15 U.S.C. § 1692

The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute, so proof of one violation is sufficient to support judgment for the consumer.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Juanita Schultz, Defendant/Respondent. · filed 2014-11-18

The FDCPA is a strict liability statute; proof of one violation is sufficient to support judgment for the consumer.

Section 1692(e) imposes strict liability for false debt-collection representations, so a collector's intent is immaterial.

Bass v. I.C. Sys., Inc. · filed 2018-07-11(e)

In the Seventh Circuit, the FDCPA is a "strict liability statute." ... The only thing that matters is whether ICS's claim that Bass owed the collection agency fee was false; whether the representation was intentionally false was immaterial.

The FDCPA imposes strict liability, so a plaintiff need not prove that a debt collector knowingly or intentionally violated it.

Bell v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A. · filed 2020-03-20

However, the FDCPA is a strict-liability statute. Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2014). It is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove knowledge or intent. Id. (citing McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2011)).

The FDCPA imposes liability on a debt collector for unintentional violations, including mistakes of law, subject to the statutory bona fide error defense.

Trice v. Oliveri & Associates, LLC · filed 2022-01-04(k)

Thus, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Walker applies retroactively; that the FDCPA is a strict liability statute for which a debt collector remains liable for unintentional violations, including mistakes of law; that the Fourth Circuit’s Archie decision does not insulate Oliveri from liability; that Trice is not estopped from pursuing her claims under the FDCPA; and that the remedial nature of the FDCPA augurs in favor of construing the law in a manner that protects consumers like Trice.

The FDCPA imposes strict liability on debt collectors for violations, including unintentional violations and mistakes of law, subject to its bona fide error defense.

Smith v. Oliveri & Associates LLC · filed 2022-02-28

Thus, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Walker applies retroactively; that the FDCPA is a strict liability statute for which a debt collector remains liable for unintentional violations, including mistakes of law; that the Fourth Circuit’s Archie decision does not insulate Defendants from liability; and that the remedial nature of the FDCPA augurs in favor of construing the law in a manner that protects consumers like Plaintiffs.

The FDCPA requires a consumer debt, a qualifying debt collector, and a violation of its prohibitions, and imposes strict liability without requiring knowledge, intent, or actual damages.

Cunningham v. Account Processing Group LLC · filed 2022-03-28

To show a violation of the FDCPA under 15 U.S.C. § 1692, a plaintiff must satisfy the following elements: (1) [the plaintiff] is a consumer as defined by the FDCPA, (2) the debt arose out of transactions which are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, (3) the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (4) the defendant violated the prohibitions set forth in § 1692e. ... “The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent, and does not need to have suffered actual damages.”

The exception for debts not in default when obtained concerns the specific debt at issue, so an entity may generally be a debt collector without being one in a particular situation.

Prince v. NCO Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2004-11-29(a)(6)(F)

NCO’s letter did include the statement “this is a communication from a debt collector.” This is not necessarily an admission that NCO is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Section 1692a(6) provides that a person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect ... debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” may be excluded from definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA “to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” The general definition of “debt collector” under section 1692a(6) refers to the person or entity and the exception in subsection (F) refers to the debt at issue, so an entity may generally be a “debt collector” without being a “debt collector” in a specific situation. Furthermore, Prince has provided no evidence that she changed her position in reliance upon NCO’s characterizations. Therefore, NCO is not estopped from arguing that it is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) exempts a servicing agent from “debt collector” status when the debt was not in default when obtained; § 1692f(6) protects a person with an interest in secured property from nonjudicial dispossession when the enforcer lacks the right to possess it.

Eke v. Florida · filed 2011-03-11(a)(6)(F)(iii), (f)(6)

The legislative history of the FDCPA confirms that Congress did not intend for entities servicing debts for others to be considered debt collectors under the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the Law Firm’s efforts to collect rent on the Law Firm’s behalf before it was due entitles it to protection under § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). ... Section 1692f(6) addresses entities that attempt to enforce security interests but who lack the right to enforce as against the secured property because the right has not matured.

For FDCPA coverage, a debt collector must have obtained the debt when it was already in default.

Gregory Rose, et ux v. FMS, Inc. · filed 2013-04-30§ 1692a(6)(F)(iii)

A debt collector is a "person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person." ... Thus, to file suit against a debt collector under the FDCPA that debt must be in default.

The FDCPA excludes from the definition of debt collector a person collecting a debt that was not in default when the person obtained it; when the loan agreement specifies when default occurs, that contractual definition determines default for this purpose.

Messina v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC · filed 2016-09-28(a)(6)(F)

The FDCPA’s definition of debt collector is not all-encompassing and excludes any person collecting or attempting to collect “a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F). ... Although the Seventh Circuit has not definitively held as much, it has looked favorably on decisions in which courts have used the definition of default in the loan agreement to determine when a loan is in default for purposes of the FDCPA. ... Here, the loan agreement provides that “If [Messina does] not pay the full amount of each monthly payment on the date it is due, [Messina] will be in default.” ... Since Messina was in default at the time Green Tree began servicing the loan'on April 1, 2013, Green Tree is a debt collector under the FDCPA.

Section 1692(a)(6)(F)(iii) excludes from the FDCPA’s debt-collector definition a person collecting a debt that was not in default when the person obtained it.

Wong v. Navient Solution LLC · filed 2020-02-28(a)(6)(F)(iii)

The FDCPA excludes various types of parties from the definition of “debt collector,” including “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt . . . to the extent that such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)(F)(iii).

Section 1692(a)(6)(F) excludes from the FDCPA's debt-collector definition a person collecting a debt that was not in default when obtained.

Mekhail v. Galencare, Inc. · filed 2020-04-03(a)(6)(F)

However, under the FDCPA, the definition of a debt collector does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt . . . due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)(F). ... The Court agrees that without an allegation that NPAS was a debt collector when it sent Plaintiff the December letter, the claim against NPAS must be dismissed.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) excludes a person from the definition of debt collector when the debt was not in default when obtained, and the parties may contractually define the period preceding default.

Ngo v. NPAS, Inc. · filed 2021-01-15(a)(6)(F)(iii)

A “debt collector” is defined by the statute as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). But the statute also provides that a person is not a debt collector when the person’s activity “concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” Id. at § 1692a(6)(f)(iii). ... In sum, there is no evidence that plaintiff’s debt was ever determined to be in default according to the terms of Tulane’s conditions of admission. Nor is there any evidence that NPAS treated the debt at issue as in default. Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on this issue, and the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to create an issue of material fact on the question of whether NPAS is a debt collector. Consequently, the Court must grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 1692a defines a personal-purpose obligation as a debt and excludes from debt-collector status collection of a debt originated by the collector or not in default when obtained.

Avent v. Platinum Plus Auto Protection · filed 2021-02-23(a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(6)(F)

Even though Plaintiff adequately alleges that he incurred a debt, he cannot sustain an FDCPA claim because Defendants are not “debt collectors” within the meaning of the statute. As defined in the FDCPA, “‘debt collector’ means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA specifically excludes from the term “debt collector” “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; [or] (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F). ... The complaint fails to plausibly allege that any Defendant was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA because, inter alia, there is no allegation that any Defendant obtained an interest in the debt after it was in default. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is granted.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) excludes from debt-collector status a person collecting a debt that was not in default when obtained.

Willison v. Nelnet, Inc. · filed 2021-03-25(a)(6)(F)(iii)

Under the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). However, the FDCPA also provides for several exceptions, one of which is relevant here. If the debt at issue “was not in default at the time it was obtained,” then a person collecting or attempting to collect such debt does not qualify as a “debt collector.” Id. at § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).

Under the FDCPA, a mortgage servicer is a debt collector if the mortgage was in default when transferred or the servicer treated it as in default at that time.

Driggers v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2021-07-15(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)(iii)

Thus, for a mortgage servicer to be considered a debt collector, the mortgage must be in default at the time it was transferred to the servicer for collection. In the alternative, a mortgage is deemed in default for purposes of the FDCPA if the mortgage servicer treats the mortgage as being in default at the time of transfer. ... The Court does not find Plaintiff’s interpretation of the November 10 statement to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Fay considered the loan to be in default. ... Because Fay is not a “debt collector,” there can be no liability for any alleged violations under the FDCPA, and Count II is due to be dismissed as a matter of law.

Section 1692a(6) does not treat a creditor collecting a debt it owns as a debt collector subject to the FDCPA.

Zielinski, Jr. v. Citizens Bank N.A. · filed 2021-07-20(a)(6)

Second is Citizens’ argument that it is not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA, which has merit. The FDCPA does not apply to “any person collecting or attempting to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... They are bound by that concession, and thus have not preserved any dispute for trial as to the applicability of the debt collector exemption.

A person servicing a debt under a current forbearance agreement is not a debt collector under the FDCPA when it obtains an interest in the debt, because the debt is not in default at that time.

Joseph v. Ocwen Financial Corporation · filed 2023-05-25(a)(6)(F)(iii)

In such a situation, we do not understand the debt as being in default for purposes of the FDCPA’s definition of a “debt collector.” ... Accordingly, Ocwen is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA, and the Josephs’ two claims under that statute do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) excludes a person from the FDCPA definition of debt collector when the debt was not in default at the time the person obtained it, so whether a mortgage loan was in default when servicing began may be submitted to the jury.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOC. v. HILL · filed 2023-09-12(a)(6)(F)(iii)

The FDCPA excludes "any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt . . . which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(a)(6)(F). ... Both plaintiff and defendants argue the terms of the subject note support their position. Nationstar asserts Hill was not in default, as defined in the subject note, when it took servicing. Hill asserts she presented evidence of being in default at the time Nationstar began servicing her loan, as defined in the subject note, and therefore the issue was properly submitted to the jury. We agree.

Section 1692a(6) covers persons who regularly collect debts owed or due another, generally requiring that the debt be in default before it is acquired.

