15 U.S.C. § 1692

Section 1692d prohibits debt collectors from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with collecting a debt.

Finnegan v. Chase Bank · filed 2021-07-26(d)

Here, Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that he owed a debt to Chase Bank or that Defendant Chase Bank qualifies as a debt collector under the statute in connection with Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s allegations thus fail to state a claim under section 1692d.

The FDCPA applies to qualifying consumer debts and debt collectors, and § 1692d prohibits a debt collector from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with collecting a debt.

Finnegan v. Lemonade · filed 2021-08-02(a)(5), (a)(6), (d)

Here, Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that he owed a debt to Defendants or that Defendants qualify as debt collectors under the statute in connection with Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s allegations thus fail to state a claim under section 1692d.

Section 1692d prohibits a debt collector from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collecting a debt.

Finnegan v. Manhattan Mini Storage, LLC · filed 2021-09-07(d)

The provision that Plaintiff invokes, section 1692d, provides that “[a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” ... Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the FDCPA because he does not allege any facts suggesting that MMS is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA, or that he owed a debt to MMS. While the Court can assume from the facts alleged that MMS removed Plaintiff’s lock based on nonpayment, Plaintiff does not state that MMS’s conduct was related to an unpaid debt.

Section 1692d prohibits debt collectors from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse, and allegations of repossession-related harm without facts describing prohibited conduct do not state a claim.

Rosario v. Santander Consumer USA · filed 2023-01-03(d)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his car was repossessed twice and that Defendant Santander Consumer USA violated the FDCPA. These allegations, on their own, are insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute. It appears that Santander Consumer USA originated the loan. “[T]hose who seek only to collect for themselves loans they originated generally do not” qualify as debt collectors. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721. Moreover, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts about what Defendant did or failed to do that violated the FDCPA. He does not allege, for example, that Defendant Santander Consumer USA continuously called him, threatened violence, published information that he had failed to pay his debt or did anything with the intent to harass, oppress, or abuse him, in violation of Section 1692d. Although Plaintiff alleges that he suffered serious harms arising from the repossession of his vehicle, including the loss of his job, he does not explain what actions Defendant took that are prohibited under the FDCPA. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim against Defendant for violating his rights under the FDCPA.

Section 1692d prohibits a debt collector from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse a consumer.

Gutierrez v. Webcollex, LLC · filed 2025-05-15(d)

Under §§ 1692d and 1692d(5) of the FDCPA, it is a violation for a debt collector to engage in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, and abuse the consumer. ... Plaintiff’s allegations, which the court accepts as true for purposes of plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, see, e.g., Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1267, are sufficient to establish that defendants, acting as a “debt collector,” engaged in conduct the natural consequence of which was to harass and mislead plaintiff, in violation of the FDCPA at §§ 1692d and 1692.

Section 1692d prohibits a debt collector from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with collecting a debt, including the listed examples.

Schwenk · filed 2026-02-27(d)

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector cannot “engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. ... Without such additional factual allegations, the Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions of “harassment” and “abuse” are insufficient to state a plausible claim under the FDCPA. And so, the Court must DISMISS the Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim.

Section 1692a(6) excludes creditors, mortgage servicers, and assignees of debts that were not in default when assigned from the debt-collector definition, while § 1692k(a)(3) requires a prevailing defendant to show bad faith and harassment to recover attorney’s fees.

Perry v. Stewart Title Co. · filed 1985-04-08(a)(6), (a)(6)(G), (k)(a)(3)

The FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person ... who regularly collects or attempts to collect ... debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The term “debt collector” does not include: ... [A]ny person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person [or] (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(G). The legislative history of section 1692a(6) indicates conclusively that a debt collector does not include the consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned. ... In this case, the FDCPA is inapplicable, since neither Hammond nor FNMA is a debt collector. ... Thus, FNMA was a bona fide assignee of a debt, and Hammond was a bona fide mortgage servicing company. ... To recover attorney’s fees under the FDCPA, the prevailing defendant must show affirmatively that the plaintiff brought the FDCPA claim in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692e(11) does not require a debt collector to repeat the statutory disclosures in a follow-up notice that merely repeats an earlier demand for payment.

Sherrie Pressley, AKA Sherrie Teague v. Capital Credit & Collection Service, Inc., an Oregon Corporation · filed 1985-05-01(e)(11)

In this case, we deal with a follow up notice which only demands a payment as earlier requested. Applying Pressley’s interpretation, requiring the debt collector to make affirmative disclosures in this narrow type of follow up notice, would ignore the balancing mandated by Congress. We therefore hold that the follow up notice sent in this case is not a “communication” within which the disclosure required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(ll) must be made.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to provide a validation notice in or within five days of its initial communication, but does not require repeating it in every follow-up letter; follow-ups are unlawful only if they specifically overshadow or contradict it.

Michael Durkin and Loretta Reed, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Equifax Check Services, · filed 2005-04-18(g)(a)

Second, pursuant to § 1692g(a), a debt collector must include a validation notice in its initial communication to the debtor or must send a validation notice within five days of its initial communication (unless the debtor has paid the debt by that juncture). ... Once that requirement is satisfied, § 1692g(a) does not mandate that further validation notices be sent. ... Rather, the matter turns on whether the specific text contains any impermissible overshadowing or contradiction with respect to the validation notice.

Section 1692a(6) covers a person as a debt collector only when debt collection is the principal purpose of the business or the person regularly collects debts owed to another; occasional, insubstantial collection efforts by an attorney do not suffice.

Mertes v. Devitt · filed 1990-04-11(a)(6)

Here the undisputed facts are that over the past ten years the defendant averaged less than two collection matters per year and that this comprised less than one percent of his practice. Such a limited involvement in collection matters does not satisfy the commonly understood meaning of the term regular. An interpretation which would include defendant’s actions as “regular” debt collection would completely erase the limitation Congress included in the law and would be inconsistent with a common sense reading of the statute. The language of the statute leads to the conclusion that defendant is not a “debt collector.”

The Act does not support a claim against parties who are not debt collectors within its meaning.

Winslow v. Bauer · filed 1984-04-23(a)(6)(D) and (F)

Nor will § 1692. The defendants are not debt collectors within the meaning of the act.

The FDCPA covers a person who regularly attempts to collect debts owed to another; sending collection letters to approximately sixty people over several weeks is sufficient regular activity even when debt collection is not the person’s principal business.

Tragianese v. Blackmon · filed 1997-09-30(a)(6)

Based on the undisputed facts of this case, the court concludes that the defendant’s debt collection efforts rise to the level of being “regular” activity. The defendant sent collection letters to approximately sixty people. This is clearly “more than a handful” of letters. His collection efforts spanned no less than a number of weeks. While debt collection activities are not the focus of the defendant’s business, the extent of the defendant’s debt collection efforts in this case are sufficient to require that the defendant comply with the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the court holds that undisputed facts establish that the defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes creditors collecting their own debts, but covers a creditor using another name suggesting that a third party is collecting, while the common-ownership exception also requires that the collector's principal business not be debt collection.

Swinyer v. Greenwood Trust Co. · filed 1998-07-06(a)(6) and (a)(6)(B)

Thus the Act generally excludes creditors attempting to collect debts owed to them. ... Because Greenwood was the creditor, it cannot be sued under the Act unless it comes within the exception for a creditor who. "in the process of collecting [its] own debts, use[d] any name other than [its] own which would indicate that a third person [was] collecting . . . such debts." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A creditor is liable under this provision when it controls the debt collection process or uses an alias. ... The creditor, however, is not liable under this provision when a separate entity collects its debts. ... In this case, plaintiff has not alleged that Greenwood used a false name to attempt to collect the debt. Thus the court finds plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Act against Greenwood. ... Simply being related corporations, however, is not enough to bring a party within the exception. The Act also requires that "the principal business of such a person is not the collection of debts." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(B). ... Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, as the court must when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court finds that the complaint does state a claim against Novus.

Section 1692a(6) covers a person who regularly collects or attempts to collect another's debts directly or indirectly, even if debt collection is not the person's principal business.

Romine v. Diversified Collection Services, Inc. · filed 1998-09-17(a)(6)

We note first that the Act regulates the conduct of “any person” in “any business” whose (1) principal purpose is debt collection, or (2) who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts, directly or indirectly. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Although Western Union’s argument that it is a common carrier indicates that debt collection is not the “principal purpose” of the business, the company’s debt collection functions are sufficiently regular to satisfy the second prong of the FDCPA definition.

The FDCPA covers a law firm that actively and regularly collects consumer debts for others, while a sender performing only ministerial mailing functions is not a debt collector; the determination turns on factors such as drafting, follow-up collection, settlement authority, compensation, and recordkeeping.

Crawford v. Senex Law, P.C. · filed 2017-05-03(a)(6)

The FDCPA applies to “debt collectors,” which is statutorily defined-as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... From these cases, it becomes clear that several factors are material to the determination of whether a sender engages in merely ministerial functions, rendering it not subject to the FDCPA, or whether the sender is actively collecting debt for another. These factors include: (1) whether the sender instructs the debt- or to contact the sender or the creditor about the debt; (2) whether the sender was substantially involved in the drafting of the letter; (3) whether the sender provides follow-up debt collection services; (4) the extent to which the sender can settle the matter; (5) the compensation structure for the sender; and (6) the extent to which the sender keeps its own- records regarding the debtors. ... Therefore, from the facts contained" in the complaint, the court finds that plaintiffs have stated a claim that, if true, could subject Senex to the FDCPA as a debt collector.

Section 1692a(6) covers a person whose principal business is collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed another; an entity collecting its own debt is not a debt collector merely because it bought the debt in default.

Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. N.A. v. Henderson · filed 2017-07-07(a)(6)

Henderson alleges the Bank violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., in several ways. That statute, however, applies only to a “debt collector” as it defines the term. The district court held the Bank was a not a “debt collector,” 107 F. Supp. 3d at 47, and we agree. The FDCPA creates two “mutually exclusive” categories, debt collectors and creditors, but only debt collectors are regulated by the statute. McKinney v. Cadleway Properties, Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 2008). Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is one who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business [1] the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or [2] who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The Bank is neither type of debt collector. There is no evidence to indicate the Bank’s “principal” business is debt collection. Nor is the debt the Bank is seeking to collect “due another”; on the contrary, the debt is due to the Bank as the current holder of the Note and Deed of Trust. That the debt was already in default when the Bank purchased it did not make the Bank a debt collector. See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 16-349, slip op. at 7–8 (U.S. June 12, 2017) (an entity collecting a debt for its own account is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA even if it purchased the debt when it was in default). Therefore, Henderson’s counterclaim under the FDCPA must fail.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person whose business principally involves collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed to another.

Kirby v. Montgomery · filed 2019-05-01(a)(6)

The FDCPA is a federal statute that provides consumers with a private right of action to sue debt collectors, as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Plaintiffs have not alleged that “the principal purpose” of defendants’ business “is the collection of . . . debts” or that they “regularly collect[] or attempt[] to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due . . . .” Accordingly, plaintiffs have not alleged, nor can they allege, that defendants are debt collectors to whom the FDCPA applies. Rather, as plaintiffs make clear, the principal purpose of defendants’ business is to provide roof construction or replacement services.

Section 1692a(6) treats a debt buyer as a debt collector when the most important goal of its business is collecting the debts it acquires, even if it uses a law firm to pursue collection.

Ramos v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2019-05-22(a)(6)

Stated differently, a debt buyer qualifies as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA if the most important goal of its business is the collection of debts, even if it pursues collection through a third party such as a law firm.

The Act does not treat mortgage lenders or their assignees as debt collectors when the debt was not in default when assigned.

Proske v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Truner & Engel, LLP · filed 2019-11-06

To survive the summary judgment motion, the Proskes must point to or submit evidence showing that the defendants were “debt collectors” under the Act. Mortgage lenders or their assignees are not debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, “as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” ... The Proskes failed to submit or point to any record evidence showing that Wells Fargo was a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or that Wells Fargo received the loan assignment after the Proskes defaulted. Summary judgment is granted dismissing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim.

The FDCPA does not cover a creditor collecting its own debts or a mortgage servicer that is not a debt collector.

Schroeder v. Feld · filed 2019-12-09

Even assuming Blake was somehow involved in the collection of the mortgage debt at issue, “the FDCPA does not apply to a creditor attempting to collect its own debts, as opposed to a third party collection agency,” and “a mortgage servicer is not held to be a ‘debt collector’ within the meaning of the FDCPA either.”

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant is a debt collector and engaged in conduct prohibited by the statute.

Dean v. Colonial Bank, National Association · filed 2020-04-21(a)(6)

Here, the Amended Complaint does not allege enough factual content to infer that each of the Defendants was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that the Defendants engaged in conduct that violated the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes officers and employees of the United States or a state from the FDCPA's definition of debt collector when collecting a debt in performance of official duties.

Blue v. Wendy R · filed 2020-05-04(a)(6)(C)

The FDCPA specifically excludes from that definition “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). Plaintiff describes Defendant as a “BWC Case Specialist” which qualifies her as an officer or employee of the State of Ohio. She is not a debt collector under the terms of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts, a person who regularly collects debts owed to another, or a person who collects its own debts using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector.

SILER v. DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION · filed 2020-07-16(a)(6)

A debt collector under the FDCPA is “(1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector.”

Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) excludes from the term “debt collector” a person collecting a debt that was not in default when the person obtained it.

Ainsworth v. Experian · filed 2020-07-28(a)(6)(F)(iii)

A person is not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA when the collection at issue “concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). ... Because Nelnet acquired Mr. Ainsworth’s loans before they were in default, Nelnet is not a “debt collector” for the purposes of the FDCPA and therefore not subject to liability under the Act.

The FDCPA's debt-collector definition does not cover a creditor collecting its own debt in its own name when there is no allegation that its principal business is debt collection or that it collects debts owed another.

Dorce v. Toyota Financial Services · filed 2020-11-17(a)(6)

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that TMCC’s principal business is the collection of debt or that TMCC attempted to collect a debt owed to an entity other than TMCC. Likewise, there is no allegation that, in seeking to collect on the debt, TMCC used a name other than its own. In fact, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the complaint is that TMCC, on its own behalf and in its own name, was collecting a debt owed to it. In other words, Plaintiffs allegations against TMCC, even if true, exceed the reach of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed.

A creditor collecting debts owed to itself generally is not a debt collector under the FDCPA, so the statute’s restrictions do not apply.

Eleazu v. JPMorgan Chase · filed 2021-06-14(a)(6)

Section 1692a(6) of the FDCPA defines a debt collector as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Here, Chase “sought payment of . . . fees . . . due to itself, not ‘owed or due to another,’” and thus “cannot be subject to FDCPA liability as a result of its conduct.”

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector as a person principally engaged in collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed or due another, and conclusory allegations do not establish that status.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Choi · filed 2021-06-17(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). ... Reviewing the pleadings, we conclude that Homeowners failed to sufficiently allege that either PNC or Kondaur (1) “uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or (2) “regularly collects or attempts to collect *** debts owed or due *** another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). ... Thus, the pleadings were facially deficient, and the trial court did not err when it dismissed Homeowners’ FDCPA claims.

Section 1692a(6)(C) excludes federal employees collecting debts for the United States in the performance of their official duties from the definition of debt collector.

REID v. BROWN · filed 2021-07-14(a)(6)(C)

The term "debt collector," however, does not include an officer or employee of a creditor collecting debts on behalf of the creditor or "any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). Mr. Reid's allegations in his Complaint indicate, and his Response confirms, that to the extent Ms. Reid was collecting a debt, she was doing so on behalf of the Postal Service, which is an agency of the United States and her employer. Therefore, she is not a "debt collector" as defined by the FDCPA, and she is therefore not subject to the limitations of the FDCPA with respect to the conduct of which Mr. Reid complains. Accordingly, Mr. Reid's claims against Ms. Brown based on the FDCPA are DISMISSED.

Section 1692a(6) defines who qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Lien Thi Ngo · filed 2021-09-01(a)(6)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the counterclaim to recover damages pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 USC § 1692 et seq. ) for failure to state a cognizable cause of action, as the plaintiff is not a "debt collector" as defined by that statute (15 USC § 1692a[6]; see Pirrelli v OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC , 129 AD3d 689, 693; Citibank [S.D.] N.A. v Sablic , 55 AD3d 651, 653).

Section 1692a(6) applies the FDCPA only to a person who regularly collects debts owed another, and a mortgage servicer that is not a debt collector is not subject to the Act’s debt-collector provisions.

Brunson v. Williams · filed 2022-02-24(a)(6)

Neither of these provisions apply to Shellpoint because it is not a debt collector. See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017); Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (the FDCPA applies only to “debt collectors.”). Under the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is “any person who . . . regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 USC § 1692a(6). ... The undisputed evidence is Shellpoint is the mortgage servicer for this loan. ... For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the FDCPA fails as a matter of law.

The FDCPA excludes a creditor collecting its own debt, or a debt that was not in default when the creditor obtained it, from the definition of debt collector.

Castorina v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2022-05-06(a)(6)(F)

In order to be liable under both the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act, Bank of America must qualify as a “debt collector.” The definition of “debt collector” is broader under the Rosenthal Act than it is under the FDCPA, as the latter excludes creditors collecting on their own debts or a debt that was not in default when it was obtained by a creditor. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F); Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., No. C09-02843 TEH, 2009 WL 5062192, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009) (“[t]he federal definition [of debt collectors] excludes creditors collecting on their own debts, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), an exclusion that does not appear in the state statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c)”). Plaintiff stipulated at oral argument to dropping his FDCPA claim as the parties agree that Bank of America is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Bank of America is the lender on the loan, and therefore, is “collecting on its own debt” and the loan was not in default when Bank of America obtained it. Accordingly, plaintiff’s FDCPA claim will be dismissed.

The FDCPA's debt-collector provisions apply to entities whose principal purpose or regular business is collecting debts owed or asserted to be owed to another, not to the creditor itself.

Gowers v. PODS Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2022-06-01(6)

For purposes of the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is someone who “uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a. ... Gowers failed to allege facts showing that PODS was a debt collector subject to liability under the FDCPA; to the contrary, the documents attached to her amended complaint indicated that PODS was the creditor for the relevant debt, and Caine & Weiner was the debt collector.

Under Section 1692a(6), a single attempt to collect a debt does not by itself make an entity a debt collector.

(PS) Mehl v. Green · filed 2022-09-02(a)(6)

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is defined as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Defendants attempts to collect a single debt, however, do not make them debt collectors.

The FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show collection activity arising from consumer debt, a defendant covered as a debt collector, and a prohibited act or omission.

Little v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · filed 2022-12-06

To successfully bring a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt [ ] collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” ... He has not alleged that Experian tried collecting any debt, and critically, he has not explained how this statute even applies to Experian, which is a credit reporting agency, not a debt collector. ... Therefore, since Mr. Little has not plausibly alleged a claim under the FDCPA, his claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.

