15 U.S.C. § 1692

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits up to $1,000 in statutory damages without proof of actual damages, and § 1692k(a)(3) requires reasonable attorney fees and authorizes costs for a prevailing party.

Britton v. Mountain Run Solutions, LLC · filed 2022-08-30(k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(a)(3)

The FDCPA allows a court to award up to $1,000.00 in statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). The FDCPA does not require proof of actual damages as a precursor to the recovery of statutory damages. ... The FDCPA mandates the award of “reasonable” attorney fees to a prevailing party. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Lee v. Thomas & Thomas, 109 F.3d 302, 307 (6th Cir. 1997). ... The FDCPA authorizes an award of costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits up to $1,000 in additional damages in an individual action, and § 1692k(b) directs courts to consider the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of the debt collector's noncompliance.

Humphrey v. Creditors Solution, Inc. · filed 2022-12-07(k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)

These allegations, and the record before this Court, lead to a conclusion that Defendants’ repeated contact of Plaintiff, including through mail, e-mail, and telephone, despite Plaintiff informing Defendants of his bankruptcy proceedings, represents recurring intentional noncompliance with the FDCPA. Therefore, the Court will award Plaintiff the statutory maximum $1,000 in damages.?

Section 1692k allows a successful FDCPA plaintiff to recover actual damages, up to $1,000 in statutory damages per lawsuit, and costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee, with the statutory award assessed using the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of the noncompliance.

Espinosa Sr. v. Metcalf · filed 2023-06-23(k)(a)(1)-(3), (k)(b)(1)

If a plaintiff is successful in establishing a claim under the FDCPA, the defendant is liable for actual damages sustained by the plaintiff “as a result of such failure [to comply with FDCPA]”, statutory damages (i.e., “such additional damages as the [C]ourt may allow, but not exceeding $1,000”), and “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the [C]ourt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)-(3). ... “Statutory damages under the FDCPA are limited to $1,000 per lawsuit, not $1,000 per violation.”

Sections 1692d and 1692d(5) require evidence of harassment or an intent to harass, while §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e can reach the use of local-area-code numbers that may conceal a collector’s identity or mislead consumers.

Leavell v. MRS BPO, LLC. · filed 2022-09-09(d), (d)(5), (d)(6), (e)

It is true, as defendant says, that the use of local area codes to call consumers or third parties is not expressly prohibited by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, but that does not mean that such conduct does not violate the statute. ... Two disconnected but completed calls over the course of few weeks, without more, are not evidence of intentional harassment. ... Because plaintiff has raised at least a genuine dispute that the use of local area codes is a violation of under § 1692d(6), defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on Count VI, and defendant’s cross-motion on Count VI is denied. ... Plaintiff raises at least a genuine dispute that defendant’s use of local area codes is a means of contacting consumers which is false, deceptive, or misleading. ... Therefore, defendant’s motion on this count must be denied. Given the number of cases that have gone the other way, and the persuasiveness of their reasoning, plaintiff’s motion must similarly be denied on this count.

Section 1692g permits a debt-collection letter to offer compromise payments alongside a clear validation notice when it does not demand payment before the 30-day dispute period, while Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10) do not make alternative offers misleading when their payment amounts and savings disclose different discounts.

SHOULARS v. HALSTED FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC · filed 2022-09-12(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (g)(a)(3)–(5), (g)(b)

The Validation Notice is not overshadowed, nor is it contradicted by inconsistent statements in the October 15 Letter. First, the Validation Notice is printed on the front page, in the same font and size as the remainder of the letter. ... It also contains all language required under Section 1692g(a)(3)–(5). ... Second, although Plaintiff seemingly argues that the period in which she could accept a compromise offer interfered with the 30-day dispute period, she clearly and unambiguously had the option to request validation and dispute the debt for thirty days. ... The Letter does not demand payment, threaten legal recourse, or emphasize any of Plaintiff’s options over the others. ... Thus, because the Letter does not suggest that Plaintiff had to pay her debt prior to the thirty-day dispute period and relinquish her validation rights, her claim pursuant to Section 1692g necessarily fails. ... At most, the difference between mailing payment by December 1 and a debt collector’s receipt of payment by December 1 is negligible—a mere few days. ... The only way one could make a payment is via electronic means, eliminating the need to use a postal courier. Thus, even the least sophisticated debtor could not be misled into making a payment too late given these exclusive electronic payment options. ... Critically, the least sophisticated consumer cannot be misled because the second compromise offer is presented as an alternative to the first. ... Moreover, the Letter includes different payment totals and savings under each option, which mathematically reflect 40% off and 20% off, respectively. ... The alternative language, coupled with different payment totals and savings, would not deceive the least sophisticated debtor to believe that the alternative option provides a 40% savings.

Under §§ 1692e and 1692g, payment options expiring after the 30-day dispute period do not necessarily overshadow validation rights, but inconsistent balance figures may mislead the least sophisticated debtor about the debt’s amount.

O'NEILL v. RADIUS GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2022-09-27(e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (g)(a), (g)(a)(1), (g)(a)(4), (g)(a)(5), (g)(b)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the August 3 Letter does not overshadow or contradict the Validation Notice in violation of 1692g. Thus, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim premised on Sections 1692g(a)(4), (5), and 1692g(b) is dismissed. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim for alleged violations of Section 1692e and 1692e(10) are dismissed. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff adequately alleges an FDCPA claim for alleged violations of Sections 1692g(a)(1) and 1692e(2)(A).

Sections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) prohibit deceptive debt-collection representations, including omitting that partial payment of a time-barred debt may restart the statute of limitations; section 1692g requires the validation notice to communicate the consumer's dispute rights clearly.

Heppinstall v. Resurgent Capital Services L.P. · filed 2024-07-01(e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (g)

While plaintiff must acknowledge the debt to re-start the statute of limitation, paying on the debt is in itself an acknowledgement of it. A factfinder may find that the Letter is deceptive because it failed to inform plaintiff that parti payment would re-start the statute of limitations. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the defendants is inappropriate. ... Accordingly, the court finds the defendants’ argument unconvincing. A factfinder may find that the Letter is deceptive and the validation notification with regard to the debtor’s full rights under the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collecting a disputed debt until it is validated and a validation letter is sent, while Section 1692e reaches contradictory statements about which entity services a loan.

Bordonaro v. FCI Lender Services, Inc. · filed 2025-09-28(e), (g)(b)

Here, Bordonaro’s Section 1692g claims directly implicate the validity of the debt that was the subject of the foreclosure judgment and are therefore barred by res judicata. The Amended Complaint indicates that the first cause of action is brought under Section 1692g(a), which requires a “debt collector” to provide certain information within five days of sending an “initial communication” to a consumer if that communication does not include the statutorily required information. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a); Am. Compl. ¶ 22. However, the Amended Complaint pleads facts pertaining to Section 1692g(b), which requires a debt collector to send a “verification” of a debt when the consumer timely disputes the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–18, 22. I therefore construe the Amended Complaint to allege a violation of Section 1692g(b). ... Section 1692g(b) provides procedures by which a debt collector must “cease collection of [a] debt” until it is validated and the debt collector sends a validation letter. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). By “issuing a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, the state court has already determined that the debt is valid.” (R&R at 22.) Thus, even though the Section 1692g claims are pled as procedural violations of the FDCPA’s disclosure requirements, they boil down to the claim that Defendants acted “improperly in connection with the . . . validity . . . of the underlying mortgage.” George, 2017 WL 3316065, at *7; see also Tanasi, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 257. The Section 1692g claims therefore “arise[] out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the adjudicated claim” and are barred by res judicata, even though they are based on a different theory and seek a different remedy. Beijing Neu Cloud, 110 F.4th at 114. ... Awarding damages for such a violation, does not implicate the validity of the mortgage or whether the plaintiff in fact defaulted. Such a claim is akin to the claim in Tanasi challenging a mortgage servicer’s negligent failure to provide a single point of contact to the plaintiff. See 257 F. Supp. 3d at 260. ... I also adopt the R&R’s recommendation that the Amended Complaint states a plausible Section 1692e claim only with respect to AMIP’s alleged contradictory statements regarding which entity was servicing the loan.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, while § 1692g generally requires debt collectors to provide debt information and cease collection after a dispute until the debt's validity is confirmed.

Lockett · filed 2025-11-12(e), (g)

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making false, deceptive, or misleading representations with respect to their debt collection efforts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. As Judge Grand explained, to proceed under this statute, “(1) plaintiff must be a ‘consumer’ as defined by the Act; (2) the ‘debt’ must arise out of transactions which are ‘primarily for personal, family or household purposes;’ (3) defendant must be a ‘debt collector’ as defined by the Act; and (4) defendant must have violated § 1692e’s prohibitions.” ... As Judge Grand recognized, the complaint does not offer any explanation as to many of these elements and certainly not as to each of the fourteen defendants, or any of them for that matter. ... The complaint also invokes section 1692g of the statute, which generally requires debt collectors to furnish debtors with information about putative debts and cease collection efforts if the debtor disputes the debt until the debt collector confirms its validity. ... Again, however, the complaint does not include sufficient detail about any specific debt or debt collector to suggest a plausible violation. Judge Grand appropriately suggested that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under either of these statutes, and the objections do not alter the Court’s similar conclusion.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means to collect a debt, and a plaintiff must identify the violated subsection and the misleading representation or means to state a claim; section 1692g requires factual allegations supporting the claimed violation.

Anglo · filed 2025-12-05(e), (g)

In Count 1 of his amended complaint, Anglo alleges violations of the FDCPA, but he does not specify which sections of the Act he believes the defendants have violated. ... To the extent Anglo intended to allege that the defendants violated § 1692g, Anglo has failed to state a claim because he has not alleged any facts supporting a violation of § 1692g in either complaint. ... Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” and lists 16 kinds of action as “a violation of this section.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Anglo does not identify which subsection of § 1692e he believes the defendants violated. Anglo also does not identify which “representation[s] or means” he alleges were “false, deceptive, or misleading.” These deficiencies are fatal to his § 1692e claim.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to verify a debt only after a consumer disputes it in writing within thirty days of notice, while § 1692e prohibits false, misleading, or deceptive representations in debt collection.

Baines · filed 2026-03-19(e), (g)(b)

Verification of a debt is required where a consumer disputes the validity of the debt in writing within thirty days of being notified of the debt. See § 1692g(a)(3)-(4). Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant communicated with her about a debt or that she disputed the debt in writing within the time required. See Senfile v. Landau, 390 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (D. Md. 2005) (failure by consumer to act within thirty-day period waives right to dispute the debt, and thus no duty to validate debt arose). ... Finally, plaintiff has not identified any alleged inaccurate or misleading statements by defendant, and her § 1692e claim is properly dismissed.

The FDCPA’s debt-collection protections do not apply to foreclosure-related possession efforts when no outstanding debt is plausibly alleged and the property owner has a present right to possession.

GORE v. WEST COAST SERVICING, INC. · filed 2022-10-04(a)(5), (a)(6), (d), (f)(6)

A debt collector is “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). “For the purpose of [15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)], [the] term [debt collector] also includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” (Id.) Gore’s allegations are not enough to show ATP was a debt collector under either definition because he fails to adequately allege the existence of a debt. ... It follows that Gore’s allegations are not sufficient to state a claim under section 1692d, which provides that “a debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. ... Section 1692f(6) bars “debt collectors” from ... Id. § 1692f. Because Gore concedes West Coast had a present right to possession of the property at the time of ATP’s alleged conduct, he has not plausibly alleged the Property was “exempt by law” from dispossession.

The FDCPA covers attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, including litigation, and potential claims based on litigation conduct require a case-by-case analysis.

Elliott v. Roberts · filed 2022-10-25(a)(6), (c)(b), (d), (f)

The Act applies to “‘attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation.’” Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995)). ... FDCPA cases involving a lawyer’s representations in the course of litigation require a case-by-case analysis. Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814, 819 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We conclude that the diverse situations in which potential FDCPA claims may arise during the course of litigation, and the Supreme Court’s caution in Heintz that careful crafting may be required in applying the statute’s prohibitions to attorneys engaged in litigation, counsel against anything other than a case-by-case approach.”). ... Construing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint liberally, considering Plaintiff’s Response to the court’s show-cause Order, and holding Plaintiff to “a lesser pleading standard than other parties,” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), I conclude that Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA may proceed to service of process.