O'Flynn v. PHH Mortage Corporation · filed 2023-09-28(a)(6)

The Act defines “debt collectors” as anyone who “regularly collects or attempts to collect ... debts owed or due ... another[,]” generally meaning a debt must be in default before it is acquired. 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(6). ... Contrary to Ocwen’s arguments, the Court has identified sufficient language in the Amended Complaint to overcome the requirements of the 12(b)(6) motion.

Section 1692f(6)(A) bars a repossessor from taking or threatening nonjudicial action against property as collateral for a lender’s debt when there is no present right to possess that property, but it does not bar handling incidental personal property when it is not seized to enforce the lender’s loan.

Nadalin v. Automobile Recovery Bureau, Inc. · filed 1999-03-12(f)(6)(A)

ARB did not seize the plaintiffs personal property for the purpose or with the likely effect of using it to satisfy the plaintiffs debt to ARB’s principal. The seizure was not a method of enforcing a debt owed to the lender. It was not an effort to claim and seize additional collateral for the loan. We can find no evidence that Congress in the debt collection statute meant to extinguish repos-sessors’ common law rights and remedies, whatever they may be, as bailees, provided the repossessor is not seizing property as collateral for the lender’s loan to the owner.

Section 1692a(6) covers a creditor’s debt-collection activity when it uses another name indicating that a third party is collecting or attempting to collect the debt.

2101 Albermarle v. Rosa · filed 1999-03-31(a)(6)

The court notes that section 1692a (6) of the FDCPA makes activities of a creditor covered by the FDCPA if in trying to collect the debt the creditor “uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.”

The FDCPA covers obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, not commercial debts, and does not apply when a creditor collects a debt owed to itself.

Franklin Credit Mgt. Corp. v. Nicholas, No. Cv-98-0546721 (Apr. 27, 1999) · filed 1999-04-27(a)(5)

Defendants' action based on the FDCPA fails because there are no allegations which support a finding that defendants' debt to the plaintiff is a "debt" within the purview of the FDCPA. ... There are no allegations which even suggest that this debt was a consumer obligation. The owner of the mortgaged property is Lantern Hill Associates, a partnership. This strongly indicates that the debt is a commercial obligation and not a consumer debt. A debt for a commercial purpose is not a debt within the FDCPA. ... Franklin Credit is trying to collect a debt owed to it, not a debt owed to another. In such case, it is not subject to the FDCPA.

The FDCPA applies to consumer debts arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and a plaintiff must plead facts—not merely recite statutory language—showing that the debt is consumer in nature.

Piper v. Meade & Assocs., Inc. · filed 2017-10-10(a)(5)

Even if the Court accepts Piper's allegations in her Complaint as true, the sole factual piece of information in the Complaint that the debt was owned by Harris Teeter simply does not constitute an adequate averment under Rule 8 that the nature of the debt meets the statute's definition. The mere recitation of the statutory language that the debt was "incurred as a financial obligation that was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a 'debt' as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)," constitutes "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" and the Court is "not bound to accept [it] as true."

Section 1692a(5) limits “debt” to obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and excludes commercial debts.

Skrabets v. Tikhvinskiy Law, LLC · filed 2023-09-19(a)(5)

The FDCPA defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money [or] property *** are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (Emphasis added.) Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2013 IL App (3d) 121700, ¶ 31 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)). Therefore, the FDCPA does not cover actions arising out of commercial debts. Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F. 3d 152, 154 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP, 852 F. 3d 207, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2017).

Section 1692g(4) requires a consumer to request debt verification in writing; a telephone request does not trigger the debt collector’s verification duty.

Fasten v. Zager · filed 1999-05-20(g)(4)

Insofar as plaintiff argues that the message conveyed by defendant’s collection representative over the telephone was misleading and contradicts the validation notice, defendant correctly notes that, since plaintiff failed to request verification of the debt in writing, as expressly required by the validation notice and Section 1692g(4), defendant was under no legal obligation to provide verification of the debt. Under Section 1692g(4), verification is triggered only by- the consumer writing a letter to the debt, collector. Here, plaintiffs telephone call to defendant did not constitute such a request for verification.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collection after a timely written dispute until it obtains and mails verification of the debt, and liability is strict.

Dragon v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2007-04-12(g)(b)

“If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the [initial] thirty-day period ... that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed ... the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt ... and a copy of such verification ... is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). Unlike § 1692c(a), § 1692g requires no intent; strict liability is imposed. ... Notwithstanding defendant’s explanation of how or why the second notice was generated with plaintiffs second ICS account, defendant does not dispute that both of its account numbers for plaintiff pertained to the same debt of plaintiff to Dell, which was disputed, and that it never obtained and mailed verification of the debt to plaintiffs counsel. As noted above, liability is strict — an unsophisticated consumer (indeed, even a sophisticated consumer) would have viewed the second notice from ICS as a collection effort with respect to the Dell debt plaintiffs counsel had provided notice she was disputing. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial as to this claim, and plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on this violation will be granted.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to cease collection after a timely written dispute until it obtains verification of the debt and mails the verification to the consumer.

Johnston v. Monterey Collections SVC · filed 2021-02-02(g)(b)

Section 1692g obligates collectors to send a consumer written notice of an alleged debt setting forth the amount of the debt; the name of the creditor; a statement that the debt will be assumed valid unless the consumer disputes the validity of the debt in writing “within thirty days after receipt of the notice”; and a statement that the collector will provide the name and address of the original creditor upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period. See §1692g(a). If the consumer timely notifies the collector in writing that the debt or any portion thereof is disputed, “the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt” until the debt collector obtains verification of the alleged debt and a copy is mailed to the consumer. § 1692g(b).

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collecting a disputed debt until it verifies the debt and mails the verification, but verification generally requires only written confirmation of the amount claimed owed, not an independent investigation.

Flores v. Debski & Associates, P.A. · filed 2021-09-14(g)(b)

After properly considering those documents, they readily support the conclusion that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against the Defendants does not satisfy the third element because their verification of the debt was sufficient as a matter of law. ... Under § 1692g(b), if a consumer notifies the debt collector in writing of a dispute within thirty days of receiving the demand notice, collection of the disputed debt must cease until the debt collector obtains verification and mails it to the consumer. “[V]erification of a debt involves nothing more than the debt collector confirming in writing that the amount being demanded is what the creditor is claiming is owed.” ... Although the Defendants’ verification letter did not include all of the items that Plaintiff requested and otherwise failed to meet his satisfaction, the letter did contain all of the information required by statute.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector to stop collecting a disputed debt until it mails verification, and verification need only confirm the amount claimed owed and the identity of the person who owes it.

Papadimitriou v. Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn, LLP · filed 2023-09-29(g)(b)

All that is required for verification is a written statement from the creditor claiming what debt is owed and the identity of the person who owes the debt.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to provide specified information in the initial notice, cease collection after a timely written dispute, and verify the debt before resuming collection; it does not require a response to the dispute when collection has ceased.

Fennell Jr v. Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd. · filed 2024-11-15(g)(a), (g)(b)

Likewise, the FDCPA provides no cause of action when a collector does not respond to the consumer’s dispute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.

Sections 1692e(5) and 1692e(10), read with § 1692c(b), prohibit a debt collector from threatening to contact a debtor’s employer when that communication is unlawful; § 1692k(a)(2)(A) limits additional statutory damages to $1,000 per action.

Raimondi v. McAllister & Associates, Inc. · filed 1999-06-15(e)(5), (e)(10), and (k)(a)(2)(A)

Taken in conjunction with § 1692c(b), § 1692e(5) forbids a debt collector from threatening to communicate with a debtor’s employer. ... Because § 1692c(b) explicitly prohibits defendant from contacting plaintiffs employer, threatening to do so in order to collect a debt amounts to a false representation in violation of § 1692e(10). ... Because the court finds that plaintiff can recover at most $1,000 in additional damages under the FDCPA, the court dismisses plaintiffs § 1692c(a)(2) claim.

An alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, is not a legally cognizable defense to a foreclosure action.

G.E. Capital Mortgage Services v. Baker, No. Cv 98-0167089 S (Jul. 7, 1999) · filed 1999-07-07

Defenses based upon alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act have been held by a Superior Court not to constitute valid defenses to a foreclosure action. . . ." (Citation omitted.) First Federal Bank v. Craco , Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 249553 (April 2, 1996, Silbert, J. ) ( 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 377 ). Therefore, there would be no legally cognizable special defense even assuming arguendo that the defendants plead sufficient facts in their special defense. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to strike the seventh special defense and the amendment thereto is granted.

Section 1692f(1) prohibits collecting more than the face amount of a dishonored check unless the excess is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

Irwin v. Mascott · filed 1999-03-24(f)(1)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1), the collection of any amount over the face amount of a dishonored check is prohibited unless the excess amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from collecting an amount not expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law, and the FDCPA imposes strict liability without requiring intentional conduct.

Conner v. Howe · filed 2004-11-08(f)(1)

The FDCPA is a strict liability statute and a consumer need not show intentional conduct by the debt collector to be entitled to recover damages. ... Howe thus attempted to collect an amount of interest not permitted by law and, since the loan agreement itself was void, Howe’s suit against Conner sought an amount not permitted by a valid agreement establishing that debt.

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from attempting to collect an amount unless the debt agreement expressly authorizes it or the amount is permitted by law.

Mund v. EMCC, Inc. · filed 2009-07-27(f)(1)

Under the FDCPA, it is unlawful for a debt collector to attempt to collect “any amount ... unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l).

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from collecting an amount unless the agreement creating the debt expressly authorizes it or the law permits it.

White v. Bank of America Bank, NA · filed 2014-12-29(f)(1)

But even setting this deficiency aside, second, the Note attached to the Whites’ complaint authorized the lender to demand payment in full in the event of default. Consequently, the instrument expressly authorized the payment demanded by McCalla Raymer. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from collecting any amount that is not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

Bennett v. Cielo Homeowners Association, Inc · filed 2020-05-05(f)(1)

Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, and upon consideration of the exhibits Plaintiffs attach to the FAC, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that show that any Defendant “collect[ed] [ ] any amount” that was not “permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).

