15 U.S.C. § 1692

Section 1692k(d) does not bar claims based on successive mailings of letters or statements mischaracterizing debt obligations because each mailing can constitute an independent FDCPA violation.

Doody v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC · filed 2023-12-07(k)(d)

Therefore, because successive mailing of letters or statements mischaracterizing debt obligations can give rise to independent FDCPA violations each time a letter is sent, Goins v. JBC & Assocs., P.C., 352 F. Supp. 2d 262, 266–67 (D. Conn. 2005), the Court finds that the statute of limitations does not bar Mr. Doody’s FDCPA claim.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within one year after the violation occurs, and the discovery rule does not extend that period.

Fuller v. CIG Financial LLC · filed 2023-12-21(d)

Under the FDCPA, “an action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Thus the applicable statute of limitations for all FDCPA claims is one year from the date on which the objectionable conduct occurred. There is no applicable discovery rule—that is, it is irrelevant to the calculation of the limitations period when the potential plaintiff discovered the FDCPA violation.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act generally requires a claim to be filed within one year after the alleged violation, and the discovery rule does not extend that period.

LACY v. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATIONS SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2024-07-23(d)

Absent an equitable tolling doctrine, the statute of limitations for a claim under the Act is one year from the date the alleged violation occurred. The Supreme Court recently held the discovery rule does not apply to the Act’s limitation period.

FDCPA claims must be brought within one year of the alleged violation.

Britton v. PHH Mortgage Corporation · filed 2024-09-12(d)

To the extent the Brittons make allegations under the FDCPA, those claims are time-barred. A violation of the FDCPA must be brought within one-year of the date on which the alleged violation occurs. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 598 U.S. 8, 13 (2019). The last payment made by PHH to Drummer Boy was on July 31, 2020. Complaint ¶ 106 [Doc. No. 1-1]. The Brittons’ FDCPA claims are untimely.

Section 1692k(d) gives an FDCPA claim a one-year limitations period measured from the date of the violation.

Benton v. Collect Access, LLC CA2/3 · filed 2024-09-23(k)(d)

The statute of limitations for claims under the FDCPA and RFDCPA is one year from the date of the violation. (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (f); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); Paredes v. Credit Consulting Services, Inc. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 410, 425, 426 (Paredes).) Where the FDCPA and RFDCPA claims arise, as they do here, from the filing of a complaint seeking to collect on an alleged debt, the date the claim is complete with all its elements is generally the date of the filing and service of the complaint and summons. (Paredes, at p. 427.) ... Thus, the FDCPA claim accrued when Collect Access filed the complaint against Benton in June 2010. (Id. at p. 1040 [“every alleged FDCPA violation triggers its own one-year statute of limitations as provided in [15 U.S.C.] § 1692k(d)”].)

Section 1692k(d) gives FDCPA claims a one-year limitations period running from the date each violation occurs.

Paxton v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2024-09-23(k)(d)

The FDCPA includes a one-year statute of limitations that runs “from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); see Bender v. Elmore & Throop, P.C., 963 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding FDCPA’s limitations period runs independently from date of each alleged violation). Here, the final action that Paxton alleged violated the FDCPA occurred on May 7, 2020, when Appellees filed a suggestion of garnishment. Accordingly, absent equitable tolling, Paxton had until May 7, 2021, to file a complaint alleging the latest of her claims, but she filed her complaint in July 2021.

An FDCPA action must be filed within one year after the violation occurs.

Y'DNEW v. LNV CORPORATION · filed 2024-11-27(k)(d)

Under the FDCPA, an action must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

Section 1692k(d) gives one year to sue from the date the FDCPA violation occurs, and for a collection letter the period runs from the date it is mailed.

Lukashin v. United Collection Bureau Inc · filed 2025-02-12(k)(d)

The statute of limitations for initiating a suit under the FDCPA runs “one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. ... In Naas v. Stolman, the Ninth Circuit approvingly cited other circuits which had held that in the context of debt service letters, rather than legal complaints, the statute of limitations “begins to run when a harassing collection letter is mailed.” 130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). ... The only fact in dispute at this stage of the litigation is the true mailing date of the August 14 Letter. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that if the letter was mailed on August 14, 2023, that his FDCPA claim is time-barred. This is because he filed suit on August 19, 2024—more than a year later.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within one year after the violation occurs, rather than after its discovery.

Harris v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2025-02-13(k)(d)

An action under the FDCPA must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... Consequently, the court finds that Harris’s FDCPA claim, as pleaded, is barred by the statute of limitations, and the court therefore dismisses Harris’s FDCPA claim with prejudice.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year after the violation occurs.

Shields v. Linear Mortgage LLC · filed 2025-07-14(k)(d)

Plaintiff’s allegations as to violations arising from this letter are barred by the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. ... Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA related to Defendants’ collection attempts in September 2021 are dismissed because they are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1692k(d) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on FDCPA claims, so claims based on a 2009 foreclosure filing brought in 2023 are time-barred.

Zulli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank · filed 2025-08-27(d)

Critically, claims brought under the FDCPA have a one-year statute of limitations. See Benzemann v. Citibank N.A., 806 F.3d 98, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)). ... Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims are premised on the filing and pursuit of the Foreclosure Action in state court based on an allegedly time-barred debt. These claims are precluded by FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Chase filed the Foreclosure Action in 2009, and Plaintiff did not file the instant Complaint until May 10, 2023—clearly outside the one-year statute of limitations for FDCPA claims.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year of the violation, measured from when the violation occurs rather than when it is discovered.

BAKER, JR. v. CENTRAL LOAN ADMINISTRATION & REPORTING FSB · filed 2025-09-16(k)(d)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), an action under the FDCPA “may be brought … within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” In Rotkiske v. Klemm, the Supreme Court confirmed that this one-year limitations period begins to run when the violation occurs, not when it is discovered. 589 U.S. 8. While Plaintiff does not allege exactly when he received the notice that is the subject of the FDCPA claim, the context of the Complaint makes it clear that he received it no later than September 19, 2023. The Complaint was filed on March 6, 2025, well more than one year later than the latest possible date. Thus, the FDCPA claim is time-barred under Rotkiske.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.

NAPRSTEK · filed 2025-10-20(k)(d)

An action for an FDCPA violation must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... To the extent Plaintiff relies on the alleged fraud concerning the difference in stamps, that is impermissible as that alleged violation occurred in 2017. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

Section 1692k(d) requires private FDCPA civil actions to be brought within one year after the violation occurs.

Slater · filed 2025-10-29(k)(d)

These private civil actions must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)). ... Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on August 7, 2024, which is over one year and eight months after the latest action he complains of. Therefore, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1692k(d) bars an FDCA claim filed more than one year after the alleged violation.

Rightsell · filed 2026-03-06(k)(d)

In any case, claims brought under the FDCA would be time-barred because his complaint was filed well over a year since any of the events in this case. 15 U.SD.C. § 1692k(d).

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year after the violation occurs.

Strickland · filed 2026-04-14(k)(d)

A plaintiff must bring an FDCPA action “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The time begins to run when the violation occurs, not upon its discovery. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 10 (2019). ... Strickland filed the instant lawsuit on January 5, 2026, well past the expiration of the limitations period. Thus, to the extent Strickland asserts FDCPA claims in his Complaint, and based upon the allegations before this Court, his FDCPA claims are time-barred.

Sections 1692g(a) and 1692e(11) require validation notice and debt-collection disclosures in communications seeking payment of a judgment debt, including an initial post-judgment communication and follow-up notices.

Frey v. Gangwish II · filed 1992-07-21(g)(a) and (e)(11)

Although the letter was sent to collect on a judgment, the act defines debt to include any obligation, "whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Gangwish's failure to provide validation notice therefore violated this section of the act. ... This section therefore clearly applies to initial communications that follow the entry of a judgment. ... We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Pipiles and therefore reject the defendant's argument that the disclosure requirements of section 1692e(11) do not apply to follow-up notices. ... As written, sections 1692g(a) and 1692e(11) apply to Gangwish's post-judgment letter. As a result, his failure to include the notice and disclosures required by those sections constitutes violations of those sections as a matter of law.

A valid judgment does not prevent an FDCPA challenge to improper post-judgment collection methods.

McCrobie v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC · filed 2023-08-18

In other words, a party cannot use improper methods even to collect a debt that it has the right to collect or even to enforce a judgment that it is entitled to enforce.

Sections 1692e and 1692f(8) prohibit deceptive collection representations and disclosure of debt information on envelopes, but do not categorically bar assigned aliases or office names in collection letters, a “Revenue Department” return-address designation, or encoded debt information on a debtor-to-collector payment envelope.

