15 U.S.C. § 1692

The FDCPA does not completely preempt state consumer-protection laws; it preempts only state laws that provide consumers less protection than the FDCPA.

Smith v. Davenport Financial, LLC · filed 2022-01-20(e)

Rather, “the FDPCA preempts only laws that afford consumers less protection than that provided by the FDCPA.” Desmond, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (collecting cases); see Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1067. Here, as evidenced by the prayers for relief, the state law claims asserted in the FAC provide greater protection than the FDCPA provides, in the form of punitive damages and other tort relief. See, e.g., Desmond, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 568. Accordingly, they are not preempted by the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken.

Wilson v. Asset Acceptance, LLC · filed 2012-06-05(e)(5)

One way in which a debt collector can violate this provision is to “threat[en] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” § 1692e(5). ... Rather than threatening action intended to induce payment of a disputed debt, Defendant merely sought to enforce a final judgment that had already been entered in its favor. ... Regardless' of the. state court’s in rem jurisdiction over the funds to be garnished, there is no suggestion that Defendant’s attempt to enforce the judgment in its favor involved any false, deceptive, or misleading representations and, thus, Defendant’s conduct does constitute a “threat” as contemplated by the Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e(5) is not violated by an attorney’s collection letter merely because it uses law-firm letterhead and an attorney’s signature; the letter must contain an actual threat of litigation.

Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C. · filed 2005-10-06(e)(5)

In this case, the fact that the Letters are on law firm letterhead and signed by an attorney are insufficient to constitute an implicit threat of litigation which would render an attempt to collect on a time-barred debt in violation of the federal FDCPA. ... Absent an actual threat of litigation in the content of the collection attempt, the mere fact that the Letters are from an attorney is insufficient to be a threat of litigation even to the least sophisticated debtor.

The FDCPA prohibits false or misleading representations and collection of amounts not authorized by agreement or law, bars inconvenient communications with consumers but not communications directed only to attorneys, generally bars direct contact with represented consumers unless an exception applies, and requires a timely written dispute to trigger debt-validation duties.

Lee v. Medicredit, Inc. · filed 2022-01-13(e)(2)(A), (f)(1), (c)(a)(1), (c)(a)(2), (g)(a), (g)(b)

The Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1692e because it contains no allegations that Defendant made representations concerning the “character, amount, or legal status” of the Debt that were false or misleading. ... Similarly to her Section 1692e claim, in support of her Section 1692f(1) claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant sought “to collect amounts Defendant was not authorized to collect.” ... Thus, because Plaintiff’s Section 1692c(a)(1) claim is based on an allegedly inconvenient communication sent to Attorney Goodman—who is not a “consumer” under Section 1692c(d)— Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1692c(a)(1). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged the essential elements to state a claim for violation of Section 1692c(a)(2). ... Thus, to state a claim pursuant to Section 1692g(b), the plaintiff-consumer must plausibly allege that he or she disputed the debt or any portion thereof within thirty days of receipt of the notice of the debt. ... First, nothing in Section 1692g(b) suggests that a debt collector must cease collection efforts and validate a debt if it acknowledges receipt of an untimely dispute of a debt and states that it is investigating the matter.

Under §§ 1692e and 1692f, a challenged communication or debt-collection practice must be connected to collecting a debt, and that connection is determined from the communication’s substance and animating purpose rather than boilerplate disclosure language.

Heinz v. Carrington Mortgage Services · filed 2021-07-09(e), (f)

Considering the content of each of the communications, we conclude that none were made in connection with the collection of a debt. ... Rather, we look to the substance of the letter—what information it provides and what it asks the borrower to do—to determine whether an “animating purpose” is “to induce payment by the debtor.” ... We thus conclude that a routine disclosure statement that is at odds with the remainder of the letter does not turn the communication into something that it is not—in this case, a communication made in connection with the collection of a debt for the purposes of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a debt collector to send written notice within five days after the initial communication to a valid address where the consumer may actually receive it, regulates location-information calls and misleading collection statements, and directs courts to consider specified noncompliance factors when awarding additional damages.

Ponce v. BCA Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2012-02-14(b)(1), (e)(10), (g)(a), and (k)(b)(1)

The FDCPA requires that a debt collector must “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a consumer . . . send the consumer a written notice” containing specified information unless that information was already included in the initial communication. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). ... While the plain language of the statute might not require the debt collector to ensure actual receipt of the written notice, the plain language does require the debt collector to send the written notice to a valid and proper address where the consumer may actually receive it. ... Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Ponce’s claim under § 1692g is not barred by the statute of limitations nor its conclusion that BCA violated § 1692g by not sending written notice in accordance with § 1692g(a) within five days of Moreno’s telephone call to Ponce. ... Accordingly, we see no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that BCA violated § 1692b(1). ... We see no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that this statement would have been misleading to the least sophisticated consumer and therefore violated § 1692e(10). ... In determining the amount of damages to award, the FDCPA instructs the district court to consider, “among other relevant factors—, . . . the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1).

Section 1692 prohibits debt collectors from threatening legally unavailable litigation, collecting amounts not permitted by law, and presenting debt information or validation rights in a confusing or contradictory way.

Larsen v. JBC Legal Group, P.C. · filed 2008-02-12(e)(5), (e)(10), (f)(1), and (g)(a)(1)

Although it is permissible for a debt collector to seek to collect on a time-barred debt voluntarily, it is prohibited from threatening litigation with respect to such a debt. ... Accordingly, by stating that they would attempt to collect from plaintiff an amount of damages that is not permitted by law, JBC, Boyajian and ORM have violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) and plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. ... Based on the foregoing, although the demand for payment, standing alone, does not violate the FDCPA, the October 24, 2003 debt collection notice fails to adequately explain to plaintiff that she retains her rights pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. ... Accordingly, the letter violates Section 1692g of the FDCPA and plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment against JBC, Boyajian and ORM on that claim as well.

Sections 1692e and 1692g prohibit a debt collector from using a misleading phone-number message in another language to overshadow or undermine the consumer's required written validation notice.

Ehrich v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2010-01-20(e), (g)

A phone call, therefore, does not suffice to meet the requirement of written notice, regardless of what occurs when the consumer calls the phone number. As such, the Spanish sentence violated § 1692g because it overshadowed the notice. ... For the same reasons set forth above regarding defendant’s violation of § 1692g, defendant’s debt collection letter also violates § 1692e. As suggested by plaintiffs, by including the Spanish sentence, defendant might deceive or mislead the least sophisticated Spanish-speaking consumer into calling the phone number, thereby potentially waiving his or her rights. As such, the debt collection letter also violates § 1692e.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, while § 1692g requires a validation-of-debt notice and prohibits contradicting or overshadowing that notice.

Scheunemann v. J.C. Christensen & Associates, Inc. · filed 2011-07-18(e), (e)(5), (e)(10), (g)

Section 1692e of the FDCPA states, “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... The court views a claim under § 1692e through the eyes of an unsophisticated consumer. ... The FDCPA creates an “implied duty to avoid confusing the unsophisticated consumer,” ... and a debt collector violates § 1692e if the required information is not communicated to the debtor or if it is provided in a manner that is “confusing” to the consumer. ... Section 1692g requires debt collectors to provide certain information “in the initial communication” with the consumer or “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication,” including a validation-of-debt notice. ... A debt collector can violate § 1692g by contradicting the required information in the collection letter or by overshadowing it.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to provide specified debt and dispute information in the initial communication or within five days, while §§ 1692d(2), 1692d(5), and 1692e(5) prohibit abusive language, repeated calls intended to harass, and threats of action not intended to be taken; § 1692e communications are evaluated under the least-sophisticated-consumer standard.

Shuler v. Ingram & Associates · filed 2011-09-29(g)(a), (d)(2), (d)(5), (e), (e)(5)

Under § 1692g, a debt collector must communicate to the debtor, either in the initial communication or within five days after the initial communication, information that includes the following: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; and (3) statements regarding the consumer’s right to dispute the debt, obtain verification of the debt, or obtain the name and address of the original creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). ... Here, the district court correctly found that Ingram complied with § 1692g(a). ... Under § 1692d(2), a debt collector is prohibited from “engag[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt,” including “[t]he use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2). ... As applied here, Ingram did not engage in abusive conduct or use abusive language. ... Under § 1692d(5), a debt collector is prohibited from “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). ... However, Ingram’s five telephone calls to the Shulers, including one successful contact with Mr. Shuler that lasted for less than five minutes and two voicemail messages, do not amount to repeated or continuous attempts to annoy, abuse, or harass the Shulers. ... Under § 1692e, a debt collector is prohibited from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... We apply the “least-sophisticated consumer” standard to evaluate whether a debt collector’s communication violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Section 1692e also prohibits a debt collector from making a “threat to take any action . . . that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). ... The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to § 1692e(5).

The FDCPA can cover attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt collection, requires a validation notice after an initial communication, and measures deceptive conduct by whether the least sophisticated consumer would be confused or deceived.

Battle v. Gladstone Law Group, P.A. · filed 2013-06-28(a)(6), (g), and (e)(10)

The FDCPA can apply to the litigating acts of attorneys, if the attorney “regularly engage[s] in consumer-debt-'collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation.” ... This Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts that could establish that Defendant Gladstone Law Group, P.A. is a debt collector within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Subsection 1692(g) is only triggered after an initial communication between the debt collector and the debtor occurs. ... The filing of a complaint is not an initial communication. ... However, if an initial communication has not yet occurred, a defendant is under no obligation to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g requirements. ... The standard for evaluating violations of the FDCPA is not whether the individual plaintiff was confused or deceived but whether “the least sophisticated consumer would be confused or deceived” by Defendants’ actions. ... An FDCPA notice incorporated into a mortgage foreclosure summons and complaint does not necessarily effectively convey notice of the rights to the “least sophisticated consumer.”

Section 1692g(a) requires specified initial debt disclosures, § 1692c(a)(2) bars communications with a consumer known to be represented by counsel when made in connection with debt collection, and § 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations.

Brand v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2018-10-09

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector, within five days of initially contacting a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, to send a written notice containing, among other things, “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed,” unless that information was in the initial communication. ... Then five days later, Caliber sent the Debt Validation Letter that identified LS9 as the creditor. Thus, there was no violation of § 1692g(a). ... Plaintiffs next claim that the Attorney Letter from Caliber violated FDCPA § 1692c(a)(2), which bars a debt collector from communicating with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt when the collector knows that the consumer is represented by an attorney. ... Taken together, these facts establish as a matter of law that the purpose of the Attorney Letter was not to collect a debt but rather to provide Plaintiffs with information regarding their change of attorney. ... Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Caliber as to the FDCPA § 1692c claim. ... The final FDCPA claim asserted by Plaintiffs invokes § 1692e, which prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. ... Yet the Court cannot conclude that the Notice of Default is plainly misleading or deceptive due to the presence of the bankruptcy disclosure. ... Consequently, the Court must grant summary judgment in favor of Caliber on the § 1692e claim.

