15 U.S.C. § 1692

Section 1692c(a)(2) prohibits a debt collector from communicating directly with a consumer about a debt, without prior consent, when the collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney regarding that debt, subject to stated exceptions.

Keating v. Frederick Debt Management, LLC · filed 2025-09-02(a)(2)

Section 1692c(a)(2) says “a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt” without the consumer’s prior consent “if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). Here, Frederick repeatedly sent debt collection communications directly to Keating when Frederick knew Keating was represented by counsel.

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars direct communication with a consumer when the debt collector has actual knowledge of the consumer’s attorney representation, while § 1692k(c) requires procedures reasonably adapted to prevent the specific bona fide error.

Six · filed 2026-04-01(c)(a)(2), (k)(c)

A primary requirement here is that the debt collector must have “actual knowledge” that the consumer is represented by an attorney regarding the debt at issue. ... This conflict goes directly to the knowledge requirement under § 1692c(a)(2). ... At issue here is the third prong. ... Second, the procedures must be “reasonably adapted to avoid the specific error at issue.”

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not make alleged FDCPA violations nonarbitrable; absent proof that Congress intended to preclude arbitration, such claims may be compelled to arbitration.

TICHANEN v. Harris & Harris, Ltd. · filed 2006-10-20

Furthermore, plaintiffs do not present any statutory language, legislative history, or show “inherent conflicts” that would establish that Congress intended to preclude arbitration in alleged violations under the FDCPA. ... There is no reason to believe this agreement does not include violations under the FDCPA.

FDCPA claims may be arbitrated when the arbitration clause preserves the consumer's substantive statutory rights and remedies.

Hawkins v. O'brien, 22490 (1-9-2009) · filed 2009-01-09

More importantly, nothing in the arbitration clause denies Hawkins any of the substantive rights conferred on him by CSPA and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") which his claims for relief invoke. Neither do those statutory provisions preclude or limit arbitration of claims brought in an action pursuant to them. Indeed, it has been held that FDCPA claims are arbitrable. Hodson v. Javitch, Block Rathbone, LLP (N.D. Ohio, 2008), 531 F.Supp. 2d 827 .

The FDCPA covers debt collection, not enforcement of a security interest such as a mortgage, and an FDCPA claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Harry v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc. · filed 2016-11-30

In Count IV, plaintiffs allege that defendants BAÑA, BNY Mellon and Di-tech violated- the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 but plaintiffs have failed to state a claim with respect to the FDCPA for two reasons. First, that statute covers debt collection, not the enforcement of a security interest such as a mortgage. Speleos v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 824 F.Supp.2d 226, 232-33 (D. Mass. 2011). Second, the statute of limitations for an FDCPA claim is one year so any claim based on that statute has long since expired. Brown v. Bank of America, Nat. Ass’n., 67 F.Supp.3d 508, 518-19 (D. Mass. 2014).

The FDCPA does not make claims under it non-arbitrable, so such claims may be compelled to arbitration.

Mounts v. Midland Funding LLC · filed 2017-06-28

Plaintiffs allege FDCPA claims in their complaint. “Congress did not intend FDCPA claims to be non-arbitrable.” ... As such, the Court finds that Congress did not intend plaintiffs’ claims to be nonarbi-trable.

The FDCPA does not make its claims non-arbitrable, so claims under the statute may be submitted to arbitration.

Patel v. CitiBank Corp. · filed 2019-08-20

Third, the Court concludes that none of Plaintiff’s claims were intended to be nonarbitrable. “Congress did not intend FDCPA claims to be non-arbitrable [and] courts routinely permit arbitration of such claims.”

The FDCPA's protections can be vindicated in arbitration, so an FDCPA claim may fall within a broad arbitration agreement when arbitration does not hinder those protections.

Bailey v. Diversified Consultants Inc · filed 2020-03-04

Thus, this Court need only consider whether the “important social policies” of the FDCPA could be effectively vindicated in arbitration. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that arbitration would hinder the FDCPA’s protections in this case. As a result, Plaintiff’s reliance on Bazemore is misplaced.

FDCPA claims are arbitrable unless Congress clearly indicates that they cannot be arbitrated.

Vitrano v. N.A.R., Inc. · filed 2020-03-27

Generally, federal statutory claims are arbitrable unless Congress clearly communicates otherwise. ... Plaintiff makes no such assertions, and there is no indication that Congress intended FDCPA claims to be nonarbitrable.

Claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are not exempt from arbitration and may be compelled to arbitration when covered by a valid arbitration agreement.

Fayez-Olabi v. Credit Acceptance Corporation · filed 2022-07-25

Congress has not exempted FDCPA and FCRA claims from arbitration. ... Accordingly, the FAA applies to the parties’ dispute, and the plaintiff is obligated to arbitrate his FDCPA and FCRA claims pursuant to the arbitration clause.

The FDCPA does not make a bare statutory violation enough for federal standing; a plaintiff must allege concrete harm connected to the violation.

DAYE v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP · filed 2022-09-23

The Court disagrees. Without reading the Letter, Daye did not suffer any harm and therefore he lacks standing. ... As TransUnion put into sharp relief, Daye may not merely allege that GC Services violated the FDCPA. ... To be sure, even if Daye had read the offending Letter, informational harm alone fails to provide standing without more. ... The Court does not suggest that all FDCPA claims are doomed. ... But Daye needs to allege some form of concrete injury that accompanies the statutory violation; some consequence that stemmed from Daye’s reliance on the Letter; some adverse occurrence that arose from the Letter; or some parallel harm caused by a third party receiving the Letter.

An FDCPA plaintiff must allege concrete harm beyond a bare statutory violation to invoke federal jurisdiction.

Du Preez v. Benchmark Maid LLC · filed 2022-11-09

The Sixth Circuit, in its consideration of the issue, has confirmed that an FDCPA plaintiff, like an FCRA plaintiff (or any other plaintiff), must allege some concrete harm, in addition to a bare statutory violation, in order to plead a case within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. ... Du Preez has alleged that McCoy violated the FDCPA in ways that (1) disparaged Du Preez’s reputation to a third party, (2) embroiled Du Preez in a baseless collection action, and (3) resulted in the assertion of a greater debt liability against Du Preez. Those harms are concrete, and Du Preez’s assertion of the harms is sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the face of the Complaint.

The court held that Congress did not intend FDCPA claims to be nonarbitrable, so such claims may be submitted to arbitration.

Garrison v. NA · filed 2024-03-22

“Congress did not intend FDCPA claims to be non-arbitrable [and] courts routinely permit such claims”. Thus, Congress intended for Plaintiff’s claims to be arbitrable.

Section 1692a(4) defines a creditor to include a person who originates a debt or is owed a debt, while excluding a person who receives a debt already in default solely to facilitate collection for another.

Cooper v. Litton Loan Servicing (In Re Cooper) · filed 2000-08-28(a)(4)

The first part of § 1692a(4) defines the universe of creditors as either those who originate a debt or those to whom a debt is owed; in either case, the creditors are not collecting the debts for others. ... There is no allegation that Credit acquired the Coopers’ debt when they were already in default, so Credit is not excepted by § 1692(a)(4), and is included in the definition of a creditor. ... Direct collection actions by creditors on their own debt do not fall within the provisions of the FDCPA. In the instant matter, Credit is a creditor under the definition of the FDCPA, and therefore is outside the scope of the Act.

Section 1692a(4) excludes an entity that receives a debt in default solely to facilitate collection for another from the FDCPA’s definition of creditor, even if the entity acquires an assigned security interest or ownership interest for that collection purpose.

Sciortino v. Barrett Daffin Frappie Levin & Brock, LLP · filed 2013-03-29(a)(4)

Indeed, the plain language of § 1692a(4) recognizes that an entity may acquire “ownership” through assignment or transfer of a debt to enable the entity to facilitate collection of the debt.

Section 1692a(3) treats a person mistakenly pursued by a debt collector as a consumer when the collector allegedly seeks payment from that person.