Section 1692f(1) bars attempts to collect amounts not expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law, and the same conduct may violate specific prohibitions in multiple FDCPA sections.

Houser v. LTD Financial Services, L.P. · filed 2021-01-07(f)(1)

But nothing in the structure of the FDCPA suggests that the same conduct can’t violate specific prohibitions in multiple sections. ... Housetr’s pleading under § 1692f with direct linkage to one of its illustrative subsections is thus sufficient. His claims under 15 USC §§ 1692f and 1692f(1) will proceed.

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from charging any amount while collecting a debt unless the amount is expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law.

Glover v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2025-02-04(f)(1)

We hold that a debt collector violates the FDCPA when they charge “any amount” which is not expressly authorized by the agreement or permitted by law while collecting or attempting to collect a debt.

The FDCPA treats household-purpose water and sewer charges as debts and prohibits charging interest or penalties above the amount permitted by law.

Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P. · filed 1999-07-29(f)(1)

We thus hold that the sewer and water claims at issue are properly considered as “debts” under the FDCPA, and that the amount of interest and penalty charged by defendants exceeded that permitted by law.

Section 1692f(1) permits a debt collector to collect a fee in addition to the principal debt when the fee is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or otherwise permitted by state law.

Lee v. Security Check, LLC · filed 2000-08-02(f)(1)

Thus, the lawfulness of a service charge under Section 1692f(l) turns on whether the charge is “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” ... Looking to the plain language of Section 1692f(l), the court interprets the statute to permit the collection of a fee, in addition to the principal obligation, if such fee is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or is otherwise permitted by state law. ... Based on the above authorities, the court is of the opinion that the uniform commercial statutes permitted Security Check to impose the $30.00 service charge.

Section 1692f(1) permits a debt collector to collect a service charge when the debt agreement expressly authorizes it or applicable law permits it; a commercially reasonable charge authorized by Nebraska law therefore does not violate the FDCPA.

Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc, D/B/A Checkmate of Fremont · filed 2001-04-27(f)(1)

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector may not impose a service charge unless (i) the agreement creating the debt expressly authorizes the charge, or (ii) the charge is permitted by law. ... In this way, Checkmate “became responsible for” the debts, and thus stands in the position of the merchants for purposes' of collecting incidental damages, in the form of a commercially reasonable charge. ... Checkmate therefore did not violate Nebraska law when it imposed the service fees, and did not violate the FDCPA when it attempted to collect them.

Section 1692f(1) bars a debt collector from collecting an amount unless the debt agreement expressly authorizes it or the law permits it.

Villanueva v. Account Discovery Systems, LLC · filed 2015-01-12(f)(1)

Accepting the well-pled allegations in the Complaint [# 1] as true, the Court finds that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l) by collecting an amount that was not expressly authorized or permitted by law.

Section 1692f(1) supports a claim when a debt collector attempts to collect an amount not authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, including collection conduct allegedly violating another law.

Klein v. Affiliated Group, Inc., The · filed 2019-01-17(f)(1)

The Court agrees with the reasoning of Klein v. Stewart Zlimen & Jungers, and concludes that Credit Management’s alleged collection of a debt for North Memorial without a written contract in violation of the AG Agreement constitutes a viable § 1692f(1) claim.

Section 1692(f)(1) permits recovery for a debt-collection fee only when the fee is not authorized by the underlying contract or permitted by law.

Alleman v. Collection Professionals, Inc. · filed 2019-04-02(f)(1)

Rather, damages are available only for such fees that were not authorized by the contracts giving rise to the debt or that were not permitted by law.

Section 1692f prohibits a debt collector from attempting to collect an amount unless it is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law; here, that barred collecting post-charge-off interest not transferred by the agreement or preserved after the creditor’s waiver.

Tabiti v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2019-03-27(f)

Section 1692f, which plaintiff also cites, makes it an unfair debt collection practice to “attempt to collect . . . . any amount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” ... Thus, Chase did not transfer any right it had to collect post-charge interest. ... Summing up, the plain language of the purchase agreement did not transfer to defendants the right to collect post-charge-off interest. And even if it did, Chase waived the right to collect post-charge-off interest, and defendants were bound by that waiver. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate for plaintiff as to liability.

Section 1692f(1) prohibits a debt collector from attempting to collect an amount unless it is authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

Carter v. Holzman Law, PLLC · filed 2025-03-20(f)(1)

The Court concludes that Carter’s Section 1692f Claim sufficiently alleges that Holzman collected an amount not authorized by law.

Section 1692f(1) prohibits a debt collector from collecting an amount unless it is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, and the same conduct can support overlapping liability under § 1692e and § 1692f(1).

Amaya v. Sentry Credit Inc · filed 2025-09-04(f)(1)

In this case, Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated Section 1692f(1), which prohibits a debt collector from collecting on any amount “unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). Based on the undisputed facts, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that he has established a violation of Section 1692f(1) “for the same reason as Defendant’s violations of Section[] 1692e.” ... Accordingly, Defendant’s attempt to collect the debt also constitutes a violation of Section 1692f(1) as a matter of law.

The FDCPA does not prohibit an accurate proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, standing alone, when it contains all required information, including the timing of the debt.

Gatewood v. CP Medical, LLC (In re Gatewood) · filed 2015-07-10

Filing in a bankruptcy case an accurate proof of claim containing all the required information, including the timing of the debt, standing alone, is not a prohibited debt collection practice.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from filing time-barred bankruptcy proofs of claim that are unfair, unconscionable, deceptive, or misleading.

Patrick v. PYOD, LLC · filed 2014-08-20(e)

Thus, as the Eleventh Circuit found, the court concludes that such a filing is “unfair,” “unconscionable,” “deceptive,” and “misleading” within the scope of § 1692e and § 1692f.

Section 1692(e) does not apply to the filing of proofs of claim in bankruptcy cases.

Claudio v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In Re Claudio) · filed 2012-01-13(e)

Because the FDCPA is inapplicable to the filing of proofs of claims in bankruptcy cases and because the Debtor did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 901 l’s safe harbor provision, the Court will GRANT LVNV’s Motion to Dismiss and DENY the Debtor’s Sanctions Motion.

The FDCPA does not permit a claim based on a proof of claim filed in bankruptcy court.

Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC · filed 2010-10-05

We hold that a proof of claim filed in bankruptcy court cannot form the basis for a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and therefore affirm the dismissal.

The FDCPA does not permit a Chapter 13 debtor to attack an allegedly inflated proof of claim filed in bankruptcy; the debtor must instead pursue the remedies provided by the Bankruptcy Code.

Gray-Mapp v. Sherman · filed 1999-10-21

This case requires the Court to determine whether a chapter 13 debtor may bring a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based on a creditor’s filing of an allegedly inflated proof of claim. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the debtor cannot attack the proof of claim under the FDCPA; she must instead pursue, in the bankruptcy proceedings, the remedies outlined in the Bankruptcy Code.

The FDCPA provides no remedy for a claim based on a creditor's proof of claim filed during bankruptcy proceedings.

Middleebrooks v. Interstate Credit Control, Inc. · filed 2008-07-09(e)

Thus, “an FDCPA claim cannot be premised on proofs of claim filed during the bankruptcy proceedings.” ... Therefore, the FDCPA provides no remedy to Middlebrooks for ICC’s allegedly wrongful proof of claim.

The FDCPA does not bar a creditor from filing a bankruptcy proof of claim when the claim is neither fraudulent nor improper.

Keeler v. PRA Receivables Management, LLC (In Re Keeler) · filed 2009-05-04

For purposes of this adversary proceeding, I need only conclude that the FDCPA does not bar a creditor from filing a proof of claim, as permitted by section 501(a), where that claim is neither fraudulent nor improper.

The FDCPA does not treat a creditor’s filing of a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case as regulated debt-collection activity.

Jenkins v. Genesis Financial Solutions (In Re Jenkins) · filed 2011-09-19

The court is not persuaded that filing a proof of claim can constitute regulated “collection” activity within the meaning of any of the statutory provisions at issue in this matter.

The FDCPA does not permit a claim based on filing a time-barred proof of claim in bankruptcy court.

Torres v. Asset Acceptance, LLC · filed 2015-04-07

In light of the above, the Court finds that filing a time-barred proof of claim in bankruptcy court “cannot form the basis for an FDCPA claim.”

Sections 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(5), and 1692f may be enforced alongside the Bankruptcy Code when a debt collector's conduct violates the automatic stay and can comply with both statutory schemes; § 1692c(a)(2) covers communications about any debt encompassed by bankruptcy proceedings when the collector knows the consumer is represented by counsel.

Nelson v. St. Catherine University · filed 2024-05-21(c)(a)(2), (d), (e), (e)(5), and (f)

The Court finds that Congress has never clearly expressed, nor even implied, an intent to repeal the FDCPA with the Bankruptcy Code. The Court further finds that where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that a debt collector pursued a state collection action in violation of the automatic stay provision, FDCPA enforcement does not irreconcilably conflict with enforcement of the Bankruptcy Code. Because debt collectors can comply with both statutes, both must be given effect. See In re American River Transp. Co., 800 F.3d at 433. Because both statutes must be given effect, and the pleading rules permit alternative theories of liability, the Court denies QLF’s motion to dismiss the FDCPA claims predicated on an automatic stay violation. ... The Court finds that Ms. Nelson has plausibly alleged that QLF had notice of her legal representation with respect to the bankruptcy action. In order to satisfy the requirements for a claim under § 1692c(a)(2), that knowledge must be “with respect to the very debt about which” QLF communicated with her. ... The Court finds, under these circumstances, that Ms. Nelson had plausibly alleged that QLF knew that she was represented in an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, and thus had knowledge of her representation for purposes of § 1692c(a)(2) with respect to any debt encompassed by the bankruptcy proceedings. ... The Court finds that Ms. Nelson has sufficiently pled a communication in connection with the collection of a debt to overcome the motion to dismiss. ... Accordingly, the Court denies QLF’s motion to dismiss Ms. Nelson’s § 1692c(a)(2) claim.

