Anti-SLAPP Laws by State
Does this state have an anti-SLAPP law, and how does its special motion to strike or dismiss a meritless lawsuit against protected speech work?
Jurisdictions
All 51 verified
Statutes checked
Every entry, oldest check July 5, 2026
Columns
7 per state
Access
Free, no account needed
What this survey covers
An anti-SLAPP statute gives a defendant sued over speech, petitioning, or association activity on a matter of public concern a fast, early way out: a "special motion to strike" or "special motion to dismiss" that a court must resolve before the case grinds through expensive discovery. If the motion succeeds, the claim is thrown out and the defendant usually recovers attorney's fees. SLAPP stands for "strategic lawsuit against public participation" — a suit filed less to win than to bury a critic, a reviewer, a whistleblower, or a vocal neighbor in legal costs until they stop talking.
Not every state has one of these laws, and the ones that exist vary sharply: what counts as "protected activity," how fast you must file the motion, what a plaintiff has to show to survive it, whether fees are automatic, and whether a losing plaintiff can immediately appeal. This is also a statute book that keeps changing — a wave of states adopted the Uniform Law Commission's model act (UPEPA) between 2024 and 2026 alone. This survey answers one question, state by state: does this state have an anti-SLAPP law, and if so, exactly how does its special motion work? Each state's page states the rule in plain English, quotes the statute it comes from, and shows the date we last verified the statutory text.
The patterns across the states
Ten states have no anti-SLAPP statute at all: Alaska, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming. That's not a static list — several of these came close in 2025-2026. South Carolina and Wisconsin each had a bill pass one full chamber before stalling (Wisconsin's ran out of Senate floor time; South Carolina's has two competing bills still alive). Wyoming's 2026 bill died in a Senate committee, but the legislature has already opened a formal interim study aimed at a future session. New Hampshire is the one outlier with a structural obstacle: its Supreme Court held in 1994 that a special-motion procedure would violate the state constitutional right to a jury trial, and two more bills have died in the House since.
The Uniform Law Commission's 2020 model act, UPEPA, has become the majority path for new enactments: fifteen states currently have a version in force (DE, HI, IA, ID, KY, ME, MI, MN, MT, NJ, OH, PA, SD, UT, WA), all but three of them since 2022. Missouri has signed a sixteenth enactment; its UPEPA replacement takes effect August 28, 2026 for civil actions filed or claims asserted on or after that date. Washington was the first UPEPA state (2021) after its own home-grown 2010 law was struck down as unconstitutional — Minnesota's 2024 UPEPA enactment followed the same path. The other roughly two dozen states with a statute wrote their own: California's 1992 law is the oldest and the direct model for Texas's TCPA, Georgia's 2016 rewrite, and Oklahoma's OCPA; several older statutes (New Mexico, Nevada, New York before 2020, DC, Massachusetts, Virginia) are narrower, protecting only speech to government or in specific forums rather than any matter of public concern.
Rhode Island is the sharpest outlier among states with a statute on the books: the law still exists, but a 1995 amendment stripped out the special motion mechanism entirely, so there is no expedited procedure left to invoke — the honest answer for Rhode Island is closer to a no-statute state in practice than its "has a statute" label suggests.
How to read the table
Each column is one feature of the special motion, answered the same way for every state, with the statutory citation compressed into the cell. A state with no anti-SLAPP statute says so plainly in every column rather than leaving it blank. Click a state for the full plain-English page: the requirements one by one, the traps people actually hit, and the verbatim statutory text with official source links.
State by state
Every column answered the same way for each jurisdiction. Open a state for the full page, with the statute text and the date it was checked.
Scroll sideways in the table to see all columns →
| State | Governing law | What speech/conduct is protected | Special motion to strike/dismiss | Burden of proof | Attorney's fees | Appeal rights | Exemptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP bill is currently pending in the Alabama legislature; Alabama is not among the states the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press or the Institute for Free Speech list as having recently considered UPEPA or any other anti-SLAPP model |
N/A — no statutory scope exists. Alabama courts have not developed a separate constitutional or common-law petitioning-immunity doctrine for SLAPP-type suits either; a defendant sued over speech relies on ordinary Alabama defamation-law defenses (truth, non-defamatory opinion, and the actual-malice standard for a public-official or public-figure plaintiff) |
N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery |
N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary pleading-sufficiency standard for a motion to dismiss, and the ordinary genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard for summary judgment, apply instead |
N/A — no SLAPP-specific fee award exists. Rule 11 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure remains available on the same terms as in any other civil case, but isn't tailored to speech-based claims. A separate statute, § 6-5-156.5, awards costs and fees against a private citizen for a frivolous or bad-faith action, but it applies only inside Alabama's drug-related-nuisance-abatement law — it has no application to a defamation or SLAPP-type suit |
N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary Alabama rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply instead |
N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Alaska verified 2026-10-06 | No general anti-SLAPP act in Title 9; general costs and fees provision at AS 09.60.010 |
N/A; no anti-SLAPP statute defines covered speech |
N/A; no statutory special motion or discovery stay in the civil-procedure title |
N/A; no anti-SLAPP statutory burden-shifting test |
No SLAPP-specific award; general AS 09.60.010 and Alaska R. Civ. P. 82 fee rules may apply |
N/A; no statutory appeal tied to an anti-SLAPP special motion |
N/A; no anti-SLAPP statute to exempt particular claims |
| Arizona verified 2026-10-06 | A.R.S. § 12-751: motion to dismiss or quash a covered legal action. |
Lawful petitioning, speech, press, association, or assembly under the federal or Arizona Constitution (§ 12-751(A), (J)). |
File within 60 days of service, or later with court permission; discovery stays only after a prima facie finding, subject to limited discovery for good cause (§ 12-751(D)-(E)). |
Movant: prima facie proof of a substantially deterrent or retaliatory motive. Respondent: existing law or a reasonable extension; state actor: clearly established law plus no deterrent or retaliatory purpose (§ 12-751(B)). |
Court may award a successful movant costs and reasonable fees; it must award the prevailing party costs and fees if the motion is frivolous or solely for delay (§ 12-751(F)). |
Grant or denial appealable after the court finds the required prima facie proof; court of appeals ordinarily expedites review (§§ 12-751(H), 12-2101(A)(5)(e)). |
A state actor or intervenor cannot file the motion; civil damages claims for only nominal damages fall outside the defined “legal action” (§ 12-751(A), (J)). |
| Arkansas verified 2026-08-20 | Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-63-501 to 16-63-508, the Citizen Participation in Government Act, enacted 2005 (Acts 2005, No. 1843) and unamended since — every section still carries only that single enacting act in its history |
Narrower and government-proceeding-anchored, an older-generation pattern: (1) a 'privileged communication' — a communication in, to, or about an issue of public concern related to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding (or other government-authorized proceeding), made in the proper discharge of an official duty, a fair and true report of such a proceeding, an expression of opinion or criticism about such a proceeding, or any criticism of a public officer's official acts — as long as it isn't made with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, its falsity; and (2) an 'act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government,' meaning a statement made before, to, or in connection with an issue under consideration by such a proceeding or body — there is no separate general 'public forum on a matter of public concern' catch-all the way broader UPEPA-style states have |
No statutory filing deadline for the defendant's motion; instead, the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney must file a sworn verification contemporaneously with the pleading asserting the claim, certifying (among other things) that the claim isn't based on a privileged communication and wasn't filed for an improper purpose (§ 16-63-505); if the verification is missing, the claim must be stricken unless verified within 10 days after the omission is brought to the party's attention (§ 16-63-506(a)); filing a motion to dismiss or motion to strike under § 16-63-506 stays discovery and any pending hearings or motions, with a hearing required within 30 days of service absent an emergency (§ 16-63-507) |
Structured around the sworn verification rather than a movant/plaintiff two-step test: § 16-63-504 makes a privileged communication or protected act immune from civil liability as long as it wasn't made with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, its falsity; a defendant who believes the plaintiff's § 16-63-505 verification is false or missing can move under § 16-63-506, putting the truthfulness of that certification — and so the privileged-or-protected status of the underlying communication — before the court |
Discretionary, not mandatory: if a claim is verified in violation of § 16-63-505, the court 'shall impose' an appropriate sanction on the person who signed the verification, a represented party, or both, which 'may include' dismissal and an order to pay the other side's reasonable expenses and attorney's fees (§ 16-63-506(b)(1)); a prevailing defendant can also recover other compensatory damages, but only on a further showing the suit was brought to harass, intimidate, punish, or maliciously inhibit protected activity (§ 16-63-506(b)(2)) |
None provided by the statute — §§ 16-63-501 to 508 contain no interlocutory-appeal provision of any kind, unlike most other states' anti-SLAPP laws; a party would have to rely on Arkansas's ordinary, generally available appellate mechanisms rather than any right created by this Act |
None — the Act has no separate exemptions or carve-outs section; its only built-in limit is the truthfulness condition inside §§ 16-63-503 and 16-63-504 themselves (a communication made with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, its falsity is never a 'privileged communication' or protected act to begin with) |
| California verified 2026-08-13 | Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 425.16-425.18; enacted in 1992; § 425.16 last amended by 2024 Cal. Stat. ch. 444, effective 1/1/2025 |
Broad: statements before an official proceeding, statements about an issue under official review, public-forum statements on an issue of public interest, and other conduct furthering petition or speech rights on a public issue (§ 425.16(e)(1)-(4)); the section directs broad construction |
Special motion to strike within 60 days after service, or later in the court's discretion; hearing generally within 30 days after service of the motion (§ 425.16(f)); discovery automatically stayed on filing, with specified discovery available for good cause (§ 425.16(g)) |