Ali v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2018-09-30(a)(3)

The FDCPA defines “consumers” as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Courts have read Section 1692a(3) to include individuals who are mistakenly dunned by debt collectors. Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 663 F.3d 997, 1002 (8th Cir. 2011). Therefore, even if defendants sought to collect from SAA, mistakenly believing he was the Debtor because he shared the same name and address on the account, SAA is still a consumer under the FDCPA. Accordingly, this element is satisfied.

Section 1692c(d) treats a consumer’s executor or administrator as a consumer when determining whether a debt collector’s communication is abusive or unlawful.

McAdams v. Receivable Recovery Services, LLC · filed 2020-10-20(d)

Section 1692c(d) specifically provides that for purposes of determining whether a debt collector’s communication is abusive or unlawful, “the term ‘consumer’ includes the consumer’s … executor, or administrator.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d). Plaintiff, the undisputed legal executor of Mrs. McAdams’ estate, alleges that Defendant’s communications violate the FDCPA. Unquestionably, Plaintiff is a consumer within the meaning of the FDCPA and has standing to bring this action.

The FDCPA does not provide a remedy for collection conduct that is alleged solely as a violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic-stay or discharge-injunction provisions.

Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2000-10-16

As set forth above, Congress has provided remedies for violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. ... To the extent plaintiff premises her FDCPA claim on violations of sections 362 or 524, said claims are barred. Plaintiffs remedies for violations of the Bankruptcy Code lie within the Code itself.

The FDCPA is not impliedly repealed by the Bankruptcy Code when the FDCPA claim arises from conduct during a bankruptcy proceeding.

Kline v. Mortgage Electronic Security Systems · filed 2009-09-21

Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Code did not impliedly repeal the FDCPA, in cases where the plaintiffs claim under the FDCPA arose out of actions that occurred during a bankruptcy proceeding.

The FDCPA is not implicitly repealed or precluded by the Bankruptcy Code, so overlapping claims based on conduct violating both statutes may proceed.

Marshall v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re Marshall) · filed 2012-09-24

This Court likewise adopts the approach of the Seventh Circuit and concludes that the Debtor’s FDCPA Claim is not precluded by the Bankruptcy Code.

The FDCPA preempts state common-law claims for abusive debt-collection conduct when those claims conflict with the Act’s purposes and remedies.

Thrasher v. Cardholder Services · filed 1999-11-05(e)

The Court finds that Congress clearly meant to preempt some state causes of action because it specifically addressed preemption in § 1692n. The Court further finds that to permit plaintiffs in Mississippi to pursue causes of action alleging intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress as remedies for abusive debt collection practices would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the FDCPA. Accordingly, under the doctrine of conflict preemption, the Court finds that Congress preempted the state causes of action alleged by Plaintiff.

Section 1692(a) states congressional findings motivating the FDCPA but does not create substantive rights.

Conboy v. AT & T Corp. · filed 2001-02-26(a)

The amended complaint cites 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) with respect to the FDCPA claim, but this provision is simply a statement of Congressional findings that motivated the passage of the FDCPA; it does not confer.any substantive rights under that statute.

The FDCPA does not completely preempt state-law claims, so it cannot by itself confer federal-question jurisdiction for removal.

Torres v. Bay Area Credit Services · filed 2021-02-05

The Court therefore joins courts around this circuit and holds that the FCRA and FDCPA do not completely preempt state law claims.

Section 1692(d) does not provide a private cause of action.

Gera v. Borough of Frackville · filed 2025-03-19(d)

many of the statues cited by the plaintiff do not provide for a private cause of action. ... These statutes include the 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; 28 U.S.C. § 4101; 18 U.S.C. § 2340; and 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d). The R&R suggests dismissal of these claims, and there appearing no clear error or manifest injustice, the R&R will be adopted on this point.

Section 1692f(6)(A) bars a debt collector from taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess property when it lacks a present right to possess it through an enforceable security interest.

McDonald v. Onewest Bank, FSB · filed 2013-03-07(6)(A)

Given the language of the statute— which specifically covers merely threatening to take nonjudicial action — such an outcome is nonsensical. A nonjudicial foreclosure intended to dispossess the homeowner of title and ownership of real property is the type of debt collection activity that may be subject to § 1692f(A). ... Plaintiff has established that NWTS violated § 1692f(6)(A) of the FDCPA.

Section 1692f(6) prohibits debt collectors from using nonjudicial means to dispossess a debtor when they have no present right to possess the property.

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Obradovich · filed 2020-05-28(f)(6)

The Obradoviches have also demonstrated a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Seterus violated § 1692f(6) when it directed its contractor to enter the Property without permission, change the locks, and winterize it prematurely. Section 1692f(6) prohibits debt collectors from taking any nonjudicial action to dispossess the debtor of their property when the collector has no present right to possess the property. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).

Section 1692e(5) bars a debt collector from threatening action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken.

Moore v. Frazier · filed 2002-04-12(e)(5)

Actually, the judge instructed the jury that it is a violation of the FDCPA “to threaten to take any action that is not intended to be taken.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). This instruction mirrors the language of the statute, omitting only “cannot legally be taken” language, language which, if included, could have served only to broaden Medical Credit’s potential liability. Accordingly it was not erroneous.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken.

Francis v. Snyder · filed 2005-09-30(e)(5)

On the first claim, Snyder identifies 810 ILCS § 5/3-806 as the “Illinois Statute” to which his letter refers. ... The statute lists three circumstances under which a dishonored check may give rise to liability, and a drawer placing a “stop payment” on the check is not among them. Under a plain reading of the statute, Francis is not liable. ... Having found that the letter violates § 1692e(5) because it contained a threat of an action that “cannot legally be taken,” we need not discuss Francis’ alternative contention that it was also an action “not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e(5) does not make a debt collector's statement that it will pursue collection through every available means deceptive, misleading, or false when the collector was prepared to use all available means, including litigation, even if it ultimately chose not to sue.

Spira v. Ashwood Financial, Inc. · filed 2005-05-24(e)(5)

As long as defendant was prepared to utilize all means available to it in attempting to collect the debt, including litigation, which defendant’s discovery response made clear, then by implication, it could have considered other, lesser forms of action short of litigation to achieve its aim. In other words, the fact that Ashwood might use litigation to collect the debt, did not bind it to initiate suit as plaintiff appears to argue. Also, that defendant may ultimately choose not to initiate litigation does not render the language in the Follow-up Letter “deceptive,” “misleading” or “false.”

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening an action it does not intend to take in connection with collecting a debt, and the threat must be assessed under the least-sophisticated-consumer standard.

Mathieson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2021-03-09(e)(5)

To constitute an actionable threat under § 1692e(5), the act threatened must not be “intended to be taken” but must be made “in connection with the collection” of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Under the circumstances of this case and the least-sophisticated consumer standard, neither could be perceived as a threat, much less a “threat to take legal action.”

Section 1692k caps class-action damages at the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the debt collector’s net worth and permits reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for a successful consumer action.

Cope v. Duggins · filed 2002-04-17(k)(2)(B)(ii) and (k)(3)

Specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(A)(2)(B)(ii) limits monetary damages in a class action to an amount not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the debt collector. ... When a consumer brings a successful FDCPA lawsuit, the defendant debt collector is liable for “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee” in an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). ... Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k(a)(3) authorizes attorney’s fees and costs only for a successful action enforcing liability for actual or statutory damages, which requires prevailing-party relief such as a judgment or comparable settlement.

Dechert, Edward v. Cadle Company · filed 2006-03-16(a)(3)

The plaintiff was entitled to an award of fees and costs only if his suit could be characterized as a “successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), meaning liability for either actual or statutory damages. The general, indeed all but invariable, rule is that to be a prevailing party and therefore entitled to an award of fees and costs, you either must obtain a judgment that provides you with formal relief, such as damages, an injunction, or a declaration that you can use if necessary to obtain an injunction or damages later, or must obtain a settlement that gives you similar relief.

Section 1692k(a)(3) makes a successful FDCPA plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fee and costs mandatory, while allowing the amount to be limited for reasonableness and limited success.