The FDCPA protects consumers from abusive debt-collection practices that confuse the least sophisticated debtor or frustrate the debtor’s ability to respond intelligently to a debt collector’s communication.

Ward v. LVNV Funding LLC · filed 2023-11-01(e)

The FDCPA is clearly concerned with preventing debt collection practices that confuse the least sophisticated debtor and frustrate the debtor's ability to intelligently respond to a debt collector's communication. However, here, the absence of a case number on the initial Summons and Complaint is unlikely to confuse even the least sophisticated debtor. Outside of the case number, the Summons and Complaint properly notified plaintiff that a lawsuit had been filed against her and that she had thirty (30) days to make an appearance. Indeed, plaintiff did not rely on the missing case number to assume that no lawsuit had been filed, or even allege that it prevented plaintiff from responding in a meaningful way. Rather, plaintiff, without the case number, was able to retain an attorney and file this FDCPA lawsuit, demonstrating her ability to understand JM's communications and properly respond. Although the FDCPA protects against an individual's concrete interest in being free from abusive debt collection practices, the omission of a case number—a seemingly unintentional omission—does not fall under the kinds of abusive practices Congress sought to protect against when passing the FDCPA.

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f can apply when a debt collector knowingly directs service of process to a debtor's wrong address to obtain a default judgment.

Downs v. Robinson Hoover & Fudge PLLC · filed 2024-09-30

Here, the Complaint states sufficient facts to plausibly establish that RHF violated the FDCPA by knowingly causing its process server to serve Downs at the wrong address.

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA protects consumers from abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt-collection practices and requires a consumer, a debt, a debt collector, and a statutory violation for an FDCPA claim.

Burns v. LVNV Funding LLC · filed 2024-10-18

The purpose of the FDCPA is to protect consumers from abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. To prevail on a FDCPA claim, the Plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of the statute; (2) there is a “debt” within the meaning of the statute; (3) the defendant is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the statute; and (4) the defendant committed some act or omission in violation of the FDCPA.

A person who acquires a debt that was not in default is excluded from the FDCPA’s debt-collector definition, but a loan servicer may qualify as a debt collector if it treats the debt as in default when acquired.

Cardin v. NewRez LLC · filed 2022-10-28(a)(6)(F)(iii)

However, the statute excludes from the definition of “debt collector” any person who acquires a debt “which was not in default when it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). “In other words, the [FDCPA] treats assignees as debt collectors if the debt sought to be collected was in default when acquired by the assignee, and as creditors if it was not.” ... Further, the Seventh Circuit and other federal appellate courts have held that a person may be considered a debt collector even when acquiring a non-defaulted debt if he treats the debt as being in default at the time of acquisition. Schlosser, 323 F.3d at 539 (holding the exclusion does not apply and defendant is a debt collector “because [defendant] attempted to collect on a debt that it asserted to be in default”); see Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 360 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A] loan servicer will become a debt collector under § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) if the debt was in default or treated as such when it was acquired[.]”). ... But at the motion to dismiss stage and based on Cardin’s allegations, the Court finds the complaint sufficiently states a claim pursuant to the FDCPA.

Sections 1692c(a), 1692j(a), and 1692e(14) respectively limit certain debt-collection communications, prohibit forms creating a false belief about a third party’s participation, and bar use of a business name other than the collector’s true name.

Blue v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2022-11-02(c)(a), (j)(a), and (e)(14)

Section 1692c(a) provides that Plaintiff’s consent to communicate about a debt (or the court’s permission) is required under three scenarios: (1) if the collection is “at any unusual time or place or a time or place known to be inconvenient to the consumer”; (2) if Defendant knows Plaintiff is represented by counsel; or (3) at Plaintiff’s place of employment if Defendant knows the employer prohibits “the consumer from receiving such communication.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a). ... Plaintiff’s complaint contains no facts suggesting any of the above circumstances applies. ... Section 1692j(a) provides that it is unlawful to furnish “any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor ... is participating in a collection of ... a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692j(a). ... Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that Defendant is “not participating in the collection of ... a debt.” ... Section 1692e(14) prohibits a debt collector from using “any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(14). ... Clearly, Defendant was not using the name “Comenity Capital Bank” as it own name but merely explaining that Comenity Capital Bank previously owned Plaintiffs account.

Sections 1692c(a)(2) and 1692e(2)(A), (5), and (10) require actual knowledge or intentional conduct for liability based on an unknown bankruptcy filing, while §§ 1692g(a)(2)-(4) and 1692e(11) are satisfied by a clear notice naming the creditor, explaining the thirty-day dispute and verification rights, and identifying the communication as an effort to collect a debt.

Hernandez-Carrasquillo v. CICA Collection Agency, Inc. · filed 2022-11-16(c)(a)(2), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (e)(11), (g)(a)(2), (g)(a)(3), (g)(a)(4)

A debt collector’s unknowing violation of an automatic stay does not transform an otherwise accurate collection letter into a ‘false representation’ within the meaning of § 1692e”; on the other hand, a “false representation” under § 1692e(2)(A) requires that the misrepresentation be intentional.” ... There cannot be liability by Defendant who did not know of the bankruptcy proceeding, a fact which has been made clear by the filings in the bankruptcy court. ... Even the “least sophisticated consumer” could discern that Claro is the creditor, and that Plaintiff, who had an account with Claro, owed $872.60 to that entity. ... Any layperson, even unsophisticated, can understand what it means to object or present an objection to a debt, which is what the letter specifically called for. ... This language is clear and Plaintiff has failed to cite any case that has found the particular language in question to be unclear. In fact, this is the exact language that 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) requires. ... That was not the case with CICA’s letter, as it clearly indicated that: (1) it was a collection agency, (2) that it was trying to collect a debt and, (3) that it was going to do everything legally possible for the collection of said debt, and any information obtained was going to be used for that purpose. There was no important information in small print. ... There is no confusion or falsity.

Sections 1692e(11) and 1692g(a) do not treat a debt collector’s response to a consumer’s unprompted contact as an initial communication.

Worley v. Meyrowitz · filed 2023-11-14(e)(11), (g)(a)

Because the April 2 Email from Meyrowitz was a response to Worley’s contact, it does not constitute an “initial communication” for purposes of the FDCPA. As such, Worley has failed to state a claim under either § 1692e(11) or § 1692g(a).

Sections 1692e(11) and 1692g(a) do not treat a debt collector’s response to a consumer’s unprompted contact as an initial communication.

Worley v. Meyrowitz · filed 2023-12-15(e)(11), (g)(a)

Here, Meyrowitz sent the April 2 Email to Worley in response to her unprompted communications first to NYCHA, and then to Meyrowitz, regarding her efforts to resolve her debt. Because the April 2 Email from Meyrowitz was a response to Worley’s contact, it does not constitute an “initial communication” for purposes of the FDCPA. As such, Worley has failed to state a claim under either § 1692e(11) or § 1692g(a).

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating credit information known or that should be known to be false, including failing to say that a disputed debt is disputed.

Thomas v. LVNV Funding LLC · filed 2022-11-21(e)(8)

The FDCPA prohibits the communication of “credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e. When a debt collector receives a dispute letter but communicates information about the debt to a credit reporting agency without noting that the debt is disputed, it violates the statute.

Section 1692b(2) applies only to communications with a person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring the consumer's location information, while section 1692j prohibits furnishing a form designed to create the false belief that someone other than the creditor is participating in debt collection.

Super v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. · filed 2022-11-11(b)(2), (j)

Like his FCRA claim, plaintiff’s FCPA claims under section 1692b(2) and section 1692j cannot get past first base. For one thing, his section 1692b(2) claim fails because plaintiff does not allege in his Amended Complaint that defendant communicated with “any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer . . . [.]” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s allegations focus on what the defendant communicated with him, not what it communicated to anyone else, so his claim under that section fails. ... Said differently, section 1692j makes it unlawful to deceive a debtor into thinking that someone else other than the creditor was participating in collection of the debt. See id.; see also Francheschi v. Mautner-Glick Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining that a plaintiff fails to state a claim under section 1692j when “the complaint itself recognizes that [the debt collector] was participating in the collecting of the debt”).

Section 1692c(c) prohibits a debt collector from communicating further about a debt after a consumer sends written notice refusing to pay or requesting that communications cease, and a single post-notice message can constitute a legally cognizable injury.

Vazzano v. Receivable Management Services, LLC · filed 2022-12-02(c)

Accordingly, the plain text of § 1692c indicates that Congress did elevate the receipt of a single unwanted post-notice message to the status of a legally cognizable injury in the context of this provision.

An FDCPA violation by itself does not establish the concrete harm needed for Article III standing.

Gregg v. SN Servicing Corporation · filed 2023-01-05

Thus, a violation of the FDCPA, standing alone, cannot satisfy the “concrete harm” element of Article III standing.

Section 1692(e) prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means to collect a debt, but alleging a violation alone does not establish Article III standing without a concrete injury.

Graves, Esq v. Foulger-Pratt Companies, LLC · filed 2023-03-30(e)

Graves alleges that this conduct violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), which prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... Accordingly, because an allegation of a mere violation of the FDCPA cannot confer standing upon Graves, she must have suffered a concrete injury beyond the mere statutory violation itself in order to have standing to raise an FDCPA claim. ... Here, Graves fails to plead any factual allegations that she relied on the fraudulent misrepresentations in any way to her detriment. ... Accordingly, Graves has failed to allege a concrete injury for the purposes of Article III standing under the FDCPA. This Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim and dismisses the FDCPA claim without prejudice.

An FDCPA violation alone does not establish Article III standing; the plaintiff must plead concrete harm or an appreciable risk of harm to the concrete interest Congress sought to protect.

Stanger v. Resurgent Capital Services L.P. · filed 2023-05-25

Thus, the Seventh Circuit has observed that "the violation of an FDCPA provision, whether ‘procedural’ or ‘substantive,’ does not necessarily cause an injury in fact." Markakos v. Medicredit, Inc., 997 F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 2021). Instead, a plaintiff "must show that the violation harmed or presented an appreciable risk of harm to the underlying concrete interest that Congress sought to protect." Wadsworth, 12 F.4th at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).

An FDCPA plaintiff alleging nonlicensure or an inaccurately identified creditor must show concrete harm, such as an adverse effect from omitted information, rather than merely a statutory violation.

GACHETT v. JHPDE FINANCE I, LLC · filed 2023-06-30

Without more, Defendants’ non-licensure and failure to identify the current creditor to whom the Debt is owed is exactly the type of “bare procedural violation” that does not confer standing without evidence of concrete harm.

The FDCPA does not by itself create Article III standing for a statutory violation absent a concrete injury, such as reliance or actual damages.

Davis v. Professional Parking Management Corporation · filed 2023-07-14

But our case law is clear that a statutory violation, by itself, does not create an injury. See Hunstein, 48 F.4th at 1245 (“Again -- no standing when the plaintiffs alleged a statutory violation that did not hurt them.”). Moreover, Davis does not provide an analogous traditional harm for these state or federal statutory violations. In fact, we have previously held that “the common law furnishes no analog[ue]” to claims brought under the FDCPA that are nearly identical to the claims Davis brought here.

An alleged violation of the FDCPA, without a resulting concrete harm, does not establish Article III standing.

Crawford v. Lawrence · filed 2024-01-16

Start with the alleged FDCPA violations. A plaintiff cannot “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. So any alleged FDCPA violation does not confer Article III standing unless Crawford can show that another, concrete harm resulted from the statutory violation.

A violation of the FDCPA alone does not create Article III standing; the plaintiff must suffer a concrete harm or appreciable risk of harm to the interest protected by the Act.

Puskarich v. Equian, LLC · filed 2024-05-20

Specific to this case, a violation of the FDCPA, by itself, does not cause an injury in fact.

Section 1692 permits a plaintiff to pursue statutory-damages claims without proving concrete harm in California state court.

