15 U.S.C. § 1692

To state an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that she owes a consumer debt or was the object of collection efforts, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant violated the Act; an individual officer's liability requires personal involvement in collecting the debt.

Sorrentino v. Fay Servicing, LLC · filed 2025-09-18(a)(6)

To bring a claim under the FDCPA, the plaintiff “must be a consumer who allegedly owes the debt or a person who has been the object of efforts to collect a consumer debt, (2) the defendant collecting the debt must be considered a debt collector, and (3) the defendant must have engaged in an act or omission in violation of FDCPA requirements.” ... The Court holds that Plaintiff fails to establish the first element of an FDCPA claim. ... But Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of alleging that Mr. Fay, Fay Servicing’s CEO, is a debt collector under the statute. “Individual defendants, such as directors or officers of a collection agency, may be held personally liable under the FDCPA.” ... In order for an individual to be liable under the statute, however, the plaintiff must “allege that the defendant was personally involved in the collection of the debt at issue.”

To prevail under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must prove collection activity arising from consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

Johnson v. Pelican State Credit Union · filed 2025-08-22

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and attached evidence, even to the extent considered, do not establish her entitlement to summary judgment on her FDCPA claim. ... Therefore, disputed facts preclude summary judgment and the evidence does not establish as a matter of law that Defendant is a debt collector or engaged in the actions about which Plaintiff complains.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that he is a consumer with a qualifying debt and that the defendant engaged in prohibited conduct; an unwanted call alone is not an inconvenient communication under § 1692c, and a § 1692b claim requires communication with someone other than the consumer to obtain location information.

Ioszpe v. Unifin Inc · filed 2025-08-28(a)(3), (b), (c)

Specifically, Plaintiff fails to set forth any allegations that support he is a “consumer” with a “debt” as contemplated by the Act. ... Thus, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a violation of § 1692b, which addresses situations where a “debt collector communicat[es] with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer.” ... Relatedly, there are no factual allegations that Unifin’s four calls occurred at obviously inconvenient times or places (a violation of § 1692c), and the mere fact that a debt collection call may be unwanted does not render it inconvenient such that it violates the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that he or she is a consumer, that the debt arises from a transaction entered into for personal purposes, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant violated an FDCPA provision.

Berrocal · filed 2025-10-23

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she is a consum-er; (2) that the debt arises out of a transaction entered into for personal purposes; (3) that the de-fendant is a debt collector; and (4) that the defendant violated at least one of the provisions of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that she is a consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, the challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a debt, and the defendant violated the Act in attempting to collect it.

LYLE · filed 2026-01-08

The aforementioned allegations against TransUnion do not state a claim for relief under the FDCPA — which requires Ms. Lyle to prove that (1) she is a consumer; (2) TransUnion is a debt collector; (3) TransUnion’s challenged practice involved an attempt to collect a “debt” as understood in the FDCPA; and (4) TransUnion violated an FDCPA provision in attempting to collect that debt. Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303 (citation modified). On the present record, Ms. Lyle does not provide facts that, if construed as true, would establish these elements.

A plaintiff claiming an FDCPA violation must show collection activity arising from a consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant committed a prohibited act or failed to perform a statutory requirement.

Hassell · filed 2026-03-03

To recover under the FDCPA, plaintiffs must show that “(1) they have been the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant attempting to collect the debt qualifies as a ‘debt collector’ under the Act; and (3) the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a requirement imposed by the Act.” ... His allegations are insufficient to allege a plausible claim for relief.

The FDCPA requires a claimant to allege that they are a consumer, the debt arose from a primarily personal, family, or household transaction, the defendant is a debt collector, and the defendant violated the Act.

Vaughn v. Equityexperts.org Midwest LLC · filed 2022-08-22

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a pleading must allege facts showing: (1) the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the debt arises out of a transaction that is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (3) the defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA; and (4) the defendant violated the FDCPA.

The FDCPA excludes a loan servicer from the debt-collector definition when the debt was not in default when the servicer obtained it.

Edmond v. American Educational Services/ National Collegiate Trust · filed 2010-10-28(a)(6)(F)

The Court will dismiss Count V of the Amended Complaint because AES, as a loan servicer, is not a covered debt collector under the FDCPA absent an allegation that plaintiff’s account was in default when AES acquired it.

Section 1692(e) regulates deceptive debt-collection conduct by debt collectors, not creditors collecting their own debts or loan servicers.

Bridge v. OCWEN FEDERAL BANK · filed 2009-08-28(e)

The Court agrees with defendants’ position that the relevant provisions of the FDCPA apply only to debt collectors and not to creditors collecting their own debts or to loan servicers.

The FDCPA distinguishes creditors from debt collectors: collecting a debt for oneself makes a person a creditor, even if the debt was assigned in default, unless it was acquired solely to facilitate collection for another.

Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2011-07-05(a)(4), (a)(6)

Accordingly, collecting debt not for another, whether or not the debt is assigned in default, makes one a creditor. ... Plaintiffs do not allege here that Defendant received the debt for the purpose of collecting for another. Accordingly, this Court finds that under the plain meaning of the FDCPA, Defendant is not a debt collector, but a creditor.

A loan servicer is not a debt collector under the FDCPA unless the debt was already in default when the servicer obtained it.

McAndrew v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. · filed 2013-10-08(a)(6)(F)

A loan servicer such as AHMSI cannot be a “debt collector” under the FDCPA unless the debt was in default when it was obtained by the servicer.

The FDCPA treats an entity that extends credit creating a debt as a creditor rather than a debt collector, and excludes the creditor’s officers and employees who collect debts in the creditor’s name.

McCrimmon v. Mariner Finance North Carolina, Inc. · filed 2016-01-05(a)(4), (a)(6)(A)

Although the FDCPA regulates the conduct of “debt collectors,” it generally does not apply to “creditors.” ... An entity that , “offers or extends credit creating a debt” qualifies as a creditor for the purposes of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). The FDCPA specifically provides that officers and employees of creditors- do not qualify as debt collectors,- even-when engaged in the process Of collecting debts, so long as they do so in the name of the creditor. Id. § 1692a(6)(A). ... Here, Mariner does not qualify as a debt collector for the purposes of the FDCPA.1 Instead, Mariner is a creditor because' it extended credit directly' to McCrimmon.' ... The court therefore concludes that Mariner is not a debt collector subject to the FDCPA.

The FDCPA regulates debt collectors but does not reach creditors collecting their own original debts.

Capital One v. Castronova · filed 2018-06-12(a)(6)(A)

The FDCPA regulates only “debt collectors,” which are businesses that regularly collect consumer debt for others. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017). The FDCPA does not reach creditors, like Capital One here, when they attempt to recover their own original debt. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A).

Section 1692(a)(6)(F)(iii) excludes a loan servicer from the FDCPA's definition of debt collector when the servicer obtained the right to collect while the debt was not in default.

Laccinole v. Navient Solutions, LLC · filed 2022-03-04(a)(6)(F)(iii)

“Pursuant to this exemption, collection activity by a servicer that obtained the right to collect at a time when the debt was not in default does not constitute debt collection under FDCPA.” ... Mr. Laccinole provides only a conclusory statement that the loan at issue was in default before Navient started servicing it. ... Mr. Laccinole’s FDCPA claims (Counts XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI) are dismissed.

The FDCPA applies to debt collectors seeking payment of consumer debts, but not to creditors.

Stephens v. US Mortgage Corporation · filed 2023-03-29(a)(6), (a)(4)

The FDCPA applies only to ‘debt collectors’ seeking satisfaction of ‘debts’ from ‘consumers’; it does not apply to ‘creditors.’” McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2008). The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A “creditor” is defined as “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). Both US Mortgage Corporation and Midland Mortgage would plainly qualify as “creditors” under the FDCPA, and plaintiff cannot assert a colorable FDCPA claim against either defendant.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person whose business principally involves collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed to another, while the FDCPA does not apply to creditors.

Stephens v. Regal Car Sales and Credit · filed 2023-03-31(a)(6), (a)(4)

The FDCPA applies only to ‘debt collectors’ seeking satisfaction of ‘debts’ from ‘consumers’; it does not apply to ‘creditors.’” McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2008). The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A “creditor” is defined as “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). Plaintiff makes no allegations that Regal or Saber are debt collectors who were directly or indirectly attempting to collect a debt owed by plaintiff to a third-party, and plaintiff has not stated a colorable claim under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA protects only debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so commercial debts fall outside its coverage.

Goldsmith v. HSW Financial · filed 2010-11-12(a)(5)

To qualify for FDCPA protection, a debt must be incurred "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). ... It is well established that "actions arising out of commercial debts are not covered by the protective provisions of the FDCPA." ... Thus, the FDCPA does not apply to this case.

The FDCPA covers debts arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, not commercial debts.

Howe v. Creditors Interchange Receivables Management, LLC (In Re Howe) · filed 2009-11-03(a)(5)

Based on that evidence, the Court finds that the debt at issue is a “business” debt that makes the FDCPA (and, by extension, the FCEUA) inapposite.

Section 1692a(5) limits FDCPA coverage to debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and proof that a debt meets that requirement is an essential element of an FDCPA claim.

Roundtree v. Ross · filed 2015-02-18(a)(5)

The FDCPA only applies to debts that are “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” ... Bush Ross argues, correctly, that proof that the debt satisfies those criteria is an essential element of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not cover attempts to collect debts arising from commercial transactions; covered debt must arise from a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Scarola Malone & Zubatov LLP v. McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff · filed 2016-02-11

Clearly, this was not an account used “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Accordingly, to the extent that the alleged debt, whether actually owed or mistakenly assessed, stems from telecommunications services provided by Verizon to SMZ, the claim arises out of a commercial transaction and is not covered by the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) defines a debt as an obligation arising primarily from personal, family, or household purposes, so the FDCPA does not apply to commercial debts.

Pasley v. Biggs (In re Pasley) · filed 2019-01-24(a)(5)

The FDCPA is inapplicable to the collection of commercial debts. ... As stated above, a debt is personal or commercial based upon the intent of the borrower at the time the debt was incurred. Here, the evidence clearly indicates the Plaintiff incurred these debts with the intent to engage in commercial activity. As such, these debts are not consumer debts, and the Plaintiff cannot meet the first prong of the FDCPA test.

Section 1692a(5) limits the FDCPA's definition of debt to obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so a civil judgment arising from an automobile accident is not covered.

Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance and Investment · filed 2019-03-15(a)(5)

A civil judgment arising out of an automobile accident is not a consumer debt within the meaning of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) limits FDCPA debt coverage to obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so a business-purpose loan remains outside the definition even when the borrower personally guarantees repayment.

Noe v. Chastain · filed 2019-04-10(a)(5)

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the FDCPA because the 2004 loan, as alleged by Plaintiff, is not a “debt” for FDCPA purposes. ... A loan taken on behalf of a corporation to pay off another loan borrowed to pay for real property owned by that corporation is not incurred “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” ... However, the FDCPA “characterizes debts in terms of end uses,” not in terms of whether a business owner personally guarantees repayment of a loan regardless of its end use.

Section 1692a(5) limits a debt to an obligation arising from a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so the FDCPA does not apply to commercial obligations.

Ruesch v. Purple Shovel · filed 2019-06-24(a)(5)

“The term ‘debt’”—as used in the FDCPA—“means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” “The term ‘consumer’ means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” ... Because the debt on which S&H sought to collect was a commercial obligation, the FDCPA does not apply.

The FDCPA covers consumer debts owed by natural persons and does not apply to commercial debts owed by businesses.

Robert J. Caluda, APLC v. New Orleans City · filed 2019-07-22(f)

This Court has held a consumer debt may be held only by a natural person, not by a business or corporation. ... In this case, Plaintiffs are business entities, not individual consumers. Plaintiffs seek to recover penalties paid under business personal ad valorem taxes—debts that are commercial in nature. As a result, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA covers only obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, not commercial business loans or guarantees.

Paushok v. Ganbold · filed 2021-03-18(a)(5)

When deciding whether a debt is a consumer debt and therefore falls within the scope of the FDCPA, courts focus on the purpose of the underlying transaction. See Cohen, 2016 WL 6581233, at *8. The purpose of both the Loan Agreement and the 2006 Surety was to provide GEM with finances to run its business operations. In fact, Paushok himself appears to concede the obvious commercial nature of the 2006 Surety when opposing dismissal. See, e.g., Opposition at 1 (acknowledging “that the original debt instrument from [GPB] was executed for a commercial purpose”). Such a loan to a business simply does not fall under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) covers only obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so a complaint must plausibly allege that the debt is a consumer debt for the FDCPA to apply.

Keswani v. Athwal · filed 2021-09-14(a)(5)

Absent some factual content on that subject, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the debt arose from a transaction that was primarily for “personal, family, or household purposes,” as required to state a claim under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

The FDCPA covers obligations arising primarily from transactions for personal, family, or household purposes, not commercial debts.

Keswani v. Athwal · filed 2022-04-14(a)(5)

Accordingly, the Court still cannot reasonably infer that Plaintiff’s alleged debt arose from a transaction that was primarily for “personal, family, or household purposes,” as required to state a claim under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

Section 1692(a)(5) limits FDCPA debt to obligations arising primarily from personal, family, or household transactions, so commercial debts are excluded.

Chattin v. Ideal Business Partners, Inc. · filed 2022-06-23(a)(5)

Chattin repeatedly has alleged in his Fourth Complaint and responses that his debt was a commercial debt and not a consumer debt. ... The statute is clear. Chattin may not bring a claim under the FDCPA because his debt constituted a commercial debt, rather than consumer debt.

Section 1692 applies only to debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so business debts are outside the FDCPA.

Shaw, Robert v. Verizon Wireless · filed 2023-11-07(a)(3), (a)(5)

The act defines “consumer” as a “natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3). The act defines a debt as a consumer’s obligation to pay money towards a transaction “in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Section 1692(a)(5). Business debt does not fall within the categories of personal, family, or household purposes. ... Shaw’s debt is a business debt, not a consumer debt. ... Therefore, the FDCPA and WCA do not apply.

Section 1692a(5) limits “debt” to obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so business debts are outside the FDCPA.

JOHNSON v. CREDIT CONTROL, LLC · filed 2024-07-29(a)(5)

The FDCPA defines a “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (emphases added). It is well-settled that the FDCPA does not apply to business debts, only consumer debts.

Section 1692a(5) defines covered debt as a monetary obligation incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; a plaintiff must plausibly allege that purpose.

McAfee v. IC System, Inc. · filed 2024-12-09(a)(5)

The FDCPA defines “debt” as a monetary obligation incurred “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). ... McAfee could very well use the Verizon account at issue for business or commercial purposes, in which case the FDCPA would not cover the debt. ... As such, McAfee did not plausibly allege the second element of his FDCPA claim.

The FDCPA covers collection of consumer debts and requires a claimant to plausibly allege that the defendant is a debt collector; it does not apply to commercial loans.

Okorie v. University Mall, LLC · filed 2025-03-31(a)(6)

“To state a claim under the FDCPA, Dr. Okorie must show (1) that he was the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) that Defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) that Defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” Douglas v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 4:14-cv-1329, 2015 WL 1064623, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015); Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P., 970 F.3d 576, 581 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Douglas as stating elements of FDCPA claim). In relevant part, the FDCPA defines a “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). ... Dr. Okorie’s FDCPA claim fails. FDCPA does not apply to his loan given that the property concerns a commercial loan and not a consumer loan. ... Because Dr. Okorie does not plausibly plead that any of the named Defendants are debt collectors as defined by the FDCPA, he fails to state a claim for relief warranting dismissal.

The FDCPA does not reach conduct occurring after a consumer has paid the debt in full and the debt collector has acknowledged payment, because that conduct is not connected with collecting a debt.

Narog v. Certegy Check Services, Inc. · filed 2011-01-10

A plaintiff cannot allege a claim for violation of the FDCPA based on conduct that occurred after he paid his debt in full, and after the debt collector acknowledged that the debt was paid in full.

The FDCPA may be violated when a debt collector threatens to sue on a time-barred debt.

Castro v. Collecto, Inc. · filed 2011-02-24(e)(5), (e)(10), (f)

Accordingly, threatening to sue on time-barred debt may well constitute a violation of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not require a foreclosure sale to be halted when a debtor does not seek verification of or otherwise dispute the debt.

Muldrow v. EMC Mortgage Corp. · filed 2011-03-02

Nothing in the FDCPA requires that a foreclosure sale be halted if a debtor does not seek verification of or otherwise dispute the debt.

The FDCPA’s coverage of entities enforcing mortgages through judicial foreclosure remained unresolved after Obduskey, so a complaint against such an entity can constitute a legitimate FDCPA cause of action.

HILL v. UDREN LAW OFFICES, P.C. · filed 2020-11-18

The Supreme Court held, in resolving different views among the Circuits about application of the FDCPA, that “but for § 1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors within the meaning of the Act.” ... While the Court specifically abrogated Kaymark v. Bank of America, N. A., 783 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2015)—the Third Circuit decision in a prior iteration of this case—while discussing “different views among the Circuits about the application of the FDCPA to nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding,” it also stated that “whether those who judicially enforce mortgages fall within the scope of the primary definition is a question we can leave for another day.” Id. at 1035, 1039 (emphasis added). In this case, Defendant Udren assisted Bank of America in the context of judicial foreclosure proceedings. ... As such, there is enough ambiguity in the Supreme Court’s ruling to conclude that Plaintiffs have brought a legitimate cause of action against Defendant under the FDCPA in its Complaint.

The FDCPA prohibits debt-collection conduct that the Act forbids, but its application to stale proofs of claim in Chapter 13 bankruptcy yields to the Bankruptcy Code when the two statutes irreconcilably conflict.

Mears v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2015-11-05

An irreconcilable conflict is what appears before this Court — the Code permits conduct that the Act prohibits. Therefore, this Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the courts addressed above and concludes that the Act must yield to the Code. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is due to be granted on Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims.

Section 1692e(11) requires a debt collector to identify itself as a debt collector in every communication with a consumer after the initial communication.

Forkum v. Co-Operative Adjustment Bureau, Inc. · filed 2014-05-22(e)(11)

The Court agrees with the reasoning of these cases. The Court finds that the clear and unambiguous language of the FDCPA governs this case; it requires a debt collector to identify himself as such in all subsequent communications with a consumer. Defendant, for its part, has failed to cite any controlling authority or provide persuasive legal analysis demonstrating that summary judgment is inappropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on his FDCPA claim is GRANTED to the extent that it is predicated on a violation of § 1692e(ll).

Section 1692e(11) requires a debt collector to disclose that a communication is from a debt collector in subsequent communications.

Bonifacio v. Northeastern Acquisitions Group, Inc. · filed 2011-07-19(e)(11)

Additionally, since Plaintiff alleges that a debt collector employed by Defendant communicated with Plaintiff once, Plaintiff cannot recover under section 1692e(11) of the FDCPA, which only requires a disclosure that the communication is from a debt collector “in subsequent communications.”

Section 1692e(11) requires debt collectors to disclose in every communication with a consumer that the communication is from a debt collector, and omitting that disclosure is actionable without a materiality requirement.

Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A. · filed 2012-01-11(e)(11)

That subsection requires debt collectors "to disclose" in their initial and subsequent communications with consumers "that the communication is from a debt collector." ... The statute expressly prohibits this exact omission by requiring debt collectors to disclose their status in every communication with a consumer. Accordingly, whether a materiality requirement attaches to other violations of § 1692e has no impact on Warren’s allegations that the defendants violated § 1692e(11).

Section 1692e(11) requires debt collectors to disclose in every communication with a consumer that the communication is from a debt collector, and an omission of that disclosure is not subject to a materiality requirement applicable to other § 1692e violations.

Warren v. SESSOMS & ROGERS, PA · filed 2012-02-01(e)(11)

Warren’s allegations, however, do not involve a false representation, or any affirmative representation for that matter. Rather, as described above, Warren complains about conduct that involves a "failure to disclose" "that the communication," the February 2009 phone message, was "from a debt collector." The statute expressly prohibits this exact omission by requiring debt collectors to disclose their status in every communication with a consumer. Accordingly, whether a materiality requirement attaches to other violations of § 1692e has no impact on Warren’s allegations that the defendants violated § 1692e(11).

Section 1692e(11) does not require a debt collector to use specific language in a subsequent communication if the communication sufficiently discloses to the least sophisticated debtor that it is from a debt collector.

Davis v. Hollins Law · filed 2016-08-08(e)(11)

Today we hold that if a subsequent communication is sufficient to disclose to the least sophisticated debtor that the communication was from a debt collector, there is no violation of § 1692e(11) even if the debt collector did not expressly state, “this communication is from a debt collector.”

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692g prohibit harassing or materially false or misleading collection conduct, and § 1692g requires a debt collector to cease collection only when the consumer disputes the debt within the thirty-day period triggered by an initial communication.

Lane v. Fein, Such and Crane, LLP · filed 2011-03-03(d), (e), and (g)

The first focal point for analyzing the statute in this situation is the “initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt” that is described in Subsection 1692g(a). Under the statute, once an “initial communication” between a debt collector and a consumer takes place, the debt collector must within five days inform the consumer of his right to challenge the debt. This in turn starts the thirty day clock during which any challenge to the debt by the consumer will halt collection of the debt, pending the debt collector’s verification of that debt to the consumer. Under this scheme, if an initial communication does not take place, the thirty-day clock to challenge the debt never begins to run. ... Under the plain language of Section 1692g, such a challenge does not invoke the temporary moratorium on the collection of debts. ... The Court therefore concludes that the statement that BMC “is a banking corporation duly licensed, organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the United States”, is not materially false or misleading, and thus does not violate Section 1692e. ... The Court therefore finds that the alleged conduct of the defendant was not harassing under Section 1692d, and dismisses the plaintiffs’ Section 1692d cause of action for failure to state a claim.

The FDCPA treats a communication as connected to debt collection when it makes an implicit demand for payment; § 1692c(a)(1) bars communications at a known inconvenient place, § 1692d requires intimidating or coercive harassment, and § 1692e imposes liability for an untrue representation without a separate materiality requirement.

Maze v. Midland Credit Management Inc · filed 2025-05-20(c)(a)(1), (d), (e)

Section 1692c prohibits debt collectors from communicating “with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt . . . at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1). ... Those allegations are sufficient to show a violation of § 1692c(a)(1), which prohibits debt collectors from communicating “with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt . . . at . . . a . . . place known . . . to be inconvenient to the consumer.” Accordingly, the court WILL DENY Midland’s motion to dismiss Count One. ... Harassment, oppression, or abuse are not “natural consequence[s]” of sending a single letter to a person’s home, absent something in the letter that would harass, oppress, or abuse the person. ... Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... A false representation in connection with the collection of a debt is sufficient to violate the FDCPA facially, even where no misleading or deception is claimed. ... Accordingly, taken in the light most favorable to Ms. Maze, Midland’s representation that it understood her letter to inquire about or request documentation about the debt was untrue. ... Even if the court accepted that the phrase “false representation” implied a materiality requirement, Midland’s response actively invited Ms. Maze to respond with a “[w]ritten explanation and documentation demonstrating any errors in your account information” based on its purported understanding (or misunderstanding) about the purpose of her letter. ... Accordingly, the court WILL DENY the motion to dismiss Count Three.

The FDCPA's disclosure requirements apply to all debt collectors, regardless of whether their collection conduct is deceptive.

Siwulec v. Jm Adjustment Services LLC · filed 2012-03-01(e)

The FDCPA mandates that all debt collectors make disclosures, regardless of whether they engage in deceptive practices, as a safeguard against deception.

The FDCPA's disclosure requirements are satisfied when the communication, viewed as a whole, would not mislead an unsophisticated consumer about the call's purpose.

Beeders vs Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., Roy Dillard · filed 2011-06-28

We find no clear error in the district court’s determination that, taking this message as a whole, even an unsophisticated consumer would not be misled as to the purpose of this call, as the message identified the name of the caller, which includes the term “Collection Bureau,” and specifically referenced a personal file number. Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Gulf Coast satisfied the disclosure requirements of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not make claims under it nonarbitrable.

O'Fallon v. Encore Receivable Management, Inc. · filed 2011-08-03

This matter concerns the arbitrability of claims arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (“FDCPA”). ... Likewise, it is undisputed that no federal statute or policy renders FDCPA claims nonarbitrable. ... Accordingly, the only issue before the Court is whether the arbitration provision in the Agreement is valid and enforceable.

The FDCPA prohibits false or misleading debt-collection representations and post-refusal collection contacts, and its debt-collector definition covers individuals who regularly collect debts for another.

Cruz Ex Rel. Cruz v. International Collection Corp. · filed 2012-03-08(e), (c), (a)(6)

The FDCPA bars the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Further, the FDCPA prohibits contacting a debtor who has “notified a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt . . . .” irrespective of whether the statement is false under state law or otherwise. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). ... Section 1692a(6) defines a “debt collector” for the purposes of the FDCPA. ... Under Fox, Hendrickson qualifies as a debt collector. ... The inquiry is therefore a two-step process, in which we must determine 1) whether the individual qualifies as a debt collector, and 2) whether that individual has taken an action that violates the FDCPA.

The FDCPA protects any person targeted by prohibited collection practices, but only when the conduct is by a statutory debt collector; creditors are not covered.

Janke v. Wells Fargo and Co. · filed 2011-08-22(a)(6), (a)(6)(F), (k)(a)

Therefore, Janke, despite not being the person listed on the consumer debt, is entitled to the protection of the FDCPA. As previously explained, however, the FDCPA’s protection is only against the acts of “debt collectors” and not “creditors.” Neither Janke’s status nor Wells Fargo’s actions alter Wells Fargo’s status as a “creditor” under the allegations of the Complaint.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to provide written debt-validation information, including verification when a consumer disputes the debt, and § 1692a(6) limits those requirements to persons collecting the debt of another.

Todd v. Discover Bank · filed 2012-05-04(g)(a); (a)(6)

Subparagraph (b) of § 1692g. also indicates that the purpose of this section is to verify to the debtor the identity of the original creditor; indeed, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.(6) defines a “debt collector,” as used in § 1692g.(a), as a person collecting the debt of another. ... We conclude, based on Todd’s failure to present evidence to the trial court indicating that Discover is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA or that Discover had failed to comply with the FDCPA, that the trial court did not err in denying Todd’s motion to dismiss.

The FDCPA protects consumers from unlawful debt-collection practices by qualifying debt collectors and requires a violation of one of the Act’s substantive provisions.

Glover v. Loan Science · filed 2020-07-13

The elements of an FDCPA claim are: “1) the plaintiff has been the object of debt collection stemming from consumer debt; 2) the defendant is a third-party debt collector or has represented itself as a third party while collecting debt from the plaintiff, and; 3) the defendant engaged in practices violating the FDCPA.” ... Such claims under the FDCPA only apply against a “debt collector.”

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show consumer status, a qualifying personal debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and a violation of one of its provisions; its debt-collector definition may not cover a mortgage servicer that began servicing before default.

Lane v. Rocket Mortgage LLC · filed 2025-08-05(a)(6)

A plaintiff must show four elements to bring a successful FDCPA claim: (1) the plaintiff qualifies as a consumer under the act; (2) the debt arises out of a transaction entered into for personal, family, or household purposes; (3) the defendant is a debt collector under the act; and (4) “the defendant violated one of the provisions contained in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a–1692o.” ... Indeed, this Court is skeptical that the FDCPA even applies to Defendant, who provided and assumed servicing responsibilities to Plaintiffs’ loan prior to any default. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Obeng-Amponsah, 624 Fed. Appx. at 462.

Section 1692f(6) prohibits a debt collector from threatening nonjudicial foreclosure when it lacks a present right to possession of the property, which requires both an enforceable security interest and default.

James v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC · filed 2015-03-09(f)(6)

The trouble with this argument is that it ignores the statutory requirement of a “present right to possession of the property” by the debt collector threatening nonjudicial action. ... Thus, Nationstar is alleged to have threatened nonjudicial forfeiture of the Jameses’ home even though it had “no present right to possession of the property” because the Loan on which the security interest was predicated was not in default.

Section 1692f(6) reaches only nonjudicial action to take or disable collateral, not a notice of sale that is part of a judicial foreclosure proceeding.

Scott v. American Security Insurance Co. (In re Scott) · filed 2017-06-14(f)(6)

However, even if true, those allegations do not support the Debtor’s claim for relief under § 1692f(6) because the Notice of Sale is part of BNY’s judicial proceeding, not a non-judicial proceeding.

Section 1692c(c) bars a debt collector from communicating further about a debt after receiving written notice that the consumer wants communications to cease; the plaintiff must show communication after the notice.

Tremaine Pace v. Portfolio Recovery Associates · filed 2013-06-10(c)

Under § 1692c(c), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the debt collector "communicate[d] further with the consumer with respect to [the] debt" after the "consumer notifie[d] [the] debt collector in writing that the consumer . . . wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer."

An FDCPA action under § 1692k(d) accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the violation, and false representations under § 1692e and false-misrepresentation claims under § 1692f must be material.

Lembach v. Bierman · filed 2013-06-12(e), (f), (k)(d)

We see no reason not to apply the discovery rule to this case. ... We hold that the Lembachs’ filing was timely because they filed within one year of the time that they discovered (or could have discovered) the fraud. ... We are persuaded by the discussion in Warren and this Court’s further citation to Hahn, Donahue, and Miller, and this leads us to the conclusion that to plead a claim of false representation under the FDCPA, the party must show that the representations are material. ... Because the Lembachs’ claim undoubtedly rests on “false misrepresentations,” the Lembachs must, once again, show that this misrepresentation was material to support their § 1692f claim.

The FDCPA applies only to debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that consumer-debt status.

Hardy v. Joseph I. Sussman, P.C. · filed 2013-07-12a(5)

It concerns debt collection practices for “consumer debt[s],” and thus applies to debts that are primarily for “personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). ... the complaint fails to allege that the underlying debt transaction was a consumer debt primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. ... and her failure to meet her burden leads the Court to dismiss both claims.

Section 1692a(5) covers debts for goods or services used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, with that purpose determined case by case from the relevant facts.

Parkway Bank and Trust Company v. Korzen · filed 2014-02-11(a)(5)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to debt transactions where a consumer is obliged to pay money for something used “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006). Whether a debt is incurred “ ‘primarily for personal, family, or household purposes’ ” is a fact-driven one to be decided on a case-by-case basis looking at all relevant factors.

Section 1692a(5) covers obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and a complaint must plead facts—not merely recite that definition—to plausibly show that the obligation is covered.

Rosenberg v. McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc. · filed 2022-08-01(a)(5)

Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that his debt falls within the scope of the FDCPA’s protection. Plaintiff’s only allegations regarding the nature of the debt are that, “[u]pon information and belief, the original subject obligation arose out of a mobile telephone debt” and “[t]he subject debt was incurred by Plaintiff solely for personal, household or family purposes.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) These allegations do not provide the necessary factual support to sustain Plaintiff’s claims because they are mere conclusory statements that repeat the statutory definition of “debt” without pleading any facts from which the Court can ascertain or infer “the asserted basis for the obligation to pay.”

The FDCPA covers obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and a plaintiff claiming its protection must show that she is a consumer and that the obligation is a covered debt.

SANDERS v. CACH, LLC · filed 2023-02-15(a)(3), (a)(5)

The FDCPA defines “consumer” to mean “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). “Debt” in turn is defined to mean obligations “to pay money arising out of a transaction . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). ... Here, Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the debt was consumer debt. ... This evidence does not reveal the nature of Plaintiff’s transactions, nor does it demonstrate that Plaintiff’s obligation to pay arises from transactions that were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Section 1692a(5) limits FDCPA-covered debts to obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Martin v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2023-08-15(a)(5)

Mr. Martin simply alleges that he is obliged to pay a mortgage “which is a ‘debt’ as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).” (¶ 8.) This allegation is nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the FDCPA’s elements and is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss. ... Mr. Martin does not allege facts regarding how he used the borrowed funds for personal, family, or household purposes, as opposed to some other purpose.

Section 1692a(5) defines a debt as a monetary obligation incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

McAfee v. IC System, Inc. · filed 2025-02-07(a)(5)

Under the FDCPA, a “debt” is a monetary obligation incurred “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). To clear the Iqbal/Twombly threshold, then, McAfee needed to allege facts that allow the Court to reasonably infer that the money owed on the Verizon account was tied to a personal, family, or household purpose. But he did not.

Section 1692a(5) covers an obligation as a FDCPA debt only when it arises from a transaction involving money, property, insurance, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Zigman · filed 2026-02-25(a)(5)

Because this broad standard comports with the purpose of the FDCPA, I apply it here. ... Applying these principles here, Zigman has failed to show a genuine dispute of fact that he purchased the underlying building lots for a “personal, family, or household” purpose. ... However, it is not enough for Zigman to show that he is an unsophisticated purchaser without some material evidence tending to show that he purchased the property for a “primarily personal, family, or household” purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). After all, the statute defines a “debt” to require both a an “obligation . . . of a consumer” and that the subject of the transaction is “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id.

Section 1692f(6)(A) covers a debt collector’s taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess property when there is no present right to possess it through an enforceable security interest, and foreclosure-related acts may be actionable under that provision even when they are not debt-collection activities under § 1692e.

Doug Walker, App. v. Quality Loan Svc. Corp. Of Wa., Res. · filed 2013-08-05(f)(6)(A)

We join this trend in recognizing a claim under § 1692f, which is consistent with the statutory language. ... "Acts required to institute foreclosure proceedings, such as the recording of a notice of default, alone, are not debt collection activities for purposes of the FDCPA unless alleged in relation to a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)." Therefore, Walker's claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e fails. ... The trial court erred, however, by dismissing Walker's claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Because his arguments concern Quality's and Select's actions to enforce a security interest, these parties may constitute "debt collectors" within the statute's meaning. Assuming that Walker's allegations are true, neither Quality nor Select had a present right to possess the property through nonjudicial foreclosure because they never held the note or the underlying debt and were not lawfully appointed under the DTA. IfWalker is able to prove these underlying DTA violations, he may also be able to show that Quality and Select violated § 1692f(6) by threatening judicial foreclosure.

Section 1692a(6)'s enforcement-of-security-interests definition requires use of the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce specifically in enforcing the security interest, not merely in some aspect of the defendant's business.

Hunte v. Safeguard Properties Management, LLC · filed 2018-05-03(a)(6)

Those decisions offer the more persuasive view of § 1692a(6)’s “collection of any debts” prong. And because the pertinent language of the “enforcement of security interests” prong at issue here tracks nearly verbatim the parallel language in the “collection of any debts” prong, Hunte is mistaken in contending that the “enforcement of security interests” prong must be read to require only that Safeguard use an instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in some aspect of its business as opposed to specifically in its interactions with Hunte.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes a person engaged in nonjudicial foreclosure from the primary debt-collector definition when the person is enforcing security interests, while section 1692f(6) still applies to that activity.

Garland v. PC · filed 2020-05-19(a)(6), (f)(6)

This language indicates that enforcement of security interests need not be the only business of a party that is involved in the nonjudicial foreclosures, but instead simply a business of the party (as is the case with Orlans PC).

Section 1692f(6) prohibits a debt collector from taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess property when there is no present right or intention to possess it, or when the property is legally exempt.

Mason v. The Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2023-10-19(f)(6)

Here, the Complaint does not plausibly allege that BONY’s conduct is prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). Instead, the allegations show that BONY did intend to take possession of the Property by having its agent, the Mickel Law Firm, mail her the Notice of Foreclosure on December 9, 2022. (See Doc. No. 1-1 Ex. A). Because it intended to take possession of the Property, BONY’s “threatening phone calls and letters . . . suggesting that they may exercise their remedies under default in the mortgage agreement, including foreclosure”, (id. ¶ 23), are not prohibited by § 1692f(6). Therefore, Ms. Mason has not alleged that BONY violated any provision of the FDCPA to which it is subject, so this claim must fail.

The FDCPA generally does not apply to a business engaged only in enforcing a security interest through a nonjudicial foreclosure, except for § 1692f(6).

Dahar v. PennyMac Loan Services LLC · filed 2024-02-01(f)(6)

However, a business engaged in no more than the kind of security interest enforcement at issue in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings falls outside of the purview of the FDCPA, except for the limited purpose of §1692f(6).

The FDCPA does not treat entities engaged only in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings as debt collectors subject to liability under the statute.

Schneider v. Molina · filed 2023-01-26

Those who engage only in non-judicial foreclosure proceedings are not “debt collectors” as defined in the FDCPA. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus, LLP, 129 S.Ct. 1029, 1038 (2019). Here, although the complaint is difficult to parse, it appears that all of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing arise out of their alleged participation in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the Property. “[A]ctions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.” Ho, 858 F.3d at 572. Thus, because Defendants are not “debt collectors,” the complaint fails to state a claim under the FDCPA and this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1692f(6)(A) prohibits a nonjudicial repossession only when the debt collector lacks a present right to possess collateral under an enforceable security interest; a repossession company may be treated as a debt collector for this claim.

Marlon V. Johnson v. Capital One Auto Finance · filed 2025-10-30(f)(6)(A)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff failed to allege facts to suggest how Relentless Recovery violated any part of this statute. Taking property through a non-judicial action is only a violation of the statute if there is no present right to possession of the property used as collateral through an enforceable security interest. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). Plaintiff signed the financing agreement in which he agreed that the vehicle was collateral for the loan and that it could be repossessed if he defaulted on the loan. ... Plaintiff defaulted on the loan. Repossesing the vehicle did not violate the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) prohibit materially misrepresenting the amount of a debt and using an unfair or unconscionable means to collect an amount the debt collector is not entitled to impose.

McDonald v. Asset Acceptance LLC · filed 2013-08-07(e)(2)(A), (f)(1)

Here, Asset made false and misleading statements in its attempts to collect Plaintiffs’ debts when it unlawfully added interest to the accounts. Certainly, misrepresenting the total amount of the debt in a state court pleading is material, not merely a technicality. ... In sum, the facts underlying the conduct constituting the original creditors’ waiver of interest on the accounts are undisputed. This conduct unequivocally evidenced the intent to waive the right to impose interest on the accounts for legitimate business reasons (saving money by not having to send periodic statements, receiving tax deductions, etc.). Further, Asset purchased the debts subject to the waiver, thereby precluding Asset from imposing interest or revoking the original creditors’ waiver. As such, Asset’s false statements regarding the total amount of the debt in the collection actions constitutes violations of § 1692e(2)(A) and § 1692f(1).

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from implying that interest or charges may accrue on a debt when the debt agreement does not permit them.

DRIVER v. LJ ROSS ASSOCIATES, INC. · filed 2019-08-28(e)

By stating that the interest and charges stood at $0.00, the letter reasonably could be read to imply that such charges could begin to accrue in the future, if Driver did not pay the debt.

Section 1692c(a)(2) permits communication with a represented consumer about a debt when the consumer gave prior consent, while § 1692f(1) may be violated when collection conduct contravenes applicable state law.

Backlund v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A. · filed 2013-08-09(c)(2), (f)(1)

Section 1692c(a)(2) prohibits communication with a consumer “in connection with the collection of any debt ... if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt.” ... The Court finds that Eric Backlund consented to receive default notices in the stipulation agreement, thereby waiving his rights under the FDCPA. ... Section 1692f prohibits debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” ... A violation of “§ 1692f(l) can be premised on a violation either of a Minnesota statute or common law.”

The FDCPA applies only when the defendant is a debt collector, generally excluding creditors collecting their own accounts and assignees of debts that were not in default when assigned, and it protects a consumer who is obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt.

Coleman v. Indymac Venture LLC · filed 2013-08-20a(3), a(4), a(6), a(6)(F)(iii), g

To be held liable under the FDCPA, a defendant must be a “debt collector” within its meaning. Notably, the FDCPA distinguishes between the term “creditor” and “debt collector.” A creditor is “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to who a debt is owed”, while the term “debt collector” is defined as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4), (6). ... The term “debt collector” does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). ... Even if Indymac Venture is considered a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, Coleman is not a debtor/consumer under the Deed of Trust, and therefore he has no cognizable claim under the FDCPA. The FDCPA provides that Indy-mac Venture, upon being assigned the debt, must communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of a debt and send the consumer a written notice containing information about the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The FDCPA defines a consumer as “a person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

Section 1692(a)(6) defines “debt collector” to include persons who regularly collect debts owed another, but excludes debts that were not in default when obtained.

Ruffin v. Seterus Inc. · filed 2019-03-26(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)

Under the FDCPA, “debt collector” is defined as: [A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). This definition does not include any “debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)(F). Seterus contends that judgment in their favor is appropriate because Ruffin did not allege in her Complaint that her loan was in default when Seterus began servicing it. ... Given that Ruffin merely presents conclusions, this Court does not find that Ruffin has adequately pled any FDCPA violation.

Section 1692a(6) can cover a mortgage servicer that regularly collects debts for another, including one that treated a debt as in default when acquired even if it was not actually in default.

Zinetti v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2020-01-24(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)

A mortgage servicer that regularly collects debts for another may be considered a debt collector under the FDCPA. ... Ocwen argues that, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F), it is excluded from the definition of debt collector because Plaintiffs have taken the position that they were current at the time Ocwen took over servicing their loan in 2011—notwithstanding the fact that Ocwen sent letters in 2018 asserting that Plaintiffs owed thousands of dollars when Ocwen took over from SMS. I disagree to the extent Ocwen argues that it cannot be a debt collector under the FDCPA, and cannot therefore be liable for violations, in cases where the plaintiff disputes that the debt was owed in the first place. As other courts have concluded, Ocwen “cannot escape coverage under the [FDCPA] by asserting to the court that the debt was not actually in default, despite having dunned plaintiffs for months or years in the face of plaintiffs’ pleas or proof that the collector has made some error.” Bridge, 681 F.3d at 362-63 (holding that the definition of debt collector under the FDCPA includes those that have treated a debt as though it was in default at the time of acquisition, even if it was not in fact in default). The Complaint plausibly alleges that Ocwen is a debt collector.

Section 1692a defines debt to exclude commercial obligations and generally excludes creditors such as mortgage lenders from the term debt collector.

Weiser v. Castille · filed 2021-09-14(a)(5), (a)(6)

Mortgage lenders are not “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA. ... Thus, even when construing all facts in favor of plaintiff, she has not stated a claim that 21st Mortgage Corporation, or any defendant, is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA. ... Additionally, an obligation arising from a commercial transaction, as opposed to a transaction “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes” is not a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA. ... Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA because the debt incurred was in connection with a commercial transaction. Thus, plaintiff’s FDCPA claims must be dismissed.

Section 1692d(5) prohibits causing a telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass; allegations of 225 calls over 54 days can adequately plead such a claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Forrest v. Genpact Services, LLC · filed 2013-08-26(d)(5)

However, it cannot be inferred from the pleadings that Plaintiff never answered or responded to any of the alleged 225 calls. Reading the complaint in its entirety and making all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, including the allegation that Defendant called Plaintiff 225 times in a 54-day time-period, it is determined that the complaint adequately pleads a cause of action under the FDCPA. A summary dismissal on the pleadings would be inappropriate based on the facts alleged.

Sections 1692d, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(8), and 1692f/f(1) do not impose liability on these facts where the collector reported the debt as disputed and the plaintiff offered no authority or specific evidence showing harassing, false, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable conduct.

Hammoud v. Equifax Information Services, LLC · filed 2024-06-06

While the list above found in § 1692d is not exclusive, Hammoud has not offered any authority suggesting that JJMS’s actions violated § 1692d of the FDCPA. ... As to § 1692e(8), the record shows that JJMA reported the debt as disputed to Equifax and TransUnion. ... Similarly, Hammoud has not explained how any of JJMA’s communications fall within the scope of § 1692e(2)(A) and the court will not make Hammoud’s case for her. ... Even if Hammoud is correct on the law, she again has not met her burden on summary judgment to come forward with specific facts, supported by the evidence in the record, upon which a reasonable jury could find a genuine fact issue for trial. ... This is not sufficient and summary judgment in favor of JJMA is warranted on these claims.

Section 1692a(5) covers debt transactions in which a consumer is obliged to pay money for something used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Parkway Bank and Trust Company v. Korzen · filed 2013-09-23(a)(5)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to debt transactions where a consumer is obliged to pay money for something used “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”

Section 1692(e)'s consumer-protection purpose supports treating the FDCPA as a federal consumer-protection statute for purposes of Massachusetts Chapter 93A.

McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. · filed 2014-12-29(e)

The correctness of these holdings is confirmed by the text of the FDCPA itself, which sets forth one of its purposes as "to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). Thus, we agree the FDCPA is a consumer protection statute for the purposes of Chapter 93A.

Section 1692i(a)(2) is violated when a debt collector files a debt-collection suit in an improper venue and the alleged debtor is notified of the suit; filing alone does not complete the violation.

Serna v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka, e · filed 2013-10-07i(a)(2)

We conclude that a violation of § 1692i(a)(2) does not occur until the debt-collection suit is filed and the alleged debtor is notified of the suit.

The FDCPA gives consumers a substantive right to receive truthful, non-misleading communications from debt collectors, and violation of that right can constitute a concrete injury for Article III standing.

Taggatz v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2020-07-10

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established injury-in-fact because the FDCPA provides the right to receive truthful, non-misleading communications from a debt collector, and Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated that right, a practice clearly prohibited under the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the amount of a debt, while § 1692e(5) prohibits threatening action the collector cannot legally take or does not intend to take.

Kalebaugh v. Berman & Rabin, P.A. · filed 2014-08-28(2)(A), (5)

Thus, the Court concludes that defendant falsely represented the amount of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). ... Although defendant misstated the amount of the debt in the collection letters, defendant did not threaten any action that it legally could not take or that it did not intend to take. In fact, defendant took the threatened action by filing suit against plaintiff Kalebaugh and plaintiff Ray seeking recovery of the amount of the debt as well as attorney’s fees. ... Thus, the Court concludes defendant did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e bars materially false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection communications, judged from the perspective of an unsophisticated consumer.

Winiecki v. Creditors Interchange Receivable Management, LLC · filed 2014-01-27(e)

To state a claim under § 1692e, a plaintiff must show that the communication “would confuse the unsophisticated consumer.” ... In the Seventh Circuit, “the question of whether an unsophisticated consumer would find certain debt collection language misleading [is] a question of fact.”

Section 1692e prohibits materially false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, judged by their likely effect on the least sophisticated debtor; a consumer may sue even without receiving the communication.

Tourgeman v. Collins Financial Services · filed 2014-06-25(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (k)(a)

A debt collector who addresses a misleading dunning letter to a consumer as a means of collecting that consumer’s debt “use[s]” an unlawful practice “with respect to” the consumer, regardless of whether some interceding condition — such as non-receipt of the letter, or the consumer’s failure to read it, or the fact that the consumer is savvy enough not to be misled by it — renders the practice ineffective. ... We therefore hold that these letters contained materially misleading statements that trigger liability under section 1692e of the Act. Accordingly, the appellant is entitled to judgment on his claims against Paragon Way under subsections 1692e(2) and e(10).

Section 1692e(10) bars false or deceptive means in debt collection; a summons can state a claim when ambiguous validation language could mislead an unsophisticated consumer about who receives disputes or presumes the debt valid.

McWilliams v. Advanced Recovery Systems, Inc. · filed 2015-06-05(e)(10)

Count III is brought pursuant to that part of the FDCPA which prohibits “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). ... That said, the Court concludes that Count III adequately states a claim. ... Nothing explained who “spoke” which paragraph of the summons. That ambiguity could result in a significant misunderstanding. ... The same conclusion applies to the dispute over which actor would have presumed the uncontested debt to be valid. The summons does not say whether Young Wells Williams or the court would presume the uncontested debt to be valid. Given the layout of the summons, an unsophisticated consumer could think that the court would presume the debt to be valid. ... For these reasons, Count III adequately states a claim.

Section 1692(e) broadly bars false, deceptive, or misleading representations and collection means, and its listed examples do not exhaust the prohibition.

Avalos v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Avalos) · filed 2015-06-12(e)

The FDCPA prohibits by its own terms, “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The particular provisions in the various subsections cited are by their own terms examples of that prohibition.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Feldheim v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2017-06-29(e)

“The FDCPA creates a general prohibition against the use of ‘false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.’ ” ... “Courts “apply an objective test based on the understanding of the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ in determining whether a [communication] violates [§ ] 1692e.””

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect consumer debt; a claim requires collection activity involving consumer debt, a covered debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission.

Weiner v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC · filed 2018-08-15

To establish a valid claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [he] was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) defendants are debt collectors as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) defendants engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” ... A violation of the FDCPA occurs when a debt collector uses “any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using deceptive or misleading practices in connection with collecting a consumer debt.

Anderson v. Experian · filed 2019-11-26(e)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits deceptive and misleading practices by “debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Plaintiff fails to state facts suggesting a claim for relief under the FDCPA. ... But as one of the three credit reporting agencies, Experian is not normally identified as a debt collector. Based on the information provided, plaintiff fails to state an FDCPA claim against Experian. ... If in fact Plaintiff seeks to bring FDCPA claims against Experian, he must allege facts suggesting that Experian is a debt collector and it used deceptive and misleading practices in connection with collecting a debt.

Sections 1692(e)(2), (e)(10), and (f) prohibit false representations about a debt, deceptive collection methods, and unfair or unconscionable collection methods.

Gish v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. · filed 2019-12-04(e)(2), (e)(10), and (f)

The FDCA prohibits debts collectors from using any false, deceptive, or mispleading representations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(2) forbids the “false representation of—(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.” Section 1692(e)(10) proscribes the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” Section 1692(f) prohibits using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that RTR made any misrepresentations in connection with collecting a debt.

Sections 1692e and 1692g regulate debt-collection communications by prohibiting misleading representations and requiring the amount and other required information to be stated clearly; an itemized balance and a settlement deadline do not violate those provisions absent a misleading implication or proof of actual confusion where extrinsic evidence is required.

Nagan v. Optio Solutions LLC · filed 2020-08-27(e), (g)

The itemization of the debt contained in the letter was articulated in the same way it was received from the creditor. The letter is not false, deceptive, or misleading, as the only reasonable interpretation of the letter is that it states the itemized amount of the debt that was owed. ... In sum, the letter does not violate §§ 1692e or 1692g.

Sections 1692e, 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) prohibit materially false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations and threats of unlawful or unintended action, judged from the least sophisticated consumer’s perspective.

Mikhael v. Credit Corp Solutions Inc. · filed 2021-06-15(e), (e)(5), (e)(10)

The court holds that Plaintiff’s “information and belief,” even when accepted as true, does not lead to a conclusion that the Letter violates the FDCPA under sections 1692e, e(5), or e(10). ... Specifically, the court finds nothing in the complaint or the Letter itself that would “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference” that Defendant’s conduct in this case amounted to a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Finally, the court finds that nothing in the complaint or the plain language of the Letter allows the court reasonably to infer that Defendant’s conduct amounts to either a threat or an empty threat in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit false, deceptive, or misleading representations and unfair or unconscionable means used to collect a debt.

RENO v. NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC. · filed 2021-09-27(e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (f)

While this Court agrees that the Letter could have been drafted more clearly, the identification of Chase as the “Original Creditor” would not mislead the least sophisticated debtor unless he adopted an idiosyncratic interpretation. ... Because the identification of Chase as the “Original Creditor” would not mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing that Chase had sold the debt to an unnamed party, this Court will grant Defendant’s motion on this basis.

The FDCPA prohibits unlawful debt-collection practices, but an unresolved legal dispute about whether an underlying debt is owed, without more, does not state a claim.

Mohnkern v. Equifax Information Services, LLC · filed 2021-11-10(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f)(1)

Here, plaintiffs’ claimed status as “non-debtors” is based entirely on their conclusory belief that they do not owe the Debt under Georgia contract law, which, as explained above, is an unresolved legal dispute. Without more, these allegations, even at this stage of the case, are insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations; sending a letter to collect a stale debt is not by itself a violation, while paying money based on misrepresentations is concrete harm sufficient for standing.

DIXON v. JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS, LLC · filed 2021-12-14(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5)

The FDCPA provides that "[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... A debt collection letter that provides an unambiguous warning regarding the statute of limitations does not violate the FDCPA. ... This asserted harm is sufficient to establish his standing to pursue an FDCPA claim.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations and unfair practices to collect consumer debts; truthful and accurate mortgage statements do not violate them.

Poynter v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC · filed 2022-03-15(e), (f)

The FDCPA prohibits “debt collectors” from collecting on a debt by using false, deceptive, or misleading statements, § 1692e, or otherwise unfair practices, §1692f. ... Defendant has demonstrated that the September 2019 statement it sent Plaintiff was truthful and accurate, and Plaintiff has failed to establish any genuine dispute of material fact on that count. Accordingly, Defendants’ mortgage statements did not violate the FDCPA.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with collecting a debt.

LEZARK v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC. · filed 2022-03-29(e)

In sum, then, the Court finds that the 540 Letter is not “false, deceptive, or misleading” within the meaning of § 1692e of the FDCPA, and Mr. Lezark’s claim will be dismissed.

The FDCPA prohibits false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable collection methods and requires debt-validation notices to be effectively conveyed without being overshadowed; multiple addresses alone do not violate those provisions when the communication is not misleading or overshadowing.

Chaga v. Simon's Agency Inc. · filed 2023-02-23(e), (e)(10), (f), (g)

The Simon’s debt collection letter did not use deceptive means to collect Mr. Chaga’s debt. It is reasonable that the least sophisticated debtor would have seen, from the numerosity and placement of the addresses, that the appropriate address for correspondence would be the remittance address. The remittance address is used twice; the headquarters address is used once. The remittance address is the only address that appears on the detachable coupon of the debt collection letter. ... Mr. Chaga has failed to offer evidence that the debt collection letter contained “inaccuracies” stemming from the inclusion of two different addresses, so the letter was not deceptive or misleading and therefore did not violate §§ 1692¢ or 1692e(10). ... Here, even though the debt collection letter contained two addresses and did not expressly state where written disputes should be sent for processing, there was no overshadowing of the validation notice. The letter contained language that effectively conveyed all the information required by § 1692g(a), and Mr. Chaga does not suggest otherwise, While the letter included both a Syracuse remittance and a Liverpool headquarters address, that fact alone does not mean that the validation notice was overshadowed. ... There is no violation of § 1692g here.

The FDCPA prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, including undisclosed reporting of a disputed debt, and caps additional damages in an individual action at $1,000 based on the nature, frequency, and intentionality of noncompliance.

Stephenson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2023-03-17(e), (e)(2)(a), (e)(8), (e)(10), (f)(1), (k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)(1)

Sections 1692e and 1692e(10) prohibit the use of any false, deceptive, and misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt. ... Stephenson alleges that Mountain Run, Carter, and Fuller violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) by communicating credit information which they knew, or should have known, to be false when Mountain Run reported information to Experian about a debt which Mountain Run knew, or had reason to know, was not owed by Stephenson and in communicating credit information which they knew was disputed, without disclosure of dispute, in their reports to Experian. ... Stephenson’s well-pleaded allegations establish the FDCPA violations, and by their defaults, Mountain Run and Fuller admit these allegations as true. ... Under the FDCPA, a debt collector that fails to comply with any provision of the FDCPA is liable, “in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). In determining statutory damages under § 1692k(a)(2)(A), a court must consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). The Court finds the well-pleaded allegations support that Defendants’ actions were intentional and Plaintiff is entitled to the maximum statutory damages of $1,000.

A plaintiff must plead facts showing that a debt collector used a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or an unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt to state a claim under §§ 1692e or 1692f.

Washington v. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing · filed 2025-12-02(e), (f)

“The FDCPA forbids debt collectors from using ‘any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,’ and § 1692e provides a non-exhaustive list of false, deceptive, or misleading activity.” ... However, Washington does not “provide well-plead factual allegations that [Newrez] took any action that constitutes a false, deceptive, or misleading representation.” ... This is insufficient. As a result, the Court should dismiss his claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). ... “Section 1692f prohibits debt collectors from using ‘unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debts.’ The statute does not define ‘unfair or unconscionable,’ but it does provide a non-exhaustive list of conduct that violates the section.” ... However, other than this conclusory allegation, Washington provides no factual support for his claim. He does not state unfair or unconscionable means Newrez took when collecting his debt. Nor does he identify violative conduct from the non-exhaustive list that the statute provides. Washington does not allege any “specific conduct . . . to support [a] claim under this section.” ... As a result, dismissal of his claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) is appropriate.

Section 1692e(11) exempts a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action from the required debt-collector disclosures.

White v. Sherman Financial Group, LLC · filed 2013-11-04(e)(11)

Defendants thus argue that the civil warrant and attached sworn affidavit fall under the “formal pleading” exception set forth in § 1692e(ll), and the Court agrees.

Section 1692f(8) bars a debt collector from displaying a consumer’s identifying information, including an account number, on an envelope, including through a transparent window.

Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing · filed 2014-10-10(f)(8)

Construing § 1692f(8) in accord with the FDCPA’s purposes in § 1692(a), we find the statute not only proscribes potentially harassing and embarrassing language, but also protects consumers’ identifying information. Accordingly, Douglass’s account number is impermissible language or symbols under § 1692f(8).

Section 1692f(8) prohibits a debt collector from displaying language or symbols other than limited exceptions on an envelope mailed to a consumer; a QR code revealing identifying information is impermissible.

Styer v. Professional Medical Management, Inc. · filed 2015-07-15(f)(8)

Thus, it is determined that the QR code is an impermissible symbol under section 1692f(8) because it discloses a consumer’s identifying information to the public.

Section 1692f(8) bars debt collectors from putting language or symbols on envelopes, except delivery-related markings, the collector's address, and a qualifying business name, and it has no benign-language exception.

Donovan v. FirstCredit, Inc. · filed 2020-12-18(8)

For the reasons that follow, we hold that Donovan has stated a claim for relief under § 1692f(8), the plain text of which forecloses a “benign language” exception.

Section 1692e(11) requires a debt collector, in communications with a consumer after the first communication, to disclose that the communication is from a debt collector.

Chatman v. GC Services, LP · filed 2014-11-06(e)(11)

In sum, the court rejects GC’s arguments that the messages left on Chatman’s voicemail were not communications under the FDCPA. It follows that Chatman is entitled to summary judgment on liability on her claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(ll), because the messages did not indicate that the caller was a debt collector.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) excludes a person from the debt-collector definition when the debt was not in default when that person obtained it.

Palacio v. Medical Financial Solutions · filed 2022-06-14(a)(6)(F)(iii)

An overdue payment is not necessarily a debt in default. ... Plaintiff's debt was not in default when defendant acquired it, and under the Act, that is enough to conclude that defendant was not acting as a debt collector in relation to plaintiff.

The FDCPA's debt-collector definition excludes a person collecting a debt that was not in default when acquired; the exception did not apply where the loan was allegedly already in default at transfer.

Alhassid v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2014-11-17(a)(6)(F)(iii)

For FDCPA purposes, a “debt collector” is defined to mean a person who regularly collects debts owed to another person. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). But, a “debt collector” does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). The FDCPA thus provides an exception for loan services that acquire loans that are not in default at the time of acquisition. ... However, Alhassid alleges that her reverse mortgage was placed in default by Bank of America before it was transferred to Nationstar. Nationstar insists, somewhat cynically, that because Al-hassid alleges that the placement of her loan in default was improper, she cannot maintain that Nationstar acquired her loan already in default. Nationstar misses the point. Plaintiffs allege that Alhassid’s loan should not have been placed in default, but that it was, and was treated as such by Bank of America and then by Nationstar. From Nationstar’s perspective under the facts as alleged, it acquired Alhassid’s loan already in default. The FDCPA exception is therefore inapplicable, and Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss Alhassid’s FDCPA claim is denied.

The FDCPA's debt-collector exemption for a debt not in default when obtained is applied using an objective, contextual balancing of the debt's status, rather than the creditor's subjective view alone.

Mavris v. RSI Enterprises Inc. · filed 2015-02-19(a)(6)(F)(iii)

But the statute remains unchanged, and until Congress amends the FDCPA, the Slenk-like balancing analysis appears to be the most prudent way of determining whether a debt is in default.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) excludes a person from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” when the debt was not in default when that person obtained it; the relevant status is assessed when servicing began.

Gentleman v. Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corp. · filed 2017-09-21(a)(6)(F)(iii)

For purposes of § 1692a(6)(F)(iii), however, the relevant question is the loan’s status when ACS began servicing the loan.

Section 1692e(10) prohibits deceptive debt-collection communications; a letter offering to settle a time-barred debt is deceptive when it does not disclose that the debt is unenforceable and that partial payment may revive the limitations period.

Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2015-01-14(e)(10)

Count I alleges that the letter is a “deceptive communication” prohibited by the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). ... The letter is deceptive because it does not tell the consumer that the debt is time-barred and defendant cannot sue plaintiff to collect it, rather, it implies that defendant has chosen not to sue. Nor does it tell plaintiff that the effect of making (or agreeing to make) a partial payment on a time-barred debt is to revive the statute of limitations for enforcing that debt. ... Offering to settle a legally unenforceable debt violates the statute.

Section 1692e(10) prohibits false representations or deceptive means in debt collection without requiring the violation to be knowing or intentional.

Hooper v. Midland Funding LLC · filed 2021-07-30(e)(10)

Contrary to Midland’s suggestion, therefore, Rodrigo does not stand for the proposition that filing the allegedly falsified service return form violated § 1692e(10) only if Midland did so purposefully in bad faith.

Section 1692e(10) does not support a claim based on requesting a credit report without facts showing that the request used false representation or deceptive means.

Miller v. First Bank · filed 2022-03-02(e)(10)

Miller’s attached Experian credit reports show two “hard inquiries” from First Bank, which Miller alleges are in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (10). ... Miller has provided no factual basis to show that obtaining the credit report was done so with “false representation or deceptive means” as alleged.

Section 1692g requires a validation notice after an initial communication connected to debt collection, while § 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection.

Clark v. Green Tree Servicing LLC · filed 2014-09-24(a)(6), (e), (g)

Thus, the October 1, 2012 letter was not subject to the requirements of § 1692g and cannot support plaintiffs FDCPA claim. ... As a result, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that defendant acquired her loan when it was in default and thus qualifies as a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e survives.

Section 1692a(6) requires the defendant to qualify as a debt collector, and a law firm’s statutorily required foreclosure notice, without a demand for payment, is not enough to establish debt-collection conduct.

Saint Vil v. Perimeter Mortgage Funding Corporation · filed 2015-10-30(a)(6)

The question in deciding whether a law firm acted as a debt collector is not simply what the firm called itself but rather whether the firm acted as a debt collector as that term is defined by the statute. Although the way the firm described itself can be one factor in deciding whether the statute’s definition applies, it does not end the inquiry. ... But sending just the statutorily required notice of foreclosure was not enough.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating false credit information, including by failing to disclose that a debt is disputed.

Plummer v. Atlantic Credit & Finance, Inc. · filed 2014-12-08(e)(8)

Indeed, Section 1692e(8) expressly prohibits “[e]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.”

Section 1692g(a) requires a collection letter to disclose the consumer’s 30-day period for disputing the debt and requesting verification or the original creditor’s name and address.

Jones v. Law Office of David Sean Dufek, & Cach, LLC · filed 2015-01-06(g)(a)

Furthermore, the only time period referenced in the letter is 30 days from the date of receipt of the letter, and that disclosure is expressly mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). The references to 30 days in the letter are limited to the following notices required by the FDCPA: (1) when the debt will be assumed valid, (2) when an offer to provide verification if requested, and (3) when an offer to provide the name and address of the original creditor must be provided.

The FDCPA’s use of “person” includes artificial entities as well as natural persons.

Anarion Investments LLC v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC · filed 2015-07-23

In summary, the usual rule from the Dictionary Act applies here: the term “person” as used in the FDCPA includes both artificial entities and natural persons alike.

Sections 1692e and 1692g prohibit deceptive debt-collection communications and communications that overshadow or conflict with a consumer’s validation rights, evaluated from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer and in light of the letter as a whole.

Berkseth v. Continental Central Credit, Inc. · filed 2015-08-12(e)(10), (e)(13), (g)(a)-(b)

Where a communication has more than one reasonable meanings, at least one of which is misleading to the least sophisticated consumer, then it violates the FDCPA. ... However, when read as a whole, the document shows itself to be a communication about a debt, not a legal action. While a debt collection letter shares some trappings with legal process, as any communication regarding a debt owed likely would, that is not enough to be misleading to even the least sophisticated consumer. ... where the validation notice is the same size, font, and color type-face as the other paragraphs, the Plaintiffs must point to some structural or formatting element of the collection letter that overshadows the disclosure of Plaintiffs’ rights. ... Plaintiffs’ argument that the Collection Letter has the auspices of a legal or governmental proceeding has already been discounted— it was not enough to mislead, is it not enough to overshadow.

The FDCPA prohibits deceptive debt-collection communications and requires validation notices to state specified rights clearly without being overshadowed or contradicted.

Musarra v. Balanced Healthcare Receivables, LLC · filed 2020-03-11(e)(10), (g)

The cumulative effects of the three total addresses, the crowded and confusing coupon with two addresses for the defendant as well as the consumer’s address, and the lack of clarifying instructions, make this a case where the inclusion of multiple addresses does invite confusion, and the plaintiffs state a plausible claim under the FDCPA. ... Specifically, there is no affirmative misdirection in the collection letter here. ... None of the disclosures on the reverse side in any way contradict the enumerated validation rights. The collection letter does not misdirect the LSC away from his validation notice.

Section 1692k(d) places civil-remedy jurisdiction for FDCPA claims in federal district courts, so the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over those claims.

Powers v. United States · filed 2015-08-18(k)(d)

Because jurisdiction to hear claims founded upon the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCP A) rests with district courts, this court cannot hear them. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (providing for civil remedies under the FDCPA in federal district court); ... Accordingly, plaintiffs FDCPA claims must be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from misleading consumers about whether a time-barred debt is legally enforceable; threatening or filing suit is not required.

Carter v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc. · filed 2015-09-11(e)(2)(A)

The Court finds that a debt collector’s misrepresentation as to its right to sue on a debt is itself sufficient to violate § 1692; the statute imposes no additional requirement that the' debt collector actually threaten to sue.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits an individual to recover actual damages plus up to $1,000 in statutory damages, while § 1692k(a)(2)(B) caps class-action statutory damages at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the debt collector's net worth, allocated pro rata among class members.

Tripp v. Berman & Rabin, P.A. · filed 2015-09-29(k)(2)(A), (k)(2)(B)

The FDCPA permits individuals to recover their actual damages in addition to statutory damages of up to $1,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). But in class actions, the FDCPA limits damages to class members’ actual damages and their pro rata share of “the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B).

Section 1692k(a) limits an individual FDCPA plaintiff’s recovery to actual damages, additional damages up to $1,000, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Malone v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2015-08-06(a)

The potential recovery of an individual plaintiff suing for a violation of the FDCPA is limited to “actual damages”; “such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1000”; and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 1692k(a) permits recovery of actual damages in addition to additional damages subject to the statutory cap based on the debt collector's net worth.

Lewis v. EQUITYEXPERTS.ORG, LLC · filed 2025-01-06(a)

Second, statutory damages are not the only damages available for a violation of the FDCPA: A plaintiff may recover “any actual damage sustained” as well as “such additional damages as the court may allow” subject to the statutory cap based upon net worth. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).

Section 1692c(c) does not require a debt collector to inform a consumer that the consumer may request that the collector cease further contact.

Szczurek v. Professional Management Inc · filed 2015-10-01(c)

Furthermore, PMM has no obligation under the FDCPA to inform a consumer that he may ask PMM to cease further contact under Section 1692c(c).

Section 1692 states Congress’s findings and purposes for the FDCPA but does not itself provide a basis for liability.

Berger v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis, L.P.A. · filed 2021-10-05

Plaintiff also cites to § 1692 as a basis for liability, but § 1692 does not itself delineate bases for bringing an FDCPA action and instead defines “Congressional findings and declaration of purpose.”

Section 1692(c) states a congressional finding about available debt collection methods and does not create a cause of action.

Fox v. DriveTime Automotive Group Incorporated · filed 2025-07-16(c)

Moreover, the FDCPA provision Plaintiff cites, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c), a subsection of the Act’s Congressional findings and declaration of purpose titled “Available non-abusive ... collection methods,” states in full: “Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.” Clearly, this ... provision of the Act does not create a cause of action.

Section 1692 states Congress's findings and the FDCPA's purpose but does not itself provide a cause of action.

Rivera v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC · filed 2015-11-05

He alleges that “Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692” in several ways, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46, 50–51, but that particular provision is the FDCPA’s statement of Congressional findings and declaration of purpose, and it does not provide for a cause of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692.

Section 1692(a) does not provide a cause of action for abusive debt collection practices.

Smith v. 4037 Lamplighter Dr LLC · filed 2025-01-24(a)

The Court, therefore, must dismiss the claims based on either § 1692a or § 1692(a) because they fail to state a cause of action.

Section 1692f(8) prohibits a debt collector from displaying any language or symbol, including a bar code, on an envelope sent to a consumer to collect a debt, including through a transparent window, unless an applicable statutory exception applies.

Palmer v. Credit Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2015-12-22(f)(8)

As always, we must begin with the relevant language of the FDCPA. As noted above, § 1692f(8), with certain exceptions not relevant here, forbids the debt collector from “[ujsing any language or symbol” on the envelope sent to a consumer to collect a debt. The bar code, of course, is a symbol. Thus, it is undeniable that § 1692f(8) forbids the appearance of the bar code through the transparent window of the envelope sent to the debtor. We must apply the statute as written unless, as our Court of Appeals directs, the result would be absurd.

Sections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(5) prohibit false or misleading representations and threats of action that cannot legally be taken, while § 1692f(1) prohibits attempting to collect an amount not authorized by the agreement or law.

Stanley v. Kansas Counselors of Kansas City · filed 2016-01-21(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (f)(1)

Other than Stanley’s own conclusory and self-serving allegations that she did not owe the amount that Kansas Counselors was attempting to collect, there is no evidence that Kansas Counselors used any false, deceptive, or misleading representation about the amount of the debt, threatened to take illegal action, or attempted to collect any amount that was not authorized. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), 1692(f)(1). Accordingly, summary judgment was proper as to Stanley’s §§ 1692e(2), 1692e(5), and 1692f(1) claims.

Section 1692e prohibits materially false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, § 1692f(1) bars collecting amounts not authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law and limits collection costs to actual costs for services performed, and § 1692k(c) does not protect legal errors.

Truhn v. EquityExperts.Org, LLC · filed 2019-11-20(e), (f)(1), (k)(c)

The FDCPA states that a “debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” and provides a range of examples of prohibited conduct. ... Both sentences violate § 1692e. ... The least sophisticated consumer would more than likely have read the letter to mean that the lien had been mailed directly to the recording office. ... This misrepresentation is material because it would tend to give the consumer the false impression that time was of the essence and that severe consequences could ensue without immediate action. This is precisely the sort of pressure tactic the FDCPA prohibits, even in connection to the collection of a legitimate debt. ... The Truhns allege a single violation of § 1692f, which prohibits “[t]he collection of any amount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” ... Thus, The Truhns are correct that Equity Experts may not charge for not-yet-performed services, and Equity Experts is incorrect that recovery may exceed actual costs. ... The bona fide error defense protects against liability for clerical and factual errors, not for legal errors.

Sections 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) prohibit, respectively, false threats of unlawful or unintended action and false or deceptive representations in debt collection, evaluated from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Chadwick v. Bonneville Billing and Collections · filed 2021-03-25(e)(5), (e)(10)

No one, not even the least sophisticated consumer, could reasonably read this letter as threatening to continue collection measures after the recipient paid the debt or requested cessation of collection activities. ... Chadwick fails to state a claim under §1692e(5). ... The statement about continuing collections activities if the recipient fails to come to the office or call obviously means only that Bonneville intends to continue collection efforts until the recipient pays. ... Certainly a recipient might have unanswered questions about his or her options upon receipt of the letter—“Are there other methods to pay the debt or stop collections activities?”—but this does not render the letter false or deceptive. ... Chadwick fails to state a claim under § 1692e(10).

Section 1692e(5) and (e)(10) apply only to communications sent in connection with the collection of a debt.

Carlvin v. Ditech Financial LLC · filed 2017-02-16(e)(5), (e)(10)

These subsections only apply to communications sent in “in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

To state claims under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the challenged communication was made in connection with the collection of a debt; § 1692d(6) also requires facts indicating calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity, § 1692e requires facts about a false, deceptive, or misleading representation, and § 1692f requires facts showing a prohibited activity.

Mohammad v. Johnson-Seck · filed 2018-03-12(d), (e), and (f), including (d)(6)

The Court agrees that Mohammad has failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that Defendants were contacting him in connection with collection of a debt, as is required by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d; 1692e; and 1692f. ... “A communication is made in connection with the collection of a debt” if “the unsophisticated consumer recognizes [the communication] as such.” ... Given the above, and even construing the complaint liberally in Mohammad’s favor, the Court cannot conclude, without some further factual support in his complaint, that Mohammad has plausibly alleged that Defendants contacted him in connection with the collection of a debt within the meaning of the statute. As this is a threshold requirement for each of Mohammad’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692, see Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2010), Defendants’ motion to dismiss each of the FDCPA claims is granted. ... What is more, Mohammad’s claims under §§ 1692(d)(6), 1692e, and 1692f fail for additional reasons. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) prohibits “the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” ... This is insufficient to state a claim under that provision. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from “using a false deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... Therefore, he fails to state a claim under § 1692e for this additional reason. ... Finally, Mohammad does not allege that Defendants have engaged in any of the numerous activities prohibited by § 1692f. And so Mohammad’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim under this provision on this basis as well.

The FDCPA covers a debt collector’s communication when, considering its context and purpose, it is made in connection with collecting a debt, even without an express demand for payment.

Byrge v. Halsey · filed 2019-06-12

However, these restrictions only apply to communications made “in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692e, 1692g. “Neither [the Seventh Circuit] nor any other has established a bright-line rule for determining whether a communication from a debt collector was made in connection with the collection of any debt.” Gburek, 614 F.3d at 384. The Court does look to several factors to determine whether the communication falls within the ambit of the FDCPA, including the relationship of the parties, the purpose and context of the communication, and whether there was a demand for payment or an effort to induce the debtor to settle his or her debt. Id. at 384–86. The Defendants argue that the October 6, 2017 letter is not a communication made “in connection with the collection of any debt” under the FDCPA because it does not include a demand for payment and is merely a response to a communication initiated by the Plaintiffs. However, this argument fails to appreciate the entire context in which the communication took place. The letter was one installment in the greater dispute over the amount the Plaintiffs owed on their loan. It contained objections to the Plaintiffs’ evidence of prior payments and made accusations of the Plaintiffs’ “obdurate obstruction.” Moreover, the conversation took place between two parties with solely a debtor-debt collector relationship. The Court would be hard pressed to find that, in this context, the correspondence was not made “in connection with the collection of any debt.” Therefore, the Court rejects the Defendants’ position and holds that the October 6, 2017 letter is a communication under the FDCPA.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with collecting a debt, and a communication is connected to collection when an animating purpose is to induce payment.

Carter v. Richland Holdings, Inc. · filed 2019-09-30(e)

While neither the FDCPA nor the Ninth Circuit have defined the phrase, “in connection with the collection of any debt,” a generally accepted definition derived from other Circuit Court of Appeals is that “for communication to be in connection with the collection of a debt, an animating purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by the debtor.” Grden v. Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169, 173 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 385–86 (7th Cir. 2010). ... The Court agrees with AcctCorp that Plaintiffs have not shown that any reporting made after December 23, 2015 was made in connection with the collection of a debt.

The FDCPA's protections apply only to communications that an objective consumer could reasonably interpret as being sent in connection with collecting a debt.

Collazo v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. · filed 2020-03-11

Plaintiff alleges several claims pursuant to the FDCPA. However, the FDCPA’s protections are triggered only when the communications at issue are “in connection with the collection of [a] debt.”

The FDCPA does not apply to a communication that is not made in connection with the collection of a debt.

Mohr v. Newrez LLC · filed 2020-03-25

This court concludes that the three letters defendant sent plaintiff, informing plaintiff that hazard insurance was required on his property, demanding proof of insurance, and informing him that defendant would purchase hazard insurance for the property on his behalf and ultimately at his expense, were not communications ‘in connection with’ the collection of any debt, and therefore do fall not within the ambit of the FDCPA.

Whether a communication is made in connection with the collection of a debt under the FDCPA requires consideration of the parties' entire factual context.

Timberlake v. Robertson, Anschutz, Schneid, P.L. · filed 2020-04-28(c)

Determination of whether the communications at issue here were made “in connection with the collection of any debt” for purposes of the FDCPA requires consideration of the entire factual context of the parties’ interactions. This argument, which might be successful once the facts are established, does not serve as a basis to dismiss the amended complaint at this stage of the proceedings.

Sections 1692e and 1692f permit FDCPA claims based on efforts to collect debts that are unenforceable under state law, while § 1692c(b) reaches only third-party communications that make an express or implied demand for payment and warn of additional fees or actions; communications to a collection agency that merely facilitate collection do not qualify.

Dunn v. Global Trust Management, LLC · filed 2020-12-10(c)(b), (e), (f)

Because Florida law applies to the accounts, Plaintiffs state valid causes of action under the FDCPA (§ 1692e and § 1692f) and FCCPA. Their debts resulted from usurious contracts, rendering the debts unenforceable. ... Efforts to collect debts unenforceable under state law can be the basis for an FDCPA or FCCPA action. ... To state an FDCPA claim under this provision, a debt collector must make a communication to a third party in connection with the collection of the debt. ... In the Eleventh Circuit, courts read communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” to mean a statement that makes an express or implied demand for payment and warns of additional fees or actions if payment is not tendered. ... Here, the communications to the collection agencies made no demand for payment. ... Section 1692c(b) punishes only the latter, which does not include communications to a third-party collection agency. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ § 1692c(b) claims alleged in Count I fail.

The FDCPA covers communications about a debt that are aimed at least in part at inducing the debtor to pay, including communications serving both informational and collection purposes.

BOGATSCHOW v. CF MEDICAL LLC · filed 2021-11-18

As a threshold, the FDCPA only applies to communications that convey information about a debt and are aimed at least in part at inducing a debtor to pay. Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299, 1302 (2014). ... Thus, because the letter says that it is an attempt to collect a debt, lists the amount owed, names Bogatschow as the party responsible for the amount owed, and was sent from a law office tasked with collecting the debt, the Court cannot rule as a matter of law that the February 20 letter was not a communication sent in connection with the collection of a debt.

A monthly mortgage statement required by the TILA can plausibly be covered by the FDCPA when it includes debt-collection language, requests payment by a date with a late fee, and the parties’ history suggests an attempt to collect a disputed debt.

Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2022-05-24

We hold, consistent with our decisions in Reese and Caceres, that monthly mortgage statements required by the TILA and its regulations can plausibly constitute communications in “connection with the collection of a[ ] debt” under the FDCPA and in connection with “collecting [a] . . . debt” under the FCCPA if (a) they contain “this is an attempt to collect a debt” language, (b) they request or demand payment of a certain amount by a certain date, (c) they provide for a late fee if the payment is not made on time, and (d) the history between the parties suggests that the statement is an attempt to collect on a disputed debt.

Section 1692's protections apply only to communications objectively made in connection with collecting a debt; a communication that merely requests information without seeking or inducing payment falls outside the FDCPA.

Ostojich v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2022-08-01

Applying the Gburek factors to the letter at issue here, this Court concludes that the amended complaint does not plausibly allege that the debt collector sent the letter in connection with the collection of a debt. ... But under current case law, taking a step in the direction of collecting a loan is not enough. Letters that merely inform debtors of the status of their accounts – without nudging them to pay up – are not communications “in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... So this letter is not a communication in connection with collecting a debt, either. It “demand[ed] nothing,” implied nothing, and didn’t contain any warnings about a failure to pay. See Bailey, 154 F.3d at 388. ... Instead, it merely offered condolences and requested information. ... The communication itself must attempt to collect the debt, someway somehow. ... As a result, the FDCPA does not apply.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits communicating known or knowable false credit information, including failing to identify a disputed debt, but the FDCPA applies only when the communication is connected to debt collection.

Hart v. Equifax Information Services LLC · filed 2022-09-30(e)(8)

Here, the record shows that Defendant communicated information about Plaintiff’s debt to credit reporting agencies in 2017 and 2018. ... However, even if this information was false or inaccurate, there is no evidence whatsoever that it was communicated in connection with the collection of a debt. ... The primary purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” ... The language of the FDCPA makes crystal clear that its rules relate to the “collection of a debt.” ... But absent an effort to collect a debt, the FDCPA does not apply. ... Because the undisputed facts show that Defendant’s actions in 2017 and 2018 did not occur in connection with the collection of a debt, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed.

The FDCPA's protections apply only to a communication made in connection with debt collection, which requires an animating purpose to induce payment.

Velez v. Absolute Resolutions Investments LLC · filed 2022-10-31(c)(a)(2)

The FDCPA “does not apply to every communication between a debt collector and a debtor.” ... Instead, the Court must engage in a “commonsense inquiry,” considering whether the communication includes a demand for payment, the purpose and context of the communication, and the nature of the parties’ relationship. ... An animating purpose of the communication must be to induce payment. ... Here, applying the Gburek factors, the Court cannot find that the ARC letter amounted to a communication in connection with the collection of a debt. ... ARC’s June 2021 letter does not include a demand for payment, and nothing suggests that the animating purpose of the letter was to induce payment. ... Taking all these factors into consideration, the Court concludes that ARC did not send the June 17, 2021, letter in connection with the collection of a debt such that the FDCPA would apply.

The FDCPA does not cover debt-collection communications made exclusively to a consumer’s attorney.

White v. Fein, Such and Crane, LLP · filed 2023-02-03

Given Gabriele, the Kropelnicki dicta, and other district courts’ analyses of the issue, the weight of the authority in this Circuit suggests that communications with attorneys are not covered by the FDCPA. The FDCPA claims here are based exclusively on communications with attorneys, see Docket Item 83 ¶¶ 36, 100, 136, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment for that reason alone.