French v. Corporate Receivables, Inc. · filed 2007-06-07(a)(3)

The FDCPA provides that successful plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages, statutory damages of up to $1,000, and "the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Successful plaintiffs are those who have obtained an award of statutory or actual damages. ... An award of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs under the FDCPA is obligatory. ... That successful plaintiffs are entitled to a fee award under the FDCPA does not mean, however, that they are entitled to the amount requested; they are entitled to what is reasonable under the circumstances. ... The district court's basis for reducing the Frenches' fee request -- limited success at trial -- is an accepted ground for limiting fees under the FDCPA.

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits a successful FDCPA plaintiff to recover the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney's fee.

Johnson v. Credit International, Inc. · filed 2007-11-08(a)(3)

The Fan- Debt Collection Practices Act provides that a plaintiff may recover “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires an award of litigation costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, as determined by the court, when the defendant is found liable under the FDCPA.

Leyse v. CORPORATE COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. · filed 2008-03-19(k)(a)(3)

“Where the defendant is found liable under FDCPA, the plaintiff will be awarded the “costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorneys’ fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C.S. 1692k(a)(3). ... Therefore, Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs as determined by the discretion of the Court.”

Section 1692k(a)(3) makes costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee mandatory in a successful action to enforce FDCPA liability.

Danow v. Law Office of David E. Borback, P.A. · filed 2009-06-10(a)(3)

As noted above, the award of attorney’s fees to a successful plaintiff for a debt collector’s violation is mandatory.

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche & Associates, P.C. · filed 2009-08-03(a)(3)

Plaintiffs who prevail under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a plaintiff who prevails under the FDCPA to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotc · filed 2009-08-03k(a)(3)

Plaintiffs who prevail under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act are entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a noncompliant debt collector to pay reasonable attorney’s fees, including fees for preparing a fee petition, and distinguishes those fees from litigation costs.

Andrews v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc. · filed 2010-11-09(a)(3)

An award of reasonable attorney’s fees, which may include fees for time that counsel spent preparing a fee petition, is mandatory under the FDCPA. The Act specifically distinguishes attorney’s fees from costs; thus, the cost shifting provisions of Rule 68 do not apply.

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a violating debt collector to pay the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee, including reasonable fees incurred after a Rule 68 offer.

Hernandez v. Asset Acceptance, LLC · filed 2012-02-13(a)(3)

Because the statute separates “costs” from attorney’s fees, Rule 68 provides no temporal limitation on recoverable attorney’s fees in FDCPA cases.

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a plaintiff who prevails under the FDCPA to an award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Bratton v. Thomas Law Firm, PC · filed 2013-05-03(a)(3)

Plaintiffs who prevail under the FDCPA are entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

The FDCPA permits an award of disproportionate attorney’s fees when a debtor enforces the Act as a private attorney general.

In re Jones · filed 2013-07-30(k)(3)

Accordingly, Debtor’s counsel in this case is entitled to disproportionate fees as a private attorney general under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a plaintiff seeking attorney’s fees and costs to recover actual or statutory damages, and permits a defendant to recover fees and costs when the action was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.

Scroggin v. Credit Bureau of Jonesboro, Inc. · filed 2013-09-20(a)(3)

The Court finds that Scroggin is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit that to be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs for having successfully brought an action to enforce a defendant’s liability under the FDCPA, it is not enough that the plaintiff prove a technical violation of the FDCPA by the defendant if the violation will not support an award of actual or statutory damages in plaintiffs favor; rather, a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees and costs against an FDCPA defendant is recovery of actual or statutory damages from that defendant. ... The Court finds that because CBJ has affirmatively shown that Scroggin brought this action in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, CBJ is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) and ArkCode Ann. § 17-24-512(a)(3)(B).

Section 1692k(a)(3) authorizes a successful consumer plaintiff to recover a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.

Kottle v. Unifund CCR, LLC · filed 2014-01-13(a)(3)

The FDCPA authorizes attorneys’ fees in a successful consumer suit. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees only when the court finds that the FDCPA action was brought in bad faith and for harassment, and any award is discretionary.

Mayhall v. Rabin · filed 2014-04-07(a)(3)

An award of fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) is discretionary, but absent “ ‘evidence that the plaintiff knew that his claim was meritless and that plaintiff pursued his claims with the purpose of harassing the defendant’” a court may not permit a prevailing defendant to recover attorney’s fees. ... Nevertheless, on the record before it, the Court concludes that an award of attorney’s fees under either 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is not justified here because there is no evidence that Plaintiff filed or pursued her case in bad faith and for purposes of harassment or that her attorney “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplied these proceedings.

Section 1692k(a)(3) mandates an award of costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee in a successful FDCPA enforcement action, but does not require fees that are unreasonable or inappropriate.

Gsell v. Rubin & Yates, LLC · filed 2014-09-04(a)(3)

The FDCPA mandates, in the event of a successful enforcement action, the award of “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the Court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). ... However, while an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in an FDCPA may be regarded as “required'' absent unusual circumstances, ... this mandate does not undermine the Court's duty to deny attorney’s fees that are unreasonable or inappropriate.

Section 1692k(a) entitles a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.

Douyon v. NY Medical Health Care, P.C. · filed 2014-09-30(k)(a)

The plain language of the FDCPA authorizes an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the Court.

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a successful FDCPA plaintiff to receive the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee, and the attorney’s-fee award is obligatory when the plaintiff recovers statutory damages.

McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. · filed 2014-09-30(a)(3)

The FDCPA entitles a successful plaintiff to an award of “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Where, as here, a plaintiff obtained an award of statutory damages, an attorney’s fee award “is obligatory.”

Section 1692k(a)(3) generally requires a reasonable attorney’s-fee award to a successful FDCPA plaintiff, but it does not require the full lodestar amount and permits downward adjustments for limited success.

Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, P.C. · filed 2015-01-06(k)(a)(3)

The Court cannot find that the Magistrate Judge abused this discretion in declining to deny plaintiff’s fee award in its entirety, especially in the context of the FDCPA, where “the fee award under § 1692k is mandatory in all but the most unusual circumstances.” ... Finally, plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that the FDCPA does not mandate a fee award in the lodestar amount. ... [Section] 1692k does not mandate a fee award in the lodestar amount. If the concept of discretion is to have any meaning at all, it must encompass the ability to depart from the lodestar in appropriate circumstances. Hensley itself recognized that, in certain circumstances, an award in the lodestar amount may be excessive. When “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success,” the district court, in calculating an appropriate fee award, “may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” ... The Magistrate Judge did not commit clear error when she followed the guidance of the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in declining to award plaintiff the full lodestar amount under circumstances where “the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . times a reasonable hourly rate” resulted in “an excessive amount” in light of the “only partial or limited success” attained by plaintiff’s counsel on plaintiff’s claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436; see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 598 & n.16 (2010) (noting that “courts have discretion in calculating reasonable attorney’s fees” under the FDCPA, and that while “[m]any District Courts apply a lodestar method,” those courts “permit[] downward adjustments in appropriate circumstances”).

Section 1692k(a)(3) makes a debt collector liable for the costs of an FDCPA action and a reasonable attorney’s fee, including fees reasonably incurred enforcing the resulting judgment.

Kersten v. Quick Collect, Inc. · filed 2016-01-22(a)(3)

Where, as here; a plaintiff prevails in an action to enforce the FDCPA, the defendant debt collector is liable for “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” ’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). ... There is no binding precedent extending this mandate to post-judgment debt collection efforts. ... It explained that 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) provides “statutory-authority not only to award fees in the initial action but also in any action ... to enforce the judgment obtained in that initial action.” ... The Court finds these other decisions persuasive.

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits attorney’s fees against a plaintiff whose FDCPA claim was brought in bad faith and for harassment; bad faith requires knowing the claim lacks merit and pressing it anyway.

Libman v. Bondarev Chiropractic CA2/2 · filed 2016-07-07(a)(3)

Attorney’s fees may be assessed under the FDCPA if the plaintiff’s claim “was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment” (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1170-1171 [so noting]), and under the Rosenthal Act and the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act if the plaintiff’s claim was not prosecuted or brought “in good faith” (Civ. Code, §§ 1785.31, subd. (e) & 1788.30, subd. (c)). ... The meaning of the term “bad faith” is well established. “Bad faith” requires more than a showing that the plaintiff’s claim lacked merit; instead, it requires a showing that the plaintiff knew of the claim’s lack of merit and nevertheless decided to press that claim.