Section 1692e(11) requires debt collectors to identify the collection purpose and their debt-collector status in initial communications, while Section 1692g(a) requires a validation notice to state the amount of the debt; on this record, an untimely notice and an overshadowing motion caused no cognizable harm, but an imprecise amount did.

Beane v. RPW Legal Servs., PLLC · filed 2019-05-06(e)(11), (g)(a), (g)(b)

Where Section 1692g(a) provides consumers with rights to contest the debt within thirty days of the validation notice, Section 1692g(b) prohibits actions which "overshadow" or are "inconsistent" with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute to dispute the debt or request the name of the original creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). ... This claim, like the "timeliness" portion of the Section 1692g(a) claim, appears not to have prejudiced Plaintiff's informational rights or ability to contest the debt in any way this Court can identify. ... The FDCPA, at the very least, affords the least sophisticated consumers the right to know the amount of the debt sought to be collected, akin to the "informational" rights under Section 1692e. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). Defendants' inconsistent and imprecise statement of the amount of the debt frustrated this right, and this suffices to create a cognizable injury under the FDCPA. ... Based on the current record, the Court finds that the September 2017 letter from Defendants to Plaintiff, ostensibly for the "Collection" of the unpaid assessment debt, was the "initial communication" under the meaning of the FDCPA. Accordingly, Defendants' "initial communication" with Plaintiff did not disclose that it was a communication from a debt collector, as the subsequent letters did. This failure violates Section 1692e(11). ... The Court thus finds that Defendants have violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) by not properly stating the "amount" of the debt in the Validation Notice.

Sections 1692e and 1692g prohibit misleading collection threats and communications that overshadow a consumer's 30-day right to dispute a debt.

LARKIN v. CHARLES I. TURNER, ESQ. · filed 2019-12-18(e)(5), (g)(b)

Although the Court declines to reach whether the stipulated facts establish a § 1692e(5) violation here – Turner has not stipulated that First Pay had no intent to sue, but rather that he did not know if it did or not – they do show that Turner implied, in a letter that also stated that either he or another attorney would file suit, that the “client” had indeed authorized the filing of a lawsuit absent timely payment, and therefore Larkin is entitled to summary judgment that Turner made a false, deceptive, or misleading representation in violation of § 1692e. ... Here, the validation notice at the bottom of the page, coming after Turner’s signature, is overshadowed and contradicted by the statement earlier in the letter threatening litigation if payment was not received within ten days, a clear violation of § 1692g.

Section 1692e(10) bars false or deceptive collection representations, while § 1692g requires specified dispute and validation disclosures and bars communications that overshadow or contradict them.

Garrett v. Financial Business and Consumer Solutions, Inc. · filed 2021-04-08(e)(10), (g)(a)(3)–(4), (g)(b)

A debt collector must inform a consumer of certain rights with respect to disputing a debt and debt validation. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)–(4). A communication “may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure” of those rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). “[A] notice is overshadowing or contradictory if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights.” Hamilton v. Capio Partners, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1113 (D. Colo. 2017). ... Plaintiff pleads plausible violations of both § 1692e(10) and § 1692g. He does more than make conclusory assertions; he states specific ways in which the letter could be found to fall short of the FDCPA’s requirements. His Complaint is specific enough to comply with Twombly/Iqbal and to inform Defendant of what he believes the letter’s shortcomings are. The pleading suggests nothing on its face that would undermine either claim for relief. Whether Plaintiff will prevail on the merits of those claims under the least sophisticated consumer standard is beyond the scope of the pleading and thus this ruling.

Section 1692g(a) is satisfied when the validation notice is sent, without proof of actual receipt, while § 1692g(b) is not implicated absent a timely dispute; the court also found no § 1692e(5), § 1692e(10), or § 1692f violation on the record.

Olson v. Armada Corp · filed 2021-10-22(g)(a), (g)(b), (e)(5), (e)(10), and (f)

Unfortunately for the Olsons, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “section 1692g(a) requires only that a Notice be ‘sent’ by a debt collector. A debt collector need not establish actual receipt by the debtor.” Mahon v, 171 F.3d at 1201-02; see also LeClair v. Suttell & Assocs., P.S., No. C09-1047JCC, 2010 WL 417418, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2010) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has interpreted the statute only to require evidence that the notice has been sent.”). ... Because the Olsons did not dispute the debt, there can also be no claim that Armada failed to meet its obligations under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). ... And because no reasonable jury could find that the events reflected in the call transcript show that Armada engaged in any kind of “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means,” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(10), to collect the debts from the Olsons (see generally 2/7/19 Call Tr.; 2/20/19 Call Tr.), the court GRANTS summary judgment in Armada’s favor. ... Because this claim is duplicative of the others discussed above, no specific examination is necessary. ... Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment on this claim to Armada and DENIES it to the Olsons.

Section 1692a(3) covers a person subject to judicial action to collect a debt, and the Act can also reach nondebtors when the alleged conduct is unconscionable as applied to them.

Covarrubias v. Union Adjustment Co. CA2/5 · filed 2014-08-12(a)(3)

And, there is no merit to defendant’s contention that plaintiff is not covered by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Defendant argues that plaintiff is not a “consumer” because he denies any obligation to pay the debt. Defendant relies upon title 15 United States Code section 1692a(3) which defines a consumer thusly, “The term ‘consumer’ means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” Title 15 United States Code section 1692a(3) applies to a person in plaintiff’s situation who is subject of judicial action to collect a debt. (Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (8th Cir. 2011) 663 F.3d 997, 1002-1003; Montgomery v. Huntington Bank (6th Cir. 2013) 346 F.3d 693, 697; Ruggia v. Wash. Mut. (E.D. Va. 2010) 719 F.Supp.2d 642, 647; see Todd v. Collecto, Inc. (7th Cir. 2013) 731 F.3d 734, 738.) And the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act extends to persons who may not be debtors if the alleged conduct would be unconscionable as applied to the nondebtor. (Todd v. Collecto, Inc., supra, 731 F.3d at p. 739; see Heintz v. Jenkins (1995) 514 U.S. 291, 292.)

Section 1692e does not cover a creditor collecting repayment of its own financed loan.

Craig v. Park Financial of Broward County, Inc. · filed 2005-04-26(e)

Based on these allegations, the Court concludes that Defendant Park Finance is a creditor and is therefore not covered by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Section 1692(e) applies only to debt collectors.

Wood v. Capital One Services, LLC · filed 2010-06-18(e)

Plaintiff alleges violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)-(g) (2006). (Compl. ¶¶ 38-71.) Each of these provisions apply only to debt collectors.

The Act applies to debt collectors rather than creditors, and defines a debt collector to include persons principally engaged in collecting debts owed another, subject to statutory exclusions.

Dauenhauer v. The Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2014-04-15(e), (a)(6)

The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act applies to “debt collectors,” but not to “creditors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); ... Borrowers did not allege that BNYM or ReconTrust fit within this definition – namely “that the principal purpose of BNYM or ReconTrust is the collection of debts, that BNYM was assigned Borrower’s loan for the specific purpose of debt collection, or that BNYM or ReconTrust attempted to foreclose under assumed names.” Thus, the district court correctly concluded that neither BNYM nor ReconTrust was subject to the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, and dismissed Borrowers claims under that statute.

Section 1692(e) prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations by debt collectors, so an entity that is not a debt collector is not subject to a claim under that provision.

Mahon v. Anesthesia Business Consultants, LLC · filed 2016-04-13(e)

Because Mr. Mahon’s FDCPA claims against ABC can only proceed against a “debt collector,” they must be dismissed. See id. § 1692e (“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” (emphasis added)); First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66, 67, 69 (asserting FDCPA claims against ABC under § 1692e).

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant is a debt collector and does not impose liability on creditors.

Mills v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2020-03-26

To state a claim for a violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., a plaintiff must allege (1) that he or she is a “consumer” as defined by the Act; (2) that the “debt” arises out of transactions that are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (3) that the defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the Act; and (4) that the defendant violated the requirements of the FDCPA. ... “[C]reditors are not liable under the FDCPA.” ... Mills also fails to state a claim under the FDCPA because there are no allegations that the defendant is a debt collector. In fact, the allegations of the complaint and the attached documents show that AmeriCredit is a creditor, who is not liable under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) generally exempts a creditor collecting its own debt, but the exemption is curtailed when the creditor uses another name indicating that a third person is collecting the debt.

Wolfe v. Bank One Corp. · filed 2005-10-11(a)(6)

The statute does exempt creditors collecting their own debts or debts acquired before default. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F). The statute also, however, curbs that exemption in situations where the creditor “uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

Section 1692e(5) does not prohibit a debt collector from communicating with a consumer’s attorney, and the FDCPA applies only when the challenged conduct is used in an attempt to collect a debt.

Hill v. Mutual Hospital Service, Inc. · filed 2005-12-09(e)(5)

Accordingly, we hold that Doe’s phone call to Hill’s attorney’s office was not a communication with the consumer and, therefore, did not constitute a violation of the FDCPA. Further, Hill’s complaint fails to assert the threshold requirement for invoking the FDCPA by omitting any claim that Doe, in making that call, was attempting to collect a debt.

Section 1692g(b) requires cessation of collection directed directly at a consumer after a written dispute until verification, while § 1692e does not reach communications directed solely to the debtor's attorney.

Guerrero v. RJM ACQUISITIONS LLC · filed 2007-08-23(e), (g)(b)

Section 1692g(b) of the Act requires a debt collector, who receives from a consumer written notice disputing a debt, to cease collection of the debt directly from the consumer until it has obtained either verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment and provided it to the consumer. Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using false, deceptive, or misleading means to collect a debt. ... We respectfully disagree, and hold that communications directed solely to a debtor's attorney are not actionable under the Act.

Sections 1692e and 1692f can apply to debt-collection communications sent to a debtor’s attorney; such communications are not categorically immune from liability.

Misleh v. Timothy E. Baxter & Associates · filed 2011-04-15(e), (f)

Having determined that communications to a debtor’s counsel may give rise to viable claims under § § 1692e and 1692f, the Court readily concludes that Plaintiffs FDCPA claims are not subject to dismissal at the present juncture.

Section 1692f(1) covers attempted collection and communications to a consumer’s attorney, and asks whether the amount was authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law.

Allen v. LaSalle Bank · filed 2011-01-12(f)(1)

As noted above, the issue here is whether § 1692f(1) governs communications from a debt collector to a consumer‟s attorney, such as FSKS‟s letters to Allen‟s attorney. The attorney for FSKS conceded at oral argument that there is nothing in the FDCPA that explicitly exempts communications to an attorney. Unquestionably, the scope of the FDCPA is broad. Indeed, § 1692f(1) prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means,” regardless of the person to whom the communication was directed. The FDCPA similarly defines a “communication” expansively. A communication to a consumer‟s attorney is undoubtedly an indirect communication to the consumer.

