15 U.S.C. § 1692

Section 1692a(6) covers persons who regularly collect debts for others, but not a creditor collecting its own debt when the debt was assigned before default and collected by its in-house employees under the creditor’s own name.

Kizer v. Finance America Credit Corp. · filed 1978-08-08(a)(6)

Thus, it clearly appears that the “debt collectors” covered by DCPA are those who regularly collect debts for others and not creditors of consumers even though the debt is created between the consumer and a third person and subsequently assigned to a creditor such as FACC if such assignment is made before default. ... From the record herein, it appears that the mobile home purchased by plaintiffs from Hernando was financed by FACC by the assignment of the retail installment contract to such defendant prior to any alleged default. Furthermore, it is manifestly clear that FACC does not collect or attempt to collect debts owed to another and that any collections made by it are made by its in-house employees under the name of Finance America Credit Corporation. ... We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs have wholly failed to meet their burden in response to defendant’s motion and that, in view of the facts established herein, this court has no jurisdiction under DCPA. Moreover, since we have already concluded that neither § 1331 nor § 1332 provides a sufficient jurisdictional base for the maintenance of this action, sua sponte, we conclude that this action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1692a(6) excludes officers or employees of a state from the Act’s definition of “debt collector.”

Gary v. Spires · filed 1979-03-14(a)(6)

This suit cannot be maintained under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because the defendant Spires is not included as a debt collector under the definitions of the Act and is excluded because he is admittedly an officer or employee of the State of South Carolina. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

Section 1692a(5) defines a debt as an obligation arising from a transaction involving money, property, insurance, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so the FDCPA does not apply to collection of taxes.

Fred G. Staub and Yvonne G. Staub v. G. H. Harris, James P. Harris, and G. H. Harris Associates · filed 1980-07-08(a)(5)

In light of the statutory language and the legislative history limiting the FDCPA to the protection of consumers, we believe the Act does not apply to practices occurring in the course of collection of taxes.

Section 1692a(5) covers an obligation arising from a consumer food purchase even when collection is pursued on a dishonored personal check.

Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. v. Scrimpsher (In Re Scrimpsher) · filed 1982-03-05(a)(5)

Upon this record of affidavits it is undisputed that the Debtor’s “debt” arises from several purchases of food paid by personal checks. ... I must reject this narrow reading of the FDCPA’s operative definition of “debt”.

Section 1692a(6) does not treat a rent-guarantee service as a debt collector when it seeks only reimbursement of amounts it paid to landlords, because those amounts are not debts owed or due another; a credit-reporting service that merely reports subscribers' bad experiences likewise is not acting as a debt collector under the Act.

Alexander v. Moore & Associates, Inc. · filed 1982-12-30(a)(6)

Under the relevant provisions of the Act, a “debt collector” is defined as: ... any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. ... Plaintiffs argue that RENTCHECK is a debt collector because it regularly collects the debts owed by tenants to landlords. The record, however, shows only that RENTCHECK sought to collect on amounts it had to pay the landlords pursuant to its rent guarantee. These are not debts “owed or due another”. ... Plaintiffs also contend that UNI-CHECK is a debt collector within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Act. The record only shows, however, that UNI-CHECK at most simply reports the bad experiences of its subscribers. If this somehow helps its subscribers collect on debts owed to them, such a result does not seem to be a matter falling within the scope of the Act. A contrary ruling would necessarily result in a finding that all credit reporting agencies are also debt collectors, a result which seems far beyond the contemplation of the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Section 1692a(6) treats a creditor's employee as a debt collector when, while collecting the creditor's debt, the employee indicates she works for a third person or denies that she works for the creditor.

Kempf v. Famous Barr Co. · filed 1988-01-22(a)(6)

The definition of "debt collector" thus includes: (1) persons in a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, (2) persons who regularly collect or attempt to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due another, and (3) creditors, who in the process of collecting their own debts, use any names which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. ... The definition of "debt collector" does not include a creditor collecting his own debts so long as the employee acting on behalf of the creditor does not indicate that the employee works for a third person. The creditor will not be deemed a "debt collector" so long as the employee acts "in the name of the creditor" by informing the debtor that she is collecting the debt as an employee of the creditor. Similarly, even though the employee of the creditor regularly collects debts owed to another (i.e. her employer/creditor), the employee is not a "debt collector" so long as the employee acts "in the name of the creditor" by informing the debtor that she is collecting the debt as an employee of the creditor. ... Conversely, if the employee of the creditor collecting the debt on behalf of the creditor indicates to the debtor that she is collecting the debt as an employee of a third person, then the creditor is a "debt collector." Likewise, if the employee of the creditor denies that she is collecting the debt as an employee of the creditor, then the employee is a "debt collector" because the employee collects debts owed to another but does not act "in the name of the creditor."

Section 1692a(6)(B) excludes a person collecting debts for a commonly owned or controlled affiliate when the person’s principal business is not debt collection.

Meads v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. · filed 1988-05-10(a)(6)(B)

There appears to be no reported decision discussing this type of corporate relationship or the (6)(B) exclusion. It appears to the Court, however, that the instant situation is precisely one sought to be excluded under (6)(B), and that neither Citibank nor CCSI are subject to the Act. ... The Court finds that both the language and the intent of the Act support the conclusion that neither CCSI nor Citibank are debt collectors under its provisions.

Section 1692a(6) includes an attorney who performs exclusively legal tasks within the definition of “debt collector” when the principal purpose of the attorney’s business is debt collection.

Matilda Scott, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Sherwood A. Jones Jones & Jones · filed 1992-05-06(a)(6)

Thus, we hold that an attorney performing exclusively legal tasks is not, on that basis alone, precluded from being considered a “debt collector” under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) excludes creditors collecting their own debts and their officers and employees collecting debts for them from the definition of debt collector.

Jonak v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1985-01-04(a)(6)

However, the Act’s protections are limited to the activities of “debt collectors,” the definition of which excludes both creditors seeking to collect their own debts and the officers and employees of creditors collecting debts for the creditors.

Section 1692a(6) treats a person as a debt collector when debt collection is a principal purpose or regular activity, subject to the affiliated-person exception; acquiring a debt already in default is not by itself dispositive.

Griffin v. Bailey & Associates, Inc. · filed 1994-06-21(a)(6)

The fact that defendant acquired Griffin's debt when it was in default would not be dispositive if in fact the collection of debts is not defendant's principal purpose or the principal business of its affiliates. ... Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that defendant has established that neither its nor its affiliates' principal business is the collection of debts.

Section 1692a(6) treats a person who attempts to collect debts owed to another for 639 different individuals during one nine-month period as regularly collecting debts, and therefore as a debt collector, even when debt collection is not the principal purpose of the person's business.

Garrett v. Derbes · filed 1997-04-23(a)(6)

Therefore, we hold that a person who, during a single nine-month period, attempts to collect debts owed another by 639 different individuals "regularly" attempts to collect debts owed another, and thus is a "debt collector" under § 1692a(6).

The FDCPA covers a consumer-payment obligation arising from a consumer transaction even when no credit was extended.

Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-08-15(a)(5)

Extension of credit is not a prerequisite to the existence of a debt covered by the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) treats homeowners’ and condominium assessments as debts when the payment obligation arises from the purchase of the home and serves a personal, family, or household purpose, even without an extension of credit or deferred payment.

Terrence Newman and Michelle Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein & Bright, Limited, David J. Riter and Kathy Riter v. Moss & Blo · filed 1997-09-12(5)

The assessments at issue in this case therefore qualify as “obligation[s] of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). ... More specifically, however, we also believe that the assessments themselves satisfy that statutory requirement. To the extent that the assessments were to be used to improve or maintain commonly-owned areas, that purpose, too, qualifies as “personal, family, or household.”

Section 1692a(5) covers consumer obligations to pay money arising from transactions for personal, family, or household purposes, even when the transaction did not involve an extension of credit or deferred payment.

Romea v. Heiberger & Associates · filed 1997-12-22(a)(5)

Thus, the plain language of the statute clearly embraces consumer obligations to pay money arising out of the relevant class of transactions without regard to whether the underlying transactions involve the extension of credit or the deferral of payment. ... It therefore holds that the Section 711 notice in this case related to a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA.

Under § 1692a(6), a creditor may be deemed a debt collector if it uses an alias or assumed name to collect its own debt, is a single economic entity with the actual debt collector, or controls almost every aspect of the debt collector’s collection practice.

Harrison v. NBD INC. · filed 1998-01-10(a)(6)

To the extent that the defendants’ motion can be deemed a motion for reconsideration of that portion of the Order, the Court has reviewed the defendants’ contentions and adheres to its original decision that ICS may be deemed to be a debt collector if: (1) ICS uses an alias or an assumed name to collect its own debt; (2) ICS and NBD are a single economic entity; or (3) ICS controls almost every aspect of NBD’s debt collection practice.