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles counsel for a prevailing FDCPA party to the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.

Hallmark v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP · filed 2019-05-08(a)(3)

"Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), counsel for a prevailing party in an FDCPA action is entitled to 'the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorneys' fee as determined by the court.' " ... Therefore, the Court grants Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and costs and approves $ 400,000 as an appropriate award for attorneys' fees and costs in this matter.

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees separately from costs, so Rule 68’s general limit on post-offer costs does not cut off those fees.

Paz v. Portfolio Recovery Associates · filed 2019-05-15(a)(3)

Paz won at trial on his FDCPA claim and his doing so entitled him to an award of “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Congress’s choice to define attorneys’ fees separately from costs in § 1692k(a)(3) meant that Paz would be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees (by operation of the FDCPA) without regard to the more general limitation on costs in Rule 68.

Section 1692k(a)(3) allows a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

FLORY v. MCCABE, WEISBERG & CONWAY, LLC · filed 2019-06-20(k)(a)(3)

The FDCPA affords prevailing plaintiffs the right to recoup their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. ... As the prevailing party in this FDCPA matter, Plaintiff is entitled to recoup her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 1692k permits a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to recover up to $1,000 in statutory damages per proceeding, actual damages for out-of-pocket loss and emotional distress, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; statutory damages are determined by the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of the violations.

Grimm v. GPG Processing, LLC · filed 2019-09-19(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(3), (b)(1)

Under Section 1692k of the FDCPA, Plaintiff may recover statutory damages, actual damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k. ... “The maximum amount of statutory damages that may be awarded under the FDCPA is $1000 per proceeding.” ... In determining the amount of statutory damages, courts must consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). ... Under § 1692k(a)(1), Plaintiff may recover actual damages incurred as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1). Actual damages include out-of-pocket expenses incurred, as well as emotional distress damages. ... “‘The FDCPA mandates the award of ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee’ and costs to a prevailing party.’”

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a consumer who prevails in an FDCPA action.

McClain v. Hana · filed 2019-12-30(a)(3)

The FDCPA mandates the award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing consumer.

Section 1692(k) makes an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs mandatory for a successful FDCPA plaintiff, and reasonable fees incurred litigating the fee award are presumptively recoverable.

Puccio v. Love · filed 2020-01-28(k)

The language of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k), and of the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code. § 1788.30, make an attorneys’ fee award mandatory. ... In FDCPA cases, fees-on-fees are presumptively recoverable as part of the lodestar calculation if they are reasonable.

Section 1692(k) shifts reasonable attorney's fees and costs to defendants in FDCPA cases, and the award need not be proportional to the plaintiff's damages.

Rudler v. Houslanger & Associates, PLLC · filed 2020-01-29(k)

To the extent Defendants’ opposition to the hours billed can be viewed as raising a disproportionality argument, that argument is rejected. ... The whole purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to generate attorneys’ fees that are disproportionate to the plaintiff’s recovery.

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits a successful FDCPA plaintiff to recover litigation costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.

Napier v. Swiftfunds Financial Services LLC · filed 2020-05-13(a)(3)

Under the FDCPA, a district court may award a successful plaintiff “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a successful consumer in an FDCPA action to receive the costs of the action and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Breeden v. Medical-Commercial Audit, Inc. · filed 2020-05-18(a)(3)

The FDCPA requires payment of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to a successful consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

The FDCPA authorizes statutory damages and attorney’s fees and costs for a successful enforcement action.

Justice v. Fidelis Recovery Management, LLC · filed 2020-05-27

Accordingly, the Court cannot recommend default judgment be entered with respect to the alleged violations of the TCPA. The Court, however, finds plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to support his claim for statutory damages and attorney’s fees and costs under the FDCPA.

Section 1692k(a)(3) allows an FDCPA plaintiff to recover the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee determined by the court.

Burkett v. Houslanger & Associates, PLLC · filed 2020-09-30(a)(3)

Under the FDCPA, plaintiffs may recover “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k)(a)(3). The task of determining the amount of the fee award is committed to the district court’s discretion, as Judge Orenstein noted.

Section 1692k(a)(3) authorizes a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to recover costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court, calculated using the lodestar method.

McCray v. Deitsch and Wright, P.A. · filed 2020-11-09(a)(3)

The FDCPA provides for costs and “reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Embree v. Medicredit, Inc., 752 F. App’x 697, 699 (11th Cir. 2018). The lodestar method applies to reach a reasonable attorney’s fee award in FDCPA cases. Embree; 752 F. App’x at 699; Moton v. Nathan & Nathan, P.A., 297 F. App’x 930, 931–32 (11th Cir. 2008); Hollis v. Roberts, 984 F.2d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding fee-shifting principles applicable in FDCPA cases).

Section 1692k(a)(3) allows a prevailing party in an FDCPA action to recover the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.

Schreier v. Professional Claims Bureau, Inc. · filed 2020-12-18(a)(3)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), the prevailing party in a FDCPA action may recover “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a successful FDCPA plaintiff to receive the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney's fee, and the fee award is mandatory.

Dees v. US Collections West Incorporated · filed 2020-12-29(a)(3)

“[I]n the case of any successful action to enforce [liability under the FDCPA],” a debtor is entitled to recover “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 949 (9th Cir. 2007). The award of fees in the case of a successful action under the FDCPA is mandatory. Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1032 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Bridgeport v. Camacho, 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a debt collector liable under the FDCPA to pay the costs of a successful enforcement action and a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.

BROWNE v. CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC · filed 2021-01-21(a)(3)

The FDCPA provides, in pertinent part, that “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount [that includes] . . . in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). ... The Court therefore finds that $119,576.85 represents a reasonable award of fees and costs in this matter and will direct Defendant to pay that amount pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692(e) gives the FDCPA a remedial purpose of eliminating abusive debt-collection practices and requires broad construction to advance that purpose.

Davis v. Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuis, P.A. · filed 2012-04-17(e)

Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The statute is remedial and must be construed broadly to give effect to its purpose.

Section 1692(e)'s pro-debtor objectives support rejecting a rule that a debt defaults immediately when payment becomes due.

David Alibrandi, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Financial Outsourcing Services, Inc. · filed 2003-06-18(e)

We conclude that the FDCPA’s broad, pro-debtor objectives would not be served if we adopted Alibrandi’s argument that default occurs immediately after payment becomes due.

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA aims to prevent third-party debt collectors from using abusive and unfair tactics to collect consumer debts.

Knighten v. PALISADES COLLECTIONS, LLC · filed 2010-07-06

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is part of a comprehensive federal legislation aimed at preventing third-party debt collectors from using abusive and unfair tactics in collecting consumer debts.

Section 1692 identifies the FDCPA’s purpose as protecting consumers from abusive and deceptive debt collection practices.

Ademiluyi v. Pennymac Mortgage Investment Trust Holdings I, LLC · filed 2013-03-11

The FDCPA is intended to protect consumers from debt collectors who engage in abusive and deceptive debt collection practices.

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt-collection practices and promote consistent state action protecting consumers against debt-collection abuses.

Monreal v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC · filed 2013-06-04

The declared purpose of the FDCPA is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors ... and to promote consistent state action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692.

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt-collection practices and prevent compliant collectors from being competitively disadvantaged.

Feggins v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Feggins) · filed 2015-11-20(e)

However, the purpose of the FDCPA is not merely to protect consumers, but also to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices” and to ensure “that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). In other words, the FDCPA protects other creditors as well as consumers, and payment of stale claims via “POT” plans reduces the amount paid to creditors holding valid claims.

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA's purpose is to eliminate abusive debt-collection practices, aimed at harmful disclosures to people such as friends, neighbors, or employers rather than routine processing by mailing vendors.