The challenged cause of action must arise from protected activity; the plaintiff must then establish a 'probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim,' based on pleadings and affidavits (§ 425.16(b)) |
A prevailing defendant ordinarily receives mandatory fees and costs; a prevailing plaintiff receives them if the motion was frivolous or solely intended to delay (§ 425.16(c)); § 425.18 separately defines a SLAPPback action |
A grant or denial is appealable under § 904.1 (§ 425.16(i)); a denial resting on a § 425.17 exemption is excluded from that appeal route (§ 425.17(e)) |
Public-prosecutor enforcement actions (§ 425.16(d)); qualifying public-interest actions and certain commercial representations (§ 425.17(b)-(c)), with carve-backs for specified media, expressive works, and government-funded nonprofits (§ 425.17(d)) |
| Colorado verified 2026-08-13 | Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-20-1101 and 13-20-1102; general 2019 anti-SLAPP law plus SB 26-095's victim-survivor provision, effective 5/19/2026 |
Section 13-20-1101 broadly covers official-proceeding statements, statements on matters under official review, public-forum statements on issues of public interest, and other petition or speech conduct on a public issue; § 13-20-1102 additionally protects specified victim-survivor statements connected to criminal, Title IX, child-welfare, protection-order, mandated-reporting, and other quasi-judicial matters |
Special motion to dismiss within 63 days of service, or later at the court's discretion (§ 13-20-1101(5)); hearing set within 28 days of service of the motion; discovery automatically stayed until the court rules, though a judge may allow specified discovery for good cause (§ 13-20-1101(6)) |
Two-step: movant shows the claim arises from an act in furtherance of petition or free-speech rights on a public issue, then the plaintiff must show 'a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim' from the pleadings and affidavits (§ 13-20-1101(3)) |
Mandatory fees/costs to a prevailing defendant, with a carve-out for actions under the Open Meetings Law or Colorado Open Records Act; mandatory fees to the plaintiff if the motion is found frivolous or solely intended to delay (§ 13-20-1101(4)) |
Under § 13-20-1101, grants and denials ordinarily go to the Court of Appeals, except exemption-based denials; Hinds v. Foreman held that route unconstitutional for a final county-court judgment, which must go to district court. New § 13-20-1102 expressly routes county-court orders to district court and district-court orders to the Court of Appeals |
Government-enforcement actions, a 3-part public-interest-lawsuit test, and a commercial-speech carve-out for sellers'/lessors' factual representations to buyers, with carve-backs protecting journalists and works of dramatic, literary, or artistic expression (§ 13-20-1101(8)) |
| Connecticut verified 2026-10-06 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a (2026 supplement; amended by P.A. 25-77). |
Free speech, petitioning, or association on a matter of public concern; speech includes certain written crime or discrimination reports made without actual malice (§ 52-196a(a)-(b)). |
File within 30 days after complaint return date or counterclaim/cross-claim filing; extension for good cause. Discovery stays on filing; hearing ordinarily within 60 days (§ 52-196a(c)-(e)). |
Movant: preponderance that claim is based on protected activity. Claimant: particularized circumstances and probable cause, considering all valid defenses, of prevailing (§ 52-196a(e)(3)). |
Mandatory costs and reasonable fees when motion granted; when denied, award to opponent only if motion was frivolous and solely intended to delay (§ 52-196a(f)). |
Discovery stay continues through any interlocutory appeal; § 52-196a(d) does not itself state when an appeal may be taken. |
Excludes specified Attorney General enforcement and bodily injury/wrongful death claims; preserves stated emotional distress and defamation exceptions (§ 52-196a(h)). |
| Delaware verified 2026-08-11 | 10 Del. C. §§ 6001-6014, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted by 2025 Senate Bill 80 (85 Del. Laws, c. 217), signed by the Governor 9/15/2025 with an immediate effective date, applying to any civil action filed or cause of action asserted on or after that date. Replaced the older, narrower former §§ 8136-8138 (limited to 'public applicant or permittee' zoning/permit disputes, no special motion or fee-shifting), which remains applicable only to pre-9/15/2025 causes of action (§ 6014) |
Standard broad UPEPA scope (§ 6002(b)): a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under review in such a proceeding, or the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern |
A 'special motion for expedited relief to dismiss' (§ 6003), filed within 60 days of service (or later for good cause). Filing automatically stays discovery and nearly all other proceedings (§ 6004(a)); the stay continues through any appeal (§ 6004(c)); limited court-permitted discovery is available on a showing of specific necessity (§ 6004(d)); the court must hold a hearing within 60 days of filing and rule within 60 days of the hearing (§§ 6005, 6008) |
Codified two-step test (§ 6007(a)): the court must dismiss with prejudice if the moving party establishes the chapter applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption applies, AND either the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its claim, or the moving party separately shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Decided on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 6006) |
Mandatory to a prevailing moving party ('the court shall award' costs, attorneys' fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, § 6010(a)(1)). Reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 6010(a)(2)). Beyond the base UPEPA model, Delaware ALSO makes punitive damages mandatory for a prevailing movant if the court finds the underlying suit was commenced or continued to harass, intimidate, punish, or maliciously inhibit the movant's speech/petition/association rights (§ 6010(b)) |
Express statutory right: the moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, but within just 10 days of entry of the order (§ 6009) — notably shorter than most other UPEPA states' windows (compare Idaho's 42 days, Hawaii's 30 days); a widely-cited secondary source (RCFP) incorrectly states 30 days, but the official code and enrolled bill both say 10 |
Five carve-outs (§ 6002(c)): claims against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting in an official capacity; claims by a governmental unit or employee, in an official capacity, to enforce any law, regulation, or ordinance (broader than the typical 'imminent threat to public health or safety' framing); claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a sale/lease-related communication; common law fraud claims; and claims under Delaware's Deceptive Trade Practices Act (6 Del. C. ch. 25, subch. II or III). But § 6002(d) claws the LAST THREE exemptions back into coverage when the claim involves consumer opinions, commentary, complaint evaluations, or reviews/ratings of businesses — online-review speech stays protected even against a commercial defendant |
| District of Columbia verified 2026-10-07 | D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, D.C. Code §§ 16-5501 to -5505; § 16-5505 exemption amended in 2023 |
Official-proceeding or public-forum speech and other petitioning or expression on an issue of public interest (§ 16-5501) |
Motion within 45 days of service; expedited hearing; grant with prejudice. Statutory discovery stay invalidated by court (§ 16-5502; Banks v. Hoffman) |
Movant: prima facie protected activity; respondent: claim likely to succeed, as construed in Mann (§ 16-5502(b)) |
Court may award prevailing movant costs and reasonable fees; respondent fees only for frivolous or delay-only motion (§ 16-5504) |
Immediate appeal from denial under collateral-order doctrine (Mann) |
Defined commercial sales claims and claims by District government, including charter schools (§ 16-5505) |
| Florida verified 2026-08-11 | Fla. Stat. § 768.295 (general anti-SLAPP, enacted 2000, expanded 2015); narrower parallel statutes cover HOA (§ 720.304(4)) and condominium (§ 718.1224) disputes |
Free speech in connection with public issues (statements before a governmental entity on a matter under its review, or in/connected with a play, movie, book, article, or similar work), plus the rights to peaceably assemble, instruct representatives, and petition for redress of grievances |
Motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment; no statutory filing deadline and no automatic discovery stay, but the court must hold a hearing 'at the earliest possible time' after the response is filed |
The statute's text does not set out a formal burden-shifting standard; it bars a suit filed 'without merit and primarily because' the defendant exercised a protected right, and the movant's motion must establish a violation of that standard |
The court shall award the prevailing party (whichever side wins the motion) reasonable attorney's fees and costs (§ 768.295(4)); actual damages are available against a governmental-entity plaintiff, subject to the sovereign-immunity damages cap in § 768.28 |
Not addressed in § 768.295 itself; as of a March 27, 2025 Florida Supreme Court rule amendment (Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(J)), a denial is now immediately appealable as of right, and certiorari review of a denial is unavailable (Vericker v. Powell) |
None listed by name in § 768.295; the statute's own limiting principle is that it only reaches a suit that is 'without merit and primarily because' of the protected activity, rather than naming excluded categories of claims |
| Georgia verified 2026-08-16 | O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1; enacted 1996 (Ga. L. 1996, p. 260), rewritten wholesale in 2016 to track Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (Ga. L. 2016, p. 341, Act 420, eff. 7-1-2016); unamended since |
Broad, four categories (§ 9-11-11.1(c)(1)-(4)): statements before an official proceeding; statements on an issue under consideration/review by a governmental body; statements in a place open to the public or a public forum on an issue of public interest; and a catch-all for other conduct furthering petition/free-speech rights on a public issue — expanded from a narrow, official-proceedings-only scope (the pre-2016 rule) by the 2016 revision |
Motion to strike or dismiss; the statute itself sets NO fixed filing deadline (unusual among anti-SLAPP states); filing automatically stays all discovery and any pending hearings or motions (§ 9-11-11.1(d)); the motion must be heard within 30 days of service unless emergency matters require a later hearing |
Two-step: movant shows the claim could 'reasonably be construed' as an act furthering the right of petition or free speech on an issue of public interest or concern (§ 9-11-11.1(b)(1)); the nonmoving party must then establish a 'probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim'; a public-figure plaintiff gets limited discovery on the sole issue of actual malice (§ 9-11-11.1(b)(2)) |
Mandatory fees and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant, amount set by the court on the facts of the case (§ 9-11-11.1(b.1)); mandatory reciprocal fees to a prevailing nonmoving party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or solely intended to cause delay; a fee motion must be filed within 45 days of the action's final disposition (§ 9-11-11.1(h)) |
Both a grant AND a denial of the motion are subject to direct appeal as of right, under the state's general direct-appeal statute (§ 9-11-11.1(e), incorporating § 5-6-34(a)) — broader than states that specially treat only denials |
One named carve-out: actions brought by the Attorney General, a prosecuting attorney, or a city attorney acting as a prosecutor to enforce laws aimed at public protection (§ 9-11-11.1(g)); no commercial-speech or consumer-claim exemption exists |
