15 U.S.C. § 1692

Section 1692f(8) prohibits specified envelope language, but an alleged violation alone does not establish Article III standing without concrete harm to a privacy or other protected interest.

Lueck v. The Bureaus, Inc. · filed 2021-09-20(f)(8)

Thus, the presence of “Personal & Confidential” on the envelope addressed to Lueck may have violated § 1692f, but, as we know, a statutory violation alone is insufficient to establish standing.

The FDCPA’s validation-notice and debt-collection disclosure provisions do not support standing without concrete informational harm, while its venue provision permits standing for attorney fees fairly traceable to an improper filing.

Maxwell v. Adams · filed 2021-09-24

Thus, Ms. Maxwell does not have standing to bring her claim against Ms. Adams under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. ... The only reason Ms. Maxwell’s attorney had to raise that defense is because Ms. Adams allegedly violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692i by filing the lawsuit in Garland County, Arkansas.

An alleged violation of the FDCPA, without personal harm or an appreciable risk of harm, does not establish standing.

Avina v. Qualia Collection Services · filed 2021-11-02

The Seventh Circuit has further clarified that, regardless of the procedural or substantive nature of the FDCPA violation, a plaintiff “must allege (and later establish) that the statutory violation harmed him ‘or presented an appreciable risk of harm to the underlying concrete interest that Congress sought to protect.’” ... Seventh Circuit precedent teaches that “a plaintiff must do more than allege an FDCPA violation to establish standing; she must also show personal harm.” ... As in Nettles, the only injury to Plaintiff in this case is the receipt of a noncompliant collection letter.

An alleged violation of § 1692e(8) does not establish Article III standing without a concrete harm from the false credit reporting, such as a lowered credit score or other concrete negative impact.

Hustedt v. Hunter Warfield Inc · filed 2022-01-24(e)(8)

Section 1692e(8) prohibits debt collectors from “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” ... Whether or not Evans is impacted by Ramirez, the application of Evans to Hustedt’s case would not support a finding of Article III standing. ... The portions of Hustedt’s pleading cited by HW allege that HW reported inaccurate debt information to credit reporting agencies, but nothing beyond that – not that those agencies had provided inaccurate credit reports or scores on Hustedt to any third-parties, or that Hustedt had otherwise been concretely and negatively impacted by HW’s sharing of erroneous information.

Section 1692f(1) covers unfair means used to collect or attempt to collect a debt, but a plaintiff must allege a concrete, particularized injury to bring such a challenge.

Hunter v. Benefis Health System · filed 2022-05-24(f)(1)

Regarding Plaintiffs’ claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Plaintiffs’ alleged violation of § 1692 stems from Defendants’ actions in filing the medical liens at issue. An injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way” to be considered “particularized.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 339. The injury “must actually exist” to be “concrete.” Id. at 340. Plaintiffs allege specifically that “Defendants have used, and continue to use, unfair means to collect or attempt to collect medical liens in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f and 1692f(1).” (Doc. 16 at 43.) As discussed in Harris, Conway, and Donald, Montana law authorizes the filing of the medical liens as part of Defendants’ efforts to collect the full chargemaster rates for their medical services. Plaintiffs have alleged no injury under the FDCPA that actually exists or could be deemed “concrete.” Spokeo, 578 U.S., at 339. Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge these medical liens under § 1692.

Sections 1692e and 1692g do not by themselves make an alleged misleading or incomplete debt-collection letter a concrete injury for Article III standing; the plaintiff must allege reliance or other concrete downstream harm.

VAUGHAN v. FEIN, SUCH, KAHN & SHEPARD, P.C. · filed 2022-06-24(e), (g)

Turning to the instant case, the Court initially notes that Plaintiff’s first argument—that misleading information in a debt collection letter confers standing irrespective of any additional harm suffered by the plaintiff—fails to account for these recent clarifications on the concreteness requirement, as discussed above. ... Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts resembling common-law fraud’s element of detrimental reliance. ... But “confusion itself is not enough.” Id.; see also Ward v. Natl. Patient Account Services Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th 357, 363 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[C]onfusion alone is not a concrete injury for Article III purposes.").

A violation of § 1692e does not by itself establish Article III standing; the plaintiff must show a concrete harm, such as reliance and harmful downstream effects.

SCHULTZ, JR. v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2022-07-29(e)

Rather, to establish standing, Plaintiffs must show evidence that bears a close relationship to reliance and damages under fraud, such as taking or failing to take some action as a result of the Collections Letters, which caused harmful downstream effects. ... Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have suffered a concrete harm sufficient to establish standing, and therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their claims.

A violation of § 1692e(3) alone does not establish Article III injury; the plaintiff must allege concrete harm beyond being misled and confused.

Currier v. Lawgix Lawyers LLC · filed 2022-08-12(e)(3)

The plaintiff’s claims relate to allegedly false representations by the defendant in its letter to the plaintiff, representations which the plaintiff says were misleading because they gave the impression that an attorney had participated in the collection process. ... The plaintiff has not alleged that she took any action because of these representations or that she endured any concrete harm. ... The defendant is correct that the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from misleading or confusing consumer debtors, but to have Article III standing, the plaintiff must allege that being misled and confused caused her a concrete injury.

A violation of the FDCPA without a concrete injury is insufficient to establish Article III standing.

Wilkinson v. I.Q. Data International, Inc. · filed 2022-09-07

But Ewing is the exception that makes the Seventh Circuit’s point, which is simply that a violation of the FDCPA unaccompanied by a concrete injury is not enough to pass constitutional muster.

A claim under § 1692c(a)(1) based on fear of contracting Covid-19 is not cognizable without a concrete injury.

Van Vleck v. Leikin, Ingber & Winters, P.C. · filed 2022-09-23(a)(1)

This Court agrees with Judge Davis that Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) are based on the fear of contracting Covid-19 and, as such, are not cognizable claims.

Under the FDCPA, a statutory violation must cause or risk real, concrete harm, and physical manifestations such as loss of sleep and appetite can satisfy that requirement.

Mladenov v. R1 RCM Inc. · filed 2022-10-04(c)(a)(2), (e)(10)-(11)

To establish standing in the FDCPA context, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant’s statutory violation led him to take some detrimental step causing a real, concrete harm. ... The mere allegation of a statutory violation itself—whether based on a procedural or substantive provision of the statute—is not enough. ... Mladenov’s allegations of loss of sleep and appetite fall within this category of injury, which while slight, rises to the level of concrete injury under the FDCPA. ... Thus, Mladenov has standing to bring his FDCPA claims against Defendant.

The FDCPA does not confer standing for a bare misleading collection-letter violation; a plaintiff must allege a concrete downstream consequence, adverse effect, reliance, or other injury beyond merely receiving the letter.

VALENTINE v. UNIFUND CCR, LLC · filed 2023-01-03

Additionally, merely receiving a “misleading” collection letter, as alleged here, is insufficient to establish a concrete injury, absent some action or inaction taken in response or other form of injury.

A bare FDCPA statutory violation, without concrete harm, does not establish Article III standing.

LEVINS v. HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC · filed 2023-01-26

Plaintiffs, here, have simply alleged a bare statutory violation, which, without more, is plainly insufficient to establish Article III standing.

A violation of the FDCPA alone does not establish Article III standing; the plaintiff must allege a concrete injury.

Clark v. Client Services Inc · filed 2023-01-30

The complaint alleges a violation of the FDCPA and a passing reference by Attorney Moore that the defendant should cease communication because the plaintiff needs to avoid stress. These allegations don’t confer standing. As the Seventh Circuit has succinctly stated, “[t]here is no FDCPA exception to Article III.”

Section 1692c(b) protects a consumer’s privacy from an unconsented debt disclosure to a third party, and that privacy violation is a concrete injury sufficient for federal standing.

Jennings v. IQ Data International Inc · filed 2023-05-03(c)(b)

As was found in Tailford, the violation of § 1692c(b) here is itself is a “concrete injury” - violation of privacy – a harm that is traditionally recognized as requiring a remedy.

Section 1692c(c) generally bars a debt collector from communicating further about a debt after written notice that the consumer refuses to pay or wants communications to cease, while § 1692k(c) provides a bona fide-error defense when the violation was unintentional and occurred despite reasonably adapted procedures.

Leichliter v. Optio Solutions LLC · filed 2023-05-12(c)(c), (k)(c)

In light of the Lupia, Vazzano, and Denmon decisions, the court concludes the record contains adequate evidence to show that Leichliter suffered an intangible concrete injury. Thus, the court rejects Optio’s argument that Leichliter lacks Article III standing to bring the § 1692c(c) claim, and the court finds that Optio is not entitled to summary judgment on the § 1692c(c) claim for lack of standing. ... To prevail on the affirmative defense, a debt collector must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the statutory violation (1) was not intentional; (2) resulted from bona fide error; and (3) occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. ... Because the court concludes that genuine issues of material facts exist as to the second and third prongs of the bona fide affirmative defense, the court concludes that both Optio’s motion and Leichliter’s motion should be denied.

Section 1692c(a)(2) and (c) violations based on a single unsolicited collection letter do not establish a concrete injury for Article III standing when the complaint alleges no additional facts showing an intrusive privacy harm.

Ebaugh v. Medicredit, Inc. · filed 2023-08-17(a)(2), (c)

Instead, the Court concludes that while delivery of a letter could invade privacy, mere receipt of an unsolicited letter, without any other factual allegations, is insufficient to establish injury as the type of intrusive privacy invasion the tort of intrusion upon seclusion seeks to prevent.

The FDCPA does not confer Article III standing based solely on a consumer’s confusion, intimidation, or feeling of being misled; the violation must harm or present an appreciable risk of harm to a concrete interest Congress sought to protect.

O'Boyle v. Unifin Inc · filed 2023-10-10

Seventh Circuit precedent establishes that a plaintiff does not satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of standing under the FDCPA simply because she feels intimidated, misled, or confused by a creditor’s communications.

An FDCPA plaintiff must plausibly allege a concrete injury beyond the alleged misrepresentation itself; conclusory claims for statutory or actual damages are insufficient.

Doody v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2024-01-02

Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege facts establishing a concrete injury resulting from a FDCPA violation. ... Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege how he relied on alleged misrepresentations to make any decision and therefore, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly show that there are harms beyond the misrepresentations themselves. Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a concrete injury, his FDCPA claim is dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Under the FDCPA, legal fees spent defending against an unlawful debt-collection process can constitute a cognizable monetary injury sufficient for standing when they are tied to a concrete risk of harm.

Levy v. Law Offices Of J. Henry Nierman · filed 2024-05-20

Only where the expense of money is “‘inextricably bound up in a cognizable injury,’ such as where a plaintiff faces a sufficient risk of harm,” from the FDCPA violation, “and then spends time, money, and effort mitigating that risk,” can such an expense constitute a concrete harm sufficient to confer standing. ... The cost incurred by Plaintiff of hiring an attorney to defend him against the Morrison Judgment is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.

The FDCPA's recognition of privacy invasions as harms it seeks to remedy does not make receipt of a single unsolicited debt letter a concrete injury for Article III standing.

Heres v. Medicredit, Inc. · filed 2024-07-02

Drazen does not support finding Congress elevated receiving a single debt letter to the level of a concrete harm simply because the FDCPA generally identifies privacy invasions as harms it seeks to remedy.

Section 1692c(b) bars debt collectors from communicating with third parties without prior consumer consent, but a transmission to a private intermediary for contacting the consumer does not, by itself, establish a concrete privacy injury equivalent to public disclosure.

ALGRANATI v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2024-07-15(c)(b)

Here, Plaintiff’s asserted harm—that the disclosure of his private, personal, and financial information to a third-party vendor engaged by Defendant was a violation of the FDCPA—is most closely related to the recognized intangible common law injury of “unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life.” ... In the Third Circuit, “[w]hen the communication of personal information only occurs between a debt collector and an intermediary tasked with contacting the consumer, the consumer has not suffered the kind of privacy harm traditionally associated with public disclosure.” Barclift, 93 F.4th at 146 (citations omitted).

Sections 1692e and 1692g(b) support Article III standing when alleged false collection litigation or failure to cease collection after a written dispute causes the consumer to defend a lawsuit the collector had no right to bring; a procedural violation alone is insufficient.

Crow v. Stenger & Stenger P.C. · filed 2025-05-14(e) and (g)(b)

Improper court filings can violate § 1692e. ... This is sufficient at the dismissal stage to conclude that Crow has standing to proceed on Count I of the Complaint. ... The FDCPA provides that “[i]f the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, . . . the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification . . . is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). ... But that is not enough to establish standing after TransUnion and Ward unless the procedural violation caused a traditionally recognized harm. ... Again, having to defend against a lawsuit that the opposing party had no right to bring is an injury in fact for purposes of standing. ... Crow adequately alleged standing for Count II at the dismissal stage.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires an initial debt-collection communication to identify the current creditor clearly and accurately, without irrelevant information that leaves consumers to guess who owns the debt.

