15 U.S.C. § 1692

Under §§ 1692e and 1692g, a collection letter is not misleading merely because it lists static, post-charge-off interest without stating that the debt is no longer accruing, and § 1692g(a)(2) requires identification of the current creditor but not the full ownership chain.

Park v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-08-13(g)(a)(1), (g)(a)(2), (e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10)

As is clear from Taylor and Lundi, then, Dynamic and Pinnacle did not violate FDCPA by including a non-zero line-item for accrued interest, or by not disclosing that Park’s debt was static. ... No reasonable jury could find, therefore, that the letter’s listing of Pinnacle as the current creditor without additional information on its acquisition of Park’s debt was false or deceptive in violation of FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a validation notice to convey that a consumer’s dispute of a debt must be submitted in writing.

VEDERNIKOV v. LTD FINANCIAL SERVICES LP · filed 2020-01-22(a)(3)

Because the Letter clearly conveys to the least sophisticated consumer the requirement disputes be submitted in writing, LTD did not violate the requirements of § 1692g(a)(3).

Under the FDCPA, a debt owner collecting for its own account is a creditor rather than a debt collector; foreclosure-related court filings do not violate § 1692c(b) merely because they disclose the debt; § 1692e reaches only materially misleading statements; and a formal pleading is not an initial communication triggering § 1692g(a)(2).

Johnson-Gellineau v. Stiene & Associates, P.C. · filed 2019-06-27(a)(4), (a)(6)(F)(iii), (c)(b), (e), (g)(a)(2), (g)(d)

Thus, because Wells Fargo is a “person . . . to whom a debt is owed,” and did not acquire the debt in default “solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another,” Wells Fargo was Plaintiff’s creditor under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (emphasis added). ... Because Chase obtained Plaintiff’s loan before she defaulted, Chase meets the exception in § 1692a(6)(F)(iii), and Plaintiff has not plausibly pled that it is a debt collector under the FDCPA. ... Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the Attorney Defendants under § 1692c(b), based on their disclosure of Plaintiff’s debt to the state court in the context of pursuing foreclosure, for failure to state a claim. ... In Cohen, the Second Circuit held that § 1692e “incorporates a materiality requirement,” which requires that “a false statement is only actionable under the FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated consumer.” ... However, the statute expressly states that “[a] communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of [§ 1692g(a)].”

A complaint alleging violations of the FDCPA must include specific factual allegations supporting the claimed statutory elements; a rote recitation is insufficient, while minimally detailed allegations may survive judgment on the pleadings.

Jones v. Bank of America NA · filed 2019-07-01

Most of these allegations, however, simply provide a recitation of the FDCPA with no factual basis to support the claim. ... The allegation does not specify which of the three actions Carrington allegedly did and certainly does not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” ... paragraphs 98 through 100 provide a sufficient basis to state a claim under the FDCPA. ... The motion, therefore, is due to be denied regarding the alleged FDCPA violations.

Section 1692e(11) requires subsequent communications to disclose plainly that they are from a debt collector, while § 1692k(a)(3) permits a prevailing defendant to seek attorney fees and costs by motion after a finding that the action was brought in bad faith and for harassment, rather than by premature counterclaim.

Washington v. Finance System of Toledo, Inc. · filed 2019-11-14(e)(11), (k)(a)(3)

In light of this Circuit split, Congress in 1996 amended § 1692e(11) so that it now allows follow-up letters to omit the warning that a debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and any information collected would be used for that purpose. Instead, the Act now requires that information only in a debt collector’s initial communication to a debtor. The amended Act retains, however, the express requirement that subsequent communications must disclose that the communication comes from a debt collector. See § 1692e(11). ... I disagree. I find nothing in the FDCPA, especially in light of the fact that Congress in 1996 retained the source-identification mandate, to support giving debt collectors that leeway. Telling the debtor what you want is not synonymous with stating who you are. This requirement is not, after all, hard to meet. One need merely read and follow a simple command: namely, to tell the debtor forthrightly that the communication comes from a debt collector.2 The letter at issue did not do so. Consequently, the plaintiff states a cause of action as to defendant’ thus far unexplained noncompliance. The defendant, accordingly, is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the issue of compliance with the source-identification requirement of the FDCPA. ... The plain language of § 1692k(a)(3) provides a clear path by which defendants may recover attorney fees and litigation costs after a finding that plaintiff brought the action in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. This comports with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, allowing a prevailing party to make a claim for attorney’s fees. A prevailing party must, by necessity, have first prevailed before it may seek attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector's notice to provide specified debt and dispute information; a notice providing that information nearly verbatim defeats a claim that the required notice was omitted.

Urrego v. Samuel White P.C. · filed 2019-12-30(g)(a)

The Notice Letter, submitted by White, contradicts Urrego’s claim. Specifically, the Notice Letter specifies the amount of the debt owed (“$757,617.25”), and the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed in capital letters (“THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON”). ... The Notice Letter provides, nearly verbatim, the information required under § 1692g(a). ... Given the uncontested information provided in the Notice Letter, Urrego fails to allege an “act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” Moore, 2010 WL 4272984, at *2. For that reason, the Court will dismiss Urrego’s FDCPA claim.

Sections 1692g and 1692e require debt collectors to present validation rights clearly without overshadowing or contradiction and prohibit false or misleading representations about a debt, including its legal status.

Sturm v. Alpha Recovery Corp · filed 2020-03-06(e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (g)(b)

Not only must the debt collector communicate the required information to the debtor, it must also convey it clearly. ... A validation is legally insufficient “if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.” ... The Court finds no inconsistency or overshadowing impacting the Letter’s clear validation notice. ... If Oliphant is not, in fact, the proper assignee of Plaintiff’s debt, then the Letter would include a false representation regarding the legal status of the debt. ... Plaintiff’s failure to avail herself of those procedures is not a bar to suit as “the FDCPA’s text does not make consumer exhaustion of § 1692g dispute procedures a condition precedent to a consumer § 1692e . . . claim.”

The FDCPA treats communications that seek payment as debt-collection activity, bars communications with a consumer known to be represented by counsel, prohibits false descriptions of a debt’s character or amount and charges not authorized by agreement or law, and defines communication broadly enough to include indirect conveyance of debt information.

Roche v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC · filed 2020-03-25(a)(2), (c)(2), (e)(2)(A), (f)(1)

In reviewing the relevant exhibits, the Court concludes that these communications constituted debt collection attempts. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs have alleged a plausible FDCPA claim because these mortgage statements were not sent solely for informational purposes, but rather were “in connection with the collection of a debt.” ... These facts, taken as true, are sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief based on the inference that Rushmore knew Plaintiffs were represented by counsel. ... Moreover, the FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” ... Defendants fail to address why communications sent by RAS on Rushmore’s behalf do not constitute “indirect” communication. ... These allegations raise plausible inferences that Rushmore’s Incomplete Payment History misrepresented the character, amount, or status of Plaintiffs’ debt. ... Given the clear and repeated allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiffs were concerned they were being charged for estimated fees and various costs in error, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an FDCPA claim.

Sections 1692g(a) and 1692e(10) require specified debt-validation disclosures, including a thirty-day dispute period, and prohibit false or deceptive means to collect a debt.

Williams v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2020-09-27(g)(a), (g)(a)(3), and (e)(10)

Further, plaintiff has not alleged that she disputed the debt within the thirty day window. In order to dispute the validity of a debt under § 1692g, a plaintiff must dispute it within thirty days of receipt of the collection letter. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3); Ritter v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 118 F. Supp. 3d 497, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). ... Consequently, the court finds that even if the court were to construe defendant’s February 19, 2019 letter as a collection notice, plaintiff did not respond until April 1, 2019, well outside the thirty day window. ... The court also cannot find that the plaintiff plausibly alleges “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer” by defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10); Easterling v. Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 2012)(under the least sophisticated consumer standard “collection notices can be deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate”).

Section 1692e(13) prohibits falsely representing or implying that a document is legal process, and the term “legal process” has the same meaning there as in § 1692a(6)(D), referring to documents that can be served.

McCoy v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2019-07-02(e)(13)

The FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” makes clear that the term “legal process” refers to a category of documents that can be “serve[d],” which aligns with the term’s ordinary meaning. ... Because there is no reason in the FDCPA or elsewhere to believe that Congress intended the term “legal process” to mean one thing in § 1692e(13) and another in § 1692a(6)(D), it follows that “legal process” means the same thing in § 1692e(13) as it does in § 1692a(6)(D).

These provisions prohibit debt collectors from harassing debtors, using false or misleading collection representations, or taking certain nonjudicial actions to dispossess property without an enforceable security interest.

Chavez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2019-05-31(d), (e), and (f)(6)

Section 1692d states: “A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” ... Plaintiff Individually has pled sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim against Defendants for violation of § 1692d, as to the incidents that occurred no earlier than one-year before April 6, 2016. ... Section 1692e states: “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... Count II therefore fails to state a plausible claim by Plaintiff Individually that Defendants violated § 1692e. ... Section 1692f states, in pertinent part: ... (6) Taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if– ... (A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest[.] ... Plaintiff Individually has pled sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim against Defendants for violation of § 1692f(6). ... Thus, the § 1692e claim by Plaintiff Individually in Count II is dismissed in its entirety, but the dismissal is without prejudice because it is arguably possible to cure the defects in that claim. Dismissal is denied as to the § 1692d claim and the § 1692f(6) claim by Plaintiff Individually in Count II, to the extent that those portions of Count II are based on acts and omissions which occurred no earlier than one-year prior to April 6, 2016.

Section 1692g(a)(4) and (5) require written disputes or requests to trigger debt-verification and original-creditor protections; a violation without concrete harm or an appreciable risk of harm does not establish Article III standing.

Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc · filed 2019-06-04(a)(4), (a)(5)

Section 1692g serves this end by giving debtors a way to dispute or verify their supposed debts. And by obligating creditors to tell debtors how to do that, subsections (a)(4) and (5) reduce the risk that debtors will inadvertently lose the protections given to those who observe the statutory requirements. Casillas did not allege that Madison’s actions harmed or posed any real risk of harm to her interests under the Act. She did not allege that she tried to dispute or verify her debt orally and therefore lost or risked losing the statutory protections. Indeed, she did not allege that she ever even considered contacting Madison or that she had any doubt about whether she owed Harvester Financial Credit Union the stated amount of money. She complained only that her notice was missing some information that she did not suggest that she would ever have used. Any risk of harm was entirely counterfactual: she was not at any risk of losing her statutory rights because there was no prospect that she would have tried to exercise them. Because Madison’s mistake didn’t put Casillas in harm’s way, it was nothing more than a “bare procedural violation.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Casillas had no more use for the notice than she would have had for directions accompanying a product that she had no plans to assemble.

The FDCPA's statutory protections can create concrete Article III injury when a violation materially increases the risk of abusive debt collection practices, and particularized emotional harm may also suffice.

Pastian v. International Credit Systems, Inc · filed 2020-11-03

Pastian has standing to continue to litigate her second through fifth claimed violations of the FDCPA. The statutory violations she alleges together with her particular emotional injuries demonstrate at this stage of the litigation that she has a concrete, non-abstract personal stake in the outcome of these claims.

For claims under § 1692(c) or (e), a statutory violation, confusion, stress, or emotional distress alone does not create Article III standing without detrimental action or risk of harm.

Mladenov v. R1 RCM Inc. · filed 2022-01-25(c), (e)

Pennell is dispositive. Mladenov relies on § 1692(c) to assert that he suffered emotional distress when Medical Financial contacted him despite his having retained counsel. ... The Seventh Circuit is clear, Mladenov does not have standing to assert an FDCPA action under § 1692(c). ... Brunett specifically addressed an alleged violation of section (e) of § 1692. ... The Seventh Circuit vacated the finding and ordered the case dismissed for lack of standing because the plaintiff took no detrimental actions based on the debt collector’s alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 1069. Plaintiff’s assertion that the letter was misleading or confusing did not confer standing. With no injury in fact, she had no standing to bring an action.