Johnson v. NCB Collection Services · filed 1992-08-21(e), (e)(9), (e)(14), and (f)(8)

The use of an assigned alias or office name, even when considered from the standpoint of the least sophisticated debtor, does not misrepresent the amount of a debt, the consequences of its non-payment, nor the rights of the contacted debtor. ... In light of the foregoing, I conclude that printing an assigned office name or alias at the conclusion of a collection letter is not a “false, deceptive or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... The mere use of the departmental designation “Revenue Department” in the return address of a collection notice is simply not the type of abusive collection practice that the FDCPA was intended to reach. ... The enclosure of a payment envelope bearing Johnson’s name and address along with encoded information regarding his debt did not violate the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a)(4) permits a validation notice to state in the alternative that the collector will obtain debt verification or a copy of a judgment, even when no judgment exists, so long as the notice is effectively conveyed.

Moore v. Ingram & Associates, Inc. · filed 1992-10-29(a)(4)

The mention of a judgment in the notice is merely an alternative means of confirmation of the debt. Even the least sophisticated consumer understands that the word “or” means that one of two alternatives will be taken. ... The letter in this case does not threaten that a judgment will be sought nor does it imply that a judgment has been obtained.

The FDCPA permits a person who is not technically a consumer to recover for a debt collector’s violation of the Act with respect to that person, protecting people other than debtors from abusive collection practices.

Dutton v. Wolhar · filed 1992-11-24

The purpose of the FDCPA is to “protect consumers from a host of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors.” ... The Act contains a civil enforcement mechanism which provides that “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of [the Act] with respect to any person is liable to such person....” ... A reading of the plain language of the Act demonstrates that § 1692k does not limit recovery to “consumers.” Instead, it imposes liability where a debt collector has failed to comply with the Act with respect to “any person.” ... The plain language of the Act, legislative history and prior judicial decision demonstrate Dutton is not precluded from recovering under the FDCPA even if he is not technically a “consumer” by virtue of the fact that the letter was addressed to his father rather than to him.

Section 1692k permits FDCPA liability to reach general partners vicariously when partnership law makes them jointly and severally liable for the debt collector's acts.

Peters v. AT&T Corp. · filed 1998-06-11(k)

The FDCPA imposes liability on a “debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. ... To determine whether the General Partners are vicariously liable for the acts of GC Services under the FDCPA, the court should look to general partnership law. ... Viewing the complaint in light most favorable to Mr. Peters, GC Services’ conduct was within the scope of its authority and thus, the General Partners cannot be dismissed since they are potentially liable jointly and severally for the acts of GC Services.

The FDCPA regulates debt collectors, not creditors' activities.

Citibank (South Dakota), NA v. Bowen · filed 2008-12-16

With regard to who is governed by this law, "'[a] distinction between creditors and debt collectors is fundamental to the FDCPA, which does not regulate creditors' activities at all.'" Id . at 998 (alteration in original; citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff was a creditor of defendant as defendant owed money on a credit card issued by plaintiff. Plaintiff was attempting through litigation to collect the unpaid and undisputed debt owed by defendant. Plaintiff is not a debt collector, but assuming arguendo that it is, defendant has not asserted that plaintiff violated any provisions of the FDCPA in its attempt to collect money owed on defendant's credit card.

The FDCPA does not provide a factual basis for a claim against a party not alleged to have participated in collecting a debt owed to a third party.

Kareem v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation · filed 2010-07-27

Furthermore, Johnson & Freedman are not alleged to have had any role in the loan transaction or any attempt to collect a debt from Kareem owed to a third party. Thus, there is no conceivable factual basis for claims against Johnson & Freedman under the TILA, the RESPA or the FDCPA.

Section 1692k(a) makes a debt collector liable to a person only for violations committed with respect to that person; an FDCPA plaintiff generally must be the debtor or stand in the debtor’s shoes.

Anarion Investments, LLC v. Carrington Mortgage Servces, LLC · filed 2017-03-20(a)

The section of the FDCPA that landed under the microscope in this appeal provides that “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person” in damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (emphasis added). ... We agree, both with this conclusion and with the reasoning used to support it. ... But, here, Anarion is not the debtor, nor does it stand in the debtor’s shoes.

Sections 1692d and 1692e can protect a nonconsumer, but only when the debt-collection activity is directed at that person.

Gilliam v. Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP · filed 2021-04-28(d), (e)

The question here, therefore, is not whether Gilliam was a “consumer” under the FDCPA. Rather, it is whether he was the “object of debt collection activities,” i.e., whether activities were directed at him (as opposed to PRPSC or the Property itself).

The FDCPA permits recovery only by the person with respect to whom the violation occurred, including actual damages and up to $1,000 in additional damages; because the additional damages are a penalty, assignment requires specific statutory authorization under Washington law.

James v. Puget Sound Collections · filed 2022-06-30(k)(1), (k)(2)

No matter what, relief under the FDCPA is available only to a person who sustains damage through a debt collector's violation of the FDCPA ‘with respect to’ that very person. When a debt collector violates the FDCPA with respect to someone else, the FDCPA does not provide for claims by others. ... The Plaintiff does not have standing in this case because the Plaintiff was not the party that was injured.

Section 1692a(5) limits covered debts to obligations incurred for personal, family, or household purposes, and section 1692a(6)(A) excludes a creditor's employee collecting debts in the creditor's own name from the definition of debt collector.

Bank of New Haven v. Liner, No. Cv91 03 45 16s (Apr. 2, 1993) · filed 1993-04-02(5), (6)(A)

The Act applies only to obligations incurred for "personal, family or household purposes." See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5). ... Third, the Act expressly does not apply to "any officer or employer of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a ; ... "Debt Collectors", as defined by the Act, are those who regularly collect for others and do not include employees of the creditor collecting in its own name. Kizer, supra. The defendants specifically allege that Mr. Hinkle, an employee of the plaintiff, violated the Act. Since the Act does not apply to acts of an employee of the plaintiff Bank, the Act does not apply to the allegations pled in the seventh count.

The FDCPA does not apply to a New York nonpayment summary proceeding's rent demand under RPAPL 711(2), and an alleged violation does not require dismissal because the remedy is a separate action for monetary damages.

Barstow Road Owners, Inc. v. Billing · filed 1998-09-02(a)(5)

It is this court’s opinion in the instant case that the three-day demand is not a communication to collect a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA. ... Finally, the three-day notice was not sent for the purpose of collecting a debt, but merely as a jurisdictional predicate to the commencement of a summary proceeding for nonpayment of rent (maintenance). ... Therefore, this court holds that even if the FDCPA were to apply to summary proceedings, a violation of said provisions would not result in dismissal of this summary proceeding. ... Moreover, this court holds that the provisions of the FDCPA do not apply to a nonpayment summary proceeding commenced in the State of New York, insofar as they relate to a demand for rent made pursuant to RPAPL 711 (2).

When a landlord uses a debt-collecting attorney to collect unpaid rent, the attorney must comply with the FDCPA when serving the rent-demand notice.

Realty v. Calixte · filed 1998-08-07

Thus, when a landlord decides to use a debt collector (i.e., an attorney) to collect unpaid rent from a tenant-debtor, the debt collector, in serving the written rent demand notice alternatively required by RPAPL 711 (2), must fully comply with the superseding provisions of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA covers debt collectors engaged in debt collection and does not regulate a debt collector's mere furnishing of a trade line to a credit reporting agency.

MILLS v. THE LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL D. BLUHM AND ASSOCIATES · filed 2023-10-26(a)(6), (g)

The FDCPA does not regulate the furnishing of information to credit reporting agencies. Hence, that MBA Law merely furnished a trade line to a credit reporting agency does not violate any provision of the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector's validation notice to remain effective, and a payment request violates the statute only when it overshadows or threatens to contradict that notice.

Burns v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections of Virginia, Inc. · filed 1993-07-12(a)

The Court finds that the letter at issue in this case has effectively communicated the debtor’s rights as required by the statutes. The request for payment is in the first paragraph of the letter which is immediately followed by two paragraphs of slightly smaller type, fully discussing the debtor’s right to dispute the debt. These two paragraphs are in type that is easily readable, and since they are in the body of the letter immediately following the request they can not be overlooked. There is no attempt to deprive the debtor of his rights. Thus, the request for payment does not ‘overshadow1 or ‘stand in threatening contradiction’ to the validation notice following it and there is no violation of either 15 U.S.C. § 1692g or M.C.L. § 339.-918(1).

Section 1692g(a) requires debt-collection letters to include a validation notice informing the debtor of the thirty-day dispute period.

Young v. Meyer & NJUS, P.A. · filed 1997-01-23(g)(a)

Section 1692g(a) requires that all letters seeking to collect a debt contain a validation notice. This notice should inform a debtor that she has thirty days to dispute the validity of the debt, either in part or in whole. If the debt is undisputed, the collector may assume the debt is valid and proceed to collect it.

Section 1692g(a) requires a 30-day validation period, and collection-letter language that makes the least sophisticated consumer think she has less time to dispute the debt can violate the Act.