Tataru v. RGS Financial, Inc. · filed 2021-01-04(g)(a)(2)

... The FDCPA relieves consumers of the burden to guess that RGS meant they were indebted to the “FNB Omaha” instead of “FNB Omaha II,” and suspecting that a scam is afoot upon learning that there is no “First National Bank of Omaha Two” is just as reasonable as concluding that the actual creditor must actually be FNB Omaha. See Janetos, 825 F.3d at 321 (observing that recipients of dunning letter that did not clearly identify creditor were “left to guess who owned the debt”); Steffek, 948 F.3d at 765 (stating that a dunning letter must “identify the current creditor clearly, without leaving the matter to guesswork.”). In short, the Court finds that, as in Janetos and Steffek, the undisputed facts show that the notice RGS sent to Mr. Tataru did not identify the creditor clearly and accurately; accordingly, Tataru is entitled to summary judgment as to liability under § 1692g(a)(2).

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a collection letter to clearly identify the current creditor to whom the debt is owed, but does not require notice of every sale in the debt's ownership chain.

Solovyova v. Grossman & Karaszewski, PLLC · filed 2021-02-12(g)(a)(2)

The letter conforms with the requirements set forth in § 1692g(a)(2) and clearly states “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” ... First, there is no requirement under the FDCPA that the defendant notify the plaintiff of a sale of plaintiff’s debt. ... Rather, the statute requires identification only of ‘the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.’

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a validation notice to make clear that only the debt collector may assume the debt is valid, and only for collection purposes.

GOLDEN v. HIGGINS BENJAMIN, PLLC · filed 2021-01-04(a)(3)

By including the term “by the debt collector,” § 1692g(a)(3) expressly intended the notice to convey the specific validation limitation to the consumer — that the debt would be assumed valid by only the debt collector and only for collection purposes.

Section 1692f(1) bars collecting a fee or other amount unless the debt agreement expressly authorizes it or the law permits it, and a notice conditioning a service fee on those requirements is not itself prohibited.

Martinez v. Integrated Capital Recovery, LLC · filed 2021-01-13(f)(1)

On its face, therefore, the statement at issue in this case does not describe conduct that is proscribed by the FDCPA. To the contrary, it essentially places the same conditions and limitations on the collection of service fees that the FDCPA places on debt collection in general. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f do not prohibit a debt collector from sending two collection letters four months apart that identify the same original creditor account and balance but use different internal account numbers.

SCOTT v. NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC. · filed 2021-01-19d, e(2), e(10), f(1)

Assigning different internal account numbers to two collection letters seeking to collect an identical debt is neither deceptive nor misleading. The two collection letters identified the same original creditor account and same balance owed. The two letters clearly identified the same debt and sought to collect the same debt.

Section 1692f(6) prohibits taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess or disable collateral when there is no present right or intention to possess it, or when the property is legally exempt.

(PS) Ponthieux v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2021-01-21(f)(6)

Thus, § 1692f(6) “regulates nonjudicial foreclosure activity.”

Section 1692f(6) prohibits taking or threatening nonjudicial action to dispossess or disable property when there is no present right to possession through an enforceable security interest, no present intent to take possession, or the property is legally exempt.

(PS) Ponthieux v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2022-08-10(f)(6)

Thus, § 1692f(6) “regulates nonjudicial foreclosure activity.”

A collection letter satisfies § 1692g(a)(2) when its context clearly identifies the creditor, and § 1692e is not violated without a reasonable but inaccurate interpretation by the least sophisticated consumer.

Chiofalo v. Forster & Garbus, LLP · filed 2021-01-25(g)(a)(2), (e)

The debt collection letter at issue clearly identifies the creditor, inter alia, by twice providing, in bold, capital letters, “Re › BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE,” both near the top of the letter and on the detachable payment slip; by providing the last four (4) digits of the BBD account number directly above the “Re” line at the top of the letter; and by indicating, also in capital letters, the balance due several lines above the “Re” line, at both the top of the letter and on the detachable payment slip. ... Since the context of the Collection Letter, read as a whole, implicitly makes clear that Barclays Bank Delaware is the current creditor, Lugo, 2019 WL 5303957, at * 3, plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Azrack and finds that “the use of the language ‘Balance Due as of [January 24, 2018]’ to describe a static debt is not false, deceptive, or misleading in violation of the FDCPA.”

Section 1692e gives consumers a right to be free from false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection communications, and a false implication of attorney involvement can cause a concrete injury for Article III standing even when the debt is valid; § 1692g(a)(3) does not confer standing when the consumer neither disputes nor intends to dispute a valid debt.

Salermo v. Hughes Watters & Askanase LLP · filed 2021-01-28(e)(3), (e)(10), (g)(a)(3)

But contrary to claim under § 1692g, Salermo sufficiently alleges a concrete injury under § 1692e. The latter section—and especially § 1692e(3)—entitles consumers to be entirely free of communications that purport to be prepared or sent by attorneys when in fact they aren’t. ... Salermo experienced the harm attendant to her right provided by Congress to be free from “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 USC § 1692e. Her alleged injury is thus sufficiently concrete to confer Article III standing. This claim will proceed.

For Article III standing, an alleged violation of § 1692c(b) based solely on sharing debt information with a third-party mailing vendor to prepare a letter is not a concrete injury, and alleged deceptive-collection harms under § 1692e must likewise be concrete rather than speculative.

Cavazzini v. MRS Associates · filed 2021-12-06(b), (e), (e)(2)(A), and (e)(10)

Applying the above principles, I find that sharing information about a debtor with a third-party mailing vendor is not analogous to an invasion of privacy. ... In sum, passing on a debtor’s information to a company for the sole purpose of creating a mailing does not appear to be one of the “unfair, deceptive, or harassing behavior[s]” the FDCPA is meant to target, Kropelnicki, 290 F.3d at 127. Plaintiff therefore does not have Article III standing for his § 1692c(b) claim. ... Plaintiff therefore does not have Article III standing for his § 1692e claim.

The FDCPA's provisions on misleading communications and third-party disclosures do not, without reliance, detriment, or publicity, establish a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing.

MADLINGER v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC · filed 2022-06-21

Consequently, as the allegations stand, Plaintiff’s general allegations of confusion and misleading debt communications in violation of §§ 1692e, e(10), (g), and g(b) do not amount to a concrete, injury-in-fact sufficient for Article III standing. ... Accordingly, I find that Plaintiff does not have Article III standing for her §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f claims.

Section 1692c(b) bars unauthorized communications about a debt to third parties, and § 1692f(8) bars certain non-business-name or address language or symbols on collection envelopes; alleged violations alone do not establish concrete injury for standing where the disclosure to a mailing vendor is not public or envelope markings do not reveal private information.

Maldonado v. Credit Control Services, Inc. · filed 2022-09-26(c)(b) and (f)(8)

For these reasons, the Court holds that Plaintiff did not suffer an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing to assert her claim under § 1692c(b). Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and remands the claim to Illinois state court. ... For these reasons, the Court holds that Plaintiff did not suffer an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing to assert her claim under § 1692f(8).

Section 1692c(b) does not support Article III standing for a private transfer of debt information to a mailing vendor lacking publicity, while § 1692e(8) requires more than a statutory violation for standing—dissemination of false information to a third party that understands its defamatory nature.

Colbert v. National Credit Systems, Inc. · filed 2023-02-01(b), (e)(8)

The Court agrees with Hunstein III’s reasoning, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s dicta in TransUnion. Here, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendant “publicly communicated” Plaintiff’s debt information to Dept. 855, as that term is defined for privacy torts. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice (but denies leave to amend), Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA for lack of Article III standing. ... Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Ewing decision controls the issue of standing for her § 1692e(8) claim. ... In fact, Ewing emphasized that “a statutory violation alone does not make an injury concrete.” 24 F.4th at 1153. Instead, as discussed above, Ewing held that a plaintiff must establish that: (1) Defendant disseminated the false information to a third-party; and (2) the third-party understood the defamatory nature of the communication.

Sections 1692e(10) and 1692g(b) prohibit deceptive collection communications and communications during the validation period that overshadow or are inconsistent with the validation notice, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Schmelczer v. Penn Credit Corporation · filed 2021-02-01(e)(10), (g)(b)

Courts “apply an objective test based on the understanding of the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ in determining whether a collection letter violates [§] 1692e.” ... Similarly, under § 1692g(b), “[w]hether collection activities or communications within the validation period overshadow or are inconsistent with a validation notice is determined under the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ standard.” ... “Under this standard, collection notices can be deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.” ... Thus, given the appearance of the Coupon and the lack of clear instructions in the Payment Letter, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim under the FDCPA and that it cannot dismiss the Complaint at this early stage.

Sections 1692(e) and 1692g(a)(1) permit a collection notice to state a current debt amount and refer the consumer to a current balance without being misleading when the collector is authorized to collect a balance that may fluctuate from payments or adjustments.

ECHOLS v. PREMIERE CREDIT OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC · filed 2021-02-08(e), (e)(10), (g)(a)(1)

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector must send the consumer a notice that contains “the amount of the debt” within “five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). Here, Plaintiff contends that Premiere’s notice violated the statute as a matter of law because it states a balance but then directs the consumer to call for any change in that balance. Whether the notice is misleading depends upon the role Premiere was asked to play by the holder of the debt, Synovus. If Premiere could not collect anything beyond the amount stated in the notice, then the direction to call could be misleading in violation of sections 1692g(a)(1) and (e). This claim fails because, as noted above, Premiere was empowered to collect fluctuating balances.

The FDCPA permits statutory damages of up to $1,000 without requiring a pattern or practice of noncompliance, while directing consideration of the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of the violation.

Otwell v. Home Point Financial Corp · filed 2021-02-09(k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)(1)

RESPA and the FDCPA provide different standards for statutory damages. ... The FDCPA does not contain similar language, instead authorizing “additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), and listing a number of factors to consider before awarding statutory damages, id. § 1692k(b)(1). In other words, unlike RESPA, the FDCPA does not require a pattern or practice of noncompliance as a prerequisite to statutory damages.

Sections 1692e and 1692f(1) do not impose liability for a debt collector's good-faith legal position or for failing to satisfy a state court's evidentiary standard when the collector is not alleged to have pursued a debt that was not actually owed.

Smith v. Stewart, Zlimen & Jungers, Ltd · filed 2021-03-08(e), (e)(2), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), and (f)(1)

Because Smith and Washington did not plead any additional facts to indicate that SZJ took anything but a good faith legal position in its prayer for relief, the complaints failed to state plausible claims that SZJ made false, deceptive, or misleading representations in violation of § 1692e. ... Although SZJ did not satisfy the Amended Standing Order’s evidentiary standard when it brought debt-collection lawsuits against Smith and Washington in Conciliation Court, failing to do so was not a violation of § 1692f(1).

These provisions prohibit debt collectors from misrepresenting the amount or character of a debt, reporting known or should-known false credit information, and using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Williams v. Columbia Debt Recovery LLC · filed 2021-03-19(e)(2), (e)(8), (e)(10), and (f)

These allegations suffice to state a claim that Columbia violated subsections 1692e(2) and (10) and section 1692f. That is, the facts alleged show Columbia’s attempts to collect on a debt included misrepresentations about the amount owed that would have misled the least sophisticated debtor, and that Columbia unfairly sought to collect amounts neither expressly authorized by the assignment received from the original creditor, nor owed by plaintiff. ... The pleading also presents a plausible claim for relief under section 1692e(8) in alleging Columbia reported an approximately $3,900.00 debt to his credit, reported inflated, false, or incorrect balances, and damaged his credit.

Section 1692f(8) permits a debt collector to put its business name on an envelope when the name does not indicate that it is in the debt collection business.

VALENTINE v. UNIFUND CCR, LLC · filed 2021-03-10(f)(8)

As discussed, Section 1692f(8) explicitly permits a debt collector to use its business name “if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.” ... Here, nothing in the name “Unifund” suggests that it is in the business of debt collecting.

Section 1692c(a)(2) permits a debt collector to communicate with a consumer who is represented by an attorney regarding the debt if the consumer previously consented directly to the debt collector.

Howard v. T-H Professional and Medical Collections, LTD. · filed 2021-03-15(a)(2)

The plain language of §1692c(a)(2) allowed T-H to communicate with Plaintiff after it learned that she had retained an attorney for the T-H debt if Plaintiff gave prior consent. ... A reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff gave “prior consent” to T-H. ... With the record before it, the Court cannot grant summary judgment to either party on the issue of whether T-H violated §1692(c).

Under § 1692e(8), a debt collector's failure to flag a debt as disputed does not create a concrete injury when the debt is valid and the resulting credit report is not shown to be inaccurate.