Section 1692a(6) can cover an individual collection-agency officer or executive who is personally involved in, approves, or ratifies collection activity; corporate status alone is insufficient.

Musso v. Seiders · filed 1999-10-27(a)(6)

Individual defendants, such as directors or officers of a collection agency, may be held personally liable under the FDCPA. To establish an individual defendant’s personal liability, a plaintiff must first establish that the individual is a “debt collector.” ... A high ranking employee, executive or director of a collection agency may fit within the statutory definition of a debt collector. ... It is not enough, however, to merely allege that Hap Seiders is a debt collector; the plaintiff must also allege that the defendant was personally involved in the collection of the debt at issue. ... The same reasoning applies to this case. The plaintiff does not seek to hold the defendant liable simply by virtue of his position with CRA; rather, she alleges that he is personally liable as a debt collector because he knew of the allegedly unlawful procedures being used but nevertheless approved or ratified them. The plaintiff has stated a claim under the FDCPA against the defendant in his individual capacity. Therefore, the defendant’s motion must fail.

The FDCPA permits individual liability when a person is personally involved in the alleged prohibited debt-collection conduct and thereby qualifies as a debt collector under the Act.

Krapf v. PROFESSIONAL COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. · filed 2007-12-12

Where the complaint contains sufficient allegations of personal involvement in the alleged violation, plaintiff states a claim for individual liability for violation of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA permits individual liability only when the person personally participates in the debt-collection conduct; inaction or inadequate supervision alone is insufficient.

Isaac v. Nra Grp., LLC · filed 2019-03-29(a)(6)

The Court declines to find individual liability here based on alleged inaction or insufficient supervision. ... In sum, given the uncontroverted evidence in the record that Kusic had no personal involvement in connection with the collection of plaintiffs' debts, the Court concludes that Kusic cannot have any individual liability under the FDCPA for any violations under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g and 1692e.

Section 1692k(c) allows a debt collector to avoid liability through the bona fide error defense only by proving that each alleged violation was unintentional, a bona fide error, and occurred despite reasonably adapted procedures to prevent it.

Caputo v. Professional Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2003-04-21(k)(c)

Therefore, for this defense to prevail on summary judgment, the defendants must prove for each and every alleged violation (1) that it was unintentional, (2) that it was a bona fide error, and (3) that it was “made despite ‘the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid’ the violation.”

Section 1692k(c) provides a bona fide error defense when a debt collector proves that the violation was unintentional, resulted from a genuine error, and occurred despite reasonable procedures to avoid that error.

Kort v. Diversified Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2005-01-10(k)(c)

To qualify for the bona fide error defense, DCS must make three showings under § 1692k(c): (1) it must show that the presumed FDCPA violation was not intentional; (2) it must show that the presumed FDCPA violation resulted from a bona fide error (here, the assumed error regarding the HEA); and (3) it must show that it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. ... To summarize, even if DCS erred and violated the FDCPA as claimed by Harris-Alleyne and Miller, see supra n.7, DCS is entitled to the bona fide error defense as a matter of law.

Section 1692i requires a debt-collection action to be brought in the judicial district where the consumer resides or signed the contract, and § 1692k(c) excuses an unintentional violation only when reasonable procedures were maintained to prevent the error.

Canady v. Wisenbaker Law Offices, P.C. · filed 2005-05-16(i), (k)(c)

Instead, Defendant affirmatively decided not to correct the error and continued pursuing the civil action in Fulton County, by moving for a default judgment against Plaintiff, even though Defendant possessed information for over two months putting it on notice that Plaintiff did not reside in Fulton County. With these undisputed facts, Defendant cannot establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the error occurred unintentionally. ... Consequently, under the particular facts of this case, the Court finds that Defendant filed suit against Plaintiff in Fulton County in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692i and thereafter failed to correct the error once on notice that it filed the action in the wrong county. As a matter of law, then, Defendant is not entitled to the affirmative defense set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).

Section 1692k(c)'s bona fide-error defense is not limited to clerical mistakes and requires the debt collector to show a bona fide, unintentional error and reasonably adapted procedures.

McCorriston v. L.W.T., Inc. · filed 2008-02-22(c)

In the absence of controlling authority in the Eleventh Circuit, this Court finds persuasive the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which have joined a growing number of courts finding that the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) are not limited to clerical mistakes.

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from liability for an unintentional violation resulting from a bona fide error despite procedures reasonably adapted to prevent such errors.

Charbonneau v. Mary Jane Elliott, P.C. · filed 2009-03-27(k)(c)

In order to qualify under the bona fide error exception, the debt collector must demonstrate (1) that a violation was not intentional; and (2) the debt collector maintains procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.

The FDCPA's bona fide-error defense involves factual questions that cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.

Pincus v. Law Offices of Erskine & Fleisher · filed 2009-05-21

Second, Defendants’ bona fide error defense turns on questions of fact and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Section 1692k(c) does not provide a bona fide error defense when an FDCPA violation results from a debt collector’s mistaken interpretation of the law.

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A. · filed 2010-04-21(c)

This case presents the question whether the “bona fide error” defense in §1692k(c) applies to a violation resulting from a debt collector’s mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA. We conclude it does not.

Section 1692k(c) gives a debt collector a bona fide-error defense only if the violation was unintentional, a bona fide error, and occurred despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the specific error.

Owen v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2011-01-07(c)

However, to qualify for the bona fide error defense, the debt collector has an affirmative statutory obligation to maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid readily discoverable errors, such as the interest errors here. ... We hold only that ICS’s limited procedures placed in this record were not reasonably adapted to avoid the type of interest errors here.

Section 1692k(c) protects a debt collector from liability when it proves that the violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such an error.

ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC v. Wright · filed 2011-07-13(k)(c)

Thus a debt collector asserting the bona fide error defense “must show by a preponderance of the evidence that its violation of the Act: (1) was not intentional; (2) was a bona fide error; and (3) occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from FDCPA liability for an unintentional bona fide error made despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid it, including a reasonable mistake about an unclear state-law limitations period.

Gray v. Suttell & Associates · filed 2015-08-12(c)

This Court finds that the bona fide error defense may be available in a case alleging defendants filed suit outside the applicable statute of limitations where the applicable limitations period has not been provided by the state legislature or resolved by the state courts. ... The Court grants Defendants’ motions for summary-judgment because, even if a four-year statute of limitations applies, Defendants’ good-faith and reasonable belief that a six-year statute of limitations governed was a bona fide error, insulating Defendants from liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).

The FDCPA bona fide-error defense must plead the circumstances of the mistake with particularity.

Walters v. Performant Recovery, Inc. · filed 2015-08-21(c)

Thus, this affirmative defense is subject to a heightened pleading standard, regardless of whether Iqbal or Twombly generally apply to affirmative defenses.

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from liability when it proves that the violation was unintentional, a genuine mistake, and occurred despite reasonably adapted preventive procedures.

Arnold v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2016-09-13(c)

A debt collector asserting the bona fide error defense must show by a preponderance of the evidence that its violation of the Act: (1) was not intentional; (2) was a bona fide error; and (3) occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.

Section 1692k(c)'s bona fide-error defense is subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard.

Balon v. Enhanced Recovery Co. · filed 2016-09-15(k)(c)

Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Defendant’s bona fide error defense asserted pursuant to section 1692k(c) is subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).

Section 1692k(c) does not excuse an FDCPA violation caused by a debt collector’s mistake about what the law requires.

Daubert v. NRA Group LLC · filed 2017-07-03(k)(c)

Where an issue of law under the FDCPA is unsettled by the Supreme Court or a precedential decision of the relevant court of appeals, debt collectors can’t escape a district court’s finding of FDCPA liability under the bona fide error defense by pointing to the persuasive authority they relied on at the time to justify their conduct.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to send a written notice stating the entire debt, and § 1692k(c) does not excuse intentionally presenting conflicting debt amounts based on a mistaken application of law.

Garcia v. Miramed Revenue Group, LLC · filed 2018-01-30(g), (k)(c)

Miramed was obligated, however, to give notice of the entire Debt, Also, by stating that the “Remaining Patient Balance” was $100, Miramed implied that nothing more was owed. ... Based on such undisputed facts, Miramed failed to comply with notice requirements in Section 1962g in regard to notice of the amount of the Debt. ... Miramed intentionally chose to present the conflicting information concerning the amount of the Debt believing it to be compliant with the law. ... Miramed is thus not entitled to prevail based on the bona fide error defense.

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from FDCPA liability for an unintentional clerical or factual error when reasonable precautions were used; it does not cover errors of law.

Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP · filed 2018-03-26(k)(c)

Section 1692k includes an affirmative defense to civil liability—a debt collector will not be held liable for an FDCPA violation if it shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that its violation was unintentional and the result of a bona fide error, even though the debt collector had ample procedures that were reasonably equipped to avoid such errors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). This “bona fide error” defense protects a debt collector’s “clerical or factual mistakes,” not the debt collector’s errors of law in interpreting the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) treats a loan as a consumer debt based on the personal use of its proceeds and the co-signer's personal purpose, while § 1692k(c) does not shield mistakes of law and requires an objectively reasonable factual mistake despite reasonable preventive procedures.

Micks v. Gurstel Law Firm, P.C. · filed 2019-02-01(a)(5), (k)(c)

It is irrelevant, for example, why a lender made a particular loan; what matters is how the loan proceeds were used. ... That motivation, like the purpose for which that former friend ultimately used the Loan-was indisputably personal in nature. Accordingly, the Loan satisfies § 1692a(5)'s definition of a debt. ... To the extent Gurstel made a mistake of law, such mistakes are not protected by the bona fide error defense. ... It is thus clear, at least within the Eighth Circuit, that a debt collector's mistake of law-whether as to the FDCPA or as to some other state or federal law implicated by its debt-collection activities-does not provide it safe harbor under § 1692k(c). ... "To be considered a bona fide error, the debt collector's mistake must be objectively reasonable." ... Under those circumstances, it was not objectively reasonable for Gurstel to persist in its mistaken belief that the judgment remained valid.