Monokrousos v. Computer Credit, Inc. · filed 1997-11-20(a)

Whether the letters sent to plaintiff by the defendants violate the Act is to be determined by applying the “least sophisticated consumer” standard. ... Hence, simply including the required validation notice in a debt collection letter may not be sufficient to comply with the Act. Notices that contain the required language may nonetheless violate the Act if they contain “language that overshadows or contradicts other language informing a consumer of her rights.” ... This language could lead an unsophisticated consumer to believe that she had only until April 24, 1997 to contest the debt, when, in fact, the thirty day validation period allowed her until April 26 to do so.

Section 1692g requires debt-collection letters to include a validation notice that is not overshadowed or contradicted by other language and is understandable to an unsophisticated consumer.

Walker v. National Recovery, Inc. · filed 1999-04-29(g)

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 1692g requires a validation notice to be included in all dunning letters and that this notice not be overshadowed or contradicted by other language included in the letters. The Comb concludes that Defendant complied with § 1692g because the letter contains a proper validation notice and when read in its entirety is not confusing to an unsophisticated consumer.

Section 1692f(1) bars collecting an unauthorized or unlawful fee, while sections 1692g(b) and 1692e(10) prohibit a collection communication during the validation period from overshadowing the consumer’s dispute rights through an immediate-payment demand implying legal action.

Durham v. Continental Cent. Credit, Inc. · filed 2008-03-20(f)(1), (g)(b), (e)(10)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l), it is an unfair practice to collect “any amount (including any interest, fee, charges, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” ... Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that Defendants engaged in unfair collection practices (in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l)) by attempting to collect a 40% (or other arbitrary amount) collection fee. Plaintiff has also stated a claim that Defendants made false or misleading misrepresentations that such collection fees were property owed. ... This letter implied that Plaintiff had to make immediate payment to avoid legal action. The letter did not reiterate Plaintiffs right to dispute the debt and, therefore, overshadowed the initial notice. Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a valid claim under sections 1692g(b) and 1692(e)(10).

Section 1692b(2) prohibits a debt collector from telling a person other than the consumer that the consumer owes a debt unless the communication is solely to obtain location information.

Stanley v. Capital Link Management LLC · filed 2025-02-14(b)(2)

More specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1692b prohibits a debt collector from “stat[ing] that [the] consumer owes any debt” when “communicating with any person other than the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2). In fact, communications with any person other than the consumer are permitted only for the purpose of acquiring location information. Id. §§ 1692b, 1692c(b). The text message to Stanley’s sister-in-law clearly stated that Stanley owed a debt and was not for the purpose of acquiring information about Stanley’s location or how she could be reached. See Docket Item 39-2. Therefore, this Court finds that Stanley has established a violation of the FDCPA for the purposes of default judgment.

Section 1692c(a)(1) bars a debt collector from contacting a consumer at a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient, and § 1692c(b) prohibits improper communication with third parties.

Austin v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc. · filed 1993-07-21(a)(1), (b)

The plaintiff first alleges that Great Lakes violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(l), which forbids a debt collector from contacting a consumer at “a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.” Indeed, the defendant’s own records clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff requested the defendant not to call her at work because such calls inconvenienced her. At oral argument, the defendant admitted that it was fully aware of this request. Great Lakes nevertheless continued to try to contact the plaintiff at her office on numerous occasions. This willful and repeated disregard of the plaintiffs clear request constitutes a direct violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(a)(l). The court must therefore grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. ... The record also supports the plaintiffs claim that the defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which prohibits improper communication with third parties. Both parties agree that on April 28,1992, Miss Snead, an employee of defendant, called the plaintiffs office and spoke with the plaintiffs secretary, Ms. Conners. The Conners Affidavit clearly shows that the Miss Snead improperly communicated with Ms. Conners in connection with the collection of the plaintiffs debt. Although the defendant’s counsel challenges Ms. Conners’ allegations, the defendant has provided no affidavits or other evidence which contest the Conners Affidavit in any way. The defendant’s bald assertion that Ms. Conners’ affidavit is not accurate or credible is not sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on this claim. ... Therefore, the plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment on her claim that the defendant violated § 1692c(b).

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from sending collection letters to the alleged debtor’s employer or other third parties, subject to statutory exceptions.

Sluys v. Hand · filed 1993-09-13(b)

Sending'debt collection letters to an alleged debtor’s employer and other third parties (with certain exceptions irrelevant here), violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). Here, such a letter was addressed directly to .plaintiffs employer (not to the employee at the address of, or in care of, the employer).

Section 1692c(b) bars a debt collector from communicating information about a debt to third parties without the consumer's prior consent or court permission, subject to the location-information exception in § 1692b.

O'CONNOR v. Check Rite, Ltd. · filed 1997-08-04(b)

Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA forbids a debt collector, except as provided in § 1692b with respect to location of information, from communicating to third parties about the debt without prior consent of a consumer or the permission of a court. Section 1692a(2) defines “communication” as “conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” Further, § 1692b provides that when a debt collector communicates with a third party regarding the location of a consumer he may identify himself but “may not state that such consumer owes any debt.” Since the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, a plaintiff need only show one violation of its provisions to be entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1692c(b) broadly prohibits debt collectors from conveying any information relating to a debt to third parties, except to obtain location information as permitted by section 1692b.

West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc. · filed 1998-03-09(c)(b)

Because a narrow interpretation of section 1692c(b) would render other portions of the statute “superfluous”, the court concludes that section 1692c(b) should be broadly interpreted to prohibit a debt collector, in connection with the collection of any debt, from conveying any information relating to a debt to a third party (except for the purpose of obtaining location information as permitted under section 1692b).

Section 1692c(b) does not subject a communication from a foreclosing party or its counsel concerning the foreclosure to liability under the FDCPA.

Acosta v. Campbell · filed 2009-01-28(c)(b)

Based on our reasoning in Vega, we hold that a communication issued from foreclosing party, or its counsel, regarding the foreclosure, does not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), as such a communication is not subject to the FDCPA.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from communicating about a debt with a person other than the consumer without the consumer’s prior consent given directly to the debt collector; merely continuing to listen to a message in a third party’s presence does not constitute that consent.

Leahey v. FRANKLIN COLLECTION SERVICE, INC. · filed 2010-02-04(b)

Under the plain language of the statute, “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, ... a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer.” This court agrees that “[a] third party, or the debtor in the presence of a third party, continuing to listen to the message in spite of the warning does not qualify as prior consent directly to the debt collector” as required by § 1692c(b).

Section 1692(e)'s FDCPA protections do not apply to a letter that merely informs a debtor of an account assignment, provides new account information, and states that it is not an attempt to collect a debt.

Parker v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2012-06-15(e)

In light of the factors discussed above, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the December 2010 letter is not a communication in connection with debt collection. The letter did not demand payment or discuss specifics of the underlying debt. And the purpose of the letter was to inform Plaintiff of the assignment of the account to Defendant. Indeed, the letter even states that “this is not an attempt to collect a debt.” (Dkt. 22-1). And, although the balance of the debt is stated, the letter does not include terms of payment or deadlines. On its face, it is clearly informational; it informs Plaintiff that her account has been assigned to Defendant and includes the new account number and Defendant’s contact information.

Section 1692b(3) permits a debt collector to contact a third party more than once when it reasonably believes the earlier response was incomplete and the person may now have complete location information, applying an objective standard.

Worsham v. Accounts Receivable Management · filed 2012-11-14(b)(3)

When communicating with a third party, the debt collector shall “not communicate with any such person more than once . . . unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is . . . incomplete and that such person now has . . . complete location information.” Id. § 1692b(3). The use of the word “reasonably” indicates that this is an objective standard that the debt collector must meet to avoid liability under the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, § 1692b(3) allowed ARM to continue calling Worsham until it reasonably believed that it had received a complete response, so ARM’s additional phone calls did not violate the statute.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits debt-collection communications with third parties, but a message asking a third party to have the consumer call back is not a statutory communication when it conveys no information about the debt.

Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC · filed 2013-10-21(c)(b)

The message conveyed no information whatsoever about the debt. Thus, these portions of the contacts with the third parties were not communications under the FDCPA.

Section 1692e applies when a debt collector’s communication is related to debt collection; an implicit payment demand can be shown by stating the debt amount, how it may be paid, where payment may be tendered, and that the communication is for collecting a debt.

Pinson v. Albertelli Law Partners LLC · filed 2015-07-09(e)

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. “That means in order to state a plausible FDCPA claim under § 1692e, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, (1) that the defendant is a ‘debt collector’ and (2) that the challenged conduct is related to debt collection.” ... In Caceres, we noted that, when determining whether a communication is “in connection with the collection of any debt,” courts should look to the language of the letters in question, specifically to statements that demand payment, discuss additional fees if payment is not tendered, and disclose that the law firm was attempting to collect a debt and was acting as a debt collector. ... A demand for payment need not be express; there may be an implicit demand for payment where the letter states the amount of the debt, describes how the debt may be paid, provides the phone number and address to send payment, and expressly states that the letter is for the purpose of collecting a debt. ... We conclude that Albertelli’s August 13 letter was not sent in connection to the collection of a debt, but its two December 24 letters were.