Collier v. Smith Rouchon & Associates, Inc. · filed 2021-03-15(e)(8)

Although Plaintiffs maintain statutory rights to dispute the debts under § 1692e(8), Defendant’s failure to flag the debts as disputed cannot cause a true injury where Plaintiffs have offered no summary judgment evidence that the debts were invalid, such that the resulting credit reports are inaccurate.

For a § 1692e(8) claim based on failing to flag a disputed debt, a valid debt with no resulting inaccurate credit report does not create a concrete injury for Article III standing.

Parker v. Smith Rouchon & Associates Inc. · filed 2021-03-15(e)(8)

Although Plaintiffs maintain statutory rights to dispute the debts under § 1692e(8), Defendant’s failure to flag the debts as disputed cannot cause a true injury where Plaintiffs have offered no summary judgment evidence that the debts were invalid, such that the resulting credit reports are inaccurate.

Section 1692e(8) requires evidence that misleading credit information was disseminated to establish reputational harm from a failure to report a disputed debt, and it does not impose an affirmative duty to report a later dispute after the debt was already reported.

CHAPMAN v. AA ACTION COLLECTION CO., INC. · filed 2023-02-15(e)(8)

Based on the facts as pled by Plaintiff, after AA first reported the Debt to TransUnion in 2018, AA had no affirmative duty to report that Plaintiff subsequently disputed her debt and therefore, AA was not negligent in failing to do so.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from misrepresenting the legal status of a debt, but collecting a spouse’s debt authorized by New Jersey’s doctrine of necessaries does not violate the FDCPA.

Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer and Wale · filed 2021-03-16(e)(2)(A)

The ECOA does not preempt New Jersey’s doctrine of necessaries, so the doctrine permitted CSW to send its collection letters to Klotz without violating the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, and liability is assessed under the least sophisticated consumer standard without requiring proof of intent.

Lichter v. Bureau Of Accounts Control, Inc. · filed 2021-03-17(e)(2)(A)

Under the objective least sophisticated consumer standard, a debt collector’s communication violates the FDCPA if it “could mislead a putative-debtor as to the nature and legal status of the underlying debt.” ... The Second Circuit has not adopted the proposition that the FDCPA requires a plaintiff to prove that the debt collector knowingly made a misrepresentation, and it has reiterated that the FDCPA is a strict liability statute. ... Thus, on the undisputed facts, Lichter has proven his prima facie case of BAC’s FDCPA violation. ... And the undisputed facts further show that BAC made a false representation as to Lichter’s alleged debt when it mailed him a letter seeking to collect a debt on behalf of Bergen Urological, although he owed no debt to that entity.

Section 1692f(1) prohibits a debt collector from attempting to collect a debt amount not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt.

Gonzalez v. Allied Collection Servs., Inc. · filed 2021-03-29(f)(1)

The service of a writ of execution or writ of garnishment that seeks to collect an inaccurate debt amount can constitute a violation or violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e or 1692f. Allied conceded at oral argument that the amount of debt owed as specified in the second writ when it was served on Gonzalez’s employer was “erroneous.” Allied violated § 1692f(1) because it attempted to collect a debt amount that was not “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt.”

Section 1692f(1) prohibits a debt collector from attempting to collect amounts not authorized by the agreement creating the debt.

Essmyer v. Huelskamp Law, LLC · filed 2024-03-08(f)(1)

Defendant therefore collected or attempted to collect amounts defendant was not actually entitled to collect, that is, defendant sought to collect $6372.48 when in fact the amount it was entitled to collect was much less (closer to $1343.46). ... Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on her claim that defendant violated Section 1692f of the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e(2)(A), (5), and (10) bar false statements and unlawful threats in debt collection, § 1692f(1) bars collecting amounts not authorized by agreement or law, and § 1692g(a)(2) and (b) require clear identification of the current creditor and prohibit communications that overshadow validation rights.

Banks v. Kottemann Law Firm · filed 2021-03-30(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f)(1), (g)(a)(2), and (g)(b)

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim under the FDCPA for violations of § 1692f(1), § 1692e(2)(A), § 1692e(5), and § 1692e(10) of the FDCPA. ... For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim under the FDCPA for a violation of § 1692g(a)(2). ... Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable overshadowing claim based on Defendants’ shortening of the validation period. ... This overshadows her statutory right to dispute the debt at the peril of adding to it. ... Therefore, she has stated a claim for overshadowing based on this provision of the Letter.

Sections 1692g(a)(1) and (a)(2) require a collection letter to clearly state the debt amount and creditor, while §§ 1692e and 1692f prohibit misleading and unfair collection means.

HOPKINS v. ADVANCED CALL CENTER TECHNOLOGIES, LLC. · filed 2021-04-07(g)(a)(1), (g)(a)(2), (e), (f)

Section § 1692g requires a debt collector to provide the consumer with certain information in a written notice. § 1692g(a). Such “notices must intelligibly convey the § 1692g(a) requirements.” ... Thus, the Letter adequately conveys the amount of the debt to the least sophisticated debtor. ... As it stands, however, I hold that Hopkins cannot rely on § 1692g(a)(1) to state an FDCPA claim, and to that extent the motion to dismiss is granted. ... The Letter does not say, which means that a consumer cannot discern who owns the debt. ... Thus, Hopkins states an FDCPA claim based on § 1692(a)(2), and the motion to dismiss is to that extent denied. ... Thus, Hopkins states a § 1692e claim. ... The motion to dismiss is denied as to the § 1692f claim.

Section 1692g(a)(3) gives a consumer 30 days after receipt of the notice to dispute a debt and does not require a collector to list every conceivable method of communicating a dispute.

Rodriguez v. Cascade Collections · filed 2021-03-31(g)(a)(3)

Nothing in the text of § 1692g(a)(3) requires a debt collector to make available every conceivable means of communicating the debtor’s desire to dispute a debt. The statute states only that the debt collector must notify the debtor that he or she has 30 days from receipt of the collection letter to dispute the validity of the debt. This provision does not say anything about the means of disputing the debt.

Sections 1692c(c), 1692d, and 1692f respectively address cease-contact requests, harassment, and unfair collection methods, and a single letter requesting only written communications does not support a plausible cease-contact or harassment claim while conduct covered by another FDCPA provision cannot be double-counted under § 1692f.

Vazzano v. Receivable Management Services, LLC · filed 2021-08-24(c), (d), and (f)

The March 5, 2020 letter contains no request that RMS stop contacting Vazzano. What the letter does contain is Vazzano’s “[f]ormal notice . . . that all further communication shall be in writing only so that no facts are misconstrued.” ECF 6-1 (emphasis added). ... RMS’s one letter, unaccompanied by other objectionable conduct, is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1692d. ... Because RMS’s conduct, if proved by Vazzano, would constitute a violation of § 1692c(c) (and thus be double-counted), and Vazzano has alleged no other misconduct, she has failed to plead a plausible claim under § 1692f.

The FDCPA treats lawyers who regularly litigate to collect consumer debts as debt collectors; it bars harassment, material misrepresentations, false threats, and unauthorized amounts, and requires specified debt disclosures.

Sanchez v. Law Office of Lance E. Armo · filed 2021-03-31(a)(6), (d), (e)(2)(A), (e)(4), (e)(5), (e)(11), (f)(1), and (g)(a)

To be held directly liable for violating the FDCPA, a defendant must, as a threshold requirement, be a ‘debt collector,’ within the meaning of the statute. ... The FDCPA defines “debt collector” to include: (1) “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” and (2) any person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” ... As Plaintiff has alleged that debt collection is Defendants’ principal purpose, and Defendants served a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit on Plaintiff and instituted an unlawful detainer action against her, both of which constitute “litigating activities of lawyers” subject to the FDCPA, Defendants are “debt collectors” within the meaning of the statute. ... A debt collector “may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” ... Plaintiff fails to make a plausible claim under Section 1692d, as Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that the communication constituted violence or threat of violence, obscene language, or any of the examples of prohibited conduct enumerated in Section 1692d. ... Section 1692e(2)(A) specifically provides that making a false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt is a violation of the section. ... This is sufficient to state a FDCPA claim under section 1692e(2)(A). ... Plaintiff has thus sufficiently alleged violations of Sections 1692e(4) and (5). ... These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under Section 1692e(11) because, as shown above, Plaintiffs have indeed alleged that Defendants failed to comply with the mandated disclosure requirements. ... Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of Section 1692f(1) by stating that Defendants attempted to collect an amount of debt not permitted by law, as the Notice indicated that she owed $396 in rent when in fact nothing was owed given the change to her Housing Assistance Payment Contract. ... This is sufficient to state a claim for a violation of Section 1692g(a) because Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants did not provide her with the required information under the section.

The FDCPA's location-information restriction applies only to communications made for that purpose; the Act prohibits repeated calls made with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass and false representations about a debt's legal status or a consumer's obligation, while § 1692f addresses conduct not otherwise covered by the FDCPA.

Smith v. Nations Recovery Center, Inc. · filed 2021-04-06(b)(3), (d), (d)(5), (e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10), and (f)

Under § 1692b(3), "Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall not communicate with any such person more than once ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3). ... Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant was communicating to acquire location information about the consumer. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of Section 1692b(3). ... Since Plaintiff has endured "unabated" phone calls from Defendant for a debt she did not owe, see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 26, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d and 1692d(5). ... This Court concludes that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that, to collect a debt that Plaintiff allegedly did not owe, Defendant falsely represented the legal status of the Debt and falsely represented that Plaintiff owed this debt. ... Plaintiff did not specify any of Defendant's conduct that violates Section 1692f. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of Section 1692f.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit deceptive and unfair or unconscionable means of collecting consumer debts, but they do not prohibit itemizing $0.00 in interest and fees on a static debt.

Hopkins v. Collecto Inc · filed 2021-04-12(e), (f)

We thus conclude that Collecto’s letter to Hopkins did not violate the FDCPA by itemizing $0.00 in interest and fees on his static debt.

The FDCPA imposes strict liability and evaluates §§ 1692e and 1692f objectively from the least sophisticated debtor’s perspective; § 1692f(1) addresses collecting amounts greater than those owed rather than collecting from the wrong person; and § 1692g verification does not require independent investigation.

Blackmon v. Ad Astra Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2021-04-20(e), (f)(1), and (g)

The FDCPA is a strict liability statute that “makes debt collectors liable for violations that are not knowing or intentional.” Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Reichert v. Nat'l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Whether conduct violates §§ 1692e or 1692f requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication.”

Sections 1692b, 1692c(b), 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f respectively limit third-party contacts to the statute’s conditions, do not require written consent when oral consent is given directly to the debt collector, do not treat one call and one email as harassment as a matter of law, require false or misleading representations for the alleged § 1692e theory, and are not violated merely by contacting a debtor’s mother absent conduct resembling the statute’s examples.

Askmo v. D.B.F Collection Corp. · filed 2024-02-12(b), (c)(b), (d), (e), and (f)

The FDCPA states that the consumer’s “prior consent” to contact third parties must be “given directly to the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). ... As such, because oral consent is sufficient to authorize third-party contact under the FDCPA, and ... because Defendant claims that Askmo provided such consent in a phone call with its employee, the Court cannot grant summary judgment to Plaintiff. ... Section 1692b only applies to a debt collector’s communications “for the purpose of acquiring location information,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692b, and Askmo does not claim that the call with his mother concerned his location. ... One phone call and one email to Askmo’s mother does not, as a matter of law, constitute harassment under Section 1692d. ... Next, Askmo’s Section 1692e claim fails because he does not allege that the communications to his mother included false or misleading representations. ... The fact that Defendant contacted Askmo’s mother does not, by itself, “resemble any of the violative conduct.”

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from communicating a consumer's personal debt information to a third party in connection with debt collection, and the phrase covers communications that concern or relate to collecting the debt, not only demands for payment.

Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc. · filed 2021-04-21(b)

We thus hold that Hunstein has alleged a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” as that phrase is commonly understood.

Section 1692c(b) does not treat a voicemail left on a debtor's personal cell phone as a prohibited third-party communication when the debtor voluntarily disseminates it.

Bryan v. Everest Receivable Services, Inc. · filed 2021-09-24(b)

Therefore, this Court finds that voicemails left on personal cell phones are not third-party communications under the FDCPA when the debtor voluntarily disseminates the information.

The FDCPA permits a debt collector to contact a third party to confirm a consumer’s location when it identifies itself and the purpose of the call, does not disclose the debt, and reasonably believes a repeat inquiry is warranted by an incomplete response; such calls alone do not violate the Act’s harassment, deception, or unfair-practice prohibitions.

Mckinley v. Everest Receivable Services, Inc. · filed 2022-02-14(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(b), (d), (e), (e)(10), (f)

Section 1692b(1) requires a debt collector communicating with a third-party for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer to “identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer.” ... As for Everest’s second call to Lois, Everest reasonably believed Lois’ first answer about John’s location was incorrect or incomplete and thus Everest could reasonably believe that she had correct location information when it called her again, 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3). ... This Court finds that a reasonable jury would not conclude that these calls violated the FDCPA because they merely sought confirmation of John’s location and did not ask anything more from Lois McKinley. ... Plaintiffs fail to state how two calls to a consumer’s mother were unfair or unconscionable. ... Plaintiffs fail to establish any violation of the cited FDCPA provisions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692d, 1692e, 1692f.

