intent crime. We therefore affirm the defendant’s conviction and turn to the sentencing issues.

Section 922(g)(1) does not excuse a felon's firearm possession because he did not know the law prohibited it.

United States v. Rowold · filed 1993-08-03(g)(1)

Ignorance of Sec. 922(g), however, does not excuse its violation.

A person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a felon's firearm possession under § 922(g)(1) without knowing or having cause to believe the possessor is a felon.

United States of America Government of the Virgin Islands v. Xavier · filed 1993-08-16(g)(1)

Therefore, we hold there can be no criminal liability for aiding and abetting a violation of § 922(g)(1) without knowledge or having cause to believe the possessor's status as a felon.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a buyer knew he was under indictment to convict him for falsely denying that status, while § 922(n) does not require knowledge of that legal status.

United States v. Chapman · filed 1993-10-29(a)(6), (n)

We find that the government failed to prove Chapman knew he was under indictment when he denied it while purchasing a gun. We reverse his conviction on the two counts that required this proof. We affirm Chapman's conviction on two counts of receiving a gun while under indictment. With these two counts, the government did not have to prove Chapman's knowledge of his legal status.

Knowledge that firearms were converted machine guns with obliterated serial numbers may be proved through circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Richard F. Tylkowski and Timothy P. Tylkowski · filed 1993-11-18(k), (o)

Specifically, Richard argues that his conspiracy and possession convictions cannot stand because the government failed to prove that he knew the firearms he possessed and transferred were illegally converted machine guns with obliterated manufacturer’s serial numbers. The evidence admitted at trial and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom refute this contention.

Section 922(o) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a machine gun.

United States v. Hector Moreno, United States of America v. Rolando Zazueta · filed 1993-12-16(o)

The crime charged requires the government to prove that the defendants "knowingly and intentionally" possessed the machine gun.

Section 922(g)(1) is a general intent crime, so voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.

United States v. Fultz · filed 1993-12-27(g)(1)

Fultz's proposed jury instructions were incorrect statements of the law under Bennett and Williams because voluntary intoxication is no defense to a general intent crime such as a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) is a general intent offense, so voluntary intoxication is no defense to possessing a firearm as a felon.

United States v. Klein · filed 1994-03-01(g)(1)

Being a felon in possession of a firearm is a general intent crime. ... Thus, Klein’s intoxication was no defense.

Section 922(g) requires only general intent for a violation.

United States v. Nichols · filed 1994-04-12(g)

Further, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) requires only general intent.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of a firearm to satisfy its intent element.

United States v. Crumpton · filed 1994-05-26(g)

Recognizing 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1) requires knowing possession, United States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir.1987), we find that knowing possession satisfies the intent element of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) and (g)(3) do not require specific intent to unlawfully possess ammunition.

United States v. Grimmett · filed 1994-08-17(g)(1), (g)(3)

Grimmett requested the district court to instruct the jury that they must find that he had the specific intent to unlawfully possess the ammunition. However, such an instruction would not have been proper because specific intent is not an element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew possessing a firearm was a federal felony.

United States v. Vass · filed 1994-11-02(g)(1)

Vass's claim is without merit. Proof of scienter is not an element of Sec. 922(g).

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant possessed a machine gun and knew it was a machine gun.

United States v. Roger E.A. Taylor · filed 1995-11-07(o)

The elements of the crime of possessing a machine gun under Secs. 922(o) and 924(a)(2) are: (1) that the defendant possessed the firearm; (2) that the firearm was a machine gun; and (3) that defendant had knowledge that the firearm was a machine gun.

Section 922(o), read with § 924(a)(2), requires knowing possession or transfer of a machine gun but does not require knowledge that the conduct is illegal.

United States v. Farrell · filed 1995-11-08(o)

We therefore reject Farrell’s plain-language and legislative history arguments and adopt the Sherbondy rationale: “knowingly” supplies the mens rea for the conduct proscribed in section 922 as designated in section 924. The statutes do not require knowledge of the law nor an intent to violate it.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know that he possessed a firearm, but does not require him to know that his possession violated the law.

United States v. Vutera · filed 1996-04-23(g)(1)

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not require that a defendant know his conduct violates the law; rather the defendant need only know that he possessed a firearm to have the requisite intent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element requires intentional control of a firearm; accident or mistake does not establish possession.

United States v. Vasquez · filed 1996-05-06(g)(1)

Yet the instructions given by the court clearly required the jury to find that the defendant had the intent to exercise dominion or control over the firearm and that possession could not be established by accident or mistake.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession, but does not require the defendant to know that possession is illegal.

United States v. Lomax · filed 1996-07-03(g)(1)

In United States v. Farrell, 69 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1283 (1996), we held that the "knowingly" element of section 922(g) applies only to the defendant's underlying conduct, not to his knowledge of the illegality of his actions. Thus, Lomax's claim that he believed his possession to be lawful is irrelevant to the mens rea of the offense, and the district court therefore properly excluded such evidence.

Section 922(o) does not require proof that a defendant knew possessing machineguns was illegal.

United States v. Branch · filed 1996-08-05(o)

Nor must the Government prove Fatta knew his conduct to be illegal.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant knew the weapon had the characteristics of a machinegun.

United States v. Rogers · filed 1996-09-17(o)

Because the Government did not introduce any evidence showing that Rogers was aware that the MAC-11 had been altered to operate as a fully automatic weapon,6 his conviction on this count cannot stand.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not require proof that a defendant knew the ultimate fate of the firearms.

United States v. Douglas · filed 1996-10-10(a)(1)(A)

Nevertheless, we note that the validity of the plea was not affected by the government's alleged failure to establish an evidentiary basis for enhancing Douglas's sentence under § 2K2.1(b)(5), as proof that he had actual or constructive knowledge regarding the ultimate fate of the firearms was not necessary for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew the gun’s characteristics that made it a statutory firearm, but not that possessing it violated the law.

United States v. Reed · filed 1997-05-30(g)(1)

But we have interpreted § 922(g)(1) to require only that defendant knew of the characteristics that made the gun a statutory firearm; the government does not have to prove defendant knew he was violating the law.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not require proof that a defendant knew the statute or specifically intended to violate it to establish willfulness.

United States v. Sillasse Bryan, AKA "Uzi," · filed 1997-09-04(a)(1)(A)

The willfulness element of unlawful sale of firearms does not require proof “that defendant had specific knowledge of the statute he is accused of violating, nor that he had specific intent to violate the statute.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a felon knew possessing a gun was illegal.

United States v. Ladell · filed 1997-10-15(g)(1)

Knowledge of this sort is not an element that must be proved to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew the object he possessed was a firearm.