| Hawaii verified 2026-10-06 | Haw. Rev. Stat. chapter 634G, §§ 634G-1 through -11; Act 96 (2022) repealed former chapter 634F. |
Government-proceeding communications, issues under government review, or constitutional speech, press, assembly, petition, or association on a matter of public concern (§ 634G-2(a)). |
File within 60 days of service or later for good cause; filing stays proceedings between movant and respondent. Hearing ordinarily within 60 days, ruling within 60 days afterward (§§ 634G-3, -4, -7). |
Movant shows coverage; respondent may show exemption. Dismiss with prejudice if respondent lacks a prima facie case on each element, or movant establishes pleading/summary-judgment failure (§ 634G-6(a)). |
Mandatory for prevailing movant; for prevailing respondent only if motion was frivolous or solely to delay (§ 634G-9). |
Movant may appeal denial in whole or part as of right within 30 days; appeal stays proceedings between all parties (§§ 634G-8, -3(d)). |
Government defendant acting officially; specified public-health/safety enforcement; seller/lessor communications about own goods or services (§ 634G-2(b)). |
| Idaho verified 2026-10-06 | Idaho Code §§ 6-3901 through -3915; applies to civil actions filed or claims asserted on or after January 1, 2026 (§§ 6-3913, -3914). |
Government-proceeding communications, issues under government review, or constitutional speech, press, assembly, petition, or association on a matter of public concern (§ 6-3902(2)). |
Special motion within 60 days of service or later for good cause; filing stays proceedings between movant and respondent. Hearing ordinarily within 60 days, ruling within 60 days afterward (§§ 6-3903 to -3905, -3908). |
Movant establishes coverage; respondent may establish exemption. Dismiss with prejudice if respondent lacks a prima facie case on each element, or movant establishes the stated pleading or summary-judgment ground (§ 6-3907(1)). |
Mandatory for prevailing movant; for prevailing respondent only if motion was frivolous or solely to delay (§ 6-3910). |
Movant may appeal denial in whole or part as of right within 42 days; appeal stays proceedings between all parties (§§ 6-3909, -3904(3)). |
Official-capacity government defendant; specified public-health/safety enforcement; seller or lessor communications about own goods or services (§ 6-3902(3)). |
| Illinois verified 2026-08-20 | 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq., Citizen Participation Act; enacted 2007 (P.A. 95-506), substantially amended 2025 (P.A. 104-431, eff. 8-21-2025); not a UPEPA state |
Narrow, government-participation focused: acts furthering the right of petition, speech, association, or otherwise participating in government, including freedom of the press (§ 15); protection turns on whether the act is 'genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome' |
No fixed filing deadline in the statute itself; the motion (a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or to strike, § 10) must get a hearing and decision within 90 days of notice (§ 20(a)); a 2025 addition (§ 17) automatically stays ALL other proceedings, not just discovery, but only for actions commenced on or after 2026-01-01 (§ 32) |
One-step immunity test: the moving party's act must fall within § 15's protected categories; the claim is then dismissed unless the responding party produces 'clear and convincing evidence' that the acts are not immunized, i.e. not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action (§ 15, § 20(c)) |
Mandatory fees/costs to a prevailing moving party (§ 25); a 2025 addition makes fees mandatory for a prevailing responding party too, but only if the motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay, and only for actions commenced on or after 2026-01-01 (§ 25, § 32) |
Denial of the motion, or the trial court's failure to rule within 90 days, must be expedited on appeal or writ, interlocutory or not (§ 20(a)); the Act has no separate appeal provision for a grant, which is a final order under ordinary appellate procedure |
No exemptions section in the Act — no commercial-speech, consumer, or public-enforcement carve-out is named anywhere in 735 ILCS 110 |
| Indiana verified 2026-10-06 | Ind. Code §§ 34-7-7-1 through -10 (1998); covered act must arise after June 30, 1998 (§ 34-7-7-1). |
Petition or free-speech activity connected to a public issue or issue of public interest; no separate association category (§§ 34-7-7-1, -2). |
Motion to dismiss treated as summary judgment; court sets an expedited period of at most 180 days. Filing stays discovery except that relevant to motion (§§ 34-7-7-6, -9(a)). |
Movant proves by a preponderance that the act was lawful petition or speech activity; statutory defense requires good faith and reasonable basis in law and fact (§§ 34-7-7-5, -9(d)). |
Prevailing defendant gets reasonable fees and costs; plaintiff gets motion-response fees and costs if motion was frivolous or solely for delay (§§ 34-7-7-7, -8). |
Chapter permits movant to appeal if court fails to act within 30 days after specified evidence submission (§ 34-7-7-9(e)-(f)). |
State-name enforcement action by attorney general, prosecutor, or other public prosecutor excluded (§ 34-7-7-1(b)). |
| Iowa verified 2026-08-20 | Iowa Code ch. 652, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2025 (House File 472, 2025 Acts ch. 93), applying to a civil action filed on or after 7/1/2025; Iowa had no anti-SLAPP statute before this chapter |
Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding, communication on an issue under consideration or review in one, or exercise of the right of free speech, press, assembly/petition, or association guaranteed by the U.S. or Iowa Constitution, on a matter of public concern (§ 652.2(2)); the 'goods or services' term used in the commercial-speech exemption excludes creative, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic work (§ 652.2(1)(a)) |
Special motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service of the pleading asserting the claim, or later on a showing of good cause (§ 652.3); hearing within 60 days of filing, extendable 60 more days if limited discovery is allowed (§ 652.5); ruling within 60 days of the hearing (§ 652.8); filing the motion automatically stays all other proceedings between the parties, including discovery, with limited discovery allowed on a showing of necessity (§ 652.4) |
Court considers the pleadings, the motion, any response, and evidence admissible on summary judgment (§ 652.6); dismissal with prejudice is required if the movant shows the Act applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption, and either the responding party fails a prima facie case on each element or the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (§ 652.7(1)) |
Mandatory court costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; the same mandatory award goes to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay the proceeding (§ 652.10) |
Only the moving party may appeal as of right, and only from an order denying the motion in whole or in part; the appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order (§ 652.9) — the statute itself sets this deadline, unlike some other UPEPA states that leave timing to a separate appellate rule |
Claims against a governmental unit or an official acting in an official capacity; government enforcement actions protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and claims against a person primarily engaged in selling or leasing goods or services where the claim arises from a communication related to that sale or lease (§ 652.2(3)) — the last exemption doesn't reach creative, journalistic, or artistic work, which is excluded from the 'goods or services' definition itself |
| Kansas verified 2026-10-06 | K.S.A. 60-5320, Public Speech Protection Act (2016). |
Claim based on, related to, or responding to protected speech, petition, or association; public-issue speech and specified government-process communications (§ 60-5320(c)-(d)). |
Motion to strike within 60 days of most recent complaint service, or later at court discretion; hearing within 30 days of motion service. Filing stays discovery, motions, and hearings, with limited-discovery exceptions (§ 60-5320(d)-(e)). |
Movant makes a prima facie protected-activity showing; respondent must present substantial competent evidence supporting a prima facie case and likelihood of prevailing (§ 60-5320(d)). |
Mandatory litigation costs and reasonable fees to prevailing movant, plus deterrent relief as needed; respondent receives motion fees and costs if motion was frivolous or solely for delay (§ 60-5320(g)). |
Movant may seek mandamus for delayed ruling or appeal a denial within 14 days; trial proceedings stay pending appeal (§ 60-5320(f)). |
State or local enforcement actions, specified seller or lessor communications, and insurance-code or contract claims; expressive-work exception to seller carve-out (§ 60-5320(h)-(i)). |
| Kentucky verified 2026-10-06 | KRS 454.460–454.478 (effective July 14, 2022). |
Government-proceeding communications, issues under official review, or constitutional speech, press, assembly, petition, or association on a matter of public concern (§ 454.462(1)). |
Special motion within 60 days of service or later for good cause; filing stays proceedings between movant and respondent. Hearing ordinarily within 60 days, ruling within 60 days after hearing (§§ 454.464, .466, .468, .474). |
Movant shows coverage; respondent may show exemption. Dismiss with prejudice if respondent lacks a prima facie case on each element, or movant shows specified pleading or summary-judgment failure (§ 454.472(1)). |
Mandatory for prevailing movant; prevailing respondent receives award if motion was brought without good cause (§ 454.478). |
Either party may appeal grant or denial, in whole or part, as of right under Kentucky civil rules; appeal stays all parties’ proceedings (§§ 454.476, .466(3)). |
Government, commercial, real-property, injury, insurance, fraud, family, employment, and consumer-law classes, with expressive-work and consumer-review exceptions (§ 454.462(2)). |
| Louisiana verified 2026-08-20 | La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 971; enacted 1999 (Acts 1999, No. 734), amended 2004 (Acts 2004, No. 232, making fee-shifting mandatory) and 2012 (Acts 2012, No. 449), no substantive amendment since 2012 |
Broad, California-modeled: statements before an official proceeding, statements on an issue under official review, public-forum statements on a matter of public interest, and a catch-all for other conduct furthering petition/free-speech rights on a public issue or an issue of public interest (art. 971(F)(1)); courts have read this broadly enough to cover non-verbal expressive conduct like photographing a public official in a public place |
Special motion to strike within 90 days of service, or later at the court's discretion (art. 971(C)(1)); notice of hearing set not more than 30 days after service unless docket conditions require otherwise (art. 971(C)(3)); discovery automatically stayed on filing until the ruling, though the court can allow specified discovery for good cause (art. 971(D)) |
Two-step: movant shows the claim arises from an act in furtherance of petition or free-speech rights on a public issue, then the plaintiff must show 'a probability of success on the claim' from the pleadings and affidavits (art. 971(A)); Louisiana courts (and the 5th Circuit applying Louisiana law) treat the plaintiff's burden as comparable to a summary-judgment showing, not a credibility-weighing mini-trial |
Mandatory: 'a prevailing party on a special motion to strike shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs' (art. 971(B)) — broader wording than most states' movant-only rule, though in practice this has meant a successful defendant-movant; the article contains no separate 'frivolous motion' fee-shift back to the plaintiff |
No special interlocutory appeal right in the statute itself. An order GRANTING the motion is a final, appealable judgment because it dismisses the claim; an order DENYING it is ordinarily interlocutory, reviewable only by a discretionary supervisory writ or by having the trial court certify it as an appealable partial judgment |