Section 1692c(b) generally bars a debt collector from communicating with third parties about collecting a debt unless the communication is reasonably necessary to effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy, and garnishing the wages of the wrong person may fall outside that exception.

Scott v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2015-10-16(c)(b)

Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA generally prohibits a debt collector from communicating “with any third parties in connection with collecting a debt except as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy.” § 1692c(b). ... The Court finds this argument unpersuasive because Portfolio has not established a lack of genuine dispute as to whether Portfolio was effectuating a. postjudgment judicial remedy against Plaintiff; rather than attempting to effectuate .a default judgment against a different person with a similar name. A reasonable- jury could conclude that garnishing the wages of the wrong person is not “reasonably necessary” to effectuate a judgment; indeed, a reasonable jury could conclude that only actions against the correct person would be necessary.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from communicating with third parties about a debt without the consumer’s consent, unless an exception such as § 1692b’s safe harbor applies.

Litt v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC · filed 2015-11-20(c)(b)

However, a consumer still may maintain an action against a debt collector for a failure to adhere to the requirements of § 1692b, but he must do so under § 1692c(b).

Section 1692c(b) does not prohibit a debt collector’s transfer of information to a mail house when that transfer is not a communication in connection with the collection of a debt, and § 1692f likewise does not prohibit that transfer.

Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc. · filed 2019-10-29(c)(b), (f)

Consequently, the Court finds that the letter sent from Preferred to the mail house does not violate §1692c(b). Hunstein also claims that “Preferred violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f by using unfair means in connection with the collection of a debt, to wit, knowingly disclosing personal information about Mr. Hunstein’s son, to third parties not expressly authorized by the FDCPA.” However, because the communication from Preferred to the mail house was not in connection with the collection of a debt, the Court finds that this letter does not violate §1692f.

Section 1692c(b) permits a debt collector to communicate with a third party about collecting a debt when the debtor consents or a court of competent jurisdiction expressly permits it.

Johnson-Gellineau v. Stiene & Associates, P.C. · filed 2020-11-17(b)

We agree with the District Court that such communications do not violate § 1692c(b), which prohibits debt collectors from communicating with third parties in connection with collection of the debt without the prior consent of the debtor or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from communicating a consumer's personal information to an outside mail vendor in connection with debt collection, unless an exception applies.

Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc. · filed 2021-10-28(c)(b)

We hold (1) that the violation of § 1692c(b) alleged in this case gives rise to a concrete injury in fact under Article III, and (2) that the debt collector’s transmittal of the consumer’s personal information to its dunning vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” within the meaning of § 1692c(b).

A § 1692c(b) letter-vendor claim does not establish Article III standing where the alleged disclosure to the vendor is not sufficiently analogous to a common-law invasion of privacy.

Nyanjom v. NPAS Solutions, LLC · filed 2022-01-19(b)

This Court joins Judge Teeter and several district courts outside the Tenth Circuit in concluding that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring her § 1692c(b) letter-vendor claim.

For standing purposes, a § 1692c(b) disclosure to a clerical-services vendor to prepare and mail an otherwise permitted collection letter does not cause a concrete injury or implicate the privacy interest protected by the FDCPA.

Clark Nabozny, Mary v. Optio Solutions LLC · filed 2022-02-01(b)

But Nabozny contends that in sharing this information with RevSpring, Optio violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which prohibits debt collectors from communication with most third parties. ... A debt collector that outsources the mechanical tasks of preparing and mailing letters that the debt collector itself is authorized to send does not inflict any concrete injury on the debtor. ... Sharing information with a third-party provider of clerical services is not analogous to disclosure to the world at large. And disclosure to such vendors is not the sort of harm the FDCPA was meant to prevent.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits debt collectors from communicating, in connection with collecting any debt, with third parties such as letter vendors unless a statutory exception applies.

KHIMMAT v. WELTMAN, WEINBERG AND REIS, CO., LPA · filed 2022-02-07(c)(b)

Section 1692c(b)’s prohibition on communications with “any person,” coupled with its exception for certain third parties like lawyers and consumer reporting agencies demonstrates that the phrase refers to any third party, including a letter vendor.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from conveying consumer-debt information to a commercial mail vendor without the consumer's consent because that transmission is a communication to a third party.

Jackin v. Enhanced Recovery Company LLC · filed 2022-06-10(b)

Section 1692c(b) broadly prohibits debt collectors from “communicat[ing] with third parties in connection with a consumer’s debt.” ... While this prohibition is subject to several carefully defined exceptions, the statute does not explicitly provide an exception for commercial mail vendors. ... the Court finds that in enacting the FDCPA, Congress used language that, on its face, bars debt collectors from communicating consumer-debt related information to mail vendors.

Section 1692c(b) requires a plaintiff to show that a debt collector conveyed information about a debt to a third party, but not that the disclosure was knowing or intentional.

Glick v. CMRE Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2022-07-06(b)

To allege a violation of Section 1692c(b), a plaintiff “must show that the defendants conveyed information about a debt to a third party, although she does not need to show that the defendants did so knowingly or intentionally.”

Section 1692c permits a debt collector to communicate with a third party or a represented consumer when a court of competent jurisdiction expressly authorizes the communication, including service required by court rules.

Usevicz v. Weltman Weinberg & Reis, Co. of Michigan · filed 2023-02-10(c)(b), (c)(a)(1), (c)(a)(2)

Stated positively, that section permits a debt collector to communicate with a third party if a court of competent jurisdiction authorizes that communication. ... This Court concurs with the reasoning in Ridder and shall dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim brought under § 1692c(b). ... Under the circumstances presented here, Defendant having communicated with Plaintiff, by virtue of having her served with the summons and complaint, falls under the statutory exception in § 1692c(a) for communications made with the “express permission” of a court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims because her Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from communicating with third parties about a consumer’s debt in connection with collection, but disclosure to a letter vendor for administrative processing is not abusive, deceptive, or unfair under the FDCPA.

Tariq Elshabba, Etc. v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC · filed 2025-05-02(c)(b), (e), and (f)

We concur with the motion judge's determination that defendant's use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, nor unfair and reject plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the FDCPA as uncritically literal. Defendant's disclosure of debt-related information to a letter vendor was not the type of conduct Congress intended to regulate when it enacted the FDCPA.

Section 1692b(2) prohibits a debt collector from stating that a consumer owes a debt when communicating with someone other than the consumer, while such communications are permitted only to obtain location information.

Lowe v. Capital Link Management LLC · filed 2025-07-14(b)(2)

More specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1692b prohibits a debt collector from “stat[ing] that [the] consumer owes any debt” when “communicating with any person other than the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2). In fact, communications with any person other than the consumer are permitted only for the purpose of acquiring location information.

Section 1692c(b) does not prohibit a debt collector from disclosing debt-related information to a letter vendor for legitimate collection efforts.

Latonya Miller, Etc. v. Americollect, Inc. · filed 2025-05-02(b)

We concur with the motion judge's determination that defendant's use of a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, nor unfair and reject plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the FDCPA as uncritically literal. Defendant's disclosure of debt-related information to a letter vendor was not the type of conduct Congress intended to regulate when it enacted the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) excludes a creditor collecting its own debt from the definition of “debt collector,” so the FDCPA does not apply to that collection activity.

Connecticut National Bank v. Carbonella, No. Cv92 0299477 (Aug. 19, 1993) · filed 1993-08-19(a)(6)

By definition, it is beyond peradventure that a creditor collecting its own debt is not a debt collector. ... It is abundantly clear from the pleadings in this case that CNB is a creditor of the defendants trying to collect its own debt. Therefore, the FDCPA is irrelevant to this case and the second special defense and second count of the counterclaim are legally insufficient and is stricken.

The FDCPA generally does not apply to a creditor that collects debts on its own behalf, because the Act excludes such a creditor from the definition of “debt collector.”

MCCOY v. MERCK SHARP & DOHME FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2022-01-14(a)(6)

Notably, the FDCPA expressly excludes creditors and their officers from the definition of a debt collector. 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)(a). In short, the FDCPA does not apply “to persons or businesses collecting debts on their own behalf.” Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4)). Rather, “it is directed to those persons who are engaged in business for the principal purpose of collecting debts.” Id.

The FDCPA does not treat a creditor collecting its own debt as a debt collector unless it uses a deceptive name to collect.

Hackett v. TD Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-05-31(a)(6)

Defendant cannot be considered a debt collector when the alleged debt was owed to Defendant itself.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person who regularly collects debts owed another, while excluding a creditor collecting its own debt in its own name.

Ivy v. AmeriCash Loans LLC · filed 2024-04-10(a)(6)

Pursuant to the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... As Defendant was attempting to collect its own debt and used its own name to do so, Defendant is a creditor, not a “debt collector,” and the FDCPA does not apply.

Section 1692a(6)(A) defines a debt collector as a person who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due another, excluding a creditor collecting a debt in its own name.