United States v. Jones, Willie C. · filed 2000-07-21(g)(1)

To prove that a defendant "knowingly possessed a firearm," the Government must establish that the defendant consciously possessed what he knew to be a firearm.

Section 922(g)(8) requires knowing possession of a firearm, but does not require proof that the defendant knew possession was prohibited.

United States v. Kafka III · filed 2000-08-23(g)(8)

To obtain a conviction, the government must prove, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), that a defendant “knowingly” violated section 922(g)(8). This knowledge requirement applies only to the act of possession, not to the prohibition on possessing firearms.

Section 922(o)(1) treats a defendant’s lack of knowledge that a gun was a machine gun as a challenge to the knowledge element, not a separate affirmative defense.

United States v. Smith · filed 2002-07-12(o)(1)

But the defense theory that Smith did not know his gun was a machine gunis not a distinct affirmative defense but rather the inverse of the knowledge element of the statute.

Section 922(g)(9) requires knowledge of firearm possession, but not knowledge that the possession is illegal.

United States v. Barnes, John · filed 2002-07-23(g)(9)

Barnes knowingly possessed the fire- arm and that is the only knowledge required to convict him.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon or knew that possessing a firearm was unlawful.

United States v. Barr · filed 2002-08-07(g)(1)

The parole instructions, admitted into evidence over Barr’s objection, were evidence of his knowledge that he was a convicted ... felon and that it was unlawful for him to possess a firearm. Because the government was not required to prove either of these facts, see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 216 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002), and United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), it was not relevant and should not have been admitted.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of a firearm, but no particular motive for possessing it.

United States v. Davis · filed 2003-06-27(g)

Section 922(g) requires merely that the Defendant knowingly possess a firearm, not that he did so for one particular purpose or another.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know that the thing possessed is a firearm, but not that it fits the statutory definition of a firearm.

United States v. Davis · filed 2004-01-08(g)(1)

Contrary to Davis’ argument, there is no requirement that the district court further instruct the jury that Davis must have been aware that the firearm he possessed fit the statutory definition of a firearm.

When a defendant stipulates to a qualifying conviction, § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove knowing firearm possession and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Howell · filed 2005-06-23(g)(1)

Because Howell stipulated to his criminal record, the government had the burden to prove that Howell knowingly possessed a firearm and that the firearm had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the accused knowingly possessed a firearm, and circumstantial evidence can establish that possession.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2005-07-01(g)

The evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. A reasonable jury could infer that the gun found on the roof had been thrown there by Robinson.

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession elements can be established by stipulations that the defendant was a convicted felon, the items were firearms, and the firearms were manufactured outside the state.

United States v. McKreith · filed 2005-07-08(g)(1)

This stipulation was sufficient to meet the government’s burden of establishing the elements of the felon-in- possession of a firearm charges, 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(1).

A felon and fugitive’s knowledge of a firearm hidden in his vehicle, together with evidence that it traveled in interstate commerce, can support convictions under § 922(g)(1) and (2).

United States v. Vincent Barker Bean · filed 2005-07-14(g)(1), (g)(2)

The evidence of Bean’s convictions, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see United States v. Shepherd, 284 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2002) (standard of review), shows that Bean, a convicted felon and a fugitive, was stopped in his vehicle across the border between North Dakota and Canada when he failed to yield at a customs checkpoint. Hidden in a firewall compartment under the hood of his vehicle was a firearm which had traveled in interstate commerce. In interviews with authorities in Canada and the United States, Bean acknowledged he knew of the gun’s presence in the vehicle. This evidence amply supports Bean’s convictions.

Section 922(g) requires a convicted felon to know that he possesses ammunition, but does not require him to know that possession is illegal.

United States v. Phillips · filed 2006-04-26(g)(1)

Phillips’s first argument fails because § 922(g) only requires that the defendant knowingly possess the ammunition, not that he knows the possession is illegal.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce or knew that possessing it was unlawful.

United States v. Peyton · filed 2006-05-26(g)(1)

To establish [possession of a firearm], it is not necessary for the Government to prove the Defendant knew that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce, nor is the Government required to prove that at the time the defendant possessed the firearm, he knew that he was breaking the law. It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed in commerce what he knew to be a firearm after he had been convicted of a felony offense. ... Having no reason to reconsider this reasoned decision, we conclude that the instruction was not erroneous.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew possessing a firearm or ammunition was unlawful.

United States v. Beverly · filed 2006-08-24(g)(1)

Further, because 18 U.S.C. § 922 is a strict liability offense, whether the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful is irrelevant.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Mathurim · filed 2006-09-06(g)(1)

Mathurim stipulated to a prior felony conviction and to the interstate or foreign commerce element, disputing only the knowing possession element. ... Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to prove that Mathurim possessed the firearm in question.

Section 922 requires proof of firearm possession for the offenses charged under subsections (g)(1), (g)(3), and (k); eyewitness testimony and evidence connecting the defendant to the firearms can support that finding.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2006-09-08

There was sufficient evidence that Johnson possessed the firearms recovered from Boswell's apartment. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson's motion for a new trial on Counts II, III, and IV.

Section 922(o) does not require proof that the weapons originated abroad.

United States v. Solomonyan · filed 2006-09-18(o)

However, the origin of the weapons is not an essential element of the offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); consequently, the Indictment properly tracks the language of the statute and is facially valid.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm possessor had a prior felony conviction.

People v. Austin · filed 2006-09-20(g)(1)

Rather, the federal statute under which defendant pleaded requires proof that the weapon possessor had a prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from knowingly possessing a firearm, and a conviction stands when a rational jury could find the offense’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Jurbala · filed 2006-09-19(g)(1)

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could here have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).

Possession under § 922(g)(1) can be established by an admission that the firearm was the defendant’s and evidence linking him to the room where it was found.

United States v. Brooks · filed 2006-09-22(g)(1)

The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish Brooks’s possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant handled and kept a firearm and was later seen with it.

United States v. Rodriquez · filed 2006-10-04(g)

We conclude that the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could lead a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriquez possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) covers knowing possession of a firearm by a felon, even if the possession is brief.

United States v. Hill · filed 2006-10-10(g)(1)

Based on their testimony, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, even if for a brief moment. Therefore, the Government’s evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew a firearm was in a vehicle he controlled.

United States v. Maloney · filed 2006-10-27(g)(1)

Here, the jury reasonably could conclude that Maloney’s familiarity with other objects in the back seat area, his admission about “things” in the car, and his efforts to avoid apprehension demonstrated knowledge of the firearm in the vehicle. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Maloney’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

United States v. Matthews · filed 2007-08-07(g)(1)

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), "'the government need not prove that the defendant knowingly violated the law; rather, it only need prove . . . that the defendant knowingly possessed firearms.'"