One exemption: the article does not apply to an enforcement action brought on behalf of the state by the attorney general, a district attorney, or a city attorney acting as a public prosecutor (art. 971(E)) |
| Maine verified 2026-08-11 | 14 M.R.S. §§ 731-742, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2024 by PL 2023, c. 626 (effective 1/1/2025, applies to actions filed on or after that date); amended by PL 2025, c. 403 (effective 2025). Replaced the older, narrower 1995 statute (former § 556), repealed by the same 2023 act |
Broad UPEPA scope (§ 733(2)): a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under review by such a proceeding, or the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern; PLUS Maine-specific coverage for listed discrimination-complaint statements and communications made without malice about an experienced sexual assault, sexual harassment, sexual misconduct, cyberbullying, or discrimination incident when the person had a reasonable basis to complain, whether or not a complaint was filed |
A 'special motion for expedited relief to dismiss' (§ 734), filed within 60 days of being served (or later for good cause). Filing automatically stays discovery and nearly all other proceedings between the parties (§ 735(1)); the stay continues through any appeal (§ 735(3)); the court may allow narrow, specifically-justified discovery during the stay (§ 735(4)); the action may be advanced on the docket for priority handling (§ 736) |
Codified two-step test (§ 738(1)): the court must dismiss with prejudice if the moving party establishes the Act applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption applies, AND either the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its claim, or the moving party separately shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Decided on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 737) |
Mandatory to a prevailing moving party ('the court shall award' costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, § 740(1)) — a strengthening from the old law's discretionary 'may award' standard. Reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 740(2)) |
Express statutory right: the moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part (§ 739). This replaces a line of Law Court decisions that had to infer an interlocutory-appeal right under the old, appeal-silent 1995 statute (Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59; Morse Bros. v. Webster, 2001 ME 70) |
Three carve-outs (§ 733(3)): claims against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting in an official capacity; claims BY a governmental unit or employee, in an official capacity, to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a communication tied to that person's own sale or lease — this last exemption does not reach dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic works |
| Maryland verified 2026-10-06 | Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807. |
Communication with government or the public on a government matter or public concern; suit must be bad-faith, materially related, and intended to inhibit or inhibiting protected rights (§ 5-807(b)-(c)). |
Defendant may move to dismiss, with hearing as soon as practicable, or seek a stay until the communicated matter is resolved; no automatic stay in § 5-807(d). |
Statute defines a SLAPP suit by three required conditions, including bad faith; it states no separate probability-of-prevailing screen (§ 5-807(b)). |
No special attorney-fee or cost award in § 5-807. |
Final circuit-court judgment appeal under § 12-301; § 12-303 enumerates interlocutory orders and does not list a § 5-807 motion. |
No listed claim-category exemptions; statute preserves otherwise available remedies (§ 5-807(e)). |
| Massachusetts verified 2026-10-06 | G.L. c. 231, § 59H; 2022 amendment excludes actions under G.L. c. 12, § 11I½. |
Statements before or about government proceedings, likely to encourage review or enlist public participation, or otherwise protected petitioning (§ 59H). |
Special motion within 60 days of complaint service or later at court discretion; discovery stays on filing, with specified discovery possible for good cause (§ 59H). |
Movant first ties challenged claim to petitioning; respondent then shows the petitioning had no reasonable factual or arguable legal basis and caused actual injury (§ 59H; Bristol Asphalt). |
Court awards costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to movant if special motion is granted (§ 59H). |
Denial may receive interlocutory review under the judicial doctrine of present execution (Fabre v. Walton). |
Special motion unavailable in an action under G.L. c. 12, § 11I½ (§ 59H, as amended by St. 2022, c. 127, § 35). |
| Michigan verified 2026-10-06 | MCL §§ 691.1851-691.1863, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, 2025 Act 52; effective March 24, 2026 |
Government-proceeding communications, communications about matters under government review, and constitutional speech, press, assembly, petition, or association on a matter of public concern (MCL 691.1852(1)(d)) |
Special motion within 60 days of service, extendable for good cause (MCL 691.1853); filing stays other proceedings between the parties, subject to exceptions (MCL 691.1854); hearing generally within 60 days and ruling within 60 days after hearing (MCL 691.1855, .1858) |
Movant shows eligibility; dismissal follows if no exemption is shown and the respondent lacks a prima facie case for each element, or the movant proves failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (MCL 691.1857) |
Mandatory reasonable motion costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses to prevailing movant; to prevailing respondent only if motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay (MCL 691.1860) |
Movant may appeal a denial, in whole or part, as of right within 21 days (MCL 691.1859) |
Commercial-speech claims against sellers or lessors, plus an individual’s claims under eleven named civil-rights, disability, whistleblower, workers’ compensation, FOIA, and federal employment statutes (MCL 691.1852(2)) |
| Minnesota verified 2026-08-13 | Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07-554.19, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2024 (Laws 2024, ch. 123, art. 18, eff. 5/25/2024), replacing a 1994 statute held unconstitutional in 2017; no amendment since enactment |
Broad UPEPA scope: communications in a governmental proceeding, communications on an issue under review by one, and the exercise of speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern (§ 554.08(b)); cut back by an unusually long exemptions list in § 554.08(c) |
Special motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service, or later on a showing of good cause (§ 554.09); hearing within 60 days of filing (§ 554.11); ruling within 60 days of the hearing (§ 554.14); all proceedings between the parties, including discovery, automatically stayed until the ruling and through any appeal, with limited discovery allowed on a showing of necessity (§ 554.10) |
Movant shows the Act applies under § 554.08(b); responding party fails to show an exemption under § 554.08(c) applies; and either the responding party fails to make a prima facie case for each element, or the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (§ 554.13) — a summary-judgment-style screen, not a 'probability of prevailing' standard |
Mandatory costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; the same mandatory award goes to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 554.16) |
Only the moving party has a statutory right to an immediate appeal, and only from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, filed within 30 days (§ 554.15); the statute creates no matching interlocutory appeal for a responding party challenging a grant |
An unusually long list: government-actor claims, crime-victim suits, real-property title disputes, bodily-injury/wrongful-death claims (unless reputational), insurance and common-law-fraud claims, family-law and employment-law actions, consumer-protection claims, and any federal-law claim — with a carve-back restoring coverage for journalistic/artistic works and consumer reviews even within the goods/services, fraud, and consumer-protection exemptions (§ 554.08(c)-(d)) |
| Mississippi verified 2026-08-23 | None enacted. A 2022 bill, S.B. 2628, would have created a 'Public Speech Protection Act' modeled on anti-SLAPP statutes elsewhere; it died in the Senate Judiciary Committee that session and was never reintroduced. No anti-SLAPP bill is currently pending in the Mississippi Legislature |
N/A — no statutory scope exists. Mississippi courts have not developed a separate constitutional or common-law petitioning-immunity doctrine for SLAPP-type suits either; a defendant sued over speech relies on ordinary Mississippi defamation-law defenses (truth, non-defamatory opinion, and the actual-malice standard for a public-official or public-figure plaintiff) |
N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery |
N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary pleading-sufficiency standard for a motion to dismiss, and the ordinary genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard for summary judgment, apply instead. Under the general Litigation Accountability Act, a party seeking fees must instead show the other side's action, claim, or defense was 'without substantial justification' — defined as frivolous, groundless in fact or law, or vexatious (§ 11-55-3(a)) |
N/A as a SLAPP-specific matter, but two general tools remain available in any civil case: M.R.C.P. 11(b) lets a court order a party or attorney who files a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or one intended to harass or delay, to pay the opposing side's reasonable expenses and attorney's fees; the Litigation Accountability Act, Miss. Code § 11-55-5(1), separately requires a court to award fees and costs against a party or attorney who brings an action or claim without substantial justification or for delay or harassment, with § 11-55-7 governing the statutory-factor analysis |
N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary Mississippi rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply instead |
N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Missouri verified 2026-08-22 | Through Aug. 27, 2026: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.528. Beginning Aug. 28, 2026: signed 2026 S.B. 1067 repeals § 537.528 and enacts the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act at § 537.529, applying only to civil actions filed or claims asserted on or after that date |
Current § 537.528: only conduct or speech connected with a public hearing or meeting in a quasi-judicial government proceeding; Missouri courts limit it to money-damages claims. Effective Aug. 28, § 537.529.3 expands coverage to communications in government proceedings, issues under government review, and constitutional speech, press, assembly, petition, or association on a matter of public concern |
Current § 537.528.1: expedited motion to dismiss, judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment; no statutory filing deadline, but discovery stays through appeals. Effective Aug. 28, § 537.529: special motion within 60 days after service (later for good cause), with proceedings including discovery stayed |
Current § 537.528: no statutory burden shift; ordinary motion standards apply, with a retaliatory-suit gloss from Missouri case law. Effective Aug. 28, § 537.529 requires the movant to show coverage, the respondent to show an exemption, and dismissal if the respondent lacks a prima facie case or the movant establishes an ordinary dismissal or summary-judgment ground |
Current § 537.528.2: mandatory fees to a prevailing movant only if filed within 90 days after the answer; respondent gets fees for a frivolous or delay-only motion. Effective Aug. 28, § 537.529 makes fees and litigation expenses mandatory for any prevailing movant, with respondent fees only for a frivolous or delay-only motion |