Sections 1692c(c) and 1692c(b) do not prohibit reporting a debt to credit reporting agencies when otherwise permitted by law; § 1692b(2) applies only to communications seeking location information and is not an independent claim; and reporting to a credit reporting agency, standing alone, is not a § 1692d violation.

Ross v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC · filed 2023-10-26(c)(c), (c)(b), (b)(2), and (d)

Based on a plain reading of the statute, communications with Credit Reporting Agencies would not be prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c), which applies only to “communications with the consumer.” ... Given the clear language of the statute, any alleged communications by Cavalry to Credit Reporting Agencies regarding the debt in question would not constitute a violation unless shown to be not “otherwise permitted by law.” ... Section 1692b’s provision apply only to communications regarding location information about the consumer. ... However, reporting such information to the Credit Reporting Agencies is “expressly permitted under § 1692d(3), and is among the options a debt collector may choose to encourage repayment of a debt.” ... Cavalry’s conduct, in and of itself, does not constitute a violation, and Plaintiff’s claim under Section 1692d is dismissed.

Section 1692k(d) addresses subject-matter jurisdiction over FDCPA claims but does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Darden v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2021-04-21(k)(d)

This misconstrues the meaning of the cited statute, which addresses only subject matter jurisdiction and fails to assert any contacts with the state sufficient to establish general or specific jurisdiction.

Section 1692e prohibits misleading collection communications judged from the least sophisticated debtor’s perspective, while § 1692f(1) concerns collection of amounts not authorized by agreement or law and does not cover merely pursuing the debt from the wrong person.

Opico v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. · filed 2021-04-26(e), (e)(2), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), (f)(1)

The Court concludes that attempting to collect a debt from the wrong person may violate § 1692e, but where that is the only wrong alleged, such conduct does not violate § 1692f. ... Conduct violates § 1692e only where the “least sophisticated debtor,” would be deceived or misled, and this standard is “designed to protect consumers of below average sophistication or intelligence” or who are “uninformed or naïve.” ... This Court find these cases’ interpretation of § 1692f(1) persuasive and concludes that because § 1692f(1) specifically concerns the amount of obligation sought, which plaintiff does not take issue with—plaintiff complains only that the obligation was sought from the wrong individual—liability does not lie under § 1692f(1).

The FDCPA protects the least sophisticated consumer from materially misleading collection communications and abusive conduct, while § 1692f(1) bars purposeful attempts to collect amounts beyond those authorized by the debt agreement or law.

Gowens v. Credit Control, LLC · filed 2022-06-28(d), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10), and (f)(1)

Whether a debt collector’s actions are “false, deceptive, or misleading” under § 1692e depends on whether the “least sophisticated consumer” would be misled, an objective standard. ... Here, under either analysis, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the letters were deceptive and misleading enough to make out violations of 1692e(2)(A) and (10). ... But according to the statutory text, it is not necessary that a debt collector’s conduct fall within one of the enumerated prohibitions if it nevertheless engaged in “any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse.” ... This is plausibly upsetting to a consumer and is sufficient to state a claim. ... To make a plausible claim under a statute like § 1692f, focused on prohibiting “unfair or unconscionable” conduct, a Plaintiff making a claim under subsection (1) would need to include some facts indicating purposeful activity aimed at collecting more than the authorized debt, not merely a possibility that a debtor might interpret an ambiguous notation that way. ... The Motion to Dismiss as to Count I’s claims under § 1692f(1) is therefore granted.

Section 1692e bars materially misleading representations in debt collection, and § 1692f(1) bars collecting amounts not authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law.

Mease v. DCS Financial Inc · filed 2024-07-23(e), (f)(1)

At a minimum, the letter “misrepresents” the “character” of the debt from the perspective of the “least sophisticated debtor” contrary to § 1692e. ... Lumping various court costs with post-judgment interest is “genuinely misleading” as to the “character” of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Section 1692f, again, provides that a “debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. DCS violated § 1692f when it sent the letter. The letter was an attempt to collect amounts which, at that time, were not pursuant to an enforceable judgment. Amounts it sought were not “authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

The FDCPA does not treat child-support obligations as consumer debts because they are imposed to enforce parental support duties rather than incurred in a transaction for consumer goods or services.

Williams v. Aetna Inc · filed 2021-05-04(a)(5)

“Child support payments ’do not qualify as ‘debts’ under the FDCPA because they were not incurred to receive consumer goods or services. Rather, the state agency responsible for collecting child support imposed these obligations upon appellants to force them to fulfill their parental duty to support their children.’”

Section 1692a(5) excludes tax obligations from the FDCPA’s definition of a consumer debt, so collecting an IRS account is not actionable under the statute.

Higgins · filed 2026-03-12(a)(5)

Accordingly, “taxes are not consumer debts” under the FDCPA. ... Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on ConServe’s efforts to collect an account owed to the IRS. This account does not qualify as a debt within the scope of the FDCPA’s protection and so any alleged actions by ConServe are not actionable under that statute.

Section 1692g(b) requires a consumer's debt dispute to be in writing before the collector must cease collection, and Section 1692e(10) prohibits materially misleading representations.

Kahn v. D & A Services, LLC · filed 2021-05-14(g)(b), (e)(10)

Plaintiff does not plausibly allege a violation of Section 1692g(b). Read in its entirety, the letter properly informs plaintiff that plaintiff must dispute the debt in writing. ... Simply put, if the least sophisticated consumer reads the letter in its entirety, as he must, it is clear that both a dispute of the debt and a request for the original creditor’s name and address must be done in writing. For the same reason, plaintiff also does not plausibly allege the disputed sentence is a false, deceptive, or misleading representation in violation of Section 1692e(10). ... Nor has plaintiff plausibly alleged Section 1692e(10) is violated because the disputed sentence is open to more than one reasonable interpretation. ... Neither the use of commas around “or any part thereof” nor the second “or” splits the sentence into two. Rather, the phrase “or any part thereof,” which is offset by commas, is simply a modifier for the preceding word, “debt.” And the second “or” properly identifies two distinct actions that must be done in writing to take effect. Accordingly, both the Section 1692g(b) and Section 1692e(10) claims must be dismissed.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits up to $1,000 in statutory damages, whose amount is discretionary and informed by the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of noncompliance; successful FDCPA plaintiffs may also recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under § 1692k(a)(3).

Magi v. United Merchant Asset Recovery of WNY, LLC · filed 2021-06-02(k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)(1), (k)(a)(3)

Based on the uncontested allegations in the Complaint (Dkt. 1) and Plaintiffs sworn statements in her declaration (Dkt. 6-1), the Court awards Plaintiff $1,000 in statutory damages under the FDCPA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(2)(A). The amount of statutory damages, not to exceed $1,000, falls within the court’s discretion. See Savino v. Comput. Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998). Factors to be considered in determining an appropriate statutory damages award include the frequency, persistence, and nature of the debt collector’s noncompliance and the extent to which the noncompliance was intentional. Id., see also 15 U.S.C. 1692k(b)(1). ... The Court further awards Plaintiff the sum of $1,517 in attorney’s fees and expenses and another $400 in court costs. The FDCPA provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for prevailing parties. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). The Court has reviewed the declaration of Plaintiffs counsel and finds the request for fees and expenses to be reasonable.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) permits up to $1,000 in statutory damages for a prevailing plaintiff, with the amount informed by the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of noncompliance; prevailing plaintiffs may also recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under § 1692k(a)(3).

Lichter v. Bureau Of Accounts Control, Inc. · filed 2021-11-02(k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(a)(3), (k)(b)(1)

Under § 1692k(a)(2)(A) of the FDCPA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to “such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000.” Prevailing plaintiffs are also entitled to “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). In determining the amount to be awarded in statutory damages, the court has to consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). ... Under these circumstances, an award of $750.00 comports with statutory damages awarded in this circuit. Accordingly, Lichter is awarded $750.00 in statutory damages. ... A debt collector found to be in violation of the FDCPA is liable “for the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C.S. §1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k permits consideration of the frequency and persistence of a debt collector’s noncompliance when determining damages, making similar prior collection violations potentially relevant.

Bassett v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc. · filed 2021-06-14

The Court finds the letters at issue in the two other cases may be relevant to damages, provided there is a showing of similarity. The defendants’ argument that any alleged FDCPA noncompliance must be limited to the letter at issue would render the “frequency and persistency of the violation” language on damages superfluous. Accordingly, the Court finds the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of other cases against the defendants should be denied.

Section 1692d(1) prohibits threats of violence or other criminal means, so a threat to sue—even without an intent to file suit—does not violate that subsection.

Rafer v. Internal Credit Systems, Inc · filed 2021-06-22(d)(1)

The Court holds that this claim fails as a matter of law. Even assuming the veracity of Plaintiff’s claim—that Internal Credit threatened to sue her but never actually intended to file suit—this conduct does not involve violence or criminal activity as required by § 1692d(1). In fact, nothing in the record suggests Internal Credit ever threatened violence or other criminal means against Plaintiff.

The FDCPA permits a debt collector to include collection expenses in the amount demanded when the agreement creating the debt expressly authorizes those expenses, and such a demand is not false, deceptive, misleading, or unconscionable.

SAROZA v. LYONS, DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS, P.C. · filed 2021-06-22(e), (f)

The Court finds that, as a matter of law, LDV had the right to add the $82.00 in fees to the amount of Saroza’s debt. ... However, here, the Customer Agreement expressly allowed LDV to collect both court costs and collection expenses. The filing fee and cost of service may reasonably be construed as collection expenses or expenses incurred in the process of collecting the debt incurred. ... The Court finds that, because LDV was entitled to recover the amount of debt plus collection costs, the Letter was therefore not false, deceptive, misleading, or unconscionable.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not prohibit a foreclosure complaint from itemizing reasonable, contract-authorized attorneys’ fees and fixed costs that are reasonably expected to be incurred.

Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2014-03-31(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), and (f)(1)

The Court finds that inclusion in the Foreclosure Complaint of the itemized fixed fees and costs would not have misled or deceived the least sophisticated debtor as to the character, amount, or legal status of his mortgage and total debt, or of any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by the debt collector for the collection of the debt.

The FDCPA does not necessarily treat a debt collector’s unsuccessful, nonfrivolous attempt to collect a debt as a false, deceptive, or unfair practice.

Robbins v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-09-14(e), (f), (f)(1)

The foundational premise of Robbin’s FDCPA claim—under both § 1692e and § 1692f—thus falls apart. ... The Act is a debtor-protection statute, not a device to provide a windfall for debtors who prevail against debt collectors who bring nonfrivolous collection suits. A debt collector who unsuccessfully sues a debtor has not necessarily made a false, deceptive, or misleading representation in violation of § 1692e, nor engaged in an unfair or unconscionable debt-collection practice in violation of § 1692f. ... MED-1’s effort to recover fees-on-fees did not violate the FDCPA.

Sections 1692d and 1692e prohibit repeated or undisclosed collection calls, false garnishment representations, threats to sue on time-barred debts, and failure to disclose the debt-collection purpose of oral communications; § 1692g(b)'s validation protections require a written dispute, and § 1692f is not a catch-all for duplicative FDCPA violations.

Shibata v. Accredited Management Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-09-21(d)(5)-(6), (e)(4)-(5), (e)(11), (f), (g)(a)(3), and (g)(b)

That section lists two examples that are applicable here: (1) “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number” and (2) “placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” See id., §§ 1692d(5)-(6). ... The Court finds that three of the non-exclusive provisions are most applicable: subsection 4, which prohibits the “representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the . . . garnishment . . . of any property or wages”; subsection 5, which prohibits threatening action that cannot legally be taken; and subsection 11, which prohibits the failure to disclose in an oral communication “that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.” See § 1692e(4)-(5), (11). ... Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant failed to disclose the purpose of the calls and the threat of garnishment violate subsections 4 and 11. See id. ... Additionally, because plaintiff’s alleged debt arises from an automobile loan on which payments have not been made since 2011, the FDCPA’s statute of limitations has passed and therefore defendant had no legal right to collect on the debt, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of subsection five. ... As to subsection (b), that subsection requires that a consumer “notifes the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a).” See § 1692g(b); ... However, plaintiff only alleges that she disputed the debt orally. ... Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to default judgment on either of her § 1692(g) claims. ... While plaintiff’s allegations do demonstrate violations of the FDCPA, plaintiff provides no support for the proposition that §1692f is a catch-all provision that bundles all violative behavior into one category. ... As a result, plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment on her §1692f claim.