MADLINGER v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC · filed 2022-07-05(e)

Moreover, a brief look to legislative history does not favor standing for these types of disclosure claims. Indeed, the alleged incidental sharing of Plaintiff’s information is not the type of practice that concerned Congress when it enacted the FDCPA. Congress passed the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). In that regard, Congress was concerned with a consumer’s sensitive information being disclosed “to friends, neighbors, or an employer,” not disinterested mailing vendors. S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 2 (1977). ... The routine mailing of a letter by a third-party vendor notifying a consumer that their outstanding debt has been placed with a debt collector for collection is a far cry from the abusive, harassing debt collection practices that Congress sought to curtail.

Section 1692 states the FDCPA’s purpose of curbing harassment and abuse by debt collectors as well as fraud-like conduct.

MCDONOUGH v. LEOPOLD & ASSOCIATES, PLLC · filed 2022-08-22

Framed as such, the FDCPA is not solely aimed at combatting fraud-like conduct, but also is intended to curb harassment and abuse by debt collectors more generally.

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA serves to eliminate abusive debt collection by debt collectors.

Myers v. Americollect Inc. · filed 2016-07-06(e)

The FDCPA serves “to eliminate abusive debt collection by debt collectors,” 15 U.S.C. § 1629(e), and “is intended for the protection of unsophisticated consumers.” Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC, 505 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir.2007).

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA seeks in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices.

Barnes v. Northwest Repossession, LLC · filed 2016-09-26

The FDCPA seeks, in part, to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692, by regulating “the actions a ‘debt collector’ is permitted to take in collecting a debt.”

Section 1692 states Congress's findings about abusive debt collection practices and declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate those practices and protect consumers.

Bock v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP · filed 2017-05-25(a), (e)

But FDCPA, including its title, is permeated by a Congressional intent to protect consumers from abusive debt collection practices, irrespective of whether the consumer in fact owed a debt.

Section 1692 declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, protect compliant debt collectors from disadvantage, and promote consistent state action to protect consumers.

Anderson v. Express Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2019-12-04

Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not completely disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692(a) declares that Congress enacted the FDCPA to curtail abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.

Tillman v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2019-12-10(a)

Congress enacted the FDCPA to curtail “the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” by debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA’s purpose is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.

Hackler v. Tolteca Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2019-12-11(e)

The purpose of the FDCPA is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, prevent competitive disadvantage to compliant collectors, and promote consistent state action protecting consumers.

Mun v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2019-12-11(e)

The FDCPA is intended to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, prevent compliant collectors from being competitively disadvantaged, and promote consistent state action protecting consumers.

Adler v. Penn Credit Corporation · filed 2020-08-03(e)

“The purpose of the FDCPA is to ‘eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to [e]nsure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.’”

Section 1692 states that Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, prevent compliant debt collectors from being competitively disadvantaged, and promote consistent state action protecting consumers.

Hampton v. Barclays Bank Delaware · filed 2020-08-13(e)

Congress enacted the FDCPA “‘to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.’”

The section states that the FDCPA aims to stop abusive debt collection, prevent compliant collectors from being disadvantaged, and encourage consistent state consumer protection.

Ghiazza v. Anchorage Marina, Inc. · filed 2021-09-24

“The purpose of the FDCPA is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”

Section 1692(a) states that Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors and address a widespread problem.

Bostic v. Michael Andrews & Associates, LLC · filed 2021-10-19(a)

“Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate ‘the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices and prevent compliant debt collectors from being competitively disadvantaged.

Bonner v. Comentiy Bank · filed 2021-11-10(e)

The FDCPA’s purpose “is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, and to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, protect compliant debt collectors from competitive disadvantage, and promote consistent state action.

Napoleon v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, LLP · filed 2022-03-10(e)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was designed to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuse.” McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).

Section 1692(e) states the FDCPA’s own purpose of eliminating abusive debt collection practices and does not import a credit transaction limit from the Truth in Lending Act.

Terri L. Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C. And Kathy Leschensky · filed 1997-04-18(e)

We need not look to sec. 1601(a) to glean Congress' intended purpose in enacting the FDCPA, because Congress clearly codified the separate and specific purpose they intend the FDCPA to serve: "It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692(e).

Section 1692 identifies harms from abusive debt collection that affect individuals and states a purpose of protecting consumers.

Anarion Investments, LLC v. Carrington Mortgage Services · filed 2014-07-17(a), (e)

Furthermore, the FDCPA states that it was passed to remedy conduct that can lead to personal bankruptcies, marital infidelity, and to invasions of individual privacy — injuries that only natural persons, not corporate entities, can suffer.

Section 1692(e) declares that the FDCPA's purpose is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.

Ross v. Commercial Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1999-01-08(e)

The purpose of the FDCPA is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692(e) declares that the FDCPA was created to protect consumers from abusive practices by debt collectors.

Riddle & Associates, P.C. v. Judith A. Kelly, Appeals Of: Edelman, Combs & Latturner, Cross-Appellee, and David L. Harts · filed 2005-07-18(e)

The FDCPA was created to protect consumers from abusive practices by debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692(e) declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, prevent compliant collectors from being competitively disadvantaged, and promote consistent state action protecting consumers.

Del Campo v. Kennedy · filed 2006-12-05(e)

Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692 declares that the FDCPA was enacted to combat abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.

McKinney v. Cadleway Properties, Inc. · filed 2008-11-13

The FDCPA was enacted to combat "abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices." 15 U.S.C. § 1692.

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA is intended to prevent abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.

Trunzo v. Citi Mortgage · filed 2012-06-25

The purpose of the FDCPA is to prevent consumers from being subjected to “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” by debt collectors. See § 1692(a), (b).

Section 1692(e) states that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, prevent competitive disadvantage to compliant collectors, and promote consistent state consumer protection.

Kaylor-Trent v. John C. Bonewicz, P.C. · filed 2012-11-02(e)

The FDCPA was enacted by Congress “ ‘to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent state action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.’ ” Jenkins v. Heintz, 25 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)), aff'd 514 U.S. 291, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995).

Section 1692(a) declares that the FDCPA aims to end abusive debt collection practices that contribute to personal bankruptcies, marital instability, job loss, and invasions of privacy.

Bracken v. Harris & Zide, L.L.P. · filed 2004-01-08(a)

In § 1692 of the FDCPA, the Congressional findings and declaration of purpose state the act is meant to end abusive debt collection practices which “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). The focus of these harms is distinctly on the individual.

Section 1692 declares that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act seeks to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.

Mitchell v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2021-09-13(e)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act seeks “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692 declares that the FDCPA was enacted to eliminate abusive debt collection practices.

Hubbard v. National Bond & Collection Associates, Inc. · filed 1991-04-02

The FDCPA was not enacted to enforce the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions; it was enacted “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692(e) aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices and protect collectors who refrain from them.

Reade-Alvarez v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C. · filed 2005-05-10(e)

Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not prohibit garnishment without a signed court order.

Durrenberger v. Comm'r · filed 2004-02-26

Petitioner contends that garnishment of his wages was improper because the Fair Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977), 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692 (2000), prohibits garnishment without a signed court order. Petitioner fails to explain where or how the FDCPA so provides, and we find no such prohibition in that act.

The FDCPA does not unequivocally abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, so claims against an unconsenting State are barred.

Sorrell v. Illinois Student Assistance Commission · filed 2004-04-22

Because the State of Illinois has not waived its sovereign immunity, and Congress has not unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate the State’s immunity, this Court holds as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs claims pursuant to the FDCPA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the Court will ALLOW the Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to those claims.

Section 1692(e) identifies the FDCPA's purpose as eliminating abusive debt-collection practices, but the FDCPA does not expressly waive the United States' sovereign immunity.

Ha v. U.S. Department of Education · filed 2010-01-13(e)

The FDCPA, upon which Ha relies, is intended “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). ... After reviewing these decisions, I have similarly concluded that the FDCPA does not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity.

The FDCPA does not expressly waive the federal government's sovereign immunity.

Ha v. US Department of Education · filed 2010-01-14

After reviewing these decisions, I have similarly concluded that the FDCPA does not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity.

The FDCPA does not expressly waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, so claims against the United States and its agencies under the Act are barred absent an unequivocal waiver.