Section 1692a(5) defines consumer debt broadly to include obligations arising from personal or household transactions, including dishonored checks, without requiring an offer or extension of credit.

Duffy v. Landberg · filed 1998-01-20(a)(5)

For these reasons third-party attempts to collect payment on a dishonored check can be debt collection practices within the meaning of the FDCPA and be subject to its consumer protections.

A dishonored check can evidence a FDCPA debt arising from a consumer transaction; the statute does not require an offer or extension of credit, and tendering the check does not eliminate the payment obligation.

Ernst v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C. · filed 1997-02-25(a)(5)

At that point plaintiff incurs the obligation to pay money. Plaintiffs tender of the cheek does not eliminate this obligation. The statutory language does not in any way hint that the method in which the obligation is incurred is determinative or even relevant to the creation of an obligation.

Section 1692a(5) covers only obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Beaton v. Reynolds, Ridings, Vogt & Morgan, P.L.L.C. · filed 1998-01-15(a)(5)

An individual is a “consumer” under the Act only if he or she has an alleged “debt,” and the Act’s definition of “debt” encompasses only transactions that are entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person whose business principally or regularly involves collecting debts owed to another.

Aquino v. Credit Control Services · filed 1998-03-19(a)(6)

These assertions are not sufficient to place Western Union within the FDGPA’s definition of a debt collector. Western Union never requested that plaintiff contact them directly or that she pay to them the money she purportedly owed. Significantly, plaintiff does not allege that Western Union had any relationship with her creditors other than as a-delivery service. She also fails to allege that she had any contact with Western Union save for receiving the imprinted envelope and reading the letter displaying their emblem. In short, she merely contends that Western Union provided the packaging and delivery of the collection notice. ... This Court is in accord with the similar reasoning and conclusions set forth in all three case which have examined this issue. ... Western Union confined its role in the collection of plaintiffs debt to one of a messenger. Plaintiffs primary grievance seems to be that the “Total Collection Solution” service is an effective means of contacting-delinquent debtors. The Court passes no judgment on the virtue of Western Union’s marketing their services to debt collection agencies, but the provision of such services no more implicates defendant in unfair debt collection practices than would the United States Postal Service’s routine delivery of debt collection letters. Accordingly, Western Union’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs FDCPA claim is granted with prejudice.

The FDCPA covers a payment obligation arising when a consumer obtains goods and gives a dishonored check; an offer or extension of credit is not required.

Snow v. Riddle · filed 1998-05-11(a)(5)

Charles, Brown and Duffy all followed Bass, as do we. Under the “plain meaning” test, it would seem to us that a “debt” is created where one obtain goods and gives a dishonored check in return therefor.

A financial obligation arising from a personal, family, or household transaction can be a debt under the FDCPA without being based on a credit transaction, and a collection firm may be a debt collector if it regularly collects debts or principally collects them.

Taylor v. Mount Oak Manor Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1998-05-22(a)(5), (a)(6)

Accordingly, I rule that a “credit transaction” is not required for a financial obligation to be considered a “debt” under the FDCPA. ... Palmieri is subject to the penalties under the FDCPA as a “debt collector” if the principal purpose of its practice is to collect debts, or if it does so on a regular basis.

Section 1692a(5) does not treat unemployment insurance contributions as a debt when the underlying transaction is not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Berman v. Gc Services Limited Partnership · filed 1998-07-07(a)(5)

Based on this Court's analysis in Newman and Bass and the Third Circuit's decision in Staub, we hold that unemployment insurance contributions do not qualify as "debts" under the FDCPA because they do not satisfy the statutory requirement that "the money, property, insurance, or services" underlying the transaction be "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."

Whether a law firm is a debt collector turns on whether its debt-collection activity is regular, assessed from the overall context and specific facts rather than a bright-line test or single factor.

Von Schmidt v. Kratter · filed 1998-06-04(a)(6)

As the court emphasized in its original ruling, the “regularity” determination must take into account the entire context of the activity and is dependant on the specific facts of the case.

Section 1692a(6) covers a person who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed another; one isolated mailing of collection letters is insufficient to make a law firm a debt collector.

White v. Simonson & Cohen P.C. · filed 1998-09-23(a)(6)

In sum, by sending out one mailing of thirty-five collection letters in nearly four decades of practice, defendant cannot be said to “regularly collect[ ] ... debts.”

The FDCPA covers condominium assessment obligations as consumer debts for personal, family, or household purposes even when no extension of credit is involved.

Loigman v. Kings Landing Condominium Ass'n · filed 1999-05-05(a)(5)

There now seems to be no question but that a claim for the payment of condominium assessments falls within the scope of the FDCPA. ... The approach of the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits is well taken since it relies upon the plain language of the statute, which contains no reference to a requirement that an extension of credit be involved in the debt. Accordingly, the court will follow that view rather than the Third Circuit's contrary holding.

Section 1692a(6) can cover corporate officers or employees who materially participate in debt-collection activities, even when acting for the corporation.

Brink v. First Credit Resources · filed 1999-07-12(a)(6)

The language of the FDCPA is clear. A “debt collector” is “any person who ... regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Using either the plain language of statute or the basic principles of agency, Fayazi and Merkwan may be “debt collectors”. Both materially participated in the activities of First Credit alleged to be collection activities. That participation may qualify them as debt collectors under the statute.

Section 1692a(6) treats a creditor as a debt collector when, while collecting its own debts, it uses another name that indicates a third person is collecting or attempting to collect the debts.

Roe v. Publishers Clearing House, Inc. · filed 1999-03-17(a)(6)

The court finds that plaintiff has alleged that defendant is a debt collector under § 1692a(6).

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector to include a person whose principal purpose is collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed to another, while the creditor and certain non-defaulted assignment exclusions limit that definition.

Saunders v. Stigers, No. Cv96 0054472s (Oct. 20, 1999) · filed 1999-10-20(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines a debt collector as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6). ... If the defendant was already in default when the plaintiff came into possession of the note, then a question of fact exists as to whether the plaintiff is within the definition of a debt collector under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA's definition of debt collector excludes a person collecting debts for a commonly owned or corporately affiliated entity, solely for related persons, when debt collection is not that person's principal business.

Backuswalcott v. Common Ground Community HDFC, Inc. · filed 2000-07-24(a)(6)(B)

Defendant meets all three requirements of this exemption, and thus it need not abide by the statute: ... In the instant case, defendant need only show that debt collection does not represent its single most significant activity. ... On the record before us, it stretches belief to conclude that defendant’s single largest or most important business is debt collection. ... Surveying the record as a whole, we find as a matter of law that defendant has not engaged in sufficient rent collection for that function to constitute its primary business.

The FDCPA treats obligations arising from transactions for personal, family, or household services as debts, but not property-tax obligations arising solely from property ownership.

Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P. · filed 2000-09-07(a)(5)

In sum, we will affirm the dismissal of the FDCPA claims with respect to the tax obligations, and we further will affirm the district court's determination that the water and sewer obligations constitute "debts" under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) covers only obligations arising from transactions primarily involving personal, family, or household goods or services, so child-support payments are not debts covered by the FDCPA.

Campbell v. Baldwin · filed 2000-02-23(a)(5)

Nevertheless, the courts have been unanimous in holding that child support payments are not a “debt” covered by the act. ... I see no reason to differ with the well reasoned opinions of the other courts interpreting the FDCPA. Mr. Campbell’s obligations were not incurred as a “consumer.” ... Mr. Campbell simply cannot establish that the child support payments he allegedly owes are a “debt” covered by the Act.

The FDCPA does not treat a state-imposed child-support obligation as a debt because it is not incurred in exchange for consumer goods or services.

Raffaele v. Marrama · filed 2001-09-20

Raffaele’s claims under the FDCPA fails because the obligation to pay child support is not a “debt” under the statute. Such an obligation is not incurred in exchange for consumer goods or services, but instead was imposed by the state to force Raffaele to fulfill his parental duty to support his child.

Section 1692a(5) defines a debt as an obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising from a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; the court held that the plaintiffs’ alleged replacement-check obligations met that definition.

Kvassay v. Hasty · filed 2002-12-31(a)(5)

Considering all of these factors together, the court finds that the Plaintiffs’ alleged obligations are “debts” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and grants partial summary judgment for the Plaintiffs on this issue and denies both the Hasty and WTG Defendants’ summary judgment motion on this issue.

Section 1692a(5) defines a debt as an obligation arising from a consensual consumer transaction, so demands for payment tied to alleged signal piracy or unsubscribed signals do not seek to collect a debt under the FDCPA.

DirecTV, Inc. v. Cavanaugh · filed 2003-11-18(a)(5)

Even if there was no evidence of piracy, Cavanaugh’s argument still falters because it fails to distinguish between the dictionary and statutory meanings of the word “debt.” By arguing that the receipt of unsubscribed-to signals constitutes some sort of surplus or mistaken credit, Cava-naugh attempts to divorce the notion of “debt” from the text of the statute. The receipt of satellite signals above and beyond what was subscribed to simply does not give rise to the type of consensual transaction envisioned by the FDCPA. Accordingly, the Court finds the demand letters do not seek to collect a “debt” within the meaning of the Act.