Section 922(g) is a general intent offense, so evidence of a defendant’s mental capacity is admissible only to prove an insanity defense under 18 U.S.C. § 17.

United States v. Torain · filed 2019-04-08(g)

Because § 922(g) is a general intent offense, see, e.g., United States v. McGlothlin, 705 F.3d 1254, 1263 (10th Cir. 2013), Torain’s mental capacity at the time of the offense is admissible only to prove the affirmative defense of insanity as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012), see United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 874 (4th Cir. 2002).

Section 922(a)(6)’s intent-to-deceive element is not negated by a dealer’s failure to sign the purchase form or possible knowledge of a third party.

United States v. Woozencroft · filed 2025-10-06(a)(6)

De Agua’s failure to sign the form or his knowledge of a third party do not impact Woozencroft’s intent to deceive.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a false statement concealing a felony indictment because that fact is material to whether a firearm acquisition is lawful.

United States v. Reilly · filed 2025-09-29(a)(6)

As such, each defendant’s statement denying he was under felony indictment was material to determining whether he could lawfully receive a firearm under § 922(n). Defendants’ false statements therefore violated § 922(a)(6), and the district courts properly denied their motions to dismiss.

For a false statement about felony status under § 922(a)(6), the judge decides whether the prior offense is punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Fulton · filed 2025-05-06(a)(6)

Whether a crime is punishable by more than one year in prison is a question of law for the judge to determine.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a knowingly false statement material to a firearm sale regardless of the form in which the statement is made.

United States v. Karani · filed 2021-01-04(a)(6)

The manner or form of a knowingly false statement is irrelevant so long as the statement is material to the lawful sale of the firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the defendant knew the challenged statement was false; it does not require proof that the defendant knew the conduct was illegal.

United States v. Davis · filed 2019-12-10(a)(6)

Because the text of the relevant statutes does not dictate a different result, the district court appropriately instructed the jury that the government had to prove that Davis knew that the challenged statements he made were false, rather than prove that Davis knew his conduct was illegal. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(a).

Section 922(a)(6) does not cover a false statement made to a shooting range that provides guns for use on its premises outside its capacity as a licensed dealer.

United States v. Artis · filed 2017-10-24(a)(6)

Therefore, the shooting range operation falls outside the scope of the federal license possessed by Jackson Arms. Put another way, when Jackson Arms operates the shooting range, it is not acting in its capacity as a federally licensed dealer. By definition, then, even if Artis could be said to have "acquired" the guns, his "acquisition" was not from a "licensed dealer" within the meaning of the statute, nor was his false statement likely to deceive a licensed dealer.

Section 922(a)(6)’s knowledge requirement may be proved through deliberate avoidance when the evidence permits a jury to find that the defendant avoided learning whether a firearm purchase statement was false.

United States v. Pierotti · filed 2015-02-03(a)(6)

Pierotti was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which makes it illegal “knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement” in connection with the purchase of a firearm or ammunition from a licensed dealer, such as Walmart in this case. The ostrich instruction describes one way in which the prosecution may prove a “knowing” act. Before including an ostrich instruction, a district court must ensure that two preconditions are satisfied: first, the defend- ant must be claiming a lack of guilty knowledge; and sec- ond, there must be evidence in the record that would permit a jury to conclude that the defendant deliberately avoided learning the truth.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a false statement was intended or likely to deceive a federally licensed firearms dealer.

United States v. Spring · filed 2011-09-12(a)(6)

However, § 922(a)(6) requires that the Government prove that the false statement was “intended or likely to deceive” the dealer; this statutory requirement is known as the materiality requirement.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits falsely identifying the actual buyer on Form 4473 because that identity is material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale.

United States v. Abramski · filed 2011-04-25(a)(6)

For the reasons stated during the hearing, the court likewise concludes that the identity of the actual buyer is material to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm and, thus, that "the act of falsifying the identity of the 'actual buyer’ on Form 4473 [constitutes] a violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(a)(6).”

Section 922(a)(6) requires a temporal nexus between a firearm purchase and regular drug use when the alleged false statement denies being an unlawful user of a controlled substance.

United States v. Boslau · filed 2011-02-15(a)(6)

Even without the first clause of the Treasury Department's definition, we believe that the district court's instruction was sufficient because "actively engaging" sufficiently encompasses the requisite temporal nexus between the purchase of a firearm and regular drug use that the statute requires.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits knowingly giving a licensed firearms dealer a materially false answer when trying to buy a firearm.

United States v. Perkins · filed 2010-04-19(a)(6)

It was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Perkins was aware of his prior felony convictions and the restraining order, understood the questions on ATF form 4473, and knowingly provided false responses in an effort to purchase a gun.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits knowingly making a false written statement material to a firearm sale that is intended or likely to deceive a licensed firearms dealer.

United States v. Floyd · filed 2008-11-21(a)(6)

As to the intent to deceive, the evidence was sufficient for the district court to find that Floyd knowingly provided a false answer to question 11b in order to deceive the firearms dealer to sell him a firearm that day and take it home before his pending state charges were detected.

Section 922(a)(6) covers false statements made in connection with acquiring a firearm or ammunition, so a conviction under it does not always involve a firearm.

Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-09-19(a)(6)

Section 922(a)(6), however, also criminalizes the making of false statements in connection with the acquisition of ammunition, which, unlike the acquisition of a firearm, is not removable conduct. Thus, it is possible to be convicted of violating § 922(a)(6) without having committed a removable offense.

Section 922(a)(6) covers false statements connected with acquiring either firearms or ammunition; an ammunition offense alone does not establish a removable firearm offense.

Dulal-Whiteway v. DHS · filed 2007-09-19(a)(6)

Section 922(a)(6), however, also criminalizes the making of false statements in connection with the acquisition of ammunition, which, unlike the acquisition of a firearm, is not removable conduct.

Section 922(a)(6) is violated when a purchaser submits a materially false application to a gun dealer, even if the purchaser later cancels the order.

United States v. Appleby · filed 2004-08-23(a)(6)

Rather, as the district court recognized, the § 922(a)(6) offense was complete when Appleby submitted a materially false application to the gun dealer.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a purchaser who denies a prior felony on a firearm purchase form to know that the denial is false.

United States v. Hardridge · filed 2004-08-17(a)(6)

The evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a finding that Defendant knew he had been convicted of a felony when he completed the ATF forms.