Sipin v. Velocity Investments CA6 · filed 2025-12-08

Taken together, Chai and Guracar hold that a plaintiff need not show “concrete harm” to prosecute claims for statutory damages in California state courts under the Debt Buyers Act, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA. ... Because respondents offer no new arguments that would undermine the rationale for these cases, we will reverse the judgment.

Sections 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g do not require a debt collector making an open-ended settlement offer for a specified sum to disclose accruing interest or specify an acceptance deadline when payment of that sum would extinguish the debt.

Felberbaum v. Sequium Asset Solutions, LLC · filed 2023-01-11(e), (e)(2), (e)(10), (f), (g)

The Second Circuit in Cortez did not establish a bright line rule that every settlement offer must include a specific deadline for acceptance. ... Ultimately, the Court reasoned that a settlement offer “need not enumerate” post-deadline interest and fees so long as the offer “clearly and accurately informs a debtor that payment of a specified sum by a specified date will satisfy the debt.” ... Insofar as Defendants’ offer remains open and represents the sum certain owed by Plaintiff to extinguish the debt, Defendants also abide by the requirements of Section 1692g. See Weiss, 2022 WL 1046260, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2022) (finding Defendants “comport[ed]” with requirements of Section 1692g where Defendants extended an open offer for Plaintiff to pay a specified amount to extinguish Plaintiff’s debt).

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not impose liability on a debt collector for failing to disclose whether interest is accruing when its settlement offer clearly promises to extinguish the debt upon payment of a specified sum.

Bertolino v. Sequium Asset Solutions, LLC · filed 2023-04-18(e), (f)

Because an “offer to extinguish the debt in exchange for a specified payment ... dispels the risk of a collection notice misleading a debtor about the effect paying the specified amount would have on the outstanding debt[,]” the failure to disclose whether interest is accruing will not subject the debt collector to liability under the FDCPA. See id. at 155-56.

The FDCPA requires claims within one year of the allegedly violative act or omission, and does not make immaterial state-court misrepresentations actionable or impose liability under § 1692f without distinct unfair or unconscionable collection conduct.

Makhnevich v. Novick Edelstein Pomerantz PC · filed 2023-01-15(e), (k)(d), (f)

As a threshold matter, FDCPA claims must be brought within one year of the allegedly violative act or omission. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... Under this reasoning, the court declines to apply equitable tolling to Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim when, as stated above, § 1692k(d) of the FDCPA already provides that a claim must be brought within one year of the allegedly violative communication. ... Importantly, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant Bougopoulos’ representation was material, as is required in this Circuit. ... Indeed, “mere technical falsehoods that mislead no one are immaterial and consequently not actionable under § 1692e.” ... As such, Plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor, and the court finds, as a matter of law, that the lone representation at issue was not a violation under § 1692e, or § 1692f, of the FDCPA.

An action under § 1692 for alleged violations by debt collectors is against the debt collector, not the United States government.

Phillips v. United States · filed 2023-01-30

In addition, Mr. Phillips alleges a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, which is part of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and prevents harassing or abusive practices. However, an action under 15 U.S.C. § 1692 for alleged violations by debt collectors would be against the debt collector, not the United States government.

Section 1692e(8) claims may not be pursued by purported assignees when the assignment is invalid under Texas law.

Cooper v. Credit Management LP · filed 2022-12-29(e)(8)

Were the court in the instant case to reach a contrary result to the one Judge Kinkeade recently reached, Cooper would be entitled to proceed here when he was not permitted to proceed under almost identical circumstances before another judge of the same court. The court therefore concludes that it should not make an inconsistent ruling, at least until there is a binding decision of the Fifth Circuit or clearer guidance is found in decisions of other district judges of this or other courts.

Section 1692 does not expressly authorize assignment of FDCPA claims, so their assignability is determined under applicable state law.

Alston v. National Credit Systems, Inc. · filed 2025-03-13

Although the Fourth Circuit has not had occasion to examine this framework, the court finds it persuasive, based on Article III’s usual requirements that an injury must be personal to a plaintiff, the absence of any assignment provision in the FDCPA, and the lack of a general federal law of assignability and consequent need to default to state law to evaluate this issue.

Section 1692f(6) is the sole FDCPA provision applicable to a business whose principal purpose is enforcing a security interest, and it governs nonjudicial action by requiring a present right to possession, intent to possess, and no applicable property exemption; a mortgage servicer is a debt collector if it acquired the debt in default or treated it as in default when acquired.

Adelson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2023-01-31(a)(6), (f)(6)

Bottom line, Trott must comply only with § 1692f(6) if its principal purpose was to enforce a security interest—in this case, Adelson’s house. Adelson’s pleading suggests that enforcing a security interest was Trott’s principal purpose. ... So Trott must comply only with §1692f(6). See Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1036–38. Under the §1692f(6) framework, we ask whether HSBC had a right to possession of the house, intended to take possession, and was allowed to do so. We say yes to all three. As discussed above, HSBC had the right to foreclose and timely did so. So Adelson’s FDCPA claim against Trott must fail. ... A mortgage servicer can be a “debt collector” if it “acquired a debt in default or has treated the debt as if it were in default at the time of the acquisition.” ... Because Ocwen did not “acquire[] a debt in default” and did not “treat[] the debt as if it were in default” until months after it acquired the debt, Ocwen is not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Bridge, 681 F.3d at 362. So Adelson’s FDCPA claim against Ocwen must also fail.

Section 1692a(6) excludes a party that is only enforcing a security interest through foreclosure from the FDCPA's primary debt-collector definition unless it is enforcing security interests for purposes of § 1692f(6).

Nelson v. Fay Servicing, LLC · filed 2023-09-15(a)(6)

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege facts sufficient to establish that Fay is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDPCA pursuant to Obduskey, Ho, and Barnes. Fay’s actions do not constitute debt collection within the meaning of the FDPCA. Fay is alleged only to have participated in efforts to effectuate or to facilitate foreclosure of the property and Fay cannot obtain a deficiency judgment. Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violation of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) generally covers persons collecting debts owed another but excludes persons who obtained the debt before default, while a security-interest enforcer is subject only to section 1692f(6)'s three foreclosure conditions.

Prentice v. Newrez, LLC · filed 2023-12-18(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)(iii), (f)(6)

The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). There is an important exception, though. So long as the debt in question “was not in default at the time it was obtained,” the person collecting or attempting to collect the debt is not a “debt collector.” Id. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). ... These “security interest enforcers” are not bound by the FDCPA’s usual restrictions – such as the Act’s debt verification procedures. ... Instead, when proceeding with nonjudicial foreclosure actions, they are only obligated to ensure that (1) there is a “present right to possession of the property” resulting from “an enforceable security interest,” (2) there is a “present intention to take possession,” and (3) the property is not legally exempt from “dispossession or disablement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6); see also Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1036-38 (2019).

Section 1692a(6) treats a person principally engaged in enforcing security interests as a debt collector only for purposes of § 1692f(6), making § 1692f(6) the sole FDCPA provision applicable to such entities.

Faria v. PNC Bank National Assoc. · filed 2024-04-15(a)(6), (f)(6)

Thus, the only provision in the FDCPA that applies to entities enforcing security interests is § 1692f(6).

Section 1692a(6)(F) excludes from the debt-collector definition a person collecting a debt that was not in default when obtained, while § 1692f(6) does not prohibit repossession when the enforcer has a present right to possession under applicable state law and the contract.

Fitzgerald v. Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC · filed 2024-07-11(a)(6)(F), (f)(6)

The FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” specifically excludes “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt . . . to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” ... Because the Lease Agreement establishes that MBFS acquired the right to enforce the Lease Agreement before Fitzgerald defaulted on her obligations under it, MBFS is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. ... But under state law and the terms of the Lease Agreement that Fitzgerald signed, ICU did have a present right to possess the SUV on MBFS’s behalf. ... As a result, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Fitzgerald’s FDCPA claims in Count II.

For claims under § 1692f(6), a debt collector includes anyone using interstate commerce or the mails in a business whose principal purpose is enforcing security interests.

Robertson · filed 2026-03-04(a)(6)

Crucially, for claims alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (the statutory provision of the FDCPA that Plaintiff alleges the Trustees violated) a “debt collector” also includes “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Plaintiff thereby has set forth factual allegations plausibly alleging that the Trustees were “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, and so the SAC will not be dismissed as to the Trustees based on the argument that Plaintiff has failed to do so.

Section 1692e(8) bars a debt collector from communicating credit information known or that should be known to be false, subject to the FDCPA’s bona-fide-error defense when the violation was unintentional and reasonable error-prevention procedures were maintained.

Evans v. Merchants And Medical Credit Corp., Inc. · filed 2023-01-31(e)(8)

A debt collector violates the FDCPA when it “[c]ommunicat[es] or threaten[s] to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). ... To establish the bona fide error affirmative defense, “[t]he debt collector must show, by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the violation was unintentional, (2) the violation was a result of a bona fide error, and (3) the debt collector-maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” Litt v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 146 F. Supp. 3d 857, 875 (E.D. Mich. 2015). ... Indeed, whether MMCC’s procedures are reasonably adapted to avoid the error that occurred here is a question of fact for the jury to decide. ... Because material questions of fact exist, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must be denied.

Section 1692e applies to claims by a consumer concerning a primarily personal, family, or household debt against a debt collector who violated the provision’s prohibitions.

Mallory-Bey v. Malesia Investments, LLC · filed 2023-02-17(e)

Plaintiff appears to have brought an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. “In order to establish a claim under § 1692e: (1) plaintiff must be a ‘consumer’ as defined by the Act; (2) the ‘debt’ must arise out of transactions which are ‘primarily for personal, family or household purposes;’ (3) defendant must be a ‘debt collector’ as defined by the Act; and (4) defendant must have violated ‘§ 1692e’s prohibitions.’” ... Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts as to how Defendant is ‘debt collector’ as defined by the Act. Plaintiff also fails to allege any facts as to how Defendant violated ‘§ 1692e’s prohibitions.’

The FDCPA’s limitations period begins when the violation occurs, and an innocuous state-court procedural error that is promptly resolved by that court is not actionable under §§ 1692e or 1692f.

Ingersoll v. Carter Jones Collection Service, Inc. · filed 2023-03-21(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), (f)(1), (k)(d)

The Ninth Circuit has held that in such cases, the statute of limitations begins to run on the filing of the complaint. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants misstated the amount of the debt owed under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) is time-barred and that claim is DISMISSED. ... The Court concludes that Defendants’ procedural error was innocuous and, certainly not “unconscionable” in either the legal or lay sense, and as such, cannot be the basis for a FDCPA claim. ... The erroneous motion for default amounted to a minor procedural misstep that, like the improper writ of garnishment, was quickly resolved by the state court.

The FDCPA protects consumers from prohibited debt-collection communications, applies to covered debt collectors, and requires claims to be filed within one year after the violation.

GROOMS v. PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC · filed 2023-03-27(a)(3), (a)(6), (c)(a), (k)(d)

Congress defines a “communication” from debt collector to consumer as the “convey[ance] of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). Congress promulgated three instances where debt collectors “may not communicate” with consumers: (1) “at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer,” (2) “if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt,” or (3) “at the consumer’s place of employment.” Id. § 1692c(a). ... Ms. Grooms says she did not provide written consent for PennyMac to contact her about her debt in January 2022. See DI 8 ¶ 6. But she does not allege any facts demonstrating PennyMac contacted her in any of the ways Congress prohibits. Her claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 1692d(5) does not reach a call pattern that shows only an effort to contact a debtor rather than intent to harass, § 1692e(10) does not make use of a local area code actionable absent a material effect on the consumer’s debt-related decision-making, and § 1692k(d)’s one-year period runs from the violation.

Brayton v. Alltran Financial LP · filed 2023-04-26(d)(5), (e)(10), (k)(d)

FDCPA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (“An action to enforce liability under this subchapter may be brought … within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.”). The statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) begins to run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not the date on which the violation is discovered. ... The 14 calls here (all but one of which were before the actionable period) do not demonstrate an intent to harass. No reasonable jury could find that the intent of Defendant’s calls was to harass, oppress, or abuse Plaintiff. ... Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1692d(5) claim with prejudice. ... Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of “any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). ... As other courts have held, the use of a local phone number is not a material misrepresentation because it has no impact whatsoever on a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose how to deal with a debt. ... Thus, Plaintiff cannot state a FDCPA claim predicated on Defendant’s use of local area codes, regardless of whether the calls were to him or to third parties.