Current § 537.528.3: expedited appeal language, but no immediate interlocutory appeal from a denial under Missouri case law. Effective Aug. 28, § 537.529 gives a movant 21 days to appeal a denial, in whole or in part, as a matter of right |
Current § 537.528: no listed exemptions beyond its narrow scope. Effective Aug. 28, § 537.529.4 excludes claims against government units or officials acting officially, specified government public-safety enforcement, and sale-or-lease communications by goods/services businesses; expressive works are excluded from 'goods or services' |
| Montana verified 2026-10-06 | Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-34-101 to -112, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, enacted by 2025 ch. 250 |
Government-proceeding communications, issues under government review, and constitutional speech, press, assembly, petition, or association on a matter of public concern (§ 27-34-102(1)) |
Special motion within 60 days of service or later for good cause (§ 27-34-103); proceedings between parties stayed on filing, subject to exceptions (§ 27-34-104); hearing generally within 60 days and ruling within 60 days after hearing (§§ 27-34-105, -108) |
Movant shows the chapter applies; respondent may show exemption; otherwise dismissal follows if respondent lacks a prima facie case for each element or movant proves failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (§ 27-34-107(1)) |
Mandatory reasonable costs, fees and litigation expenses to prevailing movant; to prevailing respondent only if motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 27-34-110) |
Movant may appeal denial in whole or part as of right; 30 days in private-party case, 60 days when the United States, Montana, or a political subdivision is a party (§ 27-34-109) |
Three claim categories excluded by § 27-34-102(2), including specified government and sale-related claims; § 27-34-104(8) separately excludes Title 40, chapter 15 protection-order actions from the stay only |
| Nebraska verified 2026-10-06 | Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,241 to 25-21,246, actions involving public petition and participation |
Damages claim by a public applicant or permittee materially related to the defendant’s reporting, comment, ruling, challenge, or opposition concerning the application or permission (§ 25-21,242) |
Expedited motion to dismiss or preferred summary-judgment hearing under §§ 25-21,245 to -246; no separately named special motion or automatic discovery stay in these sections |
On a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must show a substantial basis in law or substantial argument for changing law (§ 25-21,245); summary judgment also requires a substantial basis in fact and law, or such an argument (§ 25-21,246) |
Defendant may bring a separate statutory claim for costs and fees on proof the original action lacked a substantial basis in fact and law and a substantial argument for changing law; further damages require malicious purpose (§ 25-21,243(1)) |
Sections 25-21,241 to -246 state no special interlocutory appeal right |
No separate carve-out list; § 25-21,242 limits coverage to damages claims by a public applicant or permittee tied to the application or permission |
| Nevada verified 2026-08-22 | NRS 41.635 to 41.670, enacted 1993, broadened in 2013 (S.B. 286) to cover public-forum/public-interest speech generally (not just speech directed at government), and last substantively amended in 2015 (S.B. 444), which added a new legislative-findings section (§ 41.665) and changed the plaintiff's burden under § 41.660 to prima facie evidence; a home-grown California-influenced scheme, not a version of the newer Uniform Public Expression Protection Act |
A 'good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern' (§ 41.637): communication aimed at procuring governmental or electoral action; a complaint to a government official about a matter of concern to that entity; a statement made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative, executive, or judicial body or other official proceeding; or a communication in direct connection with an issue of public interest made in a public forum — but only if the communication 'is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood,' a truthfulness gate built into the scope test itself, not just a later defense |
Special motion to dismiss within 60 days of service of the complaint, extendable by the court for good cause (§ 41.660(2)); no separate hearing deadline — the court must rule on the motion within 20 judicial days after it is served on the plaintiff (§ 41.660(3)(f)); discovery is stayed pending the ruling and the disposition of any appeal (§ 41.660(3)(e)), with limited discovery allowed only on a showing that needed information is held by another party and isn't reasonably available otherwise (§ 41.660(4)) |
Two-step: the movant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based on a good faith communication under § 41.637 (§ 41.660(3)(a)); if met, the plaintiff must then demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 41.660(3)(b)) — § 41.665 directs courts to apply this second-step burden the same way California courts applied California's anti-SLAPP burden as of June 8, 2015 |
Mandatory reasonable costs and attorney's fees to a prevailing movant, plus a discretionary additional award of up to $10,000 (§ 41.670(1)(a)-(b)); a prevailing movant may also bring a separate action for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the fees/costs of that separate action (§ 41.670(1)(c)) — a built-in SLAPPback right; if the motion is denied and found frivolous or vexatious, the prevailing responding party gets mandatory fees plus a possible additional award up to $10,000 and other deterrent relief (§ 41.670(2)-(3)) |
If the court denies the special motion to dismiss, an interlocutory appeal lies directly to the Nevada Supreme Court (§ 41.670(4)); the statute creates no matching express right to appeal a grant, and dismissal under a granted motion operates as an adjudication upon the merits (§ 41.660(5)) |
None — NRS 41.635 to 41.670 has no statutory exemptions or carve-outs section of the kind UPEPA states use for government-enforcement or commercial-speech claims; the closest limiting feature is the truthfulness requirement built into the § 41.637 definition itself, which keeps the motion from ever reaching a communication the movant cannot show was truthful or made without knowledge of its falsity |
| New Hampshire verified 2026-10-07 | No general anti-SLAPP special-motion statute identified; RSA 507:15 provides a general frivolous-action remedy, and the 1994 advisory opinion addressed proposed SB 661. |
N/A; no special statutory protected-activity threshold. |
N/A; no special speech-case motion, statutory filing window, or automatic discovery stay. Ordinary civil motions govern. |
N/A; no anti-SLAPP threshold burden. The 1994 advisory opinion objected to SB 661's proposed probability-of-prevailing test because it required a judge to resolve disputed facts. |
No anti-SLAPP-specific fee rule. Under RSA 507:15, the court may award reasonable costs and attorney fees plus $1,000 to the prevailing party if a contract or tort action or defense clearly appears frivolous or intended to harass or intimidate. |
N/A; no special anti-SLAPP appeal route. |
N/A; no anti-SLAPP statute from which to carve exemptions. |
| New Jersey verified 2026-10-06 | N.J.S.A. §§ 2A:53A-49 to -61, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act; P.L.2023, c.155, § 14 made it applicable to actions filed or claims asserted from 2023-10-07; current compilation shows the original 2023 enactment |
Broad: a cause of action based on a communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; a communication on an issue under consideration or review in one; or the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-50(b)) |
Not called a 'special motion': an 'application for an order to show cause' filed within 60 days of service (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-51); unlike most UPEPA states the resulting stay is NOT automatic: the court 'may order' a stay, but 'there shall be a presumption that such a stay shall be granted' (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-52) |
Movant shows the Act applies; responding party must then show an exemption applies or establish 'a prima facie case as to each essential element' of the claim, or else the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-55); the court may consider anything admissible on summary judgment, not just the pleadings (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-54) |
Mandatory court costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; mandatory fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the order to show cause was frivolous or filed solely to delay (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-58); a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal WITH prejudice counts as the movant prevailing for fee purposes (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-55(c)) |
The moving party may appeal a denial (in whole or in part) as a matter of right, within 20 days of the order (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-57); the Act provides no special appeal rule for a grant |
Three categories (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-50(c)): actions against a governmental unit or an official acting in an official capacity; actions BY a governmental unit to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and commercial-speech actions against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a related communication |
| New Mexico verified 2026-08-23 | NMSA 1978 §§ 38-2-9.1 and 38-2-9.2, enacted 2001 (Laws 2001, ch. 218, §§ 1-2, eff. 6/15/2001) and unamended since; a narrow, quasi-judicial-proceeding-only statute, not a version of UPEPA or the Texas/California model |
Narrow: applies only to an action seeking money damages for conduct or speech made in connection with a 'public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any political subdivision of the state' (§ 38-2-9.1(A)); the statute's own definition (§ 38-2-9.1(D)) lists meetings or presentations before state, city, town, or village councils, planning commissions, or review boards or commissions — courts have read this to reach comparable state-agency disciplinary proceedings (e.g., a state racing commission's board of stewards) but not general public-forum speech or a private business dispute |
No statutory filing deadline for the motion itself; a defendant instead uses an ordinary motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment, which the court must consider 'on a priority or expedited basis' (§ 38-2-9.1(A)); no automatic stay of discovery — the statute is silent on staying proceedings while the motion is pending |
No special evidentiary or burden-shifting test — unlike most other states' anti-SLAPP statutes, § 38-2-9.1 doesn't create its own standard for deciding the motion; it only directs that the ordinary motion to dismiss, judgment-on-the-pleadings, or summary-judgment standard be applied on an expedited timetable, so whichever ordinary standard governs the motion type chosen controls |
Conditionally mandatory: if the § 38-2-9.1 defense is raised and the court grants a motion to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment that was filed within 90 days of the moving party's answer, the court must award the moving party reasonable attorney fees and costs; separately, if the court finds a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment was frivolous or filed solely to cause unnecessary delay, it must award fees and costs to the party who prevailed on the motion (§ 38-2-9.1(B)) |