An FDCPA plaintiff must show a concrete injury caused by the alleged statutory violation; a bare procedural violation and statutory damages alone do not establish standing.

Connor v. Russell · filed 2022-06-07

Sixth Circuit authority is clear that “[t]o satisfy the injury in fact requirement, the [plaintiff] must point to some harm other than the fact of ‘a bare procedural violation’” of the FDCPA. Hagy, 882 F.3d at 620 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ––– U.S. –––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016)); see also Lyshe v. Levy, 854 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stating with regard to an FDCPA claim, “[t]his circuit has had the occasion to interpret Spokeo and has concluded that a statutory violation in and of itself is insufficient to establish standing.”). Plaintiff must show a cognizable injury in fact caused by the defendant’s violation of the FDCPA to withstand Article III review, and the availability of statutory damages will not suffice. See Hagy, 882 F.3d at 623.

A violation of the FDCPA, without concrete harm or a material risk of harm to interests the statute protects, does not by itself confer Article III standing.

Farmer v. Optio Solutions, LLC · filed 2022-08-31(e), (f)

At the outset, Plaintiff contends that “a[n] FDCPA violation standing alone[] creates a sufficient concrete injury.” ... A statutory violation of the FDCPA does not create a per se injury sufficient to confer standing. ... More is needed.

Section 1692e does not by itself confer Article III standing when the alleged violation causes only confusion without a concrete injury.

Toogood v. The Receivable Management Services LLC · filed 2022-09-14(e)

Toogood argues that RMS’s alleged violation of § 1692e constitutes an injury in fact. [DE 35 at 182]. ... Accordingly, Toogood’s confusion does not have a close relationship to a common law analogue traditionally regarded as the basis of a lawsuit. See id. at 437.

A plaintiff asserting FDCPA claims must show a concrete injury; alleging only a bare procedural violation does not establish standing.

Sandusky v. LTD Financial Services, LP · filed 2022-09-15(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10), and (f)

Even if the new damages theory had been included in plaintiff’s complaint, his remaining claims would still fail for want of damages. ... The Court therefore concludes that plaintiff “has failed to show more than a bare procedural violation of the FDCPA [and MOC], he does not have standing to bring his claims, and [this court] lack[s] subject-matter jurisdiction to address them.”

An alleged FDCPA violation, by itself, does not establish Article III standing for a damages claim; the plaintiff must allege concrete harm or an imminent future injury.

Crawford v. The Law Offices of Brett Borland · filed 2024-01-10

Begin with the alleged FDCPA violations. A plaintiff cannot “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. So any alleged FDCPA violation does not confer Article III standing unless Crawford can show that another, more concrete harm resulted from the statutory violation. And because Crawford seeks damages rather than injunctive relief, the risk of future harm is insufficient—the harm must have already materialized. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 441 (2021) (“The risk of future harm on its own is not enough to support Article III standing for [a] damages claim.”). Even reading the Complaint generously, Crawford has not alleged any such concrete harm accompanying the FDCPA violation.

Sections 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692f require a debt-collection complaint to allege enough about the challenged letters for a court to assess the alleged threat, deception, or unfairness from the least sophisticated consumer's perspective.

FORDHAM v. SETERUS, INC. · filed 2019-07-31(e)(5), (e)(10), (f)

Here, the Amended Complaint contains no information about the New Jersey Final Letters sent to Fordham that would allow the Court to find with any degree of plausibility that Seterus violated sections 1692e(5), 10 or 1692f of the FDCPA. The Amended Complaint does not attach or quote from any of the New Jersey Final Letters Fordham allegedly received. It also fails to give approximate dates as to when these letter were received, or the amount owed. Instead, it relies on and recites snippets of a letter sent to a borrower in North Carolina and alleges her letters were similar. (ECF No. 9-1.) Because the Court cannot refer to the letters themselves it cannot determine whether Seterus’s letters, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, constitute a threat to foreclose, use deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect, or use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect the debt owed.

Section 1692 requires more than a conclusory assertion that a debt collector billed someone for debts that were not owed to state an FDCPA claim.

Bello v. Capital One Bank USA NA · filed 2024-05-31

Further, his conclusory assertion that he was billed for debts that were not owed was insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA.

Under Sections 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g(a)(1), a debt collector may use the Avila safe-harbor language about possible interest, late charges, and other charges when its contract authorizes those charges, even if it does not intend to collect them.

Morgan v. Northstar Location Services, LLC · filed 2019-08-01(e), (e)(2), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), (f)(1), (g)(a)(1)

Avila II makes clear that debt collectors may include the safe harbor language, even when they do not intend to collect interest, late fees, and/or other charges, as long as they possess the contractual right to collect those charges. Here, the explicit terms of the Loan Agreement provided the Defendant the authority to do so. ECF 21, Ex. B. §§ 1, 6, 12. Therefore, the Letter is similarly entitled to safe harbor treatment. ... Therefore, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for violations of Sections 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), 1692f, USC 1692f(1), and 1692g(a).

Section 1692c(b) does not bar a debt collector’s contacts with state courts that are reasonably necessary precedents to obtaining a postjudgment judicial remedy.

Deitemyer v. Ryback, Esq. · filed 2019-08-06(b)

Likewise, in the debt collection action, defendants’ contacts with the State courts were reasonably necessary precedents to reaching a postjudgment judicial remedy. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim fails.

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits a court to award a defendant reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs when an action was brought in bad faith and for harassment.

Gonzalez v. Allied Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2019-08-06(a)(3)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), the Court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to a defendant, if the Court finds an action was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. ... The Court concludes that Allied fails to establish entitlement to attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to give an effective validation notice explaining the consumers debt-dispute and verification rights, and a notice closely tracking the statutory language is not misleading merely because it uses the word if in the written-dispute provision.

GOTTESMAN v. VIRTUOSO SOURCING GROUP, LLC · filed 2019-08-09(a)

The use of the word "if" in the validation notice, as it was used here, would not confuse a consumer as to how to dispute the debt because the Letter does not suggest that a debtor may dispute the debt in any other method besides the in-writing requirement. Furthermore, the Letter uses language that mirrors the statutory language provided in § 1692g(a), without providing confusing, alternative ways to dispute the debt that would contradict the validation. ... Thus, I do not deem the language of the Letter to be an abusive debt collection practice because it closely tracks the statutory language provided in § 1692g(a).

Section 1692d(5) bars repeated or continuous calls made with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, while section 1692e(2)(A) bars false, deceptive, or misleading representations about the character, amount, or legal status of a debt.

Grier v. Mid-Michigan Credit Bureau · filed 2019-08-14(d)(5) and (e)(2)(A)

Although Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under § 1692d(5), she has pled sufficient facts under § 1692e(2)(A). ... Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that Defendant’s conduct amounted to harassment or abuse. ... This is insufficient to state a claim under § 1692d(5). ... In contrast, Plaintiff does allege sufficient facts to state a claim under § 1692e(2)(A). Section 1692e(2)(A) instructs that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation means in connection with the collection of any debt, including “[t]he false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). ... Because the Court must accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, and because the Complaint gives Defendant sufficient notice of the allegations, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1692e(2)(A) claim.

Sections 1692e and 1692g do not require a debt collector to warn that interest or fees are not accruing when a collection letter accurately states the total amount owed and merely itemizes zero balances.

Qureshi v. Vital Recovery Services, LLC · filed 2019-08-15(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (g)(1)

The mere itemization of a $0 balance for interest and fees has no coercive import. ... Section 1692g requires the disclosure of the amount of the debt—meaning “the total, present quantity of money that the consumer is obligated to pay.” ... The letter discloses the “total balance due,” and Qureshi does not allege that this amount was an estimate subject to additional fees or otherwise inaccurate.

Section 1692c(a)(2) and (c) do not impute a creditor's knowledge that a consumer is represented by counsel or refuses to pay to a debt purchaser; without actual knowledge, the purchaser does not violate those provisions by contacting the consumer.

PENNELL v. GLOBAL TRUST MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2019-08-20(a)(2), (c)

Even assuming that GTM is a debt collector subject to the FDCPA, GTM is entitled to summary judgment. Courts do not impute to debt collectors the information in creditors’ files. ... Knowledge, though, is neither a right nor a liability; it is “a state of mind.” ... A debt purchaser does not acquire the seller’s knowledge—or any other state of mind—any more than a homebuyer acquires the seller’s neighborly grudges or fond memories of last year’s block party. Lacking knowledge (actual or otherwise), GTM did not violate the FDCPA by sending the letter, and summary judgment for GTM is warranted.

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from collecting amounts not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

Sparks v. EquityExperts.org, LLC · filed 2019-08-21(f)(1)

The Declaration expressly authorizes the collection of the Association’s costs, which are comprised of Equity Experts’ fees. ... In short, the Declaration expressly authorizes the Association to collect its costs. Equity Experts’ fees make up the Association’s costs. Thus, the Declaration expressly authorizes the collection of Equity Experts’ fees.

Sections 1692e and 1692f create separate FDCPA causes of action with separate elements, although the same conduct may violate both.

Barilla v. Seterus, Inc · filed 2019-08-28(e), (f)

Although the same conduct can violate §§ 1692e and 1692f, these two statutes raise two separate causes of action with separate elements.

Sections 1692e and 1692g do not require interest-or-fee disclosures when a collection notice accurately states a static balance that can be paid promptly to satisfy the debt, and § 1692g is satisfied even without a breakdown of the debt’s components or future rates.

Roman v. RGS Financial, Inc. · filed 2019-09-06(e), (g)

The Defendant thus bore no obligation to provide additional disclosures because the Debt never triggered the initial predicate required for Avila to apply in the first place – i.e., “interest and fees that accumulated after the notice was sent but before the balance was paid.” ... Rather, it suffices that the debt was static at the time, even if the creditor could assess additional charges at a later date, so long as the balance due in the collection notice accurately reflects the amount that would satisfy the debt through reasonably prompt payment. ... To the extent the Plaintiff contends that the Letter failed to include a breakdown of interest and late fees already accrued, which is an argument not clearly presented, Second Circuit precedent establishes that “a debt collection letter that informs the consumer of the total, present quantity of his or her debt satisfies Section 1692g, notwithstanding its failure to inform the consumer of the debt's constituent components or the precise rates by which it might later increase.”

Sections 1692e(2) and 1692e(10) prohibit materially false or deceptive debt-collection representations, while section 1692g(a)(1) requires an unambiguous statement of the debt amount, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Navon v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC · filed 2019-09-11(e)(2), (e)(10), and (g)(a)(1)

A representation is ‘deceptive’ under [§] 1692e if it is ‘open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.’ ... Even if a representation is deceptive within the meaning of § 1692e, it must be a material misrepresentation in order to give rise to liability. ... While Plaintiff may be correct that the use of a “false record” in debt collection litigation to try to extend the statute of limitations would violate § 1692e(10), that scenario has nothing to do with the representations made to Plaintiff in the debt collection letters that Schachter sent. ... The information required by § 1692g(a), i.e., “the amount of the debt,” is stated unambiguously. ... Though Plaintiff claims that the inclusion of these amounts was “confusing,” the FDCPA does not impose liability based on unreasonable misinterpretations of collection notices.

Sections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) prohibit false representations about a debt’s amount and collection of amounts not authorized by agreement or law; allegations that a collector sought prejudgment interest not owed under state law state a claim.

Gregory v. Barton · filed 2020-12-31(e)(2)(A), (f)(1)

In sum, the Court predicts, based on the text of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.020 and relevant precedent, that the Missouri Supreme Court would not hold Gregory responsible for prejudgment interest on Angela’s medical debt before the date that Defendants made demand on him. Accordingly, Gregory’s allegation that Defendants falsely stated that he owed, and attempted to collect, such prejudgment interest states a claim under the FDCPA. Coyne, 895 F.3d at 1038. The Court thus denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Gregory’s FDCPA claims.