Section 1692d(6) does not require a debt collector to use an out-of-state number or disclose more through caller ID when the displayed number is true and accurate, while § 1692e does not prohibit using a local number merely because the collector operates elsewhere.

Leavell v. MRS BPO, LLC. · filed 2023-09-22(d)(6) and (e)

Section 1692d(6) specifically prohibits “the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” ... In light of § 1692c(b), which restricts the information that debt collectors can provide before it knows which individual has answered its call, a reasonable jury could not find that defendant failed to meaningfully disclose itself under § 1692d(6). ... Therefore, like the Bermudez court, the court finds that the use of a particular telephone number, by a defendant whose business location is covered by a different area code, is not materially misleading information or prohibited conduct under the FDCPA.

Section 1692g does not make a collection letter unlawful merely because an envelope's return address differs from the address named in the validation notice when the letter clearly associates the latter with the debt collector and the former appears only as a return address; the same facts do not violate Section 1692e.

PISTONE v. CLIENT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2023-05-12(g)(b), (e)(10)

Even the least sophisticated debtor should be aware of the function of a return address and that Defendant’s office, where the validation notice explicitly directs written disputes to be sent, is the address associated twice with Defendant’s name. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1692g fail as a matter of law. ... Here, Plaintiff’s theory that the multiple addresses Defendant provided in the Collection Letter were deceptive is the foundation for her allegations under both § 1692g and § 1692e. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 76-78.) Accordingly, as the Court found above that Plaintiff could not be deceived by the inclusion of a return address on the Envelope Face sent by Defendant to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1692e also fail as a matter of law.

A violation of the FDCPA's venue provision can support federal remedies against a debt collector but does not invalidate the underlying state-court judgment.

New Capital Home, Inc v. Kogut · filed 2023-05-19(i)

Even if it was demonstrated that plaintiff was engaged in forum shopping, Suesz is not persuasive, as a violation of the venue requirements in the FDCPA would provide the basis for federal remedies but would not invalidate the state court judgment.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit debt collectors from using misleading representations, legally unavailable or unintended threats, or unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt, and an FDCPA claim generally must be brought within one year of the violation.

Elnaggar v. Allard · filed 2023-05-23(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (f), and (k)(d)

The FDCPA provides, in relevant part, that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. This prohibition includes “[t]he false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” § 1692e(2)(A), and “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken,” § 1692e(5). The FDCPA further provides more generally that “[a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” § 1692f. ... We construe the FDCPA broadly and consider communications from lenders to debtors from the perspective of the “least sophisticated debtor.” ... Nothing in that message would mislead the least sophisticated debtor as to the status, character, or amount of the Perkins loan, nor did the message threaten action that could not “legally be taken” or that was not “intended to be taken.” ... An FDCPA claim must be brought within one year from the date of the violation. ... Elnaggar’s claims related to the service of the 2013 collection action and default judgment are thus clearly untimely. ... For the foregoing reasons, the amended complaint fails to state an FDCPA claim against the defendants.

The FDCPA does not treat a city agency enforcing civil fines and judgments owed to the city itself as a debt collector, and immobilizing a car to collect those judgments is not, by itself, conduct similar to the abusive practices prohibited by § 1692d.

Rosario v. City of New York Comptroller · filed 2023-05-30(a)(6), (d)

While having his car immobilized as a result of judgments against him was no doubt unwelcome and inconvenient for Plaintiff, this conduct is not similar in kind to the examples of prohibited conduct set forth in Section 1692d. ... An agency of the City of New York attempting to enforce civil fines and judgments owed to the City itself, rather than to a third party, is not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA.

Section 1692c(b) does not establish a concrete injury from a debt collector's disclosure of debt information to a third party without publicity.

Bryton v. Preferred Collection & Management Services, Inc. · filed 2023-05-31(b)

In Count Three, Plaintiff likewise alleges nothing more than a procedural violation of § 1692c(b) and therefore lacks standing. See Hunstein, 48 F. 4th at 1250. Defendant argues that the allegation that “[t]he Transmitted Information affected Plaintiff’s reputation” sufficiently alleges a concrete injury and establishes Article III standing. Doc. 29 at 7–8. However, as was true in Hunstein, the Amended Complaint does not allege the essential element of publicity necessary to allege a concrete and particularized injury. Hunstein, 48 F.4th at 1244.

A violation of the FDCPA does not by itself establish Article III injury; the violation must cause or appreciably risk harm to the concrete interest the statute protects.

Mahdi v. Convergent Outsourcing Inc · filed 2024-01-30

The Seventh Circuit has ruled, in a “slew of cases,” that a “violation of an FDCPA provision, whether ‘procedural’ or ‘substantive,’ does not necessarily cause an injury in fact.” Markakos, 997 F.3d at 780 (listing Seventh Circuit cases addressing this issue). To fulfill the injury-in-fact requirement, the violation must have “harmed or presented an ‘appreciable risk of harm’ to the underlying concrete interest that Congress sought to protect.” Id. (quoting Casillas, 926 F.3d at 333). In Markakos, the Seventh Circuit explained that “an FDCPA violation might cause harm if it leads a plaintiff to pay extra money, affects a plaintiff’s credit, or otherwise alters a plaintiff’s response to a debt.” Id. (citing Larkin, 982 F.3d at 1066). ... In the absence of any allegation that the harm materialized and that the plaintiff experienced a concrete injury, the court will grant the motion to remand.

The FDCPA does not treat a debt collector’s disclosure of debt-related information to a letter vendor creating and mailing a collection letter as abusive, deceptive, or unfair conduct when it falls outside the conduct Congress intended to regulate.

A-3946-22 – Amber Jones, Etc. v. American Coradius International LLC · filed 2025-05-02

We concur with the motion judge's determination that plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the FDCPA was uncritically literal. Defendant's disclosure of debt-related information to a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, nor unfair, and was not the type of conduct Congress intended to regulate when it enacted the FDCPA. When viewing plaintiff's complaint and affording her all reasonable inferences of fact, plaintiff did not "genuinely allege" any facts establishing defendant's conduct violated the FDCPA.

Under §§ 1692e(2)(A) and (10), a collection letter is not false, deceptive, or misleading where identical debt details identify the same debt despite a different internal reference number, and repeated identical validation notices do not violate § 1692e; the same conduct is not unfair or unconscionable under § 1692f.

Fogel v. Credit Control, LLC · filed 2023-05-31(e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (f)

Nor would the least sophisticated consumer be prevented from making payments on or disputing the debt due to the use of two different internal reference numbers. ... Therefore, the use of different reference numbers was not false, deceptive, or misleading under § 1692e. ... Multiple validation notices across multiple letters can be confusing or deceptive when the subsequent notice contradicts the initial notice, see Rosen, 2020 WL 1332145, at *5 (collecting cases), but here the two notices are identical. ... Plaintiff does not allege any of the specific violations listed in subsections (1) through (8) of § 1692f, nor does the conduct she describes – sending a letter with a different reference number and a renewed G-Notice – rise to the level of an “unfair or unconscionable” act. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1692f claim is dismissed.

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector's reporting or collection conduct does not violate §§ 1692e or 1692f(1) based only on an unsupported assertion that the underlying debt was invalid.

Riser v. Central Portfolio Control Inc · filed 2023-06-27(e), (f)(1)

Riser moves for summary judgment on her claims that CPC violated sections 1692e and 1692f(1) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by reporting a debt that she did not owe to the CRAs, thus misrepresenting the “character, amount, or legal status” of the debt and attempting to collect a debt that was not expressly authorized by an agreement or permitted by law. ... Because the materials and sources upon which Riser relies do not support her argument that she did not owe the debt when CPC engaged in collection efforts and credit reporting, and because each of Riser’s claims are premised on her unsupported assertion that she did not owe the debt at those times, CPC is entitled to summary judgment.

Sections 1692e and 1692g(a) can be violated when an undated collection letter creates confusion about the amount owed; § 1692g(b) requires factual allegations beyond repeating its statutory language, and §§ 1692d and 1692f do not support relief absent repeated collection efforts or distinct unfair conduct.

GINSBERG v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC. · filed 2023-08-23(e), (g)(a), (g)(b), (d), and (f)

Considering the language in Regulation F and the decision in Roger, this Court finds that compliance with Regulation F, alone, does not provide a “safe harbor” from violation of the FDCPA. Accordingly, upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and construing the facts presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Defendant’s Letter satisfies the requirements under § 1692e, and therefore, Defendant’s motion is denied as to Count IL. ... Here, for the same reasons as expressed above with respect to § 1692e, the Court finds that because omission of the date created confusion on the amount of the debt owed, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to sustain a claim under § 1692g(a). ... The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint merely repeats this statutory language without providing a sufficient factual basis to show that he is entitled to relief under § 1692g(b). ... Here, while the Complaint sufficiently states a claim for violation of § 1692¢(a), it fails to state a claim for violation of § 1692g(b). Plaintiff's claims for violation of § 1692g(b) are, therefore, dismissed. ... Here, because Plaintiff does not allege any unfair or unconscionable conduct that is not already addressed by the § 1692e claims or allege any facts pertaining to repeated debt collection efforts, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under § 1692d or § 1692f. Indeed, Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant’s motion provides no express argument with respect to his claims under §§ 1692d or 1692f.

Section 1692a(6) treats those who regularly collect debts owed another—including lawyers doing so through litigation—as debt collectors, but not landlords collecting their own debts; §1692e(2)(A) bars false statements about a debt’s amount, and §1692g(b) requires collection to stop after a dispute until verification is mailed.

LIVINGSTONE v. HADDON POINT MANAGER, LLC · filed 2023-12-27(a)(6), (e)(2)(A), (g)(b)

Thus, for the purposes of the Motion, the Court holds that Mr. Rotsides, Mr. Richards, and Weishoff & Richards are all debt collectors under the FDCPA. ... However, claims against landlords based on their attempts on their own behalf to collect outstanding amounts owed to them are not viable because the landlords would be deemed creditors and not debt collectors under the FDCPA. ... Thus, applying the plain language of § 1692e(2)(A), a fact finder could conclude that the complaints falsely represented the amount of Plaintiff’s debt. ... Section 1692g(b) is clear that when a consumer disputes a debt, the debt collector must then cease collection efforts until the debt is verified and notice is mailed to the consumer.

The FDCPA does not require a debt collector to itemize a debt into principal, interest, and fees in a proof of claim filed in a bankruptcy proceeding.

FORD v. SECOND ROUND SUB LLC · filed 2024-03-06(e), (f)

In so holding, the Court emphasizes, first, that the statutory language of the FDCPA itself does not require a debt collector to itemize a debt into principal, interest, and fees.

Section 1692c(a)(1) prohibits debt collectors from communicating with a consumer at a time or place known, or that should be known, to be inconvenient, and a preference for a communication medium does not establish an inconvenient time or place.

Marks v. Javitch Block LLC · filed 2024-03-14(a)(1)

§1692c(a)(1) places limits on when and where a debt collector may communicate with a consumer, specifically prohibiting communications “at any unusual time or place or a time or place known, or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a). ... Plaintiff does not state that the place at issue—his home—was inconvenient, but rather the medium of the communication—a letter—caused harm. ... Nowhere in the pleadings does Plaintiff state what time the letter was received, why that time was inconvenient, or why Defendant should have known that the time was inconvenient. ... After review of the record, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to plead the letter at issue was received at an inconvenient time or place. This objection is, therefore, overruled.

Section 1692c(a)(1) prohibits debt-collection communications at an unusual or inconvenient time or place, but not merely through a communication method the consumer finds inconvenient.

Pritchett v. Midland Credit Management Inc · filed 2025-03-28(a)(1)

Section 1692c(a) of the FDCPA provides that “a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt – (1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1). ... Because Plaintiff has only presented evidence and argued that Defendant communicated with her by an inconvenient method, she has failed to establish a dispute of material fact on her claim under § 1692c(a)(1).