Section 1692a(6) covers a lawyer or law firm that regularly engages in debt-collection activity, with regularity assessed case by case using factors bearing on regularity.

Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll & Bertolotti · filed 2004-07-01(a)(6)

We hold that the question of whether a lawyer or law firm “regularly” engages in debt collection activity within the meaning of section 1692a(6) of the FDCPA must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of factors bearing on the issue of regularity.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) excludes an entity that acquires a debt before the debtor's default from the definition of debt collector.

Downs v. Clayton Homes, Inc. · filed 2004-02-09(a)(6)(F)(iii)

The district court properly held that the Downses could not sue the defendants under the FDCPA because none of the defendants was a debt collector as defined by statute. CMH was not a debt collector because it assigned the Downses’ installment note to VMF without collecting any payments. VMF was a creditor, not a debt collector, because the Downses were not in default when VMF acquired the note.

Section 1692(a)(6) does not treat a credit counselor who assumes a client's debts as a debt collector because the counselor is not collecting debts owed to another.

Limpert v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp. · filed 2004-08-05(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines a debt collector as any person who collects debts owed to another. ... The Court finds that while the distinction between credit counseling and debt collection is finely cut, it is nonetheless controlling. No debtor ever retained a debt collector to collect a debt from himself. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs, whether wisely or unwisely, voluntarily retained Defendants to obtain their credit counseling services. While these “counseling” services involve Defendants assuming Plaintiffs’ debts, and while Defendants do receive fees from Plaintiffs’ creditors, there is no allegation that Defendants unilaterally seek out Plaintiffs to unlawfully harass them into paying their debts, which is the unfortunate practice that the FDCPA seeks to control. ... Defendants are not debt collectors as they do not collect debts owed to others; rather, they assume such debts as part of their method, whatever its merits, of credit counseling.

Section 1692(a)(6)(F) excludes from the definition of debt collector a person whose debt-collection activity is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation, such as a property manager collecting rent for the owner.

Reynolds v. Gables Residential Services, Inc. · filed 2006-04-26(a)(6)(F)

Therefore, this Court finds that Gables is not a debt collector within the meaning of the term in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)(F).

Under § 1692a(6), “regularly” means frequently and consistently, while “principal purpose” refers to the proportion of debt-collection activity in relation to the overall business.

Oppong v. First Union Mortgage Corp. · filed 2005-12-29(a)(6)

Two, to construe “regular” to mean frequently and consistently, and “principal purpose” to mean the proportion of the debt collection activities in relation to the overall business, gives meaning to the congressional intent that the term “debt collector” apply in the disjunctive. ... Applying the frequency approach in this case, Wells Fargo qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person whose business principally involves collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed or asserted to be owed another.

Capital One Bank (USA), NA v. Reese · filed 2015-09-30(a)(6)

For purposes of the FDCPA, a debt collector is defined as: “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). ... As a matter of law, since Capital One was the originator of the debt in question, it cannot be held liable under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA's debt definition covers an obligation only when it arises from a transaction whose subject is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Surber v. McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc. · filed 2015-12-31(a)(5)

For her obligation to Bankers Life to qualify as a debt, Surber must show that it originated from a transaction in which the money or services that were the subject of the transaction were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

The FDCPA covers only an obligation arising from a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; proving that the obligation is a consumer debt is an essential element of an FDCPA claim.

Strauss v. CBE Group, Inc. · filed 2016-03-28(a)(5)

Even if Plaintiff could establish standing, he has failed to meet his burden in establishing an essential element of any FDCPA and FCCPA claim — that the debt CBE was attempting to collect was a consumer debt.

Section 1692a(5) treats a consumer’s obligation arising from a contractual parking transaction as a debt covered by the FDCPA.

Franklin v. Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2016-08-10(a)(5)

To conclude: The signs at the parking lot offered a parking spot to all comers for $1.50 per day and noted a penalty for failing to pay. Franklin and Chism each accepted this offer—and thus formed a contract—when they parked in the lot. Their obligation to pay the $46.50 is premised entirely on this contract. Parking Revenue was therefore attempting to collect debts, and its attempts are regulated by the FDCPA’s protections.

Section 1692a(6) treats attorneys pursuing foreclosure for creditors as debt collectors when the foreclosure efforts seek repayment of a defaulted loan, without requiring an express demand for payment.

McCray v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage · filed 2016-10-07(a)(6)

The FDCPA’s definition of debt collector, however, does not include any requirement that a debt collector be engaged in an activity by which it makes a “demand for payment,” as the White Firm and the Substitute Trustees claim. ... In sum, we hold that McCray’s complaint adequately alleges that the White Firm and the Substitute Trustees were debt collectors and that their actions in pursuing foreclosure constituted a step in collecting debt and thus debt collection activity that is regulated by the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) excludes a person collecting a debt originated by that person from the FDCPA’s definition of debt collector.

Freedom Mortgage v. Dennis, P. · filed 2016-09-30(a)(6)

Under the plain meaning of the FDCPA, Freedom is not a “debt collector,” as Ms. Dennis’s default concerns a debt originated by Freedom.

Section 1692(a)(6) generally excludes an original creditor from the FDCPA's definition of a debt collector when collecting its own debt.

Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Iqbal · filed 2017-08-10(a)(6)

To the extent that defendant asserts a violation of the FDCPA, such counterclaim cannot be maintained against an original creditor ( see 15 USC § 1692 [a] [6]).

Section 1692a(6) limits FDCPA liability to defendants that qualify as debt collectors; a mortgage servicer that does not own the debt qualifies.

Booker v. New Penn Financial, LLC · filed 2017-08-08(a)(6)

To be liable under the FDCPA, a defendant must be a “debt collector.” ... Shellpoint is a mortgage servicer and does not own Booker’s debt, so it is a “debt collector” governed by the FDCPA.

An entity that acquires a debt before it is in default does not qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA.

Solis v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2017-08-17(a)(6)(F)(iii)

Because the debt was not in default when Citi acquired it, Citi cannot qualify as a debt collector. See id. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector through two alternative tests, and a debt purchaser may qualify under the principal-purpose test if collecting debts is its principal purpose even though it does not qualify under the regularly-collects test for debts owed to another.

Skinner v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2018-01-08(a)(6)

However, the FDCPA only applies to “debt collectors” as defined by the statute in § 1692a(6). ... Section 1692a(6) provides two alternative definitions of a “debt collector”: (1) “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” definition), or (2) any person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” (the “regularly collects” definition). ... Accordingly, we agree with Plaintiff that a debt purchaser can still qualify as a debt collector under § 1692a(6) if its principal purpose is the collection of debts.

The FDCPA’s definition of “debt” excludes involuntary obligations imposed by municipal law or court order rather than arising from a consensual consumer transaction.

Skeberdis v. Kinnally · filed 2018-06-21(a)(5)

Such a non-consensual obligation does not constitute an FDCPA debt, and efforts to collect it do not fall within the FDCPA’s purview.

An entity whose principal business purpose is collecting any debts is a debt collector under the FDCPA even if it owns the debts it collects, and the debt’s default status when acquired does not change that conclusion.

Tepper v. Amos Financial LLC · filed 2018-08-07(a)(6)

We affirm the portion of the Court’s opinion Amos has challenged on appeal—that it is a debt collector under the “principal purpose” definition. The Court decided correctly in light of Henson’s repeal of the “default” test. Whether an entity acquired the debts it collects after they became defaulted does not resolve whether that entity is a debt collector. Instead, we follow the plain text of the statute: an entity whose principal purpose of business is the collection of any debts is a debt collector regardless whether the entity owns the debts it collects.

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes federal officers and employees acting in their official duties from the FDCPA’s debt-collector definition, so the Department of Education is exempt from the Act’s obligations.

Russ v. U.S. Dept. Of Educ. · filed 2018-06-27(a)(6)(C)

The FDCPA excludes from the debt collector definition, "any officer or employee of the United States ... to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6)(C). As a federal agency, the Department of Education fits this statutory definition, and is exempt from the FDCPA's obligations.

Section 1692a(5) limits “debt” to consumer obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so rent under a commercial lease is not covered; § 1692a(6) does not treat a creditor collecting its own debt as a debt collector.

Batchelor v. Alexis Properties, LLC · filed 2018-11-13(a)(5), (a)(6)

This court, in Shuler v. Daudt, held that the term “debt collector” does not include creditors of the consumer. ... Thus, the failure to pay rent under a commercial lease is not considered “debt” under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person whose business principally involves collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed to another, while §§ 1692d and 1692d(5) prohibit conduct and repeated calls intended to harass, oppress, abuse, or annoy.