Sections 1692e(2)(B) and 1692f(1) prohibit debt collectors from misrepresenting or collecting unauthorized costs incidental to a principal debt, including in post-judgment collection activity.

Duvall v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2022-12-13(e)(2)(B) and (f)(1)

In sum, Ms. Duvall alleges facts that plausibly suggest a claim under § 1692e and § 1692f of the FDCPA: (1) PRA is a debt collector; (2) it misrepresented an expense Ms. Duvall owed for the collection of the debt; and (3) through such misrepresentation, it attempted to collect an amount unauthorized by law.

The FDCPA's private cause of action permits monetary relief but not equitable relief.

Cade v. O'Sullivan, Esq · filed 2019-11-14

Although Plaintiff could be entitled to monetary relief if he could prove a violation of the FDCPA, the private cause of action under that statute does not allow for equitable relief.

Section 1692f(6) applies to a person whose principal business purpose is enforcing a security interest, but conduct after the security interest has been extinguished is not enforcement of a security interest.

Thompson v. Five Brothers Mortg. Co. · filed 2020-01-27(f)(6)

In sum, Five Brothers’ conduct in this case did not involve the enforcement of a security interest because no security interest existed at the time Five Brothers entered the property on behalf of U.S. Bank. And Thompson has adduced no proof suggesting that the company ever becomes involved at earlier stages, such that its principal business purpose could be said to be that of enforcing security interests. Thompson has not shown, therefore, that Five Brothers is a “debt collector” for purposes of the FDCPA; the company is not liable under that Act. Our holding is limited; we do not consider whether a business who engages in conduct similar to Five Brothers’ while nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are ongoing engages in the enforcement of a security interest. That question is not before us.

Section 1692f(6) applies only to nonjudicial actions taken to effect dispossession or disablement of property.

LLOYD v. PLUESE BECKER SALTZMAN LLC · filed 2019-11-18(6)

The Court agrees; § 1692f(6), by its terms, is limited to actions taken in connection with a nonjudicial foreclosure case.

Section 1692f(6) covers nonjudicial foreclosure conduct when a person takes or threatens dispossession without a present right or intention to take, or against legally exempt property, while other nonjudicial foreclosure activity generally does not make the actor a debt collector under the FDCPA.

Redjai v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss CA4/3 · filed 2021-09-01(f)(6)

The United States Supreme Court recently held in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP (2019) ___ U.S. ___ [139 S.Ct. 1029] (Obduskey) that “but for [15 U.S.C. section] 1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors” under the FDCPA. (Obduskey, supra, at p. ___ [139 S.Ct. at p. 1038].) Section 1692f(6) of title 15 to the United States Code prohibits taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess property if there is no present right to possession, no present intention to take, or the property is legally exempt from being taken. (Dowers v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 852 F.3d 964, 970-971.) ... Thus, Redjai can only claim Barrett violated the FDCPA if, as Redjai asserts in his appellate brief, Barrett “ha[d] no authority to act with respect as to his note, deed of trust, debt or property.” (See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A) & (B).) Given our conclusion ante that Redjai failed to show the beneficial interest of his trust deed is unenforceable as void, his contention that the FDCPA was violated fails under Obduskey.

Section 1692f(6) prohibits taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess property when there is no present right to possession through an enforceable security interest or no present intention to take possession.

Monroy v. Real Time Resolutions Inc · filed 2022-11-10(f)(6)

As discussed above, however, the 2009 Reconveyance did not extinguish the mortgage lien or otherwise interfere with RTR’s right to take possession of the Property. Accordingly, Trustee Corps did not violate the FDCPA by initiating foreclosure proceedings.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not reach nonjudicial foreclosure because enforcing a security interest is not an attempt to collect money from the debtor, and section 1692g(b) requires a consumer to dispute the debt after receiving a validation notice.

Solano v. PHH Mortgage Company · filed 2025-09-04(e), (f), and (g)(b)

Solano’s allegations concerning violations of 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692e and 1692f are grounded in the foreclosure of his property. However, as Defendants correctly argue, non-judicial foreclosure does not fall within the ambit of the FDCPA. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466, 474–79 (2019); Barnes v. Routh Crabtree Olsen PC, 963 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he enforcement of a security interest does not entail an attempt to collect money from the debtor.”). As such, the FCPA claim as it concerns 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692e and 1692f fails. With regard to 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692g, Solano alleges that Defendants failed to properly disclose the amount of debt and failed to provide him with the opportunity to dispute or request validation of the debt. The Debt Validation Notice that Solano attaches to the 1AC as Exhibit 2 directly refutes these allegations. See 1AC at 82. And Solano does not allege that he attempted to dispute the validity of his debt upon receiving the Debt Validation Notice as required under 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692g(b). Accordingly, Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion with respect Solano’s Third Cause of Action for violations of the FDCPA and DISMISSES this claim WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Section 1692c(c) generally prohibits a debt collector from communicating with a consumer about a debt after the consumer gives written notice that communications should cease, subject to three statutory exceptions.

Hampton v. Barclays Bank Delaware · filed 2019-12-11(c)(c)

With three exceptions defined in the FDCPA, § 1692c(c) prohibits a “debt collector” from communicating with a “consumer with respect to [a] debt” after the consumer “notifies [the] debt collector in writing that . . . the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).

Section 1692c(c) protects a consumer who gives written notice to a debt collector, not merely a creditor, while allowing the collector to announce termination of collection efforts or specified remedies.

Russaw v. Scott & Associates, P.C. · filed 2019-10-24(c)

According to the plain language of the FCPA, a consumer must contact a “debt collector,” not a creditor, to invoke the protection of this section of the statute. ... The debt collector may (1) advise the consumer that the collector’s further efforts are being terminated, (2) notify the consumer that the collector or creditor “may invoke specified remedies” which they ordinarily invoke, or (3) notify the consumer that the collector or creditor “intends to invoke a specified remedy.”

Section 1692c(c) does not bar a debt collector from responding to a consumer’s later request for debt verification after a cease-communication notice, so long as the response is limited to verification.

Dumas v. Transfinancial Companies L L C · filed 2025-07-21(c)

Under § 1692g(b), however, if a consumer disputes a debt in writing then the debt collector must cease collection until it has verified the debt with the creditor and forwarded that verification to the alleged debtor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). While the statute does not expressly require a verification letter, it does prohibit further action on the debt without this communication. Restrictions on communications under § 1692c(c) must be read to avoid “anomalies” within the FDCPA. ... Courts have therefore held that verification letters do not violate the FDCPA even when a consumer has already sent notice to cease communication under § 1692c(c). ... While Dumas requested that Transfinancial cease communications, he subsequently requested verification of the debts—requiring further communication from Transfinancial before it could resume any collection activity on the accounts. He thus invited the answer and waived any claim that a response his requests would violate his directive to cease communications. Because Transfinancial’s responses were limited to this verification, it did not exceed the scope of the waiver.

A collection letter listing multiple valid addresses is not misleading under §§ 1692e and 1692e(10), and does not overshadow the § 1692g(b) validation notice, even if it does not expressly identify where disputes should be sent.

BACALZO v. CREDIT CONTROL, LLC · filed 2022-06-07(e), (e)(10), (g)(b)

Here, Credit Control’s letter does not use any false representation or deceptive means to collect the debt or obtain information nor is it misleading. ... This debt collection letter’s inclusion of multiple addresses and its failure to expressly indicate where correspondence should be sent does not overshadow or detract from Credit Control’s validation notice.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collection after a timely written dispute until it mails verification showing that the amount demanded is what the creditor claims is owed, but it does not require conclusive proof or detailed account documents.

Green v. Smith, Debnam, Narron, Drake, Saintsing & Myers, LLP · filed 2022-06-22(g)(b)

Verification only requires a showing that the amount demanded “is what the creditor is claiming is owed,” not conclusive proof of the debt. ... Defendants’ correspondence dated March 11, 2021, therefore complied with and fulfilled Defendants’ obligations under Section 1692g(b).

A collection notice does not violate § 1692g(b) merely because it requests payment or gives a due date if it clearly preserves the consumer’s validation rights, and a claim under §§ 1692e or 1692e(10) cannot rest on conclusory allegations.

Robertson v. AllianceOne Receivables Management, Inc · filed 2020-01-29(g)(b), (e), and (e)(10)

Here, AllianceOne’s notice explicitly informed plaintiff that the minimum amount due is the amount that would bring her account to current status if paid by a certain date and its admonition that this date did not in any way eliminate or affect plaintiff’s validation rights sufficiently explains away any contradiction or confusion that inclusion of the May 28, 2019 due date might arguably have created when viewed in isolation. ... In any event, the decision in Chan is certainly not binding on the undersigned. ... Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. ... Here, plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege precisely which aspect of the notice was false, deceptive, or misleading such that it violated § 1692e. ... Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

Sections 1692e and 1692g prohibit misleading or overshadowing collection communications, but they do not bar a second validation notice that extends the dispute period, and § 1692g(a)(3) requires that consumers be allowed to dispute debts orally.

Rosen v. LJ Ross Associates, Inc. · filed 2020-03-23(e), (e)(10), (g)(a)(3), (g)(b)

A debt collector’s issuance of a second debt collection letter with a second validation notice does not overshadow the original validation notice nor would it confuse the LSC. Instead, it grants the consumer additional time to dispute the debt, which the debt collector is permitted to do. ... Clear Second Circuit precedent states that the FDCPA requires that consumers be allowed to dispute a debt orally. ... The letters at issue in this case do not suggest that a consumer may only dispute a debt in writing, and thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

Section 1692g(b)’s 30-day validation period is not a prerequisite to asserting independent claims under §§ 1692e and 1692f.

Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. · filed 2020-02-03(b)

Given this explanation and the lack of any time limitation for Mack’s claims under §§ 1692e and 1692f, the Court does not find the thirty-day limitation in Mack’s initial proposed class definition necessary to the class definition and leaves arguments about the viability of her claims with or without the thirty-day limitation to a later date.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(ii) excludes an originating lender collecting a debt it originated from the definition of debt collector.

Anderman v. JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association · filed 2020-02-11(a)(6)(F)(ii)

Chase is the originating lender and is therefore exempt from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector.” See § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (“The term [“debt collector”] does not include . . . any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was originated by such person.”).

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt when attempting to collect it.

GARY v. HLADIK ONORATO & FEDERMAN LLP · filed 2020-02-21(e)(2)(A)

Gary’s allegations regarding the interest sought in the foreclosure action sufficiently set forth a false representation on Defendants’ part respecting the character, amount, or legal status of a debt in connection with an attempt to collect that debt. A debt collector who is found to have violated the FDCPA is liable for actual damages, fees and costs, as well as “such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(a). Accordingly, Count I sufficiently sets forth a violation of the FDCPA and Gary has standing to assert such a violation.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from materially misrepresenting the character, amount, or legal status of a debt; demanding attorneys’ fees before they are due can be actionable.

Walker v. Dankos, Gordon & Tucker, P.C. · filed 2021-03-19(e)(2)(A)

Walker plausibly claims that Defendants made a material misstatement in violation of FDCPA § 1692e(A)(2) by demanding payment of attorneys’ fees because the Note terms only provided attorneys’ fees “as [the loan]matures.” (Note 2.)

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the amount of a debt.

Rosen v. LJ Ross Associates, Inc. · filed 2021-07-22(e)(2)(A)

Subsection 1692e(2)(A) prohibits “[t]he false representation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). ... Therefore, because the November Letter could reasonably be interpreted as a “false representation” of the amount of plaintiff’s debt, the Letter violates the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(2)(A) does not impose liability for a mistaken debt-collection contact when the collector promptly confirms the consumer is not the debtor and stops pursuing collection from that consumer.