Section 1692c(a)(1) requires a nonconsensual debt-collection communication to occur at an unusual or inconvenient time or place to violate the statute, and presumes that 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. local time is convenient.

ELSAYED v. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2025-08-11(a)(1)

Section 1692c; the non-consensual communication must be “at an unusual or inconvenient time or place.” ... In accordance with the statute, a debt collector shall assume that the hours between “8 o’clock antemeridian and before 9 o’clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer’s location” are convenient. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1).

The FDCPA requires a claim to be filed within one year after the alleged violation occurs.

Edwards v. PNC Bank, N.A. · filed 2024-03-22(k)(d)

The FDCPA prohibits the “[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if . . . there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). A claim that alleges a violation of the FDCPA must be filed "within one year from the date on which the violation occurs." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). "The FDCPA limitations period begins to run on the date the alleged FDCPA violation actually happened." Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360 (2019). ... Plaintiff did not file her instant action in the state circuit court until March 8, 2022, nearly two years after the last possible qualifying event that might serve as the basis for her FDCPA claim and well past the one-year statute of limitations for such claims. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims is GRANTED.

The FDCPA defines “debt” and “debt collector,” prohibits false or abusive collection conduct and unauthorized amounts or property threats, and requires a written validation notice.

Wood v. Native Surf, LLC · filed 2024-04-08(a)(5), (a)(6), (c)(b), (d), (e), (f)(1), (f)(6), (g)

The FDCPA prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Debt collectors, in connection with the collection of any debt, may not: (1) communicate with any person other than the consumer without prior consent; (2) engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person; (3) collect any amount unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt; or (4) threaten to take any nonjudicial action to dispossess or disable property without either a present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest or a present intention to take possession of the property. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d, 1692f(1), 1692f(6). Mr. Carter violated most of these prohibitions. He contacted a relative about the purported debt without the Woods’ consent, he abused and harassed the Woods with repeated phone calls and profane language, and he threatened to enter the Woods’ home without their consent to “inspect and catalog” their possessions—implying an intent to dispossess the property without a legitimate basis to do so. Such conduct, committed on behalf of EWA, squarely satisfies the third element of the Woods’ FDCPA claim. ... In addition to these violations, EWA failed to comply with the FDCPA’s notice requirements. The FDCPA requires that a debt collector send the consumer a written notice containing: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor; (3) a statement that the debt will be assumed valid unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt; (4) a statement that the debt collector will obtain and mail verification of the debt to the consumer if the consumer disputes the debt within thirty days; and (5) a statement that debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor upon the consumer’s request within thirty days. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. EWA never sent the Woods a written notice containing the above requirements despite the Woods asking EWA for proof of the debt.

Section 1692c(a) does not require a debt collector to obtain express written consent before contacting a consumer; it bars communications only at specified inconvenient times or places, when the consumer is represented by counsel, or at a prohibited workplace.

JOHNSON v. STILLMAN LAW OFFICE · filed 2024-03-28(a)

But § 1692c(a) does not say that debt collectors must have express written consent from a consumer before reaching out.

The FDCPA excludes state and municipal officers and employees from the definition of debt collector when collecting debts as part of their official duties.

Neary v. Driscoll · filed 2024-04-19(a)(6)(C), (8)

Further, the FDCPA specifically excludes from the definition of “debt collector” any officer or employee of any State or municipality, to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of that individual’s official duties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6)(C), (8).

The FDCPA applies to a debt collector collecting a personal, household, or family debt from a consumer and prohibits collecting a debt not owed, misrepresenting the amount, failing to identify the collector or provide dispute rights, and authorizes actual damages, up to $1,000 in individual statutory damages, and reasonable fees and costs, with statutory damages assessed by the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of noncompliance.

Hubbard v. Zions Debt Holdings LLC · filed 2024-05-01(a)(3), (a)(6), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(5), (e)(6), (e)(11), (f)(1), (g), (k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(a)(3), (k)(b)(1)

These threshold concerns are satisfied. Plaintiff alleges that she is a natural person and a consumer within the meaning of the FDCPA and that Defendant is in the business of purchasing default debts and collecting on them. ... Plaintiff is therefore a “consumer . . . obligated to pay any debt” and Defendant is a “debt collector . . . who regularly collects . . . debts.” 15 U.S.C. 1692a(3), (6). ... Defendant attempted to collect on a debt that was not owed, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). Defendant also made false representations as to the amount owed1 and failed to disclose that it is a debt collector, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) and (11). Defendant also failed to provide Plaintiff with the required notice of her rights to dispute the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. ... Section 1692k provides that a debt collector who violates the FDCPA is liable for actual damages and, “in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). In determining whether to award statutory damages, the Court considers “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts demonstrating Defendant’s serious and intentional violations of the FDCPA, and thus the Court awards Plaintiff $1,000 in statutory damages. ... Nonetheless the Court independently reviews Plaintiff’s counsel’s fee request for reasonableness. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (authorizing a reasonable attorney fee as determined by the court). ... The Court finds the requested amount of fees reasonable, as it does Plaintiff’s requested amount for costs.

Section 1692c(c) permits a debt collector to provide validation after a consumer timely disputes a debt because that communication falls within the exception for communications needed to invoke a specific remedy.

Diaz v. KLS Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2024-05-14(c)(3)

Upon receipt of the Cease/Dispute Letter, Defendant was required to either cease collection or provide validation. Since Defendant was statutorily required to provide validation to resume collection, its December 8, 2023, letter validating the debt falls within Section 1692c(c)(3). Therefore, Defendant did not violate Section 1692c(c) by providing validation on December 8, 2023.

Sections 1692e(5) and 1692f(6)(A) prohibit debt collectors from threatening legally unavailable action or dispossession of property without a present right to possession, as judged by the least sophisticated debtor standard.

Doskocz v. ALS Lien Services · filed 2024-05-20(e)(5), (f)(6)(A)

The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from engaging in certain practices to collect or attempt to collect a debt, including threatening to take action that cannot be legally taken and threatening to effect dispossession of property where there is no present right to possession of the property. (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5), 1692f(6)(A).) ... To determine whether conduct violates the FDCPA, courts employ the “ ‘least sophisticated debtor’ ” standard. ... We thus agree with the trial court that the least sophisticated debtor would reasonably understand this language in ALS’s pre-NOD letter as threatening foreclosure in violation of section 5720. In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that ALS’s pre-NOD letter violated the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not prohibit a creditor from collecting a debt after charging it off, and a purchaser of the debt may seek to collect it.

(PS) Ortiz v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC · filed 2024-05-21

However, a creditor may choose to “charge-off” a debt “for tax purposes,” and “the FDCPA does not prohibit a creditor from collecting a charged-off debt.” ... And an entity may purchase a debt from another and seek to collect the debt.

The FDCPA can treat communications about a debt as debt-collection activity in a judicial-foreclosure context and bars direct contact with a represented consumer and false or misleading collection statements.

BROUILLETTE v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. · filed 2024-05-31(a)(2), (a)(5), (c)(a)(2), (e), and (e)(5)

Here, although a final foreclosure judgment had already been entered, the state court specifically vacated a sheriff’s sale and ordered the creditor of the debt, CitiMortgage, to review Plaintiff’s loan modification application. ... Thus, Cenlar’s statements to Plaintiff and her attorney about the completeness of her application could reasonably be characterized as “requests for financial information” that were “part of a dialogue to facilitate satisfaction of a debt” under the FDCPA’s broad definitions of “communication” and “debt.” ... Furthermore, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Cenlar’s communications violated specific provisions of the FDCPA, including § 1692c(a)(2) for communicating directly with Plaintiff despite knowing that she was represented by an attorney; and § 1692e for using “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” by claiming that Plaintiff’s application was incomplete without advising what documents were missing. ... For these reasons, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim under the FDCPA against Cenlar. ... This Court, therefore, declines to apply Obduskey here, where Powers Kirn has attempted to enforce a security interest through a judicial foreclosure. ... And by alleging that Powers Kirn threatened and then attempted to conduct a sheriff’s sale in violation of the state court order, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Powers Kirn “sought to collect monies due on a mortgage” in violation of § 1692e(5).

At the pleading stage, § 1692d(5) permits a non-debtor’s harassment claim based on repeated collection calls that continue after the person asks the collector to stop, while §§ 1692e and 1692f require factual allegations of misleading, deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable collection conduct.

McNaney v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc. · filed 2024-06-14(d)(5), (e), (f)

While the FDCPA defines “consumer” as “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3), the FDCPA provisions on which Plaintiff relies to pursue his claims contain no language to suggest that actions to redress violations of sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f are limited to consumer plaintiffs. ... Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to pursue his FDCPA claim. The court therefore declines to dismiss the FDCPA claim on the basis that Plaintiff is not a consumer within the meaning of the FDCPA. ... At this stage, Plaintiff FDCPA claim under § 1692d is sufficient and provides Defendant with fair notice of the claim and basis for same. ... Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support his FDCPA claims under §§ 1692e and 1692f, and the Motion will be granted as to Count I – FDCPA §§ 1692e and 1692f.

The FDCPA does not make a violation of a state court's technical procedural rule actionable unless the conduct also violates an FDCPA provision protecting against abusive debt-collection practices.

POCHAN v. UHG I LLC · filed 2024-07-17(d), (e)(10), (f)

In the end, as explained above, the FDCPA statute is meant to protect against abusive practices; it does not concern violations of state technical procedural rules within a legitimate civil debt collection complaint.

Section 1692i(a)(2) requires a debt collector to bring an action in the judicial district where the consumer resides at the commencement of the action; an injury from violating that venue rule is measured by the costs of travelling or sending a lawyer to the remote court and moving for a change of venue.

Perkins v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP · filed 2024-07-29(a)(2)

The injury § 1692i contemplates, after all, is “measured by the costs of travelling or sending a lawyer to the remote court and moving for a change of venue.” ... Plaintiff does not suggest that he or his attorney had to travel to Illinois to defend against the state court action or that there was some other reason why filing the suit in Illinois exacerbated his lost working time, so the harm as framed cannot provide standing.

Section 1692e(8) does not require a debt collector to report a debt as disputed when the consumer merely asks about the account balance without challenging the debt.

Lemons v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC · filed 2024-07-29(e)(8)

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim fails on the undisputed factual record. Upon review of the telephone call, it is clear that Plaintiff did not dispute the Capital One Account and no reasonable factfinder could conclude otherwise. Plaintiff made an inquiry as to the balance on her Capital One Account. When the agent responded that the balance exceeded her credit limit due to accumulated interest, Plaintiff did not challenge that response in any way, but instead concluded the call saying “thanks for your time” and “have a nice day.” Without any evidence of a dispute, Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 1692e(8) permits a consumer to dispute a debt orally, and an oral statement calling the debt’s accuracy into question can qualify as a dispute.

LAWSON v. JEFFERSON CAPITAL SYSTEMS, LLC · filed 2024-08-13(e)(8)

Just as the plain language of Section 1692g(a)(3) uses the word “dispute” without reference to an oral or written communication, so too does the plain language of Section 1692e(8) fail to distinguish whether a dispute must be made orally or in writing. Thus, reading the FDPCA as a whole, as the court did in Riccio, this Court finds that the plain meaning of the statute permits a debtor to dispute a debt orally under Section 1692e(8).

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits an award of up to $1,000, but the maximum is not automatic; under § 1692k(b)(1), the court must consider the frequency and persistence, nature, and intentionality of the debt collector’s noncompliance.

Van Norden v. Blackwater Legal Group · filed 2024-07-11(k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)(1)

The FDCPA authorizes an award of actual damages up to $1,000 against a debt collector “who fails to comply with” the Act. But that maximum $1,000 sum is not automatic. In calculating such an award, the court must consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.”

Section 1692e(8) does not cover reporting a debt as disputed to consumer reporting agencies when the reporting is not made in connection with debt collection.

Pelt v. LVNV Funding LLC · filed 2024-08-15(e)(8)

Reporting a debt as “disputed” to Credit Reporting Agencies (CRAs) under §1692e(8) is not conduct made “in connection with collection” of the debt.