Under the FDCPA, a communication to a debtor’s attorney can support an actionable claim, but it is evaluated under the competent-attorney standard.

Grajny v. Credit Control, LLC · filed 2018-10-09

Under the FDCPA, however, the import of a communication to the debtor’s attorney instead of the debtor herself is not that the communication fails to give rise to an actionable FDCPA claim; rather, the communication is reviewed under a different legal standard.

Section 1692e prohibits false or deceptive debt-collection representations and threats to take action that cannot legally be taken; the court applied it to reject claims based on a supported assignment and legally available collection theories.

Jesus Jaramillo, Sr. v. Portfolio Acquisitions, LLC · filed 2010-03-30(e)(5), (e)(10)

This section prohibits: “The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” ... Because we held appellee had a valid cause of action under account stated and quantum meruit, appellee did not threaten to take an action that could not legally be taken. ... Accordingly, we hold appellee has not alleged a cause of action not allowed under Texas law. Therefore, there has been no violation of the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(5) bars threats of legally unavailable or unintended action, and § 1692e(10) bars deceptive means used to collect or attempt to collect a debt.

Gionis v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone · filed 2005-12-14(e)(5), (e)(10)

Section 1692e(5) prohibits debt collectors from threatening “to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). Section 1692e(10) prohibits debt collectors from using “any ... deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). Plaintiff alleges that, by attaching Vick’s affidavit to the complaint, Defendant violated both of these provisions. The Court agrees. ... The Court therefore finds that the “least sophisticated consumer,” reading the affidavit in conjunction with the complaint, would be confused, and reasonably might feel pressured to immediately pay the debt, even if she disputed its validity, in order to avoid the possibility of having to also pay Direct Merchants’ attorney fees at some later date. Because the “least sophisticated consumer” could interpret Vick’s affidavit as a threat to collect attorney fees, an action that clearly “cannot legally be taken,” the Court concludes that Defendant’s conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). For the same reasons, the Court finds that Defendant used “deceptive means” to attempt to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).

Section 1692e(5) prohibits implied or express threats to take action the debt collector does not intend to take, while § 1692e(10) independently prohibits deceptive means used to collect a debt or obtain consumer information.

Carn v. Medical Data Systems, Inc. (In Re Cambron) · filed 2007-12-04(e)(5), (e)(10)

This court finds from the record that the defendant’s letter impliedly threatened to investigate the debtor’s employment, others to find assets, garnish wages or seize assets, or take further collection other than contacting the debtors, if they did not pay the debts, none of which it had any intention of doing. Accordingly, this court adopts the bankruptcy judge’s Recommendation to find a violation of § 1692e(5), but does so on that basis and not on the basis that the letter threatened to take action that cannot legally be taken.

The FDCPA bars debt collectors from harassing, oppressing, or abusing people in connection with debt collection and from threatening litigation they do not intend to pursue.

Antkowiak v. TaxMasters · filed 2011-03-17(d), (e)

Mr. Antkowiak sufficiently alleged TaxMasters engaged in conduct in violation of § 1692d. Mr. Antkowiak alleges the letter was sent by an attorney and threatened litigation, even though Mr. Antkowiak already had informed TaxMasters he would not pay the debt. This was “conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse.” ... Mr. Antkowiak sufficiently states a section 1692e claim because it alleged TaxMasters threatened litigation it “had no intention of taking and has never or very rarely taken before.”

Sections 1692e and 1692f reach false affidavits of service used to obtain a default judgment because they can constitute deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable debt-collection practices.

Carroll v. U.S. Equities Corp. · filed 2019-09-24(e), (f)

It is recognized that the practice of obtaining a default judgment by filing false affidavits of service, colloquially referred to as "sewer service," presents an actionable claim under the FDCPA. ... Plaintiff’s claim that the default judgment was obtained by the use of a false affidavit of service states a plausible FDCPA claim.

Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f do not require a debt collector to possess or attach a more extensive paper trail when filing a debt-collection lawsuit supported by an affidavit, absent a false representation or unconscionable conduct; filing the lawsuit alone is not harassment.

Deere v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone LLP · filed 2006-02-07(d), (e), (e)(10), and (f)

This Court has previously found that filing a civil debt collection lawsuit is not conduct to which FDCPA Section 1692d is addressed. That section prohibits conduct “the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” ... Filing a complaint to collect a debt that has been extinguished by the passage of time clearly falls within Section 1692e(2), prohibiting false representations about the character or legal status of any debt. It may also violate Section 1692f, which prohibits “unfair or unconscionable” methods of debt collection. ... However, filing a lawsuit supported by the client’s affidavit attesting to the existence and amount of a debt, is not a false representation about the character or legal status of a debt, nor is it unfair or unconscionable. ... The FDCPA imposes no such obligation.

Section 1692i(a) limits a debt collector’s suit on a debt to the district where the consumer signed the contract or resides when the suit begins.

Frazier v. Matrix Acquisitions, LLC · filed 2012-03-29(a)(2)

Under the terms of the statute, suit could have been brought against Frazier in the judicial district (here, county) (1) where she signed the credit card contract or (2) where she resided at the time the underlying action was commenced. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, Frazier), a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Frazier signed a credit card contract in Summit County still exists. Summary judgment as to Count III must therefore be DENIED.

The FDCPA does not treat conduct required to initiate a California nonjudicial foreclosure sale, such as sending pre-foreclosure notices, as debt-collection activity.

Cochran v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. · filed 2017-02-28(e)

The FDCPA only imposes liability when an entity is attempting to collect a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). In her complaint, Cochran complains of Defendants-Appellees’ conduct related to the initiation of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of her property, i.e., sending three pre-foreclosure notices. Such activity, which is required under California nonjudicial foreclosure laws, is not debt collection activity as defined by the FDCPA.

The FDCPA applies when a debt collector engages in prohibited collection activity arising from consumer debt.

Murphy v. Brockenborough · filed 2025-09-25(a)(6)

Here, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails because Defendant is not a debt collector as defined by the statute, and her actions in denying Plaintiff’s passport application were not collection activities arising from consumer debt.

The FDCPA does not treat notices and initial steps facilitating a non-judicial foreclosure, or reporting a mortgage account to credit bureaus, as attempts to collect a debt.

Stafford · filed 2026-03-23

The FDCPA imposes liability only when an entity is trying to collect a debt and, “[f]or purposes of the FDCPA, the word ‘debt’ is synonymous with ‘money.’” ... As a result “actions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.” ... Sending notices of default and taking the initial steps to initiate a foreclosure are not debt collection activities within the meaning of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA can apply to a debt collector's reporting of inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies when the reporting is connected to the collection of a debt.

Hart v. Equifax Information Services LLC · filed 2021-03-30

The Court is not convinced that Defendant’s alleged conduct falls outside the FDCPA. Based on the allegations and the record so far, Defendant could be seen as reporting inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies in connection with the collection of a debt, which would subject it to review under the FDCPA. ... Therefore, Plaintiff's FDCPA claim does not appear to be futile.

The FDCPA prohibits wrongful acts committed in the course of collecting a debt.

Hardrick v. Wells Fargo Bank National Association · filed 2025-06-24

And whether defendants were engaged in repossessing the Vehicle on the night of the shooting is material for purposes of the FDCPA and the TDCA. Both statutes prohibit wrongful acts in the course of collecting a debt.

The FDCPA's purposes are not impermissibly abrogated by requiring a mortgagor to comply with a contractual notice-and-cure provision before filing suit.

Wortman v. Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC · filed 2019-10-16

Here, the notice and cure provision does not serve to undermine the spirit of the FDCPA. See e.g., Giotta, 706 Fed.Appx at 422-23 (“[T]he Notice Provision does not contravene the [FDCPA’s] purposes, and, thus, does not impermissibly abrogate the FDCPA.”).

Section 1692a(6) excludes a mortgage company that acquires a mortgage through merger, rather than assignment for debt-collection purposes, when the debt was not in default at acquisition, and a non-judicial foreclosure is not automatically debt collection under the FDCPA.

Brown v. Morris · filed 2007-06-28(a)(6)(F)(iii); (a)(6)

“Because the FDCPA does not define the term “obtained”, we may look to the act’s legislative history in interpreting it. ... ABN AMRO, a mortgage company, was not specifically assigned Brown’s mortgage for debt-collection purposes. Rather, ABN AMRO acquired it through its merger with Brown’s previous mortgage company. Accordingly, ABN AMRO did not “obtain” her mortgage while it was in default. ... Brown’s contention, however, ignores § 1692a(6)’s distinction between debt collection and enforcement of a security interest. ... Accordingly, Morris is not per se an FDCPA debt collector.”

Section 1692a(6) excludes a mortgage servicer from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” when the servicer was servicing the mortgages while collecting the challenged fees.

Motley v. Homecomings Financial, LLC · filed 2008-05-30(a)(6)

Accordingly, Homecomings is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA, and Count I fails as a matter of law.

Sections 1692a(6) and 1692f(6) distinguish between primary-purpose debt collectors, subject to the FDCPA’s main restrictions, and limited-purpose security-interest enforcers, who are covered only for purposes of § 1692f(6), including when they carry out steps required by state nonjudicial-foreclosure law.

Stuckey v. Gislason & Hunter LLP · filed 2021-01-12(a)(6), (f)(6)

The FDCPA defines debt collectors as “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). It also provides that for purposes of § 1692f(6), debt collectors also include “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” Id. ... Because the FDCPA has a limited-purpose exception for security-interest enforcers in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, the Act “must also exclude the legal means required to do so.” Id. at 1039–40. ... Moreover, Plaintiffs again provide no facts or law to support their contention that Defendant is a primary-purpose debt collector in the first instance, and do not allege sufficient facts to support that Defendant was violated the FDCPA in its role as a limited-purpose debt collector. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to state a valid FDCPA claim.

The FDCPA excludes a person collecting a debt owed to another from the definition of debt collector when the debt was not in default when that person obtained it.

Green v. M&T Bank · filed 2023-01-18(a)(6)(F)(iii)

The FDCPA expressly excludes, from the statutory definition of a “debt collector,” “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). ... Thus, (1) M&T Bank is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, and (2) Green’s claims under the FDCPA—the only claims raised in Green’s complaint—fail as a matter of law.

Under the FDCPA, past-due homeowner assessments and related administrative collection fees qualify as debts, and an attorney who regularly collects them after default qualifies as a debt collector.

Abby v. Paige · filed 2012-07-18(a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(6)(F)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance of Plaintiff Abby’s account qualifies as a “debt” under the FDCPA and the FCCPA. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that where the record evidence reveals that a party did not pay assessments when due, those assessments are considered to be in default under the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the Court finds there to be sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Defendant Paige, as Defendant Windy Pointe’s attorney, regularly engaged in debt-collection activity on behalf of Defendant Windy Pointe so as to qualify Defendant Paige as “debt collector” under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) distinguishes a creditor collecting debts for itself from a debt collector who regularly collects debts for others.