Richard v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2022-01-28(e)(2)(A)

The Court finds that Defendant did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Even the least sophisticated consumer would be able to understand Defendant’s actions—after confirming that Plaintiff was not the debtor associated with the account—were not false representations of the character, amount, or legal status of the debt.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making false, deceptive, or misleading representations, including misrepresenting the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, as judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.

KAREEM v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION · filed 2022-03-01(e)(2)(A)

Section 1692e generally provides that debt collectors “may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... “This includes falsely representing ‘the character, amount, or legal status of any debt’ under § 1692e(2)(A)[.]” ... We analyze such communications “from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.” ... Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief under Section 1692e(2)(A).

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, and reporting a debt known to be false can violate that prohibition.

Spencer v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2022-04-28(e)(2)(A)

Accordingly, the FDCPA prohibits “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... For example, under § 1692e(2)(A), a debt collector may not falsely represent “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). ... Thus, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, she has alleged that Mountain Run violated the FDCPA by reporting the alleged debt to Experian though Mountain Run knew it was false. See Bradford, 2017 WL 2573947, at *8 (finding plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim under the FDCPA where plaintiff alleged the defendant reported credit information to Experian that it knew or should have known was false). As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against Mountain Run under § 1692e of the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits false representations about the character, amount, or legal status of a debt.

Duran v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2023-05-19(e)(2)(A)

Furthermore, at this early pleading stage, the Court finds the proposed amendment that Defendant misrepresented to Plaintiff that the subject consumer debt was outside the State of California’s four-year statute of limitations for written and open-ended credit accounts, “when it was not” triggers § 1692e(2)(A), which prohibits “the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.”

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, judged under the least sophisticated debtor standard.

Denius v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. · filed 2024-02-06(e)(2)(A)

As relevant here, it is a violation of the FDCPA to make a false representation of “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A); (Doc. 6. ⁋ 44.) ... In determining whether a specific act by a debt collector violates a provision of the FDCPA, courts employ a “least sophisticated debtor” standard. Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2015). ... As explained above, Real Time was legally authorized to collect on the debt at the time of the property’s sale, and there are no allegations that it engaged in any deceptive, abusive, or otherwise unfair practices in attempting to collect that debt. Accordingly, Count III will also be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, including by trying to collect a debt the consumer does not owe.

Parrish v. DCN Holdings, Inc. · filed 2024-04-15(e)(2)(A)

The Court finds that Parrish has sufficiently stated such a claim. Parrish has alleged that DCN has attempted to collect a debt. ... In addition, she has alleged that DCN has attempted to collect a debt that she does not owe, an act that is prohibited by the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, and allegations that a collector demanded an inflated amount and caused emotional distress can establish injury in fact at the pleading stage.

Cooper v. I.Q. Data International, Inc. · filed 2025-07-02(e)(2)(A)

Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that certain violations of the FDCPA—including demands of “an inflated sum” in violation of § 1692e(2)(A)—that cause “emotional distress, anger, and frustration” constitute an injury-in-fact. ... Cooper has alleged that I.Q. Data stated she owed $47,239.26—rather than the reduced amount of $8,221.93—which caused her “concrete harm including emotional distress.” ... These allegations are sufficient to establish both an injury in fact and traceability for Cooper’s claim of violation of FDCPA § 1692e(2)(A) in Count IV.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt.

NEWELL v. GREENBLATT, LIEBERMAN, RICHARDS & WEISHOFF, LLC · filed 2025-08-14(e)(2)(A)

However, “[a] debt collection letter is deceptive where it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate.” ... Here, the Court can reasonably read the eviction complaint’s misstatement of “base rent” as the debt owed for April’s rent, which is inaccurate to what Plaintiff owed for April’s rent, which was $1,651.00 and not as $5,663.63. ... At this stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently plead a false representation pursuant to § 1692e(2){A). ... Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1692e(2)(A) claim may move forward.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a debt collector to send a debt-validity notice after an initial communication, and a communication conveys debt information only when it is received.

Brewi v. RMS - Recovery Management Services, Inc. · filed 2020-02-14(g)(a)(3)

Under the statute, a “communication” is defined as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(2). For information to have been conveyed to Plaintiff, he had to have received it.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires an initial notice to identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed, while § 1692e does not make a technical creditor-labeling inconsistency actionable unless it materially affects the least sophisticated consumer’s response.

Olson v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC · filed 2020-02-19(a)(2), (e)

Having already found that Kohl’s is a creditor within the context of the FDCPA for the reasons thoroughly articulated by Magistrate Judge Locke in the Bryan Report, 2018 WL 6520730, at *4; see also id. at *5, which reasoning is adopted and incorporated by reference herein, in conjunction with consideration of the subject Letters, e.g., Kohl’s being labeled as Plaintiff’s “Creditor” in the First Letter; the explicit reference of “Your Kohl’s Credit Card Account: XXXXXXXX665” (emphasis added); and, the introductory sentence of ERC’s settlement offer, i.e., that its collection efforts are directed at Plaintiff’s “balance with Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. [which] remains unpaid”, the Court finds Olson has not alleged any FDCPA violations pursuant to §§ 1692g or 1692e. ... This Court has already ruled “that § 1692e does not impose any obligation to disclose the creditor’s name” in a subsequent dunning letter. ... Any technical violation of § 1692e is ameliorated by the inclusion of the Kohl’s information, which eviscerates the potential for the least sophisticated consumer to be frustrated in her ability to intelligently choose her response to said Letters; hence such violation is immaterial.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collection activity after a consumer disputes a debt until the collector mails verification of the debt.

LIVINGSTONE v. HADDON POINT MANAGER, LLC · filed 2020-02-25(g)(b)

Once the consumer disputes the debt, the debt collector must cease collection activity until it mails the consumer the required verification of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). ... Finally, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Weisshoff & Richards, LLC and Travis J. Richards violated the FDCPA by failing to suspend their collection efforts after he disputed the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). Although Defendants’ violation may seem inconsequential given that the underlying eviction action was eventually dismissed, courts have repeatedly emphasized that Section 1692g is violated if collection activity continues after the consumer disputes the debt, regardless of the outcome of that collection activity.

Section 1692c(c) does not prohibit a debt collector from sending a debt-verification letter required by § 1692g(b) when the communication preserves the creditor’s judicial remedies.

BROWN v. APEX ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC. · filed 2024-07-01(c)

Therefore, Defendant did not violate § 1692c(c) when it sent Plaintiff the debt verification letter required by § 1692g(b).

Section 1692f(8) prohibits debt collectors from displaying non-benign debt-collection information on an envelope, while § 1692f(7) prohibits communicating about a debt by postcard; a properly sealed double-card mailer is not itself a postcard.

MCROBIE v. CREDIT PROTECTION ASSOCIATION I, INC. · filed 2020-03-11(f)(7), (f)(8)

Where information is not truly benign, § 1692f(8) must be construed as written—a construction that is violated by the display of the “client number” on the exterior of CPA’s mailer to McRobie. ... Because the “double card” mailer CPA intended to (and potentially did) send to McRobie did not display any personal information to the outside world—that is, beyond McRobie’s name, address, and the “client number” previously discussed at length—in a manner associated with a traditional “post card,” the Court cannot find, nor does either party directly argue,27 that the double card mailer itself violates § 1692f(7).

Section 1692k(a)(3) treats the costs of a successful FDCPA action and a reasonable attorney’s fee as separate components of the award, so attorney’s fees are not included in “costs.”

Rivas v. Pollack and Rosen, P.A. · filed 2020-03-17(a)(3)

The FDCPA, like the FLSA in Arencibia, does not encompass attorney’s fees within the definition of costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (“in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”) (emphasis added).

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a successful FDCPA plaintiff to the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.

Gould v. Monarch Recovery Management Inc · filed 2020-11-10(k)(a)(3)

Successful FDCPA plaintiffs are entitled to recover “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). ... Nevertheless, considering the limited success and the relatively straightforward nature of the case, I conclude that an additional reduction of 50% is appropriate. I conclude in the exercise of my discretion that a total fee of $21,800.56 is reasonable. This amount, plus costs in the amount of $1,503.21 shall be awarded.

Section 1692k(a)(3) provides for successful FDCPA plaintiffs to receive reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, as determined by the court.

McPhaul v. Insight Management Partners, LLC · filed 2022-02-23(a)(3)

The plain language of the FDCPA authorizes an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the court. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Serys., Ine., 516 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The FDCPA provides for fee-shifting as a matter of course fo successful plaintiffs ... .”); Woods v. Sieger, Ross & Aguire, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 5698 (JFK), 2012 WL 1811628, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (awarding reasonable fees and costs for a successful FDCPA claim).

Sections 1692e(2)(A), (5), (8), and (10) prohibit false or misleading debt-collection representations and unlawful threats; § 1692f(1) bars collecting unauthorized amounts; § 1692d bars harassment; and § 1692g requires a written validation notice within five days after an initial communication made in connection with debt collection.

Macris v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2021-07-20(d), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(8), (e)(10), (f)(1), (g)

As found above, however, SLS’s contention that Plaintiff owed the mortgage debt in March and July 2016 was not false. Therefore, FDCPA §§ 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(8) were not violated. ... There were not false representations or deceptive means to collect this debt, so § 1692e(10) was not violated. Furthermore, review of SLS’s contacts with Plaintiff examined in detail above do not reveal threats to take action that could not be taken, hence § 1692e(5) was not violated. ... Without a release (which the Order of Reference did not provide), Plaintiff remained liable for the debt. His claim under § 1692f also fails. ... Review of the communication as detailed above shows that SLS did not harass, abuse, or oppress Plaintiff in attempting to recover this debt. ... “Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information [notices concerning the debt and collector and the debtor’s right to dispute the debt] is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). ... SLS is correct that Plaintiff has not identified an initial communication that would trigger the five-day notice requirement. ... Plaintiff, therefore, fails to allege a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f govern harassment, materially misleading representations, and unfair or unconscionable collection means, while § 1692g requires a validation notice and debt verification only when its initial-communication condition is triggered; a formal pleading does not trigger that condition.

Chandler v. McClain DeWees, PLLC · filed 2020-03-11(d), (e), (f), (g)(a), and (g)(b)

As it is not alleged that Defendant engaged in the type of conduct prohibited by § 1692d, the Court will dismiss Count I. ... Based on the discrepancy in these amounts and without having access to review the “court filings, discovery requests and responses, and letters to Plaintiff,” the Court cannot determine whether “Defendant overstated” and “misrepresented” the amounts. As a result, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion as to Count II. ... The Court finds that, under Kentucky law and the Master Deed, the Defendant was entitled to collect fees and assessments in the Highwood suits. ... As Defendant was entitled to collect the fees and assessments in the Highwood suits, the Court will dismiss Count III. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g) is inapplicable to this case. The alleged communication is not an “initial communication,” thus Defendant's conduct never triggered the notice obligation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). ... Furthermore, because § 1692g(a) was not triggered, Defendant did not violate § 1692g(b) by failing to “obtain and mail verification of the debt to Plaintiff.” ... Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim under § 1692g. As aresult, the Court will dismiss Count IV.

Section 1692f(6)(A) prohibits nonjudicial repossession when the repossessor lacks a present right to possession, and state law determines whether that right exists.

Richards v. Par, Inc. · filed 2020-03-25(f)(6)(A)

The statute doesn’t supply its own rule for determining whether a repossessor had a present right to possess the property when it was seized; that question can be answered only by reference to state law.

Under the FDCPA, a foreclosure that is legally permitted is not a false threat, and allegations about collection calls must plausibly explain the violation and resulting concrete injury.