The FDCPA does not treat a court-filed setoff defense as debt-collection activity when the filing lacks a reference to the amount owed, a demand for payment, and repercussions for nonpayment.

Bennett v. I.Q. Data International Inc. · filed 2024-09-30(e), (f)(1)

The recognized hallmarks of debt collection activities include reference to the amount owed, implicit or explicit demand for payment, and discussion of the repercussions if payment is not tendered. ... Here, I.Q. Data’s answers to the original and amended complaints do not contain the recognized hallmarks of a debt collection activity. ... The statement “[a]ny recovery to [Bennett], which [I.Q. Data] denies is appropriate, should be set-off by the amount that [Bennett] owes on his underlying account,”20 is not a debt collection activity, and no construction of the alleged facts could make it so.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit false or misleading and unfair or unconscionable debt-collection practices, but litigation conduct is not debt-collection activity unless its language bears recognized collection hallmarks such as a reference to the amount owed, a demand for payment, or consequences for nonpayment.

Bennett v. I.Q. Data International Inc. · filed 2024-09-30(e), (f), (e)(2)(A), (f)(1)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... Additionally, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, “[a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” ... The Court decides only that, considering exclusively the record before it, there is no evidence that the outstanding amount on Bennett’s rental account was altered by the Maryland judgment and thus, no evidence that I.Q. Data sought to recover a false amount in contravention of the FDCPA. ... Therefore, I.Q. Data’s defense is not fairly characterized as a debt collection activity, and I.Q. Data has not made a “legal claim” against Bennett to collect a debt.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken, and the court held that pursuing a foreclosure barred by a condition precedent violated that rule; it further treated the unlawful foreclosure as an unfair collection attempt under § 1692f.

Mercer Belanger Professional Corporation v. Gaeta · filed 2024-08-16(e)(5), (f)

Section 1692e(5) states that a “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken” is a violation of the FDCPA. ... Because the face-to-face requirement is a condition precedent to the foreclosure process, and Huntington “clearly did not comply with the explicit requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 203.604[,]” foreclosure was an action that could not legally be taken. ... As for Section 1692f, we find Kaiser v. Cascade Capital, LLC, 989 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021), instructive when it held that lawsuits attempting to take action not permitted by law are unfair. Pursuing an illegal foreclosure would seem to fall squarely within that category.

A plaintiff alleging violations of §§ 1692e and 1692f must identify the specific debt-collection communications, their substance, and how each communication violated the FDCPA to plead a plausible claim.

Donovan v. Fay Servicing LLC · filed 2024-08-23(e), (f)

As in the cases cited above, here the Complaint does not identify any specific communications from either Defendant, much less provide the substance of each communication and explain how each communication violates the FDCPA and the FCCPA. The Court therefore recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice, giving Plaintiff an opportunity to plead sufficient facts to show a plausible violation of the FDCPA and the FCCPA.

Section 1692c(a)(1) bars debt-collection communications at a time or place known or reasonably expected to be inconvenient, while § 1692c(a)(3) bars communications at a consumer’s place of employment when the collector knows or has reason to know the employer prohibits them.

Jones v. Halsted Financial Services · filed 2024-08-28(a)(1), (a)(3)

Even construed in Plaintiff’s favor, these allegations do not plausibly establish that Defendant’s 3:22 p.m. call of July 18, 2023, was placed at “a time or place known or which should [have been] known to be inconvenient to” Plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1). ... The Court finds these decisions persuasive and concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for violation of § 1692c(a)(3) upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1692c(a) requires a consumer’s consent or court permission only for communications at an unusual or inconvenient time or place, to a represented consumer, or at a place of employment where communications are prohibited.

Blue v. Monarch Recovery Management, Inc. · filed 2025-02-27(a)

Section 1692c(a), however, provides that consent to communicate about a debt (or the court’s permission) is required only under three scenarios: (1) if the collection is “at any unusual time or place or a time or place known to be inconvenient to the consumer”; (2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by counsel; or (3) if the debt collector intends to contact the consumer at his or her place of employment and the debt collector knows the employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.

Section 1692c(a)(1) limits the time and place of debt-collection communications but does not prohibit a particular communication medium.

Winstead v. Carter-Young Inc · filed 2024-09-16(c)(a)(1)

Here, Winstead does not allege that Carter sent the letter to the wrong address, i.e., “place.” Instead, she maintains that the medium Carter used was inconvenient. She explains that by utilizing snail mail, as opposed to email, Carter violated the FDCPA. But § 1692c(a)(1) does not prohibit any specific medium of communication, it just limits the time and place of communication.

The FDCPA covers debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and prohibits false representations about a debt and threats of legally unavailable or unintended action.

Fedorov v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2024-10-01(a)(5), (e)(2), (e)(4), (e)(5)

There are three threshold requirements for recovery under the FDCPA: (1) the plaintiff must be a “consumer”; (2) the defendant must be a “debt collector”; and (3) the defendant must have committed some act or omission in violation of the FDCPA. ... The FDCPA only applies to debts from transactions “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); see Willis, 2019 WL 2565243, at *1-2 (addressing whether the credit card debt at issue was for personal or commercial purposes). ... Section 1692e(4) prohibits a debt collector from representing or implying that nonpayment of a debt will result in “the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4). ... Section 1692e(2) prohibits a debt collector from making false representations of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt. Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. ... However, Fedorov alleges PRA violated these sections not by simply bringing a collection suit against him, but by bringing a baseless collection suit against him for debts that it is not entitled to collect. Although Fedorov failed to adequately plead the debts at issue are consumer debts, it appears he may have a viable claim if it were pleaded correctly.

The FDCPA applies to covered debt collectors’ communications made in connection with collecting a debt and prohibits false, deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable collection methods.

Hall · filed 2026-01-14(a), (e), (f)

The FDCPA was enacted to curb “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). Importantly, it only applies to communications sent in connection with the collection of a debt. See id. § 1692e (prohibiting false, deceptive, or misleading representations “in connection with the collection of any debt”); id. § 1692f (prohibiting unfair or unconscionable means “to collect or attempt to collect any debt”). ... Capital One asserts that Hall “has not alleged . . . that Capital One is a debt collector under the FDCPA.” Dkt. 20 at 4. The Court agrees, and the same is true for PRA. Hall has not alleged any facts that would allow this Court to infer that PRA or Capital One were debt collectors, that they made “false, deceptive or misleading representations” as a means of debt collection, or that they used “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect the debt. E.g., Koontz v. SN Servicing Corp., 133 F.4th 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2025) (detailing the types of allegations that are sufficient to state an FDCPA claim). He further provides no details about whether he received a direct communication from PRA or Capital One, and if so, what that communication said. Accordingly, the Court will deny Hall’s FDCPA claim.

Section 1692c(a)(1) does not treat an email as a communication with the consumer until the information is actually transmitted or transferred to that person; merely pressing send is insufficient.

Quinn-Davis v. TrueAccord Corp. · filed 2024-11-19(a)(1)

In short, the Court concludes that the phrase used by Congress means that you must actually transmit or transfer information to another person in order to “communicate with a consumer” and trigger potential liability under the FDCPA. Merely sending information into the ether of the internet by pushing “send” on your e-mail application does not suffice.

Section 1692k(d) gives one year to sue from the date of the alleged violation, and § 1692a(6) covers attorneys who regularly attempt to collect debts owed to another, even when they do not own the debt.

Anderson v. Valihura · filed 2025-05-14(k)(d), (a)(6)

A claim under the FDCPA “may be brought . . . within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2012). ... As the Supreme Court has said, “the statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) begins to run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 10 (2019). ... “The Act’s definition of the term ‘debt collector’ includes a person ‘who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed to another.’” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 293 (1995) (quoting § 1692a(6)) (cleaned up); Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 81 (2017). ... Therefore, Defendants qualify as “debt collectors” subject to the FDCPA, and Plaintiff’s “claim[] cannot be dismissed on the ground that [Defendants’] actions did not amount to ‘debt collection’ covered by the FDCPA.” Simon, 732 F.3d at 265.

Section 1692a(6) requires an FDCPA plaintiff to allege that the defendant is a debt collector, including a person whose principal business is collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed to another.

(PS) Lewis v. Synchrony Bank · filed 2025-05-14(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines the phrase “debt collector” to include: (1) “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” or (2) any person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). This claim fails because plaintiff has not alleged that defendant is a debt collector.

A creditor collecting debts owed to itself generally is not a debt collector under the FDCPA, while a third-party company collecting for that creditor is the debt collector.

Jefferson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2025-06-04(a)(6)

Here, Jefferson has not alleged facts that would demonstrate that Chase meets this definition. In particular, she has not asserted facts showing that Chase, a lender, is engaged in a business “the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due to “another.” 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(6). Rather, based on the contract for the sale of the Cadillac and its provision assigning AutoNation’s interests to Chase, it is apparent that, for purposes of these activities, Chase was a creditor who, to the extent it was involved in any relevant activities, was collecting debts owed to Chase itself and thus was “collecting debts for such creditor,” which excludes it from the definition of a “debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A).

Section 1692a(6) generally does not treat mortgage servicers and creditor assignees as debt collectors when they obtained the right to collect before the loan was in default.

Stafford v. Taffet · filed 2025-06-23(a)(6)

“[M]ortgage servicers and assignees of a creditor ‘are not debt collectors’ within the meaning of the FDCPA” where “‘they obtained the right to collect on a loan before it was in default.’” ... Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are consumers or that Defendants are debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA. As such, the FDCPA claim fails. Based on the submitted exhibits, it seems likely that Carrington obtained the right to collect on the loan as the servicer before the loan was in default and so would not qualify as a debt collector in any event. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs will be permitted to attempt to amend their FDCPA claim.

Section 1692a(6) generally covers persons whose principal business is collecting debts owed to another and creditors using another name that suggests a third-party collector.

Taylor v. Alternative Solar, LLC · filed 2025-07-30(a)(6)

The FDCPA applies to “debt collectors” and defines the term as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts . . . owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” ... Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff has alleged that Omnidian was attempting to assist Plaintiff with the installation of the solar panels, not to collect a debt. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that support an FDCPA claim against Omnidian that is plausible on its face.

Section 1692a(6) requires a defendant to qualify as a debt collector based on its general business activities, not merely on an isolated collection attempt or self-description in correspondence.

Finney v. Bank of America, National Association · filed 2025-08-01(a)(6)

However, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendant is a debt collector because the amended complaint contains no factual allegations concerning Defendant’s business or regular activities. See Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470, 481 (6th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs argue in their Response to the Motion to Dismiss that Defendant qualifies as a debt collector because “numerous correspondence from BANA identifies themselves [sic] as ‘debt collectors.’” (DN 25, at PageID # 122.) This fact is not alleged in the amended complaint, nor is it enough to infer that Defendant is a debt collector under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). A debt collector is a person or entity whose principal purpose is the collection of debts, or that regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed another. § 1692(a)(6). Even if Defendant did attempt to collect on a debt or refer to itself as a debt collector in mail communications, Defendant’s status as a “debt collector” depends on what Defendant does generally, not what Defendant did in a given case. Bates, F.3d at 480-81. The amended complaint does not suggest that Defendant’s principal business is the collection of debts, and as such, the amended complaint fails to allege that Defendant is a debt collector.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act permits a consumer subject to debt collection to sue a debt collector for a prohibited act or omission.

Yahral v. Cooper · filed 2025-08-04(a)(6)

Under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), a plaintiff subject to consumer debt collection may bring a claim against a debt collector defendant who has engaged in a prohibited act or omission. ... However, plaintiff does not allege that the defendants are debt collectors attempting to collect a debt against her.

Section 1692a(6) covers a person whose principal business is collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed or asserted to be owed to another.

Vaiano v. Experian Information Solutions Inc. · filed 2025-08-12(a)(6)

A debt collector is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... These allegations fail to establish that Experian is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. Vaiano offers only conclusory statements and does not allege with any particularity that Experian’s principal business purpose is the collection of debts or that it is regularly engaged in collecting debts.

The FDCPA covers attorneys who regularly collect consumer debts for others, including through litigation.