Proctor v. Ally Financial Inc. · filed 2019-08-02(a)(6)

Any claim Plaintiff attempts to raise under the FDCPA fails because Ally is not a “debt collector” as defined by that statute. The Credit Application authorized the Dealer to seek credit on Plaintiff's behalf in order to finance her purchase of her car. See ECF No. 17, Ex. A (Credit Application). Ally agreed to finance the purchase, and the Contract makes clear that the Dealer assigned its interest in the contract to Ally. ECF No. 17, Ex. B (Contract). Ally is therefore a creditor, not a debt collector, within the meaning of the FDCPA, since it is collecting debts on its own behalf rather than for others.

Section 1692(a)(5) limits a debt to an obligation arising from a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, while § 1692(a)(6) does not treat a person collecting its own fees as a debt collector when the obligation is not owed to another.

Necak v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2020-07-27(a)(5), (a)(6)

Defendant’s partially unsuccessful motion for costs to the district court cannot constitute debt collection under the FDCPA. First, SPS is not a debt collector in this context because it is attempting to collect its own fees—not “debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) (emphasis added). Furthermore, SPS’s motion to collect costs is not a “debt” because the RESPA litigation was not a consumer transaction and civil litigation costs are not debts “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(5).

The FDCPA’s remedies do not apply to a person who is not a consumer, and a bank is not that person’s creditor when the person was not obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the bank a debt.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Pilchesky, J. · filed 2020-08-07

Count VIII in. the counterclaim alleges a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692. Pilchesky's drum under this statute fails because he is not entitled to avail himself of any remedies it creates since he is not a "consumer" under the definition section in the statute. 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3). Simply put> Pilchesky was not obligated or even allegedly obligated to pay any debt to the Bank in these circumstances and> as such> the Bank is not his "creditor." 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4).

Section 1692a(6) treats a creditor collecting its own debt as a debt collector when it uses a name that would lead a consumer to believe a third party is collecting the debt.

Beckford v. Sky Group USA, LLC · filed 2023-02-27(a)(6)

To fall within the ambit of this exception, a creditor must “(1) use a name other than its own (2) in a way that would indicate a third person is attempting to collect its debt (3) in the process of collecting its own debt.” Pinson, 942 F.3d at 1209; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The test for satisfying the second element is not a robust one and is met where the “least sophisticated consumer” would objectively believe a third party was involved in collecting the debt. Pinson, 942 F.3d at 1209–11 (citations omitted). Although “the least sophisticated consumer standard is a low bar,” id. at 1210, Beckford does not clear it here. In short, the Court is skeptical that anyone standing in Beckford’s shoes would believe that Sky Cash Collections was an unrelated third party attempting to collect on Beckford’s debt with Sky Group, especially since Sky Group’s full name is Sky Group USA, LLC and its website is known as Sky Cash USA. (Doc. 1).

The FDCPA permits a debt buyer to qualify as both a creditor and a debt collector when it principally collects debts, including debts it purchased for itself, subject to the statute’s exceptions.

Wilde v. UHG I, LLC · filed 2023-07-05(a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(6)(F)(iii)

UHG is incorrect, however, that the terms “creditor” and “debt collector” are mutually exclusive. ... Still, UHG could potentially fall within the definition of “debt collector” at the same time. ... But because the definition of “debt collector” in the FDCPA is phrased in the disjunctive, a party that does not collect debts “due another” could still be a “debt collector” if it “uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.” Jd. ... As a result, the court concludes that Mr. Wilde has plausibly alleged that UHG is a “debt collector” as the FDCPA defines that term. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

The FDCPA imposes liability only on debt collectors and does not make a creditor vicariously liable for a debt-collecting attorney's conduct merely because the creditor is represented by that attorney.

Elliott v. Roberts · filed 2023-09-28(a)(6)

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Credit Union that it cannot be held vicariously liable, as a creditor, for the actions of its legal representative. Were the Credit Union itself a debt collector, that might be different. ... But the Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit that it would be inconsistent with the FDCPA to hold a party who is not a debt collector liable solely because it's represented by an attorney who is a debt collector. ... Only debt collectors are liable under the FDCPA, and the definition of that term expressly excludes officers or employees of creditors, anyone who originated a debt, and anyone who obtained a debt when it wasn't in default. ... It would be inconsistent with the statutory definitions to use common law agency principles to bring those people back in.

The FDCPA generally does not apply to a creditor collecting its own obligations, and parking-violation fines are not covered debts because they do not arise from a consensual transaction.

SCOTT v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY PARKING VIOLATIONS BRANCH · filed 2023-10-02(a)(6), (a)(5)

on the facts alleged, the PPA is not a debt collector subject to the FDCPA. ... This statutory language focuses “on third party collection agents working for a debt owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.” ... Thus, creditors are generally not debt collectors. ... Fees incurred for parking violations are not considered “debts” subject to protection by the FDCPA. ... “Congress’s use of the term ‘transaction’ demonstrates that Congress intended the FDCPA to apply only to consensual matters, which will almost always arise from an express or implied contract.” ... A parking violation or fine “does not stem from a consensual transaction and thus is not a debt under the FDCPA.” ... Thus, the amounts Scott owes to the PPA for parking violations are not considered a “debt” under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes creditors collecting debts they originated from the FDCPA's definition of debt collector.

Ballentine v. Credit One Bank N.A. · filed 2024-11-21(a)(6)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Credit One Bank issued him a credit card with a $500 credit limit. (ECF 1 at 5.) He thus alleges that Defendant was a creditor collecting for an account that it originated – not a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Henson,582 U.S. at 81 (“[T]hird party debt collection agents generally qualify as “debt collectors” under the relevant statutory language, while those who seek only to collect for themselves loans they originated generally do not.”). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted against Defendant under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show consumer status, a consumer debt, and a defendant that qualifies as a debt collector; a garnishee bank merely transferring funds under a lawful order is not a debt collector.

Cin Dale 3 v. Peoples Bank Corp. · filed 2025-03-25(a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(6)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not adequately allege a violation of the FDCPA. First, Plaintiffs have not alleged that any one Plaintiff is a consumer as defined in the FDCPA; the Complaint only includes a conclusory statement that Plaintiffs are consumers. Second, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that the collection activity at issue arises out of a consumer debt. Instead, the Court finds that the debt arises out a judgment for business related damages. Finally, Defendants do not fit within the FDCPA’s definition of a debt collector.

The FDCPA does not apply to a creditor collecting its own debt because that entity is not a “debt collector.”

Bey v. American Express National Bank · filed 2025-04-28(a)(5)-(6)

Because American Express was collecting its own debt from Moore Bey, it qualifies as a creditor, not a debt collector. Id. Creditors aren’t subject to the FDCPA.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with collecting a debt.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Lamar · filed 2007-09-25(e)

“Here, LS & R’s notice cannot be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings.”

Section 1692e(10) does not prohibit a debt collector from seeking information from a putative debtor related to a disputed debt.

Rosa v. Mandarich Law Group LLP · filed 2023-07-17(e)(10)

The Court thus declines to adopt Plaintiff’s readings of the FDCPA and the FCRA that fails to harmonize the two statutes and concludes that it cannot be a violation of Section 1692e(10) to seek information from a putative-debtor related to a disputed debt.

Section 1692e(10) prohibits using a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.

Revels v. Morgan and Associates, P.C. · filed 2025-01-30(e)(10)

Somewhat generically, section 1692e(10) prohibits “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt[.]” ... Here, Defendants likewise violated section 1692e(10) to collect on Mr. Revels’ debt by falsely representing that the Oklahoma court had jurisdiction over TBPA to effectuate any garnishment. ... These actions gave the misleading impression that the garnishment would be valid, when in reality it would not. ... As Defendants used a false representation to deceive TBPA into paying Mr. Revels’ debt, they violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).

Section 1692e(3) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing or implying that an individual is an attorney or that a communication is from an attorney, but an alleged violation does not itself establish Article III injury in fact without concrete harm.

Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA · filed 2020-01-03(e)(3)

Buchholz claims that MNT violated the FDCPA’s prohibition of the “false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney” when it sent two letters suggesting that an attorney had formed a professional legal opinion that he owed the two debts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3). And Buchholz argues that this violation, by itself, is an injury in fact. ... Because Buchholz has not shown that he suffered a harm Congress intended to prevent or that is analogous to a harm that the common law recognizes, he cannot prevail on the theory that MNT’s procedural violation, by itself, is an injury in fact.

The FDCPA permits consumers to sue over unlawful collection efforts even when they did not actually incur a debt from the conduct.

Hunt v. Check Recovery Systems, Inc. · filed 2007-03-21

Plaintiffs’ ability to sue Defendant for unlawful collection of interest under the FDCPA does not rest on Plaintiffs actually incurring debt as a result of Defendant’s conduct.

The FDCPA permits standing without actual damages only when the plaintiff alleges a personal injury or intrusion of a personal right protected by the Act.

Ehrich v. Credit Protection Ass'n · filed 2012-09-19

While a plaintiff need not demonstrate actual damages for standing in an FDCPA case, the plaintiff must at least allege some personal injury or intrusion of a personal right protected by the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(8) protects consumers from abusive debt-collection practices by requiring debt collectors to report a disputed debt as disputed, and violating that requirement presents a risk of real harm sufficient to establish concrete injury for standing.

Brown v. R & B Corp. · filed 2017-07-28(e)(8)

Thus, the Court finds that a violation of the FDCPA’s procedural requirement that debt collectors accurately report a disputed debt as disputed presents a “risk of real harm” to Plaintiffs substantive right in being free from abusive debt collection practices.

The FDCPA gives consumers dealing with debt collectors a statutory right to accurate, fairly presented information about their debts, legal rights, and related proceedings.

Martin v. Trott Law, P.C. · filed 2017-07-12(a)

The FDCPA confers a statutory right on the plaintiffs: The right, when dealing with the defendant as a debt collector, to receive from him nothing more — and nothing less — than accurate and fairly presented information regarding the extent of their debts, their legal rights, and the status of any legal proceedings related, to collection of those debts.

The FDCPA permits a consumer to pursue statutory claims when a collection letter’s alleged violations cause concrete, particularized harm.

Gause v. Medical Business Consultants, Inc. · filed 2020-08-27

Gause’s testimony reflects that he suffered a real and concrete injury associated with the Letter’s statutory violations.

The FDCPA's substantive prohibitions on false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable collection practices require a plaintiff to allege a concrete injury regardless of whether the violation is procedural or substantive.

Larkin v. Finance System of Green Bay · filed 2020-12-14

An FDCPA plaintiff must allege a concrete injury regardless of whether the alleged statutory violation is characterized as procedural or substantive.