Section 922(a)(6) makes a knowingly false statement in a firearm application a completed offense when the application is submitted, even if the applicant never receives the firearm.

United States v. Seagraves · filed 2004-04-15(a)(6)

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits the making of a false statement in connection with the “acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm.” The crime with which Seagraves was charged was completed at the moment he submitted the application for a firearm, on which he had knowingly made a false statement.

Section 922(a)(6) aims to keep firearms from people Congress deemed too dangerous to possess them.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2001-05-10(a)(6)

Thus, § 922(a)(6) has no purpose independent of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(a)(6) treats a false statement about the true purchaser as material when it causes a dealer to violate the firearm sale recordkeeping requirement in § 922(b)(5), even if the true purchaser is eligible to buy.

United States v. Phanphil · filed 2001-03-29(a)(6)

By providing false information to the dealer concerning the name, address, and residence of the true purchaser, the delivery of the firearm to the appellant was unlawful. Therefore, the appellant’s false statements were material to the lawfulness of the sale.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits knowingly making a false statement when acquiring a firearm if the statement is intended or likely to deceive a licensed dealer about the lawfulness of the sale.

United States v. Dillon · filed 1998-07-24(a)(6)

To sustain a conviction that a defendant violated § 922(a)(6), the government must introduce evidence to establish (1) that the defendant knowingly made a false statement to a licensed firearms dealer, (2) that the false statement was made in acquisition of a firearm, and (3) that the false statement was intended to or likely to deceive the firearms dealer as to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits falsely telling a licensed firearms dealer that guns are being purchased for the buyer's own use.

United States v. Smith · filed 1997-12-04(a)(6)

Jeff Smith and his co-defendants had at least a tacit understanding that Flora Smith would violate § 922(a)(6) by falsely asserting on ATF Form 4473 that the guns were for her use, and Jeff Smith was present when Flora Smith purchased the guns and filled out the ATF form.

Section 922(a)(6) permits a court to define “acquisition” for a jury that might be confused about redemption of a firearm from a pawnshop.

United States v. Byron R. Lawler, Also Known as Eric L. Saucier · filed 1995-08-25(a)(6)

We also reject Lawler's argument that the district court abused its discretion when it defined "acquisition" in the jury instructions, because the jury could have been confused as to whether the term "acquisition" included redemption of a firearm from a pawnshop.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require the Government to disprove potential technical constitutional defects in an existing conviction when prosecuting a false statement about that conviction.

United States v. McDowell · filed 1971-05-14(a)(6)

We think the legislative history and the intent of Congress in the gun law involved in the case at bar show clearly that the statute should be interpreted as not requiring the Government to prove the absence of potential technical constitutional defects not affecting the guilt of the party convicted.

Under § 922(a)(6), a buyer’s false address is not material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale unless the government proves the buyer did not reside in the dealer’s state.

United States v. Benton · filed 1971-07-23(a)(6)

But the material fact for a dealer under § 922(b) (3) is the residency of the buyer, not the address of the buyer, although the address may be evidence of residency. The fact that a buyer may have intentionally given a false address does not become material until the government first proves that the defendant is not a resident of the state in which the dealer is doing business.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a buyer’s false name, age, or residence as material to a firearm sale because § 922(b)(5) requires the dealer to record that information.

United States v. Crandall · filed 1972-01-17(a)(6)

In making this contention defendant overlooks subsection (5) of section (b) which makes the sale unlawful, without limitation, in every ease, unless the seller records the “name, age, and place of residence” of the purchaser. It follows from the fact that the sale is illegal unless these matters are correctly recorded, that their misstatement is a misrepresentation of a “fact material to the lawfulness of the sale.”

A buyer’s false statement about a prior felony conviction is material under § 922(a)(6) because § 922(d)(1) bars a licensed dealer from selling a firearm to a person the dealer knows or has reasonable cause to believe has such a conviction; the firearm need not have moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Menna · filed 1972-02-28(a)(6)

The Government did not prove that the firearm in question was shipped or transported in interstate commerce. But this was not required. Section 922(h) is not involved in this prosecution. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1), it is unlawful for a licensed dealer to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. There is no requirement that such firearm be one which has moved in interstate commerce. The fact of Menna’s prior conviction was material in view of section 922(d) (1).

Section 922(a)(6) covers a false statement made in connection with acquiring a firearm even when the person making it is not the actual purchaser.

The United States of America v. White · filed 1971-11-22(a)(6)

One who makes a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm is liable under Section 922(a) (6) whether or not he is the actual purchaser.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the firearm seller was a licensed dealer.

United States v. Clyde Coy Jordan · filed 1971-12-03(a)(6)

Another reason why the conviction of defendant cannot be affirmed is that there was no evidence that Joseph Dooley, from whom the defendant had acquired the firearm, was a licensed dealer within the meaning of Section 922(a) (6) of Title 18.

Section 922(a)(6) permits a knowing false-statement conviction when the seller asks the firearm buyer the required questions and the buyer answers falsely, even if the buyer cannot read the form.

United States v. Brown · filed 1972-03-29(a)(6)

The government’s case was clearly made out unless Gilbert was lying about the oral exchange between himself and Brown. In finding appellant guilty of both offenses, the jury must have credited Gilbert’s testimony that he had asked Brown the required questions and that Brown had responded falsely. That determination of credibility was within the province of the jury. Accordingly, since there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict, it will be sustained.

A buyer’s false identity and false denial of a disqualifying conviction can support a § 922(a)(6) conviction.

United States v. Kirksey McCord Nix, Jr. · filed 1972-11-13(a)(6)

Spedale testified that Nix told him he had never been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Accordingly, Spedale recorded this information on Form 4473. Spedale positively identified Nix as the individual who represented himself as Charles Tom Ward and who purchased the M-l carbine in question. At the time the purchase was made, however, Nix had been convicted on a plea of guilty to the crime of attempted bribery in Georgia state courts, which conviction was punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year. Taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the Government, there was substantial evidence on which the jury could have found Nix guilty on each count, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

Section 922(a)(6) covers a false statement on Form 4473 made after a firearm sale when the form relates to the purchase.

United States v. Peplinski · filed 1972-12-21(a)(6)

The term “acquisition” plainly encompases all acts that relate to the purchase and sale. The completion of the Form 4473 was required by regulations to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968. Just because Peplinski voluntarily completed the Form after he had paid his money and taken possession of the firearm makes it none the less “in connection with the acquisition” of that firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a purchaser’s use of a fictitious address in acquiring a firearm from a licensed dealer, even without proof that the purchaser was not a resident of the state.