Barnett v. Bryan L Billings Esq · filed 2025-09-04(a)(6)

Notably, the FDCPA “applies to ‘attorneys who “regularly” engage in consumer-debt collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation.’” Id. (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995). The Complaint, however, fails to include any nonconclusory allegations showing that Mr. Billings (or his law firm) regularly collects debts on behalf of others. Ms. Barnett has failed to plausibly allege that Mr. Billings is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA and she has therefore failed to state a claim for violation of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes a creditor collecting its own debt from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector.”

RAHMAN v. CITIBANK, N.A. · filed 2025-09-10(6)

The FDCPA expressly excludes “creditors who attempt to collect their own debts.” ... Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged, nor can he, that Citibank is a debt collector subject to the FDCPA. ... Based on the allegations, Citibank is a creditor, which is generally not subject to the FDCPA, because it provided credit in the form of a credit card to Plaintiff and is seeking to collect on an unpaid balance.

The FDCPA makes abusive debt-collection tactics by debt collectors collecting debts for others unlawful.

Daniels v. Verizon Wireless · filed 2025-09-23(e), (f)

Plaintiff’s second claim is brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) & (f). Subsection (f) does not exist, and subsection (e) is a statement of the purpose of the statute. ... The complaint here fails to allege that defendants are “debt collectors” collecting debts for others within the meaning of the statute.

The FDCPA limits the term consumer to natural persons and generally excludes creditors collecting their own debts from the definition of debt collector.

Miedel v. Ally Bank · filed 2025-09-29(a)(3), (a)(6)

Regardless, the FDCPA is inapplicable because it does not apply to debtors who are LLCs (rather than natural persons), see Valhalla Inv. Props., LLC v. 502, LLC, 832 F. App’x 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2020), and it does not apply to creditors collecting on their own debts, see Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003).

Section 1692a(6)(F) excludes a person who collects a debt it originated or obtained before the debt was in default from the FDCPA's definition of a debt collector.

Brown v. Carington Mortgage Services · filed 2025-09-30(a)(6)(F)

The FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F). A person who attempts to collect a debt originated directly by the person, or who attempts to collect a debt that was not in default when it was obtained by the person, is not a “debt collector” under the statute. Id. ... Here, Carrington is not a “debt collector” under the statute for two reasons. First, Plaintiff alleges that he obtained the loan in question from Carrington. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. Carrington is thus not a “debt collector” because it originated the debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F).

Section 1692(a)(6) defines a debt collector and excludes a loan servicer when the debt was not in default when the servicer obtained it.

Zickafoose v. Upstart Network, Inc · filed 2025-10-09(a)(6)

Mr. Zickafoose fails to state a claim under Count I because Upstart is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. ... A loan servicer is not a debt collector if the debt was not in default at the time the entity became the servicer.

Section 1692a(6) excludes original creditors and loan servicers that began servicing before default from the FDCPA's definition of debt collector, while covering persons who regularly collect debts owed to another.

Zelkowitz · filed 2025-11-20(a)(6) and (a)(6)(F)

An originator of a debt like WebBank is excluded from the definition of “debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F); see also Trenton v. Experian, No. 1:22-cv-00045-WJ-JHR, 2023 WL 2538791, at *4 (D.N.M. Mar. 16, 2023) (finding WebBank, as an originator of debt, was not liable under the FDCPA as a debt collector). ... As to Avant, the Complaint fails to allege that Avant regularly attempts to collect debts owed to another, as required under the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... To the extent Avant is a loan servicer, loan servicers that begin servicing prior to default are not debt collectors under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to allege collection activity on a consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission; landlords collecting their own debts are not debt collectors.

Tafah · filed 2026-01-16

Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim similarly fails. “To state a claim for relief under the FDCPA, a plaintiff's complaint must allege facts that show: ‘(1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.’” ... Plaintiffs do not allege anywhere in the amended complaint that Lake Village was a debt collector. And as noted by Lake Village, to the extent that Plaintiffs assert that Lake Village was a debt collector because it was collecting rent, that claim fails because “courts have noted that landlords and/or property management companies are not debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA when they are collecting their own debts.”

Section 1692c(c) applies only to debt collectors and bars further communication about a debt after a written cease-communication request, subject to statutory exceptions.

Gould · filed 2026-01-16(c)

As relevant here, Plaintiff alleges a violation of section 1692c of the FDCPA, which provides that “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt,” subject to certain exceptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). By its terms, this provision only applies to “debt collectors.” ... Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to show that Defendant is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA. All the Court can infer from Plaintiff’s allegations is that Defendant is a bank, but Plaintiff does not allege any facts at all to suggest that Defendant collects debts for other, unrelated entities, or that its principal business is to collect debts as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.

Section 1692a(6) covers persons principally engaged in collecting debts or regularly collecting debts owed another, but not creditors collecting their own accounts.

Vowels · filed 2026-01-27(a)(6)

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the principal purpose of Beacon’s business is debt collection, nor does she allege that Beacon was attempting to collect a debt on behalf of a third party. The complaint’s threadbare allegations, at most, suggest that Beacon is the lender of the auto loan for the subject vehicle. This is insufficient to state a plausible claim under the FDCPA, which requires the defendant to be is a debt collector. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The FDCPA treats an entity as a debt collector when collecting debts is its principal purpose or it regularly collects debts owed another, while generally excluding a creditor collecting its own debt.

WEST · filed 2026-02-19(a)(6)

Not all entities who engage in debt collection activities are “debt collectors” for the purpose of the FDCPA. The statutory language focuses “on third party collection agents working for a debt owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 83 (2017). “Specifically excluded from the definition’s reach are . . . a creditor’s officers and employees collecting debts for the creditor, a company collecting debts only for its non-debt-collector sister company, an entity collecting a debt it originated, and one collecting a debt it obtained that was not in default at the time of purchase.” Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC, 898 F.3d 364, 366 (3d Cir. 2018). “[T]he statute thus provides two separate paths to establishing an entity’s status as a ‘debt collector.’” Barbato v. Greystone Alliance, 916 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2019). Under the first path, which is known as the “principal purpose definition,” an entity is a debt collector if it has “the ‘collection of any debts’ as its ‘most important’ ‘aim.’” Id. at 267; ... Alternatively, an entity “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” is a debt collector under the “regularly collects” definition. Id. Under this second definition, it does not matter if the entity acquired the debt before or after default; “[a]ll that matters is whether the target of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect debts for its own account or does so for ‘another.’” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 83 (2017).

Section 1692a(6) generally covers persons whose principal business is collecting debts or who regularly collect debts owed to another, not creditors collecting their own debts.

Ali · filed 2026-03-10(a)(6)

The court has already addressed the petitioner’s FDCPA argument and explained that the petitioner’s dispute with the respondents—her landlords—does not arise under the FDCPA. ... The petitioner offers no new argument or authority that would alter this conclusion.

The FDCPA requires a defendant to be a debt collector whose challenged conduct is related to debt collection, and it does not cover a mortgage company foreclosing on real property.

McCrary · filed 2026-03-26

Here, Truist Bank was acting as a mortgage company foreclosing on McCrary’s real-property mortgage, and its acts are not covered by the FDCPA. Likewise, the other defendants were either acting as Truist Bank’s agent, or were otherwise not performing any debt collection whatsoever, meaning the FDCPA is inapplicable to all the defendants. McCrary’s claims, accordingly, fail.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant is a debt collector, and excludes from that definition a person who obtained the debt when it was not in default.

Loudermilk · filed 2026-05-22(a)(6)

Finally, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Nationstar or Rushmore are “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA because there is no allegation that the debt was in default at the time Defendant obtained it. See, e.g., Somlar v. Nelnet Inc., 4:16-cv-1037-AGF, 2017 WL 35703, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2017). As such, Count V is dismissed.

The FDCPA generally excludes creditors collecting their own debts from the definition of a debt collector unless they use a false name suggesting that a third party is collecting.

Abdool v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc · filed 2021-09-13(a)(6)

Since Capital One is a creditor and it is not alleged to have enlisted the assistance of a third party to collect the debt, it does not fall under the definition of a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA.

Section 1692c(c) generally requires a debt collector to stop communicating with a consumer after a written cease-communication request, but it does not stop communications inherent in an ordinary lawsuit or communications about invoking a specified remedy.

Errato v. Bendett & McHugh, PC · filed 2025-05-21(c)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c), “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). Nevertheless, Section 1692c(c) does not prohibit communications that “notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor” will invoke a specified remedy such as filing a lawsuit or a motion for summary judgment. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 (1995). ... The Brock Defendants were not obligated to “stop[] the litigation” against Plaintiff or to stop communications inherent to the foreclosure action. Section 1692c(c) does not empower “a debt-owing consumer to stop the ‘communications’ inherent in an ordinary lawsuit and thereby cause an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to a halt.” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296.

Section 1692c(c) requires a consumer’s written notice refusing to pay a debt or requesting that collection communications cease to be clear enough to notify the debt collector.

McGowan · filed 2025-09-16(c)

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of notifying Defendant that he was refusing to pay the debt under § 1692c(c), and instead improperly shifted the burden to Defendant to speculate as to the letter’s meaning. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to state in clear, unequivocable language that he was refusing to pay the debt, and the January 12, 2024 letter is insufficient to state a claim under § 1692c(c).

Section 1692c(a)(1) prohibits debt collectors from communicating with a consumer through a method they should know is inconvenient to the consumer.

JOHANNES v. LVNV FUNDING LLC · filed 2025-05-28(a)(1)

Mailing Plaintiff a letter, even having received his request to be contacted by email, is not a method of communication that “should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer” such that it violates the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e(2), (5), and (10) prohibit false representations about a debt or services, threats of legally unavailable or unintended action, and deceptive collection means under the least-sophisticated-consumer standard; § 1692f covers unfair or unconscionable practices, which may overlap with § 1692e, while § 1692f(1) reaches actual collection of an unauthorized incidental amount rather than merely an attempt to collect it.

Brewster v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC. · filed 2025-06-24(e)(2)(A), (e)(2)(B), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), and (f)(1)

Section 1692e(2) prohibits debt collectors from making any “false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” 15 U.SC. § 1692e(2)(A), as well as the “false representation of . . . any services rendered” by the debt collector in attempting to collect the debt. ... Here, Defendant falsely represented in the May 12, 2022 Collection Letter that in addition to the $ 1,683 unpaid principal balance Plaintiff also owed the $ 252.45 collection fee as a legitimate additional charge. ... In the instant case, Defendant’s inclusion in the May 12, 2022 Collection Letter of the $ 252.45 collection fee, assessed in violation of § 18[5], wrongly inflated the subject debt in violation of § 1692e(2)(A). ... Similarly, here, Defendant’s attempt to collect from Plaintiff the $ 252.45 collection fee in violation of § 18[5] violated § 1692e(2)(B). ... A false threat exists where the least sophisticated consumer “would interpret the [debt collector's] language to mean that legal action was authorized, likely, and imminent.” ... Accordingly, neither of these two voicemail messages violated § 1692e(5). ... Conduct that violates § 1692e(10) includes “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have a claim under § 1692e(10). ... Plaintiff thus can prevail on her Third Claim under both § 1692e and § 1692f if she can establish Defendant engaged in a collection practice that was both deceptive and unfair. ... The Second Circuit has observed that § 1692f(1) prohibits only the collection of any amount incidental to the principal obligation including, inter alia, a fee, but does not speak to a debt collector’s attempt to collect such fee. ... In the instant case, Defendant’s inclusion in the Collection Letter of the collection fee, which Defendant has never collected, did not violation § 1692f(1), and Plaintiff may not recover for a violation of that provision. ... In this case, Defendant’s attempt to collect the $ 252.45 collection fee is sufficiently unfair or unconscionable to support a claim under § 1692f. ... Accordingly, summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Third Claim based on a violation of § 1692f should be GRANTED in favor of Plaintiff and DENIED as to Defendant.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not impose liability when Medicaid estate-recovery communications accurately describe a claim against a decedent’s assets, include the debt-collection disclosure, and use no materially false, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable means.