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from liability for an unintentional bona fide factual error when it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid that error.

Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP · filed 2019-04-29(c)

The Supreme Court has focused on the orderliness and regularity of the debt collector’s error-prevention steps, not on the number or complexity of those steps. Jerman, 599 U.S. at 587. ... These procedures didn’t catch the mistake here, but “§ 1692k(c) does not require debt collectors to take every conceivable precaution to avoid errors; rather, it only requires reasonable precaution.” Kort, 394 F.3d at 539. ... The bona fide error defense applies, and summary judgment was proper.

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from liability for an unintentional bona fide error if it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to prevent that error.

Abdollahzadeh v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP · filed 2019-04-29(c)

The final element of the bona fide error defense requires the debt collector to show that it “maint[ains] … procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). To qualify for the defense, the debt collector must have “procedures” in place, and the procedures must be “reasonably adapted” to avoid the error in question.

The bona fide error defense protects a debt collector only if it proves that the violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and arose despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid it.

Garcia v. Equifax Information Services LLC · filed 2020-04-01(k)(c)

“Although the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, it excepts from liability those debt collectors who satisfy the ‘narrow’ bona fide error defense.” ... “The bona fide error defense is an affirmative defense, for which the debt collector has the burden of proof. Thus, to qualify for the bona fide error defense, the defendant must prove that (1) it violated the FDCPA unintentionally; (2) the violation resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the violation.”

The FDCPA imposes strict liability, so a plaintiff need not prove a debt collector’s knowledge or intent, subject to a bona fide error defense.

Bell v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A. · filed 2020-05-01

However, the FDCPA is a strict-liability statute. Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2014). It is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove knowledge or intent. Id. (citing McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from liability only if it proves by a preponderance that the violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid it.

Wagner v. Chiari & Ilecki, LLP · filed 2020-09-04(k)(c)

Thus, under the statute, a “debt collector asserting the bona fide error defense must show by a preponderance of the evidence that its violation of the Act: (1) was not intentional; (2) was a bona fide error; and (3) occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”

Section 1692k(c) makes the bona fide error defense an affirmative defense that the debt collector must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

Crandall v. Miller & Stevens, P.A. · filed 2020-10-21(k)(c)

Insofar as her FDCPA claims are concerned, Crandall is not required to allege that Miller & Stevens had notice of her bankruptcy or that Miller & Stevens’s violation of the bankruptcy stay was intentional. ... The plain text of this provision shows that it creates an affirmative defense that would be Miller & Stevens’s burden to plead and prove. ... Crandall (or her counsel) had no obligation to plead facts in anticipation of this defense.

The bona fide error defense requires a debt collector to show that a violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.

Urbina v. National Business Factors Inc. · filed 2020-11-05(c)

We conclude the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense does not allow debt collectors to avoid liability by contractually obligating creditor-clients to provide accurate information, nor by requesting that creditor-clients provide notice of any errors in the accounts assigned for collection without waiting to receive a response before instituting collection efforts.

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from FDCPA liability when the violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite reasonably adapted procedures.

EWING v. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2021-01-25(c)

Because Med-1 is entitled to the bona fide error defense under § 1692k(c), Ewing cannot prevail on her claims and her motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 1692k(c) provides a bona fide error defense when a debt collector's FDCPA violation is unintentional, results from a genuine mistake, and the collector maintains procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error.

WEBSTER v. RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2021-01-26(c)

As noted in the Entry on summary judgment, the bona fide error defense of § 1692k(c) applies in this case because the error was unintentional. In the notice letter, RPM identified a telephone number, U.S. mailing address, and an online complaint portal as appropriate ways for Webster to contact RPM regarding her debt, thereby showing that it was not trying to ignore Webster's attempts to report her dispute. Thus, the FDCPA violation was unintentional and the error was a genuine mistake. RPM also took reasonable steps to eliminate the -3641 fax number and maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such credit reporting errors.

Section 1692k(c) protects a debt collector from liability when it proves by a preponderance that the violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite procedures reasonably adapted to prevent it.

Shields v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc. · filed 2021-05-03(c)

The bona fide error defense requires defendant to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the violation was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error, “notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”31 This defense then requires Defendant to show evidence of the procedures it had in place to prevent errors, which would extend outside the narrow parameters previously agreed by the parties.

Section 1692k(c)'s bona fide-error defense is subject to ordinary Rule 8 pleading rather than Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard.

Twitty v. First Financial Asset Management, Inc. · filed 2023-03-13(k)(c)

However, the parties have not cited to, nor is the court aware, of case law from either the Fourth Circuit or this district supporting the application of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) fraud standard to a “bona fide error” affirmative defense, grounded in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). ... Accordingly, the court will not apply the heightened pleading standard to Defendant’s affirmative defenses as found in either or in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

Section 1692k(c) shields a debt collector from liability for an FDCPA violation when the violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and the collector maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.

Ross v. Financial Asset Management Systems · filed 2023-07-14(c)

The bona fide error defense requires a debt collector to show that (1) the violation was not intentional, (2) the violation resulted from a bona fide error, and (3) the debt collector maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. ... FAMS’s policies, procedures, and trainings were reasonably adapted to avoid the error occasioned by Camarena’s self-help, and FAMS thus satisfies the third element of the bona fide error defense.

Section 1692k(c) protects a debt collector from liability when it proves that the violation was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite reasonably adapted procedures to prevent it.

Reed v. I.Q. Data International, Inc. · filed 2023-08-14(k)(c)

To prevail on its bona fide error defense under the FDCPA (and TDCA), I.Q. Data must establish that: (1) its violation of the statute was unintentional; (2) it resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) that it had reasonably adopted procedures in place to avoid such an error. ... After considering this record under the governing summary judgment standard, the undersigned concludes I.Q. Data is not entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defense because it has not established as a matter of law that its error with respect to the Icon debt was unintentional, the first prong of the bona fide error defense inquiry.

Section 1692k(c) shields debt collectors from liability only for unintentional, good-faith violations made despite reasonably adapted procedures, while § 1692e(8) affirmatively requires a collector that knows of a dispute to notify reporting agencies in its reports.

Kaszko v. RSH & Associates LLC · filed 2023-09-01(k)(c), (e)(8)

The bona fide error defense, set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k)(c), is an affirmative defense that shields debt collectors from liability for violations of the FDCPA. ... To prevail on a bona fide error defense, defendant must show that the violation was (1) unintentional, (2) made in good faith and (3) made despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error. ... Under Section 1692(e)(8) of the FDCPA, a debt collector has an affirmative duty to notify credit reporting agencies that a consumer disputes the debt if the debt collector knows of the dispute when it makes a report to a credit reporting agency.

Section 1692k(c) provides a bona fide-error defense to FDCPA liability, and asserting that defense does not require the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).

Twitty v. United Collection Bureau, Inc. · filed 2023-11-28(c)

However, the court declines to apply this heightened pleading standard, as well. The only affirmative defense this standard could apply to is Defendant’s first affirmative defense, stating “Plaintiff’s claims are barred as against Defendant by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).” However, the parties have not cited to, nor is the court aware, of case law from either the Fourth Circuit or this district supporting the application of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) fraud standard to a “bona fide error” affirmative defense, grounded in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).

Section 1692(k)'s bona fide-error defense does not require the heightened fraud-pleading standard in Rule 9(b).

Lemons v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC · filed 2023-12-15(k)

The Court finds the reasoning set forth in Sexton persuasive and, therefore, rejects Plaintiff's Rule 9(b) argument. Plaintiff has fair notice of the defense and discovery will provide the necessary details to Plaintiff.

Section 1692k(c) requires a debt collector invoking the bona fide-error defense to show an unintentional bona fide error despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid it; evidence of account-address and phone-number discrepancies can create a fact issue on that defense.

Walker v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2024-03-28(k)(c)

To be afforded the defense, a debt collector bears the “burden of showing that its FDCPA violation (1) was not intentional; (2) was a bona fide error; and (3) occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” ... The discrepancies, when examined in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether ICS maintained procedures that were reasonably adapted to avoid readily discoverable errors on the account. Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.

Section 1692k(c) provides a bona fide-error defense to FDCPA liability when a violation was unintentional and resulted despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error; pleading that defense requires only fair notice, not Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard.

Loveless v. Trueaccord Corp · filed 2024-07-31(k)(c)

As to Defendant’s affirmative defense number 2 alleging “bona fide error” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) Plaintiff argues that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies. ... Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s Rule 9(b) argument.3 Plaintiff has fair notice of the defense and discovery will provide the necessary details to Plaintiff. ... Upon review, the Court finds affirmative defense number 2 adequately apprises Plaintiff of the nature and substance of the defense raised. The defense, therefore, will not be stricken.

Section 1692c(b) permits a debt collector to communicate with a third party without the consumer’s consent when reasonably necessary to effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy, while § 1692k(c) provides a bona fide-error defense when the violation was unintentional and resulted despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error.

Huffman v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA · filed 2024-08-13(c)(b) and (k)(c)

Section 1692c generally prohibits a debt collector from communicating with a third party in connection with the collection of a debt without the prior consent of the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). However, a debt collector may engage in such communication “as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy.” Id. Goodman argues that its conduct falls under this exception because it communicated with Chase Bank to garnish funds pursuant to a validly entered judgment against Plaintiff. (Goodman MSJ at 8.) Plaintiff does not meaningfully respond to Goodman’s argument, only noting that he alleges violations on several other grounds. (Resp. to Goodman at 9.) The Court agrees with Goodman that the exception applies, and it will grant Goodman’s Motion with respect to the alleged violation of § 1692c. ... Thus, to prevail on a bona fide error defense, a defendant has the burden to prove that (1) it violated the FDCPA unintentionally, (2) the violation resulted from a bona fide error, and (3) it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the specific error at issue. McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2011). ... Goodman has cited record evidence supporting each element of the of the bona fide error defense, and Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to any element. Goodman has also established that it did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. Therefore, the Court will grant Goodman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75).