Bradbury v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2020-04-10

With a complaint that fails to articulate any factually supported or legally sound barriers to the nonjudicial foreclosure, these claims fail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the pending foreclosure was not a “legal action which could not legally be taken,” nor did Ocwen’s conduct amount to a “false threat of foreclosure.” E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 75, 86. What remains are a handful of phone calls to the Bradburys “in an attempt to collect a debt despite the fact that [Ocwen] was aware [that he/she] had an attorney.” Id. ¶¶ 78-81. Apart from the allegation that an Ocwen representative had initiated contact with a person represented by counsel, the complaint is vague and conclusory regarding why these calls are actionable pursuant to FDCPA and how they inflicted any injury-in-fact. ... Count IV fails both to state a plausible claim based on FDCPA and to meet the Article III requirements highlighted by Spokeo.

Section 1692k(b)(1) requires courts to consider the frequency and persistence of noncompliance when assessing statutory damages, indicating that multiple violations may be addressed in a single action.

Laccinole v. Diversified Consultants, Inc. · filed 2020-04-14(k)(1)

Additionally, although Mr. Laccinole argues that he should be able to increase his potential damages award by filing a separate Complaint for each alleged statutory violation, “[i]t is well settled that a plaintiff ‘may not file duplicative complaints in order to expand their legal rights.’” , 857 F.3d at 841. Furthermore, with regard to his FDCPA claims, the statutory language does not support his gambit to sidestep that statute’s restriction of a maximum $1,000 penalty per action filed. For example, the FDCPA provides that a court should consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance” when assessing a statutory damages award. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). This suggests that “Congress did not intend each noncompliance to be its own ‘action,’ … but rather wrote the statute with the understanding that multiple violations of the act would be addressed in a single action.”

The FDCPA does not extend to communications sent to third parties such as a debtor’s attorney, and a payoff statement explaining the debt and how to contact the debt collector is not misleading or unfair under §§ 1692e and 1692f.

Izmirligil v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2020-04-22(e), (f)

This is sufficient to avoid FDCPA liability under § 1692e. ... Likewise, the August 2019 Payoff Statement is insufficient to state a claim under § 1692f, because “[i]t is not unfair or unconscionable to inform plaintiff of the exact amount he owes, tell him that it may increase over time, and provide him with a way to contact the debt collector.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s proposed FDCPA claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1692e(3) prohibits falsely representing or implying that a person is an attorney or that a communication is from an attorney.

BENCOSME v. STILLMAN LAW OFFICE, LLC · filed 2020-04-23(e)(3)

The paragraph is the same or similar to the disclaim as used in the Greco and Lesher cases and their progeny. Moreover, the disclaimer is placed in a prominent location on the front page, and contained in a separate paragraph with the same font as the other paragraphs. As such, the Stillman Letter comports with the case law and does not violate the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3).

Section 1692g requires a clear validation notice and § 1692g(b) bars collection communications that overshadow or contradict the consumer’s validation rights; a law-firm letterhead alone does not overshadow those rights. Under § 1692e(3), a letter may imply attorney involvement only if some meaningful attorney involvement occurred; reliance entirely on client-provided information may suggest that no attorney reviewed the account.

Hochhauser v. Grossman & Karaszewski, PLLC · filed 2020-04-28(g)(b), (e)(3)

A debt collection letter on a law firm’s letterhead does not inherently overshadow the validation notice. ... The letter in this case does not even reference the possibility of a lawsuit. The validation notice expressly lays out the LSC’s rights, and the fact that the debt collector is a law firm does not contradict the validation notice. ... “[S]ome degree of attorney involvement is required before a letter will be considered ‘from an attorney’ within the meaning of the FDCPA. ... “[A] letter sent on law firm letterhead, standing alone, does represent a level of attorney involvement to the debtor receiving the letter.” ... Specifically, the letter states “In making this demand, we are relying entirely on information provided by our client.” This language suggests that the defendant sent the plaintiff this letter based solely on information provided by the creditor, without any attorney review. ... This a question of fact that the parties should be able to build a record on through additional discovery. Given the paucity of evidence at this time, both motions for summary judgment are denied as to this claim.

Section 1692e(10) prohibits deceptive means to collect a debt, but the alleged representation must be materially misleading and capable of affecting the least sophisticated consumer’s response.

Dicristo v. National Recovery Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-05-04(e)(10)

Here, there is no indication that Defendant “misrepresented the nature or legal status of the debt or undermined [Plaintiff’s] ability to respond to the debt collection.” ... “The illusory concerns” detailed in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and opposition papers “do not amount to plausible allegations of a materially misleading statement.”

Section 1692 states Congress’s findings and the FDCPA’s purpose; a claimant must identify a separate FDCPA provision prohibiting the challenged conduct.

BONILLA v. AMERICAN HERITAGE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2020-05-07

She alleges only a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, entitled “Congressional findings and declaration of purpose.” There are multiple sections of the FDCPA prohibiting certain conduct, for example, harassment and abuse. Ms. Bonilla does not plead which of the prohibited conduct she alleges Defendants violation.

Section 1692 states the FDCPA's purposes but does not itself impose a legal requirement on creditors.

SCALERCIO-ISENBERG v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP · filed 2024-01-31

The “declaration of purpose” contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1692 does not function as a legal requirement for creditors.

Section 1692 states the FDCPA’s purposes and does not itself impose a legal requirement on creditors.

SCALERCIO-ISENBERG v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP · filed 2024-10-22

Indeed, the “declaration of purpose” contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1692 does not function as a legal requirement for creditors.

Section 1692 declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection, prevent compliant collectors from being disadvantaged, and promote consistent state action protecting consumers.

Hart v. Credit Control, LLC · filed 2016-10-17

Before reaching that analysis, the Court notes that “the purpose of [the FDCPA is] to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692; Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A., 817 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016).

Section 1692(a) states that Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.

Nyce v. Jones · filed 2019-11-08(a)

Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).

Section 1692(e) declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices while ensuring compliant debt collectors are not disadvantaged.

Campagna v. Client Services, Inc. · filed 2019-12-03(e)

Congress enacted the FDCPA “with the aim of eliminating abusive practices in the debt collection industry, and also sought to ensure that ‘those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not completely disadvantaged.” Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).

Section 1692 states that Congress enacted the FDCPA to protect consumers from abusive debt collection practices and encourage consumers to enforce it through lawsuits.

Raburn v. Wiener, Weiss & Madison · filed 2019-12-09

Further only allowing a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees on a motion under Rule 54(d) is consistent with the congressional purpose under the FDCPA. The Western District of Washington in Rodriguez v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, explains: Congress's explicit purpose for passing § 1692 was to increase the protection for consumers from abusive debt collection practices, and to incentivize consumers who have been subjected to such abuses to “self-enforc [e]” the legislation by bringing suit.

Section 1692 declares that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act protects consumers and legitimate businesses by curbing harassing, abusive and deceptive debt collection practices.

Hunnell-Villines v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company · filed 2020-01-23

Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in 1977 to protect consumers and legitimate businesses by curbing harassing, abusive and deceptive debt collection practices.

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices and prevent compliant debt collectors from being competitively disadvantaged.

Olson v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A. · filed 2018-02-12(e)

The FDCPA’s purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); see also Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 318-19 (8th Cir. 2004).

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA seeks to protect consumers from abusive collection practices.

Alleman v. Collection Professionals, Inc. · filed 2019-10-29

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, seeks to protect consumers from abusive collection practices.

Section 1692 declares that the FDCPA was enacted to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, protect compliant debt collectors from competitive disadvantage, and promote consistent state action.

Michaels v. Nco Financial Systems Inc · filed 2020-05-29

Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

The FDCPA was enacted to address abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices and to eliminate abusive debt collection practices while protecting consumers.

FORDHAM v. SETERUS, INC. · filed 2020-06-16

Congress enacted the FDCPA as a result of “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” and the inadequacy of existing laws and procedures designed to protect consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b). The stated purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors” and to promote further action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

Section 1692 states Congress’s findings about abusive debt collection and declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive practices, prevent competitive disadvantage, and protect consumers.

Volkman v. Enhanced Recovery Company LLC · filed 2020-08-10(a), (e)

The FDCPA was enacted for the purpose of “eliminat[ing] abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (e).

Section 1692(e) declares that the FDCPA was enacted to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

HUTCHINS v. MOUNTAIN RUN SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2021-11-17(e)

Similarly, the FDCPA was enacted to “protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692(e) declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, prevent compliant collectors from being competitively disadvantaged, and promote consistent state action.

Johnson v. Suttell and Hammer, PS · filed 2021-12-02(e)

The FDCPA was enacted “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to [e]nsure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692 declares that the FDCPA is designed to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, prevent competitive disadvantage, and promote consistent state action protecting consumers.

Franklin v. Cona Elder Law, PLLC · filed 2022-01-28

The FDCPA was designed to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

Section 1692 identifies abusive debt collection practices as harmful and states that the FDCPA should eliminate them and protect consumers through consistent state action.

Broadnax v. Greene Credit Service and James Grout · filed 1997-01-15(a), (e)

There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. ... It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. ... Congress, therefore, has legislatively expressed a strong public policy disfavoring dishonest, abusive, and unfair consumer debt collection practices, and clearly intended the FDCPA to have a broad remedial scope.

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices and protect consumers from debt collection abuses.

Bodur v. Palisades Collection, LLC · filed 2011-12-15(e)

Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

The FDCPA permits challenges to payoff demands and debt validity and seeks to prevent abusive debt collection practices, but a conclusory dispute of ownership or liability is insufficient to state a claim.

Roggero v. Fay Servicing · filed 2025-03-03

Further, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 is the section of the United States Code that governs debt collection practices and consumer credit protection. It is part of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and provides a means in which to challenge payoff demands, determine the validity and accuracy of asserted debts, and prevent abusive debt collection practices. However, the allegations of the Complaint simply state “[t]he Plaintiff disputes all claims of ownership or liability for the alleged debt and asserts that no valid contract exists under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a-g.” ECF No. 1, PageID.5. This is conclusory and insufficient to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA and therefore must be dismissed.

The FDCPA protects debtors use of accurate, non-misleading collection information for substantive purposes such as deciding how to respond to and manage their debts.

Spuhler v. State Collection Service, Inc. · filed 2020-12-15(e)

We have already rejected such a contention in analogous contexts. See Bazile, No. 19‐1298, slip op. 7; Larkin, 2020 WL 7332483, at *4. The failure to provide information that is re‐quired under the FDCPA inflicts a concrete injury only if it impairs a plaintiff’s ability to use the withheld information “for a substantive purpose that the statute envisioned.” Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2018); see Casillas, 926 F.3d at 333 (quoting Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2017)). The FDCPA envisions that debtors will use accurate, non‐misleading information in choosing how to respond to collection attempts and how to manage and repay their debts. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a), (e), 1692e. This means that for a concrete injury to result from a dunning letter’s exclusion of a statement about accruing interest, that exclusion must have detrimentally af‐fected the debtors’ handling of their debts.

The FDCPA excludes a creditor from its debt-collector restrictions; treats a management company’s collection work as outside the debt-collector definition when incidental to broad fiduciary duties; provides a bona fide-error defense for unintentional violations despite reasonable procedures; and does not impose liability for a communication that is not misleading or deceptive.

Yu v. David A. Dye CO., LPA · filed 2020-09-08(a)(4), (a)(6)(F)(i), (e), (k)(c)

Because the HOA is the entity to whom the alleged Debt is owed, it is a creditor and therefore excluded from FDCPA liability. ... This undisputed evidence demonstrates that Omni’s debt-collection activity was “incidental to” and not “central to” or “the primary purpose of” its fiduciary obligations to the HOA. ... Omni is accordingly not a debt collector under § 1692a(6)(F)(i) of the FDCPA. ... The Court finds that the preponderance of the undisputed evidence establishes all three elements such that the bona fide error exception applies even if this communication constituted an FDCPA violation. ... The responsive letter “would be unlikely to deceive a competent lawyer,” and is therefore not actionable even if communications with an attorney can implicate FDCPA liability.