An express statutory right for any party — not left to case law or a general discretionary appeal procedure — to an expedited appeal from a trial court's order on the motion, or from the trial court's failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis (§ 38-2-9.1(C)); the New Mexico Court of Appeals has held this expedited-appeal jurisdiction reaches only speech-based defenses raised under this statute (or the related Noerr-Pennington doctrine), not other grounds for dismissal argued in the same motion |
No exemptions section exists to carve activity out of the statute's narrow scope. Instead, § 38-2-9.1(E) is a savings clause: nothing in the section limits or prohibits a party's other constitutional, statutory, common-law, or administrative rights or remedies, including a civil action for defamation or malicious abuse of process |
| New York verified 2026-09-26 | Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a; CPLR 3211(g), 3212(h) |
Public-forum communication on a public-interest issue, or other lawful speech or petition conduct covered by § 76-a(1) |
CPLR 3211(a)(7) dismissal or 3212(h) summary judgment; 3211(g) filing stays discovery, hearings and motions until notice of entry of the ruling; each motion gets hearing preference |
3211(g): respondent needs substantial basis in law or substantial law-change argument; 3212(h): substantial basis in fact and law or that argument |
§ 70-a: costs and fees recoverable if the suit lacked a substantial basis in fact and law and had no substantial law-change argument; additional showing for other damages |
No separate anti-SLAPP appeal rule; ordinary noticed-motion order appeal may lie under CPLR 5701(a)(2) |
No separate exclusion list in cited anti-SLAPP provisions; coverage turns on § 76-a(1)'s definition |
| North Carolina verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. A 2023 bill to adopt the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (H.B. 144, 2023-2024 Session) was reported favorably out of committee but died, unvoted, when the biennium ended on 2024-12-13; no successor bill has been filed |
N/A: no statutory scope exists. North Carolina courts have recognized only a narrow, case-by-case common-law/constitutional Petition Clause immunity for statements aimed at influencing government action, not a codified public-interest test |
N/A: no special motion to strike or dismiss exists; a defendant must use an ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery |
N/A: no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary standards for a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment under the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure apply instead |
N/A: no SLAPP-specific fee award exists; only North Carolina's general sanctions rules for frivolous filings (e.g., Rule 11) are available, on the same terms as in any other civil case |
N/A: no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary North Carolina rules on final judgments and interlocutory appeals apply |
N/A: there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| North Dakota verified 2026-10-07 | No general anti-SLAPP special-motion statute identified; general frivolous-claim costs in N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2) |
No special statutory protected-activity definition or threshold (current Century Code; Energy Transfer LP v. Gion, 2026 ND 93 ¶ 29) |
No special speech-case motion; ordinary civil procedure applies (current Century Code; Gion ¶ 29) |
No anti-SLAPP threshold burden; ordinary civil-case standards apply (current Century Code) |
General frivolous-claim costs and reasonable attorney fees if statutory conditions are met (§ 28-26-01(2)) |
N/A; ordinary civil appeal procedures |
N/A; ordinary civil procedure |
| Ohio verified 2026-10-06 | Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2747.01-.06, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act; enacted by S.B. 237, effective April 9, 2025 |
Broad: a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under consideration or review in one, or the exercise of speech/press/assembly/petition/association rights on a matter of public concern (§ 2747.01(B)); the Act confers substantive immunity from suit, not just from liability (§ 2747.01(E)) |
Motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service, extendable for good cause (§ 2747.02); filing stays other proceedings between the parties, including discovery, subject to statutory exceptions (§ 2747.03); hearing generally within 60 days of filing and ruling within 60 days of hearing (§ 2747.04(A), (D)) |
Movant shows the claim is based on § 2747.01(B) conduct; dismissal follows if no exemption is shown and the respondent lacks a prima facie case for each element, or the movant establishes failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (§ 2747.04(C)) |
If granted, mandatory reasonable fees, court costs, and litigation expenses to the movant, including for pro bono or contingent representation; if denied, reciprocal fees only on a finding of frivolous conduct (§ 2747.05(A)-(B)) |
The movant may appeal a denial as an interlocutory final order within 30 days of entry (§ 2747.05(C)) |
Four categories in § 2747.01(C): actions against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting officially; a governmental enforcement action against an imminent threat to public health or safety; actions against a person primarily in the business of selling/leasing goods or services arising from a sale/lease-related communication; and survivorship or bodily-injury/wrongful-death actions |
| Oklahoma verified 2026-08-14 | 12 O.S. §§ 1430-1440 (Ch. 24A of Title 12), the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA), enacted 2014 (Laws 2014, c. 107, eff. 11/1/2014), modeled on Texas's TCPA; exemptions section (§ 1439) amended 2022 (insurance carve-out, Laws 2022 c. 321) and again 2025 (officer-director/employment carve-out, Laws 2025 c. 180, eff. 11/1/2025, already in force) |
Exercise of the right of free speech (a communication on a matter of public concern), the right to petition (a communication in or pertaining to a governmental proceeding), or the right of association (a communication between individuals collectively pursuing common interests) (§ 1431); 'matter of public concern' is broadly defined to include health/safety, environmental/economic/community well-being, government, public officials/figures, or a good/product/service in the marketplace (§ 1431(7)) |
Motion to dismiss within 60 days of service of the legal action, extendable for good cause (§ 1432(B)); hearing set within 60 days of service of the motion, extendable to 90 days for docket conditions/good cause/party agreement, or to 120 days if the court allows limited discovery (§§ 1433(A)-(C)); all discovery automatically suspended on filing until the court rules, with limited discovery allowed on a good-cause showing (§§ 1432(C), 1435(B)) |
Movant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the action is based on, relates to, or responds to the movant's exercise of a protected right (§ 1434(B)); burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish by 'clear and specific evidence' a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim (§ 1434(C)) — a heightened, TCPA-style evidentiary standard, not mere notice pleading; even if the plaintiff meets that burden, the court must still dismiss if the movant proves each essential element of a valid defense by a preponderance of the evidence (§ 1434(D)) |
Mandatory court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and other expenses 'as justice and equity may require,' plus court-ordered sanctions sufficient to deter similar suits, to a prevailing movant (§ 1438(A)) — Oklahoma courts have held the fee award itself is mandatory, with only the 'other expenses' component discretionary (Thacker v. Walton, 2021 OK Civ. App. 5); discretionary fees to a prevailing plaintiff only if the court finds the motion frivolous or solely intended to delay (§ 1438(B)) |
A ruling on the motion (grant or denial) is expedited-appealable, interlocutory or not; if the court doesn't rule within the time prescribed for its decision, the motion is deemed denied by operation of law and the movant may appeal that deemed denial (§ 1437) |
Enforcement actions brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney in the state's name; claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods/services/insurance arising from a commercial communication to an actual or potential buyer; bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival claims; claims under the Oklahoma Insurance Code or an insurance contract; and (added 2025) an officer-director/employee-employer/independent-contractor claim seeking recovery for trade-secret or corporate-opportunity misappropriation, or seeking to enforce a non-disparagement agreement, non-compete, NDA, or confidentiality agreement (§ 1439) |
| Oregon verified 2026-10-06 | ORS 31.150-.155, special motion to strike; current § 31.150(2)(b) includes the sexual-assault statement category |
Government-proceeding and public-forum statements, other constitutional expression connected to a public issue, and good-faith statements about sexual assault made with objectively reasonable belief (ORS 31.150(2)) |
Special motion within 60 days of service or later at the court’s discretion; hearing generally within 30 days; discovery stayed on filing until judgment, with limited discovery for good cause (ORS 31.152(1)-(2)) |
Defendant first makes a prima facie showing of protected activity; plaintiff then must show a probability of prevailing with substantial evidence for a prima facie case, plus probable malice for defamation claims under the sexual-assault category (ORS 31.150(4)-(5)) |
Mandatory reasonable fees and costs to prevailing defendant; to prevailing plaintiff only if motion frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay (ORS 31.152(3)) |
Moving party may appeal a denial, in whole or part, as of right under ORS 19.205 (ORS 31.152(5)) |
Commercial sale or lease-related communications by a person primarily in that business; official actions brought by the Attorney General, district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney (ORS 31.150(3), 31.155(1)) |
| Pennsylvania verified 2026-08-16 | 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8320.1, 8340.11-8340.18 (Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Act 72 of 2024); a narrower, still-separate 1990s-era immunity for environmental-participation speech remains at 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 and was left untouched by Act 72 |
A communication in, or on an issue under review in, a legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative proceeding, or the exercise on a matter of public concern of speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights under the First Amendment or Article I, §§ 7 or 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution |
SPLIT STATUS: the § 8340.16 special motion (60-day filing deadline, automatic stay of the whole case) is written into the statute but does NOT yet take effect: it activates only once the PA Supreme Court promulgates a conforming procedural rule and the Legislative Reference Bureau publishes notice; the current official code still carried that condition on August 16, 2026. Until it takes effect, immunity is asserted through ordinary preliminary objections or a summary judgment motion instead |
Immunity applies unless the party asserting the claim (1) states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, (2) establishes a prima facie case on each essential element, and (3) shows a genuine issue of material fact defeating judgment as a matter of law: ordinary demurrer/summary-judgment standards rather than a distinct SLAPP-specific evidentiary test |
The court shall award court costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, jointly and severally against each party who asserted the claim, to a party who establishes immunity, including when the plaintiff voluntarily discontinues after immunity is asserted; the opposing party recovers its fees instead if the immunity assertion itself was frivolous or made solely to delay |