Rogers v. Safe Federal Credit Union · filed 2025-09-09(a)(6)(A)

For purposes of the FDCPA, the term “debt collector” includes “any person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A). Here, however, SAFE is attempting to collect a debt in its own name. Though SAFE identified itself as a debt collector in the letter quoted above, the Court is unable to conclude such self-identification overcomes a clear statutory exclusion.

The FDCPA’s creditor-employee exemption cannot support dismissal when a genuine issue remains about whether the employee is exempt.

Hardin v. Folger · filed 1988-10-19

Similarly, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that she is exempt from the statute by virtue of her status as an employee of the creditor, must be denied.

The FDCPA regulates debt collectors, but exempts creditors collecting debts in their own names.

Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia v. Mata · filed 2002-10-04(a)(6)

The FDCPA applies only to debt collectors and specifically exempts creditors themselves from the statute’s requirements.

Section 1692c(b) prohibits a debt collector from communicating a consumer’s debt to nonexcepted third parties, while §§ 1692d and 1692f do not prohibit merely delaying notice to mortgagees absent harassing, oppressive, abusive, unfair, or unconscionable conduct.

McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. · filed 2013-08-26(c)(b), (d), (f)

Heiger or Aegis are not among the excepted categories of individuals or entities in section 1692c(b). As explained in the Memorandum and Order, the plain language of section 1962c(b) proscribes the May 13, 2008 communication. Hence, it was not an error of law, let alone a manifest error of law. This court stands by that analysis. ... MEEB’s failure to send the letters earlier does not have the natural consequence of embarrassing plaintiff or oppressing or abusing him even if the failure increased the litigation costs. ... MEEB did not violate section 1692f by not sending or by delaying sending the mortgagees the 30 day notice 30 days before fling suit.

Section 1692f(1) does not prohibit collecting attorneys’ fees and collection costs when the debt agreement expressly authorizes them and applicable law permits or requires their collection.

McCarter v. Nesbit · filed 2013-12-18(f)(1)

The fact that the 1971 Declaration provides that reasonable attorneys’ fees are to be “fixed” by a court in the event of a suit to collect delinquent assessments or to foreclose on a lien did not prevent the Association from seeking to collect a specific amount of attorneys’ fees and costs before filing suit. Plaintiff cites no authority to the contrary. Because Kovitz was expressly authorized to collect the attorneys’ fees and costs that it sought from plaintiff, plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of § 1692f, and Count II will be dismissed.

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits recovery of reasonable attorney fees in a successful action even when the plaintiff's attorneys may have provided the legal services without charge.

Perez v. Perkiss · filed 1990-07-12(a)(3)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Perez is not barred from recovering reasonable attorney fees merely because the legal services rendered on his behalf might have been provided without charge.

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.

Thorpe v. Collection Information Bureau, Inc. · filed 1996-10-09(a)(3)

As prevailing litigant in this case, the Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the relevant provision of the FDCPA, which allows to such a party “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires an award of attorney fees under the FDCPA to be reasonable.

Southern Siding Co. v. Raymond · filed 1997-09-19(a)(3)

The FDCPA dictates that an award of attorney fees must be reasonable. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a successful plaintiff to costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee, and the court held that a reasonable fee may include a multiplier and awarded a 10% enhancement.

Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP · filed 2008-07-30(k)(a)(3)

The FDCPA states that a prevailing party may seek “reasonable” attorney fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. A “reasonable” fee is typically the lodestar, but a multiplier or a divisor may be appropriate. ... The Court therefore concludes that a 10% fee enhancement is permissible under the FDCPA and OCSPA, and is warranted by the facts discussed above.

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a reasonable attorney’s fee in a successful FDCPA action, calculated using the lodestar method of reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.

Bilazzo v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2012-06-25(a)(3)

Section 1692k(a)(3) specifically provides that an attorney’s fee under the FDCPA must be reasonable. ... In order to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee under the FDCPA, the Court must employ the well recognized “lodestar” method applicable under other fee-shifting statutes which entails multiplying the total number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.

The FDCPA’s fee provision allows a successful plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs, with the award calculated from reasonable hourly rates and hours using a lodestar approach.

Kaylor-Trent v. John C. Bonewicz, P.C. · filed 2013-01-09(k)(3)

When calculating an award of attorney fees under the FDCPA, the court generally begins by calculating the lodestar: the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours reasonably expended.

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a prevailing plaintiff to receive the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee, with reasonableness determined by the court.

Humes v. LVNV Funding, L.L.C. (In re Humes) · filed 2013-12-17(k)(a)(3)

It provides for a prevailing plaintiff to be awarded “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). ... The sole question is whether the Plaintiffs attorney fees are “reasonable.” The Court finds that they are.

The FDCPA provides for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing consumer.

Robertson v. Pinnacle Asset Group, LLC · filed 2019-08-16

The FDCPA provides for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing consumer, Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995).

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a successful FDCPA plaintiff to receive litigation costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee determined by the court.

Richard v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2019-09-30(a)(3)

One such exception is the FDCPA, which provides “that a successful plaintiff is entitled to recovery from the defendant the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”

Section 1692k(a)(3) requires a successful FDCPA plaintiff to receive costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee, with the court determining the reasonable amount.

Deibert v. Kohn Law Firm SC · filed 2019-10-07(a)(3)

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is liable for “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court” in the case of any successful action. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k)(a)(3); see Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651–52 (7th Cir. 1995). ... Based on the foregoing considerations, I conclude that an attorney’s fee of $5,000 is reasonable. This is sufficient to account for the fees incurred prior to the offer, as well as those that would have been reasonably necessary to evaluate and accept the offer, and then complete the paperwork, including a reasonable fee petition.

Section 1692k(a)(3) authorizes a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to recover the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Lupia v. Medicredit, Inc. · filed 2021-05-19(a)(3)

The FDCPA provides such explicit authority, however, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), and Medicredit does not dispute that Ms. Lupia is entitled to such an award as the prevailing party in this litigation.

Section 1692k(a)(3) permits a court to award attorney fees in a successful FDCPA action.

Meadows v. Greenback Recovery Group LLC · filed 2021-11-02(a)(3)

Moreover, the Court may award attorney fees in this successful FDCPA action. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

The FDCPA entitles prevailing parties to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

PICCINETTI v. CLAYTON, MYRICK, MCCLANAHAN & COULTER, PLLC · filed 2022-06-30

Moreover, the FDCPA entitles prevailing parties, like Plaintiff, to recover their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 1692k(a)(3) entitles a prevailing FDCPA plaintiff to costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, and because it treats attorney fees separately from costs, Rule 68 does not by its terms limit FDCPA attorney-fee awards.

Cooper v. Retrieval Masters Creditors · filed 2022-07-29(a)(3)

The FDCPA entitles plaintiffs to an award of “costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Because of this language separating costs and attorney fees in the statute, we have held that Rule 68 does not apply by its terms to attorney fee awards under the FDCPA. Paz, 924 F.3d at 953. At the same time, nothing prevents an FDCPA defendant from making a formal Rule 68 offer of judgment that includes attorney fees and costs, as occurred here.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken, including action constituting unauthorized practice of law.

Kolker v. Duke City Collection Agency · filed 1990-10-17(e)(5)

I, therefore, find that § 61-18A-26 does not authorize the conduct of defendants at issue here and such conduct does constitute the unauthorized practice of law, which is prohibited by the federal Act.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening action that the law actually prohibits it from taking.

Poirier v. Alco Collections, Inc. · filed 1997-03-17(e)(5)

To violate § 1692e(5), Alco and Allen must have threatened to take action which they were in fact prohibited by law from taking.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken, including an unlawful collection procedure.

Picht v. Jon R. Hawks, Ltd. · filed 2001-01-09(e)(5)

We find that section 332.50 requires the exercise of judicial discretion in establishing the civil penalty for a dishonored check. Therefore, Hawks’s attempt to use the garnishment procedure prior to entry of judgment was not authorized under Minnesota law because a default judgment could not properly be entered under Rule 55.01(a). Hawks’s actions in violation of Minnesota law thus violated the FDCPA’s prohibition against threatening “to take any action that cannot legally be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening or taking action that it is legally prohibited from taking, including attempting to collect an unauthorized fee.

Eads v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP · filed 2008-02-27(e)(5)

To violate § 1692e(5), Wolpoff “must have threatened to take action which [it was] in fact prohibited by law from taking.” ... A debt collector may be liable for violating § 1692e(5) if it adds an unauthorized collection fee to the amount of debt owed. ... Eads alleges Wolpoff acted to collect an unlawful amount of debt by adding an unauthorized $225.00 filing fee to the value of the arbitration award. ... Thus, Eads sets forth a legally cognizable claim that Wolpoff undertook an unlawful action and violated § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e(5) permits a federal FDCPA claim when a debt collector threatens action that cannot legally be taken, including action barred by the collector's failure to register under state law.

LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners · filed 2010-03-30(e)(5)

We therefore hold that a violation of the FCCPA for failure to register may, in fact, support a federal cause of action under Section 1692e(5) of the FDCPA for threatening to take an action it could not legally take.

Section 1692e(5) bars a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken, and a state-law violation coupled with filing a collection lawsuit may support such a claim.

Buhler v. BCG Equities · filed 2020-02-24(e)(5)

Section 1692e(5) prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” which includes “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken.” ... For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that BCG violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e(5) does not prohibit a debt-collection letter from acknowledging that interest may accrue when that possibility exists.

Pettaway v. National Recovery Solutions · filed 2020-04-09(e)(5)

Nor do we read the Letter’s acknowledgment that interest may accrue as threatening language prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). The amended complaint therefore does not support the conclusion that the Letter was materially misleading, inaccurate, unfair, or unconscionable—thereby violating the FDCPA—simply by indicating that the balance may increase.

Section 1692(e)(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.

Kenney v. International Recovery Partners & Associates, LLC · filed 2020-07-24(e)(5)

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendant (Doc. 19); ADJUDGES that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(5); AWARDS Plaintiff statutory damages of $500.00; AWARDS Plaintiff $675.00 in attorney’s fees; and AWARDS Plaintiff $400.00 in court costs.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken.

Wiley v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2021-03-01(e)(5)

Finally, the Court finds that PRA’s threat to obtain a default judgment based on its defective summons constitutes a “threat to take an[] action that cannot legally be taken” under § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken; a threat to obtain a default judgment based on a defective summons violates this provision.

Becker v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2021-03-01(e)(5)

Finally, the Court finds that PRA’s threat to obtain a default judgment based on its defective summons constitutes a “threat to take an[] action that cannot legally be taken” under § 1692e(5). PRA argues that it did not threaten to take an illegal action because it was legally entitled to collect on the underlying debt. PRA was not, however, legally entitled to obtain a default judgment based on its defective summons. See Turek v. A.S.P. of Moorhead, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (“A judgment entered without due service of process must be vacated under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.” (quoting Blaeser & Johnson, P.A. v. Kjellberg, 483 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992))); Schwiebert Decl., Ex. G, at 6 (finding that PRA’s defective summons constituted an independent, alternative ground for vacating the default judgment entered against Wiley). Because PRA threatened to obtain a default judgment based on its defective summons—an “action that cannot legally be taken”—the Court finds that PRA violated § 1692e(5), and that its violation was material under Hill v. Accounts Receivable Services, LLC, 888 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 2018).

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to obtain a default judgment based on a defective summons when that judgment cannot legally be taken, and the violation must be material.

Yang v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2021-03-01(e)(5)

Because PRA threatened to obtain a default judgment based on its defective summons—an “action that cannot legally be taken”—the Court finds that PRA violated § 1692e(5), and that its violation was material under Hill v. Accounts Receivable Services, LLC, 888 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 2018).

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from making a material threat to take an action that cannot legally be taken, including filing a defective summons that threatens an invalid default judgment.

Mayfield v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2021-08-09(e)(5)

In sum, the Court finds that PRA violated § 1692e(5) by filing its defective summons. The summons constituted a material threat to take an action which, due to PRA’s failure to comply with Rule 4.01, could not legally be taken.

Section 1692e(5) does not prohibit an action taken in compliance with a court order while that order remains in effect.

Benjamin v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC · filed 2021-08-26(e)(5)

But on that theory, it is R&A’s underlying misrepresentations that violated the FDCPA, not the actions that followed in compliance with the court order. Section 1692e(5) precludes actions “that cannot legally be taken.” But an action taken in compliance with an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction is lawful unless and until the order is modified or set aside.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken.

Neff v. Mediation Processing Services, LLC · filed 2021-09-27(e)(5)

Section 1692e(5) provides: ... (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. ... MPS cannot, therefore, legally bring an action against Neff in New Hampshire. Thus, MPS violated 1692e(5) by threatening Neff with court action and Neff is entitled to default judgment on his complaint.

Section 1692e(5) bars a debt collector from threatening to take an action that cannot legally be taken, and an alleged violation of state debt-collector licensing law may help establish that violation when the collector files suit.

Cotte v. CVI SGP Acqusition Trust · filed 2022-02-15(e)(5)

Rather, Plaintiffs attempt to use the alleged UCAA violations to make out an element required for a claim under the FDCPA. For instance, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) makes unlawful “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken.” The UCAA outlaws conducting a collection office without registering with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. See UTAH CODE § 12-1-1. Thus, suing to collect while unregistered with the relevant Utah authority allegedly constitutes an action that cannot legally be taken in Utah. Accordingly, Plaintiffs can use a violation of the UCAA to establish an element required under the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(5) prohibits threats to take actions that cannot legally be taken, and § 1692k permits statutory damages without proof of actual damages while requiring consideration of the violation’s frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality.

Thompson v. Renner · filed 2022-04-28(e)(5), (k)(a)(2)(A), (k)(b)(1)

Thus, filing a garnishment request without reasonable grounds for jurisdiction may be sufficient to violate the FDCPA’s prohibition on “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” because it constitutes “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). ... The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $500 in statutory damages. First, Thompson need not provide proof of actual damages in order to receive an award of statutory damages. ... Additionally, the district court’s opinion demonstrates that it considered the statutory requirements—the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of Velo/Renner’s noncompliance with the FDCPA—even though it did not offer in-depth reasoning as to its decision, and its decision to award $500, rather than $1,000, for the single “violation proved in this case” comports with the Sixth Circuit’s guidance about how such factors should be considered.

Section 1692e(5) bars a debt collector from threatening action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended to be taken, including misleadingly representing that an unlicensed mortgage servicer can collect payments.

MCDONOUGH v. LEOPOLD & ASSOCIATES, PLLC · filed 2024-07-16(e)(5)

Most relevant to the Court’s analysis, Section 1692e(5) prohibits a debt collector from threatening to “take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). ... It is undisputed that at the time Leopold sent the Letter on behalf of Trinity, Trinity was not licensed as a mortgage servicer under the Pennsylvania Mortgage Licensing Act. ... Accordingly, Trinity did not have the legal right to collect payments under the HELOC or the Mortgage. Thus, the Court holds that the least sophisticated debtor would find the Letter misleading in that it represents that Trinity could collect payments on the HELOC when, in reality, Trinity was unlicensed to collect payments under the Mortgage Licensing Act. ... Accordingly, Mr. McDonough is entitled to summary judgment under §§ 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10) on this theory under Count 1.

Section 1692e(5) bars a debt collector from threatening litigation that it knows could not legally be pursued.

Ricketts v. Westwood Condo Assoc. · filed 2025-03-31(e)(5)

While this is a threat of litigation, the FDCPA only prohibits such threats of litigation where the party making the threat knows such litigation could not legally be pursued. ... Here, the foreclosure action Defendant Chappell threatened could be—and actually was—pursued.

Section 1692k(a)(1) allows actual damages for emotional distress to be proved independently of state-law requirements for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Smith v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay · filed 1991-02-12(a)(1)

This Court similarly holds that, when a violation of the FDCPA has been established, actual damages for emotional distress can be proved independently of state law requirements.

Section 1692k(a)(1) permits recovery of actual damages for emotional distress without requiring proof of the state-law elements of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Davis v. Creditors Interchange Receivable Management, LLC · filed 2008-11-12(a)(1)

I conclude that the plaintiffs need not satisfy the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress before the jury can find that the defendants caused them actual damages.

Section 1692k(a)(1) permits recovery of actual damages, including damages for personal humiliation and embarrassment, and the FDCPA does not authorize treble damages.

Candy Guajardo v. GC Services, L.P. · filed 2012-11-07(a)(1)

We hold that the district court incorrectly held that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find proof of actual damages under the FDCPA. ... Because Guajardo offered some evidence at trial of personal humiliation and embarrassment, albeit mixed, we need not decide whether the FDCPA includes actual damages for mental distress other and lesser than mental anguish. ... Although the FDCPA does not allow for trebled damages, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, the jury may have been awarding $40,000 per documented harassing call rather than trebling damages.

A plaintiff seeking actual damages for an FDCPA violation must prove a specific loss; conclusory assertions of emotional distress or disrupted routines do not suffice.

Steven Kelley Richardson, Michelle Richardson and Richard Day v. SV Almeda I Limited Partnership · filed 2013-08-29

The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... However, the debtor must prove he suffered some specific loss to recover actual damages. ... To overcome Almeda’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the appellants must have produced some evidence that, as a result of the allegedly improper debt collection activities, they each suffered “a high degree of mental pain and distress” that is “more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger,” or that substantially disrupted their routines. ... Because there is no evidence upon which a reasonable fact finder could find that any of the appellants suffered damages as a result of the allegedly improper debt collection practices, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the FDCPA claim. We overrule this issue.