United States v. Gudger · filed 1972-12-26(a)(6)

In Crandall the defendant supplied “a false name, address, and date of birth,” while in the case at bar the indictment charged the defendant with “misrepresenting identification with respect to the transaction, by presenting a fictitious address, ‘4325 Collins, Miami Beach, Florida’ to the dealer.” To us that seems a distinction without a difference. We conclude that this case is governed by Crandall, and that the district court properly denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

A firearms transaction form need not be perfectly clear to support a § 922(a)(6) conviction if it adequately puts the purchaser on notice.

United States v. Baxter Love · filed 1972-05-24(a)(6)

The only issue on appeal is appellant’s contention that the form itself is so defective as to fail to put the purchaser on notice. While the transaction record ... employed in this case is not as clear or as explicit as could be desired (or has now been devised), we do not find it fatally defective.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits false statements made when redeeming firearms from a pawnbroker.

United States v. Huddleston · filed 1973-04-16(a)(6)

We hold that the term "acquisition" in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(6), when read together with the ensuing language prohibiting false statements "with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm," clearly and unambiguously defines an offense. ... The statutes were meant to and did prohibit false statements in connection with the redemption of firearms from a pawnbroker, who is a "dealer" under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(11)(C).

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a person knowingly made a false statement intended or likely to deceive a firearms dealer.

United States v. Williams · filed 1972-07-26(a)(6)

The trial court properly instructed the jury that, in order to establish an offense under § 922(a) (6), ... the government was required to show that appellant knowingly made a false statement, ... and that the statement was intended or likely to deceive the dealer.

Section 922(a)(6) treats an attempt to redeem a pawned firearm as an attempted acquisition.

United States v. Beebe · filed 1972-11-14(a)(6)

“Acquisition”, interpretive of this language, cannot be given the narrow interpretation argued by Beebe. Beebe’s attempted redemption was an attempted acquisition.

An uncounseled felony conviction that is constitutionally invalid cannot support a § 922(a)(6) conviction based on a false denial of that felony.

Marcum v. United States · filed 1972-11-22(a)(6)

The clear effect of this decision, of course, is that constitutionally defective convictions, at least where based upon proceedings in which the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to representation by counsel, may not be used for any purpose, whether to increase a sentence, as in recidivist situations, or to establish an element of the substantive offense charged.

Section 922(a)(6) reaches a firearm purchaser’s false denial of a prior commitment when a state court ordered hospitalization, even if the purchaser was released before a competency jury trial.

United States v. Cottle · filed 1973-02-05(a)(6)

A state court of competent jurisdiction found Cottle mentally ill and ordered him hospitalized. He spent ten days in the state institution. This was a commitment. Cottle falsely stated that he had not been committed. Congress intended to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who had been committed, and to punish those who falsely attempted to buy firearms after being committed.

Section 922(a)(6) permits a prior conviction to establish that a firearm purchaser’s denial of that conviction was false, even if the conviction was later reversed.

United States v. Williams · filed 1973-08-16(a)(6)

We turn first to Williams' assertion that the trial court erred in permitting the Government to allege and prove the prior state court conviction after the conviction had been reversed by the Missouri Supreme Court. ... Having already held that the conviction was admissible to show an essential element of the crime, the sole remaining question is whether or not the fact of the reversal of the conviction should have been admitted, under proper instructions, to mitigate the damage thus done to Williams' credibility as a witness.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a false statement on a firearms transaction form made when buying a shotgun from a licensed dealer.

United States v. Long · filed 1973-09-13(a)(6)

The record affirmatively shows that the shotgun was purchased from a licensed firearms dealer holding federal firearms license No. 58-3536 and that the false statement made by appellant was on an approved firearms transaction record, Form 4473.

A person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year must disclose that conviction when acquiring a firearm, even if the court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation.

Nealy v. State · filed 1973-10-17(a)(6)

Appellant was convicted of the offense of robbery by firearms. The punishment was assessed at ten (10) years. The judge suspended only the imposition of the sentence and granted appellant probation subject to specified terms and conditions. To narrowly equate the term “convicted” with a final judgment of conviction thereafter entered would clearly frustrate the congressional purpose, evidenced, inter alia, by the very fact that a firearm may not be sold by a licensed dealer to a person under indictment.

A purchaser’s denial of a conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year is false even when the sentencing judge promised a term of no more than one year.

United States v. Willis · filed 1975-03-03(a)(6)

It is true that the judge did agree that he would not sentence Willis to more than one year, but that agreement does not alter the fact that the crime was “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” as specified by the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), and question 8b.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a false statement about a prior felony conviction was made knowingly and with intent to deceive the firearms dealer about the lawfulness of the sale.

United States v. Washington · filed 1973-10-12(a)(6)

We reach the view that the circumstances presented by the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, were sufficient to support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact, in this instance the court, that the statutory requirement was met; viz, that the false statements as to a prior ... felony conviction were made knowingly and with intent to deceive the dealer with respect to the lawfulness of the sale.

Section 922(a)(6)'s knowledge requirement can be met when an illiterate buyer gives a false answer about a prior conviction after the firearm dealer reads the question aloud.

United States v. Roy Rogers Fauntleroy · filed 1973-12-04(a)(6)

Even if he were unable to read the question, and the record does contain substantial evidence indicating that Fauntleroy was illiterate, his illiteracy did not preclude his understanding of the questions which were read aloud to him by the sales manager of the store, Thomas Chinault. ... Chinault’s testimony provided sufficient evidence on which the trier of fact could find that on two separate occasions Fauntleroy knowingly gave a false answer to the question concerning his previous conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.

Section 922(a)(6) covers a false denial of a dishonorable discharge because the discharge is material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale.

United States v. Thomas · filed 1973-10-15(a)(6)

However, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) Appendix, makes it unlawful for one so dishonorably discharged “to receive, possess or transport” a firearm. The District Judge, correctly in our view, told the jury that a dishonorable discharge was a fact “material to the lawfulness of the sale.”

Section 922(a)(6) requires the government to prove that the firearm was acquired from a licensed importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector.

United States v. Letky · filed 1974-02-28(a)(6)

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) required the Government to prove that the purchase was made “from a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector.” ... There is no evidence on the record that Jones Swap Shop is a licensed dealer as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). ... Therefore, Count One of the Indictment is dismissed for the failure of the United States to prove an essential element of the crime charged.

Section 922(a)(6) covers knowingly making a material false statement when redeeming a firearm from a licensed pawnbroker.