Sections 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, and 1692e prohibit direct collection communications with a consumer known to be represented by counsel and debt-collection conduct that harasses or misleads, and § 1692k(a)(2)(A) authorizes statutory damages for violations.

McClain v. American Credit Resolution, Inc. · filed 2021-10-13(c)(a)(2), (d), (e), and (k)(a)(2)(A)

Plaintiffs’ allegations, which the court accepts as true for purposes of plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, see, e.g., Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1267, are sufficient to establish that defendant, acting as a “debt collector,” engaged in conduct the natural consequence of which was to harass and mislead plaintiffs, in violation of §§ 1692d and 1692e, and communicated with her whilst knowing that she had counsel, in violation of §1692c(a)(2). These allegations support a successful FDCPA claim and the merits of this claim thus favor entry of default judgment.

Sections 1692e, 1692d(5), and 1692c(a)(3) prohibit misleading debt-collection communications, calls made with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, and calls at a consumer's workplace when the collector knows or has reason to know the employer prohibits them; here, the court found no violation because foreclosure was legally available, the call pattern did not show harassment, and "I'm working" did not establish a workplace prohibition.

Wilkins v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2022-08-23(e), (d)(5), (c)(a)(3)

To determine whether a debt collector made false threats in violation of [§ 1692e], courts consider two elements: (1) whether, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the debt collector threatened to take action and (2) whether the allegedly threatened action could not legally be taken or was not intended to be taken. ... In light of this conclusion, the Second Mortgage remained enforceable after the discontinuance of the foreclosure action and a new limitations period began to run each time Wilkins failed to make his monthly payment. There was therefore nothing misleading about the communications between SLS and Wilkins. ... While the total number of calls here was considerable, they were spread over years, and the relatively low frequency does not allow the inference that SLS made the calls with the intention of harassing Wilkins, as opposed to the legitimate purpose of speaking with him regarding his outstanding debts. ... The statement "I’m working" is not sufficient to indicate that an employer prohibits the speaker from taking calls.

The FDCPA applies to debts primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and to debt collectors, prohibits harassment, deceptive or misleading representations, and unfair or unconscionable collection methods, and requires specified written notice after an initial communication.

Buxton v. Hartin Asset Management, LLC · filed 2023-07-31(a)(5), (a)(6), (d), (e), (f), and (g)(a)

Buxton’s complaint fails to state an FDCPA claim because it does not sufficiently allege that the loan he took from CNG is the type of debt that these provisions apply to. ... Because Buxton has not explained what the debt was borrowed and used for, his conclusory allegation about the debt’s nature is insufficient to state an FDCPA claim. ... The provisions of the FDCPA that Buxton alleges these defendants have violated apply only to debt collectors. ... By alleging that Defendants are in the business of debt collection and regularly collect debts, Buxton has done no more than simply state that Defendants are debt collectors. Reciting the entire statutory definition does not make the allegation any less conclusory. ... In sum, Buxton has failed to state a claim against any defendant under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) covers third-party agents collecting debts for another and excludes debts obtained before default, while § 1692g(b) requires collection to stop after a written dispute until verification and §§ 1692e(2) and 1692f(1) prohibit misrepresenting or adding unauthorized debt amounts.

Wang v. Bank Of America Corporation · filed 2025-07-02(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)(iii), (g)(a), (g)(a)(3), (g)(b), (e)(2), and (f)(1)

Under the FDPCA, a “‘debt collector’ is a person ‘who regularly collects . . . debts owed . . . another’ or a person involved ‘in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.’” Wise, 2023 WL 5575889, at *3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). ... The allegations in the Amended Complaint do not clearly detail SLS’s role in handling the mortgage, but I conclude Wang has plausibly alleged that SLS is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA. ... The relevant provision of the FDCPA provides that “[i]f the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b); see also Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Section 1692g(b) thus confers on consumers the ultimate power vis-à-vis debt collectors: the power to demand the cessation of all collection activities.” (quoting Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1998)). ... Plaintiff’s allegations that SLS continued to collect on his mortgage debt without responding to Wang’s written dispute therefore state a claim for a violation of § 1692g(b). ... This violates the plain language of § 1692g(b). ... The FDCPA supports liability for charging a fee “unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1); other provisions of the law, id, §§ 1692e(2), 1692f(1), prohibit debt collectors from falsely representing the amount of a debt that is owed. ... These allegations also support an FDCPA claim against SLS.

The FDCPA requires a debt collector to verify a timely disputed debt before resuming collection, bars false credit reporting and harassing collection methods, and restricts communications made without consent, at inconvenient times, or after a written cease request.

Baldi · filed 2025-09-26(g)(b), (e)(8), (c)(a)(1), (c)(c), (d)

Defendant’s verification, as shown by exhibits referenced in and attached to Plaintiff’s complaint, satisfied both the terms of the statute and Ninth Circuit’s guidance. Defendant obtained verification of the debt and mailed that verification to Plaintiff. It also confirmed in writing that the amount being demanded was what the creditor claimed was owed. ... The Court finds that Defendant has established, based on documents referenced in and attached to Plaintiff’s complaint, that Defendant did not communicate any information known to be false. ... For the same reasons set forth above, the Court recommends denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss on that basis because Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts at this stage in the case that she revoked her consent to such communications. ... This section does not concern verification or consent. It concerns prohibited methods of debt collection. Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant engaged in conduct that was harassing.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that the plaintiff was the object of collection stemming from consumer debt, the defendants were third-party debt collectors or represented themselves as such, and they engaged in FDCPA-violating practices.

Davis · filed 2026-03-09

The Court also agrees with the Defendants that the complaint fails to state a claim under the FDCPA. To state an FDCPA claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he has been the object of debt collection stemming from consumer debt; (2) the Defendants are third-party debt collectors or have represented themselves as third parties while collecting debt from the plaintiff; and (3) the Defendants engaged in practices violating the FDCPA. ... But beyond that general allegation, there are not facts in the complaint to show the elements of an FDCPA claim. ... Nor does Mr. Davis identify the provision of the FDCPA under which he is proceeding. ... And so, the Court DISMISSES Mr. Davis’s FDCPA claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Sections 1692g(a)(1) and (a)(2) require a collection letter to identify the amount of the debt and the creditor, while §§ 1692e and 1692f prohibit misleading or unfair collection practices; a time-barred debt may still be voluntarily collected when the letter does not mislead the debtor into believing payment is legally required.

BLAIR v. FEDERAL PACIFIC CREDIT COMPANY, LLC · filed 2021-09-27(g)(a)(1), (g)(a)(2), (e), and (f)(1)

The FDCPA requires that debt collection letters include, among other things, (1) “the amount of the debt” and (2) “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” ... Even the least sophisticated debtor would understand that $230.03—the larger amount and the number identified as “amount owed,” “total balance,” and “past due balance”—is the amount of the debt. ... Therefore, the Letter complies with the FDCPA’s requirement that the consumer be provided written notice indicating “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 1692g(a)(2). ... Here, where the Letter does not use the word “settlement,” but instead offers an opportunity to “satisfy” an account, and includes an explicit statement that Defendants “cannot sue,” the least sophisticated debtor would not be misled into believing that she had a legal obligation to pay the time-barred debt. The Complaint therefore fails to state a claim under Section 1692e or Section 1692f.

Under § 1692e, a debt collector may request voluntary payment of a time-barred debt but may not use a communication that could mislead the least sophisticated debtor into believing the debt is legally enforceable.

WAGGETT v. MRS BPO, L.L.C · filed 2022-08-11(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10)

Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that state a claim for relief which is plausible on its face; that is, that the use of the word “obligation” in the context of the letter as a whole could mislead the least sophisticated debtor to believe that Defendant would seek to judicially enforce collection on her time-barred debt if the three proffered payment options were rejected.

The FDCPA does not impose an affirmative obligation on a debt collector to send monthly statements, so failing to send them is not by itself unfair, deceptive, or misleading under the Act.

Linderman · filed 2025-10-31(e), (f)(1)

At bottom, “the FDCPA does not place an affirmative obligation on a debt collector to . . . send monthly statements,” so its failure to do so is not unfair, deceptive, or misleading under the FDCPA or ICFA.

The FDCPA does not make an accurate monthly mortgage statement unlawful when it contains no false, deceptive, misleading, obscene, profane, unfair, or unconscionable content.

TOBING v. PARKER MCCAY, P.A. · filed 2021-09-27(d), (e), (e)(10), and (f)

Moreover, the undisputed facts establish that Rushmore was authorized to collect debt on behalf of WSFS pursuant to the Base Servicing Agreement executed in 2014. ... As the servicer, Rushmore did nothing more than send monthly mortgage statements, like the June 2016 statement, concerning the delinquent Note and Mortgage. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ argument that Rushmore falsely represented a debt owed is without merit. ... As for Plaintiffs’ argument that Rushmore’s statements included a delinquency notice with a threat of foreclosure, nothing in the mortgage statement rises to the level of a violation under the FDCPA. ... The mortgage statement contained no false, deceptive, or misleading representations as contemplated under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, and it contained no obscene or profane language intended to harass or abuse Plaintiffs, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2). In addition, no facts indicate that Rushmore engaged in unfair or unconscionable practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.

The FDCPA's limitations period is not saved by equitable tolling or a fraud-based discovery rule when the complaint does not link the collector's fraudulent conduct to the plaintiff's injury.

Sam v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2021-10-13(d)

For all those reasons, the RR&O correctly concluded that Sam’s FDCPA claim was barred by the statute of limitations and not saved by either equitable tolling or a fraud-based discovery rule.

Section 1692k(d) sets a one-year period running from the violation, but does not preclude California’s equitable tolling doctrine from suspending that period for an FDCPA cross-complaint.

Paredes v. Credit Consulting Services, Inc. · filed 2022-08-22(k)(d)

An action under the FDCPA must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).) ... In sum, Credit Consulting relies largely on case authority that does not address the proposition it advances on appeal. Because Credit Consulting has not demonstrated that United States Supreme Court authority or federal law precludes as a matter of law the tolling of federal FDCPA claims, we conclude that the trial court did not err in applying to Paredes’s cross-complaint California’s equitable tolling doctrine, as articulated in ZF Micro Devices, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at page 92.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year after the violation occurs, does not apply a discovery rule, and permits equitable tolling because the limitations period is neither jurisdictional nor a statute of repose.

Fuller v. CIG Financial LLC · filed 2022-09-02(k)(d)

Under the FDCPA, “an action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Thus the applicable statute of limitations for all FDCPA claims is one year from the date on which the objectionable conduct occurred. There is no applicable discovery rule—that is, it is irrelevant to the calculation of the limitations period when the potential plaintiff discovered the FDCPA violation.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year after the violation, and equitable tolling is unavailable absent extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control.

Alonso · filed 2026-02-25(k)(d)

The FDCPA provides the relevant limitations period: “An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court . . . or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... For the reasons given below, Alonso fails to plead extraordinary circumstances beyond her control and therefore is not entitled to equitable tolling. Her claim is time-barred.

Section 1692g does not support standing for a missing verification notice unless the debtor alleges that the missing information caused a concrete injury.

Millwood v. Adams · filed 2021-09-29(g)

This argument is problematic because a debtor is only entitled to additional information under § 1692g if the debtor decides to dispute the debt.

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f do not impose liability for a four to five second voicemail consisting only of barely audible humming that contains no content, demand, or threat.

Santiago v. Hunter Warfield, Inc. · filed 2021-10-20(d), (e), and (f)

The four to five second message conveys no content or express message relating to Plaintiff, her debt, or the Defendant. It makes no demand and presents no threats. It is perhaps confusing, but this is simply not a sufficient basis to file a federal lawsuit. ... Moreover, even if Plaintiff had presented evidence to establish standing, the Court agrees with Defendant’s arguments regarding the existence of a violation and Defendant’s bona fide error defense.

To state an FDCPA claim under § 1692(e), a plaintiff must allege that the defendant was a debt collector and engaged in conduct prohibited by the Act while collecting a consumer debt.

Bonner v. Santander Consumer USA · filed 2021-11-10(e)

Plaintiff has also not adequately alleged a claim against defendant Santander Consumer USA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) of the FDCPA. ... “To establish a prima facie case in an action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the defendant was a debt collector, (2) the defendant’s conduct in attempting to collect a debt was prohibited by the Act and (3) the debt was a consumer debt.” ... As noted above, plaintiff has not alleged that defendant Santander Consumer USA is a debt collector within the definition the FDCPA or that defendant Santander Consumer USA engaged in a prohibited debt collection practice under the FDCPA.

To make a prima facie FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was a debt collector, the collection conduct was prohibited by the Act, and the debt was a consumer debt.