The FDCPA does not require an allegedly aggrieved party to plead actual damages in detail.

Abramov v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2014-12-12

Nothing in the FDCPA requires an allegedly aggrieved party to plead “actual damages” in detail.

The FDCPA permits actual damages for emotional distress to be proved independently of state-law requirements once a violation has been established.

Young v. Npas, Inc. · filed 2019-02-05(b), (e)

The court holds that when a violation of the FDCPA has been established, actual damages for emotional distress can be proved independent of state law requirements.

Section 1692k(a)(1) permits actual damages, but conclusory, unsubstantiated emotional-distress evidence is insufficient to obtain them.

Wood v. Security Credit Services, LLC · filed 2025-05-28(a)(1)

The FDCPA allows a plaintiff to recover for any actual damages that result from an FDCPA violation as well as statutory damages of up to $1,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). ... While Wood has some evidence of emotional damages, he does not have enough evidence in the record for a jury to award actual damages. ... Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of SCS as to actual damages.

The FDCPA does not require a debt collector to conduct an independent investigation into the legal enforceability of a client's contract before attempting to collect a validly certified debt.

Livesay · filed 2025-10-27

And contrary to the Plaintiff’s assertion, the FDCPA did not require the Defendant to investigate the legal enforceability of the Housing Agreement between Copper Beech and the Plaintiff before it attempted to collect the $5,318.00 debt from the Plaintiff before the July 23, 2021 declaratory judgment. This is because the Seventh Circuit has interpreted the FDCPA to “read[] that debt collectors are not liable for attempting to collect validly certified amounts owed their client.” Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 1997). And under the FDCPA, a debt collector is not required “to conduct an independent investigation into the legal intricacies of the client’s contract with the consumer.” Id. at 833–34.

Section 1692 does not make an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act contingent on the validity of the underlying debt.

McCartney v. First City Bank · filed 1992-08-21

We hold that the validity of the underlying debt is not a bar to suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides civil or criminal liability for unscrupulous debt collection practices, but does not itself contest the validity of the underlying debt.

First Federal Bank v. Craco, No. Cv95-0249553s (Apr. 2, 1996) · filed 1996-04-02

In this regard, it is important to remember that the purpose of the Act is to provide civil or criminal liability for those who engage in unscrupulous debt collection practices, but not to contest the validity of the underlying debt.

The FDCPA targets unscrupulous debt collection practices and does not provide a defense to the validity of the underlying debt.

Premier Capital, Inc. v. Grossman, No. Cv99 0334654 S (Nov. 22, 2000) · filed 2000-11-22

Second, the purpose of the FDCPA is to provide for civil and criminal liability for unscrupulous debt collection practices and is not intended to provide a defense regarding the validity of the underlying debt.

The FDCPA permits a consumer to sue over unlawful collection practices regardless of whether the underlying debt is valid.

Bogner v. Masari Investments, LLC · filed 2009-06-02

The wrong alleged in this case is not that Defendants attempted to collect a debt that was not due, but that their collection practices violated the FDCPA. A plaintiff may bring a claim under the FDCPA “regardless of whether a valid debt exists.”

The FDCPA permits liability for unlawful debt-collection conduct even when the consumer may not actually owe the underlying debt.

Sykes v. Mel Harris & Associates, LLC · filed 2012-09-04

Liability under the FDCPA can be established irrespective of whether the presumed debtor owes the debt in question.

Section 1692(e) directs the FDCPA toward eliminating abusive debt-collection practices, including conduct aimed at an alleged debt even when the underlying debt is invalid.

Alanis v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2019-08-23(e)

In 1977, Congress passed the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). To that end, the FDCPA holds debt collectors accountable for abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices, “regardless of whether the debt is valid.” McCartney, 970 F.2d at 47. Accordingly, “the validity of the underlying debt is not a bar to suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.” Id. at 47–48.

Section 1692 et seq. does not let a debt collector escape liability for unlawful collection conduct by proving that the underlying debt was legitimate; the existence or validity of the debt is irrelevant to whether the conduct violated the FDCPA.

Krezic v. Advanced Endodontics of Buffalo, PC · filed 2022-05-02

Where defendants seek repayment of the debt forming the basis of the FDCPA claim, the debt and the conduct giving rise to the FDCPA violation are not part of the same case or controversy because the existence of the debt is not a prerequisite for the violation.

The FDCPA does not prohibit collection of a debt by an entity that validly purchased and owns the debt.

Gallamore v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2025-07-01

Because the sale was valid, defendant did not violate the FDCPA in attempting to collect on plaintiff’s debt.

The FDCPA is intended to protect debtors from abusive debt collection practices, not to facilitate opportunistic suits over harmless technical violations.

Ziobron v. Crawford · filed 1996-06-21

As noted above, the FDCPA was designed to protect the rights of debtors against abusive debt collection practices. It goes without saying that the Act was not intended to provide opportunistic attorneys with an easy buck for prosecuting technical violations of the Act which has in no way harmed debtors. We agree with Judge Suh-rheinrieh that it is inappropriate to bring an action for a technical violation of the Act for the purpose of obtaining the mandatory award of attorney’s fees as provided under the Act.

The FDCPA's plain meaning does not prohibit certifying a class that includes fewer than all potential plaintiffs, including a geographically limited class.

D'Alauro v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership · filed 1996-09-30

The Court finds that the plain meaning of the FDCPA does not prohibit the certification of a class in which less than all potential plaintiffs are included.

Section 1692a(6) makes a creditor subject to the FDCPA when, while collecting its own debt, it uses a name other than its own that would lead the least sophisticated consumer to believe a third party is collecting the debt.

Karen Maguire, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Citicorp Retail Services, Inc. · filed 1998-07-01(a)(6)

The triggering of the FDCPA does not depend on whether a third party is in fact involved in the collection of a debt, but rather whether a least sophisticated consumer would have the false impression that a third party was collecting the debt.

Section 1692(a)(5) limits the FDCPA to debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and the court held that consumer-debt determinations did not defeat class certification here.

Ballard v. Equifax Check Services, Inc. · filed 1999-02-22(a)(5)

The FDCPA regulates the collection of consumer, not business, debt. Consumer debt is that incurred “primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(5). ... While ECS’s characterization alone may not answer the question, the circumstances of this case are such that consumer transactions can be identified with relative ease and accuracy. Accordingly, the court finds that determinations of whether each transaction involved a “consumer debt” do not predominate over issues common to the class.

The FDCPA covers a debt only when it is a consumer debt; a commercial business debt is not covered absent evidence that collection activities converted it into a consumer debt.

Edwards v. Beatty · filed 2001-09-20

Because Edwards failed to proffer evidence to support his claim that the commercial debt from his defunct business was converted into a consumer debt by CBC’s collection activities, the district court properly granted summary judgment.

Section 1692a(5) covers obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so business loans are outside the FDCPA.

Fleet National Bank v. Baker · filed 2003-05-07(a)(5)

The FDCPA protects consumers from abusive, deceptive and other unfair debt collection practices; it applies to consumer debts, not business loans. ... Whether a debt constitutes “consumer debt” of the sort covered by the FDCPA, depends on the character of the lending transaction with particular attention to the purpose for which the credit was extended. ... Therefore, the threshold issue is whether Baker’s debt, which he has characterized in court filings as “a commercial transaction” related to “trade and commerce,” is consumer debt as defined by the FDCPA. It is not.

The FDCPA does not treat government-imposed parking fines as consumer debts when they arise from police-power regulation rather than a consumer transaction.

Rector v. City and County of Denver · filed 2005-01-27(a)(5)

When an obligation arises outside the scope of a consumer transaction, the obligation is not a “debt” under the FDCPA. ... Based on these DMRC provisions, we conclude that regulating metered parking represents an exercise of Denver’s police power, to further public safety and convenience, not rendition of a service to consumers by leasing parts of public streets for short-term private occupancy. ... Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not eiT in dismissing plaintiffs’ FDCPA and CFDCPA claims against ACS.

Section 1692 et seq. does not apply to amounts owed that do not involve consumer debt.

McDonald v. FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2005-06-29(a)(5)

FEI suggested that McDonald may have been attempting to raise a claim pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC § 1692 et seq. and correctly notes the Act does not apply to the facts of this case because the amounts owed do not involve consumer debt.

The FDCPA does not apply to debts incurred for business purposes rather than personal or consumer purposes.

Hobbs v. Duggins · filed 2009-03-24

Hobbs contends that the district court erred in finding that the legal fees owed as a result of the guaranty were not subject to the provisions of the FDCPA because they constituted a “business” debt, rather than a “personal” or consumer debt. ... Based upon a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we find that the district court correctly granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hobbs’s complaint. ... Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the district court’s order dated January 16, 2008, we AFFIRM.

The FDCPA applies only to consumer debts, so it does not provide a cause of action for debts incurred for business purchases.