United States v. Deuerling · filed 2016-09-28(a)(6)(C)

The FDCPA specifically excludes “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). ... Moreover, courts which have considered the issue have found that there is nothing in the FDCPA which contains any unequivocal or express waiver of sovereign immunity by the government. See Williams v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.N.J., 455 Fed.Appx. at 143; Wagstaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 2007). ... Thus, Defendant has failed to show that the Government waived its sovereign immunity under the FDCPA. Accordingly, Defendant’s claims against the United States and its agencies under the FDCPA, Counts II, III, and VI, should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not waive a state agency’s sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.

Owens v. TransUnion, LLC · filed 2021-09-30

For that reason, the magistrate judge properly concluded that Owens’s FCRA and FDCPA claims against MGA should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) based on sovereign immunity.

The FDCPA does not waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, and federal agencies such as the IRS and Department of Education are not debt collectors under the Act.

Thompson v. United States Department of Education · filed 2023-06-02

There is no basis to diverge from the well-established precedent that the United States is immune from suit for claims under the FDCPA because of a lack of express waiver of sovereign immunity. Because the plaintiff has failed to show that the United States waived its sovereign immunity under the FDCPA as to claims against the IRS and the DOE, this court lacks jurisdiction. ... Notwithstanding the lack of an express waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims also fail because the IRS and DOE, as government agencies, do not fall within the definition of a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. See, 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)(C).

The FDCPA does not abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

Leftridge v. Judicial Branch · filed 2023-06-30

I will dismiss Leftridge’s claims alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the FCRA, the FDCPA, SSA Title IV-D, the TILA, and the ADEA because they do not fall within any exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. First, Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the FCRA, the FDCPA, SSA Title IV-D, and TILA.

The FDCPA does not unequivocally and expressly waive the federal government's sovereign immunity.

Dingle v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. · filed 2025-03-12

First, the DOE was entitled to sovereign immunity as to Dingle’s FDCPA claims because no provision of the FDCPA unequivocally and expressly waived the government’s sovereign immunity.

The FDCPA does not require a foreclosure sale to be halted when a debtor does not seek verification of or otherwise dispute the debt.

Muldrow v. Emc Mortgage Corporation · filed 2011-03-02

Nothing in the FDCPA requires that a foreclosure sale be halted if a debtor does not seek verification of or otherwise dispute the debt.

Section 1692(e) applies to collection conduct even when the consumer no longer has a currently collectible debt; the relevant inquiry is whether the debt collector's conduct violated the Act while attempting to collect an alleged debt.

Fedotov v. Peter T. Roach and Associates, PC · filed 2005-02-03(e)

By focusing on whether or not plaintiff currently has actual debt, defendant betrays a significant misunderstanding of the FDCPA and the protections it provides. Whether a valid debt actually exists — either at the time a FDCPA action is filed or even at the time the allegedly offending collection practice is employed — is irrelevant to identifying a violation of the Act. Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether the conduct employed by a debt collector contravenes the FD CPA’s mandates.

The FDCPA applies to foreclosure complaints, and presenting not-yet-incurred fees as presently due may violate its prohibitions on false debt representations and unauthorized charges.

Kaymark v. Bank of America NA · filed 2015-04-07(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f)(1)

Thus, pursuant to McLaughlin, the Foreclosure Complaint conceivably misrepresented the amount of the debt owed, forming a basis for violations of § 1692e(2)(A) and (10). By extension, it follows that Kaymark has sufficiently alleged that Udren’s attempt to collect those misrepresented fees was not “expressly authorized” by the mortgage contract or permitted by law. §1692f(1).

The FDCPA's provisions governing communications, false representations, and unfair collection practices require conduct connected to collecting a debt; enforcing a mortgage lien that survives bankruptcy is not debt collection, and § 1692f(1) is violated only by collecting an amount unauthorized by the agreement or law.

LaCourse v. Ocwen Loan Servicing · filed 2015-04-07(c)(a)(2), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (e)(11), (f)(1)

Because plaintiffs’ mortgage was not a debt, see Worrall, 2013 WL 6095119, at *6; In re Collins, 474 B.R. at 320, Ocwen’s December letter, which was all about describing Ocwen’s procedure for helping plaintiff find solutions for their mortgage questions, was not a communication “in connection with the collection of [a] debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). ... As the court has already explained, enforcing a lien on a mortgaged property that survives a bankruptcy discharge is not an attempt to collect a debt. ... Absent an attempt to collect an unauthorized debt, there can be no violation of § 1692f(1), which entitles both defendants to dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim under that statute.

The FDCPA does not treat non-judicial mortgage foreclosure, when conducted to enforce a security interest rather than collect a debt, as debt-collection activity subject to its provisions.

Beadle v. Haughey, et al. · filed 2005-02-09(a)(6)

Because defendants were executing a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding rather than collecting a debt, their activities are not subject to the FDCPA provisions plaintiffs invoke. Thus, there is no need to consider defendants' second and third defenses, i.e., that they complied with the FDCPA and that they were entitled to § 1692k(c) protection.

Section 1692(e) restricts debt collectors from making false or misleading representations or using unfair collection methods, but the FDCPA does not provide relief for foreclosure activity that is not debt collection.

Bittinger v. Wells Fargo Bank NA · filed 2010-10-08(e)

The FDCPA claims against the AHMSI Defendants based on the foreclosure fail as a matter of law. ... “The activity of foreclosing on a property pursuant to a deed of trust is not the collection of debt within the meaning of the FDCPA.” ... Applied to the current facts, neither Wells Fargo as trustee for the certificate holders of the Soundview Home Loan Trust (which, as Bittinger acknowledges, does not make Wells Fargo or AHMSI either the trustee or substitute trustee of the loan at issue), or AHMSI as the loan servicer can be liable under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) does not treat a foreclosure-sale notice required by state law, standing alone, as debt-collection activity under the FDCPA.

Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2012-12-13(a)(6)

The Pfeifers have alleged that Recon sent a notice of the pending foreclosure sale, but this allegation is insufficient to show that Recon engaged in debt collection activities bringing it under the ambit of the FDCPA. We agree with those courts that have held that giving notice of a foreclosure sale to a consumer as required by the Civil Code does not constitute debt collection activity under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA treats mortgage foreclosure as debt collection, and lawyers who meet the general definition of a debt collector must comply with the Act when engaged in mortgage foreclosure.

Glazer v. Chase Home Finance, LLC · filed 2013-01-14

For these reasons, we hold that mortgage foreclosure is debt collection under the Act. Lawyers who meet the general definition of a “debt collector” must comply with the FDCPA when engaged in mortgage foreclosure.

Section 1692f(6)(A) covers trustees conducting nonjudicial foreclosures and bars taking or threatening that action when the actor lacks a present right to possess the collateral.

Burnett v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. · filed 2013-02-01(f)(6)(A), (e), and (g)

By its terms, § 1692f(6)(A) applies to trustees performing nonjudicial foreclosures. ... Because he thereby had a present right to possession of the property, Mr. Woodall did not violate § 1692f(6)(A) of the FDCPA by initiating nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.

Section 1692 does not support an FDCPA claim based on foreclosure proceedings because foreclosure is not an attempt to collect a debt.

Cheung v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-09-25

As no set of facts would allow plaintiffs to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA based on foreclosure proceedings, their claim is dismissed without leave to amend.

Section 1692e requires a plausible FDCPA claim to allege a debt collector and conduct related to debt collection, while § 1692f(6) treats mortgage foreclosure as enforcement of a security interest rather than debt collection activity generally.

Tonea v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2014-03-18(e), (f)(6)

“[T]o state a plausible FDCPA claim under § 1692e, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, (1) that the defendant is a ‘debt collector’ and (2) that the challenged conduct is related to debt collection.” ... Furthermore, it is well established that a mortgage foreclosure action is not debt collection activity under the FDCPA, but instead, is considered “enforcement of a security interest” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).

The FDCPA does not treat foreclosure of a security interest as debt-collection activity under the provisions at issue, and a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant is a debt collector engaged in prohibited debt-collection conduct.

Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase National Corporate Services, Inc. · filed 2014-10-30

Because foreclosing on a security interest is not debt collection activity under the provisions of the FDCPA at issue here, this conduct is insufficient to support the Beepots” claim.