Bonner v. I.C. System · filed 2021-11-16(e)

Plaintiff has also not adequately alleged a claim against defendant I.C. System pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) of the FDCPA. ... “To establish a prima facie case in an action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the defendant was a debt collector, (2) the defendant’s conduct in attempting to collect a debt was prohibited by the Act and (3) the debt was a consumer debt.” ... As noted above, plaintiff has not alleged that I.C. System is a debt collector within the definition the FDCPA or that defendant I.C. System engaged in a prohibited debt collection practice under the FDCPA. ... Liberally construing the complaint, plaintiff’s allegations against defendant under the FDCPA simply cannot survive review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and the Court will dismiss this claim as legally frivolous.

Section 1692c(c) permits a debt collector to communicate after a consumer’s cease-communication request only when the consumer explicitly requests information, and any waiver is limited to that information.

Vazzano v. Receivable Management Services, LLC · filed 2021-11-10(c)(c)

Considering the current unsettled state of the law and the fact that RMS’s motion to dismiss still fails, the court will assume arguendo that a debtor can waive her protection from a debt collector’s communications under § 1692c(c). ... Finding a waiver without an explicit request for information, however, would be inconsistent with the case law. ... The court is therefore unable to hold that Vazzano waived her protection from further RMS communication. ... The court holds that, even if Vazzano did make a specific request for communication in writing, RMS’s letter exceeded the scope of that waiver.

Section 1692c(c)'s cease-communication protection can be waived when a consumer disputes a debt in a way that invites a narrow response confirming the amount owed.

Bauer v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2024-07-23(c)

By including language that he disputed the debt in his Initial Letter, Plaintiff invited Defendant to confirm the amount owed. Defendant responded narrowly concerning the disputed debt amount, indicated it would no longer contact Plaintiff as he requested, and did not contact him thereafter. ... Considering the Response Letter in tandem with the Initial Letter, and using common sense, Plaintiff waived his § 1692c(c) claim.

A consumer waives § 1692c(c)'s cease-communication protection when the consumer's debt dispute invites the collector to confirm the amount owed, and a narrow response confirming the amount and stating that communications will cease does not violate the statute.

Smitherman v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2024-06-14(c)

By including language that she disputed the debt in her Initial Letters, Plaintiff invited Defendant to confirm the amount owed. Plaintiff cannot claim this invitation was unwanted simply by including contradictory language that the letter was not a request for validation. Defendant responded narrowly concerning the disputed debt amount, indicated it would no longer contact Plaintiff as she requested, and did not contact her thereafter. ... Considering the Response Letters in tandem with the Initial Letters, and using common sense, Plaintiff waived her § 1692c(c) claim.

Section 1692g(a)(3) does not impose a deadline on a consumer’s ability to dispute a debt.

ENNIS v. SHAPIRO & DENARDO, LLC · filed 2021-11-15(a)(3)

Defendant’s October 21 letter included the following sentence: “The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act entitles you to dispute the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, within thirty (30) days of your receipt of this notice.” This misstates the law, seeing as a debtor may dispute their debt at any time; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not impose a deadline to dispute the validity of a debt.

Section 1692k(a)(1) permits an FDCPA plaintiff to recover actual pecuniary damages, including postage paid before the action in response to an unlawful collection lawsuit.

Viernes v. DNF Associates, LLC · filed 2022-01-27(k)(a)(1)

Section 1920’s limitations on “taxable costs” do not, therefore, prevent Viernes from recovering damages for monetary harms caused by having to litigate a prior unlawful suit. Such harms are more accurately viewed as “actual” “pecuniary” damages incurred ex ante, i.e., preceding the instant case, not costs incurred ad litem, i.e., during the instant case. Because Viernes’s recovery of postage costs is not limited by § 1920, and because the FDCPA permits awards of “actual damage[s],” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), Viernes’s postage-cost harm is a redressable harm for purposes of the FDCPA claim.

Section 1692k(a)(1) permits a consumer to recover underlying attorney’s fees as actual damages when the debt collector’s violation causes the consumer to incur those fees.

Wiley v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to underlying attorney’s fees as actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), and they have standing to seek such relief.

Section 1692e(3) bars implying that a collection communication is from an attorney without meaningful attorney involvement, while § 1692g(b) is not violated by law-firm letterhead alone when the letter does not threaten imminent legal action or contradict the validation rights.

Felberbaum v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP · filed 2022-01-27(e)(3), (g)(b)

Section 1692e(3) prohibits “[t]he false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3). ... Based on the undisputed facts, the Court finds that an attorney was meaningfully and sufficiently involved in the collection process to warrant summary judgment in Mandarich’s favor on Count Two. ... Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the mere fact that a Collection Letter is printed on law firm letterhead does not, by itself, imply an immediate threat of legal action overshadowing a validation notice in violation of the FDCPA.

Section 1692c(c) requires a debt collector to stop communicating about a debt after receiving a consumer’s written cease-communication notice, and a mailed notice is complete upon receipt.

Barlow v. Capital Accounts, LLC · filed 2022-02-11(c)

There is no dispute that the plaintiff must prove receipt of the letter to prevail. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (“If such notice from the consumer [ceasing communication] is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.”)

Section 1692g(b) allows only consumers to sue for a debt collector’s failure to stop collection after receiving a written dispute.

Ross v. Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc · filed 2022-02-14(g)(b)

Given the uniformity of past decisions, the Court finds that Ross lacks statutory standing to sue under § 1692g(b).

The FDCPA regulates debt collectors, not creditors that own the debt being collected.

Guthrie v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2022-03-04(a)(6), (a)(4)

Plaintiff does not specifically dispute defendant’s contention that during the time periods relevant to the complaint, defendant, as either OLS or PHH, was the owner of the Loan, and was therefore a creditor not a debt collector under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6); (4). As a creditor, defendant’s conduct in relation to the Loan is not regulated by the FDCPA. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 134, 137 (4th Cir. 2016).

The FDCPA applies to debt collectors, not creditors collecting their own debts.

Lloyd v. TD Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2023-07-17

The FDCPA applies to debt collectors and civil liability under the Act only covers a “debt collector” who fails to comply. 15 U.S.C. § 1692; ... Generally, the Act applies only to debt collectors and creditors are not covered by the Act. ... Because TD Bank is a creditor collecting its own debts, and not a debt collector under the Act, the Act does not apply. Therefore, Count Four is properly dismissed.

The FDCPA regulates debt collectors, not creditors collecting debts owed directly to them; attorneys or law firms may qualify as debt collectors when they regularly seek to collect debts or collect an assigned debt.

Cymbalsky v. 522 Shore Road Owners Inc · filed 2025-01-08(a)(6)

The Second Circuit has held that “creditors are not subject to the FDCPA.” ... As there is no plausible allegation that the Co-op Defendants had assigned a debt to a debt collector, or that they were acting as debt collectors themselves, Cymbalsky fails to state a claim under the FDCPA against the Co-op Defendants. ... Although attorneys or law firms that regularly seek to collect debts may be considered “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, ... Plaintiff does not allege that the Finkelstein Defendants regularly engage in such conduct. ... As Plaintiff does not allege that the Finkelstein Defendants regularly attempt to collect debts, or that they contacted him to collect a debt that had been assigned to them, Plaintiff fails to state an FDCPA violation.

The FDCPA applies to debt collectors, not creditors, and a bank that extends credit creating a consumer debt is a creditor.

Lu v. Capital One, N.A. · filed 2025-09-12(a)(4)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not apply to creditors. It only applies to debt collectors. ... The Act defines a creditor as “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). This describes Capital One; Capital One extended credit to Lu, creating a debt by Lu to Capital One. So Capital One is a creditor.

The FDCPA permits claims based on materially deceptive or unfair collection communications, requires meaningful attorney review before an attorney represents a communication as being from the attorney, and allows a claim filed within one year of the violation.

Ruffin v. Kirschenbaum & Phillips, P.C. · filed 2022-03-09(e), (e)(3), (f), and (k)(d)

That the language of the Income Execution complies with the CPLR, however, does not insulate the communication from the FDCPA because an income execution can be materially deceptive or unfair. ... Plaintiff’s section 1692e(3) shall proceed to discovery.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations and unfair or unconscionable means, respectively; the court held that the challenged letter violated neither.

OZTURK v. AMSHER COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. · filed 2022-05-20(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f)

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Id. Section 1692e goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of violative conduct, including, as raised by Plaintiff here, (2)(A) “[t]he false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt”; (5) “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken”; and (10) “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” Id. ... Here, Plaintiff has failed to point to anything in this Letter that could be read as a threat. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that anything in the Letter had the potential to confuse the least sophisticated debtor. ... “Section 1692f is a catchall provision providing that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Youderian, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 672. ... Thus, for the reasons why Plaintiff fails to state a claim under section 1692e, her claims under section 1692f also fail.

Under § 1692e, a debt collector’s false, deceptive, or misleading representation is actionable only if it is materially misleading and frustrates the consumer’s ability to intelligently choose a response.

West v. Summit Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2022-07-26(e)

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Section 1692e(2) prohibits the false representation of “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2). Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of “any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). To be actionable under the FCPA, a debt collector’s false, deceptive, or misleading representations must be “material.” Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1033 (stating that an immaterial statement—even if it is false in some technical sense—does not violate the FDCPA). Only genuinely misleading statements that frustrate a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her response are material. Id. at 1034.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations; subsection (10) can survive summary judgment when the collector’s own records support that it falsely told the consumer she had made no payments, while subsection (8)’s dispute-reporting duty applies only after a timely written dispute under § 1692g(a) and requires evidence that the collector failed to report it.

Oyathelemi v. LJ Ross and Associates · filed 2022-09-21(e)(8), (e)(10)

Ms. Oyathelemi expressly invokes §1692e(8), which prohibits “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.” ... The duty to report a dispute, however, only triggers upon a dispute in response to a 1692g(a) notice. ... She has not generated a genuine dispute on the § 1692e(8) claim. ... Ms. Oyathelemi also complains that Ross’s assertion that she had not paid a bill on the xx150 Account since 2016 violates § 1692e. That appears to be a reference to § 1692e(10), which prohibits “[t]he use of any false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” Ross’s own submissions into the summary judgment record support the conclusion that Ms. Oyathelemi had been making at least some payments on the xx150 Account. Summary judgment will be denied on the § 1692e(10) claim.

The FDCPA requires debt collectors to disclose in later communications that the communication is from a debt collector and prohibits calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity; failure to make that disclosure in voicemail messages violates §§ 1692e(11) and 1692d(6).

Justice v. M.N.S & Associates, LLC · filed 2022-10-31(d)(6), (e)(11)

However, taking the Plaintiff’s allegations as true, even if the first voicemail message was not the initial communication from the Defendant, the Defendant still violated both §§ 1692e(11) and 1692d(6) of the FDCPA by failing to disclose in the first and second voicemail messages that those communications were from a debt collector.

Section 1692a(6) covers a person whose principal purpose is collecting debts regardless of whether the debts belong to that person or someone else, and § 1692e applies to false or misleading statements in communications connected to debt collection, including responses to debtor inquiries.

Lawler v. Trinity Financial Services, LLC · filed 2024-08-21(a)(6), (e)

This Court agrees, but finds this explanation to be insufficient to defend against the label of debt collector: It ignores the first prong, which categorizes a person as a debt collector if its “principal purpose … is the collection of any debts,” regardless of whether the debts are one’s own or someone else’s. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). ... Given that, in Defendant’s own words, Defendant’s primary business is purchasing defaulted second mortgages, Defendant’s “principal purpose … is the collection of … debts[.]” § 1692a(6). As such, Defendant is a debt collector under the FDCPA’s definition of one. ... The focus is not on what triggered Defendant’s communication to Plaintiff, but on whether such communication was “in connection with the collection of any debt.” § 1692e. And here, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Defendant, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s April 2022 response letter was, in fact, a communication “in connection with the collection of” Plaintiff’s debt. ... As applied to Plaintiff’s § 1692e claim, this involves determining, “from the perspective of the least-sophisticated consumer,” whether a debt collector’s language is false, deceptive, or misleading. ... Such a statement, then, is, if not patently false, at least deceptive or misleading. It does not require “a bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretation” of Defendant’s April 2022 response letter to expect a consumer to believe that Defendant was unable to provide the documents necessary to confirm the validity of Plaintiff’s Second Mortgage. ... As such, summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor is proper on this narrow FDCPA claim: that Defendant violated the FDCPA through its false statement in its April 2022 response letter.

Section 1692e(8) does not impose liability for reporting an account when the debt collector did not know and had no reason to know that the account was disputed or inaccurate.

Perno v. Experian Information Solutions Inc · filed 2022-03-15(e)(8)

Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the statute by simply reporting the account at all, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence showing that Defendant knew or should have known the account was disputed or otherwise inaccurate. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8).

Section 1692k(d) allows FDCPA civil actions to be brought in federal district court or another court of competent jurisdiction, including state court.

Moran · filed 2026-01-22(k)(d)

The state court action provides an adequate forum to address Moran’s claims. For example, Moran’s Complaint alleges Pennymac violated the FDCPA and FCRA. State courts hold concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate Moran’s FDCPA and FCRA claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); 15 U.S.C. 1681p.