Section 1692k(c) excuses an FDCPA violation only when it was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite reasonably adapted procedures.

Banda v. Cappuccio · filed 2025-02-26(k)(c)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c), parties in Defendants’ position can defeat liability by showing at trial by a “preponderance of evidence that the [alleged] violation [of the FDCPA] was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”

Sections 1692g and 1692e(10) prohibit a debt collector from undermining a 30-day validation notice with a later collection communication that would confuse the least sophisticated consumer; § 1692k(c) provides a bona fide-error defense only when the collector proves the statutory elements.

Barrientos v. Law Offices of Mark L. Nichter · filed 1999-12-09(g), (e)(10), and (k)(c)

The Second Circuit follows a “least sophisticated consumer” standard in assessing violations of § 1692g and e(10)— that is, whether these provisions have been violated is measured by the interpretation that the least sophisticated consumer would give the notice received from the debt collector. ... Even if a defendant provides the requisite validation notice under 1692g, it may still be liable under § 1692g and § 1692e(10) if it sends a subsequent communication within the validation period that “overshadows or contradicts” such notice, as Barrientos alleges in this case. ... Summary judgment on the issue of Defendants’ violations of § 1692g and e(10) is therefore appropriate. ... Section 1692k(c), however, requires in addition a showing that the violation was unintentional and resulted a from a bona fide error.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector's validation notice to clearly state the debtor's validation rights; a separate 30-day payment-or-dispute offer does not violate that requirement when it does not overshadow the notice.

Jones v. CBE Group, Inc. · filed 2003-06-06(g)(a)

The validation information that follows defendant’s offer to delay adverse credit reporting is in a separate paragraph highlighted in bold text. It clearly and accurately recites the debtor’s validation rights as established by the statute. ... That portion of the letter which permits debtors to pay off or dispute the debt within thirty days and avoid adverse credit reporting does not confuse, mislead, overshadow or in any way diminish the clarity of the statutory validation notice. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings must be granted.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt-validation notice to be conveyed effectively and not be overshadowed by the communication’s overall tenor, form, or context in a way that would confuse the least sophisticated debtor or encourage disregard of the debtor’s rights.

Voris v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. · filed 2007-06-26(g)(a)

Overshadowing occurs not only when the validation notice contains contradictory language, but also when the overall tenor, form, and context of the notice would mislead the least sophisticated debtor and encourage him to disregard his rights.

Section 1692g(b) permits collection activity during the validation period only if it does not overshadow or contradict the consumer’s validation rights; serving a collection summons and complaint without clarifying that those rights remain in force violates the statute.

Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C. · filed 2009-02-23(g)(b)

Given the FDCPA’s regulation of “collection activities” by debt-collectors and communications between them and consumers, and the undisputed fact that service of process on Plaintiff was at Defendants’ direction, and that the complaint served on Plaintiff was collection activity addressed to the debt at issue in the May 13th Letter, it is clear that the FDCPA’s prohibition on engaging in collection activities or sending communications that overshadow a consumer’s validation period applied to Defendants’ service of their lawsuit on Plaintiff. If service of that lawsuit would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to the timing or existence of FDCPA rights described in the validation notice, then such service violates § 1692g.

Section 1692g requires a debt-validation notice to be conveyed effectively and not be overshadowed or contradicted, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor; when a related Section 1692e(10) claim rests on the same language, the § 1692g analysis is dispositive.

HESS v. MERCHANTS & MEDICAL CREDIT CORPORATION, INC. · filed 2019-07-31(g)(a), (g)(b), (e)(10)

The notice must be “sufficiently prominent to be noticed,” as well as “not overshadowed or contradicted by accompanying messages from the debt collector.” ... To determine if a validation notice is “overshadowed or contradicted,” the Court must apply the “least sophisticated debtor” standard. ... In applying the “least sophisticated debtor” standard and viewing the Collection Letter as a whole, the Collection Letter is not so misleading as to violate § 1692g. ... Additionally, although Hess makes a general claim regarding § 1692e, the crux of her allegation relates to § 1692e(10). Therefore, due to precedent within this Circuit regarding similar allegations under §§ 1692e(10) and 1692g, the aforementioned dismissal of Hess’s § 1692g claim is dispositive.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to provide a thirty-day validation notice and bars collection communications during that period from overshadowing or contradicting the consumer’s dispute rights.

Sparrow Oloko v. Receivable Recovery Services, LLC · filed 2019-08-19(g)(a), (g)(b)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), a debt collector must disclose to the debtor the name of the creditor, the amount owed, and the debtor’s right to dispute the validity of the debt within thirty days—commonly known as a “validation notice.” ... In addition, § 1692g(b) states that any “collection activities and communication during the 30–day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.” ... In short, the FDCPA “forbids a debt collector from overshadowing the disclosure and from engaging in communication inconsistent with the disclosure.”

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to provide a clear validation notice, and the notice is insufficient if other language overshadows or contradicts it.

Weinberg v. CKS Financial, LLC · filed 2020-09-08(a)

“[A] debt collector violates § 1692g(a), even if the collector includes an accurate validation notice, if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.” ... Assuming that the Letter would be read with some care, the Court finds that the validation notice is not overshadowed or misdirected. ... As the validation notice is on the front page of the Letter, and is not overshadowed or contradicted by the text on either side of the notice, it is legally sufficient.

Sections 1692e and 1692g prohibit misleading debt-collection communications and require validation information to be conveyed clearly, without language that overshadows or contradicts the notice.

Dymond v. Commonwealth Financial System, Inc. · filed 2020-09-28(e), (g)

But whatever its intended purpose, the Court finds that the header “SEND ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO” in Commonwealth’s letter neither “cloud[ed]” the validation notice, DeSantis, 269 F.3d at 161, nor was false or misleading to the least sophisticated consumer, Russell, 74 F.3d at 34. Accordingly, Commonwealth’s letter did not violate FDCPA §§ 1692g and 1692e.

Section 1692g does not require a debt collector to replace the statute's phrase "the consumer" with "you" when the validation notice otherwise conveys the required rights clearly, and a clearly identified mailing address does not overshadow those rights; a law firm's letterhead also does not inherently overshadow the validation notice.

Susino v. Lacy Katzen LLP · filed 2021-03-08(g), (e), (e)(3)

The reasoning behind these consistent holdings is clear and irrefutable—it would be an absurd result to conclude that the precise language chosen by Congress to inform a consumer of his or her rights is deceptive or misleading.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to convey a validation notice effectively, without having other collection messages overshadow or contradict it, and the same-theory analysis generally disposes of a related section 1692e claim.

RIOTTO v. SN SERVICING CORPORATION · filed 2022-04-27(g) and (e)(10)

Further, to abide by section 1692g, a debt collector must not only include a recitation of the statute’s language (referenced above) to the debtor in its validation notice, but must also convey such notice “effectively.” ... “In essence, this means that the . . . notice ‘must not be overshadowed or contradicted by other messages or notices from the debt collector,’ such that the debtor could be misled into foregoing a statutory right.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that the Letter’s validation notice was ineffective under section 1692g. ... As a result, “[w]hen allegations under [§ 1692e] are based on the same language or theories as allegations under [§ 1692g], the analysis of the § 1692g claim is usually dispositive.” ... Thus, for the reasons why Plaintiff fails to state a claim under section 1692g, his claims under section 1692e also fail.

Section 1692g prohibits collection communications during the validation period from overshadowing or contradicting the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the original creditor's information.

Bangiyeva v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2022-09-26(g)

Any collection activities or communications within this thirty-day window “may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.” ... A notice is overshadowing or contradictory if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights. ... Significantly, however, the third and final sentence of the Letter’s first paragraph makes plain that “such [a] return to the current creditor and review will not occur until after the time period set forth in the paragraph immediately below.” ... Defendants simply did not violate § 1692g.

Sections 1692g(a)(3) and 1692e require a debt collector to preserve the consumer’s thirty-day dispute period and prohibit materially misleading collection communications, but they do not bar a collector from allowing the consumer more time to dispute the debt.

Facchini v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. · filed 2023-06-28(g)(a)(3), (e), and (e)(10)

This aspect of the letter is fully consistent with the FDCPA, which requires a debt collector to allow a debtor to dispute a debt within “thirty days after receipt of the notice.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3); Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 92–93 (same). ... In short, the defendants did not violate the FDCPA when they allowed Facchini more time to dispute her debt than the law required.

The FDCPA provides debt collectors and their attorneys no express or implied right to contribution or indemnity.

Irwin v. Mascott · filed 2000-02-11

There is no express or implied remedy of either contribution or indemnity in the FDCPA statute, the source of this Court’s jurisdiction. ... The motion is denied, on grounds that there is no cause of'action for either indemnity or contribution under FDCPA, either within the plain language of statute or implied, since the proposed third-party plaintiffs are not members of the class of intended beneficiaries of the FDCPA.

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits attorney's fees against an unsuccessful FDCPA plaintiff only when the court expressly finds that the action was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.

Clayton v. Bryan · filed 2000-02-25(a)(3)

Resisting C & M's quest for attorney's fees, the Bryans asserted both that C & M's offer of judgment had not been made in good faith and that Florida's offer of judgment statute is pre-empted by FDCPA's provisions that fees are to be awarded to a prevailing defendant only when the court expressly finds that the plaintiff's case was "brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment...." 15 U.S.C. § 1692.k(a)(3). ... We conclude that the federal statute involved in the instant case similarly preempts an award of fees under the offer of judgment statute. ... We conclude that the trial court correctly denied an award of attorney's fees to C & M based on its finding that the offer of judgment statute is preempted by the FDCPA. Only where the court expressly finds that the plaintiff's case was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment can attorney's fees be awarded against the unsuccessful plaintiff in an FDCPA action.

Section 1692k(a)(3) authorizes an award of attorney's fees to a defendant but does not authorize imposing those fees on the plaintiff's counsel.