Plaisted · filed 2026-03-16(e), (f)

Despite the relatively forgiving standard that applies under these circumstances, Plaintiffs’ argument fails as a matter of law. There is simply nothing materially false or misleading about these statements. Yes, each letter says that there is a “Total Amount Due.” ... In short, the letters are not materially false or misleading merely because Plaintiffs read the words “Total Amount Due” without regard to context. ... Likewise, the letters are not materially false or misleading merely because they state that they are an “attempt to collect a debt.” ... Finally, there is nothing materially false or misleading about the 30-day timeframe that the letters provide for a response. ... Next, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ § 1692f theory and concludes that it, too, fails. Plaintiffs appear to rely on the acts discussed above to support their § 1692f claims. But they fail on the merits because there is nothing “unfair” or “unconscionable” about Defendants’ acts.5 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations to collect a debt, while § 1692f prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection means and does not support a claim based on the same misconduct as a § 1692e claim.

Rainey · filed 2026-06-10(e)(2)(A), (e)(4), (e)(5), (e)(8), (e)(10), (f), (f)(1), and (f)(6)

Here, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Defendants issued a false or misleading statement because they misrepresented to Plaintiff that they were accepting his payment to cover his March 2024 mortgage payment but instead applied that money to a past due amount that was satisfied by the Partial Claim. After misleading Plaintiff about the application of his payment, Defendant Cenlar attempted to collect additional funds from Plaintiff for a delinquency partially caused by its own misapplication. ... Therefore, Plaintiff plausibly alleges a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (10). ... Section 1692f of Title 15 of the United States Code prohibits debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. ... Here, Plaintiff's § 1692f claim is based on Defendant Cenlar falsely representing the manner in which they would apply Plaintiff’s March 2024 mortgage payment, the same conduct undergirding his claims under § 1692e. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1692f because the claim is based on the same alleged misconduct undergirding his § 1692e claim.

Section 1692g(a)-(b) requires specified notice after an initial communication and cessation of collection after a timely written dispute, while § 1692e(8) bars falsely reporting or failing to identify a disputed debt; the court found neither provision applied on these allegations.

Mobley v. LOGS Legal Group LLP · filed 2025-06-20(e)(8), (g)(a)-(b)

In relevant part, § 1692g(a) requires that “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall . . . send the consumer a written notice” with specific information about the debt, as set out in the provision. ... For these reasons, the allegations establish that Defendant had no duty to respond to Plaintiff under the FDCPA and, therefore, did not violate § 1692g. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged a basis for liability under § 1692e either.

The FDCPA defines a consumer as a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay a debt, while allowing any person who is the subject of abusive debt-collection efforts to sue.

Bryant v. NewRez, LLC · filed 2025-08-18(a)(3), (a)(5)

Although plaintiff's allegations are lengthy, plaintiff has not alleged that she is a party to the Loan, that she is obligated or allegedly obligated on the Loan, or that she has agreed to assume the subject debt following her mother’s death. She is therefore not a proper party to pursue an FDCPA claim. ... Plaintiff is correct that “any person—not just any debtor—who is the subject of abusive debt collection efforts may bring suit pursuant to” the FDCPA; ... But plaintiff does not allege that any of the defendants have tried to impose liability for the Loan on her, or, in other words, collect the debt from plaintiff. ... To the extent plaintiff's allegations are more than bald and unsupported, they nonetheless do not plausibly allege any abusive efforts on behalf of any defendant in an attempt to collect the debt from plaintiff, or that plaintiff is an otherwise aggrieved party. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d; 1692f; Johnson, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 780. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA and her *DCIPA claim is properly dismissed.

The FDCPA's protections in §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f are not limited to consumers, and the debt-collector threshold under § 1692a(6) is plausibly met when contractual provisions treat a debt as defaulted upon bankruptcy and the defendant acquired it in that condition.

Kressel · filed 2026-01-28(a)(6), (d), (e), (f)

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek relief under Sections 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), 1692f and 1692f(1). ... The Seventh Circuit has found that these sections are not limited to a specific class of individuals who are protected. See Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f “do not designate any class of persons ... who can be abused, misled, etc., by debt collectors with impunity,” and emphasizing the words “any person” in § 1692d). ... As the threatened actions would harm Anthony, it is plausible that Anthony is within the zone of interest protected by the statute. ... For those reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Anthony’s claim for Count I is denied. ... For the FDCPA to apply, two threshold criteria must be met. Here, the parties dispute the first criteria, which requires that the “defendant must qualify as a ‘debt collector,’ which the FDCPA defines as any person who ‘uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts’ or who ‘regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). ... As alleged by Plaintiffs, these provisions allowed the loan to be treated as defaulted if they filed for bankruptcy, as doing so would put the mortgagee’s interest in the property at risk. As those were the conditions when Shellpoint acquired the debt, Shellpoint treated the debt as defaulted when it was acquired, and it is a debt collector under the statute. Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, these allegations are sufficient to plead that the debt was treated as defaulted when it was acquired by Shellpoint, making Shellpoint a debt collector under FDCPA. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1692k permits statutory damages in addition to actual damages, so a consumer may seek statutory damages without proving actual injury.

Kashanian v. National Enterprise Systems CA1/3 · filed 2025-09-08(a)(1)–(2)(A)–(B), (b)(2)

That is, a debt collector is only liable for actual damages if any exist. But by declaring a debt collector liable for “the sum of” actual and statutory damages, section 1692k “signifies that actual damages only add” to their liability, and “not that the absence of actual damages negates” liability. (Chai, at p. 1038, italics added.) The provision thus authorizes a court to award statutory damages to a debtor, even in the absence of actual damage. (Ibid.)

Section 1692k permits statutory damages for an FDCPA violation even when the debtor has suffered no actual injury, and those damages are intended to deter violations.

Kashanian v. National Enterprise Systems · filed 2025-10-01(a)(1)-(2)(A)-(B), (b)(2)

Consequently, the Legislature intended the section 1692k remedies to have the same meaning under the Rosenthal Act as they do under the FDCPA — statutory damages are intended as penalties to deter violations and no injury is required to seek those damages. (Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, supra, 660 F.3d at pp. 1065, 1067.)

The FDCPA excludes state and political-subdivision officers or employees from the definition of debt collector when collecting debts as part of their official duties.

Garcia v. Dove · filed 2025-09-16(a)(6)(C) & (8)

Moreover, the FDCPA and Securities Act are inapplicable to county officials like Dove. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C) & (8) (explaining the phrase “debt collector” under the FDCPA “does not include . . . any officer or employee of . . . any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of h[er] official duties” and further defining the term “State” to include “any political subdivision” thereof); ... For all these reasons, the Court will overrule Garcia’s second objection, as well.

The FDCPA prohibits misleading or unfair collection practices and requires a debt collector receiving a timely written dispute to stop collection until verification, unless it ceases further collection activity.

Eisenberg v. MRS BPO, L.L.C. · filed 2025-09-26(e)(2), (f)(1), (g)(b)

Whether conduct violates §§ 1692e or 1692f requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication. ... If a consumer disputes the validity of a debt, in writing, within the thirty-day period after receiving notice under § 1692g(a), the FDCPA requires the debt collector to cease collection efforts until the debt collector provides the consumer with verification of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). ... The Court finds that Defendant TSI fulfilled its obligations under the FDCPA. In this instance, upon receiving Plaintiff’s dispute letter, Defendant TSI sent Plaintiff documentation verifying the debt TSI was attempting to collect and ceased collection activity. The Court finds that the debt verification letter TSI sent Plaintiff was clear and concise such that it would not have misled the least sophisticated debtor.

Sections 1692g(b), 1692c(c), and 1692d address debt verification after a timely written dispute, written cease-and-desist notices to the identified debt collector, and harassing collection conduct.

Bell v. Portfolio Recovery Associates · filed 2026-01-15(g)(b), (c)(c), (d)

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), which requires a “debt collector [to] cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt,” “[i]f the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing” within thirty days after the debt collector provides notice of the debt. ... Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant failed to provide her an assignment contract fails to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g because that section does not require a debt collector to do so. ... The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. ... Defendant next argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1692c(c), which generally requires a “debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer” “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer,” because Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that Plaintiff sent a cease-and-desist letter to Defendant. ... The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege this element of the claim because it alleges that a complaint letter was sent to the CFPB, rather than Defendant. ... Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1692d, which prohibits harassment (or oppressive or abusive conduct) in connection with debt collection activities, including “[t]he use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.” ... The Court agrees with Defendant. The complaint only states that Defendant’s letter demanding payment threatened unspecified “further action.” ... It does not allege that Defendant’s letter contained harassing communications, such as “obscene or profane language.”

The FDCPA applies to a communication only when its animating purpose is to induce payment by the debtor; discovery subpoenas directed to a non-party for another purpose are not communications in connection with debt collection.

Gentry · filed 2026-03-17(c)(b), (d), (e), (f)

In light of the above factors, the Court concludes that inducing payment of a debt was not an animating purpose of the subpoenas. ... Here, by contrast, the subpoenas were issued to a third party for the purpose of questioning defendants’ proferred expert witness about his financial interest in the state-court cases. As such, the subpoenas cannot be characterized as communications in connection with the collection of a debt. ... Rather, the Court concludes only that the animating purpose of the subpoenas was not to induce payment of a debt, and therefore they were not “communications in connection with the collection of a debt.” Thus, DocketSearcher’s FDCPA claim cannot go forward.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, and § 1692k(d) gives an FDCPA plaintiff one year from the violation to sue.

Howard · filed 2026-03-31(e), (k)(d)

The statute of limitations for an FDCPA claim is one year from the date on which the violation occurs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails on the merits. While Plaintiff plausibly alleges she is a consumer who allegedly owes a debt and the Court assumes, without deciding, that Defendants are “debt collectors” as defined under the FDCPA, Plaintiff has not plausibly demonstrated that Defendants have engaged in any false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt. ... And in any event, Plaintiff does not allege any specific, non-conclusory statements made by Defendants in any debt collection communications that could plausibly be considered false, deceptive, or misleading. Thus, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collection after a consumer disputes a debt in writing until it obtains verification or a judgment and mails it to the consumer.

Sanders · filed 2026-04-15(g)(b)

A claim under § 1692g(b) requires the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) plaintiff is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector who contacted him to attempt to collect a debt, (3) plaintiff notified the defendant in writing that he disputed the debt, and (4) defendant “resumed or failed to cease debt-collection efforts without first (a) obtaining verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment and (b) mailing a copy of the verification or judgment to the consumer.” ... The fourth element requires that the defendant “resumed or failed to cease debt-collection efforts without first (a) obtaining verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment and (b) mailing a copy of the verification or judgment to the consumer.” ... Because communication between a debt collector and a credit reporting agency as well as reporting a disputed debt to a credit reporting agency may at times constitute debt collection activity, ... Sanders has, for the purposes of screening, identified debt collection activity, ... Based on the language in Sanders’ Complaint, this Court cannot determine what information was provided in the credit statements and whether the information was sufficient to satisfy Resurgent’s requirements for verification under § 1692g(b). ... Because this Court cannot determine at this stage that Sanders’ Complaint is wholly without merit, Sanders’ FDCPA claim survives screening by a thin margin.

The FDCPA’s official-duty exception excludes state officers only when collection is within their official duties, its bona-fide-error defense does not excuse a mistake of law, and materially false or misleading collection representations under §§ 1692e and 1692f(1) are judged from the reasonable consumer’s perspective.

Campbell · filed 2026-04-30(a)(6), (e), (f)(1), (k)(c)

State officers are only excluded from the requirements of the FDCPA “to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” ... If the constable “exceed[s] the scope of their authority under the writ of execution” then they are not performing official duties. ... In sum, Defendants’ actions were not in performance of their official duties. Thus, Defendants are debt collectors subject to the FDCPA. ... The Supreme Court of the United States, in Jermane v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, clearly held that “the bona fide error defense in § 1692k(c) does not apply to a violation of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector’s incorrect interpretation of the requirements of that statute.” ... In summary, a representation violates § 1692e only if it is materially false, deceptive, or misleading to the reasonable consumer. ... Here, where Plaintiffs asserted § 1692f violation is based on a false statement of the amount owed, these same principles apply. Thus, Plaintiff must show that the false statement was material to the reasonable consumer.