An entity whose business is centered on buying defaulted debts and using third parties to collect them can qualify as a debt collector under the principal-purpose test, while a representation is deceptive only when it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation and at least one is inaccurate.

Stinson v. Houslanger & Associates PLLC · filed 2020-09-17(a)(6), (e)

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. “A representation is ‘deceptive’ under section 1692e if it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.” ... The unambiguous Stipulation is deceptive under the FDCPA only if it is “open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.” ... An entity with a business model centered on buying defaulted debts and using third parties to collect them is still, despite using third parties, primarily in the business of collecting debt. ... Here, Stinson has pleaded that Demi has the principal purpose of collecting debts. (Compl. ¶ 12.) These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

At the pleading stage, the FDCPA can apply to constables who go beyond serving legal process and attempt to collect a debt, and alleged knowing seizures and threats plausibly state claims for harassment, abuse, and false or misleading representations.

Espinosa Sr. v. Metcalf · filed 2022-07-25(a)(6), (d), and (e)

Further, to the extent the SAC alleges that MCO and Abelli attempted to collect on the 2006 judgment, see, e.g., D. 41 ¶¶ 71–72, such would disqualify them from the legal process server exclusion, even assuming they did serve process to the Espinosas. ... Here, the SAC sufficiently alleges harassing, oppressing or abusive conduct by MCO and Abelli. ... This claim also plausibly constitutes a false, deceptive or misleading representation intended to induce Junior to allow Defendants to take his vehicle despite that they had no such right. ... Accordingly, the SAC adequately pleads a violation of § 1692e.

Sections 1692e(11) and 1692g(a) apply to the defendant's debt-collection conduct, for which the court found him liable.

Rani v. Drobenare · filed 2020-09-09(e)(11), (g)(a)

For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment, finds Defendant liable for violating sections 1692e(11) and 1692g(a) of the FDCPA, awards Plaintiff damages in the amount of $900, consisting of $500 in statutory damages and costs totaling $400, and denies Plaintiff’s request for additional costs and attorneys’ fees, but grants Plaintiff leave to submit supporting documentation within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Section 1692g(a)(3) informs a debtor that the debt may be disputed orally or in writing, and a collection notice violates § 1692g or § 1692e when its language overshadows, contradicts, or is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading of those rights.

Schik v. Miramed Revenue Group, LLC · filed 2020-09-23(g)(a)(3) and (e)(10)

Reading the Collection Notice in its entirety, the Court cannot find facts to sustain the alleged violations. The Second Circuit has determined the statutorily-required validation rights sufficiently inform a debtor of the right to dispute a debt orally and in writing. Hooks, 717 F.3d 282. Both parties agree the Validation Rights track the statutory language. Therefore, to find a violation, the Court needs to find that this message is overshadowed, contradicted, or reasonably susceptive to an inaccurate reading. ... While Defendant encourages Plaintiff to call to discuss payment, payment plans, and settlement plans via phone, the option to orally dispute is not contradicted. While Defendant could certainly be more explicit, even the “least sophisticated consumer” would believe they could use this phone number to contact Defendant regarding any matter. Further, in the context of the entire Collection Notice, the direction to send written disputes to Defendant’s address would not lead the “least sophisticated consumer” to think oral disputes are foreclosed. Therefore, the Courts finds Plaintiff has failed to state violations of §§ 1692g(3) and 1692e.

The FDCPA does not treat a convenience fee as incidental to a debt when the person paying it owed no debt to the defendant.

Bowen-Hay v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2020-09-25

When Plaintiff made the payments for which a convenience fee was charged, he did not owe a debt to Defendant. The convenience fees by definition were not incidental to any debt Plaintiff owed, as contemplated by the FDCPA.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading collection practices, including use of a name other than the debt collector’s true name, when the representation is material, while Section 1692f prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection means.

Tavernaro v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. · filed 2020-09-25(e), (e)(10), (e)(14), (f)

To allege a violation of Section 1692e, plaintiff must show that (1) defendant engaged in a practice that was false, deceptive, or misleading and (2) the false, deceptive, or misleading statement was material, in that it had the potential to frustrate the least sophisticated consumer’s ability to choose his or her response. ... The “true name” provision prohibits using “any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization.” ... Because this Court finds that the OWE was not materially misleading, and because plaintiff has not alleged conduct by defendant was unfair or unconscionable, plaintiff’s allegations under Section 1692f are insufficient.

Section 1692d prohibits abusive, oppressive, or harassing debt-collection conduct judged from the least sophisticated debtor’s perspective, while § 1692f(6)(A) prohibits taking or threatening nonjudicial dispossession when there is no present right to possess collateral through an enforceable security interest.

Milburn v. SN Servicing Corporation · filed 2021-02-04(d), (f)(6)(A)

But the least sophisticated debtor could not be expected to understand that when SN Servicing said “any correspondence,” they meant specifically the notices regarding loss mitigation options. A reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s actions here were abusive in violation of § 1692d. ... Even if this is true, the nonjudicial foreclosure was reset twice while Defendant did not have the present right to possession of the property. This discrepancy is a genuine issue of material fact appropriate for a jury to decide.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit misleading debt-collection representations and unfair or unconscionable collection means; confusion alone is not conduct listed in § 1692f when it duplicates a § 1692e theory.

DABBAH v. JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS LLC · filed 2023-06-29(e), (f)

The Court finds that under the unique facts of this case, the least sophisticated debtor would not be confused as to the meaning of the last line of the Letter. ... When reading the Letter as a whole, the least sophisticated debtor would not understand the last line of the Letter as requiring the amount of the debt to be paid in full for the tradeline to be deleted. ... Even if the Letter fails the least sophisticated debtor standard by having two possible meanings of the last line, creating confusion is not one of the prohibited actions listed in § 1692f. ... Since Plaintiff does not allege unfair or unconscionable conduct that is not already addressed by the § 1692e claims, the § 1692f claim must be dismissed.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit materially false or deceptive representations and unfair or unconscionable debt-collection methods; a pleading defect under state law is not enough without material falsity, deception, or unfairness.

Nyberg v. Portfolio Recovery Associates · filed 2023-07-06(e)–(f)

While PRA concedes that its complaint failed to plead the necessary mutual asset for account stated, that deficiency under Oregon law is not a per se violation of the FDCPA. See Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1996). Nyberg does not identify how this deficiency rendered PRA’s complaint materially false or deceptive or an unfair or unconscionable debt-collection method. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–f.

Section 1692e does not require a debt collector to itemize a debt into principal, interest, and other charges.

YAVORKA v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2020-09-25(e)

At the outset, it is significant to note that nothing in the statutory text of the FDCPA requires a debt collector to itemize the debt being collected. Moreover, courts that have considered the issue have consistently determined that a debt collector is not required to itemize a debt into principal, interest, and other charges to comply with the FDCPA.

Section 1692e does not require a debt collector to itemize a debt into principal, interest, and other charges.

FIKE v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC · filed 2020-09-25(e)

At the outset, it is significant to note that nothing in the statutory text of the FDCPA requires a debt collector to itemize the debt being collected. Moreover, courts that have considered the issue have consistently determined that a debt collector is not required to itemize a debt into principal, interest, and other charges to comply with the FDCPA.

Section 1692e does not generally require a debt collector to itemize the components of a principal debt, but collection-related fees must be itemized separately.

Vogel v. McCarthy, Burgess, & Wolff, Inc. · filed 2020-10-19(e)(2)(A)

There was nothing “false, deceptive, or misleading” about telling Vogel the total amount owed, without breaking it down. The letter did not deceive her about the amount of the debt, or mislead her in any way. It simply gave her the final tab. There was nothing deceptive about telling Vogel what she owed.

Section 1692k(d) gives an FDCPA plaintiff one year from the violation to sue, and later filings or statements concerning the same foreclosure conduct do not create a new violation or restart the limitations period.

Walker v. Pitnell · filed 2020-09-26(k)(d)

Claims brought under the FDCPA are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. ... The Court disagrees. Plaintiff cannot “argue that [Defendants] committed a new violation of the FDCPA each and every time they filed a document or made a statement in the foreclosure action concerning [Defendant HSBC’s] authority . . . to proceed with the action.”

The FDCPA permits a debt collector to send a second validation notice that effectively extends the consumer’s time to dispute a debt, so long as the later notice does not overshadow or contradict the original, and permits a prevailing defendant to recover fees only upon a finding of bad faith and harassment.

Kurzdorfer v. Constar Financial Services, LLC · filed 2020-09-28(e), (g), and (k)(a)(3)

In sum, I find that the Second Letter neither overshadowed or contradicted the validation notice contained in the First Letter in violation of section 1692g, nor did it make a false representation or deceive Kurzdorfer in an effort to collect the debt in violation of section 1692e. ... Constar instead merely extended Kurzdorfer’s time to dispute the validity of her debt beyond the initially noticed validation period, which it was permitted to do. ... Rather, attorneys’ fees under this section are appropriate when “evidence [exists] that the plaintiff both knew that her claim was meritless and pursued it with the purpose of harassing the defendant.”

Section 1692k(d) sets a one-year limitations period for FDCPA claims, and state renewal statutes cannot extend it.

Edwards v. Solomon and Solomon, P.C. · filed 2020-09-30(d)

Congress specifically provided for a one-year limitations period for FDCPA claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). And incorporating Georgia’s renewal statute into the FDCPA would undermine the uniform application of this federal limitation. We therefore conclude that Georgia’s renewal statute does not extend the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations.

Under the FDCPA, a collection letter is not misleading merely because it lists multiple addresses when it clearly directs disputes to one address, and its validation notice need only be clear, legible, and free from overshadowing or contradiction.

Kim v. Advanced Call Center Technologies, LLC · filed 2020-10-05(g)(a), (g)(b), (e), (e)(10)

When reading the Letter in its entirety, the least sophisticated consumer would understand that payments must be mailed to the Florida Address while disputes must be mailed to the Tennessee Address. ... As such, the Letter does not violate the FDCPA by including both the Tennessee Address and the Florida Address. ... The Letter’s placement of the validation notice complies with the FDCPA and the Complaint’s second cause of action is DISMISSED.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt-collection validation notice to clearly communicate the consumer’s dispute and original-creditor-information rights, and does not prohibit multiple addresses, settlement-offer language, or a legible notice placed among other important information.

Rajkumar v. FBCS, Inc. · filed 2021-03-12(g)(a)

The Court agrees with the reasoning set forth in Dillard that (1) the use of multiple addresses does not render the debt collection letters misleading or in violation of the FDCPA since “[e]ven the least sophisticated consumer should be able to deduce that Defendant’s address is the address that appears below Defendant’s name three times,” id. at *4; (2) when read as a whole, “the least sophisticated consumer would understand that the front of the letter provides an ‘offer’ to pay a reduced amount and various payment options to satisfy the debt” and would not assume that the required notices regarding disputing or inquiring about the debt “were merely offers” based on the language that Defendant “is not obligated to renew this offer,” id. at *5; (3) the option to make a down payment and then pay the remaining balance thirty days after the initial payment is received is not misleading or in violation of the FDCPA, id. at *5-6; and (4) the placement of the validation notice does not violate the FDCPA as “[t]he notice is not printed in a smaller font, or overshadowed by other large or bold font” and instead is “provided in legible typeface, among other important information . . .,” id. at 6.

Sections 1692e(10) and 1692g prohibit misleading or confusing collection communications and require a consumer’s validation rights to be conveyed in writing; an invitation to call does not violate those provisions when it does not imply that a call legally stops collection or can exercise validation rights.