Ozmun v. Portfolio · filed 2022-03-24(a)(3)

This issue is conclusively resolved in Wood and Chatman’s favor by our recent decision in Tejero v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C.,8 in which we held that Section 1692k(a)(3) does not authorize the award of attorneys’ fees against counsel. 955 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Section 1692k(a)(3) says only that ‘the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees . . . .’ . . . Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or Rule 11, there is no language that specifically and explicitly permits the courts to depart from the common law and make fee awards against lawyers.”). Thus, the district court’s erred in awarding attorneys’ fees to the Debt-Collection Defendants against Wood and Chatman under FDCPA § 1692(k)(a)(3).

Sections 1692e and 1692e(5) prohibit misleading debt-collection representations and threats of unlawful action, while § 1692f(1) prohibits collecting amounts not authorized by agreement or law.

Duffy v. Landberg · filed 2000-05-25(e), (e)(5), (f)(1)

New Concepts' letter included the entire $100 civil penalty as part of the amount debtors could pay to satisfy the debt without proceeding to court. This violated the FDCPA because it was a misleading representation of Minnesota law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Accordingly, New Concepts violated the FDCPA by threatening to seek attorney fees in the event the parties proceeded to litigation. ... Finally, although the interest calculations were admittedly only slightly overstated, the letters seeking these overstated interest charges were nonetheless an attempt to collect interest not permitted by law, and therefore a violation of the plain language of section 1692f(1).

Section 1692e(2) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt.

Weast v. Rockport Financial, LLC · filed 2015-07-17(e)(2)

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the1 collection of any debt.” 15 U.S:.G. § 1692e. As * noted above, § 1692e(2) prohibits “the false representation of (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector, for the collection .of a debt.” ... Here, the Court finds that the language of the collection letter did not “use false impressions to characterize the amount” of Plaintiffs debt as claimed by Plaintiff. The statement about the collection fee was separate from the statement of Plaintiffs total balance due, which was stated twice in the letter. A reasonable unsophisticated consumer would understand that the convenience fee was not a part of her principal debt. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. under § 1693e(2).

Section 1692g(a)(1) requires a debt collector to state the total amount due, including principal, interest, and other charges, as of the date of the collection letter; an accurate day-specific disclosure with a limited adjustment warning is a safe harbor when the amount changes daily.

Miller v. McCalla Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C., and Echevarria, McCalla Raymer, Barrett, and · filed 2000-07-26(a)(1)

We hold that the following statement satisfies the debt collector’s duty to state the amount of the debt in cases like this where the amount varies from day to day: “As of the date of this letter, you owe $_ [the exact amount due]. Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your check, in which event we will inform you before depositing the check for collection. For further information, write the undersigned or call 1-800- [phone number].” A debt collector who uses this form will not violate the “amount of the debt” provision, provided, of course, that the information he furnishes is accurate and he does not obscure it by adding confusing other information (or misinformation).

Section 1692g(a)(1) requires a debt collector's dunning letter to state the amount of the debt clearly enough that the recipient is likely to understand it.

Chuway, Caldean M. v. Nat'l Action Finan · filed 2004-03-30(a)(1)

It is not enough that the dunning letter state the amount of the debt that is due. It must state it clearly enough that the recipient is likely to understand it.

Section 1692g(a)(1) requires a dunning letter to state the amount of the debt clearly enough that the recipient is unlikely to misunderstand it.

Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, L.L.C.; Doug A. Schletz v. Academy Collection Service, Inc. · filed 2004-05-25(a)(1)

As we noted just the other day in Chuway, a dunning letter must state the amount of the debt sufficiently clearly that the recipient is unlikely to misunderstand it.

Section 1692e(2) prohibits false representations about the character, amount, or legal status of a debt; an unexplained inflated balance in a collection notice can violate it.

Richard v. Oak Tree Group, Inc. · filed 2008-02-12(e)(2)

Accordingly, the court concludes that the December 14, 2005 collection notice violated § 1692e(2).

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector’s validation notice to clearly state the amount of the debt, and a payoff statement is incomplete if it omits information needed to determine the current and future amounts owed and the basis for fees and interest.

Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP · filed 2017-03-29(g)(a)

We do not hold that a debt collector may never satisfy its obligations under § 1692g by providing a payoff statement that provides an amount due, including expected fees and costs. But a statement is incomplete where, as here, it omits information allowing the least sophisticated consumer to determine the minimum amount she owes at the time of the notice, what she will need to pay to resolve the debt at any given moment in the future, and an explanation of any fees and interest that will cause the balance to increase.

Section 1692g(a)(1) requires a debt collector's collection letter to state the amount of the debt due as of the date of the communication, including accrued charges, but does not require disclosure of additional costs that may accrue in the future.

Tena v. Transworld Systems, Inc. · filed 2018-12-18(a)(1)

Similarly, the statement that collection costs are charged in accordance with federal regulations is consistent with the breakdown of charges, which showed that the balance due included collection costs. Transworld provided the citation to the applicable federal regulation, but no outside research was required for the unsophisticated consumer to understand that the amount due included all collection costs that had already accrued. The FDCPA requires that Transworld state the amount due as of the date of the communication. It does not require that Transworld disclose whether additional costs may accrue in the future if the debt goes unpaid. Nothing about the letter suggested that additional collection fees had already accrued. The unsophisticated consumer would not be left wondering if the list of charges was incomplete.

Section 1692g(a)(1) requires a debt collector to state the amount it is collecting, and § 1692e does not require the collector to disclose interest or fees that the creditor may separately charge when the collector is not authorized to collect them.

Trischler v. MRS BPO, LLC, d/b/a MRS Associates of New Jersey · filed 2018-12-20(g)(a)(1), (e)

Regardless of whether Chase could have charged Trischler post-charge off fees, MRS’ September 2, 2017 dunning letter effectively stated “the amount of the debt” it sought to collect from Trischler. This Court finds as a matter of law that MRS complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). ... The Seventh Circuit has made clear that to satisfy 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, “a credit agency need only request the amount it is owed; it need not provide whatever the credit-card company may be owed more than that.” ... Here, MRS undoubtedly requested the amount that it was owed.

Section 1692(e) prohibits debt collectors from materially misrepresenting the amount legally owed, including by adding unauthorized interest.

Bassett v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc. · filed 2021-08-13(e)

Accordingly, as a matter of law, attempting to collect interest pursuant § 45-104 without first obtaining a judgment overstates the amount due and is a material violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from communicating with a consumer about a debt when it knows the consumer is represented by an attorney, and the creditor’s knowledge of that representation may be imputed to the debt collector when the creditor withholds it while referring the debt for collection.

Powers v. Professional Credit Services, Inc. · filed 2000-08-01(a)(2)

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the statute does not require that the debt collector have “actual knowledge” of plaintiffs legal representation. Knowledge can be imputed to the debt collector when the creditor has such knowledge and fails to convey it to its agent, the debt collector, at the time it seeks collection.

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from communicating with a consumer about a debt when the consumer is represented by an attorney and the collector knows of that representation.

Shrestha v. State Credit Adjustment Bureau, Inc. · filed 2000-08-21(a)(2)

To prevail on his first claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that he was represented by an attorney “with respect to the debt” and that defendant knew that he was so represented. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from directly contacting a consumer about a debt when the collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney specifically for that debt.

Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc. · filed 2004-08-31(a)(2)

A debt collector violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) if it communicates directly with a debtor after it knows that the debt- or is represented by an attorney with respect to the debt in question. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found that an attorney’s representation has to be specific to the debt in question under the statute. ... The Third Circuit’s approach is a fair reading of the statute. I will adopt it in this case, in which plaintiffs were represented by an attorney with respect to the cancellation of their timeshare agreement but gave defendant no indication that they were represented with respect to the debt referred to in defendant’s July and December 2003 letters. ... Because the debts sought to be collected are not explicitly part of the timeshare cancellation litigation and because there is no evidence that defendant would have known that plaintiffs had legal representation for these debts, I conclude that defendant did not violate § 1692c(a)(2) of the Act.

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from communicating with a consumer about a debt when the collector knows the consumer is represented by counsel, unless an exception applies; the court held that communications unrelated to collecting the debt fall outside the prohibition.

Salsbury v. Trac a Chec, Inc. · filed 2005-04-18(a)(2)

The FDCPA restricts the ability of debt collectors to communicate with debtors when the debtor is represented by counsel. The FDCPA provides with regard to communication in connection with debt collection as follows: ... unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). ... Such communication is not a violation of the FDCPA because it is not in connection with the collection of a debt.

Under the FDCPA, when a debt collector must communicate with a represented consumer through the consumer’s lawyer, a written debt notice sent to the lawyer must contain all information required in a notice sent directly to the consumer.

Evory v. RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING LLC · filed 2007-10-23(g)

We conclude that any written notice sent to the lawyer must contain the information that would be required by the Act if the notice were sent to the consumer directly.

The FDCPA does not apply its “least sophisticated consumer” standard to communications between debt collectors and consumers’ attorneys.

Marshall v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc. · filed 2009-08-12

Thus, I join Judge Cercone and find that communications between debt-collectors and consumers’ attorneys are not subject to the “least sophisticated consumer” standard of the FDCPA.

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from directly communicating with a consumer represented by an attorney when the debt collector knows of the representation, and the creditor’s knowledge is not imputed to the debt collector.

Bacelli v. MFP, INC. · filed 2010-07-28(c)(a)(2)

The Court agrees with these well-reasoned decisions and the Magistrate Judge that no basis exists for departing from the plain language of the statute or imputing a creditor’s knowledge to a debt- or. Accordingly, MFP is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim against MFP under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from directly communicating with a consumer when it has actual knowledge that the consumer is represented by an attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable time or consents.

Isham v. Gurstel, Staloch & Chargo, P.A. · filed 2010-07-07(a)(2)

Under § 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA, the “knowledge” requirement means that a debt collector must possess “actual knowledge” that the debtor was represented by an attorney. ... In contrast, the Court finds that Gurstel’s April 2009 calls did violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) as a matter of law.