Section 1692a(6) covers a debt collector’s mortgage-foreclosure activity as debt collection even when the foreclosure action does not seek a money judgment or deficiency judgment.

Bieber v. J. Peterman Legal Group Ltd. · filed 2015-05-15(a)(6)

Thus, I conclude that despite the fact that defendant did not seek a money judgment against plaintiff, the foreclosure action still constituted debt collection under the FDCPA. Because defendant concedes that it meets the general statutory definition of “debt collector” and the foreclosure actions constitutes “debt collection,” plaintiffs complaint has adequately pled these two elements.

The FDCPA applies to attorneys collecting condominium-association fees; on these facts, the demand letter complied with § 1692g and foreclosure to collect a partially time-barred debt did not establish liability under §§ 1692e or 1692f.

Mahmoud v. De Moss Owners Assn, Inc. · filed 2017-07-28(e), (f), (g)

The FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., imposes civil liability on “debt collector[s]” for certain prohibited debt collection practices. The Act regulates interactions between consumer debtors and “debt collector[s],” defined to include any person who “regularly collects . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” §§ 1692a(5),(6). Attorneys qualify as debt collectors for purposes of the FDCPA when they regularly engage in consumer debt collection, including but not limited to litigation on behalf of a creditor client. ... The district court did not err in determining that the notice did not violate § 1692g. ... We do not hold that nonjudicial real property foreclosures in Texas are wholly exempt from the FDCPA; under the facts of this case, however, summary judgment was properly granted on Appellants’ §§ 1692e and f claims based on the contention that part of the debts they owed were time-barred.

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f(1) prohibit specified abusive, deceptive, and unauthorized debt-collection conduct, while § 1692g(b) requires verification after a consumer's timely written dispute.

Garner v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2019-09-10(b), (d), (e), (f)(1)

As the magistrate judge noted, Garner has not alleged or presented evidence that she sent a timely notice to SPS that would trigger § 1692g’s requirement. ... Even assuming Garner sent a timely request that would trigger an obligation for SPS to verify the debts, Garner failed to produce evidence that these verifications did not fulfill SPS’s obligations under §1692g(b). ... Nonetheless considering the merits of Garner’s claim, the magistrate judge found that the newly alleged violation of § 1692d failed because SPS’s foreclosure by advertisement did not violate § 1692d’s prohibition on advertising the sale of a debt to coerce payments. ... The magistrate judge’s finding to which Garner objects is that Garner failed to identify any false, deceptive, or misleading representations, meaning that summary judgment is appropriate for SPS on the § 1692e claim. ... If this claim were true, SPS’s attempt to collect would violate §1692f’s prohibition on collecting a debt that is not authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). But this claim is not true, nor is the question of its truth before the Court.

The FDCPA applies to debt-collection litigation activities, including testimonial documents filed by a debt collector, and state-law witness or litigation privileges do not bar liability under the Act.

Blevins v. Hudson & Keyse, Inc. · filed 2004-09-29(e)

The FDCPA, as noted above, is a broad remedial statute, regulating conduct far broader than that which might lead to liability for defamation or similar common law torts. Congress clearly intended to regulate the “process” of debt collection, and nothing in the statute exempts testimonial documents filed by a debt collector. Moreover, recognition of an absolute witness immunity as defendant urges would be contrary to the statutory purpose of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA applies to attorneys’ debt-collection litigation activities and does not exempt them from liability under state-law litigation or attorney-immunity doctrines.

Blevins v. Hudson & Keyse, Inc. · filed 2004-09-29(e)

The Court concludes, that the Attorney Defendants are not immune from Plaintiffs FDCPA complaint under the state law litigation privilege or attorney immunity doctrines.

The FDCPA's protections are not defeated by common-law immunity or privilege for lawyers' litigation activities.

Gallagher v. Gurstel, Staloch & Chargo, P.A. · filed 2009-07-29

The Court therefore concludes that Gallagher’s FDCPA claims are not barred by any common-law immunity or common-law privilege applicable to lawyers’ litigation activities.

Conduct specifically prohibited by the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is not shielded by the litigation privilege when asserted through an unfair competition law claim.

The People v. Persolve, LLC · filed 2013-08-15

Conduct specifically prohibited by the Federal Act would also be negated by the litigation privilege.

Section 1692k(b)(1) requires courts setting statutory damages to consider the debt collector’s frequency and persistence of noncompliance, the nature of the noncompliance, and whether it was intentional.

Mann v. Acclaim Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2004-11-10(b)(1)

The FDCPA sets out a number of factors to be considered by the Court in determining the amount of statutory damages, including “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(l).

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits additional damages of up to $1,000 against each liable debt collector, so multiple defendants may each be liable for up to $1,000.

Overcash v. United Abstract Group, Inc. · filed 2008-03-10(a)(2)(A)

By its terms, however, the statute does not impose such a limitation. The statute provides, in part, that “any debt collector ... is liable” for additional damages not to exceed $1,000. ... In other words, the limitation that the statute imposes is cast not in terms of the plaintiffs recovery, but in terms of the defendant’s liability. Thus, in the case of multiple defendants, each may be liable for additional damages of up to $1,000. ... As a corollary to this, United Abstract and American Credit are not jointly and severally liable for the full $2,000 in additional damages that the court imposes; rather, each is individually hable for $1,000 in additional damages.

Section 1692k caps statutory damages at $1,000 per action, so multiple FDCPA violations arising from calls that must be joined do not each yield a separate $1,000 award.

Beeders v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau · filed 2009-06-30(k)

Recovery of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k is limited by the language of the statute to $1,000.00 per action. ... As Plaintiffs claims are to be joined in a single action, Plaintiff is eligible for no more than $1,000.00 dollars in statutory damages under § 1692k of the FDCPA.

Section 1692k permits a plaintiff to recover provable actual damages plus up to $1,000 in additional statutory damages.

Shepherd v. LAW OFFICES OF COHEN & SLAMOWITZ, LLP · filed 2009-10-29(k)

But $1,000 is not the maximum amount of relief available to Mrs. Shepherd (or to any plaintiff) under FDCPA. A plaintiff in such an action is entitled to any actual damages she can prove, plus up to $1,000 in “additional” damages. “Additional” means over and above actual damages, which are separately recoverable.

Section 1692k permits an individual plaintiff to recover additional damages up to $1,000, with the award set in light of the debt collector's noncompliance.

Versteeg v. Bennett, DeLoney & Noyes, P.C · filed 2011-04-20(k)(a)(2)(A)

Having prevailed on her FDCPA claims, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 provides: ... (2) (A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; ... The Court finds that the illegal conduct of BD & N was pervasive and that Plaintiff received several illegal calls from BD & N, therefore the Court will award Plaintiff the maximum statutory damages of $1,000.00.

Section 1692k(a) permits a consumer to recover statutory damages for an FDCPA violation even if the consumer suffered no actual damages.

Salvati v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., N.A. · filed 2014-07-29(k)(a)

However, the District Court’s conclusion was error because it ignored the fact that, under the FDCPA, a plaintiff may collect statutory damages even if he has suffered no actual damages.

Section 1692k caps an individual plaintiff's statutory damages at $1,000 per suit, while the frequency and persistence of noncompliance help determine the amount awarded.

Horia v. Nationwide Credit and Collection, Inc. · filed 2018-07-31(k)(a)(2)(A)

This conclusion is consistent with the FDCPA’s provision concerning damages, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), under which an individual plaintiff is entitled to a maximum of $1,000 in statutory damages per suit regardless of whether a debt collector committed just one violation or multiple violations. See Smith v. Greystone All., LLC, 772 F.3d 448, 449 (7th Cir. 2014). To determine the appropriate amount of statutory damages, a court must consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). Hence, Nationwide’s noncompliance with the FDCPA regarding Horia’s debt in the present case would have been a relevant factor to consider in awarding statutory damages in Horia I. But Nationwide’s failure to report a second account as disputed would not have altered the statutory damages cap. Allowing the present suit to proceed would undermine the FDCPA’s provision limiting statutory damages.