Huddleston v. United States · filed 1974-03-26(a)(6)

In sum, the word “acquisition,” as used in § 922 (a) (6), is not ambiguous, but clearly includes any person, by definition, who “come[s] into possession, control, or power of disposal” of a firearm. As noted above, “acquisition” and “sale or other disposition” are correlatives. It is reasonable to conclude that a pawnbroker might “dispose” of a firearm through a redemptive transaction. And because Congress explicitly included pawnbrokers in the Act, explicitly mentioned pledge and pawn transactions involving firearms, and clearly failed to include them among the statutory exceptions, we are not at liberty to tamper with the obvious reach of the statute in proscribing the conduct in which the petitioner engaged.

Section 922(a)(6) does not penalize a firearms purchaser for denying a prior conviction obtained unconstitutionally.

United States v. Megura · filed 1975-04-10(a)(6)

More fundamentally, § 922(a)(6) cannot be construed to penalize the denial of a conviction obtained unconstitutionally.

An indictment under § 922(a)(6) is sufficient when it charges all essential elements of the false-statement offense.

United States v. Snell · filed 1975-03-24(a)(6)

A comparison of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) with the allegations of the indictment clearly shows that the indictment accurately and sufficiently charged the appellant with all the essential elements of the statutory offense.

Section 922(a)(6) permits an inference of intent to deceive a firearms dealer when a buyer knowingly makes a false statement denying a felony conviction.

United States v. Graves · filed 1975-05-13(a)(6)

Defendant certified in writing that he had not been convicted of a felony punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. The reasonable inference is that the purpose of his actions was to deceive the gun dealer.

Section 922(a)(6) does not make a purchaser’s denial that he is under indictment a false statement when he is charged by information and the answer is literally true under the ordinary meaning of “indictment.”

United States v. Isaacs · filed 1976-08-05(a)(6)

When the defendant said that he had not been indicted, he told the literal truth if the word is taken in the sense in which it is most commonly used and in the sense in which it is precisely used. ... We hold that, if a word has two meanings and if the answer to a question is literally true under one meaning of a word, the answer cannot be said to be false because, by some process of interpretation, including the determination of congressional purpose, a second meaning might be given to the word.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a firearm purchaser to disclose a prior conviction that has not been set aside, even if it is later found constitutionally invalid.

Cassity v. United States · filed 1975-08-27(a)(6)

However other sections of the Act might be construed in this circuit, we are satisfied that § 922(a)(6) compels disclosure of all convictions which have not been set aside, whether ultimately shown to have been valid or not.

A prior felony counts as a conviction under § 922(a)(6) when a state sentencing error does not void the conviction.

United States v. Cody · filed 1976-03-03(a)(6)

The argument founders on the distinction between a conviction and an unassailable judgment imposing sentence. While there is some language in the Missouri cases open to the interpretation placed thereon by appellant, a careful reading of the leading cases discloses that Missouri does not hold the conviction void. ... But the narrow issue is whether, within the meaning of the Federal Firearms Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., appellant had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a time exceeding one year at the time he swore that he had not been so convicted. ... Consistently with our holding in Williams, supra, and with what we deem to be the congressional intent to apply the Federal Firearms Act broadly, we affirm the denial of appellant’s motion for new trial.

Section 922(a)(6) permits a prior state felony conviction to establish that a purchaser falsely denied having a felony conviction when the plea satisfies federal constitutional standards, even if it fails stricter state requirements.

United States v. Pricepaul · filed 1976-08-09(a)(6)

However, we conclude that the government need not prove compliance with the stricter requirements of Tahl in order to use the prior state conviction to prove a violation of the federal firearms statutes.

Section 922(a)(6) does not prohibit telling a firearms dealer that one has no prior felony conviction when that conviction has been set aside under the Youth Corrections Act, even if the speaker believes otherwise.

United States v. Fryer · filed 1975-10-31(a)(6)

This Court is also unpersuaded by the Government’s argument that even if it is held that the § 1202(a) conviction must be set aside, the same is not true of the §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a) convictions. The essence of these charges is knowingly and falsely giving a statement intending to deceive a firearms dealer. To prove this, the Government would have had to show that the defendant had been previously convicted since it alleges he falsely told the dealer that he has not. It does not matter that the defendant actually believed that he was a convicted felon when he told the firearms dealer he was not. The fact is that legally he was not a convicted felon. One cannot know something that is not so. What he told the firearms dealer was true whether he believed it to be or not.

A pending indictment for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison is a material fact under § 922(a)(6) because § 922(d)(1) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling a firearm to a person under such an indictment.

United States v. Friday · filed 1975-12-19(a)(6)

Since § 922(d) (1) makes it unlawful to sell a firearm to a person under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year, the existence of such an indictment is clearly a “fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” for purposes of § 922(a) (6).

A later state law reducing an offense to a misdemeanor does not erase a final felony conviction for purposes of § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Tobin · filed 1976-02-10(a)(6)

Congress has provided limited exceptions to the firearms statutes. If Congress intended a change in state law to be a further exception, it could well have said so. Congress did not make such an exception. We are therefore constrained to hold that Pennsylvania’s change in law does not make the defendant eligible to acquire and possess firearms under these federal statutes.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a false statement made in connection with redeeming a firearm even if someone else takes possession of it.

United States v. Frazier · filed 1977-02-18(a)(6)

What has been said by this court in United States v. White, supra, concerning sales, is equally applicable to and controlling of the redemption of a firearm, and it is immaterial whether or not Frazier actually made the acquisition of the firearm himself or whether the acquisition was made by his father. It is the making of the false statement by Frazier which was proscribed by the statute and, therefore, is illegal.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a firearm buyer to disclose a prior mental institution commitment that has not been set aside, even if the buyer claims it was unconstitutional.

United States v. Seidenberg · filed 1976-08-27(a)(6)

While the question under consideration herein is certainly not free from doubt, this Court is persuaded by the view of the Sixth Circuit in Cassity and concludes that the purpose of section 922(a)(6) is furthered by the construction which the Sixth Circuit adhered to in its said opinion. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the indictment upon the ground discussed in this opinion will be denied. ... Yet, if an unconstitutional court order may not be ignored, there would seem no constitutional barrier to the Congress requiring that a person list all prior commitments and all prior felony convictions, whether or not they are constitutionally valid, until such person takes steps to have any such invalid commitment or invalid conviction appropriately determined to be invalid.

A constitutionally infirm prior felony conviction cannot support a false statement charge under § 922(a)(6).

United States v. O'Neal · filed 1977-01-10(a)(6)

Based on O’Neal’s uncontroverted showing that a necessary element of the appellant’s affirmative case, the 1948 felony conviction, was constitutionally infirm, the district court properly granted the motion to strike the prior conviction and dismissed the indictment prior to trial.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a firearm buyer to disclose an outstanding felony conviction on the purchase form even if the conviction is later held invalid.

United States v. Ransom · filed 1977-01-14(a)(6)

The fact that the South Carolina conviction was later held to be invalid for failure to provide counsel as required by Gideon based on Ransom’s testimony to that effect does not obviate the penalty for failure “to tell the truth about the conviction,” Cassity, supra, 521 F.2d at 1323. Ransom was required to make a full disclosure at the time of filling in the Treasury form and his failure to do so compelled a finding of guilty by the trial judge.

Sections 922(a)(6) and 922(h) do not treat a prior plea as a conviction when the court withheld adjudication of guilt.

United States v. Dotson · filed 1977-07-01(a)(6), (h)

This appeal is from the district court’s order dismissing the indictment for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and § 922(h) on the ground that the defendant-appellee Dotson had not been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. On the basis of the district court’s order, see Appendix A hereto, and the United States Supreme Court decision in Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 81 S.Ct. 1563, 6 L.Ed.2d 940 (1961), the judgment is ... AFFIRMED.

Section 922(a)(6) does not treat a conviction already set aside under the Youth Corrections Act as a prior conviction for a firearm purchase.

United States v. Fryer · filed 1977-02-02(a)(6)

We now hold that a conviction already set aside under the Youth Corrections Act cannot constitute a conviction for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) or 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) treats a purchaser’s false statement about name, age, or residence as material because § 922(b)(5) requires the seller to record those details correctly.

United States v. Buck · filed 1977-02-22(a)(6)

Appellant next contends that the indictment was infirm because the misstatement alleged to have been made by her was not material to the lawfulness of the sale or required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). ... In making this contention, appellant overlooks subsection (5) of Section (b) which makes the sale unlawful in every case unless the seller records the name, age and place of residence of the purchaser. Unless these matters are correctly recorded, the sale is illegal and any misstatement with respect thereto is clearly a misrepresentation of a material fact.

Section 922(a)(6) punishes a firearm purchaser who falsely denies an outstanding felony conviction, even if the purchaser claims the conviction was unconstitutional.

United States v. Bennie Graves · filed 1977-03-18(a)(6)

As part of a comprehensive plan of firearms regulation, § 922(a)(6) creates an affirmative obligation to make full and honest disclosures. Since Graves was derelict in his duty when he refused to reveal the fact of his outstanding conviction, even assuming that it was obtained in an unconstitutional manner, imposition of the sanctions prescribed by Congress is warranted.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that a defendant knowingly made a false statement material to a firearm sale; an honest and reasonable belief about residency can defeat that requirement when the charge alleges knowing misrepresentation of residency.

United States v. Behenna · filed 1977-03-23(a)(6)

Nevertheless, the statute does require proof that the defendant knowingly made a false statement intended or likely to deceive the dealer with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale. ... It appears that if defendant reasonably and honestly believed that he was a South Carolina resident and thus entitled to purchase the firearm, this belief would be a defense to the specific charges in the indictment.

Section 922(a)(6) treats acquisition and attempted acquisition of a firearm as separate offenses; proof of an attempt does not establish a charged acquisition.

United States v. Brozyna · filed 1977-04-21(a)(6)

Under these circumstances, where the statute clearly defines two crimes, one “in connection with the acquisition” and the other in connection with the “attempted acquisition,” it is necessary that the defendant know what position the prosecution is taking so that she may adequately prepare her defense. In this case the Government clearly did not charge an attempt. Perhaps there was an effort to expand the meaning of the verbiage “in connection with the acquisition of.” If that is the case, the Government has failed and for that reason the motion for judgment of acquittal on Count I is granted.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a buyer's denial of a prior conviction as false when the offense was punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the buyer received a shorter sentence.

United States v. Place · filed 1977-09-06(a)(6)

If the intent of Congress to limit the acquisition of firearms, as reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), is to be effected, the term “convicted” must be given a nonrestrictive interpretation. Once guilt has been established, by plea or verdict, and naught but sentencing remains, a defendant has been “convicted” within the meaning of that word in question 8.b.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a firearms purchaser to disclose a prior conviction truthfully even if the conviction is alleged to be constitutionally defective.

United States v. Edwards · filed 1977-12-19(a)(6)

We hold that the prior conviction, in spite of the alleged constitutional defect, may support a falsification prosecution under the Gun Control Act.

Section 922(a)(6) treats false identification during a completed or attempted firearm acquisition as one offense, regardless of whether the firearm is obtained.

United States of America, Appellant-Appellee v. Lani M. Brozyna, Defendant-Appellee-Appellant · filed 1978-02-10(a)(6)

The phrase “in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm” does not suggest an intent on the part of Congress to create separate offenses. Rather, it indicates that Congress deemed it to be immaterial whether the firearm was ultimately acquired.

Section 922(a)(6) applies to a false denial of a prior conviction even if that conviction is later found invalid.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1980-01-02(a)(6)

We agree with the five other circuits that have held that section applicable to a false denial of a prior conviction even though, subsequent to the denial, the conviction is determined to have been invalid.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits denying a felony conviction when acquiring a firearm, even if the conviction is later claimed or shown to have been unconstitutional.

United States v. Kozerski · filed 1981-07-20(a)(6)

Additionally, the weight of, and what the Court considers to be the better-reasoned, authority is to the effect that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) is violated by a denial of conviction of a felony, even though the conviction is later claimed or shown to have been unconstitutional.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a firearm purchaser from knowingly making a false statement material to whether the dealer may lawfully sell the firearm.

United States v. Meldish · filed 1983-11-28(a)(6)

The dealer cannot carry out his obligations without the cooperation of the purchaser, and the “essence of a § 922(a)(6) violation,” therefore, is the purchaser’s failure to tell the truth.

Section 922(a)(6) permits a conviction for a false statement about a prior felony conviction even if the state later expunges that conviction.

United States v. James Cody, Sr. · filed 1983-03-16(a)(6)

The fact that a state court ordered appellant’s state felony conviction expunged from his record subsequent to his federal conviction does not affect the federal conviction.

Section 922(a)(6) makes the materiality of a false statement to the lawfulness of a firearm sale a question for the court.

United States v. Mastro · filed 1983-09-16(a)(6)

In considering false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), there is no factual question as to the tendency of the statements to induce action or reliance, as in the securities fraud cases cited by the defendant, but rather only a legal question as to the materiality of the false statements to the lawfulness of the sale. It therefore appears that considering materiality to be a question of law for the Court rather than one of fact for the jury represents the better view.

Section 922(a)(6) is violated when a straw purchaser gives false information on the firearm purchase form, regardless of a constitutional challenge to the law barring the real buyer from purchasing.

United States v. Enyinnaya · filed 1985-09-27(a)(6)

In the instant case, the constitutionality vel non of the Tennessee law has no bearing on the Sec. 922 violation. The violation was completed when Enyinnaya's agent Rankins filled out the ATF form false information.

For purposes of § 922(a)(6), a firearm purchaser who fails to maintain the student status required by his visa is illegally in the United States even before a deportation order.

United States v. Igbatayo · filed 1985-06-19(a)(6)

The only issue of any note which Igbatayo raises in this appeal is whether he was an “illegal alien” prior to the date that he was actually ordered deported. ... This argument is not convincing. Although the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., does not define the term “illegal alien,” it is clear that an alien who is in the United States without authorization is in the country illegally. After failing to maintain the student status required by his visa, Igbatayo was without authorization to remain in this country.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a firearm buyer’s identity as material to the lawfulness of the sale, so using a false name violates the section without a separate showing that the buyer was ineligible.

United States v. Anaya · filed 1985-07-26(a)(6)

To put it another way, Congress made identity per se material within the terms of Section 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) treats a false statement about a firearm purchaser’s identity as material, and the court decides materiality as a matter of law.

United States v. Jose Salvador Ortiz-Loya, Angel Ojeda-Avila and Jesus A. Garcia, Defendant · filed 1985-12-02(a)(6)

In United States v. Gudger, 472 F.2d 566 (5th Cir.1972), this Court determined that the question of materiality in a § 922(a)(6) case is a question of law for the court. Any misstatement with respect to the name, age and place of residence of the purchaser is clearly a misrepresentation of a material fact.

Section 922(a)(6)’s knowledge requirement may be proved by evidence that a firearm buyer answered specific questions on Form 4473 and that the dealer explained the form.

United States v. Studnicka · filed 1985-12-06(a)(6)

Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that it was impossible to respond to the questions in section A, including the two questions appellant answered falsely, without reading the questions. In addition, the Government produced as a witness at trial a salesman of one of the licensed firearms dealers from which appellant purchased several of the firearms, who testified that he always explained Form 4473 to the purchaser. This evidence was more than sufficient to support appellant’s section 922(a)(6) convictions.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the defendant acquired a firearm from a federally licensed dealer and knowingly made a false statement intended or likely to deceive the dealer about the lawfulness of the sale.

Harper v. United States · filed 1987-08-14(a)(6)

To establish a violation of § 922(a)(6), the government must show that the defendant (1) acquired a firearm from a federally licensed firearms dealer as charged; (2) that in doing so, he knowingly made a false statement, (3) which was intended to deceive or was likely to deceive the firearms dealer as to the lawfulness of the sale in question.

Section 922(a)(6) makes a buyer’s state of residence material to the lawfulness of a firearm purchase; the government need not prove that the buyer’s stated street address was false if it proves the stated residency was false.

United States v. Wajcman · filed 1988-03-07(a)(6)

18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(6) 1 prohibits buyers from making false statements that are material to the lawfulness of a firearm purchase. The material fact involved in this case is the residency of Wajcman, not his address.

Section 922(a)(6) continues to support a conviction for pre-amendment conduct when the Firearm Owners' Protection Act's section 101 amendment takes effect during a pending appeal.

United States v. Turner · filed 1987-09-04(a)(6)

Because the section 101 amendments are not expressly listed by the Act as applicable to pending cases, the general savings clause in 1 U.S.C. Sec. 109 applies to support Turner's conviction under the pre-FOPA version of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 921(a)(20) and 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) can be violated without a written instrument, a statement filed with a public office or public servant, or intent to defraud the government.

People v. Behrman · filed 1988-06-16(a)(6)

Thus, as distinct from the New York statute, it is possible to violate the Federal statute without (1) a written instrument; (2) an offering of the false statement to a public office or public servant; (3) the filing of the false statement with such public office or public servant; or (4) the intent to defraud the State or any political subdivision thereof.

Section 922(a)(6)’s knowledge requirement is satisfied by deliberate disregard for whether a statement is true or false coupled with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.

United States v. Hester · filed 1989-07-31(a)(6)

The district court interpreted the requirement more broadly as including “deliberate disregard for its truth or falsity with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth,” and so instructed the jury. Because the jury conceivably could have found the requisite knowledge on this alternative basis rather than on the basis of “actual” knowledge, it is necessary to decide whether “knowingly” as used in 18 U.S.C. •§ 922(a)(6) contemplates this alternative state of mind as well as “actual” knowledge. We conclude that, as defined by the district court, it does.

Section 922(a)(6) treats the identity of a firearm purchaser as material to the sale.

United States v. Stewart · filed 1990-04-16(a)(6)

The identity of the purchaser is "per se" material under Sec. 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(5) and (a)(6) convictions can stand when the evidence supports the required residency facts and false statements about residence.

United States v. Miles · filed 1990-04-25

Miles asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that he was not a resident of Virginia and that Jerry Miles was, 4 and that the evidence was insufficient to prove Miles made false statements as to his residence when purchasing firearms. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), we find these contentions to be without merit.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits making a false statement in connection with acquiring a firearm from a licensed dealer.

United States v. Austin · filed 1990-09-26(a)(6)

This evidence, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to support the jury verdict that Austin’s false answer was intended, or at least likely, to deceive the sales clerk about a fact material to the legality of the sale of the firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits knowingly making a false statement material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale, and § 922(e) requires written notice to a common carrier when transporting firearms.

United States v. Eddie Bishop Jones · filed 1990-08-06(a)(6), (e)

In light of this evidence, we have no doubt that any rational juror could have found Jones was a resident of New York when he purchased the firearms in Virginia, and, contrary to Jones' assertion, we find no error in the trial court's instruction concerning what the jury could consider in determining residency in the discrete circumstances of this case. ... In Jones' view, since both Jarrett and Layton gave their correct names and addresses to the firearms vendors in making the "straw purchases" on behalf of Jones, they could not have violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(6). The record is replete, however, with evidence that the two associates purchased the guns and gave them to Jones knowing that he was using them as purchasers because he was apprehensive of purchasing any more weapons in his own name. The transactions obviously were direct purchases for Jones, and only by blind adherence to a strained logic could we conclude other than that false information was provided to facilitate the transactions. ... However, as Jones candidly admits, the Sec. 922(e) offense required proof of elements which are not part of the District of Columbia offense--whether the firearms were transported on a common carrier and whether written notice was given to the common carrier. It is also clear that the government in the Sec. 922(e) prosecution proved different conduct than that grounding the District of Columbia illegal possession conviction. The double jeopardy prohibition, therefore, does not apply.