The FDCPA reaches unscrupulous debt-collection practices involving litigation, and attorney’s fees and emotional harms can qualify as cognizable injuries when traceable to an FDCPA violation.

Rose Marie Lawless v. T Fin. Servs., LLC · filed 2025-01-30

The FDCPA is an “extraordinarily broad statute” intended to protect consumers from unscrupulous debt collection practices wherever they might be found—including unscrupulous practices involving litigation. ... Where a plaintiff like Lawless seeks to recover for attorney’s fees incurred in separate foreclosure proceedings, we have squarely held that those fees “constitute a concrete, particularized injury.” ... Several district courts in this circuit have also held that personal humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, and emotional distress are all cognizable injuries under the FDCPA.

A technical FDCPA violation does not itself establish Article III injury; confusion or stress alone is insufficient without an appreciable risk of harm.

Czachorski · filed 2026-04-09

Instead, to support standing, the violation must have presented an “appreciable risk of harm”—for example, standing exists if the alleged violation led to paying extra money, affected credit, or otherwise altered the response to a debt. ... Mere stress or confusion caused by generally misleading statements do not create standing for an FDCPA claim. ... Nothing in Czachorski’s complaint alleges how the letter injured her beyond being “confused” and “misled.” Accordingly, the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to create standing under binding Seventh Circuit precedent.

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from collecting a fee or other amount unless the agreement creating the debt expressly authorizes it or applicable law permits it.

Fields v. Western Mass. Credit Corp. · filed 2007-03-22(f)(1)

The language of section 1692f requires inquiry into the language of the contract and applicable state law. ... Thus, because neither any agreement nor any statute authorized it to do so, Western Mass, could not legally add a fifteen percent fee to the amount of the claim it was collecting on Sovereign’s behalf.

Section 1692f(1) prohibits collecting a fee or other amount unless the debt agreement expressly authorizes it or the law permits it; a percentage-based fee unrelated to actual collection costs is unauthorized when the agreement allows only actual collection costs.

Bradley v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc. · filed 2014-01-02(f)(1)

We therefore hold that Franklin violated the FDCPA when it collected from Bradley a debt that included a 33-and-1/3% “collection fee” when Bradley only agreed to pay the actual costs of collection.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a collection letter to identify the creditor owed the debt, while Sections 1692e(5) and (10) prohibit false threats of immediate or imminent legal action, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Dewees v. Legal Servicing, LLC · filed 2007-06-29(a)(2), (e)(5), (e)(10)

The court first considers whether the Letter violated Section 1692g(a)(2), which requires that the debt collection letter identify the creditor that is owed the debt being collected. ... I therefore determine that Dewees’ claim that the letter fails to identify the creditor is plausible and can withstand a motion to dismiss. ... In this case, the Letter states that (1) Defendant “may” file litigation and that (2) the Plaintiffs debt is “currently being reviewed for potential litigation.” ... As a result, Plaintiff states plausible claims under Sections 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) that the letter falsely threatens immediate or imminent legal action.

Section 1692e(5) does not prohibit a debt-collection letter that merely indicates an unpaid account may be referred to an attorney if payment is not made, without threatening that legal action will occur.

Adams v. JC CHRISTENSEN & ASSOCIATES, INC. · filed 2011-03-28(e)(5)

In this Court’s view, a letter like Christensen’s, which merely “indicates that a matter may be referred to an attorney ... if payment is not made,” is not unlawful.

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit debt collectors from using misleading or unfair means, and § 1692g(a)(2) requires the initial communication to identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed.

Eun Joo Lee v. Forster & Garbus LLP · filed 2013-03-01(e), (f), (g)(a)(2)

Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that the Collection Letter was misleading to the least sophisticated customer and failed to identify the creditor to which Plaintiff owed the debt.

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires a collection letter to name the creditor, and reading the whole letter can cure a potentially misleading label; Section 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection.

Williams v. Client Services, Inc. · filed 2020-07-29(g)(a)(2), (e)

Pursuant to Section 1692g(a)(2), a debt collection letter must contain “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” ... Thus, because “letters must be read in their entirety, the use of a potentially misleading label may be cured by other language within the letter that alerts even the least sophisticated consumer to the identity of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” ... When applying the above-referenced standard to the facts of this case, the Court agrees with the reasoning in the R&R that the Letter complies with the FDCPA when read as a whole. ... Finally, Section 1692e prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... Thus, Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1692e must be dismissed.

The FDCPA does not require a debt collector to identify the creditor in a particular way; a commonly used acronym or business name is permissible unless the collection letter would mislead a significant fraction of unsophisticated consumers.

Fellenz, Mikayla v. The Stark Collection Agency, Inc. · filed 2020-12-04

However, the court concludes that dismissal is appropriate here because both the creditor and nature of the debt is quite “apparent from a reading of the letter” and “not even a significant fraction of the population would be misled by it.”

Section 1692 covers only consumer debts or alleged debts arising from a transaction, not subrogation interests or tort claims arising from negligence.

Stephens v. Omni Insurance · filed 2007-04-23(a)

The federal act does not regulate the collection of subrogation interests, whether “alleged” or reduced to judgment. It specifically regulates only the collection of consumer debt or alleged debt arising from a “transaction.”

Section 1692 limits the FDCPA to collection of debts covered by the statute, so a tort-subrogation obligation arising from alleged negligence is not covered.

Bartlett v. Blaser, Sorensen & Oleson, Chartered · filed 2014-06-19

Therefore, the Court finds that this action does not involve a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA and, as a result, Plaintiffs FDCPA-related claims (Counts I and II) fail as a matter of law.

The FDCPA's fiduciary-obligation exception exempts a condominium, its managing agent, and attorneys acting on its behalf from the Act when collecting common charges.

Barry v. Board of Managers · filed 2007-12-12(a)(6)(F)

Since there is a fiduciary relationship between each unit owner and all other unit owners, the collection of common charges by the condominium, its managing agent or attorneys acting on its behalf are exempt from the application of the FD-CPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to plead facts showing a covered consumer debt and debt collector, along with facts plausibly supporting the specific alleged debt-collection violation.

(PS) Simmons v. LVNV Funding LLC · filed 2025-04-15(a)(5), (a)(g), (c)(a)(1), (d), (e)(2)(A), and (f)

The Complaint does not sufficiently state a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C § 1692d because without further facts, it is not clear to the Court how Defendant’s behavior amounts to abusive, harassing, and/or oppressive conduct as required by the FDCP. ... The Complaint does not sufficiently state a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C § 1692c because the Complaint lacks sufficient facts to show that the communications were “at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer” as stated by 15 U.S.C § 1692c. See 15 U.S.C § 1692c(a)(1). ... The Complaint does not sufficiently state a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C § 1692f because it is not clear to the Court how these actions support that Defendant as a “debt collector” used “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt” as stated by 15 U.S.C § 1692f. ... The Complaint does not sufficiently state a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C § 1692e(2)(A) because the facts do not establish that the alleged debt is covered by the FDCPA and that Defendant as a “debt collector” falsely represented “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” as stated by 15 U.S.C § 1692e(2)(A). Based on the above, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA.

An FDCPA claim does not require particularized pleading, but the complaint must individually identify the defendant as a debt collector beyond a conclusory allegation.

Jean v. US Bank National Association · filed 2008-04-22

The court does not agree that the plaintiffs have successfully pleaded an FDCPA claim against Ting-Hopper. While such a claim does not require particularized pleading, it does require, at a minimum, that the plaintiff identify the defendant individually, in the complaint, as a “debt collector,'' beyond mere conclusory allegation.

A plaintiff invoking the FDCPA must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that a debt collector engaged in abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt collection practices.

Winstead v. Emc Mortgage Corporation · filed 2010-03-22

What the plaintiff fails to understand is that the burden rests on him, at this stage, to allege facts sufficient to support his claim. ... Because the plaintiff has not articulated facts to support his FDCPA and NHA claims, see Mem. Op. (June 5, 2009) at 6; see generally Pl.’s Opp’n, the court dismisses those claims.

To state an FDCPA claim at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must provide detailed factual allegations about the defendant's efforts to collect the debt.

BELLO v. CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA) N.A. · filed 2021-08-16

Mr. Bello’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim is also futile because he did not provide any more detailed factual allegations concerning Capital One’s efforts to collect his debt. Indeed, the assertion in his original complaint that we found insufficient—“Capital One falsely billed and called [him] for debts that were not owed”—was not changed when Mr. Bello submitted his proposed amended complaint. Therefore, it too is futile.

To state a plausible FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must plead factual matter identifying specific debt-collection conduct and the FDCPA provisions allegedly violated.

Phillips v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2021-09-15

Even applying a lenient pleading standard to a pro se complaint, plaintiff “must plead factual matter that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of [defendant’s] misconduct.” Atherton, 567 F.3d at 681-82 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The vague and conclusory assertions of this complaint fail to articulate an FDCPA claim against defendant, see Rivera v. Rosenberg & Assocs., LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 149, 159 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that plaintiff failed to state plausible FDCPA claim where amended complaint failed to identify which specific provisions of the FDCPA on which claims were based), assuming that the FDCPA even applies here.

Section 1692(d) does not provide a separate remedy for abusive conduct arising from a creditor's filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy when Bankruptcy Code objection procedures govern.

Williams v. Asset Acceptance, LLC (In Re Williams) · filed 2008-05-20(d)

Here, Asset did not engage in any wrongful conduct by filing a proof of claim. ... The debtor does not need the FDCPA to protect itself from improper claims, as the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to file an objection. ... Based on the overwhelming authorities supporting Asset’s contentions, that FDCPA claims are precluded by the Bankruptcy Code, this Court is satisfied that Asset’s request for dismissal with respect to the claims asserted in Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint is well taken and, therefore, should be granted.

The FDCPA does not apply to prohibit a creditor from filing an otherwise accurate, time-barred proof of claim in bankruptcy when the Bankruptcy Code permits the filing and supplies the debtor’s remedy.

Martin v. Quantum3 Group (In re Martin) · filed 2015-10-09

For the reasons set forth above, the FDCPA is precluded by the Bankruptcy Code with regard to a creditor’s filing of an otherwise accurate, but time-barred, proof of claim.

Section 1692(e)’s stated purpose is broad enough that a person need not have communicated directly with a debt collector to fall arguably within the FDCPA’s zone of interests.

Muir v. Navy Federal Credit Union · filed 2008-06-20(e)

But the statutory purpose the district court quoted is quite broad, and what the court meant by the phrase “subjected to the practices of a debt collector” -- other than Dearing’s contention that there must have been communication between the plaintiff and the defendant -- is unclear. The statute provides for civil liability against “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of [the FDCPA] with respect to any person,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (emphases added), and, as noted above, several of those provisions do not contain an express “communication” requirement. Muir thus “arguably” falls within the statute’s compass.

The FDCPA protects consumers from unscrupulous debt-collection practices regardless of whether a valid debt exists.