Section 1692k(b)(1) directs courts to consider the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of a debt collector’s noncompliance when determining statutory damages.

Flores v. Cred X Debt Recovery, LLC · filed 2019-10-03(k)(b)(1)

In calculating an appropriate award of statutory damages, the district court considers relevant factors such as the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of noncompliance by the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). ... The Court finds that a damages award of $1,000 is not warranted by the facts of this case. ... In light of the circumstances—three non-threatening voicemails—$250 is an appropriate amount of damages.

Section 1692k(b) requires courts awarding FDCPA statutory damages to consider the debt collector's violations' frequency and persistence, nature, and intentionality.

Poskovic v. D2 Management, LLC · filed 2019-12-11(b)

When awarding statutory damages, the court must consider, among other relevant factors, (1) the frequency and persistence of the debt collector’s FDCPA noncompliance, (2) the nature of the noncompliance, and (3) whether the noncompliance was intentional. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b). ... Because the complaint alleges several intentional FDCPA violations—which must be taken as true—the Court finds it is appropriate to award the full $1,000 in statutory damages.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits up to $1,000 in statutory damages for an FDCPA violation, and § 1692k(b)(1) directs courts to consider the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of the noncompliance.

Burr, Mathew v. McNeil and Myers Receivables Management Group, LLC · filed 2020-11-30(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1)

As for the statutory damages award, in addition to actual damages, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) contemplates an award of statutory damages against a debt collector violating any provision of the FDCPA in an amount not exceeding $1,000. ... The court finds the reduced request reasonable and will award plaintiff $500 in statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).

Section 1692k(a)(1) limits additional statutory damages to $1,000 per action, not per violation.

Branum v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2022-08-04(a)(1)

Critically, the FDCPA allows for statutory damages of up to $1,000, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for a successful claim. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). Those statutory damages are limited to $1,000 per action, not per violation.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to recover up to $1,000 in statutory damages.

Penning v. Liberty Legal Group Inc. · filed 2023-05-08(a)(2)(A)

The former permits statutory damages of $1,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).

In California state courts, the FDCPA permits consumers to seek statutory damages without proving concrete harm.

Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions · filed 2025-05-21(k)(a)

Under the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Spokeo and TransUnion, even though Congress intended to permit consumers to seek statutory damages under the FDCPA absent actual damages, Guracar would not have standing to bring FDCPA claims in federal court unless he suffered a concrete harm under Article III. ... However, as noted above, California courts are not bound by the restrictions that Article III imposes on the federal judiciary. ... As the Rosenthal Act incorporates portions of the FDCPA (Civ. Code, § 1788.17) and states that its remedies are “cumulative” and “in addition to any . . . remedies under any other provision of law” (id., § 1788.32), we infer that the Legislature intended to honor Congress’ intent and to allow consumers to bring claims directly under the FDCPA in California courts absent concrete harm.

Sections 1692e and 1692f apply to a creditor attorney's statements and pleadings in debt-collection litigation, but unsuccessful pleadings or immaterial technical errors alone do not violate them.

Penn v. Cumberland · filed 2012-07-25(e), (f)

There is of course no doubt in this circuit that a creditor’s attorney’s statements and pleadings in debt-collection litigation are subject to the FDCPA, even when the consumer is represented by an attorney. ... But, as this case demonstrates, it is equally clear that the filings and pleadings of a creditor’s attorney cannot be said to run afoul of the FDCPA merely because they are unsuccessful or contain immaterial technical errors.

The FDCPA applies to debt-collection litigation, including the filing of a collection complaint, when the conduct violates the Act.

Delawder v. Platinum Financial Services Corp. · filed 2005-03-01

Consequently, Defendants can be held liable for all litigation conduct, including the filing of the Ironton complaint, if that conduct violates the FDCPA.

The FDCPA's private-attorney-general enforcement mechanism supports maintaining class treatment even when individual class-member recoveries are minimal, because deterrence is a remedial purpose of the Act.

Wise v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC · filed 2012-02-06

... I note further that the contrary conclusion—decertifying the FDCPA class because of minimal recoveries by members—would emasculate the office of private attorney general occupied by plaintiffs such as this one.

Section 1692(e)’s purposes favor class actions where appropriate to protect more consumers from abusive debt collection practices.

Santoro v. Aargon Agency, Inc. · filed 2008-10-14(e)

Given the broad and express purposes of the Act — to protect consumers and to eliminate abusive collection practices so completely as to eliminate any business advantage such practices may bestow — courts should favor use of the Act as a means to protect more, rather than fewer, affected consumers. Where appropriate, a class action seems therefore more suited than individual actions to effectuate the purposes of the Act.

The FDCPA bars a debt collector from using a business name other than its true name and gives courts discretion to award up to $1,000 in additional damages based on the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of noncompliance.

Lester E. Cox Medical Center v. Huntsman · filed 2005-06-01(e)(14), (k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)(1)

Section 1692e outlines sixteen types of conduct that violate the Act. Relevant to this case, § 1692e(14) provides that a debt collector violates the FDCPA when it uses "any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector's business, company, or organization." ... The Act grants discretion to the district court in assessing statutory damages. ... In assessing statutory damages, a district court considers: (1) the frequency and persistence of non-compliance; (2) the nature of such non-compliance; (3) the extent to which the non-compliance was intentional. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1).

Section 1692e(14) prohibits a debt collector from using a name other than its actual corporate or legally used trade name when the use is false, deceptive, or misleading.

Mahan v. RETRIEVAL-MASTERS CREDIT BUREAU, INC. · filed 2011-04-13(14)

Given these undisputed factual parameters, the Court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff has not pleaded a cognizable claim for violation of § 1692e(14).

Section 1692a(6) treats a creditor as a debt collector when it collects its own debts under another name suggesting that a third party is collecting them, including a pseudonym or alias.

Carlson v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center · filed 2005-07-11(a)(6)

There is one situation specifically recognized by the FDCPA when a creditor will be deemed a debt collector and therefore subject to the strictures of the Act. That situation exists when the creditor attempts to collect its own debts by using “any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The imposition of liability in this case recognizes the fact that when a creditor uses a name other than his own, the motivation to protect the good will in his own name is absent and the likelihood for abusive debt collections practices returns. Thus, a creditor may be found liable under section 1692(a)(6) if, in the course of collecting its own debts, it “pretends to be someone else” or “uses a pseudonym or alias.”

Section 1692n does not preempt a state debt-collection law that is not inconsistent with the FDCPA, including a law that affords consumers greater protection.

Pirouzian v. SLM Corp. · filed 2005-08-30(n)

The FDCPA provides that it does not preempt state law unless the federal law and state law are inconsistent. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n. ... However, the CFDCPA’s more inclusive definition of “debt collector” is not “inconsistent with” the FDCPA. By enlarging the pool of entities who can be sued, the CFDCPA merely affords a separate state remedy, which grants protection beyond what is provided by the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not make innocuous state-court procedural errors that are not unconscionable a basis for a debt-collection claim.

Anglin v. Merchants Credit Corporation · filed 2020-07-15

Generally, such procedural mishaps in state court cannot be the basis for a FDCPA claim. ... The Court concludes that Defendants’ procedural error was innocuous and, certainly not “unconscionable” in either the legal or lay sense, and as such, cannot be the basis for a FDCPA claim. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed.

Section 1692(n) preserves state debt-collection laws that are consistent with the FDCPA, including laws that provide consumers greater protection.

White v. NewRez, LLC · filed 2020-08-17(n)

Here, federal law does not preempt state law, as the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides that it “does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to [the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of [the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act].” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n. A state law is consistent with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act “if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by [the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act].” Id. Maryland’s Consumer Debt Collection Act is, in fact, distinct from the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in significant ways. For example, the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act provides greater protections in its extension of the statute of limitations from one year under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to three years, in addition to its application to all creditors and not just debt collectors. See Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 14-201, et seq. On the other hand, as this Court has previously noted in Akalwadi v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc., 336 F. Supp 2d 492, 511 (D. Md. 2004), the FDCA is a strict liability statute where the Maryland statute is not. Accordingly, Maryland’s state law is not preempted by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.