Light v. Seterus, Inc. · filed 2018-12-04(a)(6); (d); (d)(5)

Plaintiff need only plead that Defendant fits within the definition of "debt collector" as found in section 1692a(6). ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled that Defendant is a "debt collector." ... The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from engaging in "any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. This includes "causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number." § 1692d(5). ... Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged a violation of section 1692d.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes a loan servicer from the definition of debt collector unless it began servicing after the loan was in default.

Qurashi v. Ocwen Loan Servicing · filed 2019-01-24(a)(6)

A loan servicer acting on behalf of the owner of a debt obligation is not a debt collector unless it began its servicing duties after the loan entered default status.

Section 1692a(6) treats a business as a debt collector when its principal purpose is obtaining payment on debts it acquires, even if it outsources the collection.

Barbato v. Greystone Alliance LLC · filed 2019-02-22(a)(6)

As long as a business’s raison d’être is obtaining payment on the debts that it acquires, it is a debt collector. Who actually obtains the payment or how they do so is of no moment.

Section 1692a(6) excludes creditors collecting their own debts from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector,” which covers those collecting debts owed to another.

Frazier v. Morristown Memorial Hospital · filed 2019-04-12(a)(6)

Moreover; the Hospital is not a “debt collector,” as defined by the statute. The FDCPA does not apply to creditors who collect their own debts; it applies only to debt collectors who collect debts owed to another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A).

Section 1692a(6)'s definition of debt collector includes individuals, so an individual agent may be held personally liable for FDCPA violations he personally commits.

McCrobie v. Palisades Acquisition Xvi, LLC · filed 2019-02-14(a)(6)

This Court agrees with the majority that the definition of debt collector includes individuals. ... For each and all of those reasons, Houslanger may be held liable individually for his own FDCPA violations.

Section 1692a(6) covers a business whose principal purpose is collecting acquired debts even when it hires a third party to perform the collection.

Barbato v. Greystone Alliance, LLC · filed 2019-02-22(a)(6)

The District Court held that it does, and we agree: an entity that otherwise meets the "principal purpose" definition cannot avoid the dictates of the FDCPA merely by hiring a third party to do its collecting.

Section 1692a(6) excludes businesses engaged in no more than nonjudicial foreclosure from the FDCPA's primary debt-collector definition, except for the specific prohibitions in §1692f(6).

Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP · filed 2019-03-20(a)(6)

These considerations convince us that, but for §1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors within the meaning of the Act.

Section 1692(a)(6) treats a debt purchaser as a debt collector when its primary business objective is collecting purchased debts, even if it delegates the collection work to another entity.

Reygadas v. DNF Associates LLC · filed 2019-05-16(a)(6)

However, the statute’s plain meaning reveals that there is no such requirement. ... As a result, the plain meaning of the statutory definition classifies a business as a “debt collector” if the business’s primary objective is to ensure that debts it is owed are collected. The language does not include a requirement that the business is the entity that must do the collection.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector through three categories, and a person who fits none of the main-text definitions is not subject to the statutory exclusions.

Saunders v. Capital One Bank · filed 2019-07-03(a)(6)

The FDCPA provision that defines the term “debt collector,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), can be broken into two parts. The first part supplies a general definition, while the second lists several categories of individuals or entities that are expressly excluded from that definition. It follows, then, that to determine whether a person qualifies as a “debt collector” under the statute, a court “must first determine whether the person satisfies one of the statutory definitions given in the main text of § 1692a(6) before considering whether that person falls into one of the exclusions contained in subsections § 1692a(6)(A)-(F). If a person does not satisfy one of the definitions in the main text, the exclusions in subsections § 1692a(6)(A)-(F) do not come into play.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2016), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017). I begin, accordingly, with the statute’s main text. Here, the provision states: The term “debt collector’ means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The Fourth Circuit has put this more succinctly, explaining that a debt collector is someone who falls into any of the following three categories: “(1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector.” Henson, 817 F.3d at 136.

Section 1692a(5) limits FDCPA debts to obligations arising from transactions involving money, property, insurance, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; an overpayment of a grant is not a debt when no consumer transaction occurred.

Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, LLP · filed 2019-06-25(a)(5)

Here, Calogero's obligation to repay the alleged Road Home overpayment is not a "debt" as defined by the FDCPA.

A creditor collecting a debt it originated on its own behalf is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA.

Anderman v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association · filed 2019-08-28(a)(6)

First, Chase originated this debt and sought to collect the debt on its own behalf, through a properly-filed law suit. ... Therefore, Chase is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The FDCPA applies only when the defendant qualifies as a debt collector under the Act’s statutory definition.

Franklin v. Navient, Inc. · filed 2019-09-05(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants are “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA, and thus his attempt to bring a claim under the FDCPA fails as a matter of law.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as an entity that regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due another; an FDCPA claim therefore requires the defendant to fall within that definition.

Petronykoriak v. Equifax Information Services LLC · filed 2019-09-10(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines a debt collector as an entity that “regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due another.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)). Comcast has not been pleaded as a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) treats an individual who regularly collects or attempts to collect another person’s debt as a debt collector, and a corporate officer may be personally liable under the FDCPA.

Jammeh v. HNN Associates LLC · filed 2019-10-15(a)(6)

With respect to Mr. Wojdak, a corporate officer may be personally liable under both the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and the CPA, RCW ch. 19.86. Under the FDCPA, a debt collector includes any individual who “regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Cruz v. Int’l Collection Corp., 673 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2012).

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes creditors from the definition of debt collector, except when the creditor's principal business is debt collection or it uses another name suggesting that a third party is collecting.

Bernadin v. US Bank National Association as Trustee, Successor · filed 2019-10-28(a)(6)

First, a creditor may nonetheless be a debt collector if that person “uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). This is known as the “principal purpose” test. ... Second, a creditor may be a “debt collector” if “in the process of collecting his own debts, [the creditor] uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... There are no allegations in the Complaint that bring U.S. Bank within either of these exceptions to the general rule that creditors are not subject to FDCPA liability. Therefore, Count III fails to state an FDCPA claim against U.S. Bank.

Section 1692a(6)'s false-name exception treats a creditor as a debt collector when it uses another name that would make the least sophisticated consumer believe a third party is collecting the debt.

Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association · filed 2019-11-12(a)(6)

We now join the Second and Seventh Circuits and hold that the false-name exception applies when the “least sophisticated consumer” would believe a third party was involved in collecting a debt.

The FDCPA definition of debt excludes child support obligations, so those obligations do not receive FDCPA protection.

Silver v. Clark County Child Support Division · filed 2019-11-14(a)(5)

However, child support obligations do not constitute “debts” under the FDCPA. See Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 32 F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1994)).

Section 1692a(5) covers consumer obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, assessed based on the purpose when the obligation was undertaken.

McDaniel v. Central Oregon & Pacific Railroad Inc. · filed 2019-11-15(a)(5)

When determining whether a debt is regulated by the FDCPA – i.e., whether a debt is for “personal, family, or household purposes” – the Court must focus on the purpose for which the debt was incurred. See id.; see also Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC, 698 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2012). This determination looks at the time the obligation was undertaken, not when a debt collector attempts to collect the debt. Id. at 293. ... Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the subject debt was incurred “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this ground is DENIED.

The FDCPA does not treat a person collecting a debt that person originated as a debt collector; collecting one's own debt makes the person a creditor rather than a debt collector.

Nwoga v. Karceski · filed 2019-11-22(a)(6)

Here, Nwoga has not alleged facts to establish that that she was the object of debt collection activity or that Defendants are debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA. Defendants here were collecting their own debt, and thus, were merely creditors of Nwoga. Because the Defendants are not debt collectors, Nwoga fails to state a claim under the FDCPA. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Nwoga’s FDCPA claim.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector to include persons whose principal purpose is debt collection or who regularly collect debts owed to another.

STONE v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA · filed 2019-11-27(a)(6)

The FDCPA provides two alternative definitions of a debt collector: (1) any person “who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” definition), or (2) any person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” (the “regularly collects” definition). Id. at 265; 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Because Defendant collects on its own behalf, this definition of “debt collector” does not apply to Defendant. ... As a result, Defendant does not meet the “regularly collects” definition of a debt collector, and Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims must fail.

Section 1692f prohibits unfair practices by debt collectors, while § 1692a(4) treats a party owed the debt as a creditor unless it acquired a debt in default solely to facilitate collection for another.

Cotterell v. General Motors LLC · filed 2019-12-18(a)(4), (a)(6), (f)

These allegations suggest that GM Financial qualifies as a “creditor” under the FDCPA, since it was a party to the lease agreement before Ms. Cotterell’s default and did not receive the assignment for the purpose of facilitating the collection of a debt for another. Because Ms. Cotterell has alleged no other facts to suggest that GM Financial was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, I find that she has failed to state a claim under § 1692f and dismiss this claim with prejudice.

Section 1692a(6) excludes a creditor collecting its own debt from the FDCPA's definition of a debt collector.

(PS) Narayan v. County of Sacramento · filed 2020-01-03(a)(6)

As stated in the deed, Wells Fargo is the lender and beneficiary. Accordingly, any alleged debt-collection activities Wells Fargo performed would be in relation to debt which Wells Fargo was a creditor, precluding Wells Fargo from being a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. Therefore, plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action fail as a matter of law.

The FDCPA's primary debt-collector definition can apply to attorneys who pursue a debt through judicial foreclosure; the limited security-interest-enforcement treatment described in § 1692a(6) does not categorically exempt judicial foreclosure activity.

Woodard v. The Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2020-01-06(a)(6)

MC reads Obduskey too broadly. The Supreme Court’s holding in Obduskey extends only to security-interest enforcers engaged in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in a manner required by state law. ... Here, MC was not a law firm retained solely to execute a nonjudicial foreclosure. Instead, MC represented BNYM in a judicial foreclosure proceeding, which involved executing a foreclosure sale.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector and excludes a person collecting a debt that was not in default when the person obtained it.

Stewart v. JPMorgan Chase Bank · filed 2020-01-28(a)(6)

Under the FDCPA, “debt collector” is defined as “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).). “The term does not include . . . any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). ... Stewart does not allege that the debt was in default at the time Freddie Mac became the “creditor” or that Freddie Mac engaged in any debt collection activity. Freddie Mac is not a debt collector. Stewart has not and cannot plausibly alleged that Freddie Mac is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA.

The FDCPA generally does not apply to enforcement of a security interest, including a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding.

Ha v. US Bank National Association · filed 2020-02-10

In general, the FDCPA does not apply to the enforcement of a security interest such as a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding.

The FDCPA's primary definition of “debt collector” covers a law firm that files a foreclosure complaint in a Pennsylvania judicial foreclosure.

BRONSTEIN v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC · filed 2020-02-11(a)(6)

The Court will adopt Plaintiff’s argument. Despite the well-reasoned and thoughtful arguments of MWM’s counsel, the Court declines to extend Obduskey’s holding to Pennsylvania’s judicial foreclosure system given its express limitation to apply only to nonjudicial foreclosures. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that MWM is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA’s primary definition and Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims are not defeated by Obduskey.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector through three alternative categories, and an entity collecting debts on its own account does not qualify under the “regularly collects” definition.

Husain v. Bank of America, NA · filed 2020-02-18(a)(6)

Accordingly, under Henson, the only relevant question is whether Defendants were collecting on their own accounts. The Amended Complaint allege that BANA and Nationstar were collecting on their own accounts and are therefore not debt collectors under the “regularly collects” definition. The documents provided support these allegations. ... The Court agrees. Defendants are not debt collectors under the principal purpose definition. ... For these reasons, Nationstar and BANA are not debt collectors. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a claim under the FDCPA. Count I is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1692a(6) excludes a creditor collecting its own debt from the FDCPA’s definition of a debt collector.

Traver · filed 2026-03-11(a)(6)

As relevant to this case, the FDCPA defines a “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). In Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., the Supreme Court held that the definition of “debt collector” does not include “a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.” 582 U.S. at 83 (“[I]t would seem a debt purchaser like Santander may indeed collect debts for its own account without triggering the statutory definition in dispute.”). Here, GM Financial and Santander were the creditors of Plaintiffs’ consumer financing agreements, which provided for loans on the two vehicles at issue.2 [Dkt. 16 ¶ 7-8; Dkt. 54-3 at 5]. Defendants’ repossession of the vehicles was thus an action to collect on their own debts. Accordingly, they are not “debt collectors” subject to the FDCPA, see id., and Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead facts supporting this claim.

Section 1692a(6) limits the FDCPA to persons whose business principally involves collecting debts or who regularly collect debts owed to another.

Chambers v. Capital One Financial Corporation · filed 2026-04-03(a)(6)

But “[t]he FDCPA applies only to a debt collector,” defined as “a person in interstate commerce in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another.” Knight v. Exeter Fin. LLC, No. 23-cv-2850, 2024 WL 3887385, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. N.A. v. Henderson, 862 F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2017); and then quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). ... Because nothing in Ms. Chambers’ filings indicates that Capital One is a debt collector, the Court must dismiss her claim under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) permits an individual who is directly or indirectly involved in debt-collection activities to qualify as a debt collector and incur personal liability without piercing the corporate veil.

GRIFFIN v. O'brien, Wexler, and Associates, LLC · filed 2023-06-30(a)(6)

In the absence of binding authority on this issue, the Court will follow the majority approach and hold that, under the plain language of the FDCPA, Johnson can be considered a “debt collector” and thus held personally liable without piercing the corporate veil. See Kistner, 518 F.3d at 437. After all, the FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added).

The FDCPA applies only when prohibited practices are used to collect a debt, meaning an obligation arising from a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Dobronski v. Keroles Enterprises LLC · filed 2021-09-02(a)(5)

A threshold requirement for application of the FDCPA is that the prohibited practices are used in an attempt to collect a ‘debt,’ as that term is defined by § 1692a(5). ... The term “debt” is defined by the FDCPA as: ... whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

The FDCPA covers a tuition loan as a consumer debt, bars further debt-collection communications after a written cease request unless an exception applies, requires a written debt-validity notice within five days of the initial communication, and makes the bona fide-error defense dependent on proof of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid the error.

Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. · filed 1980-07-16(a)(5), (c), (g), (k)(c)

A “debt” so defined is clearly involved in the present case. Plaintiff, while a student, incurred an indebtedness to the University of Florida in the form of a federal loan for tuition. As a student, Plaintiff acted as a “consumer” of educational services in securing an obligation to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the subject thereof was a “service,” education, intended for Plaintiff’s “personal” use. ... If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except— ... This Court finds that Defendant has failed to provide any evidence that it maintained proper procedures to avoid the error of Mr. Scott’s being unaware of Plaintiff’s letter which led to his calling Plaintiff in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). Therefore the “bona fide error” defense under § 1692k(c) is not available to Defendant. ... The Court finds that Defendant also violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, which requires that a debt collector send the consumer a written notice concerning the validity of the debt within five days after the initial communication with the consumer.

Section 1692a(5) treats a dishonored check used for primarily personal, family, or household purposes as a consumer debt under the FDCPA.

Johnson v. CRA Security Systems · filed 1997-02-05(a)(5)

This Court finds, based on the plain language of the statutes, their legislative history and various Federal Trade Commission guidelines, that dishonored checks are “debts” within the meaning of the Act. ... This Court believes that the statute does include dishonored checks within the scope of “debt.”

Section 1692a(5) excludes personal property tax obligations from the FDCPA definition of a consumer debt because they do not arise from a qualifying consumer transaction.

Beggs v. Rossi · filed 1997-09-29(a)(5)

In light of the statutory language and in the absence of legislative history suggesting otherwise, the court concludes that the collection of delinquent personal property taxes are not protected by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Section 1692a(5) limits a covered debt to an obligation arising from a consensual consumer transaction, so an alleged theft does not create a debt under the FDCPA.

Coretti v. Lefkowitz · filed 1997-06-06(a)(5)

A claim arising out of an alleged theft does not constitute a “debt” under the FDCPA. ... Plaintiffs alleged theft by use of an illegal decoding device does not constitute a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA.

Section 1692k(c) protects a debt collector from liability for an unintentional bona fide error when the collector proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid that error.

Jenkins v. George W. Heintz and Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & McPhee · filed 1997-10-23(k)(c)

Section 1692k(c) requires that the debt collector show by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. The district court correctly concluded that defendants' elaborate procedures meet this standard to avoid collecting unauthorized charges. They go so far as to insist that their client verify under oath that each of the charges was true and correct. Where defendants maintain extensive systems designed to prevent errors, an unintentional violation of the Act will not result in liability. Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F.Supp. 1130, 1138 (D.Del.1992). Defendants have satisfied their burden to prove this affirmative defense.

The FDCPA's definition of debt includes a consumer's payment obligation evidenced by a dishonored check, so third-party collection attempts on that check can be subject to the Act's protections.

Duffy v. Kevin W. Landberg, Attorney at Law; New Concepts Business Services, Inc. · filed 1998-02-26(a)(5)

Since a check written by a consumer in a transaction for goods or services "evidences the drawer's obligation to pay" and this obligation remains even if the check is dishonored, abusive collection practices related to the dishonored check are prohibited by the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) limits an FDCPA debt to an obligation arising from a consensual or business transaction for primarily personal, family, or household purposes, so a tort obligation arising from negligence is not covered.

Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment Inc. · filed 1998-05-11(a)(5)

At a minimum, a “transaction” under the FDCPA must involve some kind of business dealing or other consensual obligation. Because Hawthorne’s alleged obligation to pay Mac Adjustment for damages arising out of an accident does not arise out of any consensual or business dealing, plainly it does not constitute a “transaction” under the FDCPA. Moreover, the fact that Mac Adjustment may have entered into a contract with the insurer for subrogation rights does not change the fact that no contract, business, or consensual arrangement between Hawthorne and the damaged party, its insurer, or Mac Adjustment exists. Consequently, the FDCPA does not apply because this is not a transaction.

Section 1692a(5) does not cover personal property tax obligations because they do not arise from the kind of consumer transaction contemplated by the statute.

Brian Beggs and Jennifer Beggs v. Robert v. Rossi Leslie Marcarelli and Rossi Law Ofcs., Ltd. · filed 1998-05-27(a)(5)

There is simply no “transaction” here of the kind contemplated by the statute.

Section 1692(e)(11) requires a debt collector to identify itself as a debt collector in communications with the consumer, including voicemail messages.

Gryzbowski v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2010-03-05(e)(11)

As the FDCPA imposes strict liability, and Defendant admits to leaving messages on Plaintiffs voicemail without identifying itself as a debt collector, Defendant violated section 1692e(ll) of the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(10) does not impose an affirmative duty on debt collectors to communicate; it regulates their conduct when they choose to communicate.

Myers v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A. · filed 2011-02-17(e)(10)

The FDCPA does not create an affirmative duty to communicate with anyone.

Under § 1692a(2), an unanswered call can be a debt-collection communication when the consumer understands that a debt collector is calling about a debt.

Rush v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC · filed 2013-10-17(a)(2)

In this manner, the phone calls that occurred after Plaintiffs retained counsel are properly considered communications because they indirectly conveyed to Plaintiffs “information regarding a debt.”

Section 1692e(11) requires a debt collector to identify itself as a debt collector in all communications with a debtor.

Kagan v. Selene Finance L.P. · filed 2016-09-28(e)(11)

As noted above, § 1692e(ll) requires that a debt collector identify itself as such in all communications to enable consumers to know they are, in fact, in contact with a debt collector so they can choose to respond to a letter or voicemail message.

The FDCPA applies to independent third-party debt collectors assigned state debts, and a materially confusing implication that a collection notice came from a government actor is prohibited deception.

Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones · filed 2015-05-08

Special counsel had an affirmative duty as debt collectors to abide by the provisions of the FDCPA. The FDCA prohibits, as a per se deception, the false implication that a collection notice is being sent by a government actor. This deception may inappropriately influence a consumer’s decisions by inducing prompt payment, regardless of the debtor’s circumstances or the accuracy of the alleged indebtedness. That an OAG employee could attain the same leverage against the alleged debtor is not at issue in this case—employees and officers of a state are exempt from the FDCPA. Whether or not the use of the letterhead by special counsel was compelled by the OAG, a jury could reasonably find that special counsel’s use of the letterhead is confusing; and therefore a violation of § 1692e, as a materially false, deceptive and misleading practice. We recognize the importance of a state’s ability to collect on its own accounts, but once it has assigned debts to an independent, third-party debt collector, the federal rules apply. That is what happened in this case. And special counsel are liable if a jury finds that they have held themselves out as something they are not.

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes a government officer or employee from the definition of debt collector to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect a debt is part of the officer’s official duties.

Heredia v. Green · filed 1980-12-01(a)(6)(C)

I conclude that defendant’s activities at issue in this action constitute official duties of an L&T Officer, and are thus excluded from the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not apply to government employees whose collection activities are part of their jobs.

Hyler v. Comm'r · filed 2002-12-30(a)(6)

Petitioner argues that respondent violated some procedures set forth in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977), 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692 (2000). By its terms, however, that act does not apply to employees of the Government whose collection activities are part of their jobs. See 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692a(6) (2000). Congress has amended the Internal Revenue Code to require respondent to observe some FDCPA procedures. See sec. 6304 as added by RRA 1998, sec. 3466, 112 Stat. 768; see also H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 291 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1045. Petitioner’s reliance upon FDCPA practices that Congress has not included in the Internal Revenue Code is unavailing.

Section 1692a(6)(c) excludes United States and state officers and employees from the FDCPA's definition of debt collector when collecting a debt in the performance of their official duties.

Allen v. United States Department of Education · filed 2010-12-14(a)(6)(c)

However, the definition of “debt collector” excludes “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.”

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes federal and state officers and employees from the FDCPA’s definition of debt collector when collecting a debt in their official duties.

Griffin v. United States · filed 2019-09-24(a)(6)(C)

Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims fare no better. Sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims because the FDCPA defines the term “debt collector” as excluding “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C).

The FDCPA excludes United States officers and employees acting in their official duties from the definition of “debt collector” and does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity.

Jones v. United States Department of Education · filed 2020-03-30(a)(6)(C)

Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient factual content to allow the Court to reasonably infer that Defendants are liable under the FDCPA because the federal government is expressly excluded from that statute’s protections. See 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)(C) (“debt collector” does not include “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties”). Moreover, the FDCPA does not contain a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. Coburn v. Saul, No. 4:19-CV-2705-DDN, 2020 WL 1275589, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2020). Thus, the Court will dismiss this claim.

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes state and federal officers or employees from the definition of debt collector when collecting or attempting to collect a debt as part of their official duties.

Leiss v. DeMarois · filed 2020-04-07(a)(6)(C)

The FDCPA excludes from the definition of “debt collector” any “officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). Thus, any FDCPA claims arising solely from the collection of taxes by agents of the Montana Department of Revenue are barred under the statute.

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes United States officers and employees collecting debts in the performance of their official duties from the FDCPA’s definition of debt collector, and the FDCPA does not unequivocally waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity.

Manalansan-Lord v. U.S. Department of Education · filed 2020-07-27(a)(6)(C)

However, the FDCPA definition of “debt collector” excludes the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C) (“debt collector” excludes “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties”). ... The FDCPA “does not contain an unequivocal and express waiver of sovereign immunity.”

Section 1692g does not apply to debt collections initiated before the effective date of the subchapter.

Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. · filed 1980-12-04(g)

Defendant asked the Court to reconsider its Order granting summary judgment as to liability on Plaintiff’s cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, pointing out that such section does not apply to any debt collection initiated prior to the effective date of the subchapter. The instant debt collection clearly was initiated prior to the effective date of the subchapter; therefore, the Court hereby VACATES that portion of its July 17, 1980 Order granting summary judgment on the issue of liability as to Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Judgment is hereby entered for Defendant with respect to said claim.

The statute is interpreted to protect unsophisticated debtors and to assess potentially deceptive collection language from the perspective of the least sophisticated reasonable consumer, without requiring actual consumer testimony.

Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc. · filed 1981-01-12

It is clearly addressed to protecting the weak and unsophistical debtor from abusive, dishonest and sharp collection practices. ... And I also conclude that the standard of ability and conduct to which the debtor is held is on the low end of the spectrum of the “reasonable person.” ... Finally, in evaluating whether a given language choice tended to deceive, I will apply the principle that actual consumer testimony is not necessary in evaluating the tendency of language to deceive.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a validation notice to communicate that the consumer may dispute the debt beyond merely disputing the check, and compliance is judged from the least sophisticated consumer's perspective.

Bukumirovich v. Credit Bureau of Baton Rouge, Inc. · filed 1994-03-28(a)(3)

There is no dispute about the language of the Validation Statements. Applying a least sophisticated consumer standard, it is clear that the Validation Statements do not comply with section 1692g(a)(3). The least sophisticated consumer would not understand from reading the Validation Statement that anything other than the amount of the check or whether the consumer issued it could be disputed.

Section 1692 evaluates whether a debt-collection communication is deceptive from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer and does not require proof that the plaintiff was personally deceived.

Seawell v. Universal Fidelity Corp. · filed 2006-03-06

In order to prevail on her FDCPA claim, Seawell must show that the letter was deceptive from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer. ... A plaintiff is thus not required to show that she herself was deceived.

Section 1692(e) requires alleged debt-collection deception to be evaluated objectively from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP · filed 2007-04-17(e)

The Court must evaluate the defendant’s conduct under the “least sophisticated consumer” test, and objectively determine whether that consumer would be misled by the defendant’s statement.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, but a court filing is actionable only when it materially misleads the least sophisticated consumer or impedes the consumer’s ability to respond to or dispute collection.

Gabriele v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. · filed 2012-11-27(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(9), (e)(10)

Section 1692e of the FDCPA proscribes debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt[,]” and provides a non-exhaustive list of example violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Although “[i]t is clear that Congress painted with a broad brush in the FDCPA[,]” Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1989), not every technically false representation by a debt collector amounts to a violation of the FDCPA. ... Our case law demonstrates that communications and practices that could mislead a putative-debtor as to the nature and legal status of the underlying debt, or that could impede a consumer’s ability to respond to or dispute collection, violate the FDCPA. ... Croog’s affidavits and motions were not misleading or deceptive as to the nature or legal status of Gabriele’s debt, nor would they have prevented the least sophisticated consumer from responding to or disputing the action. Within the context of an adversary proceeding in state court between two represented parties, these allegations simply do not state plausible claims under the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not impose liability for false but nonmaterial collection representations that would not mislead the least sophisticated consumer.

Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2015-09-01(e), (f)

Nevertheless, “false but non-material representations are not likely to mislead the least sophisticated consumer and therefore are not actionable under §§ 1692e or 1692f.” ... Consequently, the Eyre Declaration does not contain any misrepresentation and Defendants did not violate the FDCPA by using the Eyre Declaration.

Section 1692(e) prohibits misleading debt-collection communications, assessed objectively from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.

McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan PC · filed 2015-11-04(e)

In the Ninth' Circuit, a debt collector’s liability under §§ 1692e and 1692f is a question of law. ... The least sophisticated debtor standard “presumes a basic level of 'understanding and willingness to read with care.” ... Given these presumptions, the Court concludes that Defendants’ communications or lack thereof would not have misled a least sophisticated debtor or constituted an unfair debt collection practice.

Section 1692e prohibits debt-collection practices that tend to confuse the least sophisticated consumer.

Martin v. Trott Law, P.C. · filed 2016-07-26(e)

“A debt collector violates § 1692e, put simply, if the collection practice that he uses has the tendency to confuse the least sophisticated consumer.”

FDCPA communications are evaluated from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.

Pollak v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC · filed 2018-01-17

Accordingly, communications from lender to debtors are analyzed from the perspective of the "least sophisticated debtor."

Section 1692e bars a debt collector from using a false, deceptive, or misleading representation in debt collection, including one the least sophisticated consumer could reasonably interpret inaccurately.

Teitelbaum v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2021-06-01(e)

One of those provisions—the one that Plaintiff specifically alleges Defendant ICS violated—forbids a “debt collector” from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. A representation is “false, deceptive, or misleading” under § 1692e if, from the perspective of the “objective ‘least sophisticated consumer,’” the representation is “open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.”

The FDCPA uses an objective least-sophisticated-consumer standard to assess whether debt-collection conduct violates the Act.

Pilkey v. 21st Mortgage Corporation · filed 2025-05-21

Taking his counts in turn, plaintiff’s FDCPA claim (Count I) must be evaluated under the least sophisticated consumer standard. ... “Courts use the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ standard, an objective test, when assessing whether particular conduct violates the FDCPA.”

Section 1692i(a)(2) requires a debt collector to bring a legal action on a debt only in the district where the consumer signed the contract or resides, and the venue restriction applies only to actions against the consumer.

Smith v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C. · filed 2012-08-23i(a)(2)

The FDCPA statutory language is clear in that the venue provision applies only to legal actions “against the consumer.” Having determined that trustee process in Massachusetts is an action against a third-party trustee and not the consumer, Smith’s complaint fails sufficiently to allege that the defendants initiated a legal action against a consumer in violation of the FDCPA’s venue provision, and it should be dismissed.

Section 1692k(d) permits FDCPA enforcement actions in an appropriate federal district court without regard to the amount in controversy, but it does not provide an explicit venue rule, so the general federal venue provisions apply.

Gachette v. Tri-City Adjustment Bureau · filed 1981-06-26(k)(d)

In the absence of an explicit venue provision in the Act, it is reasonable to assume that the general venue provisions apply.

Section 1692i(a)(2) permits an FDCPA action against a debt collector in the judicial district where the consumer resides.

Maloon v. Schwartz, Zweban & Slingbaum, L.L.P. · filed 2005-11-07(a)(2)

Under Section 1692i of the FDCPA, venue is proper in Hawaii because Plaintiff resides here.

Section 1692i permits a covered legal action to be brought in the judicial district where the consumer signed the contract or where the consumer resides when the action begins; it does not require suit in the consumer's current county.

in Re Christopher Morice · filed 2011-09-15(2)(A), (B)

Neither statute mandates that suit be brought in Harris County. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(2)(A), (B) (providing that legal action subject to FDCPA may be brought in judicial district in which consumer signed contract or in which consumer resides at commencement of action).

Section 1692i(a) does not control venue for a post-judgment enforcement action under Massachusetts trustee process law because that action is directed against the trustee, not the debtor.

Smith v. Solomon and Solomon, P.C. · filed 2013-04-24(a)

This case requires us to decide whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., controls the choice of venue in a post-judgment enforcement action to recover a debt under Massachusetts trustee process law. We conclude that it does not.

Sections 1692e(5) and (10) prohibit collection communications that can mislead the least sophisticated consumer about intended legal action or create a false sense of urgency, and § 1692g(a)(3) requires the validation notice to make clear that the debt collector, only for collection purposes, will assume the debt valid unless disputed.

Fariasantos v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC · filed 2014-03-10(e)(5), (e)(10), (g)(a)(3)

The fact that the loan has been referred for the stated purpose of taking legal action could reasonably be expected to lead the least sophisticated consumer to believe that the loan has been referred to the attorney for the purpose of filing a lawsuit, something the least sophisticated consumers would know that attorneys commonly do. This reasonable conclusion (from the viewpoint of the least sophisticated consumer) is false and misleading. Making false or misleading statements is unlawful under § 1692e(5) and may also be a violation of § 1692e(10) if the statement is a deceptive collection practice designed to impart a false sense of urgency to the consumer. ... The Letter’s failure to state who will assume the validity of the debt does not fulfill Rosenberg’s clear obligation under the statute to tell the consumer that it is the debt collector who will assume the debt to be valid.

Section 1692e prohibits deceptive debt-collection practices only when the challenged conduct occurs in connection with the collection of a present debt.

Miller v. Bank of America, National Ass'n · filed 2012-03-14(e)

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the FDCPA because BAC’s allegedly false statements cannot be deemed to be “in connection” with a present debt collection proceeding.

A creditor collecting a debt it owns is not a debt collector under the FDCPA's second-prong definition, and a business is covered by the principal-purpose prong only when debt collection is its principal purpose.

Gross v. Loancare LLC · filed 2022-09-29(a)(6)

An entity is a debt collector if (1) “the principal purpose of [using interstate commerce] is the collection of any debts”, or (2) if [the entity] “regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... CIT is plainly not a debt collector under the second prong. The debt in question is due to CIT itself, and not owed to another entity. ... CIT’s principal purpose is not debt collection. CIT is a financial services conglomerate that provides many other services such as personal banking and commercial financing, in addition to mortgage loans. Plaintiff merely recites the FDCPA’s definition of a “debt collector” in his complaint and does not allege any facts to support the allegation that CIT’s principal purpose is debt collection. See Compl. ¶ 16. Accordingly, the FDCPA claims against CIT are dismissed because CIT is not a debt collector under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA generally does not cover creditors collecting debts owed to themselves; a person must attempt to collect debts owed to another to qualify as a debt collector.

Wang v. Verizon Communications, Inc. · filed 2023-01-19

Wang’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) also fail. As the Supreme Court has explained, “you have to attempt to collect debts owed another before you can ever qualify as a debt collector” under the FDCPA. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1724 (2017). Wang’s complaint alleges that the relevant defendants in this action are or were creditors seeking to collect debts owed to them; therefore, they are not “debt collectors” within the meaning of the statute. See Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (“As a general matter, creditors are not subject to the FDCPA.”).

Section 1692a(6) excludes creditors collecting their own debts from the FDCPA’s definition of debt collectors, so the Act generally does not apply to them.

Scriven v. Barnum · filed 2024-04-24(a)(6)

Scriven does not set forth facts to show or to suggest a claim under the FDCPA and, in any event, the FDCPA does not apply to a creditor, such as Barnum.

Section 1692(a)(6) does not treat a creditor collecting debts owed to itself as a debt collector.

LOUIS-JEAN v. WESTLAKE FINANCIAL SERVICES · filed 2024-08-22(a)(6)

Therefore, the FDCPA does not apply to Westlake because Westlake is not a “debt collector.”

Section 1692a(6) excludes a creditor collecting its own debt in its own name from the FDCPA's definition of debt collector when the creditor's principal purpose is not debt collection.

Cross v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union, The · filed 2024-11-12(a)(6)

And its repossession of Cross’ vehicle pursuant to the terms of the Loan did not itself violate the FDCPA because the law does not prohibit creditors from “collecting their own debt in their own name [if] their ‘principal purpose’ as an entity is not debt collection.” ... PenFed repossessed Cross’ vehicle to recover its own debt, and Cross does not allege (nor could he) that PenFed’s principal purpose is debt collection. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Cross’ FDCPA claim with prejudice.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes creditors collecting debts owed to themselves from the FDCPA’s definition of debt collector.