The FDCPA excludes a person collecting a debt from the definition of debt collector when the debt was not in default when that person obtained it.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2022-12-23(a)(6)(F)

Under the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is any person “who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). This broad definition is subject to a significant limitation. It excludes “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” Id. § 1692a(6)(F); see also Whittingham v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Servs., Inc., No. 06-3016, 2007 WL 1456196, at *7 (D.N.J. May 15, 2007) (“Importantly, the legislative history of the FDCPA demonstrates that the term ‘debt collectors’ does not encompass a mortgage servicing company.” (citing Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977))). Ditech began servicing the account prior to it going into default; therefore, by definition, Ditech is not a debt collector under the FDCPA. ... Accordingly, the Claimant fails to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) excludes a debt purchaser collecting a debt it owns from the definition of “debt collector.”

PennyMac Loan Servs. · filed 2023-04-18(a)(6)

Here, PennyMac is considered a debt purchaser because they purchased Johnson’s Mortgage Loan from Weststar. Accordingly, PennyMac collected on a debt Johnson owed it for the cost of the force-placed insurance. PennyMac did not collect a debt owed to another, and is not, therefore, a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA. See id. at 83, 137 S. Ct. at 1721–22, 198 L. Ed. 2d at 181.

The FDCPA's debt-collector restrictions do not apply to a creditor collecting its own service-related debts.

EL v. DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION · filed 2023-05-01

None of the Defendants is a debt collector under the FDCPA; rather, each is a creditor. To the extent Siler-El’s claim relies on the FDCPA, therefore, it is dismissed.

Section 1692(a)(6) defines a debt collector as a person whose business principally involves collecting debts or who regularly collects debts owed another, and excludes a consumer's creditors.

Barnes v. Capital One Financial Corporation · filed 2023-10-10(a)(6)

A debt collector is defined under the FDCPA as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)(6). However, the definition does not include the consumer’s creditors.

Section 1692a(6) does not treat a mortgage lender, servicer, or assignee as a debt collector when it was assigned a debt that was not in default, and an FDCPA claim requires collection activity that violates the Act.

Warren v. State Of Texas · filed 2023-10-13(a)(6)

The claim for a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., fails because a mortgage lender or servicer, or assignee, is not a “debt collector” if it was assigned a debt not in default when the assignment was made, and because the allegations show no collection activity that violates the Act. See § 1692a(6).

The FDCPA protections apply only when a defendant qualifies as a debt collector under the statute.

Stanton v. Roche · filed 2023-11-28(a)(6)

Last, Defendants argue that they cannot be held to account for any FDCPA violations because the Complaint has not made plausible that they are “debt collectors” as contemplated by the statute. ... The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “(1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector.” ... However, nothing in the Complaint makes plausible that Defendants, as mere employees of a Credit Union, amount to “debt collectors” such that the FDCPA protections are triggered. Thus, this claim also fails as a matter of law.

Section 1692a(6) generally defines a debt collector as someone collecting debts owed or asserted to be owed to another, so a creditor collecting its own debt is not generally a debt collector under the FDCPA.

Kennedy v. Equifax Information Services LLC · filed 2024-01-29(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as: any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another . . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). Based on the language in the statute, debt collectors under the FDCPA are therefore entities collecting debts on behalf of third parties, not debts directly owed to them by a consumer. ... Here, Mr. Kennedy alleges that his Trans Union credit report identifies an account with CFNA in the amount of $1,251, and that CFNA attempted to collect a debt he did not owe due to his being a victim of identity theft. (Am. Compl. [#28], at ¶ 30.) There are no allegations in Mr. Kennedy’s pleading regarding CFNA’s attempt to collect a debt on behalf of a third party. Even construing Mr. Kennedy’s pleadings liberally, the only reasonable inference based on the facts alleged are that CFNA is a creditor not a debt collector under the FDCPA. Mr. Kennedy has not alleged facts that plausibly place CFNA within the ambit of the FDCPA. CFNA is entitled to dismissal of Mr. Kennedy’s FDCPA claim.

Section 1692a(6) does not treat a debt purchaser collecting debts for its own account as a debt collector.

Banks v. Trans Union LLC · filed 2024-02-01(a)(6)

Applying Henson, U.S. Auto’s motion to dismiss is granted. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) defines the term “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6) (emphasis added). ... The letter demonstrates that U.S. Auto is a debt purchaser not a debt collector. A “debt purchaser ... may ... collect debts for its own account without triggering the statutory definition” of “debt collector.” Henson, 582 U.S. at 83.

The FDCPA's restrictions apply only to debt collectors, including persons whose principal purpose is collecting debts or who regularly collect debts owed another.

Federal Savings Bank, The v. Montgomery · filed 2024-03-05(a)(6)

The FDCPA defines a “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Mr. Montgomery does not allege that Federal Savings is a debt collector under the FDCPA, and there is no evidence that Federal Savings is a debt collector under the law.

The FDCPA does not cover defendants who are not debt collectors and whose challenged conduct does not violate the Act.

Leonardo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA · filed 2024-09-30

As to Count VI, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim fails because Defendants are not debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCA and did not engage in conduct that violated the FDCPA.

The FDCPA does not treat a loan servicer as a debt collector when the servicer began servicing before the debt was in default.

In Re: Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2025-03-24(a)(6), (a)(6)(F)

Excluded from the definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA is “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed .. . or due another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” Id. § 1692a(6)(F). Therefore, “[a] loan servicer acting on behalf of the owner of a debt obligation is not a debt collector unless it began its servicing duties after the loan entered default status.” ... Accordingly, Green Tree and Ditech were not debt collectors as defined by the FDCPA; the FDCPA does not apply here; Hutchinson’s claim premised on the FDCPA fails as a matter of law; and the Bankruptcy Court did not err in so holding.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes a purchaser collecting a debt for its own account from the definition of debt collector, and an FDCPA disclaimer does not change that status.

Algarin v. FMA Alliance, LTD · filed 2025-03-25(a)(6)

The language used in the Amended Complaint itself therefore establishes that FMA is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. See Henson, 582 U.S. 79, 83 (2017) (explaining that purchasers of debts originated by someone else which seek to collect those debts for their own account are not FDCPA “debt collectors”). ... The inclusion of cautionary language in a communication does not transform FMA into a debt collector when it otherwise does not meet the definition under the statute.

Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector to include a person who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or asserted to be owed to another.

Aiello v. Rent Recovery Solutions, LLC · filed 2025-07-11(a)(6)

Under the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Given the totality of this evidence, the Court rejects Rent Recovery’s argument that it is not a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA's definition of “debt collector” excludes a creditor and its employee collecting a debt originated by that creditor.

Poullard · filed 2025-10-22(a)(6)

Nor does the term include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed . . . to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was originated by such person.” ... Poullard fails to plausibly allege Guillory is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. Poullard’s pleadings state that the alleged debt sought to be collected by Guillory was originated by ACA. A “debt collector” under the statute does not include a consumer’s creditors.

The FDCPA applies only to a defendant that qualifies as a debt collector, and a mortgage lender or servicer may fall outside that coverage.

Zaykaria · filed 2026-01-09

Notwithstanding the conclusory nature of Plaintiffs’ FDCPA allegations, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint also fails to allege that Freedom was a debt collector subject to the FDCPA. See Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (10th Cir. 2018) (mortgage servicing company that began servicing the loan before the plaintiff went into default was not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA); see also Ladouceur v. Wells Fargo, 682 F. App’x 649, 652 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (FDCPA did not apply to creditors such as the originating mortgage lender and servicer). Here, Plaintiffs’ own allegations reflect that Freedom was the original lender and servicer of the subject mortgage. [Doc. No. 6, at ¶ 7] (“Plaintiffs executed a mortgage loan with Freedom Mortgage Corporation on or about December 1, 2022.”). Without alleging how Freedom is subject to the FDCPA, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims will be dismissed.

The FDCPA generally excludes mortgage lenders and servicers from the definition of “debt collector,” unless they became lenders or servicers after the debt was in default.

Bob · filed 2026-02-19(a)(6)

The court also notes that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants fall within the scope of the FDCPA. Section 1692g of the statute imposes certain obligations on debt collectors. A “debt collector” under the FDCPA is “any person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). However, mortgage lenders and servicers are generally not “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 459 F. App’x 424, 428–29 n.1 (5th Cir. 2012); Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). A mortgage lender or servicer may be a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA if it becomes a mortgage lender or servicer after the debt was in default. Smith v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., No. 20-CV- 00321, 2020 WL 5759967, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2020). Defendants Deutsche Bank and New Century do not fall within the definition of “debt collector” based on the pleadings before the court, as the debt was assigned to Deutsche Bank from New Century prior to Plaintiff’s default. As to the other defendants, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants’ principal business is collecting debts or that they regularly collect debts or attempt to collect debts for someone else.

The FDCPA provides a remedy for consumers subjected to abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors, and a credit reporting agency is not a debt collector under the statute.

Boyer · filed 2026-06-02

The FDCPA “provides a remedy for consumers who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.” ... “[I]t is well-settled that a credit reporting agency such as Equifax is not a ‘debt collector’ under the FDCPA ....”

The FDCPA excludes officers and employees of the United States who collect debts in the performance of their official duties from the definition of debt collector, and the United States itself is not treated as a debt collector.

Ainsworth v. U.S. Department of Education · filed 2019-11-19(6)(B)

Moreover, defendant is not a “debt collector” as defined in the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (defining debt collector as, inter alia, “any officer or employee of the United States [not the government itself] or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties”). Therefore, defendant is immune from this lawsuit to the extent that plaintiff alleges a violation of the FDCPA and, thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

The FDCPA covers debts collected by a statutory debt collector and only debts arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

St. Thomas v. Complete Service Center and Towing, LLC · filed 2025-02-14(a)(6), (a)(5)

The FDCPA aims to protect consumers from abusive practices of “debt collectors,” defined in the Act as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). ... Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint plausibly suggests that Complete Services is debt collector withing the meaning of FDCPA, rather than an ordinary creditor to which Plaintiff owes a debt for towing services. His complaint therefore fails to state a plausible claim. ... Further, the FDCPA applies only to debts which arise out of “transactions” intended “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); ... Plaintiff’s complaint fails to suggest that his purported debt to Complete Services arose from a “transaction” arising from a business dealing or consensual obligation intended “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”2 Accordingly, his complaint fails to state a claim for this reason as well.