Buford v. PALISADES COLLECTION, LLC · filed 2008-05-09

The injury of which Plaintiffs complain is the type that the FDCPA was designed to remedy: protecting consumers from the unscrupulous antics of debt collectors, irrespective of whether a valid debt actually exists.

Section 1692(e) requires the FDCPA to be construed broadly as a remedial statute to eliminate abusive debt-collection practices.

Shorts-Watson v. Schlee & Stillman, LLC · filed 2013-03-12(e)

The’ statute is remedial and must be construed broadly to give effect to its purpose.

Section 1692(e) states the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s purpose of protecting consumers from abusive practices by debt collectors, and the Act does not apply to the government’s collection of criminal restitution.

White v. USA - 2255 · filed 2022-10-25(e)

However, as the government notes (ECF 175 at 5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 relates to the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, which establishes legal protection from debt collection practices by private debt collectors; it does not apply to the government’s collection of criminal restitution.

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits false representations about the amount of a debt, and a debt collector may violate it by demanding an inaccurate amount even unintentionally.

Hepson v. Resurgent Capital Services, LP · filed 2010-06-17(e)(2)(A)

The facts, as found by the district court, show the actual amount of debt held by Resurgent at the time of its transfer to JCC was a total of $1,369.16 plus accrued interest, not the $2,024.17 plus interest demanded by JCC. That finding is supported by the evidence presented at trial and is not clearly erroneous. The district court’s conclusion that JCC violated the FDCPA through this inaccurate demand, even if unintentionally, is not in error.

Sections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) bar debt collectors from misrepresenting the amount of a debt or attempting to collect amounts not authorized by the agreement or permitted by law.

PAYDAY TODAY, INC. v. Hamilton · filed 2009-07-20(e)(2)(A), (f)(1)

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from making false representations of the "amount ... of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The FDCPA further prohibits a debt collector from attempting to collect any amount that is not "expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). ... Here, the dunning letter attempts to collect an amount not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. The letter unambiguously threatens litigation if attorney fees are not paid, and as we point out above, such a threat violates the prohibition against collecting or attempting to collect attorney fees found at Ind.Code § 24-4.5-7-409. This alone is sufficient to warrant the trial court's conclusion. ... It is apparent as a matter of law that Hall's letter misrepresents the amount of debt owed and that this is a clear violation of the FDCPA.

A consumer's FDCPA claim based on a debt collector's filing of a collection action in the wrong venue may be barred by claim preclusion when the consumer previously pleaded the claim and sought damages in a state-court proceeding that ended in judgment.

Dexter v. Tran · filed 2009-08-05(i)

Specifically, Plaintiff identified his right to statutory damages and offset under the FDCPA for the alleged filing of the debt collection suit in the wrong venue, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692i — the same claim that he is bringing in the instant action. ... Thus, Plaintiff is precluded from bringing a claim under § 1692i in this instant action.

Section 1692 claims are barred by claim preclusion when they depend on issues resolved in a prior state-court judgment, and allegations of harassment or deceptive collection methods are insufficient when pleaded only conclusorily without specific supporting facts.

Doyle v. Trans Union · filed 2016-03-23

However, his allegations that the debt was inaccurate, that he had no contractual obligation, and that defendants misrepresented the debt are precluded by the state court judgments. ... Further, Doyle's allegations of harassment and using deceptive means to collect a debt fail because he provided no specific facts as to how defendants violated the FDCPA other than his belief he did not owe the debt. Thus, the allegations are too conclusory to state a claim.

FDCPA claims arising from debt-collection conduct are not barred by claim preclusion based on the prior action to collect the underlying debt.

Castillo v. Duke Capital · filed 2024-09-23

Given the analysis in Cotte—including that order’s consideration of persuasive authority as developed out-of-circuit among both district and appellate courts—this court finds McMurray unpersuasive. In addition to the reasons laid out in Cotte, the court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ claims here are not barred by claim preclusion on account of “the reasonable expectations of the parties.” Gillmor, 284 P.3d at 629. While Plaintiffs should have understood that the state-court actions foreclosed future challenges to the validity of the debt, they could not have reasonably expected that statutory consumer-rights claims regarding injuries stemming from the process of collecting those debts would be precluded by the state-court actions. Pragmatically, a consumer need not expect that claims related to damages arising from the conduct of collection agencies—including the initiation of a lawsuit—be raised in defense against the collection of the underlying debt.

The FDCPA treats attempts to collect debts that consumers do not owe as violations of its false-representation and validation-notice provisions, and authorizes up to $1,000 per violation plus attorney’s fees for a prevailing party.

Martine v. AFNI, Inc. · filed 2021-07-06(g), (g)(a)(1), (g)(a)(2), (e), (e)(2)(A), (e)(10), (k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(a)(3)

The allegations in the complaint sufficiently state a claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692g(a)(1) and (2), 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10). Trying to collect a debt that is not and never was owed is a quintessential violation of the FDCPA. ... The statute provides for up to $1000 per violation, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), and plaintiff seeks $500 due to the absence of aggravating factors (although the violation itself seems pretty aggravated), which is reasonable. The statute also provides for an award of attorneys’ fees in favor the prevailing party. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

The FDCPA covers attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, prohibits false or misleading representations and threats or actions that cannot legally be taken, and permits statutory damages without proof of actual damages; filing suit to collect a debt discharged in bankruptcy violates those prohibitions.

Eastman v. Baker Recovery Services (In Re Eastman) · filed 2009-10-15(a)(6), (e)(2)(A), (e)(5), (e)(10), (k)(a)(2)(A)

However, even if it was contested, the court holds that the Trejo Law Offices are “debt collectors” that may be held liable under the FDCPA. ... Therefore, the Defendants violated the three sections of the FDCPA when they filed a claim to recover on a debt that was not recoverable due to a discharge in bankruptcy. ... With regard to the statutory damages, a plaintiff need not establish actual damages to recover under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not treat a debt buyer’s failure to obtain a state collection-service license as a violation when the buyer itself does not conduct collection activities and instead uses licensed agencies or attorneys.

Bradford v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2014-02-25(e)(5), (f), (f)(1)

Under the unique circumstances of this case, the Court is persuaded by LVNV’s argument and holds that an entity that does not engage in collection activities itself but relies on licensed collection agencies and licensed attorneys to conduct those activities... need not be licensed pursuant to the TCSA, and LVNVs failure to obtain the license does not constitute a violation of the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a)(4) requires a validation notice to tell consumers that they must dispute a debt in writing to obtain verification, while §§ 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) do not make unlicensed collection alone actionable absent a litigation threat or misrepresentation.

Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, P.L.L.C. · filed 2009-12-04(g)(a)(4), (e)(5), (e)(10)

The plain text of the FDCPA requires debt collectors to advise consumers of their rights in a prescribed manner, and Streeter Law failed to do so. Accordingly, plaintiffs request for relief with respect to Streeter Law's violation of § 1692g(a)(4) is granted. ... There is insufficient legal support for a categorical holding that debt collection efforts initiated in New York City by unlicensed debt collectors violate § 1692e(5) or § 1692e(10) of the FDCPA. Not every violation of state or city law amounts to a violation of the FDCPA. ... This statutorily required notice cannot be construed as a threat to litigate. In fact, had Streeter Law failed to include the notice, Streeter Law would have violated the FDCPA. ... Thus, Streeter Law made no misrepresentations as to its legal status under local law. Accordingly, plaintiffs request for damages for the asserted § 1692e(10) violation is denied.

A viable FDCPA claim requires collection activity arising from consumer debt, a defendant covered as a debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission.

Rhodes v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2014-09-11

I agree with the Defendants that Plaintiffs proposed amended claim for violation of the FDPCA fails to allege all of the essential elements of such a claim. More specifically, she fails to allege facts which would establish that the Defendants are “debt collectors” or that she was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt. Under the circumstances, I find that her proposed amended complaint fails to assert a viable claim under the FDCPA.

A plaintiff bringing an FDCPA claim must show that they were the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant committed a prohibited act or omission.

O'Neil-Rosales v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. · filed 2017-03-07

‘“[T]o prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) [s]he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute, and (3) the defendant engaged in a prohibited act or omission under the FDCPA. [Citation.]”

To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must show that they were the object of consumer-debt collection activity, that the defendant was a debt collector, and that the defendant committed a prohibited act or omission.

O'Neil-Rosales v. Citibank · filed 2017-05-10

“[T]o prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) [s]he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute, and (3) the defendant engaged in a prohibited act or omission under the FDCPA. [Citation.]”

To state an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must be a consumer, the defendant must be a debt collector, the challenged practice must involve an attempt to collect a debt, and the defendant must have violated an FDCPA provision.

WRIGHT v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY · filed 2019-08-26

Typically, [t]o prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.

The FDCPA requires a claim to allege that the plaintiff is a consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, and the defendant violated the Act.

Buczek v. Setrus LLC · filed 2019-08-29(a)(3), (a)(6)

To assert a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she is a “consumer” within the meaning of the FDCPA, (2) the defendant is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant violated the FDCPA. ... A “consumer” under the FDCPA is “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (3). ... A “debt collector” under the FDCPA is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6). ... Here, Buczek sufficiently alleges that the defendants are “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that she was the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant committed a prohibited act or failed to perform a requirement imposed by the Act.

Leato v. Teachers Credit Union and Tri-Force, Inc. · filed 2019-09-10

A plaintiff alleging a violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 ef seq., must demonstrate: (1) she has been the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant attempting to collect the debt qualifies as a debt collector under the Act; and (3) the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a 2 John Leato may not represent Laurina Leato. It is well settled that a pro se individual may represent another individual. See, e.g., Knoefler v. Unitec: Bank of Bismairk, 20 F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A nonlawyer . . . has no right to represent another entity ...inacourt of the United States”); Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“While a non-attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, ‘[h]e has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.’”). requirement imposed by the Act. See, e.g., Pace v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 861, 864 (W.D. Mo. 2012). Given the allegations of the Complaint regarding the two voicemails left for her, Laurina Leato has alleged sufficient factual support to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the conduct complained of].”. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. She has stated a plausible claim.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the Act.

Stoute v. Navient · filed 2019-09-19

To the extent Stoute alleges that Naviant violated Section 807 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., the amended complaint has not described any actions by Naviant that violate this statute. To show a violation of the FDCPA, Stoute must establish the following three elements: “(1) that [he] was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) defendant[ ] [is a] debt collector[ ] as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) defendant[ ] engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.”

An FDCPA claim requires allegations identifying a consumer, a debt collector, an attempt to collect a statutory debt, and a specific FDCPA violation by each defendant.

HILL v. BURGEON LEGAL GROUP, LTD. CO · filed 2020-01-10(e)

To prevail on a FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a “debt” as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt. ... At a minimum, Plaintiffs must plead some facts to specifically allege for each defendant that he, she, or it is a debt collector who took a particular action to collect a debt that was in violation of a provision of the FDCPA. Plaintiffs lump their FDCPA claims against a law firm, two lawyers, and two healthcare facilities without specifying who did what in violation of the FDCPA. The Court must dismiss without prejudice Count II for failure to state a cognizable claim under Rule 8 and Twombly/Iqbal.

Section 1692 requires an FDCPA claim to allege collection activity arising from a consumer debt, a defendant covered as a debt collector, and a prohibited act or failure to perform an FDCPA requirement.

White v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC · filed 2020-02-18

As this Court has previously discussed, to state an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing that: “(1) [the] plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant qualifies as a ‘debt collector’ under the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act or has failed to perform a requirement imposed by the FDCPA.”

The FDCPA claim requires proof of collection activity involving consumer debt, a defendant who qualifies as a debt collector, and an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

Dean v. Colonial Bank, National Association · filed 2020-02-25(a)(6)

To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a consumer debt and requires a claimant to prove the elements of an FDCPA violation.

Jones v. Bank of America NA · filed 2020-03-16

The FDCPA seeks to remedy abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors against consumers, and prohibits debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). Under the FDCPA, a debt collector who “fails to comply with any provision . . . with respect to any person is liable to such person” for “actual damage[s],” costs, “a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court,” and “additional damages.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). “In order to prevail on an FDCPA claim, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt; (2) Defendant qualifies as a ‘debt collector’ under the FDCPA; and (3) Defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” Dunham v. Lombardo, Davis & Goldman, 830 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1306-07 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Wise v. Cach, 2010 WL 1257665, *2 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). ... In short, Carrington’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is due to be granted.

To establish a prima facie FDCPA claim under § 1692(e), a plaintiff must show that the defendant is a debt collector, the collection conduct is prohibited by the Act, and the debt is a consumer debt.

Coburn v. Saul · filed 2020-03-17(e)

Plaintiff has also not adequately alleged a claim against defendants Carvana Group, LLC and Ameren Missouri pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) of the FDCPA. ... “To establish a prima facie case in an action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the defendant was a debt collector, (2) the defendant’s conduct in attempting to collect a debt was prohibited by the Act and (3) the debt was a consumer debt.” ... Plaintiff has not alleged that either Carvana Group, LLC or Ameren Missouri are debt collectors within the definition the FDCPA or that they engaged in a prohibited debt collection practice under the FDCPA with respect to a consumer debt. ... Liberally construing the complaint, plaintiff's allegations against these defendants pursuant to the FDCPA do not survive review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and the Court will dismiss this claim as legally frivolous.

The FDCPA requires a claim to involve collection activity arising from a consumer debt, a defendant who qualifies as a debt collector, and an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

Hinyub v. AA Recovery Solutions, Inc. · filed 2020-10-05

To establish a claim for a violation of the FDCPA, the Plaintiff must show that (1) she has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt; (2) the defendant qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.

A plaintiff cannot state an FDCPA claim without alleging how the FDCPA was violated and that the defendant is a “debt collector”; the court also recognized § 1692(k)’s one-year limitations period but did not resolve timeliness because the complaint lacked relevant dates.

KEYES v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC · filed 2020-10-16(e)(2), (e)(10), (k)

However, these allegations are in no way clear on the face of the Complaint, nor are they sufficient to raise FDCPA claims. They do not specify exactly how Plaintiff believes the FDCPA was violated, or how those claims are relevant to RAS Citron Law Offices, who were merely counsel for Nationstar. They also entirely fail to allege at any point that any of the three FDCPA defendants are actually “debt collectors,” as is required to state a valid FDCPA claim. ... Similarly, it appears extremely likely that these claims are time-barred under the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k), since the Court’s best attempt at interpreting the Complaint is that they are related to the 2015 foreclosure action and activities that preceded it. However, the claims are so devoid of factual allegations, such as relevant dates, that the Court cannot properly assess this argument. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has also failed to sufficiently state a valid FDCPA claim against any of these three defendants.

Section 1692 requires a plaintiff alleging an FDCPA violation to show that the defendant is a statutory debt collector and committed a prohibited act or omission while collecting a consumer debt.

Weiss v. Sherloq Revenue Solutions, Inc. · filed 2021-03-12

Thus, to state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff is a person who was the object of efforts to collect a consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined in the statute; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission in violation of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to establish economic or other damages to proceed with an FDCPA claim.

Bainbridge v. U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustree for the C-BASS Mortgage Loan Trust Asset-Back Certificates, Series 2007-CB6 · filed 2021-03-12(a)(1)

In any event, considering the FDCPA claim concerning the bankruptcy action, the court agrees that there is nothing in the record to establish that the plaintiffs sustained any damages, economic or otherwise, as they must ... in order to go forward with their claim. See 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(1). As such, the moving defendants will be granted summary judgment as to this claim.

A plaintiff bringing an FDCPA claim must allege that the collection activity involved consumer debt, that the defendant is a statutory debt collector, and that the defendant committed a prohibited act or omission.

Darden v. Volkswagen Credit, Inc · filed 2021-06-09

To state a claim for a violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute, and (3) the defendant engaged in a prohibited act or omission under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to allege collection activity on consumer debt, a defendant that qualifies as a debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission to state a violation.

Childs v. Capital Management Services, L.P. · filed 2021-09-01

To state a FDCPA violation, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to allege collection activity on consumer debt, a defendant that qualifies as a debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission to state a violation.

Childs v. Sequium Asset Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-09-01

To state a FDCPA violation, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege consumer harm, a qualifying personal debt, a debt collector defendant, and a violation of the Act.

BERKERY v. CREDIT COLLECTION SERVICES · filed 2021-09-07

The FDCPA “provides a remedy for consumers who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.” ... “‘To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she is a consumer who was harmed by violations of the FDCPA; (2) that the ‘debt’ arose out of a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (3) that the defendant collecting the debt is a ‘debt collector,’ and (4) that the defendant violated, by act or omission, a provision of the FDCPA.’” ... Where a plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting each of these elements, the FDCPA claim is not plausible.

Section 1692 requires an FDCPA plaintiff to plead consumer status, that the defendant is a debt collector, an attempted debt collection, and a violation of the Act.

Davis v. Debt Co Collection and Recovery Services · filed 2021-09-15

To state a prima facie case for a violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector; (3) the debt collector attempted to collect a debt; and (4) the debt collector violated the FDCPA in some manner.

A prima facie FDCPA claim requires pleading and proving that the defendant is a debt collector, engaged in conduct prohibited by the Act while attempting to collect a debt, and that the debt is a consumer debt.

Bonner v. First Progress · filed 2021-11-19(e)

Plaintiff has also not adequately alleged a claim against First Progress pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) of the FDCPA. ... “To establish a prima facie case in an action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the defendant was a debt collector, (2) the defendant’s conduct in attempting to collect a debt was prohibited by the Act and (3) the debt was a consumer debt.” ... Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against First Progress because he has not alleged that it is a debt collector within the definition the FDCPA or that First Progress engaged in a prohibited debt collection practice under the FDCPA.

A prima facie FDCPA claim requires pleading and proving that the defendant is a debt collector, the collection conduct is prohibited by the Act, and the debt is a consumer debt; expressing a debt as a positive number is not intrinsically misleading.

Bonner v. Medicredit Inc. · filed 2022-01-14

“To establish a prima facie case in an action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the defendant was a debt collector, (2) the defendant’s conduct in attempting to collect a debt was prohibited by the Act and (3) the debt was a consumer debt.” ... In the case at bar, plaintiff does not specifically allege that the defendant is a debt collector as defined in the FDCPA. ... Even if the Court were to presume that plaintiff had properly identified the defendant as a debt collector, plaintiff’s allegations would fail to state a valid FDCPA claim because they do not establish that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the FDCPA. ... However, expression of a debt in this manner cannot be considered intrinsically misleading, and plaintiff neither explains why he found it misleading, nor connects his assertion to any provision of law. In sum, plaintiff has offered nothing more than unsupported assertions and conjecture in support of his claims.

Section 1692 et seq. requires an FDCPA plaintiff to show consumer status, a qualifying consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and a violation of the FDCPA.

Miller v. Hope Federal Credit Union · filed 2022-04-22

“(1) the plaintiff is a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of the statute; (2) the debt at issue arises out of a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (3) the defendant is a ‘debt collector’ within the meaning of the statute; and (4) the defendant violated a provision of the FDCPA.”

To prevail under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show collection activity arising from a consumer debt, a defendant covered as a debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission.

Neria v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-04-05

To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove "(1) [she] has been the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA."

An FDCPA claim requires showing that the defendant is a debt collector, that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the Act while attempting to collect a debt, and that the debt was a consumer debt.

Reynolds v. Merrick Bank Corp. · filed 2022-06-02

“To establish a prima facie case in an action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the defendant was a debt collector, (2) the defendant’s conduct in attempting to collect a debt was prohibited by the Act and (3) the debt was a consumer debt.” Webb v. SuddenLink Commc’ns, 2010 WL 3940905, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 6, 2010). Here, plaintiff does not identify any Defendant as a debt collector; nor does he allege that any Defendant engaged in any debt collection practice at all, much less one that violated the FDCPA. Plaintiff does provide copies of letters he received from Merrick, but he does not allege that Merrick sent any letter in an attempt to collect a debt; nor can the letters be reasonably interpreted as such. The Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a plausible FDCPA claim against any named Defendant.

A complaint need not cite the FDCPA by name to assert a claim when its allegations and terminology fit the Act's debt-collection provisions.

Wilkening v. Santander Consumer USA · filed 2023-02-06

The bottom line is that, in balancing the need to liberally construe the Wilkenings’ Complaint against the need to resolve doubts in favor of remand, I conclude that the Wilkenings do enough to assert an FDCPA claim. Though the specifics of this claim have yet to be sorted out, the Wilkenings’ allegations fit comfortably in several FDCPA subsections, including 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692f.

Section 1692 regulates abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices and requires a plaintiff to allege collection activity arising from a consumer debt, a covered debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission to state a claim.

Raphiel v. Haley Residential Inc · filed 2023-02-07

The FDCPA regulates “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” by limiting the type and number of contacts a “debt collector” may make with a debtor. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he has been the object of collection activity arising from [a] consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a ‘debt collector’ as defined by the Act, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the Act.”

To state an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege a consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

Raphiel v. Haley Residential Inc · filed 2023-02-16

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he has been the object of collection activity arising from [a] consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a ‘debt collector’ as defined by the Act, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the Act.” ... This Court agrees with Clatanoff that Raphiel has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under the FDCPA. First, Raphiel did not specify any consumer debt that was the subject of a collection activity. ... Second, Raphiel has not alleged that Clatanoff is a “debt collector” as defined in the FDCPA. ... Third, Raphiel fails to allege what activity Clatanoff engaged in that violated the FDCPA. ... Thus, because Raphiel failed to plead a plausible claim for relief against Clatanoff under the FDCPA, or any other law, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

The FDCPA targets abusive debt collection and requires a claimant to plead consumer status, debt-collector status, a covered debt-collection attempt, and a violation of the Act.