Lightfoot v. Borkon (In Re Lightfoot) · filed 2008-10-08(a)(5)

... Regardless, no cause of action under the FDCPA applies inasmuch as that law applies only to consumer debts. ... There is no dispute that the purchase of the trucks by the Debtor and her husband were for their business. The Debtor, therefore, lacked standing to raise that claim.

Section 1692a(5) covers obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; dues and fees on vacant lots bought for investment were not consumer debt.

Baird v. ASA COLLECTIONS · filed 2009-07-15(a)(5)

Thus, the evidence demonstrated that Baird may be characterized as an investor rather than a consumer in the transaction, and she has failed to show that the dues and fees that were assessed involved a "consumer debt" within the meaning of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA applies to obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Butto v. Collecto Inc. · filed 2013-03-29(a)

A claim under the FDCPA must involve a consumer debt, meaning it applies to the obligation of a consumer to pay money arising from a transaction for personal, family, or household purposes.

The FDCPA covers collection of debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, not a commercial equipment-financing obligation.

Hardy v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. · filed 2013-07-12a(5), a(6), a(6)(F)(iv)

The Lease Agreement pertains to financing for non-cash payment processing equipment for the plaintiff’s business, such that the underlying debt not is a “consumer debt” for purposes of the FDCPA, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that “said equipment, if used, was for personal use only.” Id. ¶ 2. “[T]he burden rests on [the plaintiff], at this stage, to allege facts sufficient to support [her] claim[s]” under the FDCPA, Winstead v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal citations omitted), and she fails to establish that the underlying debt was a consumer debt primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

The FDCPA covers claims arising from financial obligations incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Gold v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2014-10-07

Those whose financial obligations were not incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes do not have claims under the FDCPA and do not pose a risk of “satellite litigation ... over who was in the class in the first place.”

The FDCPA covers only debts arising primarily from transactions for personal, family, or household purposes, not business debts.

Saylor v. Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC · filed 2015-07-16(a)(5)

However, the statutory scope of the FDCPA is limited to consumer debts, which the account was clearly not.

The FDCPA covers only debts arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, not primarily business debts.

Fischer v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, Jpmorgan Chase, N.A. · filed 2018-03-26(a)(5)

Here, Plaintiff incurred the debt in question in furtherance of his real estate investment business and not for a personal, family, or household purpose. Because Plaintiff's loan does not represent consumer debt under the FDCPA, Count I shall be dismissed with prejudice.

The FDCPA's definition of consumer debt governs whether an obligation falls within the Act.

Bagdasaryan v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2020-01-07

Plaintiffs have not shown plain error in Jury Instruction 11, regarding the definition of consumer debt under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) limits covered debts to obligations arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and section 1692a(6) requires the defendant to qualify as a debt collector.

Dude v. Congress Plaza, LLC · filed 2020-05-06(a)(5), (a)(6)

Accordingly, actions arising out of commercial debts are not covered by the protective provisions of the FDCPA or FCCPA.

Section 1692a(5) covers only debts arising primarily from transactions for personal, family, or household purposes, not commercial transactions.

Ergas v. Eastpoint Recovery Group, Inc. · filed 2021-04-30(a)(5)

Where the debt was not incurred “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” it is not a consumer debt covered by § 1692a(5).

An education-related debt is consumer debt under the FDCPA when it is incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Peiffer v. Merchants & Medical Credit Corporation Inc · filed 2021-08-23

She correctly notes that an education-related debt is a “consumer debt” under the FDCPA, and that consumer debt is a prima facie element of an FDCPA claim.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies only when the claim involves a qualifying consumer debt; a subrogation debt stemming from a tort does not qualify.

Jamison v. Stuart Lippman and Associates · filed 2022-03-28(a)(5)

However, any claim brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires a qualifying debt under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and a subrogation debt does not qualify.

Section 1692(a)(5) defines a consumer debt as an obligation arising from a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and the FDCPA's relevant provisions apply only to such debts.

Arora v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2023-05-08(a)(5)

The relevant provisions of the FDCPA “apply only to consumer debts, which the [FDCPA] defines as any obligation to pay money ‘arising out of a transaction’ entered into ‘primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.’” Woods v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 27 F.4th 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(5)).

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to allege that the debt arose from a consumer transaction, the defendant is a debt collector, and the defendant committed a prohibited act or omission.

ESTRELLA · filed 2026-02-19

To prevail on an FDCPA claim a plaintiff must allege: (1) the debt arose from a consumer transaction; (2) the defendant is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the statute; and (3) the defendant engaged in a prohibited act or omission under the FDCPA. ... Ms. Estrella fails to allege the debt she undertook as an LLC qualifies as a consumer transaction under the statute. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Ms. Estrella leave to amend her FDCPA claim to sufficiently allege a consumer debt.

Section 1692a(5) covers consumer obligations arising from transactions for primarily personal, family, or household purposes; water and sewer service obligations qualify, but property-tax obligations arising from property ownership do not, even after assignment or payment-plan arrangements.

Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P. · filed 2000-08-29(a)(5)

Like the district court, we conclude that homeowners’ water and sewer obligations meet the definition of “debt”; indeed, these obligations constituted “debts” from the time they initially were owed to the government entities, and they retained that status after their assignment to NTF. ... As we have concluded, in their original form, the water and sewer obligations were “debts” under section 1692a(5) but the tax obligations were not. Accordingly, we hold that the FDCPA is inapplicable to all of defendants’ conduct relating to the tax obligations, including conduct occurring after the creation of the payment plans.

Section 1692a(5) treats a loan used to purchase a residence as a consumer debt because it is incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Bush v. Loanstar Mortgagee Services, L.L.C. · filed 2003-03-07(a)(5)

The FDCPA does apply to this case. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) defines a “debt” as: ... As the statute clearly states, and as the Ninth Circuit has confirmed, the FDCPA “characterizes debts in terms of uses, covering debts incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” ... A loan to purchase one’s residence is clearly a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a treats delinquent municipal water charges as consumer debt, and a private law firm hired by a municipality qualifies as a debt collector rather than as an exempt government officer or employee.

Piper v. Portnoff Law Associates · filed 2003-05-15(a)(5), (a)(6)(C)

Therefore, providing water service to the citizens of Bethlehem is a pro tanto exchange, and the delinquent water charges fall within the FDCPA’s definition of debt. ... Because the exemption is expressly limited to “any officer or employee of the United States or any State,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)(C), PLA qualifies as a debt collector under the statute.

Section 1692a requires a qualifying consumer debt for a claim to be cognizable under the FDCPA.

Chance v. DeFilippo · filed 2005-03-25(a)

Second, plaintiffs request for return of his non-driver’s identification card or a refund of the purchase price of that card is not cognizable under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et al., because plaintiffs complaint does not identify a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA that defendants sought to collect.

Under § 1692a(5), whether an obligation is a consumer debt depends on the purposes of the transaction that created it, so condominium assessments arising from a personal-use purchase remain covered even if the property is later rented.

Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC · filed 2012-10-22(a)(5)

Because the statute’s definition of a “debt” focuses on the transaction creating the obligation to pay, the obligation to pay is derived from the purchase transaction itself.

Section 1692a(5) treats an obligation as a debt under the FDCPA only when it arises from a consensual transaction involving money, property, insurance, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Parham v. Seattle Service Bureau, Inc. · filed 2016-02-02(a)(5)

To state a claim under the FDCPA and FCCPA, the plaintiff must allege the existence of a consumer debt. In order to qualify as a consumer debt, the debt must arise as a result of a consensual transaction; not as a result of negligence.

Section 1692a(5) covers obligations arising from a transaction involving money, property, insurance, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, so mandatory municipal garbage fees are outside the FDCPA.

Morrow v. Smith Rouchon and Associates Inc · filed 2019-12-18(a)(5)

Garbage collection services and the accompanying fees are automatically assessed against residents of Alabama. Thus, the fees Morrow incurred and which SRA sought to collect were not the result of a transactional, consensual dealing between Morrow and the municipal government—they were imposed upon her as a consequence of her residency in the state. Therefore, Morrow’s obligation to the county did not arise from a contract. Because Morrow’s obligations to Franklin County did not arise out of a “transaction” for the purposes of the FDCPA, she fails to state a claim under the statute. Accordingly, SRA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is due to be granted.

Under the FDCPA, an obligation to pay money must arise from a personal, family, or household transaction to qualify as a debt, and holdover damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs in a possession-only unlawful-detainer proceeding do not qualify.

Montijo, Jr. v. Hrdlicka · filed 2021-08-30(a)(5)

Accordingly, the court finds that the “holdover damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs” that defendant sought by way of the default judgment proceedings in state court do not constitute “debt” under the FDCPA.

A communication under the FDCPA must convey information regarding a debt; a general informational voicemail that does not concern a debt is not covered.

Hurster v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2022-08-05(a)(2)

Under a plain reading of the statute, a communication must meet two requirements: it must (1) convey information (2) regarding a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). Where, as here, the content of the message does not convey information about a debt, then the message does not constitute a communication under the FDCPA.