CLEMENS · filed 2025-11-24(a)(6)

For the FDCPA’s protections to apply, a plaintiff must allege facts tending to show that the defendant is a debt collector. A “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Here, Clemens alleges that Ardent Credit Union has attempted to collect on the defaulted auto loan by threatening repossession of the Nissan Pathfinder. In other words, Ardent Credit Union is attempting to collect on a debt that Clemens owes to it. Accordingly, Ardent Credit Union is a creditor, not a debt collector, and the FDCPA does not govern its collection attempts.

Section 1692k does not imply a private right to seek injunctive relief under the FDCPA.

Strong v. NATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT COMPANY · filed 1984-10-17(k)

Similarly, this court concludes that no private right to seek injunctive relief should be implied under the FDCPA.

Section 1692k does not authorize a private action for injunctive relief under the FDCPA; private parties may pursue the statute's monetary remedies.

Zanni v. Lippold · filed 1988-02-03(k)

Thus, the issue is whether the FDCPA authorizes a private remedy of injunctive relief. This issue has not been expressly addressed in this circuit. The only two cases which have directly confronted this issue have determined that no such private action exists. Finding the reasoning in those cases persuasive, we hold likewise. ... Clearly, Congress was allowing only for monetary damages where private parties were concerned. ... Thus, Congress did provide for injunctive relief under the Act, but reserved its availability to the FTC.

The FDCPA does not permit private plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief.

Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp. · filed 1998-03-24

Defendants are correct. ... Therefore, to the extent that the amended complaint seeks injunctive relief, defendants’ request is granted and plaintiffs shall be barred from requesting such relief in the amended complaint.

The FDCPA does not make injunctive or declaratory relief available to private plaintiffs.

Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics Inc. · filed 2009-02-11

Third Circuit precedent is clear that injunctive or declaratory relief is not available to private plaintiffs pursuing claims under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not authorize injunctive relief.

Andrews v. Countrywide Bank, NA · filed 2015-04-01(k)

In any event, the FDCPA claim is irrelevant for purposes of this motion, as the FDCPA does not provide for injunctive relief.

Section 1692 et seq. does not authorize equitable or injunctive relief, so a plaintiff cannot obtain a temporary restraining order under the statute.

Womack v. Freedom Mortgage · filed 2019-11-13

Although Plaintiff may be entitled to some monetary relief if he can prove a violation of the FDCPA by some or all Defendants, he cannot obtain a TRO pursuant to that statute.

Section 1692k does not authorize declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief in private FDCPA actions.

Mitchell v. Greenville Property Owners LLC · filed 2021-12-14(k)

Finally, the FDCPA does not expressly authorize injunctive relief in private actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (listing damages and counsel fees as remedies, but not declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief). In Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 231 F.3d 970 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit noted that, “although this circuit has not definitely ruled on the issue, courts uniformly hold that the FDCPA does not authorize equitable relief.” Id. at 977 n.39 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing cases). Thus, even if Plaintiff prevailed on the merits of her FDCPA claim against Greenville and was able to satisfy the other requirements for injunctive relief, she would not be entitled to a TRO or preliminary injunction.

The FDCPA does not permit individual litigants to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief.

NUAMAH-WILLIAMS v. FRONTLINE ASSET STRATEGIES, LLC · filed 2022-03-28

Thus, the Court declines to allow Plaintiff to circumvent Congress’s intent to preclude such relief under the FDCPA by seeking equitable relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 instead.

The FDCPA does not provide injunctive relief as a remedy.

HOWARD v. VILLAGE CAPITAL & INVESTMENT LLC · filed 2025-07-25

Moreover, the FDCPA, TILA, and RESPA do not permit the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs.

Section 1692d's general harassment prohibition is a broad catch-all that is not limited to the specifically enumerated forms of conduct.

Penny v. Williams & Fudge, Inc. · filed 2012-01-05(d)

While this portion of the Act lists several discrete violations, “§ 1692d is explicitly not limited to the conduct proscribed by subsections (l)-(6).”

Claims under § 1692d are judged from the perspective of a consumer whose circumstances make the consumer relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse.

Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc. · filed 1985-03-04(d)

Thus, we hold that claims under § 1692d should be viewed from the perspective of a consumer whose circumstances makes him relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse.

Section 1692d(5) prohibits causing a telephone to ring or engaging someone in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, and the court held that the frequency and volume of calls can establish that intent.

Sanchez v. Client Services, Inc. · filed 2007-10-29(d)(5)

With respect to subsection (5), the parties agree that defendants Client Services and Karla Davis made approximately 54 telephone calls to plaintiff Irma Sanchez at work and left approximately 24 messages on the answering machine. ... Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to defendants, the frequency and volume of the telephone calls show that defendants intended to annoy, abuse and harass plaintiff Irma Sanchez. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as to this claim is granted.

Section 1692d prohibits harassment or abuse by debt collectors, but conclusory allegations of harassing calls and mailings do not plausibly establish a violation.

Shetiwy v. Midland Credit Management · filed 2013-09-20(d)

Harassment or abuse is prohibited under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. The Amended Complaint makes conelusory and formulaic allegations that two plaintiffs received harassing calls and mailings, but these allegations fail to plead a plausible violation sufficient to withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Indeed, one allegation fails to state who made the harassing communications, or what they were about.

Section 1692d(5) prohibits repeatedly or continuously causing a telephone to ring with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass in connection with debt collection.

Masuda v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2014-04-29(d)(5)

Masuda’s allegation that Citibank called his cell phone over 300 times in spite of this knowledge raises a plausible inference that it intended to harass him in violation of Subsection 1692d(5).

Section 1692d(5) prohibits repeatedly or continuously causing a telephone to ring with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, and liability turns on evidence of that intent and the overall pattern of calls.

Hatuey v. IC System · filed 2018-11-14(d)(5)

Consequently, phone calls intended to contact a debtor, even if made persistently and over an extended period of time, cannot alone lead to liability under the FDCPA. Rather, I look to the “volume, frequency, and persistence of calls, to whether defendant continued to call after plaintiff requested it cease, and to whether plaintiff actually owed the alleged debt.”

Section 1692d asks whether conduct’s natural consequence is harassment, oppression, or abuse, regardless of subjective intent, while § 1692f requires unfair or unconscionable means used to collect or attempt to collect a debt.

Ramirez v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP · filed 2019-03-29(d), (f)

On that question, remember that § 1692d prohibits conduct “the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse” the debtor or another person. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. As the statutory text demonstrates, the subjective intent of the debt collector is unimportant; rather, the question is whether “the natural consequence” of the defendant’s conduct was to harass, oppress, or abuse. Horkey, 333 F.3d at 774-75. ... Ramirez’s allegation of a single hard inquiry, without more, is insufficient to sate a claim under § 1692d. ... To successfully state a claim under § 1692f, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant used “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. ... But Ramirez has not alleged that Mandarich used the hard inquiry as “a means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.” See generally Compl. ... This gap in the allegations renders the § 1692f claim, at least as presently alleged, inadequate.

Section 1692d prohibits debt collectors from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with collecting a debt.

Trupp v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2020-04-09(d)

Finally, specifically pertaining to 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, that statute states that “[a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” ... If the filing of a debt-collection lawsuit without the immediate means of proving the debt does not constitute a Section 1692d violation, then the filing of a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case cannot either.

Section 1692d(5) prohibits a debt collector from repeatedly or continuously causing a telephone to ring or making telephone calls with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, and one missed call is insufficient to establish that violation.

Cunningham v. Radius Global Solutions LLC · filed 2020-09-14(d)(5)

Under § 1692d(5) of the FDCPA, it states “the following conduct is a violation of this section: Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” 15 U.S.C. § 1629d(5). ... One phone call—and here, a missed phone call—is not sufficient to establish harassment, oppression or abuse.

Section 1692d does not treat filing a debt-collection lawsuit, even a meritless one, as conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person.

Finch v. Slochowsky & Slochowsky LLP · filed 2020-09-30(d)

The filing of a lawsuit to collect a debt—even if the lawsuit is meritless—is not properly understood as “conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person” under this provision. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.

Section 1692d does not treat continued reporting of a disputed debt as harassment, oppression, or abuse when the conduct is unlike the statute's enumerated examples.

WOODS v. LVNV FUNDING, LLC · filed 2021-05-04(d)

The Court agrees with Defendants. Although the specific types of prohibited conduct listed in Section 1692d are meant to serve merely as examples "[w]ithout limiting the general application" of the otherwise broad prohibition against harassment, oppression, and abuse, under the ejudem generis rule of statutory construction—that is, "when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration," Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991)—the nature of the enumerated conduct is instructive. The Court rejects Woods' implication that continued reporting of the debt—even if he disputed it five times—is in any way like the use of "violence or other criminal means," "obscene or profane language," or repeatedly calling a person's home with the intent to harass them. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(1), (2), (5). Defendants, then, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.