Section 1692d's protections do not apply to a debt incurred for agricultural rather than personal, family, or household purposes, or to creditors collecting their own debt.

Munk v. Federal Land Bank Of Wichita · filed 1986-05-14(d)

Plaintiffs make the conclusional assertion that some defendants "harrassed plaintiff Mary Munk" in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692(d), et seq. This Act does not apply to this debt or to these creditors. This debt was not incurred for "personal, family, or household purposes." See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692a(5). Further, the defendants are not attempting to collect another's debt. See id. Sec. 1692a(6)(A).

The Act covers debts from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and a party collecting only its own debt is not a debt collector under the Act.

King v. Amoco Oil Co. · filed 1987-05-11(a)(5), (a)(6)(A)

Similarly, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC § 1692 et seq., was intended to apply to debts arising out of transactions “in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 USC § 1692a (5). The transactions which form the subject of this action would therefore not be covered. ... Further, appellee was not attempting to collect another’s debt and is therefore not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the statute. Id. 15 USC § 1692a (6) (A).

The Act covers debts incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and a violation supports a damages claim rather than dismissal for insufficient process.

Community Savings Bank v. Dovitski, No. Cv93 0528311 (Apr. 29, 1994) · filed 1994-04-29

The court cannot find, nor has defendant cited, any authority establishing that a failure to comply with the FDCPA renders process insufficient. Rather, violations of the Act give rise to a claim [ for damages ] under federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692K . ... Additionally, the protections afforded by the federal Act cover only those debts incurred "primarily for personal, family or household purposes" [ See ]: 15 U.S.C. § 1692 a(5); ... In this case, the subject debt is evidenced by a "Commercial Promissory Note," is signed by the borrower "d/b/a Terryville Construction Co.," and would [ not ] appear to be an obligation incurred for family or personal purposes.

Section 1692 protects consumers from abusive debt-collection practices by debt collectors and does not cover an officer or employee of a creditor collecting the creditor's own debt.

Van Eck v. Mbna America Bank, No. 424382 (Sep. 28, 1999) · filed 1999-09-28

"The defendant is correct in its argument that count one does not state a cause of action for violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 . That statute protects consumers from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. "The term debt collector means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts. . . . The term does not include any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor." (Emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6)(A). The plaintiff alleges that an employee of the defendant has made harassing phone calls in an effort to collect a debt of which the defendant is the creditor; the plaintiff does not allege that a debt collector has engaged in this activity.

The FDCPA’s notice and other obligations apply to independent debt collectors, not creditors collecting their own debts or their employees, officers, or affiliates.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Taylor · filed 2013-06-28

The FDCPA “is directed at independent debt collectors and not creditors attempting to collect on their own debts.” ... Additionally, “[a]s a matter of law, the FDCPA does not apply to creditors, their employees or officers, or their affiliates.” ... Moreover, Chase alleged in the complaint that it had complied with all conditions precedent and this was not contested. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a default judgment because of the FDCPA.

Section 1692 applies only when the defendant is a debt collector as defined by the statute.

Downs v. Indy Mac Mortgage Services · filed 2014-03-20

Moreover, the complaint failed to state a claim under the FDCPA, see Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2003), as none of the defendants was alleged to be a debt collector as defined by the statute.

Section 1692 generally applies to third-party debt collectors, not individual creditors.

Eddie Long v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-02-19(c)

Secondly, we note that the statute generally applies to third party debt collectors, and not to individual creditors.

The FDCPA covers consumer debts from primarily personal, family, or household transactions and requires a plaintiff to identify a debt collector, the debt, and the conduct alleged to violate the Act.

Robinson v. Guzman · filed 2023-03-06

The FDCPA applies to consumer debt “arising out of . . . transaction[s] . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” ... The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging facts suggesting a viable FDCPA claim. Plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that Defendants are debt collectors. He must also describe the debt he owed to Defendants and describe the conduct that Defendants engaged in to collect that debt.

The FDCPA applies to debt collectors, not creditors collecting their own accounts.

Williams v. Navy Federal Credit Union · filed 2023-11-30

Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA also fail as a matter of law because the FDCPA only applies to debt collectors, and Navy Federal is not a debt collector.

The FDCPA does not treat foreclosure and loss-mitigation communications as debt collection when they seek to enforce a security interest rather than induce payment of the underlying debt.

Heinz v. Carrington Mortgage Services LLC · filed 2019-11-19

Unlike Owens, the challenged communications do not discuss the terms of the underlying debt, demand payment for the debt evidenced by the note or in any other form, or threaten additional collection proceedings. ... Instead, Carrington was actively engaged in a process to dispossess Mr. Heinz of the Property. ... Such actions can only be fairly regarded as “enforcement” of security interests pending the foreclosure sale of the Property. ... Thus, the “animating purpose” of these communications and conduct cannot be appropriately described as seeking to collect the underlying debt. The Court therefore determines that the lien-foreclosure activities here do not constitute debt collection under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA covers a communication only when a consumer could reasonably understand it to be connected with debt collection; disclaimers that it is informational only can take a mortgage statement outside the statute.

Smith v. Bendett & McHugh, PC · filed 2024-03-13

Contrary to Smith’s position, not every communication between a mortgage servicing company and a former bankruptcy debtor violates the FDCPA. The FDCPA only applies to a communication if “a consumer receiving [that communication] could reasonably understand it to be… in connection with the collection of a debt.”

Section 1692 identifies eliminating abusive debt collection practices, protecting consumers, and redressing consumer injuries as the Act’s purposes.

Venes v. Professional Service Bureau, Inc. · filed 1984-08-21

The purpose of the act, as reflected in 15 U.S.C. § 1692, is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, to protect consumers and redress their injuries.

The FDCPA protects against harassment, oppression, abuse, false or misleading representations, and other unfair practices in connection with debt collection; allegations of harassing collection calls and threats suffice to let the claim proceed at the pleading stage.

Avent v. Platinum Plus Auto Protection · filed 2020-02-14

The statute protects against, among other things, harassment, oppression, or abuse in connection with the collection of a debt, false or misleading representations, and other unfair practices. 15 U.S.C. 8 1692 et seq. ... Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant PayLink instituted collections on his debt, and that he was “harassed and intimidated by defendant PayLink Direct constantly by phone calls,” that he received threats through phone calls, and that each Defendant engaged in unlawful debt collection practices. Compl. at § 18. The Court recommends that this claim be permitted to proceed.

The FDCPA applies to consumer debts, not commercial debts.

Conboy v. SBA · filed 2021-03-19

The Court properly granted judgment on the UTPCPL and FDCPA claims because those statutes apply to consumer debts, not commercial ones like the debt at issue.

Section 1692(e) requires the FDCPA to be construed liberally because it is a remedial statute protecting consumers from abusive debt-collection practices.

Neria v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-11-28(e)

The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and therefore must be construed liberally in favor of the Debtor.

The FDCPA does not provide the avenue for challenging proofs of claim in a Chapter 13 case when the underlying state-law claims are enforceable.

Raja v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2024-04-10

In sum, because these causes of action relate to the proof of claim process and involve otherwise enforceable state law claims, they are properly considered under the Bankruptcy Code, not under the FDCPA.

To plead an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege that they are a consumer harmed by a violation, that the debt arose from a primarily personal, family, or household transaction, that the defendant is a debt collector, and that the defendant violated the Act; collection on a nonexistent contract alleges no debt under the Act.

PETER v. TAVISTOCK AT MAYS LANDING HOA · filed 2024-10-25

Specifically, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail where either: (1) there is valid debt underlying the foreclosure but no clear allegations of misleading conduct by Defendants where they are only vaguely accused of representing “an invisible entity;” or (2) Plaintiffs’ allegations of a debt being collected on a non-existent contract would necessarily fall outside of the FDCPA because to argue as much would functionally be contending that there is no debt at all because there is no contract upon which the Defendant Attorneys seek to collect. Either way, there is no cognizable claim under the FDCPA, and Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is dismissed in its entirety against all Defendants.

Section 1692 protects consumers from unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices while avoiding unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors.

Mendez v. Apple Bank for Savings · filed 1989-05-09

The legislative history behind the FDCPA makes clear that its purpose is "to protect consumers from a host of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors” (S Rep No. 95-382, 95th Cong, 1st Sess, at 1-2, reprinted in 1977 US Code Cong & Admin News 1696). The act was promulgated upon a finding that persons collecting debts for others were increasingly engaging in methods designed to annoy and intimidate debtors into satisfying outstanding debts.

Section 1692(e) declares that the FDCPA aims to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.

Lyles v. U.S. Retirements & Parents · filed 2021-11-10(e)

The FDCPA was enacted “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); see also Russell v. Absolute Collection Servs., Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).

The FDCPA regulates methods of collecting a debt, not a collateral challenge to the existence or amount of a debt already established in bankruptcy.

Adair v. Michael L. Sherman and Sherman & Sherman · filed 2000-08-25

We are also convinced that issue preclusion applies because the FDCPA is an improper vehicle for challenging the amount of a debt established by the bankruptcy court. The FDCPA regulates the practices used to collect a debt. ... However, this circuit and other federal courts have held that an FDCPA action is not an action to establish a debt but an action contesting the method of collection of that debt.

Section 1692 does not make a debt collector's failure to respond to a debtor's letters, by itself, an abusive debt collection practice.

Ray v. Oakland County Drain Commission · filed 2004-09-20

Ray’s dissatisfaction with the law firm’s inaction to her letters does not establish an abusive debt collection practice.

The FDCPA prohibits abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt-collection practices, but the defendants’ timely collection suit and demand letter did not violate it because the plaintiff produced no evidence that the debt was uncollectible, misstated, or not owned by the creditor.

Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP · filed 2005-10-26

The FDCPA broadly prohibits: (1) unfair or unconscionable collection methods, (2) conduct which harasses, oppresses, or abuses any debtor, and (3) any false, deceptive, or misleading statements in connection with collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d— f. ... Because there are no genuine issues of triable fact on any of these purported deficiencies in the underlying debt, the Plaintiffs FDCPA claims fail as a matter of law. ... Because no reasonable jury could find for the Plaintiff on his FDCPA claims, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those claims is granted.

The FDCPA applies to abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt-collection practices regardless of whether the underlying debt is valid.

Naranjo v. Universal Surety of America · filed 2010-01-14(a)

Actions brought under the FDCPA do not depend upon the validity of the underlying debt, but rather “makes debt collectors liable for various ‘abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices’ regardless of whether the debt is valid.”

The FDCPA protects consumers’ concrete interest in being free from abusive debt collection practices, including sewer service.

Fleming v. Provest California LLC · filed 2021-12-22

Accordingly, the Court follows this uniform authority and concludes that Congress sought to protect individuals’ concrete interest in being free from abusive debt collection practices, which includes the practice of sewer service, when passing the FDCPA.

The FDCPA can provide a remedy alongside a Bankruptcy Code discharge-injunction claim arising from the same facts.

Eastman v. Baker Recovery Services and Law Offices of Juana Trejo (In re Eastman) · filed 2009-04-20

The same set of facts may give rise to a cause of action for violation of both the FDCPA and section 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and a debtor may successfully enforce both statutes on the same set of facts.

The FDCPA does not require debt collectors to investigate a debt before filing a collection lawsuit.

Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Management · filed 2014-01-28

Plaintiffs claim fails as a matter of law because the FDCPA does not impose a duty of investigation on debt collectors.

The FDCPA does not require debt collectors to independently investigate a debt's validity and permits them to rely on information provided by their clients unless doing so is unreasonable.

Campbell v. Puget Sound Collections Inc · filed 2022-01-07

The FDCPA does not impose a duty upon a debt collector to independently investigate the validity of a debt and, unless it is unreasonable to do so, debt collectors have the right to rely upon the information provided by their clients.

Section 1692 imposes civil liability on debt collectors for certain prohibited debt collection practices, and a debt collector regularly collects debts owed or asserted to be owed to another.

Beard v. Experian · filed 2023-12-21

Section 1692, however, “imposes civil liability on ‘debt collector[s]’ for certain prohibited debt collection practices.”41 A debt collector is any person “who regularly collects . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”42 In his Complaint and the attachments thereto, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant is a debt collector or that any prohibited debt collection practices were used by Defendant. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1692 must likewise be dismissed.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector’s validation notice to clearly tell consumers that a dispute must be submitted in writing to trigger verification and cessation of collection activity.

Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp. · filed 1990-10-02(g)(a)(4), (g)(b)

The invitation to telephone unaccompanied by any warning that the notice must be in writing to be effective obscures the dispute validation notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.

Section 1692g requires a debt-collection notice to clearly tell consumers that disputes must be made in writing, and language inviting them to “discuss” a debt can violate that requirement when it overshadows the validation notice.

MacArz v. Transworld Systems, Inc. · filed 1998-09-21(g)

The common connotation of the word “discuss” implicates oral, rather than written, communication. While a more sophisticated consumer may understand that a “discussion” can take place through exchanged written communication, the least sophisticated consumer would likely find the admonition to “discuss,” unaccompanied by a warning that such discussion must take place in writing, an invitation to call. Particularly where the warning of the written dispute requirement appears separately, and in distinctly smaller print, the Court finds that the language directing the consumer to “discuss” overshadows and contradicts this validation notice.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to send a written validation notice within five days of the initial debt-related communication, including the debt amount, creditor identity, a 30-day dispute statement, and information for verifying the debt and original creditor.

Chiverton v. Federal Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2005-09-30(g)

Within five days of the initial communication with a consumer regarding a debt, a debt collector must send a written notice containing a “validation notice,” which includes “the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor, a statement that the debt’s validity will be assumed unless disputed by the consumer within 30 days, and an offer to verify the debt and provide the name and address of the original creditor, if the consumer so requests.” ... In this case, the sole written notice the defendant sent Chiverton was a November 23, 1999 letter, which was well after its initial telephone call to the plaintiff. This tardy notice lacked a statement that the debt’s validity would be assumed unless disputed by the consumer within 30 days. The defendant’s omission of required information regarding the plaintiffs statutory right to dispute the debt violated § 1692g.

Section 1692g(a) requires an initial debt-collection communication to provide specified validation disclosures, but does not require a subsequent collector or servicer to send a second validation notice after those disclosures have been provided.

Oppong v. First Union Mortgage Corp. · filed 2008-07-24(g)(a)

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that: a) the Foreclosure Complaint constituted an initial communication; b) the initial communication contained the validation information in compliance with § 1692g; c) the Foreclosure Complaint, taken as a whole, could not induce the least sophisticated consumer to ignore his legal rights under the FDCPA; d) Oppong was timely advised of the transfer of servicing of his loan from First Union to Wells Fargo; and e) there was no duty on the part of Wells Fargo to serve upon Oppong a second validation notice.

Section 1692g requires each debt collector, including a subsequent debt collector, to provide valid validation disclosures in its initial communication with a consumer.

Stair v. Thomas & Cook · filed 2008-09-23(g)

The Court accordingly holds that “[t]he requirement of providing valid disclosures under § 1692g applies to each debt collector.”

Section 1692g(a) requires one validation notice after the initial collection communication, and § 1692g(b) requires the debt collector to cease collection only when the consumer disputes the debt or requests information in writing within 30 days.

Moore, et al. V. MERS, et al. · filed 2013-04-25(a), (b)

“The” indicates that there can be but one “initial communication” with any given consumer; were multiple “initial communications” a possibility, Congress would likely have employed the indefinite article “an,” or perhaps the possessive “its” (to refer to each debt collector’s first communication with the consumer). ... Because the Moores had already received a § 1692g(a) validation notice from Harmon in the summer of 2009, Ocwen was not required to send a new notice to the Moores when it undertook its efforts to collect their debt. ... Subsection (b) requires a debt collector to fulfill these obligations only “[i]f the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period” following his or her receipt of the validation notice. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).

Section 1692g(a) does not require a debt-validation notice to include transitional language explaining that a payment request does not limit the consumer’s right to dispute the debt within thirty days.

Stuppiello v. Southwest Credit Systems · filed 2018-05-01(g)(a)

Stuppiello contends—without citing any Ninth Circuit authority in support—that validation notices must include transitional language, i.e. language explaining that a request for payment does not limit a consumer’s right to challenge a debt within thirty days. We have never imposed such a requirement, and decline to do so now.

Section 1692g does not require a debt collector to send multiple validation notices after it timely sends one following an earlier inquiry.

Nguyen v. Plusfour, Inc. · filed 2019-07-26(g)

However, because § 1692g does not require debt collectors to send multiple notices, Plusfour complied with the statute when it sent notice within five-days after the 2016 inquiry. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a debt-validation notice to convey the required dispute information, but does not require a literal, verbatim recitation of the statutory language.

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Jones · filed 2020-01-21(g)(a)(3)

Nothing in the statute indicates that the phrasing of the statement must perfectly track the instruction. There are no quotation marks setting apart mandatory words or phrases or a command by Congress to include specific language. Instead, the statute provides an instruction for the information-not the exact verbiage-that must be included. Therefore, the letter sent by S&M to Jones on July 26, 2016 is considered to be a \"debt validation letter\" that triggered a thirty-day period during which Jones needed to respond in order to contest the amount owed.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a debt collector to provide a validation notice stating that a debt will be assumed valid unless disputed within 30 days, while § 1692g(b) requires the collector to cease collection until it verifies a timely disputed debt and mails the verification to the consumer.

Alausa v. Monterey Financial Services, LLC · filed 2023-09-19(a)(3), (b)

Section 1692g sets forth the process for a consumer to dispute a debt, and provides, inter alia, that if a consumer challenges a debt within 30 days of a debt collector first providing the notice set forth in Section 1692g(a), the debt collector must verify the debt or “cease collection of the debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b); see also Agu v. Rhea, No. 09-CV-4732 (JS) (AKT), 2010 WL 5186839, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010). ... Therefore, because Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts that could establish Defendant’s violation of § 1692g of the FDCPA, this claim survives Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1692g is satisfied when a validation notice is clearly signposted on the front of the communication and is legible and sufficiently prominent on the reverse to be noticed by the least sophisticated debtor.

Graziano v. Harrison · filed 1991-01-02(g)

The statement itself, contrary to plaintiffs contentions, is plainly legible and is the only writing on the reverse side of the letter. Furthermore, the second and final paragraph of the statement states clearly and explicitly that the letter is a debt collection notice. The statement of rights is thus sufficiently prominent, visually and verbally, to satisfy the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g and thus is adequate under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(ll) tó inform the debtor that the purpose of the form letter was to collect a debt and that information obtained through communication would be used for that purpose.

Section 1692g(a)'s validation notice is inadequate when collection-letter language grossly overshadows it by threateningly contradicting the debtor's 30-day dispute period; ordinary payment requests alone do not do so.

Anthes v. Transworld Systems, Inc. · filed 1991-05-16(g)(a)

An otherwise adequate notice can nonetheless be inadequate if it is “grossly overshadowed” by language in the body of the letter. ... There is no “gross overshadowing” unless the language of the letter stands in “threatening contradiction” to the statutorily required notice. ... Some contradiction, or slight overshadowing, is insufficient. ... Further, language designed to encourage payment of the debt does not, in and of itself, overshadow a validation notice. ... If this statement was received by the plaintiff less than 30 days after she received the validation notice, it would directly contradict the notice’s statement that she had 30 days to contest the debt. ... The third letter would therefore “grossly overshadow” the earlier validation notice and violate § 1692g(a) of the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(a)(4) does not require a debt collector to promise a copy of a nonexistent judgment, but it must provide alternative verification, and the validation notice may not be contradicted or overshadowed by the collection demand.

Beeman v. Lacy, Katzen, Ryen & Mittleman · filed 1995-02-22(a)(4)

Section 1692g(a)(4)’s use of the disjunctive “or” between “verification of the debt” and “copy of the judgment” leads to the conclusion that the debt collector is free to choose the appropriate form of verification. If a judgment exists, the debt collector should promise to provide it. If a judgment does not exist, the debt collector must promise to provide alternative verification of the debt. ... A plain reading of the statute as well as plain logic compel the conclusion that a debt collector can not be required to disclose that it will furnish a copy of a judgment which does not exist. ... We hold instead that a complaint alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g can survive a challenge under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as long as (1) the plaintiff pleads a contradiction between the demand language and the validation language and (2) it is possible that the plaintiff could prove that the contradiction would mislead the least sophisticated consumer into disregarding his or her rights under the validation notice.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector’s validation notice to be presented in a non-confusing manner.

Charles O. Sims and Sandra Adams v. Gc Services L.P., Dls Enterprises, Incorporated, and Gc Financial Corporation · filed 2006-04-26(g)

The validation notice required by the FDCPA must be presented in a non-confusing manner.

The FDCPA does not require a debt collector to send a validation notice to an address other than the address the debtor provided for the account.

Saunders v. NCO Financial System, Inc. · filed 2012-12-19(a)

First, plaintiff contends that NCO did not “properly” send a validation notice, which violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), because it never sent a validation notice to his Brooklyn address. The validation notice was sent to the address that defendant had for the account, which was the address that plaintiff had provided. Nothing in plaintiffs letters of March 16, 2011 and April 22, 2011 should have alerted defendant to the fact that the address that plaintiff had listed on the account was not the address to which he wanted the validation notice sent. The notice was properly sent, and plaintiffs claim is therefore rejected.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to send a written validation notice within five days after the initial communication, but a brief delay without attendant harm or material risk of harm does not create the concrete injury needed for Article III standing.

Yeager v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2017-02-22(a)

The debt collector must send the validation notice to the consumer “[wjithin five days after the initial communication with [the] consumer in connection with the collection of any debt ..unless the [ ] information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has'.'paid the debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). ... The court need not reach whether any FDCPA validation-notice delay, no matter how long, would fail to support standing. It is merely saying that a delay as brief as the one alleged by the Yeagers, without any attendant harm or material risk of harm, does not.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector's validation notice to be effectively conveyed, and other text cannot overshadow or contradict it.

Sharpe v. Midland Credit Management · filed 2017-09-01(g)(a)

After examining both the physical characteristics and the content of the Letter and the Complaint, the Court concludes that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the validation notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other text and therefore violates the FDCPA.

Section 1692g(b) requires a debt collector’s validation notice to clearly explain that collection may resume after verification is mailed, even if the thirty-day validation period has not ended.

ROCK v. GREENSPOON MARDER, LLP · filed 2021-01-26(g)(b)

But in fact, a debt collector may recommence its debt collection activities after it mails the verification. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). Defendant maintains that the Letter clearly sets forth a consumer’s validation rights. Def. Br. at 14-15. Applying the least sophisticated debtor standard, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Letter does not clearly explain that Defendant could re-start its collection activities after mailing the verification, even if the initial 30-day verification period had not ended.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to send the consumer a written validation notice within five days after the initial communication, but does not require proof that the consumer actually received it.

Neal · filed 2026-06-10(a)

But Plaintiff’s sworn denial is of no import because the debt collector need not establish actual receipt by the debtor. ... In short, Transworld sent Plaintiff the required notice letter, and Plaintiff offered no evidence to the contrary. As such, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails.

The FDCPA imposes strict liability for false or unfair collection conduct, so intent is not required under § 1692e and culpability affects damages, while § 1692g’s verification procedure applies only to the initial communication.

Pittman v. JJ Mac Intyre Co. of Nevada, Inc. · filed 1997-03-24(e), (f), and (g)

Under these circumstances, the court cannot conclude that the defendant’s purported lack of knowledge of the debt’s satisfaction is a defense to plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1692e and 1692f, The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. ... There is no requirement under § 1692e that false representations be intentional to be actionable. Furthermore, under these circumstances, a trier of fact could conclude that the conduct of the defendant was “unfair or unconscionable” under § 1692f. Because the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, the defendant’s culpability is a consideration only in computing damages under the FDCPA. ... This court finds that § 1692g does not apply in these circumstances. Section 1692g applies only to the initial communication between a debt collector and an alleged debtor.

The FDCPA imposes strict liability on debt collectors, and claims are evaluated objectively from the perspective of an unsophisticated consumer.

Randle v. GC Services, L.P. · filed 1998-09-14

The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, see Wells v. McDonough, 1998 WL 160876, at *3 (N.D.Ill. March 31, 1998), and claims against debt collectors under the FDCPA are viewed objectively through the eyes of the “unsophisticated consumer.” See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir.1996).

Section 1692e imposes liability for the covered false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection practices without requiring the plaintiff to plead that the debt collector acted knowingly or intentionally.

Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc. · filed 2000-03-14(e)

Equifax has argued that knowledge or intent is an essential element of a cause of action under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. It is defendants’ contention that because plaintiff failed to allege in the complaint that the violation of the FDCPA was knowing or intentional, the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After reviewing the law in this area, this court disagrees with the defendants’ characterization of the FDCPA and finds that the complaint does not have to allege that the violation was knowing or intentional.

The FDCPA generally does not regulate a repossession agency enforcing a security interest, except for the restrictions in § 1692f(6).

Jordan v. Kent Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 1990-02-28(a)(5), (a)(6), (f)(6)

Thus the legislative history confirms that Congress intended an enforcer of a security interest, such as a repossession agency, to fall outside the ambit of the FDCPA for all purposes except for the prohibitions described in § 1692f(6).

Section 1692a(6) treats a creditor as a debt collector when it uses a name that would indicate third-party collection, but permits the creditor to collect under an established business name it has consistently used with the debtor.

Dickenson v. Townside T v. & Appliance, Inc. · filed 1990-10-31(a)(6)

Nowhere does the FDCPA define a creditor’s “own name” as being only its name of incorporation. ... This language of the statute, along with its legislative history and the commentary of the Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter “FTC”], leads this Court to conclude that a creditor may use any established name under which it is known, to collect its debts from a particular debtor as long it has consistently dealt with such debtor since the beginning of the credit relationship at issue under such name. ... The solicitation practices and leasing arrangements of Townside may or may not violate West Virginia law, however, under the facts of this case, this Court cannot conclude that Townside and its agents are “debt collectors” for the purposes of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) generally excludes a creditor collecting its own debt from the definition of debt collector unless the creditor uses another name that falsely indicates a third party is collecting the debt.

Sorenson v. MBI, Inc · filed 2019-07-18(a)(6)

Under the so-called false name exception, a creditor will be deemed a “debt collector” if: (1) the creditor is collecting its own debts; (2) the creditor ‘uses’ a name other than its own; and (3) the creditor’s use of that name falsely indicates that a third person is ‘collecting or attempting the collect’ the debts that the creditor is collecting. ... With respect to MBI, the final notice contains both direct and circumstantial evidence of the relationship between Danbury Mint and MBI. ... In sum, neither MBI nor Hobar qualify as “debt collectors” under the circumstances alleged here. Accordingly, the FDCPA does not apply to them and Count Eleven is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) caps additional damages at $1,000 per lawsuit, regardless of how many FDCPA violations the debt collector committed.

Donahue v. NFS, INC. · filed 1991-12-30(a)(2)(A)

Viewing the plain statutory language, this Court agrees with the latter view and holds that, in this case, the plaintiff may recover a maximum of $1,000.00 additional damages despite the fact that the plaintiff alleges that NFS has committed five FDCPA violations.

The FDCPA's damages cap does not require a nationwide class action, and a de minimis recovery per class member does not automatically bar the action from proceeding.

Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp. · filed 1997-03-17(k)(a)(2)(B)

At least on the facts before us, the FDCPA does not require a nation-wide class. Nor does the FDCPA or Rule 28 necessarily require that the recovery per class member be more than de minimis for the lawsuit to go forward. The attorney’s fees provision is designed in part to correct the disincentive created by the possibility of a small recovery. Cy pres recovery is reserved only for those unusual situations where victims are unidentifiable, disbursement would be impossible or, for some other reason, the disbursement of damages to victims would be impossible or inappropriate. By contrast, the FDCPA specifically requires that damages (that may consist of more than actual monetary loss) be paid.

The FDCPA's class-action damages cap does not require a nationwide class or an individual recovery above a de minimis amount.

Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corporation · filed 1997-03-17(k)(a)(2)(B)

At least on the facts before us, the FDCPA does not require a nation-wide class. Nor does the FDCPA or Rule 23 necessarily require that the recovery per class member be more than de minimis for the lawsuit to go forward.

Section 1692k makes a noncompliant debt collector liable for actual damages, permits up to $1,000 in additional damages in an individual action subject to statutory factors, and requires costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee in a successful enforcement action.

Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc. · filed 1998-01-10(a)(2)(A), (a)(3), (b)

The FDCPA provides that a debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of the statute is liable to such person. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. ... The decision as to whether to award statutory damages, and the size of such an award, is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. ... As set forth in the statute, statutory damages shall not exceed $1,000. In determining whether to award such “additional damages,” the district court must consider “the frequency and persistency of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional, and other relevant factors in deciding the amount of any ‘additional damages’ awarded.” ... With regard to additional statutory damages, the Court finds that the letter sent to the plaintiffs home, in violation of the clear provisions of FDCPA, warrants the imposition of $ 500.00 as “additional damages.” ... Accordingly, judgment is awarded in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant for additional damages in the sum of $ 500.00. ... In addition to damages, Section 1692k(a)(3) provides that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover “the costs of the action; together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the Court.” ... Section 1692k(a) sets forth the three standard components of liability for violations of the Act: it states that a debt collector who violates the act ‘is hable’ for actual damages, statutory damages as determined by the court, and a reasonable attorney’s fee. Given the structure of the section, attorney’s fees should not be construed as a special or discretionary remedy; rather, the Act mandates an award of attorney’s fees as a means of fulfilling Congress’s intent that the Act should be enforced by debtors acting as private attorneys general.

Section 1692k(a)(1) permits recovery of actual damages for injuries caused by a collection-letter violation, but does not treat collection fees as unjust-enrichment damages.

Schimmel v. Slaughter · filed 1997-09-08(a)(1)

Here, the collection took place, and the fact that the letter violated the Act makes the collection illegal and subject to the penalties imposed by the Act, but does not indicate application of the unjust enrichment doctrine. Accordingly, the court finds that the unjust enrichment theory of actual damages proposed by plaintiffs is without foundation, and that portion of the class notice referring thereto should be stricken.

Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) provides for a jury to determine statutory additional damages in an individual FDCPA action when a jury trial is timely demanded.

Ron Kobs and Stacie Kobs v. Arrow Service Bureau, Inc. · filed 1998-01-22(a)(2)(A)

The issue raised before this Court is whether the determination of statutory additional damages under the FDCPA should have been submitted to the jury or whether the court was permitted to make such determination. We hold that 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) provides for trial by jury in determining statutory additional damages and thus remand for a jury to determine the amount of statutory damages, if any, to which the Kobs are entitled.

The FDCPA applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, including litigation, and does not give them blanket immunity for that activity.

McMullen v. McHughes Law Firm · filed 2015-01-221692d, 1692e(2), 1692e(10), and 1692f

Turning to McMullen’s FDCPA claims, we note that the FDCPA applies to “attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation.” ... Thus, McHughes does not enjoy any blanket immunity for its litigation activities as a debt collector and is subject to the provisions of the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(6) treats an attorney who regularly engages in debt-collection activities as a debt collector subject to the FDCPA and provides no implied exemption for an attorney's legal activities.

Yale New Haven Hospital v. Orlins, No. Cv6-10396 (May 12, 1992) · filed 1992-05-12(a)(6)

This court holds that there is no additional, implied exemption for "attorneys when performing tasks of a legal nature" as claimed by the plaintiff.

The FDCPA applies to lawyers who regularly engage in consumer debt collection, including litigation, but it does not impose a heightened investigative duty merely because the collector is a lawyer.

Amond v. Brincefield, Harnett · filed 1999-03-22

Lawyers who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activity are subject to the limitations of the FDCPA, even where their conduct involves litigation. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). However, they are not subject to any special, higher duty under the FDCPA solely by virtue of their status as lawyers. ... Of course, Rule 11 (and equivalent state law sanction provisions) applies to lawyers when they act in their capacity as litigators (as opposed to debt collectors). Conduct by lawyers that violates the established norms of Rule 11 remains subject to sanction. However, we will not combine Rule 11 with the FDCPA to create a heightened duty of investigation for lawyer-debt collectors engaging in ordinary debt collection activity.

Section 1692a(6) covers attorneys who regularly collect debts through litigation as debt collectors, and the FDCPA provides no blanket common-law litigation immunity.

Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson · filed 2007-05-09(a)(6)

The statutory text makes clear that there is no blanket common law litigation immunity from the requirements of the FDCPA. First and foremost, the plain meaning of the Act’s definition of "debt collector" encompasses attorneys.

Section 1692a(6) treats repossession businesses as debt collectors only for purposes of § 1692f(6), which prohibits nonjudicial dispossession when the creditor lacks a present right or intent to possess the property or the property is legally exempt.

Rivera v. Dealer Funding, LLC · filed 2016-04-15(a)(6), (f)(6)

The Third Circuit has interpreted § 1692a(6) to mean that repossession agencies are subject to the FDCPA, but only for § 1692f(6) and not the remaining provisions of the statute. ... Since Defendant CAC is a repossession agency, we must now decide whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim under the sole applicable provision of the FDCPA, § 1692f(6). ... Therefore, Defendant CAC had a right of possession and was not in violation of § 1692f(6)(A). Additionally, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that suggest violations of § 1692f(6)(B) or § 1692f(6)(C). For these reasons, Plaintiff has not pleaded with sufficient facts a plausible claim under 15 Ü.S.C. § 1692f(6).

A repossession company whose principal business is enforcing security interests, and that does not otherwise meet the debt-collector definition, is subject to the FDCPA only under § 1692f(6).

Espinosa Sr. v. Metcalf · filed 2021-12-01(a)(6), (f)(6)

For these reasons, Export may be subject to Section 1692f(6) of the FDCPA but not to any other section of the statute.

A mortgage servicer is a debt collector under the FDCPA only if the mortgage was in default when the servicer began servicing it.

Ezekwo v. Specialized Loan Servicing · filed 2023-04-17(a)(6)

A mortgage servicer is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA “if the mortgage was in default at the time the servicer began servicing the debt.” Zirogiannis v. Seterus, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 292, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), aff'd, 707 F. App’x 724 (2d Cir. 2017). “[W]here a mortgage servicer obtains a loan that is not in default,” it is not a debt collector.

The FDCPA imposes a one-year limitations period for violations and prohibits false representations about a debt’s character, amount, or legal status in connection with debt collection.

Tapia v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · filed 2010-06-22(e), (e)(2)(A), and (k)(d)

A suit alleging a violation of the FDCPA must be brought within one year of the violation’s occurrence. ... An alleged FDCPA violation occurs, and the action accrues, when the alleged debt collector sends the debtor the notice of default. ... The FDCPA provides a cause of action where a debt collector “use[s] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... False representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt violates FDCPA.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within 365 days beginning on the date of the violation; for a violation based on a mailed letter, the violation occurs when the debt collector mails it, and the period ends the day before the anniversary date.

Mattson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., Service Investment Corporation, Doing Business as Service Investment Co · filed 1992-06-01(k)(d)

Once SIC placed the letters in the mail, its conduct with respect to any violation of the FDCPA was complete. The date on which SIC mailed the letters was its last opportunity to comply with the FDCPA, and the mailing of the letters, therefore, triggered section 1692k(d). ... U.S. West and SIC contend, therefore, that if the violation occurred on November 27, 1989, Mattson had 365 days beginning on that date to file her claim. This period ended on November 26, 1990, 365 days later. ... Second, if Mattson's position is accepted, her claim would be timely though filed 366 days "from the date on which the violation occur[red]." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). This result would extend the jurisdiction of federal courts by one day; Rule 82 prohibits such a result.

The FDCPA requires suit within one year of the alleged violation and does not bar peaceable repossession of collateral under an enforceable security agreement when the debtor is in default.

Kiefer v. Harris · filed 1997-08-21(k)(d)

However, FDCPA actions must be brought within one year of the date on which the alleged statutory violation occurred. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The repossession in this case occurred on August 11, 1993, and Kiefer filed her original action on June 22, 1995. Thus, the FDCPA claim fails because it is untimely. Moreover, the FDCPA does not preclude debt collectors from peaceably repossessing property subject to an enforceable security agreement when the debtor is in default.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA civil action to be filed within one year after the violation occurs, measured from when the cause of action accrued.

Peoples v. Wendover Funding, Inc. · filed 1998-05-08(k)(d)

The FDCPA requires that a civil action be brought within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... Accordingly, the statute of limitations contained in § 1692k(d) bars her cause of action because she brought suit more than one year after her cause of action accrued under the FDCPA.

Section 1692k(d) gives an FDCPA claimant one year from the date the violation occurs to sue.

Backus v. I.Q. Data International, Inc. · filed 2021-03-04(k)(d)

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), the statute of limitations for a claim under the FDCPA is one year from the date on which the violation occurs. The last act alleged in the complaint that could reasonably give rise to a claim under the FDCPA took place on September 11, 2018, and plaintiff’s FDCPA claim would be timely if it were filed before September 11, 2019. The complaint in this case was filed on May 20, 2020, and plaintiff’s FDCPA is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA claim to be brought within one year of the violation.

Flores v. Forster & Garbus LLP · filed 2021-05-11(d)

FDCPA claims must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... Thus, there are no grounds for relation back, and Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims against ProVest are time-barred and must be dismissed.

Section 1692k(d) starts the FDCPA limitations period when the violation first occurs, so a later filing that merely continues the initial debt-collection assertion does not create a separate violation.

Keith v. Bruce · filed 2021-06-09(k)(d)

The Court finds that Defendant’s Second Motion for Default Judgment does not constitute a separate, independent FDCPA violation as it relates to the original claims for interest and fees under the Note. Rather, this filing simply gave “continuing effect” to Mariner’s initial assertion for interest and fees in its state-court complaint. Id. This was simply a single attempt to collect a debt. The statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims began to run on August 29, 2019 (and certainly no later than October 18, 2019). Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on November 13, 2020, over a year after the limitations period began to run. The Complaint must be dismissed as time barred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Section 1692k(d) requires an action to enforce FDCPA liability to be brought within one year after the violation occurs.

Bradley v. Progress Residential Property Manager, LLC · filed 2021-06-25(k)(d)

The undersigned finds Defendant’s arguments here to be compelling. The undersigned will, therefore, recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA and/or negligence – stemming from allegations in 2016.

Section 1692k(d) requires FDCPA claims to be filed within one year after the violation occurs.

Hardie v. CIT bank · filed 2021-08-16(d)

But FDCPA claims must be filed “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); see also Bender v. Elmore & Throop, P.C., 963 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2020). Because all of the events described in the Amended Complaint occurred in or before August 2017, while the action was not filed until September 12, 2020, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims are dismissed as untimely.

An action to enforce liability under the FDCPA must be brought within one year after the violation occurs.

Patterson v. Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc. · filed 2021-08-24(k)(d)

Section 1692k(d) of the Act provides: An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (emphasis added). ... With no indication to the contrary from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against FAMS is dismissed because it was not brought within one year from the date of the alleged violation.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within one year of the violation, measured from when the violation occurs rather than when it is discovered.

Boote v. Finance of America Mortgage, LLC · filed 2021-11-12(d)

Under the FDCPA, “[a]n action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court ... within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d). In the Third Circuit, a claim under 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d) runs from “the date on which the violation occurs,” not when it is discovered.

The FDCPA requires an action to be filed within one year after the violation occurs, and the limitations period runs from the violation date rather than the date of discovery.

Sonderegger v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2022-01-13(k)(d)

A cause of action under the FDCPA must be filed “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... The Eighth Circuit’s precedent makes sense because the Supreme Court specifically held that the statute of limitations for FDCPA claims begins to run on the date that the alleged violation occurs, not on the date when the plaintiff discovers the violation. Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 358.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within one year after the violation occurs.

Green v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2022-03-08(d)

As an initial matter, any claim for violations of the FDCPA must be brought within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. 15 U.S.C. §1692k(d). Any actions allegedly taken by SLS in violation of the FDCPA prior to April 18, 2018, one year prior to the plaintiffs’ filing of the original complaint, would therefore be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year after the violation occurs.

Sanders v. National Credit Service · filed 2022-03-28(d)

FDCPA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (“An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought . . . within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.”).

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be brought within one year from the date of the violation.

Schneider v. Credit Human Federal Credit Union · filed 2022-03-31(k)(d)

The statute of limitations for an action under the FDCPA is one year from the date of the violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); Jodway v. Orlans, PC, 759 Fed. Appx. 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2018). Therefore, Count Seven is time-barred.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be commenced within one year of the violation, which here began when plaintiffs received the collection letter.

AKEGNAN v. TRINITY FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC · filed 2022-08-16(k)(d)

For example, the proposed amended allegations premised on the false and misleading nature of defendants’ debt collection letter are likely untimely under the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (FDCPA action must be commenced “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs”).

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within one year after the alleged violation.

Lewis v. Steward · filed 2022-09-30(k)(d)

FDCPA actions must be brought within one year from the date of the alleged violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... As the Report observes, the vast majority of the alleged events in the Complaint occurred more than one year before the Complaint was filed on August 29, 2019, and thus, the FDCPA claims are time barred.

Section 1692k(d) gives an FDCPA claim a one-year statute of limitations.

Gonzalez v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-01-17(k)(d)

Gonzalez’s FDCPA claim against all defendants is time-barred. The statute of limitations for such claims is one year. Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1511 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)).

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within one year after the violation occurs.

Assed v. CreditOne, LLC. · filed 2023-01-19(k)(d)

Defendants move to dismiss Ms. Assed’s FDCPA claim solely on the basis that it is time-barred under § 1692(k). The Court agrees. ... The FDCPA has a one-year statute of limitations: ... within one year from the date on which the violation occurs. ... Ms. Assed failed to plead with sufficient factual specificity that Defendants’ alleged FDCPA violations occurred within the one-year statute-of-limitations.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA action to be filed within one year from the date of the violation.

McClain v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Wells Fargo Home Mortgage · filed 2023-01-30(k)(d)

Finally, McClain alleges violations under three federal statutes: ... while the FDCPA has a one-year statute of limitations, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... She does not, however, provide any incidents of unlawful debt collection occurring within one year of the filing of her Amended Complaint. Because McClain did not file the present litigation until 2017, her statutory claims for violations of the FDCPA, PHIFA, MMFPA, and Regulation O, are also time-barred.

An FDCPA action generally must be filed within one year after the violation occurs, although equitable tolling may apply in extraordinary circumstances.

WOODS v. CACH, LLC · filed 2023-02-01(k)(d)

Under the FDCPA, “[a]n action to enforce any liability . . . may be brought . . . within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.”

Section 1692k(d) gives each discrete FDCPA violation its own one-year limitations period, measured from the date that violation occurs.

Bouye v. James Bruce, Jr. · filed 2023-03-01(k)(d)

That rule comes straight from the text of the statute. “[T]he date on which the violation occurs” determines when the one-year statute of limitations starts running. § 1692k(d). Find the FDCPA violation in the complaint. Count out a year. That determines the statute of limitations. ... If we were to only consider the date Mariner filed suit, like Bruce asks us to, without regard to subsequent FDCPA violations within that lawsuit, we would create a rule that disregards the fact that § 1692k(d) creates an independent statute of limitations for each violation of the FDCPA. ... So the district court erred in dismissing the entire case on statute-of-limitations grounds.

Section 1692k(d) gives an FDCPA claim a one-year statute of limitations, which applies to claims based on conduct in a foreclosure proceeding and runs from service of the foreclosure complaint.

DeBoskey v. Statebridge Company, LLC · filed 2023-03-20(d)

The FDCPA and FCCPA claims that Plaintiff asserts in Counts I and II, respectively, are based on Defendants’ maintenance of and participation in the foreclosure action that remains pending in Hernando County. FDCPA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), and FCCPA claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, see Fla. Stat. § 559.77(4). Where a plaintiff bases FDCPA and FCCPA claims on a foreclosure proceeding, these statutes of limitations run from the date the plaintiff was served with the foreclosure complaint. See Rivas v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 676 F. App’x 926, 929−30 (11th Cir. 2017); Archer v. Aldridge Connors, LLP, 998 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA claim to be brought within one year of the alleged violation.

McBryde v. Freedom Mortgage · filed 2023-04-14(k)(d)

A FDCPA claim must be brought within one year of the date when the alleged violation occurs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Here, Plaintiffs allege violations of the FDCPA in a Complaint filed on October 14, 2022, based on a letter dated September 15, 2019. The undersigned finds that Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims against Freedom Mortgage based on the referenced letter are time-barred.

Section 1692k(d) imposes a one-year limitations period on FDCPA claims, running from service of the foreclosure complaint when the claim is based on foreclosure proceedings.

DeBoskey v. Statebridge Company, LLC · filed 2023-05-09(k)(d)

As the Court noted in its prior order dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. 24, FDCPA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), and FCCPA claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, see Fla. Stat. § 559.77(4). When a plaintiff bases FDCPA and FCCPA claims on a foreclosure proceeding, these statutes of limitations run from the date the plaintiff was served with the foreclosure complaint.

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA claim to be filed within one year after the violation occurs.

Balash v. The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association · filed 2023-07-10(k)(d)

An FDCPA claim must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). ... Plaintiff filed the original complaint in October 2022, thus any FDCPA violation that occurred prior to October 2021 is barred by the statute of limitations. With two exceptions, because all actions alleged in the Complaint with respect to the foreclosure occurred between 2006 and 2017, more than four years prior to Plaintiff’s filing of this action, they are time-barred. The two exceptions consist of Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants filed a fraudulent referee’s deed on October 4, 2022, and “scheduled the auction and sale of the premises for October 31, 2022.” (Dkt. No. 1, at 14–15). While these events are not time-barred under the FDCPA, the Complaint contains no factual allegations regarding any communications with Plaintiff or that would allow a plausible inference that Defendants’ filing of the referee’s deed or second sale of the premises constituted actionable conduct under there FDCPA. Accordingly, the motions to dismiss by Defendants BNYM, MIT, and McCabe, Weisberg & Conway is granted.

Section 1692k(d) gives each discrete FDCPA violation its own one-year limitations period, running from the date the violation occurs.

Osure Brown v. Transworld Systems, Inc. · filed 2023-07-14(d)

Although we perhaps have not yet said so explicitly, every alleged FDCPA violation triggers its own one-year statute of limitations as provided in §1692k(d).

Section 1692k(d) requires an FDCPA claim to be brought within one year after the alleged violation.

Mickman v. Philadelphia Professional Collections LLC · filed 2023-10-02(d)

The FDCPA claims are plainly time-barred. An FDCPA claim must be brought within one year from the date of the violation. See Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).

Section 1692k(d) generally gives a plaintiff one year from the FDCPA violation—not its discovery—to sue; conduct in a collection lawsuit that merely reaffirms the suit’s legitimacy does not create a new violation.

Delia v. NewRez LLC · filed 2023-11-20(k)(d)

An action to enforce the FDCPA must be filed “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); Maloy v. Phillips, 64 F.3d 607, 608 (11th Cir. 1995). “That language unambiguously sets the date of the violation as the event that starts the one-year limitations period.” Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 360. So “absent the application of an equitable doctrine, the statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) begins to run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not the date on which the violation is discovered.” Id. at 358. ... Because the litigation conduct challenged by Delia involved no more than reaffirming the legitimacy of the foreclosure suit, this conduct is not independently actionable under the FDCPA. Thus, the one-year limitations period began to run from either filing or service of that lawsuit. ... Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed this FDCPA action as time barred.