Moyer v. Patenaude & Felix · filed 2021-03-16(e)(10), (g)(a), (g)(b)

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to “cease all collection efforts if the consumer provides written notice” that she disputes the debt. ... A phone call from a debtor would not legally require Patenaude to cease collection efforts. ... Moyer’s argument fails because Patenaude never claimed the phone call was a “legally effective” means of stopping collection efforts. Patenaude invited Moyer to call to “eliminate” collection action, but never asserted, explicitly or implicitly, that the phone call would, by law, force Patenaude to cease its collection efforts. ... The Validation Notice instructs the debtor to write to exercise their § 1692g rights, leaving no suggestions that a phone call would suffice. Likewise, the Contact Sentence does not suggest that a debtor could exercise any § 1692g rights over the phone. And the order of the paragraphs does not create confusion about what each one conveys.

Sections 1692g and 1692e require debt-collection letters to communicate validation rights clearly; a general instruction to send correspondence to a P.O. Box does not violate those provisions when the letter, read as a whole, does not require written disputes, foreclose oral communications, or overshadow the validation notice.

Weinberg v. RGS Financial, Inc. · filed 2021-05-17(e), (e)(10), (g)(a)(3), (g)(b)

The least sophisticated consumer would not interpret Defendant’s instruction to “send all correspondence” to its P.O. Box address to impose a mandatory writing requirement for disputes. ... Defendant’s correspondence instruction merely alerts the consumer that it prefers to receive written correspondence at its P.O. Box address rather than its street address. It neither mandates that all disputes be made in writing nor foreclose oral communications. ... Defendant’s instruction does not overshadow or contradict the validation notice on the reverse side of the Letter. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim that Defendant violated Section 1692g. For the same reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1692e as Defendant’s instruction was not false, deceptive or misleading.

The FDCPA bars debt collectors from collecting amounts not authorized by the agreement or law or making false or misleading representations about a debt, and a later violation can support a timely claim even if it repeats an earlier violation.

Stone v. J&M Securities, LLC · filed 2020-10-06(e)(2), (f)(1), and (k)(d)

Even a minor overstatement of interest due in the September 2018 Garnishment and February 2019 Jerome and Felicia Garnishments can constitute an attempt to collect interest or other amounts not permitted by law in violation of § 1692(f)(1). ... Further, the inconsistent amounts and incorrect calculations in the three garnishment applications and orders could plausibly mislead an unsophisticated consumer and constitute false or misleading representations regarding the character or amount of the debt in violation of § 1692(e)(2). ... Even where a claim includes assertions of earlier violations, if the plaintiff sues within one year of the violation, the claim is not barred by § 1692k(d).

Section 1692f(1) prohibits collecting any amount unless it is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law; the amount need not be incidental to the principal obligation.

Thomas-Lawson v. Carrington Mortgage Services LLC · filed 2021-04-05(f)(1)

It is clear from the statute’s plain language that an “amount” collected does not need to be “incidental to the principal obligation” to violate § 1692f(1). See Simmet, 2016 WL 11002359, at *6 (“‘Any amount’ includes, but is not limited to, charges ‘incidental’ to the underlying debt.”). Thus, despite Flores and the cases that have followed its reasoning, this Court concludes that a fee can violate § 1692f(1) even if it is not incidental to the principal obligation.

Section 1692(f)(1) prohibits collecting any interest, fee, charge, or other amount unless it is expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law, protecting consumers from attempts to collect debts not owed.

Stone v. J&M Securities, LLC · filed 2021-09-30(f)(1)

Section 1692(f)(1) “protects consumers from being subjected to attempts to collect debts not owed.” Id. (citing Demarais, 869 F.3d at 691, 699). ... Further, Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendant attempted to collect a debt that was not owed under section 1692(f). As Plaintiffs cannot show a section 1692(f) violation and have failed to demonstrate that they suffered concrete injury, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1692f(1) prohibits debt collectors from collecting an amount unless the agreement creating the debt expressly authorizes it or the law permits it.

Otte · filed 2025-12-01(1)

Debt collectors “may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” including collecting any amount unless it is “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). ... Based on the plain language of the Rules and Regulations and the Declaration itself, the Court concludes Defendants had specific authorization for this charge. Because the fees were allowed in the Declaration, there is no violation of the Act, no violation of the FDCPA, nor any violation of the ICFA. Accordingly, the FDCPA and ICFA claims are dismissed.

Section 1692 does not impose a duty on loan servicers that can support negligence per se or wantonness claims.

Driggers v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2020-10-14

Though the bulk of case law discussed above relates specifically to RESPA, the Court reaches the same conclusion as to Plaintiff’s negligence per se and wantonness claims premised on a statutory duty imposed by the FDCPA. As other courts have acknowledged, FDCPA does not impose a duty upon servicers.

Section 1692a limits FDCPA consumer-debt protections to obligations owed by natural persons, so an LLC's debt is outside the Act.

Valhalla Investment Properties v. 502, LLC · filed 2020-10-26(a)(3), (a)(5)

Thus, the FDCPA applies only if Flex Yield is a natural person (i.e., a human being). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(3), (5), 1692d–1692g; Black’s Law Dictionary 1028 (5th ed. 1979); cf. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403–07 (2011) (describing corporations as “artificial entities” and concluding that they do not have “personal privacy”). We agree with the district court: Flex Yield is not a human being. ... No natural person, no FDCPA protection.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year after the violation, and claims based on older conduct may be dismissed when no tolling or continuing-violation basis is shown.

Hagwood-EL v. Allied Interstate · filed 2020-09-04(k)(d)

The FDCPA provides that an action must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... Hagwood makes no argument for tolling or continuation of the FDCPA limitations period. ... Accordingly, I will dismiss with prejudice Hagwood-El’s FDCPA and CCPA claims to the extent that they are premised on conduct that occurred before August 23, 2018 (one year prior to the filing of this lawsuit on August 23, 2019), including any claims based on the alleged “conversion” of his signature on the promissory notes in 2013, defendants’ communications with him and his coworkers in 2014, and the wage garnishments in 2014.

A debt collector may violate the FDCPA by filing a bogus lawsuit to collect a debt the consumer does not owe without intending to prove the claim.

Woychesin v. Midland Funding LLC · filed 2020-10-05(d), (e), and (f)

And where, as here, the complaint alleges not just that Midland filed a lawsuit, but that it filed a “bogus” lawsuit against Mr. Woychesin to collect a debt he did not owe with no intention of proving the collections case, the court finds that the complaint plausibly alleges that Midland violated the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not prohibit filing a debt-collection lawsuit merely because the collector has limited ownership evidence or relies in part on arguably inadmissible hearsay, absent a showing that the suit was frivolous, baseless, deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable.

SMITH v. GRASSY SPRAIN GROUP, INC. · filed 2023-09-26(e), (f)

Beginning with Ms. Smith’s first argument, the mere filing of a lawsuit to collect a debt with limited evidence of ownership of the debt does not violate Section 1692e. ... Initiating a debt-collection lawsuit without immediate possession of a complete paper trail, without more, does not constitute a false, deceptive, or misleading representation. ... In sum, this debt-collection lawsuit, albeit unsuccessful, does not constitute threatening an “action that cannot legally be taken.” ... Filing a lawsuit to collect on a debt which relies in part on what can be argued inadmissible hearsay is not unfair or unconscionable under Section 1692f.

The FDCPA does not make the mere filing of a collection lawsuit instead of invoking an arbitration agreement a prohibited false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable collection practice.

Hubbard · filed 2026-04-22(e), (f)

Hubbard’s bare contention is that ARI violated the FDCPA simply by filing a lawsuit rather than invoking the arbitration agreement. This action does not support a plausible claim under the FDCPA, as it is not expressly prohibited by the FDCPA and is not false, deceptive, misleading, unfair or unconscionable. Because Hubbard fails to state an FDCPA claim, this claim is due to be dismissed.

Section 1692g(a)(1)-(2) requires an initial debt-collection notice to state the amount of the debt and the name of the current creditor, while the original creditor need be provided only upon written request if different.

SANTANA v. RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, LP · filed 2020-10-30(a)(1)-(2)

Critically, the statute only requires the disclosure of the name of the current creditor. ... Here, the Letter not only identified the current creditor, LVNV, but the original creditor, Comenity, as well. ... This is more than sufficient to satisfy § 1692g(a)(1)-(2).

Section 1692g(a)(5) requires an initial debt-collection notice to state the amount of the debt but does not require an itemization explaining how that amount was computed.

Maldonado v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. · filed 2020-11-20(a)(5)

Section 1692(g)(a)(5) of the FDCPA requires only that a collection letter state the “amount of the debt.” It does not require an itemization by which that amount is computed, nor are courts interested in such an itemization, taking the stance that “[a] dollar due is a dollar due.”

Section 1692g(b) prohibits collection communications during the 30-day validation period from overshadowing or contradicting the consumer’s right to dispute the debt.

Mizrachi v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP · filed 2020-11-05(g)(b)

First, while Wilson Elser fulfilled its obligation to inform Mizrachi of his right to dispute his debt within 30 days, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), the complaint adequately alleges that Wilson Elser nonetheless violated the requirement that “[a]ny . . . communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt,” id. § 1692g(b); see also Savino v. Comput. Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998). A communication “overshadows or contradicts the validation notice if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights.” Ellis, 591 F.3d at 135. The letter here, by threatening a lawsuit, cataloging the myriad consequences of such a suit, and offering payment or arrangement of payment “now” as the only means of “avoid[ing]” this suit, Joint App’x 15, generates just such uncertainty. Even if the letter does not literally demand immediate payment, these warnings, combined with the all-caps admonition that no further notice might follow before a lawsuit is filed, could have created the misimpression that immediate payment is the consumer’s only means of avoiding a parade of collateral consequences, thereby overshadowing the consumer’s validation rights.

The FDCPA permits claims based on an attempt to collect a fully paid debt to proceed independently of a bankruptcy discharge order, even when the debt was paid through a Chapter 13 plan.

Manikan v. Peters & Freedman, LLP · filed 2020-11-25(d), (e), and (f)

We now hold that Walls does not preclude FDCPA claims in such circumstances because whether an unfair debt collection practice occurred does not depend on issuance or enforcement of the discharge order.

The FDCPA’s debt-collector exceptions exclude a person collecting a convenience fee it originated or that was not in default when obtained, and a separate optional convenience fee is not an amount incidental to the underlying mortgage obligation.

Garbutt v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2020-09-22(a)(6)(F)(ii), (a)(6)(F), and (f)

Excepted from this definition is “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was originated by such person.” § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (emphasis added). ... To the extent the convenience fee is a debt, it was originated by Defendant. Thus, it would not be a debt “due another,” and Defendant would not be a debt collector as it relates to the convenience fees. ... Also exempted from the definition of “debt collector” is a person who collects or attempts to collect a debt when the conduct “concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F); see also Fla. Stat. § 559.55(7)(f). Although Plaintiff alleges that his mortgage was in default when Defendant began servicing it, there is no allegation or indication that he was in default on his obligation to pay the convenience fee. Accordingly, assuming the convenience fee is a debt, Defendant would not be a “debt collector” as to the convenience fee, which was not in default. ... Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is prohibited from “the collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principle obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f . The Court is unpersuaded that the convenience fee here is incidental to the principle obligation, but rather adopts the reasoning of those courts that have concluded the convenience fee is a separate optional fee that originated from Defendant and was not a fee stemming from the underlying mortgage. ... Because the Court concludes that the convenience fees were not a debt owed another and were not in default, Defendant would not be a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and the FCCPA. Thus, at least as to the FDCPA claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim.

Section 1692i(a)(2) requires a debt collector bringing a legal action on a debt against a consumer to sue only in the judicial district where the consumer signed the contract or resides when the action begins, and a garnishment action based on a judgment obtained in the wrong venue may be treated as an action against the consumer.