Section 1692d bars debt collectors from harassing conduct and repeated or continuous calls made with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, while § 1692c(a)(2) bars communications about a debt when the collector knows the consumer is represented by counsel.

Dunning v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2012-11-09(a)(2), (d), and (d)(5)

The FDCPA at § 1692d states as follows: “A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” Additionally, section 1692d(5) specifically prohibits debt collectors from repeatedly or continuously calling any person with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass that person. ... Rather, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a fact issue for the jury as to the harassing nature of Defendant’s calls. ... Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claims for alleged violations of § 1692d and § 1692d(5). ... Section 1692c(a)(2) precludes communication by a debt collector with a debtor where the debt collector knows that the debtor is represented by counsel “with respect to such debt.” ... Therefore, summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiffs claim for violation of § 1692c(a)(2) is appropriate.

Section 1692(a)(2) bars a debt collector from directly contacting a debtor about debt collection when the collector knows the debtor is represented by an attorney whose contact information is readily available.

BAC Home Loans Servicing v. Baker · filed 2013-09-16(a)(2)

According to both the Maine and United States Fair Debt Collection Acts, a debt collector may not directly contact a debtor in connection with the collection of a debt where the debt collector knows an attorney represents the debtor and the debtor's attorney's contact information is readily available. 32 M.R.S. § 11012(l)(B) (2012); 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(2) (2006). ... The final letter was sent March 17, 2012, after the notice of transfer to Bank of America, N.A. was headed with the disclaimer: "For Informational Purposes: This is not an attempt to collect a debt." (Higgins Decl. at Ex. 15). The substance of the letter is a disclosure of fees associated with loan services and loan payoff The Court finds that this letter is not an attempt by Counterclaim-Defendant to collect the debt in question and therefore not a violation of either the Maine or Federal Fair Debt Collections Act.

Section 1692c(a)(2) prohibits a debt collector from directly communicating with a consumer about a debt when it knows the consumer is represented by an attorney, absent attorney consent or the attorney's failure to respond.

Cook v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC · filed 2016-01-05(c)(2)

That Green Tree violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c by contacting the Plaintiffs on July 3, 2013; July 5, 2013; July 8, 2013; August 13, 2013; and October 5, 2013, after receiving notice that they were represented by Richard L. Stea-gall, an attorney.

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from communicating directly with a consumer about a debt when it knows the consumer is represented by counsel and knows counsel’s name and address, unless counsel fails to respond within a reasonable time or consents to direct communication.

Washington v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2016-09-29(a)(2)

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Freedman violated § 1692c(a)(2) by sending the wage deduction notice to Plaintiff rather than to Plaintiffs counsel.

Section 1692c(a)(2) generally prohibits a debt collector from directly communicating with a consumer when it knows the consumer is represented by counsel and can readily ascertain the attorney’s contact information.

Estate of Russell E. Morgan Sr. v. BWW Law Group, LLC · filed 2019-07-03(c)(a)(2)

The FDCPA generally prohibits a debt collector from communicating directly with a consumer if said collector has actual knowledge that the consumer is represented by counsel, and if the debt collector knows of or can readily ascertain the attorney’s contact information. 15 U.S.C. 1692c(a)(2). Plaintiffs do not suggest that they provided a direct communication to Rushmore to advise of counsel’s involvement. Plaintiffs’ view that Rushmore was on notice of their legal representation is tethered to the electronic filing with the Court of the appearance of counsel. This method of notification is sufficient, but only for a portion of Plaintiffs’ proposed timeline.

Section 1692c(a)(2) generally bars a debt collector from communicating directly with a consumer about a debt when the collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney, absent the statutory exceptions.

Ewalt v. Collection Professionals Inc · filed 2019-11-04(c)(2)

The Plaintiff’s new allegations are sufficient to state a claim under Section 1692c(a)(2).

Section 1692c(b) permits a debt collector to communicate directly with a represented debtor when a court of competent jurisdiction expressly permits the communication.

HAGUE v. LYONS, DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS, P.C. · filed 2020-03-18(b)

Examining the phrasing in the applicable rules, along with the New Jersey state court’s own interpretation of its rules in Palisades, where it found that its rules may provide express permission of a court for FDCPA purposes, this Court finds that Defendant had the “express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction” to cause the original complaint to be mailed to the debtor’s address.

Section 1692c(a)(2) generally bars a debt collector from communicating with a consumer known to be represented by an attorney about a debt, but permits direct communication when the consumer gives prior consent directly to the debt collector, the court permits it, or the attorney consents.

Jackson v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2020-11-30(a)(2)

Further, the Court finds no support in the statutory text for Plaintiff’s argument that an attorney’s instruction to his client to contact the debt collector can never constitute consent to direct communication between his client and that debt collector under 15 U.SC. § 1692c(a)(2).

Section 1692c(a)(2) prohibits a debt collector from communicating with a consumer about a debt when it knows the consumer is represented by an attorney, and the communication must be connected to debt collection.

TAGGART v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2021-06-03(c)(a)(2)

Section 1692c(a)(2) provides, “a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt . . . if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). ... Without more, the Court cannot conclude “that this can be classified as collection activity.” Vilinsky, 640 F. App’x at 142. The Court dismisses this claim as well.

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from contacting a consumer about a debt when it knows, before the contact, that the consumer is represented by counsel.

Raymond v. Arcadia Recovery Bureau, LLC · filed 2021-08-25(a)(2)

The Court accordingly follows the majority view that to state a claim under Section 1692c(a)(2), a plaintiff must adequately allege that the debt collector had actual knowledge, prior to contacting the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was represented by counsel.

Section 1692c(a)(2) protects a consumer known to be represented by an attorney from direct debt-collection communications, and the protection is triggered without a formal attorney appearance.

Shafer v. The Moore Law Group · filed 2021-09-14(a)(2)

Given Congress’ protective intent when enacting the FDCPA, the Court will not extend the reasoning in Holcomb to this situation, where no local rule expressly required serving Plaintiff directly. ... An attorney appearance is not required to trigger the protections of § 1692c(a)(2).

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from communicating with a consumer about a debt when the collector actually knows the consumer is represented by counsel concerning that debt.

MANOPLA v. UNITED COLLECTION BUREAU, INC. · filed 2022-08-31(a)(2)

Under Section 1692c(a)(2), Plaintiff must establish that: “(1) prior to the debt collector’s communication with the plaintiff, the plaintiff was represented by counsel with respect to the debt owed to the creditor; and (2) the debt collector had actual knowledge that the plaintiff was represented by counsel with respect to the debt owed to the creditor.”

A violation of § 1692c(a)(2) does not necessarily threaten a recipient’s concrete interests for Article III standing.

Six v. IQ Data International Incorporated · filed 2023-05-18(a)(2)

And, as analyzed above, the intrusion into the peace and seclusion presented by unwanted phone calls differs materially from the receipt of a letter in a mailbox—even though both actions on behalf of the debt collector are violative of the statute if it has knowledge of a debtor’s representation by counsel. In essence, not every violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) necessarily threatens the recipient’s concrete interests. Therefore, the Court considers the alleged violation here more procedural than substantive.

Sections 1692c(a)(2) and 1692c(c) restrict a debt collector’s direct communication with a consumer who is represented by an attorney or has sent a written cease-and-desist notice; a violation claim requires plausible allegations that the collector had actual knowledge of the representation.

Korth v. Credit Control, LLC · filed 2023-10-10(a)(2), (c)

To state a claim alleging a violation of § 1692c, Korth must plausibly allege that Credit Control had actual knowledge of his representation.

Section 1692c(a)(2) bars a debt collector from contacting a consumer about a debt when it has actual knowledge that the consumer is represented by counsel regarding that specific debt.

Woodman v. Medicredit, Inc. · filed 2024-09-09(a)(2)

FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from contacting a debtor in connection with the collection of any debt “if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt or can readily ascertain the attorney’s name and address.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(A)(2). ... The Third Circuit’s reasoning in Graziano v. Harrison is persuasive on these facts. There, the court held that a debt collector does not automatically violate Section 1692c(A)(2) by communicating with a debtor regarding new debts, even when the debtor is represented by counsel on an earlier debt. ... Because Medicredit’s policy designates representation by account, Medicredit’s knowledge of representation was thus limited to the accounts on which it was specifically informed. Communication efforts to collect on the third account were therefore not improper during the disputed time. ... The court therefore finds Medicredit was reasonable in its efforts to collect on the third account pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(A)(2) and is entitled to summary judgment on those grounds.

Section 1692c permits an FDCPA claim based on persistent unwanted collection communications after a consumer notifies the collector that she is represented by an attorney and wishes communications to cease, when resolving the claim does not depend on a bankruptcy discharge order.

Miraglia v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency · filed 2024-10-28(c)

Plaintiff’s FDCPA and Rosenthal Act claims brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c and Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.14 are based on PHEAA’s continued communications with Plaintiff after she notified PHEAA that she was represented by an attorney and that she wished to cease further communications with it. (See Compl. ¶¶ 45–48.) Even if Plaintiff “had never received a discharge in [her] bankruptcy case, she could still assert [PHEAA] acted unlawfully by attempting to collect [her] debt” with persistent unwanted communications. Brown, 73 F.4th at 1039. As such, resolving these claims would not turn on the issuance or existence of the discharge injunction, and so are not precluded by Walls. Manikan, 981 F.3d at 716; Brown, 73 F.4th at 1039. PHEAA’s argument fails as to these claims.

Section 1692c(a)(2) prohibits a debt collector from directly communicating with a consumer about collecting a debt when the collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney.

Six v. Iq Data International, Inc. · filed 2025-02-24(a)(2)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) prohibits debt collectors from engaging in certain practices, including directly communicating with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt when the collector knows that the consumer is represented by an attorney. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). ... We hold that an individual who receives a letter in violation of § 1692c(a)(2) has standing to bring a claim, and thus reverse the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings.