15 U.S.C. § 1692

The FDCPA covers only debts arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; commercial debts are outside its protections.

Speer v. US National Bank · filed 2023-03-20(a)(3), (a)(5)

As pled, Ms. Speer fails to allege that the loan at issue constitutes a “debt” covered by the FDCPA. Not once does Ms. Speer allege that the Property was used for personal, family, or household purposes. Nor does she state that the Property is, or was, used as her personal residence. ... Even construed liberally, Ms. Speer has failed to allege facts that the instant dispute arises from a consumer transaction. ... Accordingly, the Defendants motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

The FDCPA applies only to obligations arising from consensual consumer transactions, so traffic fines are not debts covered by the Act.

Calderon v. Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson LLP · filed 2023-03-21(a)(5)

The Act does not define “transaction”, but the Ninth Circuit has held the Act is limited in reach “to those obligations to pay arising from consensual transactions, where parties negotiate or contract for consumer-related goods or services.” ... Because traffic fines do not constitute “debts” for purposes of the FDCPA, the statute does not apply to Defendant’s effort to collect the fines.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not apply unless the defendants are debt collectors and the dispute involves a debt within the statute's scope.

Bey v. Chastek · filed 2023-06-07(a)(5) and (6)

Nor does the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, apply because none of the defendants is a “debt collector” and there is no dispute over any “debt” within the scope of that statute, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and (6).

Section 1692a(5) requires a plaintiff to plausibly plead that the underlying debt arose primarily from personal, family, or household purposes; merely stating that the debt is personal on information and belief is insufficient.

Thomas v. Law Offices of Steven Cohen, LLC · filed 2024-01-02(a)(5)

A plaintiff like Thomas must adequately plead under the Twombly/Iqbal standard that the underlying debt is “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). ... But I do not think it is enough for a complaint to state simply that “upon information and belief, the debt is personal,” as Thomas does here.

Sections 1692a(3) and 1692a(5) limit the FDCPA to natural persons and obligations arising primarily from personal, family, or household purposes, excluding business loans.

Northwest Investment Holdings, LLC v. Civic Real Estate Holdings III, LLC · filed 2024-05-15(a)(3), (a)(5)

Consistent with these definitions, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the Act applies to consumer debts and not business loans.” ... The loan here was a business loan. ... In addition, Plaintiff is a business, not a natural person, and thus is not a “consumer” under the FDCPA. The FDCPA does not apply here, so Plaintiff’s first and third claims for relief must be dismissed.

Section 1692a(5) excludes federal tax obligations from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt”.

Wilson v. Cavalry SPV II, LLC · filed 2024-11-06(a)(5)

Federal taxes are not a debt [under the FDCPA].

The FDCPA applies only to obligations arising primarily from consumer transactions, so a tax assessment is not a debt under the statute; the statute also regulates debt collectors and prohibits abusive collection conduct.

Pina v. Bank of America Corporation · filed 2025-06-04(a)(5)

The allegation that BoA put a hold on Plaintiff’s bank account in response to a state-issued notice does not suggest a claim under the FDCPA. At the outset, Plaintiff does not allege that BoA engaged in the type of abusive behavior that the statute prohibits. Also, the tax obligation underlying the hold on Plaintiff’s account does not constitute a debt as defined by the statute. Finally, BoA was not acting as a debt collector, as the statute defines, under the circumstances alleged in the complaint. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA applies only to debts incurred for personal, family, or household purposes.

Moon v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2025-10-02(a)

Taken together, the plain text of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) means that the FDCPA applies only to debts incurred for “personal, family, or household purposes.” See Bloom v. I.C. System, Inc., 972 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1992).

Section 1692g does not prohibit a collection letter from stating an amount “Now Due” alongside the total “Balance” when an unsophisticated consumer would understand that the former is only the portion of the balance the creditor will currently accept; such wording neither contradicts nor overshadows the validation notice, and the “Balance” adequately states the amount of the debt.

Olson, Deborah L. v. Risk Mgmt Alternativ · filed 2004-04-27(g), (g)(a)(1)

We agree with the district court, however, that the words “Now Due,” when considered in the context of the letters at issue, do not eviscerate the message conveyed in the debt-validation notice. The phrase “Now Due,” even to an unsophisticated consumer, simply means that the debt collector is willing to accept less than the total balance of the debt to bring the account to a current status. The consumer has the option of paying the amount due, paying the total balance, or doing neither and contesting the debt. These options do not contradict one another. When used in conjunction with a “Balance” figure, simply listing an amount “Now Due” does not contradict or overshadow the validation notice. ... We conclude that an unsophisticated consumer, able to make “basic logical deductions and inferences” and to not interpret collection letters “in a bizarre or idiosyncratic fashion,” Pettit, 211 F.3d at 1060, would understand that the amount of the debt is the “Balance” and that the amount “Now Due” is the portion of the balance that the creditor will accept for the time being until the next bill arrives.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to give a consumer thirty days to dispute a debt, and a collection letter that makes that notice ineffective violates the FDCPA.

Robles v. Corporate Receivables, Inc. · filed 2004-03-02(g)

Therefore, since, as complained, Defendant sent this second debt collection letter (Letter 2) within the thirty-day validation period, Letter 2 violates the FDCPA. ... Whether a form debt collection letter violates the law is determined according to the “unsophisticated consumer” standard and it is not necessary for the debtor to demonstrate that he has read the letters at issue or was confused by them.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a debt collector's validation notice to state that the consumer has thirty days after receiving the notice to dispute the debt.

Rivera v. Amalgamated Debt Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2006-10-16(a)(3)

The Court, therefore, finds that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g by not specifying in its notices that debtors have thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice to challenge the debt.

Section 1692g does not require a debt collector to send an additional validation notice for the same debt when the requisite notice was already issued in an earlier foreclosure complaint.

Oppong v. First Union Mortgage Corp. · filed 2009-05-06(g)

Even assuming that Wells Fargo’s substitution in the foreclosure action could somehow be described as an attempt to collect on the debt, § 1692g did not require an additional validation notice from Wells Fargo because, as we have already discussed, the requisite validation notice regarding the same debt had already been issued in the foreclosure complaint more than one year earlier.

Section 1692 requires a debt-collection letter to clearly explain statements that could contradict or confuse the required debt-validation notice.

Dunn v. DERRICK E. McGAVIC, PC · filed 2009-09-01

To avoid liability under § 1692, a debt collection letter must sufficiently explain any statements that contradict or confuse the required validation notice.

A debt collector may not require a consumer to dispute the debt in writing in the validation notice.

Castillo v. Frenkel · filed 2010-12-23(g)(a)(3)

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, however, states a cause of action in paragraph 23 (b) thereof, in that it alleges a violation of the FDCPA based upon the fact that defendant’s dunning letter of September 1, 2008 improperly-included a notice that in the event plaintiff sought to dispute the debt, he was required to do so in writing.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to send a written validation notice, but under Ninth Circuit law the collector need not establish the consumer’s actual receipt of that notice.

Grant v. Unifund CCR Partners · filed 2012-02-06(a)

Under Ninth Circuit law, a § 1692g(a) notice must be “sent” to the consumer by the collector, but the collector “need not establish actual receipt by the debtor.”

Section 1692g(a)(4) and (5) require written disputes or requests, but Section 1692g(a)(3) does not.

Kennedy v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp. · filed 2014-03-31(g)(a)(3)-(5)

Thus, Sections 1692g(a)(4) and (5) impose an “in writing” requirement but Section 1692g(a)(3) does not.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to send written validation information, including the amount of the debt and dispute rights, within five days after the initial communication, and failure to provide that notice violates the statute.

Bland v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2015-09-08(g)

Failure to provide such notice (even where, as here, it appears that there is no dispute about the validity of the underlying debt) is a clear violation of § 1692g.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to communicate the consumer’s validation rights effectively, including the 30-day dispute period and cessation of collection until verification after a timely dispute.

Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell · filed 2017-01-13(g)

In this context, the threat of recording of a lien is a debt collection activity, which under the FDCPA must cease if the debtor-homeowner disputes the debt and the debt collector has not yet mailed verification of the debt to the debtor-homeowner. The Davis-Stirling Act does not mandate otherwise. Epsten was obligated to explain such debt validation rights in an effective manner. See Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225. In failing to do so, the threat of filing a lien overshadowed Mashiri’s right to dispute the debt, in violation of § 1692g.

Sections 1692d and 1692g prohibit harassment by debt collectors, including conduct whose natural consequence is harassment even without intent to annoy, and require a validation notice to be sent, but not necessarily received, by the consumer.

Decker v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC · filed 2019-03-11(d), (d)(5), (g)

Section 1692d of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits debt collectors from engaging in any conduct, the “natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. ... A reasonable jury could conclude that the “natural consequence” of calling someone an average of two times a day for five months straight—often twice within the same hour, on the weekends, and despite (according to Decker) repeated requests to stop—would be to “harass, oppress, or abuse” the person on the other end. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. ... A debt collector can violate this provision even if it did not have the intent to annoy the debtor. ... The latter is a sufficient-but-not-necessary subset of the former. ... The statute does not require receipt; Decker must show that the notice was not sent. ... There is no dispute that Receivables sent the required information to an address that Decker provided; to the degree there is a dispute, it is whether “#6” should have been in the address.

Section 1692g(a)(3) does not require a consumer's notice disputing a debt's validity to be in writing.

Untershine v. Encore Receivable Management Inc · filed 2019-08-09(a)(3)

Having reviewed the relevant authority, the court is persuaded that there is no requirement that a notice of a dispute under § 1692g(a)(3) must be in writing. Most significant in the court’s analysis is that Congress omitted any writing requirement in subsection (3) but included it in subsections (4) and (5), as well as in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to notify a consumer that the consumer has 30 days to dispute a debt's validity, but does not require the dispute to be in writing.

Bluming v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC · filed 2019-10-03(g)

The FDCPA requires the debt collector to send a written notice to the consumer stating that the consumer has 30 days to dispute the validity of the debt before it will be assumed valid. 15 U.S.C. §1692g. It does not require that disputes be in writing. See Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013). ... Here, the letter tracks §1692 nearly verbatim and contains no overshadowing or contradicting statements. See Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996) (“A notice is overshadowing or contradictory if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights” or is “reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading.”). Therefore, it is not misleading.

Section 1692g(a)(3) requires a validation notice from a debt collector to state that an undisputed debt will be assumed valid by the debt collector; adding that it will also be assumed valid by the creditor does not mislead the least sophisticated consumer.

Lorenzo v. Durham & Durham LLP · filed 2020-04-07(g)(a)(3)

The least sophisticated consumer, who understands the debt collector is the creditor’s agent and the creditor have the same right as the debt collector, would not be misled. “Thus, because the same implication arises whether or not the language of the notice is ‘assumed valid by the debt collector,’ as required by statute, or ‘assumed valid by the creditor,’ as stated in the letter, the letter did not mislead.” Id. Therefore, inline with the reasoning in Caceres, the Court finds that the validation notice in this case would not mislead the least sophisticated consumer.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector validation notice to explain that a written dispute within thirty days triggers verification of the debt and suspension of collection efforts.

LESZCZYNSKI v. D&A SERVICES, LLC · filed 2021-04-20(g)

The following paragraph – the sentence Leszczynski contends is deceiving – told him that if he did either of the things listed in the prior paragraph, D&A would “suspend [its] efforts to collect the debt . . . .” (Id.) Read in its entirety, the letter apprised Leszczynski of his obligations under Section 1692(g).

The FDCPA requires an action to be filed within one year after the violation and gives a consumer 30 days after receiving a validation notice to dispute the debt and request validation.

TAGGART v. NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. · filed 2022-03-18(k)(d), (g)(a)

An action under the FDCPA must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); ... Plaintiff was served with the Collection Lawsuit on July 10, 2014, but did not file this action until six years later, on June 29, 2020. As such, the statute of limitations for any claimed violations of the FDCPA has run and summary judgment is granted for Defendants on counts One, Three, and Seven. ... Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a), a debt collector is required to validate debts that a consumer owes. ... But Mr. Taggart’s request was untimely. Mr. Taggart had 30 days from receipt of the November 5, 2013 letter to dispute the validity of the debt and request validation, but he waited more than six years after the notice had been sent to request validation.8 Warshaw Decl, Attach. 2. As a result, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1692g requires debt collectors to give consumers written notice of specified rights and debt information, and a claim may be dismissed when the complaint lacks sufficient allegations of a violation.

VALENTINE v. MULLOOLY, JEFFREY, ROONEY & FLYNN LLP · filed 2022-07-06(g)

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Section 1692g of the FDCPA, which requires debt collectors to provide the consumer with written notice of certain rights and information related to the debt, such as the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. ... The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to include sufficient allegations demonstrating that they violated Section 1692g.

Section 1692g(b) protects a consumer's right to have collection cease after a timely written dispute until the debt collector mails verification, and misleading the consumer into reasserting that right can cause a concrete injury.

Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services, L. · filed 2023-06-07(g)(b)

But with the second postage fee of $3.95, Mack has pled harm to an underlying concrete interest that Congress sought to protect.

Section 1692g(b) allows a debt collector that receives a dispute either to provide the requested validation and continue collection or to cease collection activity.

Rivera v. NCB Management Services Incorporated · filed 2023-11-14(g)(b)

Thus, § 1692g(b) essentially gives debt collectors two options after receiving notice of a dispute: they may either provide the requested validation and continue their collection efforts or cease all collection activity.

The FDCPA requires a debt collector to provide the specified validation notice and debt-collector disclosure, prohibits deceptive settlement demands that conceal a debt's time-barred status, and does not make a single collection letter without other objectionable conduct actionable harassment.

Hawkins · filed 2026-02-23

Section 1692g(a) requires debt collectors to send the consumer a written notice “[w]ithin five days of the initial communication with that consumer.” ... Plaintiff pled sufficient facts that plausibly allege a violation of § 1692g(a) because he pled that the initial letter did not contain the five items enumerated in § 1692g(a), and that he never received a separate notice supplying the missing information. ... Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Defendant violated §1692e(10) by simultaneously offering a settlement and failing to indicate the debt’s judicial enforceability. ... Taking these allegations as true and applying the requisite “unsophisticated” or “least sophisticated” consumer standard, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant violated §1692e(11). ... Like Vazzano, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a violation of §1692d because he pled one contact without any other objectionable conduct.

Section 1692g requires a debt collector to provide a validation notice within five days of the initial communication.

Hunter · filed 2025-10-09(g)

Under § 1692g, a debt collector who solicits payment from a consumer must, within five days of the initial communication, provide the debtor with a detailed and written “validation notice” setting forth the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.

Section 1692(e) prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in collecting a debt, including materially misleading statements about a debtor’s legal rights.

Crespo v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, LLP · filed 2025-03-20(e)

This case is straightforward under Easterling and Arias. Crespo alleges, and adduces sufficient evidence to for a reasonable jury to find, that he “told Mr. Thigpen that all the money in [his] bank account was COVID-19 stimulus funds and unemployment benefits”—which are exempt—and that Thigpen replied that “the only way you’re going to get your money released is if you sign this [] agreement.” ... Like in Easterling, Thigpen’s alleged statement was technically untrue. Instead of signing the agreement, Crespo could have waited for his bank to submit an exemption form to GMBS, submitted the form on his own, or otherwise communicated to GMBS that his funds were exempt. ... Easterling instructs that a debt collector’s representation incorrectly implying that a difficult-to-obtain form of relief is unobtainable is actionable under the FDCPA. And Arias explains why such a misrepresentation is material: When a debtor is misled regarding their legal rights in debt collection, that is, of course, prone to influence them to accept the less-than-ideal solutions that they believe remain.

The FDCPA prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, requires specified disclosures, and makes violating debt collectors liable for damages and fees.

Snider v. Premium Resolution Services, LLC · filed 2022-06-03(e)(2)(A), (e)(3), (e)(5), (e)(10), (e)(11), (e)(14), (g)(a), (k)(a)

First, PRS violated the FDCPA by falsely representing the legal status of the alleged debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). ... Next, PRS created the false representation that it was a law firm and made threats to file a lawsuit that it did not intend to file. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), (5). ... Finally, PRS failed to make certain required disclosures and violated mandatory standards for attempting to collect a debt under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11), 1692g(a). ... PRS used false representation and deception as means to collect an alleged debt from Snider. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). PRS’ actions were in violation of the FDCPA and, therefore, PRS is subject to civil liability. Id. § 1692k.

Section 1692e requires courts to judge whether a debt collector's communication is false, deceptive, or misleading from the perspective of an unsophisticated debtor.

Born v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC · filed 2010-06-17(e)

In determining whether a communication by a debt collector is false, deceptive, or misleading under the FDCPA, we are obliged to view the communication through the eyes of the “unsophisticated debtor.”

Section 1692e(7) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing or implying that a consumer committed a crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.

In Re Accelerated Recovery Systems, Inc. · filed 2010-03-09(e)(7)

Appellee cannot avoid liability under § 1692e(7) of the FDCPA for the handwritten statement. Contrary to the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that “[t]he statement was true and the [appellee] has not violated,” the statement, as a matter of law, was not true, and it violates § 1692e(7).

Section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a debt collector from misrepresenting the amount or status of a debt, including by continuing to insist that money is owed after the debt has been paid.

Williams v. Edelman · filed 2005-12-28(e)(2)(A)

When read in the light most favorable to Williams, she has alleged that although she paid her debt, Defendants nevertheless continued to insist that she owed money (and attempted to collect the money), a claim that may fairly be characterized as alleging a misrepresentation of the “amount” and/or “status” of the debt.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with collecting a debt, including threats of action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended.

Clark v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc. · filed 1999-03-15(e), (e)(5), (e)(10)

Claims against debt collectors under the FDCPA are judged by the standard of the “unsophisticated consumer,” described as the hypothetical consumer whose reasonable perceptions are used to determine if collection messages are deceptive or misleading. ... Keeping those standards in mind, it is not implausible that an unsophisticated consumer who received the RMCB letter might believe litigation was authorized and imminent. Therefore, it cannot be said that Mr. Clark could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Mr. Clark’s complaint is denied.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from making false or misleading representations, including unauthorized threats of legal action, deceptive collection representations, or false claims of being a consumer reporting agency.

Combs v. Direct Marketing Credit Services, Inc. · filed 1999-03-18(e)(5), (e)(10), and (e)(16)

Among the standards enacted to prevent such abuse is the requirement that debt collectors abstain from engaging in "false or misleading representations," including threatening "to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken," 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5); using "any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt;" 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10); and falsely "represent[ing] or implicat[ing] that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(16). ... Turning first to § 1692e(5), courts have found that for a collection notice impermissibly to threaten legal action, it must falsely "communicate that a lawsuit is not merely a possibility, but that a decision to pursue legal action is either imminent or has already been made." Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F.Supp. 1120, 1136 (N.D.Ill., 1998). ... Applying the objective standard of an unsophisticated debtor, we fail to see how the words contained in the notice imply that litigation has been, or will be, initiated. ... Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the defendant's name could trick an unsophisticated consumer into believing that the defendant is a credit reporting agency.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading practices, but § 1692e(11) does not apply to a complaint or pleading, and the defendants’ collection complaint and affidavit did not violate § 1692e because the debt was assigned for collection and the defendants acted as Memorial’s debt collectors and agents.

Parish v. Frazier · filed 1999-12-16(e), (e)(11), (e)(12)

The district court found that § 1692e(11) was not applicable, by its express terms, to a complaint or pleading. Also, even if the section were applicable, the district court found that there would have been no violation. Likewise, the court found no violation of § 1692e(12) (even assuming it applied) because the record clearly indicates that the relationship between Memorial and the defendants was that of creditor and debt collector. We agree. ... Thus, Memorial clearly retained control and ownership of the debt owed by Parish. The sworn affidavit was not misleading, and does not constitute a violation of the FDCPA § 1692e by the defendants.

Section 1692e(16) prohibits falsely representing or implying that a debt collector operates as or is employed by a consumer reporting agency, assessed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable unsophisticated debtor.

Pettit, Lori v. Retrieval Masters · filed 2000-05-09(e)(16)

The FDCPA specifically prohibits a "false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency . . . ." 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692e(16). ... According to our unsophisticated debtor standard, a statement will not be confusing or misleading unless a significant fraction of the population would be similarly misled. ... A careful reading of the letter would not lead an unsophisticated debtor to believe that Retrieval is identified as a credit reporting agency. So we agree with the district court that any danger of misreading created by simply placing the name "Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc." on the letterhead does not violate the Act.

Section 1692e(16) prohibits a debt collector from falsely representing or implying that it operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency, judged from the perspective of an objectively unsophisticated debtor.

Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., and Russell Fuchs · filed 2000-06-07(e)(16)

The FDCPA specifically prohibits a “false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency....” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(16). ... Practices purporting to violate the Act must be viewed from the objective standard of an “unsophisticated debtor.” ... According to our unsophisticated debtor standard, a statement will not be confusing or misleading unless a significant fraction of the population would be similarly misled. ... A careful reading of the letter would not lead an unsophisticated debtor to believe that Retrieval is identified as a credit reporting agency. So we agree with the district court that any danger of misreading created by simply placing the name “Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc.” on the letterhead does not violate the Act.

Section 1692e is not violated when collection documents accurately identify a debt as assigned for collection and the creditor retains control and ownership of the debt.

Parish v. Frazier · filed 1999-10-13(e), (e)(11), (e)(12)

The attachments to the collections complaint in question expressly indicate that Parish’s debt was assigned “for collection” only and authorize the defendants to take legal action on behalf of Memorial as Memorial’s agents, not in their own right. Further, the contract between Memorial and the defendants also specifies that the debt was assigned only for collection and that any amounts collected by the defendants were to be paid in full to Memorial. Thus, Memorial clearly retained control and ownership of the debt owed by Parish. The sworn affidavit was not misleading, and does not constitute a violation of the FDCPA § 1692e by the defendants.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false or misleading representations or deceptive means to collect a debt.

McStay v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2001-10-31(e)

Section 1692e prevents a debt collector from using false or misleading means or representations to collect a debt. ... Both sections deal with the use of misleading or deceptive means to collect a debt. ... Since the court has already decided that the February letter cannot reasonably admit of two‘different readings, the court must conclude that the February letter does not violate §§ 1692e and 1692e(10).

Section 1692(e) prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations even when the misrepresentation is unintentional.

Frye v. BOWMAN, HEINTZ, BOSCIA AND VICIAN, PC · filed 2002-01-28(e)

The court concludes that § 1692e does not require that the misrepresentations be knowing or intentional.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations judged from the perspective of an unsophisticated consumer; the challenged letter statements and omission of the response deadline did not violate the statute.

Peters v. General Services · filed 2002-01-28(e)

In evaluating whether a debt collection letter is false, misleading, or deceptive in violation of § 1692e, the letter must be viewed through the eyes of an unsophisticated consumer. ... We conclude as a matter of law that the statement does not violate § 1692e. ... The phrase "or otherwise plead" is sufficient to alert an unsophisticated consumer that he or she need not physically appear to deny a petition. ... We conclude that the failure to mention the thirty day deadline in the VA does not violate § 1692e.

Section 1692(e) prohibits deceptive or misleading debt-collection conduct, but a person who merely reads a letter addressed to someone else cannot sue based on its contents because the letter was not a communication to that person.

Laura Kropelnicki, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Hal Siegel, Linda Strumpf, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellant · filed 2002-05-08(e)

For the same reason, Kropelnicki has no standing to claim that the contents of the letter violated the FDCPA. Even if the letter contained language that was threatening or misleading, it was not threatening or misleading as to Kropelnicki because it was not addressed to her. Put another way, prohibited language in the letter sent to Evanauskas cannot create a cause of action for Kropelnicki merely because she read the letter containing the threat. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no set of facts under which Kropelnicki could state a claim based on the October 28 letter.

Section 1692(e) prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means when collecting a debt, and the court evaluates alleged deception under the unsophisticated-debtor standard.

Hogan v. MKM ACQUISITIONS, LLC · filed 2003-01-17(e)

When reviewing documents for compliance with the FDCPA, such as the two letters sent by MKM, the court uses the “unsophisticated debtor” standard. ... The unsophisticated debtor standard also presupposes that an unsophisticated debtor “possesses the rudimentary knowledge about the financial world, is wise enough to read collection notices with added care, possesses ‘reasonable intelligence,’ and is capable of making basic logical deductions and inferences.” ... Therefore, based on the unsophisticated debtor standard, and the evidence presented, the court finds that the two letters MKM sent to Hogan are not misleading, deceptive, or false. MKM has not violated FDCPA. Therefore MKM is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1692e does not require a separately operated affiliated debt collector to disclose its corporate connection with the creditor, and nondisclosure is not misleading on these facts.

Orenbuch v. North Shore Health Systems, Inc. · filed 2003-03-13(e)(14)

These factors demonstrate that the hospitals and RCRS do business separately. Based on the uncontraverted evidence, the Court concludes that RCRS’s nondisclosure of its connection with the hospitals does not constitute a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” under Section 1692.

Section 1692e bars false or misleading debt-collection demands, § 1692g(a) requires the specified follow-up notice for a claimed debt, and § 1692f(1) bars collecting incidental amounts unless authorized by agreement or law.

Shula v. Paul D. Lawent and J.V.D.B. Associates, Inc. · filed 2004-02-26(e), (f)(1), (g)(a)

Because the plaintiff did not owe the defendants $52.73, the letter demanding that payment as a debt that he did owe them was false and misleading and so violated section 1692e, while the failure to send a follow-up letter violated section 1692g(a). ... Therefore section 1692f(l) was violated as well.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means used in connection with collecting a debt, evaluated from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer.

Kimbro v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2004-09-22(e)

The FDCPA prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Claims under the FDCPA are evaluated under the “least sophisticated consumer” standard.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, but a law-firm collection letter with a clear disclaimer of attorney involvement does not violate § 1692e(3).

Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P. · filed 2005-06-21(e)

In light of the disclaimer, we agree with the district court that the least sophisticated consumer, upon reading this letter, must be taken to understand that no attorney had yet evaluated his or her case, or made recommendations regarding the validity of the creditor’s claims. Accordingly, the district court was correct to conclude, as a matter of law, that the defendants had not used any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, including the “false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), with meaningful involvement as an attorney in the debtor’s case.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with collecting a debt, judged by whether the communication would deceive or mislead an unsophisticated but reasonable consumer.

Headen v. ASSET ACCEPTANCE, LLC. · filed 2005-08-23(e)

An unsophisticated but reasonable consumer would not be deceived by the letters at issue in a manner contemplated by the statute. The interpretation of section 1692e sought by the plaintiffs in these cases would have unreasonable results plainly at variance with the policy of the FDCPA as a whole. Plaintiffs have not stated claims under section 1692e of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaints are granted.

The FDCPA permits a claim when a debt collector knowingly sends a collection letter stating an incorrect debt amount.

Clabault v. Shodeen Management · filed 2005-10-11

Finally, we must determine whether petitioner states an FDCPA claim upon which relief can be granted. By alleging that defendant Agrella was aware that the debt amount was incorrect in the letter he sent to petitioner, petitioner has stated such a claim.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with collecting a debt, and materially misleading statements in formal eviction complaints can state a claim under the least-sophisticated-debtor standard.

Lipscomb v. Raddatz Law Firm, P.L.L.C. · filed 2015-06-18(e)

Although this circuit has not addressed the standard that governs conduct under these provisions, numerous others have held that “[w]hether conduct violates §§ 1692e or § 1692f requires an objective analysis that takes into account whether ‘the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by the communication.’” ... Applying these standards, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under both § 1692e and § 1692f. ... Misrepresenting rental units as not subsidized could, therefore, impede a tenant’s ability to “intelligently choose his or her response” to Defendants’ collection efforts. ... At the end of the day, making false statements to impede tenants’ ability to discover potential defenses to eviction for the nonpayment of their debts strikes the Court as the sort of deceptive and unfair behavior that the Act was intended to prevent.

Section 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, but an accurate bankruptcy proof of claim based solely on a time-barred debt does not trigger it when the claim contains required timing information, the limitations law only bars remedies, and no other legal or factual impediment exists.

Broadrick v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Broadrick) · filed 2015-06-19(e)

The FDCPA should not be impli-catéd with regard to stale debts when' a creditor merely (a) files an accurate proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, (b) when the proof of claim includes all the required information including the timing of the debt, (c) the applicable statute of limitations is one that does not extinguish the right to collect the debt but merely limits the remedies, and (d) no legal impediment to collection or factual circumstances exist that would invoke the FDCPA other than merely the applicability of a statute of limitations.

Section 1692e requires a false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representation to be material—capable of influencing the decision of the least sophisticated debtor—to be actionable.

Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler · filed 2015-06-30(e)

Because the materiality requirement is a corollary of the least sophisticated debtor standard, the relevant “decisionmaking body” here is the least sophisticated debtor. Thus, a statement in a communication is material if it is capable of influencing the decision of the least sophisticated debtor.

Section 1692e can reach allegedly false or deceptive descriptions of fees included in a payoff statement, and a claim may be based on debt-collection conduct rather than the statement as a communication.

Manrique v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. · filed 2015-07-02(e)

Following this reasoning, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint is not premised upon the actual payoff statement itself; rather, the payoff* statement is a part of Defendants’ conduct, and that conduct has allegedly violated the FDCPA and FCCPA. ... A careful reading of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint shows that part of Plaintiffs claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e is premised on the allegation that the mortgage statement’s labeling of property inspection fees as “MISC THIRD PARTY RECOVERABLE Billed” constitutes a “false representation and deceptive means to collect a debt.” ... The allegedly false payoff statement included, though not explicitly, those fees as part of the total amount due. ... Thus, because Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is premised on the conduct of charging allegedly invalid fees and allegedly providing a false payoff statement, which included those fees along with a discrepancy between “Total Fees Owed” and “Other Unpaid Expenses,” ECF No. [18] at 8, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of the FDCPA and the FCCPA.

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from demanding attorneys’ fees in a collection complaint when the fees are not legally authorized, because the demand falsely represents compensation the collector may lawfully receive.

Samms v. Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP · filed 2015-07-06(e)

Thus, the demand for attorneys’ fees in the State Court Complaint falls squarely within Section 1692e’s general prohibition against “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s],” as well as its specific prohibition against “false representation^] of ... compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.”

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using statements that are materially false, deceptive, or misleading, judged objectively from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer; even a technically true statement can violate the statute if it is materially misleading.

Walker v. Shermeta, Adams, Von Allmen · filed 2015-08-10(e)

If additional charges or interest might one day accrue under Plaintiff’s loan agreement, whether added by Defendants’ client or subsequent holders of the note, then Defendants’ letter is not threatening or misleading. ... On balance, however, the letter tracks the FDCPA requirements for debt collection letters, and, under these facts, stating that additional interest or charges “may” accrue is not technically false, nor does it render the letter threatening or materially misleading. However, if Plaintiff can show that interest or charges could never accrue and therefore the balance owed is truly fixed, then his claim should be allowed to go forward to determine if, under those circumstances, Defendants’ letter was threatening or materially misleading.

Section 1692c permits debt collectors to communicate with a represented consumer’s lawyer, even about a debt that may have been discharged, and § 1692e uses a competent-attorney deception standard when the communication is directed to counsel.

Katiuska Bravo v. Midland Credit Management, Inc · filed 2016-02-08(a)(2), (c), and (e)

This Court held in Tinsley v. Integrity Financial Partners, Inc., 634 F.3d 416 (2011), “that § 1692c as a whole permits debt collectors to communicate freely with consumers’ lawyers.” ... A consumer’s name on an envelope does not equate to communication with that consumer when it is sent in “care of” and to the address of an attorney. ... Whether a debt is pending or discharged is irrelevant. ... This case involves alleged false representations to a debtor’s attorney. Therefore, the standard is whether a competent attorney, even if he is not a specialist in consumer debt law, would be deceived by two letters requesting payment for debts resolved in a settlement.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in collecting a debt, including threats of legally unavailable action and false implications that documents are legal process.

Simon v. FIA Card Services NA · filed 2016-02-17(e)

The Simons contend that the subpoenas contained a false statement (the statement that they had been sent to the Simons personally), and an omission (required language from Rule 45) that rendered the communications deceptive and misleading in violation of the FDCPA. We disagree. Although the statement that the subpoenas had been sent to the Simons personally was technically false, it was not material, and is not actionable, because it could not have had an impact on the Simons’ decision with respect to their debt. ... With respect to the omission of text from Rule 45(d)-(e), the subpoenas were technically incomplete without that text, but the omission did not render them false, deceptive, or misleading, even to the least sophisticated debtor. ... This is key, confirming that the subpoenas did not contain a “threat to take [an] action that cannot legally be taken,” in violation of § 1692e(5), because they described an action that legally could be taken. They also did not violate § 1692e(13), which prohibits “[t]he false representation or implication that documents are legal process,” because they were actual legal notices, albeit with procedural defects.

Section 1692e does not prohibit a debt collector from using a licensed trade name, including for purposes of the statute’s true-name rule.

Beider v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc. · filed 2015-11-24(e)

Without converting this motion into one for summary judgment, the Court may take judicial notice of these documents in order to establish that defendant’s use of a licensed trade name does not violate § 1692e.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, but a statement is actionable only if it would materially mislead the least sophisticated debtor.

Gallaher v. Autovest, LLC · filed 2016-03-30(e)

Section 1692e broadly prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... Additionally, “a false or misleading statement is not actionable under § 1692e unless it is material.”

Section 1692e(10) prohibits materially false or misleading representations made to collect or attempt to collect a debt, including misstatements about a debtor's legal rights to cure or reinstate the debt.

Jacobson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2016-05-04(e)(10)

The FDCPA is a strict liability statute which specifically prohibits “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information regarding a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). ... When applying the “least sophisticated consumer” standard, the misleading statement must also be materially false or misleading to violate FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... The District Court correctly concluded Bayview’s false representations about the Jacobsons’ legal rights are a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) and under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f are an unfair practice; the FDCPA violations also constitute violations of § 30-14-103, MCA.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations, but it does not prohibit authorized state-agency agents from accurately identifying the state official on whose behalf they collect debts or using that official’s letterhead.

Sheriff v. Gillie · filed 2016-05-16(e), (e)(9), and (e)(14)

Assuming, arguendo, that special counsel do not rank as “state officers,” we hold, nevertheless, that their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead does not offend §1692e. Not fairly described as “false” or “misleading,” use of the letterhead accurately conveys that special counsel, in seeking to collect debts owed to the State, do so on behalf of, and as instructed by, the Attorney General. ... Special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead at the Attorney General’s direction does not offend §1692e’s general prohibition against “false . . . or misleading representation[s].” ... On safe ground with respect to §1692e’s general proscription against false and misleading representations, special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead is consistent too with §1692e(9)’s specific prohibition against “falsely represent[ing]” that a communication is “authorized, issued, or approved” by a State. ... Nor did special counsel, in sending letters on the Attorney General’s letterhead, use a name other than their “true name,” in violation of §1692e(14).

Section 1692e(10) prohibits debt collectors from using false representations or deceptive means in debt collection, and a statement is misleading if it could deceive the objective least sophisticated debtor.

Balon v. Enhanced Recovery Co. · filed 2016-06-02(e)(10)

Under section 1692e, “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. ... The sub-part alleged to have been violated here is section 1692e(10), which prohibits a debt collector from using “any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). ... When analyzing whether a statement is misleading or deceptive under the FDCPA, the court must apply the objective “judge-made standard” to determine if “the objective least sophisticated debtor would be” mislead or deceived by the challenged statement. ... Thus, Plaintiff states a plausible claim that the statement in question is misleading or deceptive under section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA.

Section 1692(e) bars false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, but filing a factually accurate proof of claim on a time-barred debt does not violate the section when the claim discloses relevant dates and does not misrepresent the debt's character or legal status.

Robinson v. JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC (In re Robinson) · filed 2016-07-28(e)

This Court concludes that the filing of the claim does not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The proof of claim identifies a debt owed by the plaintiff to the defendants that was scheduled in her bankruptcy case. The proof of claim also contains specific information regarding the date the debt was charged off, the date of the last payment on the account, and the date of the last transaction. There is nothing false, deceptive or misleading about filing a proof of claim with specific true factual disclosures, and the claim is not a direct misrepresentation of the character and legal status of the debt.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with debt collection, including representations made in court filings.

Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S · filed 2016-09-07(e)

Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive or misleading representation in connection with the collection of any debt. ... Accordingly, we hold that representations may violate § 1692e of the FDCPA even if made in court filings in litigation.

Section 1692e prohibits false or misleading representations about a debt, including treating prospective collection costs as amounts already owed when the least sophisticated consumer could understand them that way.

Annunziato v. Collecto, Inc. · filed 2016-09-19(e)(2)

However, nowhere in this letter does the Defendant indicate that the total amount due reflects an estimate of the Defendant’s collection costs. Rather, the Defendant lists the collection costs as part of the Plaintiffs overall debt. Therefore, the Court finds that the least sophisticated consumer could easily misinterpret the Defendant’s letter to mean that the Plaintiff actually owed $1,382.79 in collection costs, when it fact it did not. As the cases above establish, such misinformation about the amount of a debt is a clear violation of Section 1692e(2).

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means to collect a debt, including a time-barred debt letter that omits material warnings about the consequences of partial payment or a promise to pay and the legal bar on suit.

Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2017-03-29(e)

To accomplish those purposes, the Act provides in sweeping terms: “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The question is how that language applies to the dunning letter here, which attempted to collect a debt barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ... We agree with the district court’s two reasons for finding that the dunning letter here was deceptive. First, the letter does not even hint, let alone make clear to the recipient, that if he makes a partial payment or even just a promise to make a partial payment, he risks loss of the otherwise ironclad protection of the statute of limitations. Second, the letter did not make clear to the recipient that the law prohibits the collector from suing to collect this old debt. Either is sufficient reason to affirm summary judgment for the plaintiff.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations, and a collection letter is evaluated from the perspective of an unsophisticated consumer.

Bassett v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc. · filed 2017-05-25(e)

In evaluating whether a debt collection letter is false, misleading, or deceptive in violation of § 1692e, the letter must be viewed through the eyes of an unsophisticated consumer. ... For purposes of this motion early in litigation, the court agrees with the plaintiff in most respects. First, the statement regarding the appointment could be construed by an unsophisticated consumer as mandatory. The statement also could be construed as misleading or confusing regarding the requirement to show up for the appointment failing which CBS would proceed with unspecified and presumably more serious collection efforts. The court cannot determine as a matter of law that the statement is not misleading. It is misleading to indicate that a debtor must meet with CBS at a particular time and place.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in collecting a debt, generally assessed from the least-sophisticated-consumer perspective, although that standard does not apply when falsity depends on objective, recipient-specific facts or the collector’s intent.

Landeros v. Pinnacle Recovery, Inc. · filed 2017-05-30(e)

The merits of the Landeroses’ FDCPA claims do not turn on the sophistication of the person who read the Pinnacle letter. Rather, the merits of the claims depend on the objective factual circumstances unique to each recipient’s indebtedness. ... Thus, the potential falsity or tendency to deceive has nothing to do with that person’s sophistication. It depends solely upon objective facts or the intentions of Pinnacle, which may vary from class member to class member. As such, the least sophisticated consumer standard does not apply in this case.

Section 1692e does not require a debt-collection letter to state that interest or fees have stopped accruing, and an accurate statement that a settlement may have tax consequences is not misleading as a matter of law.

Taylor v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc. · filed 2017-05-18(e)

Summary judgment is granted in favor of FRS on Count One because the letters’ failure to state that interest or fees had stopped accruing does not violate § 1692e as a matter of law. ... Thus, the statement is not misleading under § 1692e as a matter of law.

Section 1692(e) prohibits debt collectors from making false, deceptive, or misleading representations to collect a debt.

Walker v. Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones · filed 2017-09-01(e)

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from making false, deceptive, or misleading representations to collect a debt. ... Accordingly, it would have been obvious to even the least sophisticated debtor receiving the notices regarding the sheriffs sale that the attorneys for Phelan represented entities seeking to collect a debt from plaintiffs via the foreclosure proceeding.

Section 1692e protects consumers from false information supplied by debt collectors, and false information about the identity of the current creditor is material and can cause a concrete injury.

Ferris v. Transworld Systems, Inc. · filed 2018-01-31(e)

In Section 1692e, Congress decided to specifically protect consumers from being provided with such false information. ... Ferris had a right to know the identity of the current creditor that was claiming that an entitlement to payment. The identity of the current creditor would be material information in regard to the debt collection.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, but a false representation is actionable only when it could cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a disadvantage in deciding how to respond.

Afewerki v. Anaya Law Group · filed 2017-08-18(e)

Material false representations, then, are those that could “cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the collection effort.”

Section 1692e(10) prohibits deceptive or misleading debt-collection communications, including a time-barred-debt letter that omits the risk that a partial payment or promise to pay may revive the limitations period.

Pierre v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2018-02-05(e)(10)

In Pantoja II and here, the collector’s silence about the significant risk of losing the ironclad protection of the statute of limitations renders the letter misleading and deceptive as a matter of law. Pierre and the class members are thus entitled to summary judgment as to liability on Count I.

Section 1692e does not make a debt collector liable merely for state-court procedural or evidentiary missteps; actionable conduct requires a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means.

Skibbe v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., As Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust · filed 2018-02-15(e)

Based on all the undisputed facts before this Court on summary judgment, the Court finds that the filing and prosecuting of the procedurally-barred Foreclosure III does not give rise to an FDCPA violation. “Because state-court procedural and evidentiary missteps are not ‘false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means that are actionable under [15 U.S.C.] § 1692e [of] [sic] the FDCPA,” this Court grants summary judgment to Nevel.

Section 1692(e)(10) prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations made in connection with debt collection, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.

Searle v. RBS Citizens Bank N.A. · filed 2018-03-07(e)(10)

The FDCPA prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive or misleading representation” in connection with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(10). Courts evaluatewhether a collection practice violates the FDCPA based onwhether anobjective,“least sophisticated debtor”would find the practice threatening or misleading.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, and a communication is assessed under an objective unsophisticated-consumer standard; a facially nonmisleading communication requires objective evidence of confusion.

Keys v. Collection Professionals, Inc. · filed 2018-03-26(e)(2)(A)

To determine whether a statement is misleading or deceptive under § 1692e, the Court applies an unsophisticated consumer standard. ... Where a communication is not clearly misleading or confusing on its face, “summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendant, unless the plaintiff has presented ‘objective evidence of confusion’ [by the unsophisticated consumer].” ... Keys has not provided any evidence, aside from his own confusion, to support his argument for summary judgment on this claim or to rebut CPI’s cross motion for summary judgment. ... Accordingly, to the extent that Count I includes a claim alleging a misrepresentation of the amount of Keys’ debts, CPI is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1692(e) does not require a collection notice to disclose that interest and fees are not currently accruing when the stated balance is accurate and prompt payment would satisfy the debt.

Taylor v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc. · filed 2018-03-29(e)

Construing the FDCPA in light of its consumer protection purpose, we hold that a collection notice that fails to disclose that interest and fees are not currently accruing on a debt is not misleading within the meaning of Section 1692e.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection; a material failure to identify the creditor can violate the statute.

Gritters v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. · filed 2018-04-13(e)

Summary judgment is likewise granted for Gritters on her § 1692(e) claim. Section 1692e provides that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt.” The Seventh Circuit recognizes three categories of § 1692e cases: (1) where the allegedly offensive language is plainly and clearly not misleading; (2) where the language is not misleading or confusing on its face, but may potentially mislead the unsophisticated consumer; and (3) where the language is plainly deceptive or misleading. ... Pierce’s failure to identify Gritters’ creditor falls into the third category because it contained a plainly deceptive statement that is likely to mislead the unsophisticated consumer. ... Gritters must also establish that Pierce’s misstatement was material. ... If a debt collector’s false statement does not affect a consumer’s ability to “choose intelligently” and the false statement would not “mislead the unsophisticated consumer,” then the statement does not constitute a violation of § 1692e. ... Because the identity of the creditor was material, and Pierce failed to provide it, its letter was plainly deceptive. Summary judgment for Gritters on this claim is granted.

Section 1692e does not treat reporting a debt's original balance and delinquent status as inaccurate or misleading merely because the debtor's Chapter 13 plan has been confirmed, so long as the debt has not been discharged.

McGee v. Rockford Mercantile Agency, Inc. · filed 2018-04-24(e)

Because a debt subject to a Chapter 13 confirmation plan is only fully extinguished after it is discharged by a bankruptcy court, this court finds persuasive the reasoning of the judges in this and other districts who have concluded that at least prior to discharge, reporting a loan balance and delinquent status per the original terms—as opposed to the modified terms of the confirmed Chapter 13 plan—is neither inaccurate nor misleading.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, and a statement is actionable only if it would materially mislead an unsophisticated consumer.

Heroux v. Callidus Portfolio Management Inc. · filed 2018-05-01(e)

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... In Hill, the Eighth Circuit applied a materiality standard to § 1692e. ... In other words, “[i]f a statement would not mislead the unsophisticated consumer, it does not violate the [Act] - even if it is false in some technical sense.” Id. ... Here, the minor errors in the corporate names would not mislead even an unsophisticated consumer about the identities of the creditors.

Under the FDCPA, false or misleading statements must be material to support claims under §§ 1692e and 1692f; technically false statements with no material effect on the consumer’s decisions or the debt-collection outcome are not enough.

Markette v. HSBC Bank USA, National Association · filed 2018-04-06(e), (f)

The Seventh Circuit has also imposed a materiality requirement. ... In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to raise their right to relief under § 1692e above the speculative level. ... Because the same conduct as discussed above forms the basis for the Markettes’ § 1692f claim, that claim must be dismissed as well. ... Thus, Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims against ALO—each of which is based on allegedly false or misleading statements—must be dismissed due to the Markettes’ failure to allege facts to support the element of materiality.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of any debt.

Nath v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2018-07-24(e)

The bank’s name, however, merely appeared in the caption for the foreclosure proceeding that resulted in the sale, which inclusion Nath fails plausibly to allege amounts to a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation . . . in connection with the collection of any debt,” id. § 1692e, or could mislead the least sophisticated consumer, see Taylor v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., 886 F.3d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 2018).

Section 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations as perceived by an unsophisticated consumer, and a settlement offer stating “We are not obligated to renew this offer.” falls within the safe harbor; § 1692f cannot be used to circumvent that protection.

Bass v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2018-08-22(e), (f)

The Seventh Circuit held that those concerns could be adequately addressed, while still protecting unsophisticated consumers from receiving false impressions of their options, by including with the offer the following language: “We are not obligated to renew this offer.” ... In the present case, PRA’s letters contain the exact language deemed to fall within the safe harbor for debt collectors in Evory. ... This Court declines to create such a work-around for the safe harbor established in Evory. Bass’s claim under § 1692f cannot survive.

Sections 1692e and 1692f do not prohibit a settlement letter that states an expiration date and says the debt collector is not obligated to renew the offer, and § 1692f cannot be used to circumvent that safe harbor.

Taylor v. Client Services, Inc. · filed 2018-09-12(e), (f)

Here, Client Services’ letters to Taylor “contain the exact language deemed to fall within the safe harbor for debt collectors in Evory.” Bass v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 17-cv- 08345, 2018 WL 4005199, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2018). Each letter makes a settlement offer to Taylor, lists an expiration date, and notes that Client Services is “not obligated to renew this offer.” ... Taylor also fails to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Sections 1692f provides that a “debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692f. While § 1692e and § 1692f are not necessarily coterminous, to allow plaintiff's § 1692f count to proceed “would seriously undermine” the delicate balance struck by the Seventh Circuit in Evory. ... Plaintiff's § 1692f theory therefore also fails.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with collecting a debt, and § 1692j bars flat-rating.

Saafir v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2018-10-16(e) and (j)

That pleading alleged violations under §§ 1692e and 1692j of the FDCPA. Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, while § 1692j “bars the practice commonly known as ‘flat-rating,’” Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 623, 639 (7th Cir. 2002). For substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, we conclude that none of the documents that Saafir challenges here made a false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of a debt. Nor did any of those documents employ the practice of flat-rating.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, and a collection letter on attorney letterhead bearing an attorney signature implicitly represents that the attorney meaningfully reviewed the account.

Knack-Toms v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA · filed 2018-11-09(e), (e)(3), (e)(10)

Under Nielsen, the representation of “meaningful review” is implicit in the letter being on an attorney’s letterhead and bearing an attorney’s signature and, therefore, no explicit statement that such a review occurred is required for the representation to have been made.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, including false representations about a debt's character, amount, or legal status.

Carroll v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2018-12-13(e)(2)(A)

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Subsection (2)(A) makes any false representation of “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” a violation of the Act. Id. at § 1992e(2)(A). ... Rather, a plaintiff must allege communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” among the abusive, harassing, false, or misleading practices prohibited by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Carroll has not alleged a single false representation made by SLS regarding the character, amount, or legal status of her loan, nor has she alleged any other violation of the FDCPA. Therefore, Carroll’s FDCPA claim is dismissed.

Sections 1692e and 1692f require extrinsic evidence to prove that a collection letter is misleading when it is susceptible to both an innocent and a misleading interpretation, and § 1692g(a)(1) likewise requires extrinsic evidence when it is unclear whether an accurately stated debt amount would confuse consumers.

Wood v. Allied Interstate, LLC · filed 2018-12-28(e), (f), (g)(a)(1)

Accordingly, Allied’s letter falls into the second Ruth category, and Wood therefore was required to adduce “extrinsic evidence, such as consumer surveys, to prove that unsophisticated consumers do in fact find the challenged statements misleading or deceptive.” ... Because he does not do so, Allied is entitled to summary judgment on his §§ 1692e and 1692f claims. ... Because Allied’s letter accurately states the amount of the debt and it is unclear whether the table’s listing $0 in fees and collection costs would confuse recipients, Wood’s failure to adduce extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion as to the amount of the debt means that his § 1692g(a)(1) claim cannot survive summary judgment.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations made in connection with collecting a debt, including misleading foreclosure-related statements to a borrower’s attorney.

Lucas v. New Penn Financial, LLC · filed 2019-01-31(e)

This Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit’s logic that “every mortgage foreclosure, judicial or otherwise, is undertaken for the very purpose of obtaining payment on the underlying debt” and concludes that where a debt collector makes false, deceptive, or misleading representations to a borrower’s attorney in connection with a foreclosure, that conduct violates the FDCPA. Glazer, 704 F.3d at 461; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

Section 1692(e) prohibits false or misleading debt-collection representations and, under the Seventh Circuit's framework, requires extrinsic evidence when a statement is only possibly misleading.

Johnson v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC · filed 2019-01-24(e)

Because I conclude that the challenged statements in ERC's letter are not plainly misleading or deceptive, Johnson's failure to offer extrinsic evidence that the language would confuse or mislead a significant fraction of the population is fatal to her FDCPA claim.

Section 1692(e) prohibits false representations and certain abusive or legally unavailable debt-collection conduct; the court found no FDCPA violation where the collectors had standing and the plaintiffs showed no deception from the affidavits.

Waddell v. Transworld Systems, Inc. · filed 2019-03-14(e)

The Act prohibits false representations regarding the amount of debt a consumer owes, engaging in threatening or abusive behavior to collect a debt, and threatening to take certain action against a debtor that cannot be legally taken. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). ... The Waddells have failed to present evidence on summary judgment that they relied on these affidavits at all, let alone were deceived by them. At the end of the day, there is no dispute that they owed the student loan debts to the trusts, and the Defendants had standing to collect the debts. Accordingly, the Complaint will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Under § 1692e, filing a lawsuit on an unenforceable debt is a false representation because it falsely implies that the debt collector has a valid right to sue.

Bahena v. Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC · filed 2019-01-29(e)

First, as already discussed, the failure to provide notice is not the "misrepresentation" at issue for the purposes of § 1692e ; the act of filing a lawsuit on an unenforceable debt constitutes a misrepresentation, because it falsely implies that a debt collector holds a valid right to sue.

Section 1692e makes a debt collector's false or misleading representation actionable when it is material, meaning it could affect the least sophisticated consumer's ability to respond to or dispute the debt.

Kelsey v. Forster & Garbus, LLP · filed 2019-02-11(e)

Therefore, since "[t]he misrepresentations at issue concerned assertions made during pretrial proceedings in an adversarial system," ... and because Defendant's attorney affirmation was not materially "misleading or deceptive as to the nature or legal status" of Plaintiff's debt, nor would it "have prevented the least sophisticated consumer from responding to or disputing the action," ... Plaintiff's § 1692e claim is dismissed.

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using a materially false, deceptive, or misleading representation, judged by whether it would deceive an unsophisticated but reasonable consumer and could influence that consumer's decision.

Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S. · filed 2019-04-24(e)

In this circuit, claims that a defendant has violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e are evaluated under an objective “unsophisticated consumer” standard. That is, the question whether a debt collector has violated § 1692e turns on whether “the debt collector’s communication would deceive or mislead an unsophisticated, but reasonable, consumer.” ... The Seventh Circuit has also interpreted § 1692e as requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that a false or misleading statement is material, which means that the statement must have “the ability to influence a consumer’s decision.”

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using a false or misleading representation about a debt’s legal status, including pursuing relief in litigation that is legally unavailable and would mislead an unsophisticated consumer.

Tevere v. Weltman Weinberg & Reis Co, L.P.A. · filed 2019-06-03(e)

Because the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from misrepresenting the legal status of a debt and from seeking to collect amounts not permitted by law, courts have held that a debt collector violates the Act when it sues a consumer for legally unattainable relief. ... Cobo thus leaves no room for dispute that Weltman ran afoul of the single-refiling rule by incorporating its request for a deficiency judgment into the foreclosure action it filed on Old National’s behalf. And because an unsophisticated consumer would have been unlikely to appreciate that Old National was legally barred from pursuing that request (indeed, Weltman itself continues to resist that conclusion), Weltman violated the FDCPA on the same stroke.

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, and a false statement must be material to the least sophisticated consumer's debt-related decision-making.

Flowers v. Naiman · filed 2019-08-01(e)

The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. To establish a FDCPA violation based on a false statement, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the challenged statements were false and “material.” ... Only misstatements concerning the amount or nature of the debt itself are material. ... Such statements would undoubtedly qualify as “material” because they concern the nature of the debt itself and would impact a consumer’s decision-making.

Section 1692e requires a materially false or misleading representation in connection with debt collection.

Perdomo v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC · filed 2019-08-28(e)

In Cohen, the Second Circuit joined several sister circuits in holding that § 1692e incorporates a materiality requirement. ... An ambiguity that, in the worst-case scenario, would lead a consumer to mail her payment a few days earlier than necessary does not rise to the level of a materially misleading statement. Because there is no material misrepresentation at issue in this case, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA.

Sections 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) prohibit threats of action that cannot legally be taken or are not intended and false representations or deceptive means used to collect a debt.

Spehr v. Seterus, Inc. · filed 2019-09-06(e)(5), (e)(10)

Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded facts to state a claim under § 1692e(10)to survive a motion to dismiss. ... The Court finds that a reasonable fact finder could determine the Default Letters, even in light of the undisclosed “grace period,” constitute unlawful threats in violation of § 1692e(5).

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with debt collection; stating the current balance of a static debt without disclosing that interest and fees are not accruing is not misleading.

Kidd v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2019-09-27(e)

Taylor does control here. Midland sent Kidd and Lemoine letters stating the “current balance” of their static debts without clarifying that the debts were not accruing interest or fees. Taylor teaches that no clarification was needed. 886 F.3d at 215 (“[W]e hold that a collection notice that fails to disclose that interest and fees are not currently accruing on a debt is not misleading within the meaning of Section 1692e.”). Since Kidd and Lemoine’s debts were not accruing interest or fees, it was not misleading for Midland to state the “current balance” without mention of interest or fees.

Under the FDCPA, a false statement is actionable only if it is material and has the potential to affect the least sophisticated debtor's decision-making.

Frank v. Autovest, LLC · filed 2019-09-30

Both of those documents, however, contain, at most, false non-material statements that are not actionable under the FDCPA. ... Even assuming representations about Dunn’s and Deuman’s employer were false, they were the type of “mere technical falsehoods that mislead no one” and do not give rise to FDCPA liability.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from reporting credit information it knows to be false, including omitting that a debt is disputed, and provides no reasonable-time grace period.

Clanton v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2019-09-30(e)(8)

Section 1692e(8) of the FDCPA prohibits "[c]ommunicating . . . credit information which is known . . . to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed." ... Whatever the practical merits of such an argument may be, the FDCPA neither provides nor incorporates a grace period in which it is legally permissible for debt collectors to report information they know to be false. ... On the issue of whether MCM violated Section 1692e(8), however, Clanton is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, and an inaccuracy is actionable only if it is materially misleading—meaning it has the potential to affect the least sophisticated consumer's decision-making.

Luci v. Russell · filed 2019-10-15(e)

Assuming the omission of “is complete” from the summons is technically inaccurate and misleading, Luci must still demonstrate that it “has the potential to affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated consumer,” i.e., the omission is materially misleading. Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 85 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The materiality inquiry focuses on whether the false statement would frustrate a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her response.” Id. at 86 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 1692e prohibits materially false or misleading representations about the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, including misidentifying its true owner, even when the collector has standing to foreclose.

Glazer v. Chase Home Finance LLC · filed 2019-11-25(e)(2)(A)

Defendants contend there was no material misrepresentation as they undisputedly had the right to bring the foreclosure action as servicer/holder. However, the Court agrees with Glazer that, standing aside, whether a party may bring a foreclosure action does not insulate it from liability under the FDCPA for material misrepresentations made in the foreclosure proceeding regarding the true owner of the Note and Mortgage. See Wallace, 683 F.3d at 387. (“We disagree that the issue of standing in Ohio, even if resolved in Lerner, Sampson's favor, has any bearing on whether misidentifying a creditor is materially misleading under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.”).

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false or misleading representations, including an itemization of a static debt that could confuse an unsophisticated consumer about whether fees or interest are accruing.

Knaak v. Optio Solutions LLC · filed 2019-12-18

The Letter becomes misleading because the parties agree that the debt was static and would not, in fact, ever increase. ... Unlike Fields, the debt here was static, and so itemization would only open up avenues for confusion, not close them. Fields falls far short of blessing the carte blanche use of itemization for collection letters, and certainly not for static debts.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, including false representations about a debt’s character, amount, or legal status.

Beverly v. Shermeta Law Group, PLLC · filed 2020-01-10(e)(2)(A)

The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Specifically, the FDCPA prohibits “[t]he false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” § 1692e(2)(A). ... Because they are different debts, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants used “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s]” in the collection of Plaintiff’s debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a violation of the FDCPA.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making material false or misleading statements about a debt or using deceptive means to collect it, but a letter that does not threaten any action does not violate § 1692e(5).

EDMONDS v. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, LLC · filed 2020-02-04(e)(2)(A), (e)(5), and (e)(10)

That statement was false because there were not going to be late charges. The misrepresentation, as alleged, is one that could affect an unsophisticated debtor’s decision-making process about whether to disclose the requested personal information to the debt collector. Edmonds has plausibly alleged a violation of § 1692e(2)(A). ... A debt collector violates § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA when it “threat[ens] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). ... After examining the language of the letter from Capital Accounts to Edmonds, the Court cannot conclude that the letter contains a threat to take any action. It does not threaten a lawsuit, a lien, or any other act. Edmonds’ complaint therefore fails to plead a violation of § 1692e(5). ... The assertion in Capital Accounts’ letter to Edmonds—that late charges could be applied to her bill—constitutes a plausible misrepresentation of the amount of debt Edmonds owed, in the context of an attempt to collect a debt. It therefore constitutes a plausible violation of § 1692e(10).

For an FDCPA false statement to be actionable, it must be material—one that could cause the least sophisticated debtor a disadvantage in choosing how to respond to collection efforts; merely hypertechnical falsehoods are immaterial.

Putnam v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC · filed 2020-04-15(e)

Not all false statements are actionable, however. To constitute a violation of the FDCPA, a false statement must be “material.” ... Material false statements are those that could “cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the collection effort.” ... Immaterial false representations, by contrast, are those that are “literally false, but meaningful only to the ‘hypertechnical’ reader.”

Sections 1692e and 1692f prohibit false or misleading and unfair or unconscionable debt-collection practices, respectively; under the unsophisticated-consumer standard, ambiguous litigation language may survive dismissal, and overlapping claims under both provisions may proceed.

Soyinka v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc. · filed 2020-07-15(e), (f)

To determine whether a debt collector’s statements are false, deceptive, or misleading under § 1692e, the statements must be viewed from the perspective of an “unsophisticated consumer.” Dunbar v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C., 896 F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 2018). The court must ask “whether a person of modest education and limited commercial savvy would likely be deceived.” Id. ... Here, the letter’s first paragraph could suggest to the unsophisticated consumer that a lawsuit is possible, when in fact it is not. ... In combination, these sentences could communicate to an unsophisticated consumer the message that if she does not pay, then she will be sued. ... The disclaimer does not clean up the threat of litigation, at least not to the extent that dismissal is justified. The false-representation claim survives. ... Courts evaluating claims under § 1692f must apply the same “unsophisticated consumer” standard used for claims under § 1692e. McMillan, 455 F.3d at 759. ... The Seventh Circuit has allowed claims under both statutes to proceed even when the offending conduct overlaps. See McMillan, 455 F.3d at 765 (reversing dismissal of § 1692e and § 1692f claims based on overlapping conduct); Fields v. Wilber Law Firm, P.C., 383 F.3d 562, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2004) (same). So the one argument that Franklin offers against the § 1692f claim is rejected.

Section 1692e permits a debt collector to use the statement that it is not obligated to renew a settlement offer without violating the prohibition on false, deceptive, or misleading representations.

Schmeling v. United Collection Bureau Inc · filed 2020-10-30(e)

Because UCB used the Evory safe-harbor language in its collection letters, it did not violate § 1692e of the FDCPA. Schmeling’s second amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and will therefore be dismissed.

Section 1692e prohibits false or misleading representations in debt-collection communications; for a communication to a consumer’s attorney, the question is whether it would deceive or mislead a competent attorney, and the statement must be material.

Roberts v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC · filed 2020-11-09(e)

In evaluating whether a plaintiff has stated a claim under section 15 U.S.C. § 1692e based on a communication to the plaintiff’s attorney, “the right question … is whether it would deceive or mislead a competent attorney,”even one who does not specialize in consumer debt law. Gomez v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 962 F.3d 963, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Bravo v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 812 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2016)); see also Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 2016). ... Further, nothing alleged in the Complaint suggests that the misidentification of TIAA Bank as the owner of the note was material to any decision of Plaintiff or his attorney. See Lox v. CDA, Ltd., 689 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that materiality is an element of a § 1692e claim). A false or misleading statement is “material” if it has “‘the ability to influence a consumer’s decision.’” McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 301 F.Supp.3d 866, 878–79 (N.D.Ill. 2018) (quoting Lox, 689 F.3d at 826)).

Section 1692e bars false, deceptive, or misleading collection representations judged from the least sophisticated consumer’s perspective, while § 1692k(a)(3) permits a court to award a defendant fees and costs only when the action was brought in bad faith and for harassment.

Spitz v. Nationwide Credit, Inc. · filed 2020-11-09(e), (k)(a)(3)

The least-sophisticated-consumer standard is an objective one that is forgiving, but not toothless. ... In evaluating the § 1692e violation alleged here, the Court’s inquiry under the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is whether such a consumer “could reasonably interpret the representation in a way that is inaccurate.” ... The Court concludes that, even viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Spitz, his pleadings fail to state a plausible claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, and NCI is entitled to judgment on the pleadings. ... Specifically, if the Court finds that a case “was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment,” it “may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). ... But without more, the Court declines to infer that Spitz brought the claims “in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Section 1692e makes a false or misleading debt-collection statement actionable only when it is material to the least sophisticated debtor's decision-making.

Tiene v. Drexel University · filed 2020-08-21(e)

As the district court rightly concluded, because the incorrect address prevented Tiene from receiving notice of the suit, it could not have affected his decision-making and therefore is not actionable under the FDCPA.

The FDCPA is not violated, on these undisputed facts, by a debt collector's incorrect reporting of the original creditor's identity or erroneous “Reaffirmation of Debt, Medical,” notation.

Jackson v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc. · filed 2020-12-14

Based on the undisputed facts, as a matter of law, neither Defendant’s incorrect reporting of the identity of the original creditor, nor its erroneous notation “Reaffirmation of Debt, Medical,” constituted a violation of the FDCPA.

The FDCPA can reach mortgage-servicer notices and statements sent in connection with debt collection, and a debt collector may not use misleading late-fee information or incorrectly summarize the debt merely because the communication is required by TILA.

Pagan v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC · filed 2020-12-17(e), (g), (k)(e)

Because Rushmore has not specifically explained why the facts pleaded by Plaintiffs do not sustain this claim, and the Court finds it plausible on its face that a debt collector could violate this requirement by incorrectly summarizing the debt owed (as Plaintiffs allege), the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs § 1692g claims based on Rushmore’s minimal briefing of the issue. ... Rushmore does not support its position that a debt collector following a CFPB template is exempt from liability even when it includes deceptive or misleading information in that communication. ... Rushmore’s argued compliance with the template is irrelevant to the bottom-line issue of whether Rushmore threatened to collect a fee that it had no right to collect.

Section 1692e(10) prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means used to collect a debt, and a communication that cannot reasonably be read in more than one way is not deceptive or misleading.

SHAW v. HAYT, HAYT & LANDAU, LLC · filed 2021-02-12(e)(10)

Further none of the statements in these letters would be capable of more than one (1) reading, so the letters are neither deceptive nor misleading in violation of § 1692e(10).

The FDCPA does not treat a dispute over whether contract-authorized inspection fees were unreasonable as a plausible false-representation claim without facts showing that the inspections never occurred.

Silvester v. Selene Finance, LP · filed 2021-03-08

As these same failings in Weir exist here, the FDCPA claim is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Mortgage terms belie the claim of a misrepresentation and Plaintiffs fail to plead facts that would allow the Court to infer plausibly that they were charged for inspections that were never performed.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, but a statement is actionable only if it has the potential to affect the least sophisticated debtor's decision-making.

ARCILA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC · filed 2021-03-23(e)

In Jensen, the Third Circuit adopted a materiality standard for claims brought under § 1692e. Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 420 (3d Cir. 2015). A statement is material if it has “the potential to affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated debtor.” Knight v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 755 F. App'x 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421). The standard “is not a particularly high bar.” Id. (citing Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421). ... In its bankruptcy proof of claim, PRA accurately listed the full amount, which Plaintiff admits is correct. ... The failure to distinguish between principal and interest in this case is therefore not material.

Section 1692e does not require a debt collector to disclose the applicability of the statute of limitations when seeking voluntary repayment of a time-barred debt, so long as it does not initiate or threaten legal action.

Barnes v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. · filed 2021-07-12(e)

The FDCPA does not place “an affirmative duty on a debt collector to disclose to the consumer the applicability of the statue of limitations.” ... The majority of courts considering the issue “have held that when the expiration of the statute of limitations does not invalidate a debt, but merely renders it unenforceable, the FDCPA permits a debt collector to seek voluntary repayment of the time-barred debt so long as the debt collector does not initiate or threaten legal action in connection with its debt collection efforts.”

Section 1692e bars debt collectors from falsely implying that an attorney is involved in collecting a debt unless the communication clearly conveys that the attorney or law firm is not acting as an attorney.

HEEREMA v. FORSTER, GARBUS & GARBUS · filed 2021-08-13(e)

A collection letter may not, consistent with the FDCPA, “falsely imply that an attorney, acting as an attorney, is involved in collecting [a] debt.” ... But that does not mean an attorney cannot participate in collecting a debt. ... Instead, it means the attorney must clearly convey to the least sophisticated debtor “that the law firm or attorney sending the letter is not, at the time of the letter’s transmission, acting as an attorney.”

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from threatening actions they cannot legally take or do not intend to take and from using false or deceptive means to collect a debt.

KNIGHT AKA FLEMING v. AR RESOURCES, INC. · filed 2021-10-29(e)(5), (e)(10)

Because filing a credit report is an action that “could come to pass,” the challenged statement cannot be viewed as false or misleading, even to the least sophisticated debtor, and thus does not constitute a violation of Section 1692e. See Bordeaux, 2021 WL 4438127, at *5.

Under §§ 1692e and 1692g, a debt collector’s statement about the amount of a debt must be materially misleading to the least sophisticated consumer to be actionable.

Lamm v. FMS, Inc. · filed 2022-02-28(e) and (g)

The Second Circuit also reads a materiality requirement into the FDCPA’s prohibition of false, deceptive, or misleading practices in the collection of a debt. ... Simply put, a debt collector’s statement is material if it is capable of influencing the decisions of the least sophisticated consumer. ... Hence, the Court concludes that the one-cent misstatement here is immaterial, and therefore, unactionable under the FDCPA.

Section 1692e(8) bars a debt collector that communicates credit information from falsely reporting that a debt remains disputed, because the debt’s no-longer-disputed status is material.

Samano v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2022-04-19(e)(8)

The Court finds that, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925, Defendant may be held liable for failing to change the accounts status from disputed to undisputed and continuing to report those accounts to the credit reporting agencies as such. ... The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the false representation by Defendant to credit reporting agencies regarding his no-longer-disputed accounts constituted a material misrepresentation.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from making false or misleading representations in connection with debt collection.

Williams Jr v. Heartland Realty Investors, Inc. · filed 2022-07-27(e)

Simply put, Heartland Realty Investors, Inc. had the authority to bring the state court eviction complaint, as Heartland Willowbrook’s agent. Because SBZR did not make a misrepresentation under these circumstances, plaintiffs’ first FDCPA argument fails. ... Plaintiffs’ claim based on attorney’s fees is therefore without merit. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs’ final FDCPA argument has no factual basis.

Section 1692e(8) prohibits a debt collector from communicating credit information that it knows or should know is false, and a communication is connected with debt collection when an animating purpose is to induce payment.

Samano v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2022-08-31(e)(8)

While neither the FDCPA nor the Ninth Circuit have defined the phrase “in connection with the collection of any debt” under § 1692e, a generally accepted definition derived from other Circuit Courts of Appeals is that “for communication to be in connection with the collection of a debt, an animating purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by the debtor.” ... Taking these allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that an “animating purpose” of Defendant’s continued reporting of his account as “disputed” was to induce payment of his debt so that he would remove the barrier to his obtaining a mortgage. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged conduct “in connection with the collection of any debt” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 35) is DENIED.

Section 1692e prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt collection, assessed under an objective reasonable-consumer standard, and allegations that a communication could mislead a reasonable consumer may state a claim.

Warden v. Tschetter Sulzer, P.C. · filed 2022-12-05(e)(5), (e)(10)

Section 1692e prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” ... The inquiry is whether the reasonable consumer could reasonably interpret the representation to have multiple meanings, one of which is untrue. ... On the other hand, if a reasonable consumer could understand a representation as misleading, materiality is then assessed by asking whether the reasonable consumer would have his ability to intelligently respond frustrated. ... The Court finds this argument unavailing and, applying the reasonable consumer standard, finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that she interpreted the representations in the Stipulation and Advisement to mean that she could stay within her rental residence for additional time and that any money claims against her would be dismissed upon vacating the unit.

Section 1692e does not make a debt collector’s failure to procure or maintain a license, standing alone, a false representation.

Cooper v. Solomon · filed 2023-09-29(e)

With respect to the FDCPA, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he defendant violated provisions defined in 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692 false representation in the course of collecting a debt.” ... Even assuming that Solomon and CDG were acting as debt collectors in this situation, their failure to procure or maintain a license would not constitute a false representation. ... Because Plaintiff has not specifically identified any false representation made by Defendants, the FDCPA claim must be dismissed.

The FDCPA does not prohibit a debt-collection letter that accurately warns that an old debt cannot be sued on but that certain actions may restart the statute of limitations.

Alena Woodhouse, Etc. v. Heartland Resolution Group, LLC · filed 2024-03-18

Language in the letter regarding the effect of certain actions on the statute of limitations is also accurate and not materially deceptive pursuant to the FDCPA as the language warns plaintiff of the potential consequences of taking any action.

The FDCPA does not make identifying the creditor as the court that charged the debt false or misleading merely because the consumer disputes the court's legitimacy; a challenge to the debt's validity is not a claim about the collector's statements.

Chapman v. Yost · filed 2024-04-22

Even liberally taking the remainder of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it was not “false and misleading” for Defendant to identify the FCCCP as the creditor of the underlying debt for purposes of stating a claim under the FDCPA.

Section 1692e prohibits materially false, deceptive, or misleading debt-collection representations, judged from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.

Benjamin v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC · filed 2024-08-13(e)

The standard is further tempered, moreover, by the application of some form of a materiality requirement—that is, “a false statement is only actionable under the FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated debtor; in other words, it must be material when viewed through the least sophisticated debtor’s eyes.”

Under the FDCPA, a written statement refusing to pay a debt can constitute a dispute, so reporting the debt as disputed is not false under §§ 1692e(8) or 1692e(2)(A).

Johnson v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. · filed 2025-04-11(e)(8) and (e)(2)(A)

The Court relied on caselaw and the dictionary and defined “dispute” as “to call into question or cast doubt upon.” Id. (gathering cases). ... As the Court previously concluded, Johnson called the debt into question when she sent a letter to BBC stating, “I refuse to pay [the debt].”2 Id. (citing Ross v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 2024 WL 4404043, at *1 n.2 (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2024) (unpublished) (describing the plaintiff’s notice of refusal to pay as a “dispute regarding that debt”)). ... Thus, Johnson has not sufficiently alleged that BBC communicated credit information that it knew or should have known to be false or that it made a false representation of the status of her debt. Johnson fails to state a claim for relief under §§ 1692e(8) or 1692e(2)(A).

Section 1692e prohibits materially false, deceptive, or misleading representations in debt-collection communications, including false statements about a debt's legal status.

Palen · filed 2025-11-24(e)

The references to an existing lien cannot constitute a false or misleading statement because the passage of the limitations period did not “eliminate the debt,” Freyermuth, 248 F.3d at 771, or extinguish the remaining rights of the lienholder, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 580.09, 580.10, 580.24.

Sections 1692e(10) and 1692f(6) do not provide a vehicle for enforcing a TILA periodic-statement obligation against a debt collector who is not subject to that obligation.

Hodges · filed 2026-01-26(e)(10), (f)(6)

Plaintiff does not identify any specific entity that was required to send her periodic statements such that its failure to do so means that interest and fees can no longer be collected on her HELOC, so Plaintiff’s argument that Shellpoint made false representations in the Acceleration Letter or subsequent statements regarding the amount owed on her HELOC loan therefore fails. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for an FDCPA violation on behalf of herself and the class, and Count II is dismissed. Because Plaintiff’s individual claim against Shellpoint for violating § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA relies on the same theory, it too fails, and Count VI is also dismissed.

Section 1692e prohibits debt collectors from using false or misleading representations about the character or amount of a debt, including a failure to present principal, interest, or costs clearly enough for an unsophisticated consumer to understand.

Moran v. Greene & Cooper Attorneys LLP · filed 2014-09-04(e)

The FDCPA requires that communications to debtors not deceive them as to the “character” or “amount” of any debt due. “It is not enough that the dunning letter state the amount of the debt that is due. It must state it clearly enough that the recipient is likely to understand it.” ... A debt collector need not “itemize” the debt, so long as its statement of the total is clear and accurate. ... However, a dunning letter may violate the FDCPA if its failure to clearly distinguish principal and interest can mislead the debtor into misunderstanding the size of the principal or the rate of interest.

Section 1692f(1) permits collection of attorneys’ fees when they are expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt.

Sierra v. Foster & Garbus · filed 1999-05-11(f)(1)

Thus, these fees were “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt,” in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l) and do not violate the FDCPA.

Section 1692a(5) limits the FDCPA to consumer debt, and § 1692a(6) does not treat an originating creditor whose principal purpose is lending money as a debt collector.

Zsamba Ex Rel. Zsamba v. COMM. BANK, ABILENE, KAN. · filed 1999-08-05(a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(6)(F)(ii)

In this case, the Bank is clearly a creditor of plaintiffs parents. While plaintiff emphasizes the portion of the definition of a debt collector which states “in any business,” this interpretation would require the court to ignore the plain language of the statute which states in relevant part “in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). Clearly, the principal purpose of the Bank is not the collection of debt. Rather, the Bank’s principal purpose is lending money. Plaintiffs interpretation also ignores § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) which provides that the term “debt collector” does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed ... to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was originated by such person.” Plaintiffs argument also ignores the numerous cases which have held that creditors are not subject to the FDCPA. The statute itself, and the case law interpreting it, clearly does not support the broad definition of “debt collector” proposed by plaintiff. ... Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the underlying debt in this case is not consumer debt. Furthermore, the court finds that the Bank is not a debt collector, as defined by the FDCPA. As a result, the court concludes that the FDCPA is inapplicable to the circumstances of plaintiffs case, and the defendant’s motion should be granted.

The FDCPA does not treat a creditor collecting its own debt as a debt collector, and excludes a related corporate affiliate that collects only for affiliates and whose principal business is not debt collection.

Burns v. Bank of America · filed 2008-12-04(a)(6)

Bank of America is not liable under the FDCPA because it “is clearly not a ‘debt collector’; rather, it is the very party to whom the debt is due.” ... Bank of America Mortgage thus “meets [the] requirements of [the corporate affiliate] exemption.”

Section 1692a(6) covers an entity that regularly attempts to collect debts even when it also enforces a security interest, so the entity may face FDCPA liability beyond § 1692f(6).

Birster v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. · filed 2012-07-18(a)(6)

Although Reese dealt with the applicability of § 1692e, the practical effect of the case is to overrule the reasoning relied on by the district court, since Reese allowed the enforcer of a security interest to be held liable under the FDCPA beyond § 1692f(6). Reese provides that an entity can both enforce a security interest and collect a debt, and constitutes binding precedent on this point. Id. at 11.

The FDCPA imposes liability on debt collectors for prohibited collection practices and limits coverage to persons whose business principally or regularly collects debts owed or asserted to be owed to another.

Hopson v. Chase Home Finance LLC · filed 2014-04-11(a)(6)

The FDCPA imposes civil liability on “debt collector[s]” for certain prohibited debt collection practices. ... The FDCPA applies only to “debt collectors”, which it defines as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”. ... In the case at bar, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to state a FDCPA claim as they have not alleged any facts to indicate that any of the named defendants is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. “Mortgage lenders and mortgage servicing companies are not ‘debt collectors’ within the meaning of the FDCPA.” ... Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed.

The FDCPA applies to debts arising from transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant is a debt collector.

Hall v. Barclays Bank Delaware · filed 2024-12-17(a)(5), (a)(6)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she had a credit card account with Defendant, demonstrating she is a “consumer” and that her account was “charged-off,” indicating she had a debt. However, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the debt arose from a consumer transaction, i.e., incurred for personal, family, or household purposes.

Section 1692a(6) excludes a state officer from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” only when collecting or attempting to collect a debt is part of the officer’s official duties.

Peretto · filed 2026-04-30(a)(6)

Accepting periodic, voluntary payments is not forcibly taking possession. And regardless, Plaintiff’s payments fell short of satisfying the judgment—so without a surplus, the debtor’s preference under Rule 69A could not have come into play. In sum, Constable Kolkman’s actions were not in performance of his official duties and Constable Kolkman LLC is not an officer of the state. Thus, the Kolkman Defendants are debt collectors subject to the FDCPA.

Section 1692c(c) requires a debt collector to cease all communications about a specific debt after the consumer provides written notice, even if the collector later assigns that debt a new account number.

Salazar v. MFP, Inc. · filed 2012-03-09(c)

By its terms, the statute concerns only “debts,” not “accounts” as urged by Defendant, and requires a debt collector to cease all communications regarding a specific debt, regardless of how that debt may be classified or re-classified in the future by the debt collector.

The FDCPA allows all consumers to prevent debt collectors from contacting them at work, although the process differs slightly from Massachusetts law.

Vines v. Sands · filed 1999-08-10(c)

Although the process described in the FDCPA varies slightly from the Massachusetts law, the plaintiffs are correct that all consumers may prevent debt collectors from contacting them at work.

Section 1692c(c) bars further debt-collection communication after a consumer gives written notice refusing to pay or requesting that communication cease, subject to statutory exceptions.

Boyd v. General Revenue Corp. · filed 2013-03-07(c)

Under the FDCPA, to preclude GRC from communicating with Plaintiff, Plaintiffs should have submitted in writing a “refus[al] to pay a debt or that the [Plaintiff] wishe[d] the debt collector to cease further communication.”

Section 1692's FDCPA imposes strict liability for debt-collection violations, so liability does not require proof of deception or actual damages, and one violation is sufficient.

Picht v. Hawks · filed 1999-08-27

The FDCPA is a remedial, strict liability statute which was intended to be applied in a liberal manner. ... Proof of deception or actual damages is not necessary to make a recovery under the FDCPA. ... Proof of one violation is sufficient to support a finding of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in an FDCPA action. ... Furthermore, the strict liability nature of the FDCPA compels the conclusion that Defendant violated the FDCPA by pursuing a garnishment based the improperly entered default judgment.

Section 1692 states that the FDCPA’s purpose is to eliminate abusive debt-collection practices, and the Act is a strict-liability statute.

Mendus v. Morgan & Associates, P.C. · filed 1999-06-29

The Act’s purpose is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices found by Congress to exist. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. The Act is a strict liability statute.

The FDCPA imposes strict liability: a plaintiff need not prove intent to violate the Act or actual damages to establish liability.

Irwin v. Mascott · filed 2000-08-31

The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Plaintiffs need not prove either that Defendants knew that their debt collection practices violated the law or that they intended to violate the law. Plaintiffs need only prove that (1) the Defendants knew what practices they were engaged in, and (2) the practices violated the FDCPA. Plaintiffs are not required to prove that consumers suffered any actual damages, in order to prove Defendants’ liability for FDCPA violations.

The FDCPA imposes strict liability for violations, including technical notice requirements, and a plaintiff need not prove injury to recover statutory damages.

Anderson v. Credit Bureau Collection Services, Inc. · filed 2011-05-25

We do note, however, that the FDCPA is a strict-liability statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; ... This means that Anderson is entitled to sue to enforce its provisions, even the “highly technical” ones like the notice requirement at issue here and the prohibition against sharing personal information with third parties. ... Requiring proof of injury would run afoul of the statutory scheme.

Section 1692e does not require a knowing or intentional violation, making the FDCPA essentially a strict-liability statute rather than one allowing a good-faith defense.

Polk v. Legal Recovery Law Offices · filed 2013-06-19(e)

A good faith defense fails as a matter of law with regard to the alleged FDCPA violation because the FDCPA is essentially a strict liability statute.