Any order granting, denying, or otherwise determining immunity is immediately appealable under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 702; because immunity can already be raised through ordinary motions, this appeal right is currently usable even though the separate § 8340.16 special-motion procedure is not yet in effect |
Ten exclusions in § 8340.14(b): claims against or by a government unit, claims against a seller/lessor over statements tied to selling their own goods or services, most bodily-injury/wrongful-death claims (unless they sound in defamation, privacy, or emotional distress, or arise solely from public-concern speech), protection-from-abuse and sexual-violence-victim claims, insurance-contract claims, trade-secret/corporate-opportunity misappropriation claims, enforcement of a non-disparagement or non-compete agreement, and internal business-entity governance or manager-liability disputes |
| Rhode Island verified 2026-10-06 | R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-33-1 through -4; conditional immunity in § 9-33-2. |
Written or oral statements to or about government proceedings, or connected to an issue of public concern (§ 9-33-2(a), (e)). |
Immunity asserted by an appropriate civil-procedure motion; filing stays discovery until ruling, with specified discovery possible for good cause (§ 9-33-2(b)-(c)). |
Conditional immunity unless speech is a “sham”; statute requires both objective and subjective baselessness (§ 9-33-2(a)(1)-(2)). |
Costs and reasonable fees after successful motion or eventual trial win; compensatory damages require frivolousness or harassment/inhibition showing; punitive damages discretionary (§ 9-33-2(d)). |
Final judgment appeals under § 9-24-1; § 9-24-7 specifies certain interlocutory orders, not an immunity-motion denial. |
Sham exception to conditional immunity; no separate claim-category exemption list in § 9-33-2(a). |
| South Carolina verified 2026-07-16 | None enacted. The official current Title 15 index contains no anti-SLAPP chapter, and current Chapter 3 contains Articles 1, 2, 3, and 5 — not the proposed Article 7. The only nearby statewide scheme is the general South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, S.C. Code § 15-36-10. H.3305/S.43 and H.5420 did not become law before the 2025-2026 regular session adjourned sine die on May 14, 2026 |
N/A — no South Carolina anti-SLAPP statute defines protected petitioning, speech, press, assembly, or association activity |
N/A — no anti-SLAPP special motion, filing deadline, expedited hearing, ruling deadline, or automatic discovery stay. Ordinary civil-procedure motions apply |
N/A — no SLAPP-specific burden shift or evidentiary screen. Ordinary pleading and summary-judgment standards apply; § 15-36-10 separately uses a reasonable-attorney/frivolousness standard for sanctions |
No SLAPP-specific fee shifting. Under the general sanctions act, a court may impose a just sanction for a violating filing, and sanctions may include the prevailing party's reasonable costs and attorney's fees (§ 15-36-10(B)(2), (G)(1)) |
N/A — no anti-SLAPP interlocutory appeal or expedited appeal exists. Ordinary appellate rules govern |
N/A — there is no anti-SLAPP statute and therefore no statutory exemptions list |
| South Dakota verified 2026-08-14 | SDCL Chapter 15-40, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), added by 2026 Senate Bill 137 (SL 2026, ch. 91) and effective July 1, 2026 under SDCL § 2-14-16's regular-session default |
Standard broad UPEPA scope (§ 15-40-1): a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under review in such a proceeding, or the exercise of the right of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association guaranteed by the U.S. or South Dakota constitution, on a matter of public concern |
A 'special motion for expedited relief to dismiss' (§ 15-40-3), filed within 60 days of service (or later for good cause). Filing automatically stays discovery and nearly all other proceedings (§ 15-40-4); the stay continues through any appeal; limited court-ordered discovery is available on a showing of specific necessity; the court must hold a hearing within 60 days of filing and rule within 60 days of the hearing (§§ 15-40-7, -10) |
Codified two-step test (§ 15-40-9): the court must dismiss with prejudice if the moving party establishes the chapter applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption applies, AND either the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its claim, or the moving party separately shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Decided on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 15-40-8) |
Mandatory to a prevailing moving party ('the court shall award' court costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, § 15-40-12(1)). Reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 15-40-12(2)) |
Express statutory right: the moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, within 30 days of entry of the order (§ 15-40-11). Only the moving party gets this express interlocutory right; the statute does not create a parallel express right for a responding party to immediately appeal a grant |
Three carve-outs (§ 15-40-2): claims against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting in an official capacity; claims BY a governmental unit or employee, in an official capacity, to enforce a law, rule, regulation, or ordinance protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a communication (or lack of communication) related to that person's own sale or lease — this exemption does not reach the advertisement, creation, dissemination, or exhibition of an artistic, dramatic, journalistic, literary, musical, or political work |
| Tennessee verified 2026-10-06 | Tennessee Public Participation Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110; applies to actions commenced on or after July 1, 2019 (2019 Pub. Ch. 185, §§ 1-2) |
Constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public concern or religious expression, petitioning of government, or collective action on a matter of public concern (§ 20-17-103) |
Petition to dismiss within 60 calendar days after service, or later if the court permits; response at least 5 days before hearing unless court orders earlier; discovery stayed on filing, with limited good-cause discovery possible (§ 20-17-104) |
Petitioner first makes a prima facie showing that the action targets protected activity; respondent must then make a prima facie case on each claim element; petitioner still wins by establishing a valid defense (§ 20-17-105(a)-(c)) |
On dismissal, mandatory costs, reasonable fees, expenses, and deterrent relief; respondent may receive costs and fees only on written findings that the petition was frivolous or filed solely for delay (§ 20-17-107) |
Order granting or denying the petition is immediately appealable as of right to the Court of Appeals (§ 20-17-106) |
Government enforcement action brought in the state or subdivision's name by specified public attorneys is excluded; chapter creates no independent private cause of action (§ 20-17-108) |
| Texas verified 2026-10-07 | Texas Citizens Participation Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 27; current § 27.010 includes 2023 exemption |
Action based on/in response to free speech, petition, or association, plus § 27.010(b) publishing and consumer-review activity (§§ 27.001, .003) |
File by 60th day after service unless extended; discovery suspended on filing; hearing generally by day 60, outside limit 90 or 120 with limited discovery (§§ 27.003–.004, .006) |
Movant demonstrates protected basis; claimant must show clear and specific evidence of a prima facie case for each essential element (§ 27.005) |
Dismissal generally requires costs and reasonable attorney fees to movant; sanctions discretionary; specified reciprocal and counterclaim rules (§ 27.009) |
Untimely non-ruling deemed denial and appealable; expedited appeal or writ from order or failure to rule (§ 27.008) |
13 § 27.010(a) categories, including client legal-malpractice claims; § 27.010(b) restores coverage for specified publishing/review claims |
| Utah verified 2026-10-06 | Utah Code §§ 78B-25-101 to -115, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, effective May 3, 2023; § 78B-25-114 savings clause amended in 2024 |
Government-proceeding communications, issues under government review, and constitutional expression on a matter of public concern (§ 78B-25-102(2)); artistic, journalistic, political and similar works excluded from “goods or services” (§ 78B-25-102(1)(a)) |
Special motion within 60 days of service or later for good cause (§ 78B-25-103); proceedings between the parties stayed on filing, subject to exceptions (§ 78B-25-104); hearing generally within 60 days and ruling within 60 days after hearing (§§ 78B-25-105, -108) |
Movant shows chapter applies; respondent may show exemption; otherwise dismissal follows if respondent lacks a prima facie case for each element or movant shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (§ 78B-25-107(1)) |
Mandatory reasonable costs, fees and litigation expenses to prevailing movant; to prevailing respondent only if motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 78B-25-110) |
Movant may appeal denial in whole or part as of right (§ 78B-25-109); notice due within 21 days under Utah R. App. P. 4(a)(2) |
Official-capacity claims against government units or agents, certain government enforcement actions involving imminent public-health or safety threats, and covered seller or lessor communications (§ 78B-25-102(3)) |
| Vermont verified 2026-08-14 | 12 V.S.A. § 1041; enacted 2005 (No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 2), last amended 2023 (No. 14, § 2, eff. May 10, 2023) to add the legally-protected-health-care exemption |
Broad, four categories (§ 1041(i)): (1) statements before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding or other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) statements in connection with an issue under consideration or review by such a body; (3) statements on an issue of public interest made in a public forum or place open to the public; and (4) other conduct or statements on a public issue or issue of public interest that furthers the exercise of free speech or petition rights |
Special motion to strike filed and served within 60 days of the complaint's filing (§ 1041(b)); a response is due within 15 days of service of the motion; the court may extend either deadline for good cause. Filing automatically stays all discovery until the motion is decided (§ 1041(c)(1)), though the court may allow limited discovery on a good-cause showing (§ 1041(c)(2)). The court must hold a hearing within 30 days of service of the motion absent good cause for an extension (§ 1041(d)) |
Plaintiff-unfriendly two-part conjunctive test: the court SHALL grant the motion unless the plaintiff shows BOTH that the defendant's exercise of speech or petition rights 'was devoid of any reasonable factual support and any arguable basis in law' AND that the defendant's acts caused the plaintiff actual injury (§ 1041(e)(1)). Requiring both elements makes this a harder standard for a plaintiff to overcome than a single 'probability of prevailing' test |
Mandatory defense costs and reasonable fees when the motion is granted; mandatory plaintiff costs and fees only when denial includes a finding that the motion was frivolous or intended solely to delay (§ 1041(f)(1)) |
An order granting or denying the motion is appealable in the same manner as an interlocutory order under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 (§ 1041(g)); the statute does not create an automatic appeal as of right |
Two carve-outs (§ 1041(h)): (1) any enforcement action or criminal proceeding brought by the State of Vermont or a political subdivision; and (2) a case involving tortious interference with legally protected health care under 12 V.S.A. § 7302 — a 2023 addition tied to Vermont's reproductive- and gender-affirming-care shield law, which gives its own separate cause of action instead |
| Virginia verified 2026-08-23 | Va. Code § 8.01-223.2, 'Immunity of persons for statements made at public hearing or communicated to third party'; enacted 2007 (c.798), most recently amended 2025 (c.641, adding a Title IX-hearing category and an employee-retaliation category); referred to by Virginia courts as the state's anti-SLAPP statute, but not a UPEPA-style special-motion act |
Narrower and more itemized than most states: (i) statements on a matter of public concern that would be protected under the First Amendment, communicated to a third party; (ii) statements made at, or otherwise communicated to, a local government body's public hearing on a matter properly before it; (iii) statements made at a Title IX hearing before a higher-education tribunal; or (iv) an employee's statements against an employer where retaliation is barred by § 40.1-27.3 (§ 8.01-223.2(A)) |
No standalone special motion or statutory filing deadline. Immunity is ordinarily raised through a plea in bar (Virginia's Supreme Court has noted a demurrer tests only the complaint's legal sufficiency, not an affirmative defense like this one); no statutory stay of discovery |
No probability-of-prevailing test. Immunity attaches to the listed categories of statements unless the plaintiff shows the declarant knew or should have known the statement was false, or made it with reckless disregard for its truth (§ 8.01-223.2(B)); courts resolve this at the plea-in-bar or demurrer stage by asking whether the complaint's well-pleaded allegations, taken as true, are enough to overcome the immunity |
Discretionary, not mandatory: a person whose suit is dismissed, whose subpoena is quashed, or who otherwise prevails based on the immunity 'may be awarded' reasonable attorney fees and costs (§ 8.01-223.2(C)); no reciprocal fee award against a losing movant |
Not addressed in § 8.01-223.2 itself. Since a 2023 recodification, a circuit court order granting or denying a plea of 'sovereign, absolute, or qualified immunity' is immediately appealable to the Supreme Court of Virginia by petition within 15 days (§ 8.01-670.2); the Court exercised that jurisdiction over a denial that included § 8.01-223.2 statutory immunity in Brooks-Buck v. Wahlstrom (Va. Oct. 16, 2025) |
No separate exemptions section naming carve-outs like commercial speech or government enforcement. The only statutory limit is subsection B's exception for statements made with actual or constructive knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth |
| Washington verified 2026-10-06 | RCW chapter 4.105, the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, enacted by 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 259. It supplies a special motion for expedited relief, a stay, an appeal, and cost provisions. |
RCW 4.105.010(2) covers a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under governmental consideration or review, or constitutional speech, press, assembly, petition, or association activity on a matter of public concern, subject to subsection (3) exclusions. |
Give written notice of intent to move at least 14 days before filing; an omitted notice leaves the motion available but forfeits attorney’s fees (§ 4.105.020(1)). File within 60 days after service, or later for good cause (§ 4.105.020(2)). Notice or filing stays other proceedings between moving and responding parties; the court may extend the stay to another party on motion, and limited discovery and other statutory exceptions remain possible (§ 4.105.030(1), (4)-(7)). |
Under RCW 4.105.060(1), the movant establishes statutory coverage, the respondent may establish an exclusion, and dismissal follows if the respondent fails to establish a prima facie case on every essential element or the movant establishes failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law without a genuine material-fact issue. Section 4.105.050 identifies the pleadings and summary-judgment evidence the court may consider. |
The court awards costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and reasonable motion-related litigation expenses to a prevailing movant, except that omitted 14-day notice forfeits attorney’s fees. A prevailing respondent receives those amounts only if the motion was not substantially justified or was filed solely to delay (§§ 4.105.020(1), 4.105.090). |
The movant may appeal an order denying the motion in whole or part as of right within 21 days (§ 4.105.080). On an appeal from a ruling on the motion, proceedings between all parties are stayed until the appeal concludes, subject to § 4.105.030(5)-(7). |
RCW 4.105.010(3)(a) lists twelve exclusions, including specified government actions, commercial communications, crime-victim actions, real-property claims, bodily-injury and wrongful-death claims, insurance claims, common-law fraud, domestic and protective-order matters, employment claims, Consumer Protection Act claims, and federal claims. Subsection (3)(b) restores coverage for specified expressive works and consumer commentary within the commercial-communication, fraud, and Consumer Protection Act exclusions. |
| West Virginia verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP statute exists in the West Virginia Code. At least seven UPEPA-style bills have been introduced and died in committee since 2020 (HB 4726 and HB 4782 in 2020; HB 2485 and HB 2716 in 2021, reintroduced 2022; SB 469 and HB 4912 in 2024; HB 2756 in 2025; HB 4866 in 2026), none reported out of committee. The most recent, 2026's HB 4866 ('West Virginia Public Participation Protection Act'), was referred to House Judiciary 1/28/2026 and died when the legislature adjourned sine die 3/14/2026 without a vote. No bill is currently pending; the next regular session convenes January 2027 |
N/A — no statutory scope exists. West Virginia case law provides a real but much narrower substitute: the West Virginia Supreme Court has held the state constitutional right to petition the government (W. Va. Const. art. III, § 16) is 'protected by the actual malice standard' of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (Harris v. Adkins, 189 W.Va. 465, 432 S.E.2d 549, Syl. pt. 1 (1993)) — reaching a statement connected to petitioning a government body (the case itself involved a statement at a public city council meeting), not the broader public-forum or public-interest speech most anti-SLAPP statutes cover |
N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment under the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery |
N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; ordinary pleading-sufficiency and summary-judgment standards apply. For petition-clause speech specifically, Harris v. Adkins requires the PLAINTIFF to prove actual malice — that the defendant made the statement with 'knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth' — to win the underlying case at all, but this is a substantive element proven over the life of the case, not a threshold showing decided on an early special motion |
N/A as a SLAPP-specific matter, but a general tool remains available in any civil case: W. Va. R. Civ. P. 11(c) lets a court, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, sanction an attorney, law firm, or party who violated Rule 11(b)'s certification requirements (presenting a filing for an improper purpose, or asserting claims unwarranted by existing law); a sanction 'may include... an order directing payment... of part or all of the reasonable expenses and attorney fees directly resulting from the violation,' but it's discretionary and not tailored to speech-based cases |
N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a speech-based case. Ordinary West Virginia rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply |
N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Wisconsin verified 2026-08-16 | None enacted. A 2025-2026 session bill adopting the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (2025 Assembly Bill 701, with an identical companion, Senate Bill 666) passed the Assembly 2026-02-17 on a voice vote after a unanimous 8-0 committee report. A.B. 701 then 'Failed to concur in pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 1,' while S.B. 666 'Failed to pass pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 1,' both on 2026-03-23. No anti-SLAPP statute is in force |
N/A: no statutory scope exists. Unlike some no-statute states, Wisconsin courts also have not developed a separate petitioning-immunity common-law doctrine for SLAPP-type suits; a defendant sued over speech relies on ordinary defamation-law defenses under general Wisconsin tort law (truth, non-defamatory opinion, and the actual-malice standard for public-figure plaintiffs) |
N/A: no speech-specific motion exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6.) or a Wis. Stat. § 802.08 motion for summary judgment. Filing the ordinary dismissal motion stays discovery and other proceedings for up to 180 days under § 802.06(1)(b), but that is a general civil-procedure stay, not an anti-SLAPP protection |
N/A: no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary pleading-sufficiency standard for a motion to dismiss, and the ordinary genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard for summary judgment, apply instead |
N/A: no SLAPP-specific fee award exists; Wisconsin's general sanctions rule for improper pleadings and motions, Wis. Stat. § 802.05, remains available on the same terms as in any other civil case, but it isn't tailored to speech-based claims |
N/A: no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary Wisconsin rules on final judgments and interlocutory appeals (Wis. Stat. § 808.03) apply |
N/A: there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Wyoming verified 2026-08-23 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP statute exists in the Wyoming Statutes. The Wyoming First Amendment Protection Act (2026 HB 103) passed the House but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 4, 2026 without a Senate vote. The Legislature's Joint Judiciary Committee has approved a 2026 interim topic to study anti-SLAPP legislation and draft a Wyoming-specific bill for a future session |
N/A — no statutory scope exists. Wyoming courts instead apply the ordinary First Amendment actual-malice doctrine: a public official or public figure cannot recover for a defamatory statement on a matter of public concern unless the statement was made with actual malice |
N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant sued over speech must use an ordinary motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery |
N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists. Where the actual-malice rule applies to a defamation claim by a public official or public figure, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving actual malice as a substantive element of the claim, litigated on the normal case timeline rather than on an early special motion |
N/A — no SLAPP-specific or general frivolous-litigation fee-shifting statute exists. Wyoming follows the American Rule: each side bears its own attorney's fees unless a specific statute, contract, or rule independently authorizes an award. W.S. § 1-14-126(b) lets a court exercise discretion over the AMOUNT of a fee award only in actions where a fee award is 'authorized' by some other law — it does not itself create a right to fee-shifting in an ordinary defamation or tort case |
N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a speech-based case. Ordinary Wyoming rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals under the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure apply |
N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
All 51 jurisdictions verified. Each state page shows the statute text and verification date behind its row.
Have a specific situation?
A 50-state comparison shows the landscape. Ask your exact question and see what your state's law says for your facts, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Starts from the statutes this survey is built on
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace