15 U.S.C. § 1692

The FDCPA applies to a communication only when a consumer could reasonably understand it as connected with the collection of a debt; a debt-collector disclaimer alone does not establish that connection.

Garrasi v. Selene Finance, LP · filed 2024-04-16

The Court finds that, even under the least sophisticated consumer standard, Plaintiff has not “plausibly alleged that a consumer receiving the communication could reasonably interpret it as being sent ‘in connection with the collection of a debt.’”

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating credit information known or reasonably known to be false, including failing to report that a debt is disputed, when the communication is made in connection with collecting the debt.

Mims v. LVNV, LLC · filed 2025-03-07(e)(8)

As indicated, Ms. Mims alleges that LVNV violated § 1692e(8) of the statute. Section 1692e(8) provides that, “in connection with the collection of any debt[,]” a debt collector may not “[c]ommunicat[e] or threaten[] to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). ... The plain language of § 1692e indicates that its prohibitions apply to debtor collectors’ actions “in connection with the collection of any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... “[F]or a communication to be in connection with the collection of a debt, an animating purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by the debtor.” Grden, 643 at 173 (citing Gburek, 614 F.3d at 385). ... LVNV’s “dispute” notation on Ms. Mims’ credit report is not a demand for payment. It raises a question regarding the balance due, rather than stating that one in fact is owed. Such a notation would not constitute a “strategy to make payment more likely.” Goodson, 600 F. App’x at 431. In fact, it likely would have the opposite effect. It does not express an attempt to collect a debt, nor does it threaten consequences for the failure to pay. Finally, it was not a direct communication between LVNV and Ms. Mims that might induce her to pay the debt; instead, it was merely an updated remark under the account details of her credit report. For these reasons, the Court finds that the “dispute” notation does not amount to a false statement in connection with the collection of a debt.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take legally unavailable action, including litigation to collect a time-barred debt.

Pirera v. Sullivan Kline Group, LLC, The · filed 2019-09-05(e)(5)

Accordingly, courts permit debt collectors to send collection letters for time-barred debt where the letters do not threaten collection action; however, if there is a threat of litigation or other remedy that the debt collector could not legally pursue, the FDCPA is violated. ... Here, defendant’s letter contained a threat of litigation, informing plaintiff that “a recommendation to file a lawsuit to collect this debt is being processed.” ... Thus, defendant’s letter violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).

Section 1692f(8) prohibits a debt collector from placing any language or symbol other than its address on an envelope mailed to a consumer, including an alphanumeric portion of an account number visible through the envelope window.

Dorman v. Computer Credit, Inc. · filed 2015-12-21(f)(8)

In pertinent part,. § 1692f(8) prohibits the use of “any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails.” ... The alphanumeric symbol visible through the glassine window here is clearly a “symbol ] other than the debt collector’s address.”

Sections 1692f(1) and 1692e(2) bar a debt collector from collecting fees not expressly authorized by the debt agreement or law and from falsely representing the compensation it may lawfully receive.

Prescott v. Seterus, Inc. · filed 2015-12-03(f)(1), (e)(2)

Because the least sophisticated consumer would not have understood that the security agreement “expressly authorized” Seterus to charge estimated fees for legal services not yet rendered, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Prescott’s § 1692f(1) claim. ... Seterus violated that provision when it demanded that Prescott pay estimated attorney’s fees before it would reinstate his loan, because Seterus could not “lawfully receive” those fees under the terms of the security agreement.

The FDCPA requires an initial debt-collection communication to identify the creditor and prohibits misleading efforts to collect a time-barred debt without disclosing its non-enforceability.

Rawson v. Source Receivables Management, LLC · filed 2016-01-06§ 1692g(a)(2); § 1692e(2)(A), (5), (10)

On its face, the FDCPA requires that a debt collector’s initial communication with a debtor disclose the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). ... The first falls short because on its face, the FDCPA explicitly requires debt collectors to disclose the identity of the creditor. ... In McMahon, the Seventh Circuit held that a letter that misleads an unsophisticated consumer to believe a time-barred debt is legally enforceable violates the FDCPA, regardless of whether the letter threatens litigation. ... For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that no extrinsic evidence is required to establish that the letter plaintiff received violated the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit misleading or unfair debt-collection representations, but a failure to disclose accruing interest is not actionable when the underlying contract already informs the debtor and the omission does not confuse the debtor; immaterial understatements are not actionable, and fees authorized by the debt agreement may be included in the amount sought under §§ 1692e(2)(B) and 1692f(1).

Uvaldo v. Germaine Law Office PLC · filed 2022-01-21(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(2)(B), (f), and (f)(1)

Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits any false representation of the “character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” including but not limited to “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C § 1692e(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). ... Accordingly, Defendant’s failure to note that interest would continue to accrue on the balance was not a false or unfair representation as a matter of law. ... Accordingly, the understatement by Defendant, though careless, was less than $20 and is immaterial as a matter of law. ... Defendant did not make a false representation or attempt to collect an amount that was not authorized by including the $2,575 in the demand letter. As a result, Defendant did not violate section 1692e(2)(B) or section 1692f(1).

Section 1692a(6)(F) excludes an original creditor collecting a debt it originated from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector,” to the extent the activity concerns that debt.

Pinson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association · filed 2016-03-28(a)(6)(F)

Second, because Chase was the lender, Pinson’s argument that Chase was a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA fails. Section 1692a(6)(F) exempts original creditors, such as Chase, from its definition of debt collector.

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector to disclose that a debt is disputed whenever it communicates information about that debt, including to a creditor or credit reporting agency, and a consumer’s dispute of the debt’s amount is enough.

Irvine v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2016-03-31(e)(8)

The Court finds no basis to limit the protections of § 1692e(8) against debt collector’s “failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed” to only those instances where a consumer disputes the entire amount of a debt. ... Section 1692e(8) is not limited to communications to credit reporting agencies.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collecting a disputed debt until it mails verification, and sending verification materials satisfies that requirement.

Johnson v. Trueaccord Corp. · filed 2022-11-14(b)

On or around June 15, 2020, Resurgent investigated Johnson’s dispute and sent a verification letter and supporting documents to Johnson. (Doc. No. 11-2 at PageID# 72 ¶¶ 8-9.) On August 8, 2020, Johnson sent again a dispute and request for validation of debt, which appears to be identical or substantially similar to what Johnson previously sent on June 2nd. (See Doc. No 11-3 at PageID# 101-03.) On August 13, 2020, TrueAccord received that second dispute. (Doc. No. 11-3 at PageID# 84 ¶ 10.) On or around August 14, 2020, Resurgent investigated Plaintiff’s dispute and mailed Johnson a verification and supporting documents. (Doc. No. 11-2 at PageID# 72-73 ¶¶ 10-11 & PageID# 79-81.) Johnson produced no evidence to dispute the facts above, nor did she introduce additional evidence that would somehow mollify or overcome the facts above. The notion that TrueAccord ignored or disregarded the requests for a verification are belied by the undisputed evidence. Summary judgment therefore is entered in favor of TrueAccord on Johnson’s claim under § 1692g for failure or refusal to verify a debt in response to a request for same.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from failing to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.

Brewer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC · filed 2024-07-29(e)(8)

Plaintiff has not shown that any violation of the FDCPA occurred as Defendant did not fail to report a dispute.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector's validation notice to clearly and accurately identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed, and a violation requires no additional proof of confusion or materiality.

Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP · filed 2016-04-07(a)(2)

To sum up our view of the merits, if the validation notice required under § 1692g(a)(2) does not identify the current creditor clearly and accurately, the law has been violated. A plaintiff need not offer additional evidence of confusion or materiality to prove the violation.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector to clearly disclose the identity of the current creditor to whom the debt is owed.

Steffek v. Client Services, Incorporated · filed 2020-01-21(a)(2)

The defendants’ debt validation notices violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) as a matter of law by failing to disclose clearly the identity of the current creditor.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector to state the current creditor's name clearly enough for an unsophisticated consumer, and the disclosure requirement has no materiality exception.

Heisler v. Convergent Healthcare Recoveries Inc · filed 2020-03-16(g)(a)(2)

But there is no materiality requirement for § 1692g(a)(2), which requires a specific disclosure and penalizes the failure to provide it regardless of materiality.

Section 1692f(6)'s prohibition on certain nonjudicial dispossession conduct applies only when the conduct is used in an attempt to collect a debt.

Hlista v. Safeguard Properties, LLC · filed 2016-05-05(f)(6)

Because the prohibited conduct under § 1692f “presupposes that the actions are used in an attempt to collect a debt,” failure to allege the existence of such a debt or draw any connection between Defendants’ alleged conduct and an attempt to collect a debt places the conduct outside of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes state officials acting in their official duties from the definition of debt collector, and § 1692a(6)(D) protects process servers unless they go beyond serving process and engage in abusive or harassing conduct.

Garcia v. Fry · filed 2016-05-12(a)(6)(C), (a)(6)(D)

Likewise, Fry was attempting to collect debts in the performance of his official duties as a state marshal. Even if, as Garcia alleges, Fry’s transmission of fax to an out-of-state entity was not in accordance with Connecticut law, his actions were still performed in the course of his duties as a marshal, a fact that the plaintiff does not dispute. Thus, Fry is exempt from the FDCPA under the state officer exemption. ... The court agrees. Garcia contends that the fax created a false impression that it was a garnishment and was legal process. However, Garcia has failed to allege facts showing that any of Fry’s actions were abusive or harassing such that they would cause his conduct to be outside the scope of the process server exemption.

The process-server exemption does not protect a person who engages in sewer service, and even one instance may forfeit the exemption and permit an FDCPA claim to proceed.

Holmes v. Electronic Document Processing, Inc. · filed 2013-08-15(a)(6)(D)

Importantly, the list of proscribed abusive and harassing activities in Section 1692d is non-exhaustive. ... As it may be possible for even one instance of sewer service to forfeit the process server exemption, the Court finds that Holmes has sufficiently alleged that Defendants are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA who are ineligible for the process server exception because of their engagement in “sewer service.”

The FDCPA bars materially deceptive debt-collection statements, harassment, unfair or unconscionable collection methods, and misleading collection forms, and requires a debt collector to seek information from the creditor after a consumer disputes a debt in writing.

Dixon v. Stern & Eisenburg PC · filed 2016-06-13(d), (e), (f), (g), and (j)

We consider whether the least sophisticated debtor would find a debt collector’s statement deceptive or misleading, applying an objective standard. ... Also, “[a] debtor simply cannot be confused, deceived, or misled by an incorrect statement unless it is material.” ... A statement is material “if it is capable of influencing the decision of the least sophisticated debtor.” ... Thus, for purposes of Dixon’s claims in this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact that for Stern & Eisenberg PC to name Wells Fargo as the “Current Lender” in the notices it sent was truthful, to the extent it was even a material statement for it to do so. ... The FDCPA, however, prohibits debt collectors from using false or misleading representations “in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... Section 1692e does not apply to the circumstances presented here involving Stern & Eisenberg PC’s efforts to later record the mortgage assignment. ... We conclude that the defendants’ straightforward and one-time effort to comply with state and federal notice requirements through one round of mailings, with no other communication set out in the record, does not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. ... Relatedly, sending those required notices to the debtor was not an unfair or unconscionable means of collecting a debt under the circumstances of this case. ... That statutory provision concerns procedures when a consumer disputes a debt. Notably, as the District Court concluded, the provision does not require a debt collector to independently investigate a debt before it begins collection activities, let alone affirmatively verify every aspect of the chain of assignment of the right to collect on a debt. ... Rather, that provision requires a debt collector to seek information about a debt from the creditor once a consumer disputes a debt. ... Consequently, there is also no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1692j.

Section 1692f(6)(A) treats taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess property as prohibited when the debt collector lacks a present right to possession, and foreclosure qualifies as debt-collection activity for purposes of that claim.

Jason S. Dionne, et al. v. Federal National Mortgage Association and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-06-14(f)(6)(A)

In addition, the Dionnes’ FDCPA claim is based on § 1692f(6)(A), which prohibits “[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if there is no present right to possession of the property . . . .” Courts uniformly recognize that even if foreclosing on a mortgage is not debt collection activity as a general matter for purposes of the FDCPA, it is debt collection activity for purposes of § 1692f(6).

Section 1692f(6)(A) and (C) prohibit debt collectors from taking or threatening nonjudicial dispossession when they lack a present right to possess the property or the property is legally exempt, while the bona fide-error defense in § 1692k(c) does not cover mistakes of law.

Espinosa Sr. v. Metcalf · filed 2022-10-31(f)(6)(A), (f)(6)(C), (k)(c)

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from “tak[ing] or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A), or if “the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(C). ... Champion, Metcalf and JAU therefore violated 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692f(6)(A), (C) when they seized Junior’s Mini Cooper to satisfy a judgment against Senior. ... Because Senior did not have legal title to the Honda Accord, this vehicle was exempt by law from being taken on execution. Champion, Metcalf and JAU therefore violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f(6)(A), (C) when they seized Senior’s leased Honda Accord to collect on Senior’s debt. ... Although the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, a debt collector may avoid liability through showing “by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). ... However, the bona fide error defense does not apply to a mistake of law.

Section 1692f(6)(A) bars nonjudicial dispossession of collateral when the creditor lacks a present right to possession; the court found Ally had such a right because James was in material default.

James v. Ally Financial Inc. · filed 2023-07-05(f)(6)(A)

Here, the summary judgment record establishes that Ally had a present right under the RISC to repossess the vehicle where James was in material default. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A) (prohibiting the “[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest…”).

Section 1692f(6)(A) prohibits a debt collector from taking nonjudicial action to repossess property when it has no present right to possession through an enforceable security interest.

Shelton v. Marshall · filed 2024-03-19(f)(6)(A)

Finally, Shelton satisfies the third element by pleading that Marshall engaged in a prohibited act under § 1692f(6), which provides, in relevant part, that a debt collector violates the FDCPA by taking nonjudicial action to repossess property when “there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). Here, Trader Ricks had no present right to possession of the Jeep because Shelton was current on her payments through October 2021, as confirmed in writing by Barnikow just 9 days before the repossession. Accordingly, Shelton has successfully established an FDCPA claim and is entitled to damages.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i) permits an additional recovery of up to $1,000 for each named plaintiff.

Schuchardt v. Law Office of Clark · filed 2016-04-28(k)(2)(B)(i)

The Court also preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement’s provision of a statutory award to each named Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides for an additional recovery for each named plaintiff of up to $1,000 per plaintiff. ... Accordingly, the Court approves the $1,000 statutory award to each named Plaintiff.

The FDCPA generally excludes a lender collecting a debt it originated from the definition of “debt collector,” so it is not liable under the Act on that basis.

Larkin v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Larkin) · filed 2016-07-07(a)(6)(F)(ii)

This definition indicates that a lender or creditor collecting its own debts is generally not a “debt collector.” ... Section 1692a(6) further restricts the definition of debt collector, by specifically excluding a collector that originated the debt being collected. ... BOA fits squarely into the § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) exclusion. ... BOA was not a “debt collector” under the . FDCPA’s § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) exclusion.

Section 1692f(1) bars collecting a fee or charge unless it is authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, and a charge is incidental when incurred in connection with efforts to collect the debt.

Johnson-Morris v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. · filed 2016-07-11(f)(1)

But also, Santander’s argument that its “convenience fees” are not “incidental” to the underlying debt is itself a departure from Seventh Circuit authority demonstrating that a charge is “incidental” to a debt within the meaning of § 1692f if it is incurred in connection with efforts to collect that debt, as was certainly the case here.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating credit information known or that should be known to be false, including failing to state that a disputed debt is disputed.

Sanchez v. Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC · filed 2016-07-15(e)(8)

Section 1692e(8) prohibits the communication of “credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). ... Defendant admits that it was not required to report the account to the credit reporting agencies. ... The Court finds that the undisputed facts establish that defendant made twenty-two elective communications to the credit reporting agencies without identifying the account as disputed. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendant violated § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector to communicate that a debt is disputed when it knows or should know the debt is disputed, while § 1692k(c) provides a defense for an unintentional bona fide error made despite reasonably adapted procedures.

WEBSTER v. RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2020-07-21(e)(8), (k)(c)

Therefore, the Court concludes that, although RPM violated § 1692e(8) because it should have known the debt it was reporting to TransUnion was disputed by Webster, the bona fide error defense of § 1692k(c) applies because the error was unintentional, the error was a bona fide error, and RPM maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such credit reporting errors.

Section 1692e(8) treats a debt collector's failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed as a false or misleading representation under the FDCPA.

Olds v. Applied Business Services, Inc. · filed 2021-06-09(e)(8)

Failure of the Defendant to communicate that the debt was in dispute states a colorable claim of a violation of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) (“the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed” constitutes a false or misleading representation under the Act.).

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector to communicate that a debt is disputed when reporting it, and a recipient’s later awareness of the dispute does not excuse the omission.

ANDERSON v. BARITZ · filed 2025-01-27(e)(8)

Section 1692e(8) prohibits “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). ... Second, nothing in § 1692e(8) excuses a failure to communicate a debt’s disputed status on the basis that the recipient of the communication later learned of the dispute.

Section 1692k(a) permits a named FDCPA plaintiff to recover actual damages, individual statutory damages, and a pro rata share of a class recovery.

Jarzyna v. Home Properties, L.P. · filed 2016-08-18(k)(1), (k)(2)(A), and (k)(2)(B)

Under the FDCPA, Plaintiffs ability to represent a class carries with it the prospect of a greater financial recovery than he would otherwise obtain in an individual action. This is because the FDCPA allows a named plaintiff to recover actual damages, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(l), statutory damages, see id. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), as well as a pro-rata share of the entire recovery, see id § 1692k(a)(2)(B).

The FDCPA does not prohibit filing a Chapter 13 proof of claim on a time-barred debt when the statute of limitations does not extinguish the underlying debt.

Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC · filed 2016-08-25(e)-(f)

We conclude that filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy based on a debt that is time-barred does not violate the FDCPA when the statute of limitations does not extinguish the debt.

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using an ambiguous offer to settle a time-barred debt that could mislead an unsophisticated consumer, and the violation may be established as a matter of law without extrinsic evidence.

McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2018-03-14(e)

Based on a straightforward application of that holding to this case, the McMahon letter is deceptive as a matter of law because the McMahon letter does not contain any unambiguous warning about the possibility of losing the protection of the statute of limitations by accepting the "offer" to "settle."

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using collection-letter language that would mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing a time-barred debt is legally enforceable, even without a threat of litigation.

Woodward v. Collection Consultants of Cal. · filed 2019-02-15(e)

Accordingly, the Court adopts the view that while an attempt to collect a time-barred debt alone is not a violation of the FDCPA, a threat of litigation is not a required element; rather, a viable claim exists if the letter contains anything that would mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing the time-barred debt is legally enforceable.

The FDCPA is not violated when a debt collector fails to notify a debtor that a debt is time barred if the debt is not time barred.

Palmer v. Commonwealth Credit Union, Inc. · filed 2024-11-27

As a result, the statute of limitations has not expired, and L&M has not violated the FDCPA by failing to notify Palmer that the Debt was time barred from suit.

Section 1692g requires an initial written debt-validation notice and, after a timely written dispute, pauses collection until verification is mailed, but those duties were not triggered on these facts where the consumer initiated contact and the collector ceased collection; § 1692i's venue rule applies only when a debt collector brings a legal action against the consumer.

Carlisle v. Stellar Recovery, Inc. · filed 2016-10-28(g)(a), (g)(b), (i)(a)(2)

This provision triggers an obligation on the part of a debt collector who makes an “initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt” to send a written notice of the amount of the debt, the creditor to whom the debt is owed, notice of the consumer’s opportunity to demand verification of the debt, and a statement that, upon receipt of the consumer’s written request, it would provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). ... Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff, not Stellar, initiated communication with respect to the Comcast debt. See Compl. ¶¶ 5-6; Martin Decl. ¶ 10. It cannot be said that Steller initiated communication with Plaintiff by responding to the BBB’s inquiry. ... And because Stellar ceased collection activity, it was not obligated to send Plaintiff a separate validation of the debt. See Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1031 (6th Cir. 1992). ... Plaintiff neither alleges in her complaint nor demonstrates in response to Stellar’s summary judgment motion that Stellar has brought any legal action against her regarding the Comcast debt. Stellar could not have violated § 1692i because it has not brought any legal action against Plaintiff.

Section 1692i(b) does not affirmatively prohibit debt collectors from bringing legal actions; it merely declines to expand the circumstances in which they may do so.

Deitemyer v. Ryback, Esq. · filed 2019-09-13(i)(b)

However, this discrepancy is of no legal significance. Under either reading, § 1692i(b) “does not affirmatively prohibit debt collectors from bringing legal actions, but merely declines to extend the circumstances under which they may do so[.]”

Section 1692i(a)(2) requires a debt collector to bring a legal action on a debt against a consumer, including a garnishment action, only in the judicial district where the consumer signed the contract or resides at the commencement of the action.

Simpson v. Newman, Hesse, and Associates, P.A. · filed 2019-10-25(i)(a)(2)

Consistent with Fox and Flores, the Court concludes the issuance of a writ of garnishment is an action on a debt against a consumer and creditors are obliged to comply with the venue requirements of § 1692i.

Section 1692i(a)(2) requires a debt collector to bring a collection action only where the consumer signed the contract or resides when the action begins; consumer consent and state-law venue compliance do not create exceptions.

Griffin v. Robichaux · filed 2019-12-16(a)(2)

The FDCPA contains no “consent” exception to its venue provision. Section 1692i lays out two options for venues in which a debt collector may file a collection action, and if a debt collector fails to comply with that rule, the collector violates the FDCPA. Whether the debt collector has complied with state-law venue requirements is irrelevant.

Section 1692e(8) does not treat every communication with a credit reporting agency about a debt as being made in connection with debt collection; voluntary reporting and reporting required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act may be distinct.

Samano v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2022-06-28(e)(8)

Not every communication with a credit reporting agency about a debt is made “in connection with the collection of any debt” under § 1692e as a matter of law. There is a recognized distinction, for example, between voluntary reporting of debts and reporting that is made in compliance with procedures required under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from reporting credit information it knows or should know is false, including failing to identify a disputed debt as disputed.

Francisco v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2019-02-08(e)(8)

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). ... There is no genuine dispute as to the material fact that MCM violated § 1692e(8) when, on August 25, 2017, it “fail[ed] to communicate that a disputed debt [wa]s disputed.”

Section 1692e(8) does not require a debt collector to report a debt as disputed when it lacks evidence that it knew the debt was disputed.

Irvin v. Nationwide Credit and Collection, Inc. · filed 2019-09-17(e)(8)

The court agrees with defendant and concludes that plaintiffs have no evidence that defendant was aware the debts were disputed and thus, had no duty to so communicate with the credit reporting agencies.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits communicating credit information known or that should be known to be false, including failing to report that a disputed debt is disputed.

Goss v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC · filed 2020-05-07(e)(8)

It is well settled that a debtor need not say the word “dispute” to prove a § 1692e(8) claim.

Section 1692f does not prohibit a debt collector from accurately reporting separately debts arising from different charges to the same creditor, because separate reporting is not unfair or unconscionable.

Zablocki v. Merchants Credit Guide Co. · filed 2020-07-28

Viewing Merchants’s separate reporting of debts from the perspective of an unsophisticated but reasonable consumer, we see the alleged conduct as falling outside the scope of these terms. It is reasonable, and not at all deceptive or outrageous, for a collector to report individually debts that correspond to different charges, thereby communicating truthfully how much is owed on each debt. ... If sorting through and weighing these competing interests ultimately shows the plaintiffs’ proposed “aggregation” rule to be a wise public policy, then the adoption of that rule should be done by Congress or through the administrative process. Section 1692f does not create that rule on its own.

Section 1692e(8) bars a debt collector from communicating credit information known or reasonably knowable to be false, including failing to report that a debt is disputed.

Burns v. KEYBRIDGE MEDICAL REVENUE CARE · filed 2021-07-22(e)(8)

Under the FDCPA, "a debt collector may not" "communicat[e] . . . credit information which is known or which should be known to be false including the failure to communicate that a debt is disputed." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). ... A debt collector, such as Defendant, need only report debts as disputed if it reports those debts to a credit agency. ... In brief, Defendant accurately and timely reported the disputed status of Plaintiff's debt under § 1692e(8). ... Defendant sufficiently marked the debt as disputed using the "XB" code. ... Because Defendant promptly reported the disputed debt to the credit agencies, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from reporting credit information without communicating that a debt is disputed when the collector knew or should have known of the dispute.

McCarthy v. Receivable Recovery Services L L C · filed 2021-12-02(e)(8)

In cases involving a violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(8), the issue “depends solely on the debt collector’s knowledge that a debt is disputed.” ... Thus, the statute is violated if the defendant knew or should have known that the debt was disputed but fails to communicate that fact.

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector to report that a consumer disputes a debt once the consumer clearly communicates a dispute, regardless of whether the dispute is valid or reasonable.

FUDGE v. MOUNTAIN RUN SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2021-12-08(e)(8)

Section 1692e(8) does not require an individual’s dispute be valid or reasonable. Instead, the plaintiff must simply make clear that he or she disputes the debt.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating credit information about a disputed debt without communicating that the debt is disputed.

Williams v. Eastern Account System of Connecticut Inc · filed 2022-02-11(e)(8)

Deeming William’s allegations admitted, and having reviewed the exhibits attached to the complaint, the Court finds that she has sufficiently alleged in Count I of her complaint a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8), of the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector to communicate that a debt is disputed when reporting credit information about that debt.

Williams v. Amerassist A/R Solutions Inc · filed 2022-07-18(e)(8)

AmerAssist’s final argument is that Ms. Williams’ claim depends on a finding that the retail installment contract is invalid, which is a legal determination debt collectors do not have to make. (Doc. 23 at 17, 20–21). While AmerAssist may be correct about debt collectors’ obligations to adjudicate legal challenges to underlying debts, Ms. Williams’ claim, as pleaded in her amended complaint, is that AmerAssist violated the FDCPA by reporting her debt to consumer reporting agencies without noting that she disputed the debt. (See doc. 22 at 15–16; see also id. at 16 ¶ 61, 16 ¶ 64 (alleging that AmerAssist failed to report the debt as disputed)). This is a claim that the FDCPA expressly permits. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) (prohibiting debt collectors from failing “to communicate [to any person] that a disputed debt is disputed”).

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector to report a debt as disputed when it knows or should know the consumer disputes it, but the duty ends when an investigation is communicated and the consumer does not indicate continued disagreement.

Wood v. Security Credit Services, LLC · filed 2023-05-23(e)(8)

Wood correctly points out that under Seventh Circuit precedent, “Section 1692e(8) does not require an individual’s dispute be valid or even reasonable. Instead, the plaintiff must simply make clear that he or she disputes the debt.” Evans v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 889 F.3d 337, 347 (7th Cir. 2018). While true that Wood initially disputed the debt, Wood cites no cases, nor has the Court found any, that hold that once a debtor disputes a debt, the debt collector’s obligation to report a debt as disputed lasts indefinitely. Rather, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning in Foster v. AFNI, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-12340-TGB, 2020 WL 1531651 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2020) that when a debt collector investigates a dispute and communicates the results to the consumer, the dispute is resolved unless the consumer indicates that it disagrees with the results.

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector who knows or should know that a debt is disputed to disclose that fact when reporting or updating the debt’s credit information, and the dispute need not be in writing.

Powers v. Atlas Used Cars, Inc. · filed 2024-02-16(e)(8)

The Court first observes that Powers’s oral dispute to LRS directly, assuming it occurred as Powers alleges, would trigger LRS’s duty under Section 1692e(8) to report the dispute when reporting the debts or updating prior reports of the debts. See Jerman v. Carlisle, 464 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005)) (“‘Oral dispute of a debt precludes the debt collector from communicating the debtor’s credit information to others without including the fact that the debt is in dispute.’”). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that “[i]f consumers contest a debt orally,” as opposed to in writing, “they may still dispute the debt,” they simply “do not invoke their rights under Sections 1692g(a)(4), (a)(5), and (b),” which require a debt collector “to verify the debt and to cease all collection efforts.” Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 757–58; 758, n.7 (6th Cir. 2018) (abrogated on other grounds); see also Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Debtors can protect certain basic rights through an oral dispute, but can trigger a broader set of rights by disputing a debt in writing.”). In light of this authority, the Court rejects LRS’s contention that, in order to validly dispute his debts, Powers was required to notify LRS in writing pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector to report a debt as disputed when a consumer clearly disputes it, including in a court filing; the dispute need not be valid or reasonable.

Ostojich v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2024-05-17(e)(8)

The provisions of §1692e apply to statements made in court filings. Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S., 836 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2016). Thus, in no uncertain terms, the plaintiffs disputed the debt no later than October 18, 2021, triggering SLS’s obligation to report the debt as disputed in monthly reports to CRAs.

Section 1692(e)(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating credit information known or that should be known to be false, including failing to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed, and whether a consumer’s statements amount to a dispute may be a jury question.

Burgos v. Helvey & Associates, Inc. · filed 2024-07-22(e)(8)

However, when considering all evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, a reasonable jury could find that her communications to Defendant’s representative constituted a dispute of her debt such that Defendant knew or should have known that the debt was disputed.

Section 1692e(8) protects consumers when a debt collector communicates credit information about a debt it knows or should know is disputed, without requiring the consumer to dispute the debt in writing.

SAYRE v. LIVE OAK FINANCIAL INC · filed 2025-08-12(e)(8)

This ‘knows or should know’ standard requires no notification by the consumer, written or oral, and instead, depends solely on the debt collector’s knowledge that a debt is disputed, regardless of how or when that knowledge is acquired.

Section 1692f(6)(A)'s present-right-to-possession requirement is determined by state foreclosure law, so alleged violations of another federal statute do not alone establish an FDCPA violation.

Dionne, et al. v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc., et al. · filed 2016-11-21(f)(6)(A)

“[I]n order to state a viable claim under § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings without the requisite possessory interest under state foreclosure law.” ... “Thus, state, not federal, law determines whether a foreclosing party has a present right to possess the property under § 1692f(6)(A).” ... “Because state law and not federal law determines whether Chase had a right to possess the property, Chase’s alleged RESPA violations, even if proven, are insufficient to be the basis of an FDCPA claim under § 1692f(6)(A).”

Section 1692f(6)(A) bars a debt collector from taking nonjudicial action to dispossess property unless the property is collateral under an enforceable security interest and the collector has a present right to possession.

Richards v. Par, Inc. · filed 2020-03-25(f)(6)(A)

Whether a repossessor had a “present right to possession” for purposes of § 1692f(6)(A) can be determined only by reference to state law.

Section 1692f(6) limits repossession-agency liability to cases where the agency lacks a present right to possess collateral under an enforceable security interest.

ISHMAEL v. GM FINANCIAL INC. · filed 2022-06-09(a)(6), (f)(6)

Section 1692f(6) requires, among other things, “no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).

The FDCPA's remedial scope is not limited by state-law remedies; abusive debt-collection practices may violate both the FDCPA and state law.

Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP · filed 2017-11-14(e), (b)

But abusive debt collection practices may violate both the FDCPA and State law. The FDCPA’s express purpose includes “promoting] consistent State action to protect consumers' against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). ‘ The legislative history confirms this purpose: Congress' enacted the FDCPA in part to address “the inadequacy of existing State ... laws.” Senate Report at 1697; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) (“Existing laws and procedures for redressing [abuse by debt collectors] are inadequate to protect consumers.”). We therefore reject the argument that the remedial scope of the FDCPA is limited by State law. See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d, 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).

The FDCPA treats an assignee of a debt already in default as a debt collector only if it is in the business of collecting debt, makes statutory damages up to $1,000 discretionary, and permits prevailing defendants attorney’s fees only when the action was brought in bad faith for harassment.

Professional Collection Consultants v. Lujan · filed 2018-05-221692a(6); 1692k(a)(2)(A); 1692k(a)(3)

The FDCPA defines a “debt collector” as a person engaged in a “business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts . . . asserted to be owed or due another. . . .” (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).) ... “An assignee may be deemed a ‘debt collector’ if the obligation is already in default when it is assigned” ... but only if the assignee is in the business of collecting debt. ... Here, Lujan presents no evidence that Wireless did anything with the debts other than assign them further to PCC. He presents no evidence that Wireless “regularly collects or attempts to collect” on the debt of others (15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)), and no legal authority for the proposition that one who does no more than buy and sell debt is a debt collector under the FDCPA. ... Statutory damages are entirely discretionary under the FDCPA, which provides for “such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000.” (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), italics added.) ... The FDCPA allows an award of fees to a prevailing defendant only where a plaintiff’s case is “brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.” (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).)

Sections 1692e(2) and 1692e(10) prohibit false or deceptive statements about a debt, § 1692c(a)(2) restricts direct communications when the collector knows the consumer is represented by counsel, and § 1692k(c) provides a bona fide-error defense when its conditions are met.

Vazquez v. USCB Corporation · filed 2018-07-09(e)(2), (e)(10), (a)(2), and (k)(c)

Section 1692e(2) of the FDCPA prohibits false representations of “the character, amount, ot legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2). Similarly, section 1692e(10) prohibits “any false representation or deceptive means” to collect, or attempt to collect any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1962e(10). ... In sum, by sending a collection letter on July 10, 2017, stating that the debt was due and payable, Defendant falsely represented the legal status of the debt. Further, since the false representation could have caused an unsophisticated consumer to be misled, Defendant violated § 1692e(2) of the FDCPA. Additionally, by misrepresenting the status of the debt, Defendant violated § 1692e(10), which prohibits making “any false representation or deceptive means” to collect, or attempt to collect any debt. ... The FDCPA prohibits communications with a consumer “if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). ... This provision provides a complete defense to a debt collector who “shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).

Section 1692g(a)(4) and (5) require debt collectors to tell consumers that debt verification and original-creditor information must be requested in writing, and § 1692g(b) requires collection to cease until the requested information is provided; a misleading omission creating a material risk that consumers will waive those rights is a concrete injury for Article III standing.

Macy v. GC Services Ltd. P'ship · filed 2018-07-30(a)(4), (a)(5), (b)

The FDCPA’s requirement that debt collectors “not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” is a core object of the FDCPA, which aims to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). Including a materially false, deceptive, or misleading statement in a debt-collection communication may cause an individual “to lose the very . . . rights that the law affords him.” Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190. And the communication here risked just that – without the required notice of the in-writing requirement, consumers risked waiving important verification rights under Section 1692g(a)(4) and (a)(5) and their right to suspension of collection of disputed debts pending verification under Section 1692g(b). Accordingly, “[h]aving alleged such procedural violations, [Plaintiffs were] not required to allege ‘any additional harm’ to demonstrate the concrete injury necessary for standing,” id. at 191 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549), and GC’s claim that Plaintiffs have not alleged a concrete injury because they did not identify actual harm stemming from GC’s defective notices fails.

Section 1692e(16) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing or implying that it operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency.

McCurdy v. Grant & Weber, Inc. · filed 2018-08-13(e)(16)

Here, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that G&W violated § 1692e(16) of the FDCPA. The phrase “Member of Experian” could imply to the unsophisticated consumer that G&W operates or is employed by Experian.

Sections 1692e(10) and 1692g do not make a collection letter deceptive or deficient when, viewed as a whole, it provides the debt collector’s mailing address for correspondence and written disputes, even if it also lists a telephone number.

Jones v. Economic Recovery Consultants, Inc. · filed 2018-08-14(e)(10), (g)(a), (g)(a)(3)

In sum, viewing the letter “as a whole,” the Court is unconvinced that an unsophisticated consumer would be confused regarding the correct address to contact Defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings with regard to Plaintiff’s section 1692e(10) claim. ... Thus, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s claim under section 1692g fails because the letter provides an address for Plaintiff to send correspondence to dispute her alleged debt, despite Plaintiff’s allegations that the letter lists a telephone number as Defendant’s “sole contact information.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Section 1692(e) prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, while § 1692(e)(5) requires a plausible threat of imminent action that the collector did not intend or could not legally take.

Cadiz v. Credence Resource Management, LLC · filed 2018-08-24(e), (e)(5), (e)(10)

Section 1692(e) of the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using any “false, deceptive, or misleading” representation in connection with the collection of debt. ... Credence’s statements are not clearly misleading. But the Court cannot say that they in no way could be interpreted as misleading to the unsophisticated consumer. Rather, the letter is properly categorized as the second type of claim—for it is plausible that the use of the word “amicably” could mislead the unsophisticated consumer into believing that litigation was a possibility if the debt were left unresolved. ... Thus, although Credence’s letter might plausibly be understood by the unsophisticated consumer to indicate the possibility of legal action, the letter cannot plausibly be interpreted as an imminent intention to take legal action in the near future. ... Thus, Cadiz fails to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(5). ... For the reasons stated above, Credence’s motion to dismiss 1s granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to Cadiz’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(5)—that claim is dismissed. The motion is denied with respect to Cadiz’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) generally and § 1692(e)(10).

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with collecting a debt.

Ellison v. Fullett Rosenlund Anderson P.C. · filed 2018-09-28(e), (e)(2), (e)(5), (e)(10)

The Seventh Circuit has defined three categories of § 1692e cases which employ the “unsophisticated consumer” standard: (1) cases where “the allegedly offensive language is plainly and clearly not misleading”; (2) cases that include debt collection language that is not confusing or misleading on its face, “but has potential to be misleading to the unsophisticated consumer”; and (3) cases “involving letters that are plainly deceptive or misleading.” ... Here, the Notice, taken as a whole, is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer, regardless of having repeated references to the “property.” ... The Notice was thus misleading and confusing on its face.

Section 1692e(10) bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or deceptive means to collect a debt, judged by the least sophisticated debtor.

Reneisha Knight v. Midland Credit Management · filed 2018-11-08(10)

Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of any debt,” including “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). ... Courts analyze FDCPA claims under the “least sophisticated debtor” standard. ... A “specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually confused or misled.” ... Instead, the focus is on whether the objective least sophisticated debtor would be deceived or misled by a debt collector’s statement in a communication. ... Furthermore, for a debt collector’s statement to be actionable, it must be material. ... Given its ambiguous and contradictory language, the Letter could be found to cause the least sophisticated debtor to interpret it in ways that are neither bizarre nor idiosyncratic.

Section 1692e(8) requires a debt collector that knows or should know a consumer disputes a debt to report it as disputed, § 1692e(2)(A) imposes liability for materially false balance reporting, and § 1692f(1) permits collection fees when expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law.

Levine v. Creditors' Protection Service, Inc. · filed 2019-03-07(e)(8), (e)(2)(A), and (f)(1)

Section § 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, ... including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) (emphasis added). ... The Seventh Circuit has held that § 1692e(8) simply requires a plaintiff to “make clear that he or she disputes the debt.” ... As long as the debt collector reasonably should know that a consumer disagrees with a debt, the debt collector is obligated to inform a credit reporting agency of the existence of that disagreement before reporting the debt. ... Section 1692e(2)(A) makes it unlawful to falsely represent “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). ... A debt collector may only be found strictly liable under § 1692e(2)(A) if'a misleading representation meets the element of “materiality”—that is, a statement that would confuse or mislead an unsophisticated but reasonable consumer. ... The court finds this reasoning applies with equal force to claims made under § 1692e(2)(A). ... Section 1692f(1) prohibits a debt collector from collecting or attempting to collect a debt, including additional amounts such as collection fees or interest fees, unless such amount is (1) expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or (2) permitted by law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1); ... The court finds that summary judgment is appropriate for CPS on this claim.

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f do not make a debt collector liable merely because an affidavit is technically false and inadmissible if the underlying debt and amount are factually correct; allegations that the debt was not owed or that material facts were misrepresented can state a plausible claim.

Bugg v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2019-08-19(d), (e), (f)

Absent an allegation that Danny did not owe the debt or that the amount of the debt was otherwise misrepresented, it has not been plausibly alleged that Plaintiffs or the state court judge or anyone else was misled in any meaningful way by the affidavit. ... Assuming the affidavit was filed by someone without personal knowledge of the validity of the debt, this conduct alone does not have the natural consequence of harassing, oppressing or abusing anyone. ... Finally, turning to Plaintiffs’ claim that Midland violated §1692f by using unfair or unconscionable means to collect the debt when it caused the affidavit of debt to be filed, this Court does not find the filing of a technically false and inadmissible but otherwise factually correct affidavit of debt rises to the level of being an unfair or unconscionable means to attempt to collect a debt.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not prohibit a debt collector from stating that a collection charge is currently due when the governing loan terms make reasonable collection costs immediately due upon default and the statement is not otherwise false, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable.

Ossipova v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. · filed 2019-12-11(e), (f)

As a result, the Court concludes that Pioneer’s inclusion of the $19,221.03 collection charge in its June 22, 2018 letter was neither false, deceptive, or misleading, nor did it constitute the use of unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect on a debt.

Section 1692e(10) prohibits false representations or deceptive means in debt collection, but a consumer’s dispute of a debt and identification of inaccuracies do not establish a violation without evidence that the debt collector fabricated or falsified the documents.

Cooper v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs. · filed 2020-01-14(e)(10)

But Cooper’s claims turn on whether PRA made deceptive or misleading statements by providing him with fabricated documents. ... Cooper has presented no evidence of fraud or fabrication by PRA. Assuming, as we must, that Cooper’s testimony is accurate and that he never opened the account, it does not follow that PRA fabricated or falsified the account statements or information. ... Cooper has simply established a genuine issue whether he is responsible for the underlying debt.

Sections 1692e(5) and (10) reach threats of debt-collection action that the collector does not intend to take or that use false or deceptive means.

Williams v. Seterus Inc · filed 2020-01-22(e)(5), (e)(10)

Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Williams, Seterus sent a letter threatening action it never intended to take. Thus, Ms. Williams’s allegations state a claim under both § 1692e(5) which prohibits a debt collector from any action “that is not intended to be taken,” and under § 1692e(10), which prohibits the use of “any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” ... Construed in the light most favorable to Ms. Williams and accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true, the Alabama Final Letter could be viewed as false, misleading, or deceptive in violation of §§ 1692e(5) and/or 1692e(10).

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, and the FDCPA's § 1692a(6)(D) service-process exemption does not protect a party that goes beyond merely serving process by filing a false affidavit of service.

Makhnevich v. MTGLQ Investors, L.P. · filed 2020-02-14(e), (a)(6)(D)

Making a false averment to a court in an effort to obtain a default judgment and foreclose on a mortgage is plainly a violation of the FDCPA. ... That protection does not extend to actions “beyond mere service of the notice,” id. at 118, like filing a false affidavit of service.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit materially false or misleading representations and unfair or unconscionable collection methods, but truthful statements about a late claim and demands for a valid copay and court costs do not violate them.

Nichols v. West Virginia United Health System, Inc. · filed 2020-04-07(e), (f)

The Defendant’s statement that it was “too late” to submit the claim was a true statement. ... The mere fact that the Plaintiff was able to explain the situation to United Healthcare to successfully secure payment, does not make the Defendant’s statement false or misleading for purposes of establishing a violation of the FDCPA. ... There is nothing unfair or unconscionable about the Defendant demanding the Plaintiff pay her $25 co-pay, as required by her health insurance. ... There is nothing unfair or unconscionable about the Defendant demanding the Plaintiff pay the court costs, as ordered by the court in its judgment.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit false, deceptive, or misleading representations and unfair or unconscionable collection methods, but pleadings that clearly distinguish the debt from possible court costs do not violate them.

Lin v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2020-04-22(e), (f)

The Court finds that the statements in this case fall into the first category. Defendants’ state court pleadings complied with the FDCPA. ... These state court pleadings, which complied with forms provided and sanctioned by the Illinois courts, cannot be described “deceptive and misleading.” ... Therefore Lin’s § 1692f claim is dismissed.

Section 1692e does not require every debt-collection communication about a time-barred debt to disclose that the debt is time-barred, but it can be violated when a letter’s statements could mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing that the debt is legally enforceable.

Solis v. Commonwealth Financial System, Inc. · filed 2020-05-15(e)

Even assuming the complaint had adequately alleged that the debts were time-barred, the lack of disclosure of that status on the Letter sent here does not violate the FDCPA. ... The Letter includes no language that the least sophisticated consumer could plausibly interpret as a settlement offer, demand for payment, or a threat of litigation. The mere mention of the “Current Balance” alone does not suffice, particularly in the absence of any method to effectuate any payment such as a payment coupon, direction indicating how and where to submit payment, or reference to a payment website. Even the least sophisticated consumer would not view the Letter’s invitation to call and “discuss further” to be a settlement offer. ... Plaintiff has offered no authority for the proposition that every communication from a debt collector regarding a time-barred debt must disclose that fact to the consumer. In short, while there may be circumstances were a debt collector’s silence regarding the expiration of the statute of limitations on a debt may be actionable under the FDCPA, the current case does not present such a situation.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means to collect a debt, and a plaintiff must plausibly allege such collection conduct.

BONILLA v. AMERICAN HERITAGE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2020-05-19(e)

Section 1692e of the FDCPA provides “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” and contains a non-exhaustive list of sixteen subsections of prohibited conduct. ... But she never alleged how Defendants attempted to collect a debt from her. She fails to sufficiently plead facts to plausibly state a claim Defendants violated section 1692e.

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using a false or deceptive representation or means to collect a debt, including reporting a second collection attempt in a way that falsely makes one debt appear to be two.

Reyes v. IC System, Inc · filed 2020-06-29(e)(2)(A) and (e)(10)

Here, ICS’s use of a different account number for what was really a second collection attempt on an already-reported delinquent debt, without clarification or other notation, made it essentially impossible for even a savvy reader to know that Reyes had only $254 in one delinquent debt and not $508 in two delinquent debts. For initial pleading purposes, this satisfies section 1692e(2)(A)’s description of a “false representation of the character . . . of any debt,” as well as section 1692e(10)’s description of “deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with collecting a debt, and a statement is actionable only if it is material—capable of influencing the decision of the least sophisticated consumer.

Vaccaro v. Western New York Federal Credit Union · filed 2020-07-02(e), (e)(10)

Whether a statement is false or misleading for purposes of the FDCPA is evaluated under the “least sophisticated consumer” standard, which is “an objective standard, designed to protect all consumers, ‘the gullible as well as the shrewd,’” and asks whether the hypothetical least sophisticated consumer would be confused or misled by a debt collector’s communications. ... Whether a false or misleading statement is also “material” (and thus, actionable) requires that it be “capable of influencing the decision of the least sophisticated consumer.” ... In short, because the statements at issue were legally and factually true and not susceptible to misinterpretation by the least sophisticated consumer, I find that plaintiff has failed to state plausible claims of false statements in violation of FDCPA §$1692e and 1692e(10).

Section 1692e(10) prohibits a debt collector from using false representations or deceptive means to collect a debt, and a collection letter is deceptive when it presents a contingent collection fee as a definite amount owed without disclosing its contingent nature.

Francis v. General Revenue Corporation · filed 2020-08-10(e)(10)

However, defendant’s failure to disclose the contingent nature of the collection cost – instead representing the fee as an out-of-pocket expense that the creditor has already paid, or at least definitely will pay in the future – was deceptive. ... If the collection letter explained that the collection fee was contingent on the collected amount, there would likely be no violation. But the lack of disclosure renders the collection letter deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer, who “could easily misinterpret the defendant’s letter to mean that the plaintiff actually owed [$1,680.04] in collection costs, when i[n] fact [she] did not.”

Sections 1692e and 1692g(a)(1) do not require debt collectors to predict the future when they accurately state the present debt; an itemized breakdown with zero interest and charges and a no-interest-during-collection statement is not misleading without an explicit suggestion of future accrual.

Degroot v. Client Services, Incorporated · filed 2020-10-08(e) and (g)(a)(1)

The logic of Fields suggests that a collector will not violate the FDCPA if it accurately reports that the amount of additional other charges or interest is zero, even if it is also permissible—maybe even preferable—for the creditor to fill in those fields with a “not applicable” notation when it is handling a “static” debt. ... For that reason, the itemized breakdown here, which makes no comment whatsoever about the future and does not make an explicit suggestion about future outcomes, does not violate the FDCPA. ... We likewise conclude that this statement does not run afoul of § 1692e. ... For that reason, the letter complies with both §§ 1692e and 1692g.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with debt collection, including a foreclosure action that misrepresents the creditor's right to collect based on an allegedly invalid mortgage assignment.

GARY v. HLADIK ONORATO & FEDERMAN LLP · filed 2020-12-22(e)

15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... We have already noted that, if a communication meets the Act’s definition of an effort by a “debt collector” to collect a “debt” from a “consumer,” it is not relevant that it came in the context of litigation. ... The same is true where the communication comes in the context of in rem litigation. ... Similarly, Gary alleges that Defendants brought the Foreclosure Action to collect a debt from Gary relying on an allegedly fraudulent mortgage assignment, thus misrepresenting that the sum of money sought was in fact owed to Defendants. ... For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Gary has sufficiently alleged an FDCPA claim based upon misrepresentations respecting the ownership of the HELOC.

Section 1692e bars false or misleading representations by debt collectors, while section 1692g provides a debt-verification claim only when the plaintiff alleges facts tying the request and nonresponse to the named defendant.

Wilson v. Grest · filed 2021-01-20(e), (g)

Without specifying which defendants committed the alleged violations of the FDCPA, plaintiff generally asserts that the defendants made various false or misleading representations in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Grest made false or misleading representations. Additionally, plaintiff states that he requested verification of the debt in June 2016, but did not receive a response—an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. ... Aegis Mortgage Corporation is not a party to this case, and plaintiff does not allege facts to support his § 1692g claim against any of the named defendants.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not prohibit a debt collector from seeking payment of an untariffed cellular-service debt that is timely under the applicable state statute of limitations.

Mixon v. Contract Callers, Inc. · filed 2021-03-24(e), (f)

Since Castro was decided, federal courts have agreed that state law claims aimed at collecting debts incurred from the non-payment of untariffed charges can be pursued in compliance with the relevant state statute of limitations. This Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Castro that the statute of limitations set by Illinois applies here. Therefore, Mixon has not stated a cause of action for false, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable debt collection in violation of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not make a debt-collection letter false or misleading merely because the consumer did not recognize or previously transact with the assignee, when the letter accurately identifies the assignee as the purchaser and current owner of the original debt.

Hernandez v. Oliphant Financial, LLC · filed 2021-08-13(e)(2)(A), (e)(10)

The Court holds that this theory is specious, and although Plaintiff may not have known any better, her counsel certainly did. On this record, it is an uncontested fact that the letter attached here as an Appendix, which forms the basis of each count of the Amended Complaint, is entirely true. The letter is not false or misleading under either the FDCPA or FCCPA. ... Under the “least sophisticated consumer” standard, the letter is clear, plain, and understandable.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with collecting a debt.

Amelina v. Selene Finance LP · filed 2021-09-20(e)

Moreover, even if Selene qualified as a debt collector under the FDCPA, the FAC fails to state a FDCPA claim with respect to at least the first and second notices of error. ... Selene’s alleged actions, or lack thereof, with respect to Amelina’s loss mitigation requests were not “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”

Section 1692e prohibits false representations and deceptive means in debt collection, assessed from the perspective of an unsophisticated consumer.

Mayfield v. LTD Financial Services, L.P. · filed 2021-09-30(e)(2)(A), (10)

Section 1692e provides a non-exhaustive list of unlawful practices, including “[t]he false representation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” and “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” ... In sum, I find that the phrase “we are not obligated to renew this offer” is not misleading to support Mayfield’s FDCPA claim. However, I find that the phrase “selecting a repayment option and payment by the due date will settle this debt in full with the current creditor” is not so clear that it may be deemed FDCPA-compliant as a matter of law.

Section 1692e(10) requires a plaintiff to specifically allege a false representation or deceptive means used to collect or attempt to collect a debt; failure to honor a settlement agreement alone is insufficient.

SNODGRASS v. TSAROUHIS LAW GROUP, LLC · filed 2021-12-01(e)(10)

Not abiding by the terms of a settlement agreement is not, in and of itself – and without additional allegations as to specific violative actions taken or false statements made – use of a false representation or deceptive means.

Section 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, but identifying a collector’s authorized collection account and its opening date did not plausibly violate it; the court likewise found no factual support for §§ 1692d or 1692f claims.

Labarr v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC. · filed 2022-05-19(d), (e), and (f)

Plaintiff failed to provide any well-pleaded factual allegations to support her claim that Defendant’s collection of Plaintiff’s debt caused misrepresentations to appear on Plaintiff’s Experian credit report. ... Therefore, Plaintiff failed to provide any well pleaded factual that any portion of Defendant’s debt collection was unlawful or caused a misrepresentation regarding the ownership of Plaintiff’s account to appear on her Experian credit in violation of the F.D.C.P.A. ... For these reasons, Plaintiff failed to allege well pleaded factual allegations to support her 15 U.S.C. § 1692d claim. ... For these reasons, Plaintiff failed to set forth any well pleaded allegations to support her 15 U.S.C. § 1692f claim.

The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable means to collect a debt, including collecting without documentation establishing the collector’s entitlement to it.

Lizarraga-Davis v. Transworld Systems Inc. · filed 2022-07-15(a)(6), (e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), and (f)

A debt collector’s suit to collect on a debt that it is not entitled to collect, because it lacks the requisite documentation, violates § 1692f (prohibiting use of “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect on a debt), § 1692e(2)(A) (prohibiting use of misrepresentation regarding “the character, amount, or legal status” of the debt); § 1692e(5) (prohibiting use of “deceptive means” to collect on a debt), and § 1692e(10) (prohibiting use of “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect on a debt).

Sections 1692e and 1692f bar misleading debt-collection representations and unfair collection methods, including attempting to collect an amount not authorized by the underlying agreement.

Remler v. Cona Elder Law, PLLC · filed 2022-09-29(e), (f)

If proven, this discrepancy would constitute not only a misstatement of the obligation but would also be misleading in that it would represent to the “least sophisticated consumer” that there was no underlying agreement between the insurance company and the provider for in-network services, thus inducing the debtor to pay a higher amount than owed, in violation of § 1692e. ... Should Remler prove that Cona overstated the amount due as a result of its own negligence, such an attempt to collect an amount not authorized by the underlying agreement would present a violation of § 1692f.

Section 1692e(2)(A) does not make a creditor's use of a recognizable brand or trade name a false representation when the least sophisticated consumer would understand who the creditor is.

Robinson v. Macy's Inc · filed 2025-03-20(e)(2)(A)

And as was the case in Iadevaio Plaintiff’s allegedly misleading labels are clearly “the use of [a] brand or trade name,” would not confuse the least sophisticated consumer, and thus do not violate the FDCPA. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Exhibits 5 and 6, purportedly produced by a credit bureau, both identify the Instant Account as an “AMEX/DSNB” account. It is apparent, therefore, that the credit bureau fully understood that the account was related to an American Express card issued by DSNB.

Section 1692e prohibits using a false representation in connection with the collection of a debt, including falsely representing that a person owes the debt.

Robinson v. ECollect Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-11-30(e)

Based on these well-pleaded facts, the court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that eCollect violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e in using a false representation in connection with the collection of a debt when it falsely represented that the plaintiff owed a debt in obtaining a garnishment order and in having his wages garnished.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations and unfair or unconscionable means in connection with collecting a debt.

Henry v. Collection Professional, Inc · filed 2024-02-20(e), (f)

In addition, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that a reasonable jury could find the alleged statement to Plaintiff’s husband that the bankruptcy discharge “did not matter” and “that the Defendant had no intention of dismissing [Plaintiff] from [the Collection Lawsuit],” made by someone in Defendant’s law firm, to be a false or misleading representation made in connection with debt collection.

Sections 1692g(b), 1692e, 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) prohibit overshadowing verification rights, misleading representations, and threats of unlawful collection, but a clear distinction between stopping communications and disputing a debt does not violate those provisions.

Johnson v. Alltran Financial, LP · filed 2018-05-07(g)(b), (e), (e)(5), and (e)(10)

Here, in context, Johnson’s right to ask Alltran to cease communication with her does not overshadow her right to verify the debt. ... The conditional statement here captures a truism that while a debt collector may cease communications on request, it may still collect the debt. This statement does not interfere with or overshadow the verification right, nor does it mislead or deceive the unsophisticated consumer. ... Nothing in the Debt Letter would suggest to an unsophisticated consumer that Alltran will continue collecting a consumer’s debt during a verification request or if the debt turns out to be invalid. ... Under Chuway, the Debt Letter is not misleading or confusing to the unsophisticated consumer.

Section 1692f(1) treats overcharging to reinstate a loan and charging default fees on a loan that is no longer in default as attempts to collect money, while section 1692f(6) regulates nonjudicial foreclosure actions lacking an enforceable right to possession.

Randall v. Ditech Fin., LLC · filed 2018-05-24(f)(1), (f)(6)

However, overcharging Randall to reinstate his loan and charging default fees and costs for a loan that is not in default are attempts to collect money and, consequently, are actionable under section 1692f(1). ... Section 1692f prohibits "[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or displacement of property" when the debt collector has no intention of taking possession of the property, or holds "no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest."

The FDCPA does not treat nonjudicial foreclosure activity under a deed of trust as the collection of a debt.

McEwen v. Benedict · filed 2021-04-16(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... However, the activity of nonjudicially foreclosing on property under a deed of trust is not the collection of a “debt” under the FDCPA. See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, __ US __ , 139 S.Ct. 1029, 1037 (2019) —law firm engaged in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings was simply enforcing security interest and not acting as debt collector; Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F3d 568, 571, 575 & fn. 11(9th Cir. 2017) —actions by trustee of deed of trust to facilitate nonjudicial foreclosure (sending notice of default and notice of sale) are not attempts to collect “debt” by “debt collector” under FDCPA. Given that this situation is clearly not encompassed by the FDCPA, the motions to dismiss the FDCPA claim are GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

The FDCPA does not treat foreclosing on a mortgage or giving a consumer the legally required notice of a foreclosure sale as debt-collection activity.

Jackson v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA4/2 · filed 2021-11-15

However, the act of foreclosing on a mortgage loan does not constitute debt collection. (Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1264.) Further, “giving notice of a foreclosure sale to a consumer as required by the Civil Code does not constitute debt collection activity under the FDCPA.” (Ibid.)

Section 1692f does not provide an enforcement mechanism for separate state or federal-law violations, while § 1692e prohibits deceptive representations and threats judged from the perspective of an unsophisticated but reasonable consumer.

Sanchez v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2018-08-14(e), (e)(2), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), and (f)(1)

The provision implies “that state judicial proceedings are outside the scope of § 1692f.” Bentrud, 794 F.3d at 875 (quoting Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2007)). Thus, while subsection (6) is merely one of eight illustrations in a non-exhaustive list, it is highly doubtful that a state action filed to collect on an overdue debt could qualify as an “unfair or unconscionable” act under the FDCPA. Id. Moreover, § 1692f does not even hint at being an enforcement mechanism for other rules of state and federal law. Beler, 480 F.3d at 474. ... For this reason, the Court concludes that Sanchez’s claims under § 1692f and § 1692f(1), to the extent they are based on the mere violation of RESPA, are dismissed.

Section 1692f(8) permits benign language on a debt-collection envelope, and §§ 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) do not make a discounted settlement offer misleading when it uses the Seventh Circuit’s safe-harbor language stating that the collector is not obligated to renew the offer.

Preston v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2018-09-04(f)(8), (e)(2)(A), and (e)(10)

The Court follows these authorities in similarly rejecting a literal interpretation of § 1692f(8). In this case, MCM’s use of the phrase “TIME SENSITIVE DOCUMENT” on the envelope it sent Preston does not create any privacy concerns for Preston or expose potentially embarrassing information by giving away the fact that the letter is from a debt collector. ... The Court therefore concludes that MCM’s use of this language on the envelope falls within the benign language exception and does not violate § 1692f(8), meaning Preston cannot state a claim for a violation of § 1692f(8). ... Because MCM properly employed Evory’s safe harbor language to address any concerns raised by its discount offer and time-sensitive language, the Court finds that MCM did not violate § 1692e(2)(A) or e(10).

Section 1692f(8) prohibits any non-exempt language or symbol on a debt-collection envelope, without a benign-language exception, while §§ 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) do not make a discounted settlement offer misleading when it uses the Seventh Circuit’s safe-harbor language stating that the collector is not obligated to renew the offer.

Preston v. Midland Credit Management · filed 2020-01-21(f)(8), (e)(2)(A), and (e)(10)

In sum, the meaning of § 1692f(8) is clear: When a debt collector communicates with consumers through the mails, it may not use any language or symbol on the envelope except for its business name or address, as long as the name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business. ... The inclusion of this phrase thus violates § 1692f(8), and the district court erred in dismissing the claim set forth in Count I of Mr. Preston’s complaint. ... The inclusion of this language cured any misimpression that an unsophisticated consumer might have formed concerning the meaning of the settlement offers. ... Consequently, the district court did not err in dismissing the claim set forth in Counts III and IV of Mr. Preston’s complaint.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector's notice to clearly identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed, but it does not require the literal phrase "current creditor" when the creditor can be understood from the notice.

GLASS v. AFNI, INC. · filed 2019-10-28(a)(2)

The only reasonable interpretation of the collection letter is that “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed” as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) is Affirm Operational Loans III Trust. Although the let−ter does not use the phrase “current cred−itor,” the letter identifies the original creditor as Cross River Bank and identifies the only other creditor as Affirm Operational Loans III Trust. The “basic logical deduction[] and inference[]” from the letter is that the only other listed creditor is the current creditor. Wahl, 556 F.3d at 645. The FDCPA does not require the explicit use of the phrase “current creditor.”

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector to clearly identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed, and ambiguous identification as the current owner may violate the FDCPA.

Africano-Domingo v. Miller and Steeno, P.C. · filed 2020-01-16(a)(2)

While debt collectors may not need to use Section 1692g’s exact terms, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants violated Section 1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA by using ambiguous language to identify the current creditor.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector to identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed; naming a retailer that services the account as the collector’s client does not satisfy the requirement when another entity owns the debt.

Bryan v. Credit Control, LLC · filed 2020-04-03(g)(a)(2)

By 2017, Capital One had replaced Chase as the “credit grantor,” making Capital One, not Chase and certainly not Kohl’s, the creditor to whom the debt was owed. Thus, since the collection letter did not identify Capital One at all, it did not comply with Section 1692g. Accordingly, the district court erred when it granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Credit Control.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires disclosure of the current creditor's name without an additional materiality requirement, while §§ 1692e and 1692f require proof that a misleading or unfair communication would confuse an unsophisticated consumer, which may require extrinsic evidence when not plainly deceptive.

RHODES v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC · filed 2020-07-21(g)(a)(2), (e), (f)

The FDCPA required Enhanced Recovery's letter to identify the "creditor to whom the debt is owed" in a manner "clear[] enough that the recipient would likely understand it." ... Even if Kohl's could be considered a creditor under the FDCPA, it is clearly not the "creditor to whom the debt is owed," despite its role as servicer of the account. ... Rather, the undisputed evidence makes clear that Capital One, the issuer and financial backer of the Kohl's account, is the creditor. ... Thus, on its face, the letter failed to disclose the information required by § 1692g(a)(2).

Section 1692f(6)(A) bars repossession when the collector lacks a present right to possess the property, with that right determined by applicable state self-help repossession law.

Hart · filed 2025-10-21(f)(6)(A)

The FDCPA bars repossession without a “present right to possession of the property,” 15 USC § 1692f(6)(A), and one’s right to possession is determined by “the applicable state self-help repossession statute.”

The FDCPA’s debt-collector provisions do not apply to a holder collecting its own debt, and FDCPA claims have a one-year statute of limitations.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, ETC. VS. STEVEN SCHEFERS (F-015174-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-09-26(a)(6), (k)(d)

In a cogent and comprehensive opinion, the judge correctly concluded that the FDCPA does not apply to this case because plaintiff is attempting "to collect its own debt" as holder of the note and mortgage as opposed to another entity. Furthermore, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to FDPCA violations expired on December 14, 2006. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

The FDCPA applies to attempts to collect consumer debts by debt collectors and imposes a one-year limitations period on civil actions.

WISHNIA v. US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION · filed 2021-03-10(a)(6), (k)(d)

It is unlawful for a defendant debt collector to violate a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect a debt from a plaintiff consumer. Park v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 15-2867, 2015 WL 6579686, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2015); 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). Here, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim does not allege that Defendants are debt collectors within the meaning of the statute and affirmatively pleads facts that suggest US Bank was foreclosing upon a debt that it believed was owed to it as a mortgage lender. (Compl. ¶ 17 (“MERS assigned the First Mortgage to US Bank”); D.E. 17 at 26 (acknowledging that “[t]he Complaint does not state one way or another if US Bank was a ‘debt collector’”).) Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim seems to have far surpassed the applicable one-year limitations period. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k)(d); see Compl. ¶ 85 (basing FDCPA claim on Defendants’ pre-2015 actions). As a result, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim will be dismissed.

Section 1692d(5) prohibits repeatedly causing a telephone to ring or engaging anyone in telephone conversation with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, and protects any person at the called number, not only consumers.

Hayes v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC · filed 2018-09-26(d)(5)

Section § 1692d states, “A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Section 1692d(5) specifically prohibits a debt collector from “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). ... Here, Plaintiff alleges facts showing an intent to harass. ... In light of Wright, and the fact that Plaintiff alleges he demanded the calls to stop on numerous occasions, Plaintiff has alleged facts to show a plausible violation of the FDCPA with regard to § 1692d(5).

Section 1692d(5) prohibits repeatedly or continuously causing a telephone to ring or engaging someone in conversation with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass.

Laccinole v. Rausch,Sturm,Israel,Enerson & Hornik LLP · filed 2022-11-15(d)(5)

Although a caller’s intent if often a question for a jury, summary judgment is appropriate “where the volume and pattern of calls demonstrates an intent to contact debtors rather than an intent to annoy, abuse, or harass them.” ... Here, the only reasonable conclusion from the evidence is that RSIEH attempted to contact a third-party debtor, not harass Mr. Laccinole.

Section 1692a(6)(F) excludes a person servicing a loan that was not in default when the person began servicing it from the definition of debt collector.

Mason v. Fremont Investment & Loan · filed 2018-10-25(a)(6)(F)

Mason’s admission that he defaulted on the loan in 2012 establishes that the loan was not in default when Ocwen began servicing the loan in 2006. The district court did not err in dismissing Mason’s FDCPA claim because Ocwen was not a debt collector under the Act.

A mortgage servicer is not a debt collector under the FDCPA when the loan was not in default when the servicer acquired it.

SCALERCIO-ISENBERG v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC. · filed 2020-09-30(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)

The FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The statute excludes “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” § 1692a(6)(F) (emphasis added). Therefore, “the servicer of a residential mortgage loan is not a ‘debt collector’ if the loan in question is not in default when acquired by the servicer.” Block, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 588 (citations omitted).

Section 1692a(6)(F) excludes a mortgage servicer from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” when the loan was not in default when servicing began, while § 1692k(d) requires an action within one year after the violation.

DeCotis v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2022-11-22(a)(6)(F), (k)(d)

A plaintiff must bring a claim for a violation of the FDCPA “within one year of the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... In any event, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that SLS was acting as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. As this Court has previously held, [m]ortgage servicing companies such as [SLS] are not considered debt collectors under the FDCPA unless the servicer obtained the servicing rights when the debt was in default. ... There is no allegation that the loan at issue was in default when SLS took over as the mortgage servicer for DeCotis in December, 2014. Thus, the motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff’s FDCPA claim will be allowed.

The FDCPA generally regulates debt collectors rather than creditors, and defines a debt collector by whether its business principally or regularly collects debts owed another.

Echeverria v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2022-12-19(a)(6)

Although the FDCPA provides for the validation of debts upon a consumer’s request, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, the FDCPA generally only regulates debt collectors, not creditors, and the Amended Complaint has not alleged that defendants are debt collectors within the meaning of the statute. ... Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that SLS is a “mortgage servicing company” engaged in “buying, selling, securitizing and/or servicing mortgages,” and therefore FDCPA claims cannot be brought against it. ... As for Gulf Harbour, the Amended Complaint does not allege that Gulf Harbour is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. Accordingly, plaintiff's FDCPA claims will be dismissed.

Section 1692g(a)(4) requires a debt-validation notice to state that, after a written dispute, the collector will mail verification or a copy of the judgment, but the notice need not include the judgment language when no judgment exists and the letter otherwise conveys the required information.

Merrill v. Johnson Mark LLC · filed 2019-06-05(g)(a)(4)

Here, Defendants’ notice complied with the requirements set forth in Section 1692g. Plaintiff did not allege that there was a judgment against her, so any language regarding a judgment would have been inapplicable and possibly misleading. Furthermore, as a whole, the letter conveys the information required by §1692g. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding an informational injury are unfounded.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector to identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed, while § 1692g(b) requires a validation notice that is not overshadowed or contradicted; § 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading collection representations.

Taylor v. American Coradius International, LLC · filed 2020-08-05(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), (e), (e)(10)

The FDCPA requires that debt collectors convey the identity of the creditor to whom the recipient owes a debt. ... And there is simply no requirement in the statute that a debt-collection notice clearly describe every step in the chain of ownership that the debt travels to arrive in the current creditor’s possession. Rather, the statute requires identification only of “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). ... Debt collectors must provide consumers an address to send written dispute letters. ... A debt-collection letter fails to adequately convey the validation notice if other language in the letter “overshadows” or “contradicts” the validation notice. ... Although a letter’s formatting can “overshadow” a validation notice, the formatting here comes nowhere close. ... Neither the direction to “see [the] second page” nor the box containing online payment information improperly “overshadows” the validation notice in this letter.

Sections 1692e and 1692g(4)-(5) do not make a clear collection letter misleading merely because it contains multiple addresses, safe-harbor language about renewing a payment offer, or validation notices on the reverse side in legible type with a prominent instruction to turn the page.

Dillard v. FBCS, Inc. · filed 2020-08-24(e), (g)(4)-(5)

The collection letter plainly states that the recipient has a right to dispute the debt, and to request information about the original creditor. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims that the collection letter violates Sections 1692e and 1692g(4)-(5) because the letter (and Defendant’s website) contain multiple addresses are dismissed.

Sections 1692e and 1692g require debt-collection letters to be clear to the least sophisticated consumer, including by allowing oral disputes under § 1692g(a)(3), clearly identifying the creditor, and avoiding language or formatting that overshadows the validation notice.

Watson v. Premiere Credit of North America, LLC · filed 2020-09-27(e)(10), (g)(a)(2), (g)(a)(3)

The court finds that least sophisticated consumer reading the instant letter would understand that the validity of the debt could be disputed orally, and would not interpret the letter to mean that any dispute must be made in writing. ... Because defendant has made plain that it is collecting the debt “for” College Assist, the court finds that the identity of the creditor is clear, even to the least sophisticated consumer. ... The court finds that formatting of the letter does not overshadow or distract from the validation notice or otherwise mislead the least sophisticated consumer. ... Because the inquiry for § 1692g and § 1692e is essentially the same, this court dismisses plaintiff’s claims under § 1692e for the same reasons it dismissed the § 1692g claims.

Sections 1692g(a)(2) and (a)(3) require a debt collector to identify the creditor and provide a thirty-day dispute notice, while § 1692g(b) bars collection communications that overshadow or contradict those rights, and § 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations.

Fogle v. American Coradius International, LLC · filed 2021-03-23(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), (e), (e)(10)

The same analysis applies here, as it is difficult for the Court to conceive of a way Defendant could have made more explicit that Synchrony Bank is the “creditor.” ... A debt collector must clearly convey the validation notice required by § 1692g to the debtor in a manner that is not “overshadowed or contradicted by other language” such that “it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights.” ... Here, when reading the Fogle Letter in its entirety, the least sophisticated consumer would not overlook the validation notice because of the instruction to turn the page. ... Here, the Fogle Letter is not misleading, even though it contains multiple addresses. ... Plaintiff Fogle’s claims based on multiple addresses fail as a matter of law.

Section 1692g(a)(4) requires a debt collector’s validation notice to explain that a consumer’s written dispute within thirty days triggers verification of the debt or judgment and mailing of that verification or judgment.

LESZCZYNSKI v. D&A SERVICES, LLC · filed 2021-04-19(g)(a)(4)

Read in its entirety, the letter apprised Leszczynski of his obligations under Section 1692(g) and does not support his FDCPA claims.

Section 1692a(3) covers a natural person whom a debt collector alleges owes a debt, even if the person claims not to owe it.

Loja v. Main St. Acquisition Corp. · filed 2018-10-18(a)(3)

We therefore hold that the definition of "consumer" under the FDCPA includes consumers who have been alleged by debt collectors to owe debts that the consumers themselves contend they do not owe.

The FDCPA treats a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt as a consumer, including a person mistakenly identified as a debtor.

Woodard v. O'Brien · filed 2020-12-04(3)

Moveover, the FDCPA itself defines a “consumer” as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(3) (emphasis added).

Section 1692a(3) protects only a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay a debt; an LLC member is not personally a consumer merely because the LLC owns property subject to the debt.

Taborda · filed 2026-03-23(a)(3)

Given this timeline, we agree with Freedom that Taborda wasn’t a “consumer” or “debtor” for purposes of the FDCPA and the FCCPA because he wasn’t “obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3); FLA. STAT. § 559.55(8); see also MTD at 10 (“[A]ll relevant events involve Ashbry LLC, not Taborda individually . . . even if Ashbry LLC had an obligation or alleged obligation to pay off Fernandez’s mortgage, which it did not, that is not an obligation or alleged obligation of Taborda himself.”).

Section 1692g(a)(4) requires a debt collector's written notice to state that a consumer may dispute the debt or any portion of it and receive verification, while section 1692e(10) does not make a notice misleading when its language, read as a whole, clearly preserves that right.

Conde v. Webcollex, LLC · filed 2018-11-26(g)(a)(4); (e)(10)

Webcollex’s letter does not violate § 1692a(g)(4) because it explicitly states that Mr. Conde can “dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof.” D.E. 1 at 2. So Mr. Conde cannot state a claim that Webcollex omitted the necessary notice. We turn then to Mr. Conde’s second claim, that the wording of Webcollex’s letter is misleading because the second sentence does not repeat the “any portion” language when referring to the debt. ... We disagree. Webcollex’s letter unequivocally stated that a consumer could “notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof.” Doc. 1 at 2. The letter does not limit how a consumer may notify the office, whether orally or in writing. Nor does Webcollex distinguish its later statements by specifying that they only apply to the entire debt. As the district court ably explained, “reading the letter as a whole clearly communicates that the recipient has the right to challenge ‘any portion’ of the debt.” District Court Op. at 5.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year of the violation, with the period generally running from the date of the violation rather than its discovery.

McDonagh v. SN Servicing Corporation · filed 2021-03-12(k)(d)

“[A]bsent the application of an equitable doctrine, the statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) begins to run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not the date on which the violation is discovered.” ... Here, the very latest date that Plaintiffs could have filed an FDCPA claim is one year from the latest “discrete act,” which would have allegedly occurred on January 8, 2019. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims are time-barred because the lawsuit should have been filed by January 8, 2020, but was not filed until June 24, 2020.

When the FTC enforces the FDCPA, the FTCA standard for individual liability applies.

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Moses · filed 2019-01-11(l)(a)

The FTC, then, is enforcing the FDCPA pursuant to its authority under the FTCA. And because the FTC can enforce compliance with the FDCPA only by employing the FTCA, and "in the same manner as a violation" of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a), it follows, we conclude, that the FTCA individual liability standard applies.

The FDCPA permits direct or vicarious liability of a principal for an agent’s debt-collection violations under general agency principles.

Campbell v. Olson Associates PC · filed 2024-07-23

Because the FDCPA is a federal statute, the court applies general principles of liability as opposed to Utah law. Generally, a principal may be held either directly or vicariously liable for the torts of their agent. An agency relationship arises when both the principal and agent manifest that the agent will act on behalf of the principal and be subject to the principal’s control. A principal may be held directly liable for the torts of an agent when the principal directs or ratifies the agent’s conduct. Likewise, a principal may be held vicariously liable for the torts of employee-style agents committed while within the scope of the agency relationship.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making false or misleading statements in connection with collecting a debt and does not allow an unclean-hands defense based on the consumer’s conduct.

Francisco v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2019-03-15(e)

Because the unclean hands defense focuses exclusively on “the plaintiff’s fault,” Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 1985)), the court joins several district courts across the country and holds that unclean hands is not an affirmative defense to a violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), and 1692g(a)(1) require debt-collection statements about a debt and its amount to be nonmisleading and understandable, but a letter that might possibly confuse an unsophisticated consumer requires extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion to support liability.

Lemke v. Escallate, LLC · filed 2019-03-19(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (g)(a)(1)

With the Escallate letter falling squarely in the second Ruth category, the court must grant summary judgment for Defendant Escallate on Plaintiff’s § 1692e claims. When collection letters “might possibly mislead or deceive the unsophisticated consumer . . . plaintiffs may prevail only by producing extrinsic evidence, such as consumer surveys, to prove that unsophisticated consumers do in fact find the challenged statements misleading or deceptive.” ... The Seventh Circuit has explained that § 1692g(a)(1) requires a collection letter to “state [the amount of debt] clearly enough that the recipient is likely to understand it.” ... In the case before this court, Escallate did “stop there”; the letter makes no mention of any need to request a current balance. The collection letter clearly states a “balance due,” and though Plaintiff argues that the “accrued interest” implies the balance may change in the future, the statute simply requires the debt collector to communicate the amount of the alleged debt. Escallate’s letter is not nearly as misleading as the language used in the Chuway letter, which, on its face, suggested that the letter did not disclose the actual amount due, in direct violation of § 1692g(a)(1).

Sections 1692g and 1692e require debt-collection communications to provide validation information and prohibit materially false, deceptive, or misleading statements, but a bare assertion that no debt is owed is insufficient to plead a violation of section 1692e.

COHEN v. MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, LLC · filed 2022-05-18(g)(a)(1)-(5), (g)(b), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10)

Defendant’s letter conforms to these requirements and states that Plaintiff has 30 days to dispute the debt or obtain verification of the debt. ... I find that Defendant’s letter would apprise the least sophisticated debtor of the essentials outlined by the FDCPA: the alleged debt’s amount, the entity to which it is allegedly owed, and the right to contest and obtain verification of the alleged debt. ... Whether or not Plaintiff is in fact indebted to Defendant, the FDCPA claim fails because the letter complied with the requirements of § 1692g to notify Plaintiff of his rights. ... Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a violation of § 1692e because he fails to provide any factual detail to support his claim that he owes no debt to either Defendant or Regional. ... The FDCPA is not a guarantee against all mistaken billing; it is an antifraud statute. A letter stating an amount purportedly owed, giving the opportunity to contest it, and offering to verify it on request is not, on its face, necessarily fraudulent. Something more is required in the way of factual allegations.

Sections 1692e(5), 1692f(1), and 1692k(c) respectively treat filing a time-barred collection lawsuit as a threat of unlawful action, limit § 1692f(1) to challenges to the amount collected rather than the validity or method of collection, and do not provide a bona fide-error defense for a debt collector's mistaken interpretation of state law.

Thompson v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2019-03-25(e)(5), (f)(1), (k)(c)

Filing a time-barred lawsuit to collect a debt falls within the confines of § 1692e(5), which prohibits "[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken." ... Because Thompson does not challenge the amount of the debt owed, but rather, challenges Midland's act of filing a time-barred lawsuit to collect the debt in its entirety, § 1692f(1) is inapplicable. ... The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the bona fide error defense is not available to Midland based on its mistaken understanding of Kentucky law.

Section 1692e can be violated by a collection letter seeking payment on a time-barred debt when an implicit threat can reasonably be inferred, even without an express threat of litigation, while § 1692f does not make attempts to collect time-barred debt per se unfair or unconscionable.

Holzman v. Malcolm S. Gerald & Associates, Inc. · filed 2019-04-05(e), (f)

We likewise conclude that with regard to a collection letter seeking payment on a time-barred debt, an express threat of litigation is not required to state a claim for relief under § 1692e so long as one can reasonably infer an implicit threat. ... Although we find that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that Defendants’ collection letter was misleading under § 1692e, we reject Plaintiff’s claim that the general practice of attempting to collect on time-barred debt is per se unfair or unconscionable in violation of 1692f of the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit a debt collector from offering payment options for a time-barred debt without clearly disclosing that the debt is not legally enforceable and that paying or promising to pay may revive the statute of limitations.

Wheeler v. Midland Funding LLC · filed 2020-03-26(e), (f)

Because the SOL Disclosure did not note the risks that came with paying or promising to pay a time-barred debt, and because the website did not include any discussion at all about the statute of limitations, Defendants plainly violated the FDCPA and extrinsic evidence is not required.

Section 1692e does not impose liability for a communication directed solely to a debtor’s attorney without a threat to contact the debtor, and a straightforward attempt to collect a time-barred debt is not deceptive absent an implication that the debt is enforceable in court.

Plumb v. Professional Account Services, Inc. · filed 2020-05-13(e)

It is undisputed that the FDCPA does not prohibit attempts to collect a time- barred debt but that it does prohibit any attempts to collect such a debt by false representation or deceptive means.

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from threatening legal action it does not intend to take and from collecting a time-barred debt without warning that a partial payment could reset the statute of limitations.

Greene v. Accredited Management Solutions, LLC · filed 2022-08-02(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10)

A debt collector violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) when it threatens to take legal action that it has no intention of taking. ... A debt collector also violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), and 1692e(10) where it attempts to collect a time-barred debt from a consumer without also advising the consumer that a partial payment would reset the statute of limitations. ... Taking the Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendant United Merchant also violated the FDCPA in several ways, including by threatening to sue the Plaintiff to collect the alleged debt when the statute of limitations had run, threatening to sue the Plaintiff to collect the alleged debt when Defendant United Merchant had no intention of filing such a lawsuit, and failing to disclose to the Plaintiff that making a partial payment or promising to pay the alleged debt may extend the statute of limitations.

The FDCPA defines a debt collector to include a person who regularly collects debts, excludes collection of debts not in default when obtained, requires an initial notice to identify the creditor, treats a materially wrong creditor name as misleading, and provides a bona fide-error defense only when reasonable preventive procedures were maintained.

Ferris v. Transworld Systems, Inc. · filed 2019-03-28(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)(iii), (g)(a)(2), (e)(2)(A), (k)(c)

According to the language of the statute, a debt collector may conduct some business other than debt collecting—debt collection must simply be its “principal purpose” or something it does “regularly.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... That is, a company is only a debt collector when the debts that it obtains are in default at the time it obtains them. ... Convergent also does not dispute that Ferris’s notice incorrectly identified his creditor, Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 29, a clear violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). ... The materiality requirement is met here, and no reasonable jury could find otherwise. ... No reasonable jury could find that Convergent did not violate §§ 1692e and 1692g. ... To succeed on the bona fide error defense, Convergent also must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the error occurred “notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Procedures that qualify as reasonably adapted to avoid mistakes like Convergent’s must be institutionalized and systematic; the Seventh Circuit has stressed that “procedures are ‘processes that have mechanical or other such regular orderly steps.’” ... As a result, although there are very few disputes about the actual facts here, a reasonable jury could find either for Ferris or Convergent on the issue of whether Convergent’s procedures were reasonably adapted to prevent mistakes like this one.

Section 1692e prohibits materially false representations about a debt and deceptive means used to collect it, including misstatements about the debt’s character or amount.

Jackson v. Sagal · filed 2019-03-29(e)(2)(A), (10)

The FDCPA prohibits "[t]he false representation of ... the character, amount, or legal status of any debt" and "[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), (10). Because the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, a consumer need only prove one violation to trigger liability. ... A misrepresentation must be "material" to violate § 1692e. ... Courts analyze the language in a debt collection letter alleged to violate the FDCPA from the perspective of the "least sophisticated debtor."

Sections 1692e, 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) prohibit false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, while Section 1692g(a)(1) requires the initial communication to state the amount of the debt clearly enough that an unsophisticated consumer is unlikely to misunderstand it.

Duarte v. Client Services, Inc. · filed 2019-03-29(e), (e)(5), (e)(10), (g)(a)(1)

An unsophisticated consumer, like plaintiff, could reasonably have believed that she would incur other charges if she did not pay the debt. ... Accordingly, this Court finds that plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of Section 1692e of the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the Court finds, on these facts, that plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of Section 1692g(a)(1) of the FDCPA. ... An unsophisticated consumer is protected from receiving false impressions of their options when safe harbor language is included in a settlement offer. By including the safe harbor language, CSI’s settlement letters were not misleading under Section 1692(e).

Section 1692e prohibits false representations and deceptive or unintended collection actions, so a lawsuit filed without meaningful attorney involvement or without intent to prove the debt can plausibly violate §§ 1692e(3), (5), and (10).

TROUTMAN v. JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS LLC · filed 2019-06-27(e)(3), (e)(5), and (e)(10)

However, the plain language of the FDCPA focuses on specific false representations: the “false representation or implication . . . that any communication is from an attorney” or “the use of a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(3),(10). The Defendants’ theory appears to be that even if a complaint deceptively indicates that it was prepared with meaningful attorney involvement, there is no FDCPA liability if the attorney becomes meaningfully involved later on. However, there is nothing in the FDCPA, and the Defendants cite no authority, to support such a carve-out. Here, Troutman’s allegation is that the complaint was filed without meaningful attorney involvement. That plausibly alleges a FDCPA violation, regardless of whether Fierman became more involved later. ... Troutman alleges that violates § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA, which prohibits “[t]he threat to take any action . . . that is not intended to be taken.” ... Taking Troutman’s allegations as true, however, it is possible that JCS and RVO knew they could not prove the debt and never intended to prove the debt at the time the complaint was filed. The possibility that Fierman later attempted to prove it, allegedly through false testimony, does not change that. Troutman has stated a FDCPA claim against JCS and RVO.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a debt collector's validation notice to effectively convey that a consumer's dispute must be in writing, and related collection-letter language does not violate § 1692e(10) when it neither contradicts nor overshadows that requirement.

CHENG v. SRA ASSOCIATES, INC. · filed 2019-05-31(g)(a)(3), (e)(10)

A plain reading of the disputed paragraph of text is enough to show that Defendant effectively conveyed the writing requirement for disputing a debt. The Court recognizes that the validation notice could be clearer by qualifying the first sentence, about dispute of debt, with an additional “in writing” clause. Instead, Defendant’s verification notice mirrors FDCPA sections 1692g(a)(3)-(5), including 1692g(a)(3)’s silence on the method of dispute. As with sections 1692g(a)(3)-(5), the overall message of the validation notice is still apparent, and the paragraph successfully conveys the writing requirement, even from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor. Written dispute is clearly the debtor action required to trigger verification of the debt. ... It would require a “bizarre and idiosyncratic” interpretation of the letter as a whole to conclude that the header’s telephone number and instructions for mailing payment overrode the validation notice’s explicit rules governing a dispute. ... Defendant’s validation notice concisely laid out the requirements for making a dispute, and neither the inclusion of the telephone number nor the instructions for sending payment to Defendant’s mailing address could be understood as creating a second, alternative meaning upon which a debtor could rely.

Section 1692g(a) requires a validation notice to explain the consumer’s dispute rights, including that oral disputes prevent assumption of validity while written disputes trigger verification and creditor-information rights, and § 1692e(10) bars false or deceptive collection representations.

Denciger v. Network Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2020-10-07(g)(a)(3)-(5), (e)(10)

Here, however, the letter explicitly states that the consumer may dispute the debt orally or in writing, and the reverse side contains an adequate validation notice. At bottom, then, the sentence on the first side would cause the letter to violate the FDCPA only if the consumer did not continue to the reverse side. This alleged defect falls short of meeting the least-sophisticated-consumer standard. | therefore conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

Section 1692g(a)(3) permits a consumer to dispute a debt orally, while section 1692g(b) bars collection activity during the validation period from overshadowing or contradicting the consumer's validation rights.

Wertzberger v. Shapiro, Dicaro & Barak, LLC · filed 2021-02-01(g)(a)(3), (g)(b)

A consumer may orally dispute the validity of a debt under section 1692g(a)(3), as the right to dispute a debt is “the most fundamental of [the rights] set forth in [section] 1692g.” ... Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant denied his right to dispute the debt when he attempted to do so in the July 23, 2019 telephone call. ... However, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that the particular actions Defendant took to collect the debt — filing a lawsuit in state court and serving him with a summons and complaint but no reaffirmation of his thirty-day validation rights — overshadowed the statutory rights identified in the Collection Letter.

Section 1692g does not require a validation notice to state that a consumer’s dispute must be made in writing.

SMALLWOOD v. ALLTRAN FINANCIAL, LP · filed 2019-06-03(g)(a)(3)-(5)

But though both opinions cited Graziano, neither required the validation notice to state, as Smallwood wants, that any dispute must be in writing. No such requirement exists in the Third Circuit.

Section 1692g prohibits debt collectors from sending collection communications during the validation period that overshadow or are inconsistent with the consumer’s right to dispute the debt.

Chambers v. IC Systems, Inc. · filed 2020-06-25(g)

With this admonition in mind, the Court concludes that Defendant’s act of sending the second letter within the initial 30-day validation period violated section 1692g of the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a)(3)-(5) requires debt collectors to include specified disclosures in an initial written communication, and failure to do so can establish FDCPA liability.

Berkowitz v. Universal Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2020-07-16(g)(a)(3)-(5)

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FDCPA by failing to include the disclosures required by § 1692g(a)(3)-(5) in its initial written communication with Plaintiff. (ECF No. 10-1 at 8-10.) The Court finds that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish defendant’s liability under the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a) requires a validation notice to state the amount of the debt but does not require the notice to include its date.

Bergida v. PlusFour, Inc. · filed 2023-10-31(g)(a)

Based on a plain reading of the statute’s text, validation notices must include “the amount of the debt,” but need not include the date of the notice. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a); cf. Stimpson, 944 F.3d at 1198-99 (refusing to read additional requirements in to the FDCPA because “[g]enerally, the inclusion of certain terms in a statute implies the exclusion of others” (quotation omitted)). Upon reading the letter, the least sophisticated debtor would understand “Total amount of the debt now: $103.69” to represent “the amount of the debt.” Therefore, Bergida has not plausibly alleged that the letter violates § 1692g(a).

Section 1692g(a)(2), (3), and (5) protect consumers’ concrete interests in receiving clear and accurate debt-collection notices, and alleged violations can satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement when they create a material risk of harm, without proof of additional harm.

Hargis v. Equinox Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2019-06-03(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(5)

In this context, it is clear that the provisions of § 1692g were intended to protect consumers’ concrete rights to be free from misleading or otherwise unfair initial communications from debt collectors. ... Assuming, arguendo, that Equinox’s identification of Dr. ZZZ’s as the “Original Creditor” constitutes a violation of § 1692g(a)(2), the failure to clearly identify “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed” poses a real risk of harm. ... Instead, a violation of this particular procedural right “is sufficient in and of itself to constitute concrete injury in fact because Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete interests and the procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to that concrete interest.” ... Thus, a failure to provide accurate information concerning how to dispute a debt entails a significant risk that consumers will forego disputing a debt altogether and lose important consumer protections—even if the debt collector, in practice, handles disputes differently (and more generously) than is suggested by the collection letter itself. ... Thus, the Court finds that Equinox’s alleged failure to properly disclose information concerning requests for the identity of the original creditor entailed sufficient risk to satisfy the concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement without Plaintiff needing to allege or prove additional harm.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act permits a debt collector to use safe-harbor language stating the amount of a debt that varies from day to day, provided the letter accurately states that additional charges are possible.

Avila v. Reliant Capital Solutions, LLC · filed 2019-06-04

In Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC (Avila I), we adopted safe‐harbor language to “satisfy a debt collector’s duty to state the amount of debt in cases where the amount varies from day to day.” 817 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 2016). ... Because Reliant’s letter was not inaccurate in stating that “late charges and other charges” were possible, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Avila’s complaint. See Avila I, 817 F.3d at 77.

Sections 1692(e) and 1692(g) do not impose liability when a collection letter states the actual amount due, warns that the amount may increase because of interest or other charges, and provides a way to contact the debt collector under the Avila/Miller safe harbor.

Byrnes v. Eltman Law, P.C. · filed 2019-08-22(e), (g)

In light of the state of the law as described above – a state with which Plaintiff’s counsel is no doubt familiar given counsels’ experience in this area of practice – the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and 15 U.S.C. § 1692g are not viable as a matter of law. Specifically, the safe harbor provision contained in Defendant’s Letter immunizes Defendant from liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Plaintiff’s claims under these provisions of the FDCPA must fail as a result.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, while § 1692g(a)(1) requires written notice of the amount of the debt.

FIORARANCIO v. ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES, P.C. · filed 2019-06-06(e), (g)(a)(1)

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendant falsely represented the amount of his debt in violation of § 1692e which prohibits the use of misleading, deceptive or false representations in the collection of debts. ... The least sophisticated debtor would understand that the amount set forth in the Letter was what was owed and what would be collected, and would not believe that the amount would increase over time. ... There being nothing false or deceptive about the phrase, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § 1692e will be dismissed. ... Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to inform him how much he owed in violation of § 1692g which requires that a debt collector provide a consumer with written notice of “the amount of the debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § 1692g will be dismissed.

Sections 1692e(10) and 1692g prohibit materially misleading debt-collection communications and require a written notice stating the amount of the debt, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Kleinman v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC · filed 2020-02-12(e)(10), (g)

It may be that the dunning letter at issue in this case presents the lowest passing example of a sufficient debt collection notice, but I think it does at least that. There is no question that certain information is not offered in the letter – namely, an explanation for why plaintiff owes $168.39 less than he did at charge-off. But given the format of the table, the wording of the table’s column headings, the express instructions in the body of the letter, and the lack of certain additional variables that could possibly confuse a reader, not even the least sophisticated consumer would be misled into thinking that he owes an amount other than $12,771.57.