Barboza v. Weinstein & Riley, P.S. · filed 2020-10-01(i)(a)(2)

Section 1692i requires “any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer” to “bring such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity (A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or (B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2). ... The Court is convinced the two-step analysis supports the purpose of the FDCPA, given that the Fifth Circuit has instructed that the FDCPA should “be construed broadly and in favor of the consumer.” Salinas, 952 F.3d at 683. The Court recognizes case law in the Fifth Circuit is not developed on this particular issue, but suggests that the two-step analysis can be squared with the language of the statute as follows: When a debt collector brings a garnishment action based on a default judgment obtained in the wrong venue, the Court finds it reasonable to interpret the action as “against any consumer,” for the consumer, while not the subject of the garnishment action, ... experiences the inability to have his day in court, in a proper venue, on the merits of the judgment.

The FDCPA's government-actor exclusion removes state and political-subdivision officials and entities from the debt-collector definition when collecting debts in the performance of their official duties.

(PS) Narayan v. County of Sacramento · filed 2022-01-24(a)(6)(C)

The undersigned joins with these courts in finding a political subdivision of a state, like Sacramento County, excluded from the FDCPA “to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of [its] official duties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). ... Accordingly, the County also is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA, under § 1692a(6)(C). Because the FDCPA claims against the County must thus fail as a matter of law, all County defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.

The FDCPA permits claims under §§ 1692e and 1692f for attempts to collect debts unenforceable under state law, while § 1692c(b) covers only third-party communications that demand payment and warn of additional fees or action, not communications merely facilitating collection.

McIntosh v. Global Trust Management, LLC · filed 2020-12-10(c)(b), (e), (f)

Because Florida law applies to the accounts, Plaintiffs state valid causes of action under the FDCPA (§ 1692e and § 1692f) and FCCPA. Their debts resulted from usurious contracts, rendering the debts unenforceable. See Fla. Stat. §§ 516.02(2)(c), 687.071(7). Efforts to collect debts unenforceable under state law can be the basis for an FDCPA or FCCPA action. ... To state an FDCPA claim under this provision, a debt collector must make a communication to a third party in connection with the collection of the debt. In the Eleventh Circuit, courts read communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” to mean a statement that makes an express or implied demand for payment and warns of additional fees or actions if payment is not tendered. ... Here, the communications to the collection agencies made no demand for payment. Plaintiffs instead seem to conflate Defendants’ communications to facilitate the collection of the outstanding debts with a communication demanding payment. Section 1692c(b) punishes only the latter, which does not include communications to a third-party collection agency. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ § 1692c(b) claims alleged in Count I fail.

The FDCPA bars continued collection during validation of a timely disputed debt and restricts debt collectors’ communications with third parties.

ALFORD · filed 2025-12-19(b), (c)(b)

THE COURT FINDING that, liberally construed, these allegations plausibly state claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) (failure to cease collection pending validation after timely dispute) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (third-party communications), See Twombly, 550 U.S, at 555, At ... Accordingly, Plaintiff's FDCPA claim against TrueAccord will be permitted to proceed; and ... ORDERED that Counts I (FDCPA) and II (intrusion-upon-seclusion) of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt, No. 1) may proceed.

Section 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, judged from the least sophisticated debtor's perspective and subject to materiality, while section 1692f(1) bars collecting amounts not authorized by the agreement or law.

Maclean v. Collection Bureau of America, LTD. · filed 2020-12-11(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), and (f)(1)

Under § 1692e, “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Section 1692e(2)(A) specifically identifies “[t]he false representation of—the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” as conduct that violates § 1692e. Sections 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) prohibit “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken” and “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” ... To constitute a violation of the FDCPA, the Ninth Circuit, following the Seventh Circuit, requires that a false or deceptive statement must be “material.” ... In sum, the Court finds that no part of the collection letter, standing alone or “read as a whole,” violates § 1692(e).

The FDCPA generally excludes a loan servicer from the debt-collector definition when the debt was not in default when obtained, and § 1692f(1) does not prohibit optional payment fees that are not incidental to the underlying debt.

Alexander v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC · filed 2020-12-11(a)(6), (a)(6)(F), and (f)(1)

The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” or one that “regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Section 803 provides exceptions to the term “debt collector,” including “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another to the extent such activity . . . (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F). ... This exemption instead applies where a loan servicer seeks to collect a debt that was not in default when it was acquired for servicing. ... Finally, even if Carrington did not qualify for the exemption under § 803 of the FDCPA, Plaintiffs’ claim would still fail because the $5 convenience fees were not incidental to their mortgage debt as required by the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). ... Plaintiffs affirmatively chose to use this alternative method of payment, which is not prohibited by state or federal law.

The FDCPA is not a public disclosure law and therefore does not itself support an informational-injury theory based on missing disclosures.

Obstfeld v. Unifin, Inc. · filed 2025-03-26

First, Plaintiff failed to allege that the FDCPA is a public disclosure law. Nor can he as the FDCPA does not qualify as such.

Sections 1692d(6) and 1692e(14) prohibit debt collectors from making collection calls without meaningful identity disclosure or using a business name other than the collector’s true name, but those bare procedural violations do not establish Article III standing without concrete harm.

Ward v. Nat'l Patient Account Servs. · filed 2021-08-16(d)(6), (e)(14)

Ward alleged that NPAS, Inc. failed to state its full name in voice messages, in violation of the FDCPA. Failing to receive full and complete information does not closely resemble intrusion upon seclusion, which generally requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant “intentionally intrude[d], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his privacy affairs or concerns.” ... By contrast, the mere failure to provide certain information does not mirror an intentional intrusion into the private affairs of another. ... Because the procedural injuries Ward asserts do not bear a close relationship to traditional harms, we conclude that he cannot demonstrate standing based upon the statutory violations alone.

Under Section 1692c(b), a debt collector's transmittal of a consumer's personal debt information to a third-party mailing vendor can cause a concrete privacy injury sufficient for Article III standing; an essentially identical theory supports standing under Section 1692f.

Thomas v. Unifin, Inc. · filed 2021-08-20(c)(b), (f)

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning finds support in the Supreme Court’s recent decision TransUnion, where the Court recognized that various intangible harms can be concrete for purposes of Article III standing, such as reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at 2204. Hunstein is also supported by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gadelhak, in which the court concluded that common law has long recognized actions against defendants who invade privacy rights, in that case, intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at 462. Other Seventh Circuit precedent confirms that Thomas has asserted a concrete harm in the context of the invasion of privacy rights. Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Sys., LLC, 980 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The invasion of a legally protected privacy right, though intangible, is personal and real, not general and abstract.”). The Court therefore concludes that Thomas has standing to bring his claim under § 1692c(b). Because Thomas’s theory of liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f is essentially the same as his theory under § 1692c(b), Thomas has standing to bring his claim under § 1692f.

Sections 1692e and 1692f require an FDCPA plaintiff to allege a concrete injury, regardless of whether the alleged violation is procedural or substantive.

Nettles v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2020-12-21(e), (f)

An FDCPA plaintiff must allege a concrete injury regardless of whether the alleged statutory violation is characterized as procedural or substantive.

The FDCPA does not by itself establish Article III standing for a statutory violation; the plaintiff must show concrete harm or an appreciable risk of harm to the concrete interest the statute protects.

Giannini v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2021-01-19

More importantly, however, the Seventh Circuit’s recent FDCPA standing decisions make clear that, without accompanying detrimental action, a plaintiff’s confusion, annoyance, and intimidation do not amount to concrete harm for standing purposes. ... The Court similarly concludes that, absent an allegation tying Giannini’s stress, anxiety, and worry to some detrimental action she took or risked taking related to her outstanding debt, the stress and worry she allegedly suffered does not alone amount to a cognizable injury.

The FDCPA does not by itself confer standing for a statutory violation; the plaintiff must allege a resulting concrete injury, such as acting or failing to act to the plaintiff's detriment.

Kwasniewski, Helen v. Medicredit, Inc. · filed 2021-01-25

Yet as discussed above, the Seventh Circuit has made it clear that an allegation of false or misleading information in violation of the FDCPA is not by itself enough to establish standing. What is also required is an allegation of some act or failure to act resulting from that violation causing plaintiff a “concrete injury.”

The FDCPA’s prohibition on deficient debt-collection information does not by itself confer Article III standing; the violation must cause concrete harm or present an appreciable risk of harm.

Rose Markakos v. Medicredit, Inc. · filed 2021-05-14

The violation of an FDCPA provision, whether “procedural” or “substantive,” does not necessarily cause an injury in fact. ... Here too, Markakos’s lack of standing is obvious. As with ERISA, there is no FDCPA exception to Article III. And Markakos has failed to show an injury in fact for a commonsense reason: she has not paid a dime, and she has properly disputed her debt.

Section 1692e(2)(a) prohibits debt collectors from misrepresenting the legal status of a debt, and emotional harm caused by such a false representation can constitute a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing at the pleading stage.

Magruder v. Navy Federal Fin. Group, LLC · filed 2021-05-19(e)(2)(a)

The attendant mental distress that Magruder allegedly suffered was, on this theory of the case, caused by a series of statutory violations at the heart of Congress’s scheme, namely, the prohibition against debt collectors mischaracterizing the “legal status of any debt” and then disseminating false information about that debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a), all leading to the issuance of “phony legal” process, H. Rep. No. 95-131, at 2 (1977); see also S. Rep. 95-382, at 2 (“Collection abuse takes many forms, including . . . misrepresentation of a consumer’s legal rights, . . . impersonating public officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process.”)

The FDCPA does not confer standing for a bare statutory violation; a plaintiff must allege concrete and particularized harm, and distress, confusion, or anxiety alone is insufficient.

Preisler v. Eastpoint Recovery Group, Inc. · filed 2021-05-25

In sum, Preisler’s attempt to bring claims for technical violations of the FDCPA fails. Mere violations, without a showing of a concrete and particularized injury, are insufficient to convey standing.

The FDCPA does not itself confer Article III standing for alleged statutory violations; a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury, and receipt of a noncompliant letter or confusion without detrimental action is insufficient.

Tavarez v. Transworld Systems Inc · filed 2021-07-12

A plaintiff’s allegations that a defendant violated multiple provisions of the FDCPA, without any allegation of a concrete injury, are insufficient to confer standing. ... However, as Casillas and its progeny make clear, a plaintiff’s mere receipt of a letter that does not comport with the FDCPA does not necessarily constitute an injury. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s “deprivation,” without more, is insufficient for purposes of standing. ... But the state of confusion is not itself an injury. ... Because Plaintiff does not suggest that her confusion caused her to act to her detriment, she has not pleaded an injury in fact.

The FDCPA does not support standing based solely on confusion, stress, or a consumer’s time and expense when the challenged communication does not harm a concrete interest the statute protects.

Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. · filed 2021-09-01

Mack argues that not only did the June 18 letter cause her confusion and stress but that it also caused her to take detrimental action, namely, to spend time and money to send another letter disputing her debt and requesting validation. But these actions do not rise to the level of detriment the Seventh Circuit has required for standing in FDCPA cases, particularly because the June 18 letter’s inclusion of a second validation notice did not adversely affect any interests Congress sought to protect through the FDCPA and instead effectively provided Mack with another opportunity to dispute her debt if she had failed to properly do so upon receipt of the first letter.

Section 1692c(b) bars a debt collector from communicating debt-related information to third parties without the consumer’s prior consent, and disclosure of private information can constitute a concrete injury supporting Article III standing; the same disclosure theory supports standing for a § 1692f claim.

Liu v. Radius Global Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-09-14(c)(b), (f)

Because the disclosure of private information is a harm traditionally recognized as cognizable, the Court finds it appropriate to follow the Eleventh Circuit in finding that Liu has Article III standing for her § 1692c(b) claim. ... And because Liu’s theory under § 1692f also depends on the disclosure of private information, she similarly suffered a concrete harm and has Article III standing for her § 1692f claim.