15 U.S.C. § 1692 does not provide a basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Jordan v. United States · filed 2022-03-15

To the extent that Mr. Jordan has not abandoned this claim, the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction over it and grants the government’s motion to dismiss this claim as well. Dainja El, 2017 WL 4639364, at *2 (finding that 15 U.S.C. § 1692 “do[es] not provide a basis for jurisdiction in this Court”).

Section 1692f(6) applies to an agent enforcing a security interest, and a debtor sufficiently states a claim by alleging that the agent repossessed without a present right after breaching the peace and continuing over the debtor's protest.

Sinegal v. Big Horn Auto Sales, Inc. · filed 2022-03-16(f)(6)

This section applies to “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” ... The Supreme Court recently explained that an agent hired to carry out a nonjudicial foreclosure, “by virtue of its role enforcing security interests, [is] at least subject to the specific prohibitions contained in § 1692f(6).” ... Sinegal has alleged that Texas Recovery Solutions was responsible for enforcing Big Horn’s security interest, so § 1692f(6) applies. ... Sinegal alleges that Texas Recovery Solutions did not have a right to repossession under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f because it breached the peace and continued with the repossession over Sinegal’s protest, which led to Sinegal’s physical injury. ... Sinegal has sufficiently alleged that Texas Recovery did not have a right to repossess as it did.

The FDCPA does not make a debt collector liable under §§ 1692c, 1692e, or 1692f merely for attempting to collect a debt that the consumer claimed was discharged when the debt was not legally discharged.

Reisenauer v. Columbia Debt Recovery · filed 2022-03-24(c), (e), (f)

Accordingly, CDR is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Reisenauer’s causes of action that have debt dissolution as their sole basis. Summary judgment is granted as to Mr. Reisenauer’s claim that CDR violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692e, and 1692f, for attempting to collect debt that he was absolved of.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a debt collector’s validation notice to state the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, and section 1692e prohibits material false or misleading representations in debt collection.

Bowman v. Receivables Performance Management LLC · filed 2022-03-28g(a)(2), e, e(2)(A), e(10)

Viewed through the lens of the least sophisticated consumer, the March 9 Letter’s identification of Plaintiff’s creditor as “Simple Choice No Credit”—the name of a cell phone plan offered by T-Mobile, although not one there is any record of Plaintiff having signed up for—does not satisfy section 1692g(a)(2)’s requirement to provide “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” ... Because the March 9 Letter did not include the name of (or any version of the name of) Plaintiff’s purported creditor, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on her claim (at Count III of her Complaint) that RPM violated 15 U.S.C. section 1692g(a)(2). ... Similarly, the March 9 Letter’s failure to identify the creditor to which Plaintiff allegedly owed a debt constituted a false and misleading representation as to the character of that debt in violation of sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10). ... Plaintiff is therefore entitled to summary judgment in her favor as to her claim (at Count IV of her Complaint) that RPM’s identification of “Simple Choice No Credit” as the relevant creditor violated 15 U.S.C. sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10).

An obligation is a debt under the FDCPA only when it arises from a transaction involving money, property, insurance, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; a tort-based subrogation claim does not qualify.

CHAVANNE v. SECOND LOOK, INC. · filed 2022-03-28(a)(5)

Further, Plaintiff’s legal duty not to start a fire exists independently of any contractual obligations that she may have. Whether set intentionally or unintentionally, the damages that flow from the fire are tort damages, not contract damages. The mere fact that Plaintiff had a lease with Lefever does not change the fact that fire damages are tort and not contract damages. Accordingly, the subrogation claim in this case is not a debt as defined by the FDCPA and Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1692 requires a plaintiff alleging an FDCPA violation to plead facts plausibly supporting the claimed prohibited debt-collection practice.

Ortiz v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC · filed 2022-03-29

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA. ... Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded facts to support that contention. Plaintiff’s assertion that she does not owe a debt to LVNV does not by itself surmount her burden of pleading facts to support her FDCPA claims, because it is “a legal conclusion, or at least a mixed allegation of law and fact, rather than a factual allegation.”

The FDCPA claim must allege facts showing how the debt collector misrepresented the debt or used unfair or deceptive practices to collect it.

JANE DOE v. PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC. · filed 2022-06-27

Separate from the alleged garnishment, Plaintiff alleges that Pioneer violated the FDCPA in attempting to collect her debt. (See AC ¶¶ 65–73.) However, the allegations in her pleading are merely “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Amended Complaint does not contain any factual allegations as to how Pioneer misrepresented the amount or character of her debt or used unfair or deceptive practices to collect her debt, either in collection letters or in other communications to Plaintiff. ... Accordingly, this Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim without prejudice.

A plaintiff alleging an FDCPA violation must identify the violated FDCPA provision and explain how the defendant violated it, in addition to alleging the consumer, debt-collector, and violative-act elements.

Johnson v. AFNI, Inc. · filed 2023-04-15

A violation under the FDCPA requires that “(1) the plaintiff must be a consumer who allegedly owes the debt or a person who has been the object of efforts to collect a consumer debt, (2) the defendant collecting the debt must be considered a debt collector, and (3) the defendant must have engaged in an act or omission in violation of the FDCPA’s requirements.” ... The plaintiff neither identifies the provisions of the FDCPA that the defendants allegedly violated, nor alleges how the defendants did so.

To state an FDCPA claim, a consumer must plead facts showing that a debt collector violated a specific FDCPA provision while attempting to collect a debt; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

WEST v. GLOBAL LENDING SERVICES, LLC · filed 2025-05-28(e), (f)

West has failed to allege facts supporting the fourth element, that Defendants violated one of the FDCPA’s provisions in collecting on her debt, because she does not describe said violations other than in conclusory terms. For example, she asserts the legal conclusion that Defendants “misrepresent[ed] their legal right to repossess” her “vehicle and engag[ed] in deceptive practices to enforce a nonexistent right to possession,” purportedly in violation of the FDCPA’s prohibition on making “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s]” in connection with debt collection. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. But she does not allege any facts supporting that conclusion, such as the contents of said misrepresentations, to whom Defendants made them, or why Defendants’ asserted right of repossession would be “nonexistent.” She further asserts that Defendants collected on her debt through “unfair or unconscionable means,” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, but nowhere in her pleading does she identify the means Defendants used which were purportedly unfair or unconscionable.

The FDCPA claim requires allegations identifying actions by each defendant that violated the Act.

Bishop · filed 2025-11-12

Magistrate Judge Stafford recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, first, under Eleventh Amendment immunity, and second, for her failure to plead how Smith and Husbands engaged in illegal conduct. ... And if Plaintiff intended to sue Smith and Husbands in their individual capacities, she did not allege any of their actions which violated the Act. Therefore, the Court need not even reach the issue of whether a statute of limitations applies.

The FDCPA imposes a one-year limitations period, requires specified validation information in an initial collection communication, and prohibits materially misleading, harassing, or unfair collection practices, while permitting collection-related communications with a debtor’s attorney or authorized representative.

Makhnevich v. Bougopoulos · filed 2022-03-29(c)(b), (d), (e), (e)(5), (e)(11), (f), (g)(a), and (k)(d)

The court finds that Defendants were not required to send Plaintiff a separate written notice because all of the information required by Section 1692g(a) was contained in Defendants’ initial communication of April 3, 2015. ... Thus, “a false statement is only actionable under the FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated consumer.” ... In sum, the court concludes that Defendants’ communications with Mr. Schuessler and Plaintiff’s daughters did not violate Section 1692c(b). ... Nevertheless, the court finds that the February 13, 2018 letter did not violate Section 1692e(11) based on Defendants’ failure to specifically invoke the statutory language that the Novick Firm was a “debt collector.” ... But New York law expressly authorizes parties to seek sanctions and attorney’s fees during the course of litigation. ... Accordingly, in addition to rejecting any claim under Section 1692d for the reasons explained above, the court declines to extend Section 1692d to reach the alleged litigation misconduct in the Civil Court action here. ... In any event, having reviewed the record, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendants used any unfair or unconscionable means to collect her debts to the Board.

Section 1692n permits state debt-collection laws to provide greater consumer protection than the FDCPA.

Allen v. Majerle Management, Inc. · filed 2022-03-30(n)

And the FDCPA itself specifies that state laws affording’ greater protection to consumers are not inconsistent with its own safeguards. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.

Sections 1692d(5) and 1692e(2)(A) prohibit harassing or abusive repeated debt-collection calls and misrepresenting a debt’s character, amount, or legal status, while § 1692k governs statutory damages, actual damages, and attorney’s fees.

Nitzkin v. One Reliance LLC · filed 2022-04-13(d)(5), (e)(2)(a), (k)(a)(3), (k)(b)(1)

Plaintiff alleges five different violations of the FDCPA, of which the Court finds two to be credibly pled: a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) for engaging in conduct that is meant to “harass, oppress, or abuse” in the course of debt collection, and of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a) for misrepresenting the “character, amount, or legal status” of a debt by calling Plaintiff about a debt he did not owe. ... Given that Plaintiff has shown more than one violation of the FDCPA, the Court will award the full $1,000 in statutory damages.

Sections 1692d and 1692e prohibit harassing, oppressive, abusive, false, or misleading debt-collection conduct, while § 1692g requires a debt collector to send specified written disclosures within five days after the initial communication.

Stewart v. MNS & Associates, LLC · filed 2022-08-08(d), (e), and (g)

Plaintiff’s allegations, which the court accepts as true for purposes of plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, see, e.g., Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1267, are sufficient to establish that defendants, acting as a “debt collector,” engaged in conduct the natural consequence of which was to harass and mislead plaintiffs, in violation of the FDCPA at §§ 1692d and 1692e. Assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations, defendant also violated § 1692g, which requires a debt collector to send the consumer, within five days after the initial communication, a written notice containing certain disclosures.

The FDCPA covers consumer-payment obligations arising mainly from personal, family, or household transactions, regulates qualifying debt collectors, and imposes a one-year limitations period.

Wescott v. Block · filed 2022-04-18(a)(5), (a)(6), and (k)(d)

Those laws prohibit abusive, unfair, or deceptive practices in consumer debt collection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.1. “Because not all obligations to pay are considered debts under the FDCPA, a threshold issue in a suit brought under the Act is whether or not the dispute involves a ‘debt’ within the meaning of the statute.” ... Plaintiff’s vague allegations do not adequately describe the consumer debt that Defendants allegedly attempted to collect. Likewise, Plaintiff’s does not explain his naked assertion that Defendants were acting as debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”); ... Plaintiff’s allegations also appear to run afoul of the one-year statute of limitations contained in both statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); ... Accordingly, the court recommends dismissal of these claims with leave to amend to address these deficiencies.

Section 1692k(d) gives state courts concurrent jurisdiction over FDCPA claims.

Robbins v. NewRez LLC · filed 2022-04-25(k)(d)

Moreover, the statutes that provide the basis for Robbins’ federal claims (RESPA and the FDCPA) grant concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts, making the Circuit Court competent to protect Robbins’ federal rights as well. See 12 U.S.C § 2614; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

A creditor remains outside the FDCPA's debt-collector definition unless, while collecting its own debt, it uses a name implying that a third party is collecting or attempting to collect it.

Morgan v. Bank Of America, N.A. · filed 2022-05-03(a)(6)

The parties’ dispute is whether BANA falls under the FDCPA despite its status as a creditor because it used a name other than its own “which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect” the debt owed by Mr. Morgan. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Here, the plain terms of the statute simply do not apply. FDCPA’s exception to creditor liability attaches when “it uses a name that implies that a third party is involved in collecting debts.” Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Dickenson v. Townside T.V. & Appliance, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. W.Va. 1990) (creditor’s use of business name from inception of credit relationship with consumer did not imply debt had been transferred to a third party collection agency). The facts here show no such implication. By continuing to use the name FIA Card Services throughout the district court litigation, BANA in no way sent the message that it had retained a third party to collect Mr. Morgan’s debt. Instead, the continued existence of the FIA name sent the message that the original creditor was the one who continued to pursue the debt.

The FDCPA generally excludes creditors, but a creditor may be liable as a debt collector when it uses another name indicating that a third party is collecting or attempting to collect the debt.

HEDDEN v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2024-10-29(a)(4), (a)(6)

The FDCPA requires that a claim be against a debt collector. See Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, 916 F.3d 260, 261 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)); ECF 9-1 at 15–17. “Creditors”—entities that offer credit or to whom a debt is owed—are generally not subject to the FDCPA. Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC, 898 F.3d 364, 366 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(4)). But Hedden’s allegations about a unilateral withdrawal of payment through a debt-collecting Navy Federal subsidiary, id. ¶ 135, nudge her claim of an FDCPA violation “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Tepper, 898 F.3d at 366 (noting liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) where a creditor uses “any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts”). Hedden plausibly states a claim for relief under the FDCPA, which may be fleshed out through discovery. Navy Federal’s motion to dismiss Count IX is denied.