GARCIA v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2023-02-16

To bring a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1)[ |he is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.”

To state an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege that they are a consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, the debt collector attempted to collect a debt, and the debt collector violated the FDCPA.

Chong v. Credit Control LLC · filed 2023-03-03

To state a prima facie case for a violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector (3) the debt collector attempted to collect a debt; and (4) the debt collector violated the FDCPA in some manner.

Section 1692 requires a plaintiff claiming an FDCPA violation to establish that she is a consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, the practice involves an attempt to collect a debt, and the defendant violated an FDCPA provision while attempting to collect it.

THOMAS v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2023-04-17

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” ... Here, the Court—assuming based on the allegations of the Complaint that there is a valid debt in question—is unable to discern what provision of the FDCPA Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated as necessary for a FDCPA claim such as whether Defendant engaged in deceptive or unfair means to collect the debt or provided false or misleading information when collecting the debt. But Plaintiff has pled none of the above—or any other cause of action under the FDCP. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim under the FDCPA is also dismissed.

Section 1692 protects consumers from unfair and deceptive debt-collection practices and requires an FDCPA claim to allege a consumer, a debt collector, and an act or omission violating the statute.

Adams v. Speedy Recovery Inc · filed 2023-04-28

It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to claim a violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act. The FDCPA was created to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive debt collection practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. “To state a claim for violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is a debt collector collecting a debt.” Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In order for a plaintiff to recover under the FDCPA, there are three threshold requirements: (1) the plaintiff must be a ‘consumer’; (2) the defendant must be a ‘debt collector’; and (3) the defendant must have committed some act or omission in violation of the FDCPA.” Robinson v. Managed Accounts Receivables Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3), (6). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue this claim, he must provide the necessary facts to show how all three requirements listed above are satisfied.

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is a debt collector who attempted to collect a debt and violated the statute, and that the plaintiff is a consumer.

Hurt v. Exeter Finance LLC · filed 2023-08-25

To state a prima facie case for a violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector; (3) the debt collector attempted to collect a debt; and (4) the debt collector violated the FDCPA in some manner. ... Plaintiff has not alleged that defendants are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, and in fact, it appears that Exeter is the creditor who financed plaintiff’s car purchase.

The FDCPA provides consumers a remedy for abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt-collection practices and requires a plaintiff to plead consumer status, a debt collector, an attempt to collect a debt, and a statutory violation.

SCOTT v. CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE · filed 2023-09-06

The FDCPA “provides a remedy for consumers who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.” ... To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she “is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” ... Where a plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting each of these elements, the FDCPA claim is not plausible. ... Although Scott appears to allege that she is a consumer, she does not allege that Capital One is a debt collector. Nor does she allege that she owes a debt to Capital One. ... Accordingly, to the extent Scott asserts claims under the FDCPA, the claims will be dismissed.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that they are a covered consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, and the defendant violated an FDCPA requirement.

Gabriel v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2023-09-12

“To establish a violation under the FDCPA, three elements must be proven: ‘(1) the plaintiff [must] be a “consumer” who allegedly owes the debt or a person who has been the object of efforts to collect a consumer debt, (2) the defendant collecting the debt must be considered a “debt collector,” and (3) the defendant must have engaged in an act or omission in violation of the FDCPA’s requirements.’” ... Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated various provisions of the FDCPA but does not articulate exactly how it has done so. ... The Court agrees. Nowhere in his Complaint does Plaintiff allege that Defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA or that a third party is collecting a debt in Defendant’s name. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state an FDCPA claim against Defendant.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that she is a consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, the challenged practice attempts to collect a debt, and the defendant violated an FDCPA provision.

SCOTT v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2023-09-15

The FDCPA “provides a remedy for consumers who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.” ... To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she “is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” ... Where a plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting each of these elements, the FDCPA claim is not plausible. ... Although Scott appears to allege that she is a consumer, she does not allege that Navy Federal is a debt collector. Nor does she allege that she owes a debt to Navy Federal. ... Scott’s vague and conclusory allegations do not raise a reasonable inference that Navy Federal has violated her rights under the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, to the extent Scott asserts claims under the FDCPA, the claims will be dismissed.

A plaintiff asserting an FDCPA claim must plead facts showing that the defendant is a debt collector and committed an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

Whatley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-12-13

The problem with Plaintiffs’ complaint is not necessarily the relief they request. The problem is that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts that meet the essential elements of their claims under the FCRA, the FDCPA, and the Privacy Act. The deficiencies of each claim are outlined in the bulleted list above and are detailed in the order regarding amendment. ... Accordingly, the court agrees with the magistrate judge—summary dismissal is appropriate.

To establish a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a plaintiff must show that he was a consumer who was the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

Adams v. Ally Bank · filed 2024-01-26

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts about how Ally or Experian have violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Under the FDCPA, debt collectors are prohibited “from making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices.” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995); Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010). To establish a violation of the FDCPA, Plaintiff must show: (1) he was a consumer (2) who was the object of a collection activity arising from a consumer debt, and (3) the defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA, (4) who engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. Moriarity v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-00855-AWI-SMS, 2013 WL 4400096, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (citing Miranda v. Law Office of D. Schott Carothers, No. 1:10-cv-01487-OWW-SMS, 2011 WL 2037556, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) and Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff has not established any of these elements.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant is a covered debt collector and failed to comply with a provision of the Act to establish a claim.

Frickey v. Concora Credit Inc · filed 2024-02-04(a)(6)

To establish a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant is a debt collector as defined under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6), and (2) the defendant failed to comply with a provision of the FDCPA.

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege collection activity arising from a consumer debt, a defendant that is a debt collector, and an act or omission prohibited by the statute; purchasing a debt without a contract with the plaintiff, without more, does not establish a violation.

Chong v. Security Credit Services LLC · filed 2024-02-13

In order to state a claim under the FDCPA, a “[p]laintiff must show (1) that he was the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) that Defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) that Defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. ... In the present case, the plaintiff does not specifically allege that the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, nor does he adequately assert that the alleged debt was consumer related. Even if the plaintiff had properly identified the defendant and the debt, his claim would still fail because none of his allegations establish that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the FDCPA. ... The plaintiff fails to connect these allegations to any provision of law, and there is no basis to conclude that his assertions amount to violations of the FDCPA. Therefore, he has failed to state a valid FDCPA claim.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show collection activity arising from a consumer debt, a defendant covered as a debt collector, and an act or omission prohibited by the statute.

Nolan v. Miles, Jr. · filed 2024-02-22

To state a successful claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt [] collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” ... Plaintiff does not describe, with any degree of specificity, any acts or omissions by Defendants that violated FDCPA or TILA. Accordingly, any claims Plaintiff raises under these statutes must be dismissed.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to allege that she was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant committed an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

McCrae v. Transunion LLC · filed 2024-04-29

“To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show (1) she has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.”

A plaintiff must plausibly allege collection activity involving a consumer debt, a covered debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission to state an FDCPA claim.

Atkinson v. National Credit Systems Inc. · filed 2024-06-05

To bring an FDCPA claim, Atkinson must plausibly allege that (1) he was the object of collection activity arising from a “consumer debt” as defined by the FDCPA, (2) the defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant engaged in an act or omission that the FDCPA prohibits. ... A “debt” under the FDCPA is “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). ... Atkinson fails to plausibly allege that National is a debt collector or engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the court dismisses Atkinson’s FDCPA claim against National.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show that a consumer debt collection targeted him, the defendant was a debt collector, and the defendant committed a prohibited act or omission.

Ferguson v. Credit One LLC · filed 2024-10-15

To successfully bring an FDCPA claim, “a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) he was the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt as defined by the FDCPA, (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.’” ... Plaintiff’s cryptic allegations, even generously construed, do not allege any facts or circumstances showing that he was the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt as defined by the FDCPA. ... Further, he does not allege that defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692 and RECOMMENDS that any such claims be DISMISSED.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to allege that he is a consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, the challenged practice involves collecting a debt, and the defendant violated an FDCPA provision.

ROACH v. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP. · filed 2024-12-23

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the [FDCPA] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Moyer v. Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C., 991 F.3d 466, 470 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted). Where a plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting each of these elements, the FDCPA claim is not plausible. ... To the extent he seeks to present an FDCPA claim, Roach has failed to allege facts in support of a plausible claim. He alleges that “Firstsource’s attempt to collect a debt based on unauthorized information transfer and deceptive practices constitutes a violation of the FDCPA and FCRA.” (ECF No. 2 at 6.) This allegation is wholly conclusory and does not meet the Iqbal pleading standard. Moreover, Roach would need to establish standing to bring an FDCPA claim and he has not done so.

An FDCPA claim requires facts showing a prohibited act or omission, and conclusory allegations do not satisfy that requirement.

Wilson v. Carrington Mortgage Services L L C · filed 2025-01-15

The Court declines to conduct an inquiry into whether Defendant qualifies as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA because Plaintiff’s claims fail on the third prong of the FDCPA requirements. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendant violated a provision of the FDCPA.

To succeed on an FDCPA civil claim, a plaintiff must show collection activity arising from consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission.

Borne v. NewRez, LLC · filed 2025-03-12

In order to succeed in a civil lawsuit brought under the FDCPA, the plaintiff must prove the following: “(1) that the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.”

To state an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that she is a consumer, the defendant is a debt collector, the challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a debt, and the defendant violated the FDCPA in doing so.

Pinkston v. Advanced Financial Services · filed 2025-04-14

Regarding Plaintiff’s claim under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, it is not enough to simply assert that she is the rightful owner of her vehicle, and that Defendants stole and confiscated it. (See D.I. 2.) To plausibly state a FDCPA claim, Plaintiff must allege that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 417 (3d Cir. 2015). The allegations in the Complaint do not suggest that Defendants are debt collectors or that they violated a provision of the FDCPA when they took the vehicle. Since it is not inconceivable that Plaintiff’s deficient pleading could be cured, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend her FDCPA claim.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show collection activity arising from consumer debt, that the defendant is a debt collector, and an act or omission prohibited by the Act.

Diaz v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2025-05-27

Mr. Diaz’s does not identify an act or omission on part of the defendants that violated the FDCPA. To succeed on a claim under FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that they were “the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt,” that the “defendants are debt collectors as defined by the FDCPA,” and “engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” ... Though Mr. Diaz claims that NewRez did not respond to his validation of debt request, NewRez told him that it is the loan servicer for FNMA as of October 1, 2023, and provided letters of validation of debt on April 19, 2024, June 6, 2024, and July 30, 2024. ... As such, Count Four is dismissed as the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of the FDCPA.