Sections 1692e(2)(A), (2)(B), (5), and (10) prohibit false or deceptive debt-collection representations, including misstatements about a debt or fees and threats of unlawful action; § 1692f prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection methods, and § 1692f(1) bars collecting amounts not authorized by contract or law.

Hrdlicka v. Bruce · filed 2022-05-11(e)(2)(A), (e)(2)(B), (e)(5), (e)(10), (f), (f)(1)

Accordingly, Section 1692e(2)(A) and (B)’s proscription against making “false representations” were not violated. Ultimately, because Mr. Hrdlicka fails to provide facts which plausibly give rise to a violation of Section 1692e(2)(A) or (B), those claims are dismissed. ... Accordingly, the request of those fees was “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law,” and were deemed reasonable by the state court. As a result, Mr. Hrdlicka has failed to state a claim under Section 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). ... Unlike in the cases Mr. Bruce relies on, his request for default judgment was more than “procedural mishap”—it was a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation [] in connection with the collection of any debt” that seemingly caused faulty default judgment to be entered. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Accordingly, Mr. Hrdlicka’s Section 1692e(5) and (10) claims premised on Mr. Bruce’s improper motion for default survive dismissal. ... For similar reasons as discussed in the Section 1692e portion of this order, the Court finds Mr. Hrdlicka to have sufficiently pled a claim under Section 1692f premised on Mr. Bruce’s improper request for default and failure to serve, but not when premised on Mr. Bruce’s response in opposition to Mr. Hrdlicka’s wage garnishment challenge. ... Accordingly, Mr. Hrdlicka’s Section 1692f claim survives dismissal on two of the three grounds he presents.

Sections 1692e(8) and 1692e(9) concern false or misleading credit-information communications, and claims under them seek to remedy personal rather than contractual harm and are legally unassignable under Oklahoma law.

Dotson v. Transworld Systems Inc · filed 2022-07-08(e)(8), (e)(9)

FDCPA claims under § 1692e(8) and § 1692e(9) concern communications of allegedly false credit information, and as stated in Plaintiff’s pleading, a debt collector’s misconduct harms a consumer’s “personal [and] credit reputation.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 27. These asserted claims seek to remedy a personal harm, not a contractual one, and thus are legally unassignable.

Sections 1692e(2)(A), (4), (5), and (10) prohibit false representations about a debt's legal status, arrest, or legally unavailable action, while § 1692g(b) prohibits collection communications that overshadow the consumer's right to dispute the debt during the validation period.

Ambridge v. Accredited Management Solutions, LLC · filed 2022-07-12(e)(2)(A), (e)(4), (e)(5), (e)(10), (g)(b)

Here, the complaint alleges that Defendants falsely represented that (1) they could collect on a debt that had been time-barred for approximately five years, see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 32-34; (2) there was a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest and an upcoming court date, see id. at ¶ 32; and (3) Defendants could bring a legal action against Plaintiff if he did not immediately pay the debt, see id. at ¶ 34(a). The Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to meet Plaintiff's "modest burden" of demonstrating violations of Sections 1692e(2)(A), (4), (5), and (10) ... Although "a debt collector is, as a general matter, entitled to demand immediate payment of a debt, and to threaten further action in the event of non-payment," Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 91, the Court finds that Defendants' threats of a "warrant for [Plaintiff's] arrest" and "legal action against Plaintiff if he did not immediately pay the alleged debt," Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 31, 34, would leave the least sophisticated consumer "uncertain whether she had the option to dispute the debt, and to withhold payment while disputing it," Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 92; see also Parker v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP, No. 19-CV-6313, 2021 WL 2351177, *14 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2021) ("A communication from a debt collector may be a threat if the least sophisticated consumer 'would interpret th[e] language to mean that legal action was authorized, likely, and imminent'") (quoting Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff has demonstrated his entitlement to relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.

Section 1692b(3) permits a debt collector to contact a third party again only when the third party requested it or the collector reasonably believes the earlier response was erroneous or incomplete and the third party now has correct or complete location information, while the location-information safe harbor permits a callback message that violates no other prohibition.

Raze v. Everest Receivable Services, Inc. · filed 2022-07-22(b)(3)

After careful consideration, this Court agrees with the Eleventh Circuit on this close question and finds that as long as a call relays information regarding a debt, it is a “communication” regardless of whether it discloses or implies the existence of the debt. ... Leaving a message after the third party declines to provide contact information during a proper location-acquisition call does not violate the statute. ... Thus, this Court finds that a message left with a third party in the course of a call made “for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer” does not violate the FDCPA, so long as it does not violate another prohibition in section 1692—such as stating that the consumer owes a debt.

The FDCPA covers debts arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, bars unfair or misleading collection practices, and requires FDCPA claims to be filed within one year of the violation.

Tawose · filed 2026-02-09(a)(5), (e), (e)(2), (f), (k)(d)

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiff’s debts as clearly commercial. Yes, the debts stem from Plaintiff’s allegedly improper income-generating use of his Silverhawk Property. But those debts were assessed because Plaintiff violated Silverhawk’s covenants forbidding his rental of the property—for the purposes of maintaining a residential neighborhood. ... With respect to Plaintiff’s “unfair means” claim pursuant to § 1692f, the Complaint alleges nothing about the “means” in which the inaccurate amounts were used. It only states that Defendants continued to rely on the inaccurate liens even after Plaintiff disputed them. The issue is merely the representations themselves, and thus Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Winton Defendants pursuant to § 1692f. ... Due to Plaintiff’s vague allegations and the lack of briefing on this issue, however, the Court cannot conclude whether Plaintiff’s non-time-barred FDCPA claim falls within the meaning of the FDCPA or is more properly cognizable in bankruptcy court. Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims are therefore DISMISSED.

The FDCPA covers consumers, debt collectors, and qualifying consumer debts, bars false, deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable collection practices, and allows up to $1,000 in statutory damages per lawsuit based on the nature and persistence of noncompliance.

WILLIAMS v. MOUNTAIN RUN SOLUTIONS · filed 2022-07-22(a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(6), (e)(2)(A), (e)(8), (e)(10), (f)(1), (k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)(1)

The FDCPA “prohibits ‘debt collector[s]’ from making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices.” ... Finally, courts in this Circuit apply the “least sophisticated debtor” standard when deciding if debt collection violates Section 1692e. ... Mountain Run used unfair or unconscionable means to collect the debt by attributing it to Mr. Williams instead of his father, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). ... The FDCPA provides the Court with discretion in granting statutory damages up to $1,000 per lawsuit, not per violation. ... In granting statutory damages, the Court must consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” § 1692k(b)(1). ... Mountain Run’s behavior does not establish the intentionality, persistence, and egregiousness to warrant a full $1,000 award. The Court therefore awards $500 in statutory damages.

The FDCPA bars debt collectors from using deceptive or unfair collection methods, requires a plaintiff to plead the consumer, debt, debt-collector, and statutory-violation elements, and does not cover a creditor collecting its own debt.

MACALL v. FIRST MONTGOMERY GROUP · filed 2025-01-29(a)(6), (e), and (f)

The FDCPA provides, in relevant part, that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The FDCPA further provides more generally that “[a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” § 1692f. To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” ... Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is “any person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . to another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). To the extent that any former landlord attempted to collect the judgment on their own behalf, they are creditors and not debt collectors.

Sections 1692e(4) and 1692f(1) prohibit threats of arrest or seizure and unauthorized collection amounts, while § 1692k permits up to $1,000 in statutory damages and reasonable attorney fees for a successful consumer.

Grayson v. Midland Group & Associates, LLC · filed 2025-03-25(e)(4), (f)(1), (k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b), (k)(a)(3)

Additionally, Grayson indicates that he was “regularly told by Midland representatives that they would throw [him] in jail, that they would seize his bank account, and garnish his social security benefits.” (Doc. 14 at J 8.) This establishes an independent violation of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4). ... The Federal Debt Collection Practice Act provides for the recovery of statutory damages in the amount of no more than $1,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). In assessing whether such damages should be awarded, courts must evaluate the frequency and consistency of the debt collector’s noncompliance, the nature of the noncompliance, and whether the noncompliance was intentional. Jd. § 1692k(b). ... Here, because Midland has engaged in more than ... one violation of the Act as discussed above, a maximum statutory damages award is justified.

Section 1692(e) prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection communications, but a plaintiff must allege concrete harm beyond the statutory violation to establish standing.

FOLEY v. MEDICREDIT, INC. · filed 2022-07-29(e)

Regarding the Amended Complaint’s alleged injury of misrepresentations under Section 1692(e), the Court again looks to TransUnion for guidance to determine whether the harm alleged is “concrete” enough to confer Article III standing. ... Applying that logic here, Foley does not allege that she was actually harmed in any manner from receiving the Collection Letter. ... The Court therefore finds that Foley does not allege an injury beyond statutory violations, which the Supreme Court has made clear is not enough to confer standing.

Section 1692g(b) requires written dispute notice within 30 days of an initial debt-collector communication before collection must cease, and § 1692e(8) bars omitting the fact that a debt is disputed when communicating credit information.

Zinetti v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2022-08-03(a)(6), (e)(8), (f), (g)(b)

Section 1692g(b) requires that a debt collector “shall cease collection of the debt” if, within thirty days of receiving a written notice from the debt collector, the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing that the debt is disputed. ... The Zinettis’ cases therefore do not create a broader notification period that the period explicitly recited in section 1692g. ... Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating “to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.”

Section 1692c(c) bars a debt collector from communicating further about a debt after the consumer gives written notice that the consumer refuses to pay, and the refusal need not also demand that communications cease.

Vazzano v. Receivable Management Services, LLC · filed 2022-08-12(c)

Section 1692c(c) provides that “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt . . . the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt” except in limited circumstances not applicable here. ... In Vazzano’s letter to RMS, she stated that she “refuse[d] to pay” the debt. ... First, RMS does not specify what an “unqualified” refusal is—and it is hard to see how much more clear Vazzano could have been beyond saying that she “refuse[d] to pay.” ... And, second, § 1692c(c) does not require a statement that Vazzano wanted to cease communications. ... Accordingly, the court holds that Vazzano has met her heavy burden to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist, and that she is entitled to partial summary judgment establishing her § 1692c(c) claim.

Section 1692c(c) generally bars a debt collector from communicating further about a debt after receiving a consumer's written refusal to pay, subject to specified exceptions.

(PS) Wilson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2025-06-12(c)

Plaintiff also alleges that Sky Cloud violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) by continuing collection efforts after receiving a cease-and-desist letter from plaintiff. ... The complaint does not sufficiently state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) against Sky Cloud because while plaintiff alleges that she received communication after sending a cease-and-desist letter, it is unclear whether this communication came from Sky Cloud, or if this communication qualified under one of the exceptions listed in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (stating that if a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refused to pay a debt, the debt collector shall not communicate further regarding the debt except to advise the consumer that the collector’s further efforts are being terminated, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies normally invoked, or to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to revoke a specified remedy).

A consumer’s written statement that they refuse to pay a debt can trigger the debt collector’s duty to stop communicating about that debt, subject to statutory exceptions.

Rivera · filed 2026-03-31(c)

Instead, the email at least arguably reflects a request for Defendant to cease communications in the form of Plaintiff’s statement “I reject to pay”: as Plaintiff notes, under the FDCPA, and as stated above, “[i]f a customer notifies a debt collector in writing that the customer refuses to pay a debt . . . the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt” except in the case of enumerated exceptions not applicable here. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). In moving for summary judgment, Defendant makes much of the fact that Plaintiff, in responding to Defendant, seemingly did not use language explicitly requesting that Defendant cease all communication with her, see, e.g., ECF No. 36 at 2, but in doing so, Defendant ignores the requirement that all communication must cease when Plaintiff has stated that she “refuses to pay [the] debt.” Since Plaintiff stated that she “reject[ed] to pay” the debt in sending her first email, under this provision, she has, at minimum, created a fact dispute as to whether she triggered Defendant’s obligation not to communicate further with her with respect to the debt.

Section 1692e prohibits materially false, deceptive, or misleading representations judged from the perspective of a reasonable consumer.

Tavernaro v. Pioneer Credit Recovery · filed 2022-08-08(e)

In summary, a representation violates § 1692e only if it is materially false, deceptive, or misleading to the reasonable consumer.

Section 1692e(14) prohibits a debt collector from using a business name other than its true name, without distinguishing between an agent and its principal; an identity misrepresentation is actionable when it can affect the least sophisticated debtor’s decision-making.

WALKER v. CENLAR, FSB · filed 2022-08-09(e)(14)

As noted, the statute specifically deems it a violation for a debt collector to misrepresent its identity and makes no distinction between agents and principals.