50-State Surveys › Anti-SLAPP Laws by State
Anti-SLAPP Laws by State
Does this state have an anti-SLAPP law, and how does its special motion to strike or dismiss a meritless lawsuit against protected speech work?
51 of 51 jurisdictions verified
every entry statute-checked, oldest 2026-07-05
What this survey covers
An anti-SLAPP statute gives a defendant sued over speech, petitioning, or association activity on a matter of public concern a fast, early way out: a "special motion to strike" or "special motion to dismiss" that a court must resolve before the case grinds through expensive discovery. If the motion succeeds, the claim is thrown out and the defendant usually recovers attorney's fees. SLAPP stands for "strategic lawsuit against public participation" — a suit filed less to win than to bury a critic, a reviewer, a whistleblower, or a vocal neighbor in legal costs until they stop talking.
Not every state has one of these laws, and the ones that exist vary sharply: what counts as "protected activity," how fast you must file the motion, what a plaintiff has to show to survive it, whether fees are automatic, and whether a losing plaintiff can immediately appeal. This is also a statute book that keeps changing — a wave of states adopted the Uniform Law Commission's model act (UPEPA) between 2024 and 2026 alone. This survey answers one question, state by state: does this state have an anti-SLAPP law, and if so, exactly how does its special motion work? Each state's page states the rule in plain English, quotes the statute it comes from, and shows the date we last verified the statutory text.
The real patterns, now that all 51 pages are built
Ten states have no anti-SLAPP statute at all: Alaska, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming. That's not a static list — several of these came close in 2025-2026. South Carolina and Wisconsin each had a bill pass one full chamber before stalling (Wisconsin's ran out of Senate floor time; South Carolina's has two competing bills still alive). Wyoming's 2026 bill died in a Senate committee, but the legislature has already opened a formal interim study aimed at a future session. New Hampshire is the one outlier with a structural obstacle: its Supreme Court held in 1994 that a special-motion procedure would violate the state constitutional right to a jury trial, and two more bills have died in the House since.
The Uniform Law Commission's 2020 model act, UPEPA, has become the majority path for new enactments: fifteen states have adopted a version of it (DE, HI, IA, ID, KY, ME, MI, MN, MT, NJ, OH, PA, SD, UT, WA), all but three of them since 2022, and Missouri's legislature has passed a full UPEPA replacement for its older statute that awaited the Governor's signature as of this survey's last check. Washington was the first UPEPA state (2021) after its own home-grown 2010 law was struck down as unconstitutional — Minnesota's 2024 UPEPA enactment followed the same path. The other roughly two dozen states with a statute wrote their own: California's 1992 law is the oldest and the direct model for Texas's TCPA, Georgia's 2016 rewrite, and Oklahoma's OCPA; several older statutes (New Mexico, Nevada, New York before 2020, DC, Massachusetts, Virginia) are narrower, protecting only speech to government or in specific forums rather than any matter of public concern.
Rhode Island is the sharpest outlier among states with a statute on the books: the law still exists, but a 1995 amendment stripped out the special motion mechanism entirely, so there is no expedited procedure left to invoke — the honest answer for Rhode Island is closer to a no-statute state in practice than its "has a statute" label suggests.
How to read the table
Each column is one feature of the special motion, answered the same way for every state, with the statutory citation compressed into the cell. A state with no anti-SLAPP statute says so plainly in every column rather than leaving it blank. Click a state for the full plain-English page: the requirements one by one, the traps people actually hit, and the verbatim statutory text with official source links.
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| State | Governing law | What speech/conduct is protected | Special motion to strike/dismiss | Burden of proof | Attorney's fees | Appeal rights | Exemptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP bill is currently pending in the Alabama legislature; Alabama is not among the states the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press or the Institute for Free Speech list as having recently considered UPEPA or any other anti-SLAPP model | N/A — no statutory scope exists. Alabama courts have not developed a separate constitutional or common-law petitioning-immunity doctrine for SLAPP-type suits either; a defendant sued over speech relies on ordinary Alabama defamation-law defenses (truth, non-defamatory opinion, and the actual-malice standard for a public-official or public-figure plaintiff) | N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary pleading-sufficiency standard for a motion to dismiss, and the ordinary genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard for summary judgment, apply instead | N/A — no SLAPP-specific fee award exists. Rule 11 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure remains available on the same terms as in any other civil case, but isn't tailored to speech-based claims. A separate statute, § 6-5-156.5, awards costs and fees against a private citizen for a frivolous or bad-faith action, but it applies only inside Alabama's drug-related-nuisance-abatement law — it has no application to a defamation or SLAPP-type suit | N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary Alabama rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply instead | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Alaska verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP statute exists in the Alaska Statutes, and none has ever existed. No anti-SLAPP or UPEPA bill has been introduced in the current 34th Legislature (2025-2026) or found in any prior session | N/A — no statutory scope exists. Alaska courts instead apply a general constitutional conditional privilege to statements on a matter of public interest, under which a defamation claim fails unless the plaintiff proves the statement was false and made with actual malice | N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant sued over speech must use an ordinary motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment under the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists. Where the public-interest privilege applies to a defamation claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving actual malice as a substantive element of the claim itself, litigated on the normal case timeline rather than on an early special motion | N/A as a SLAPP-specific matter, but Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 is a general, non-SLAPP-specific rule requiring a fee award to the prevailing party in every civil case: 20-30% of actual attorney's fees in cases with no money judgment (30% if tried, 20% if resolved without trial), or a percentage-of-judgment schedule in money-judgment cases. It applies regardless of whether the underlying claim involved speech | N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a speech-based case. Ordinary Alaska rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Arizona verified 2026-07-05 | A.R.S. § 12-751, 'Strategic actions against public participation; motion to dismiss or quash; definitions'; originally enacted 2006 (Laws 2006, ch. 234) as a narrow right-of-petition-only statute split across companion §§ 12-751/12-752, substantially rewritten and consolidated into the current § 12-751 by a 2022 amendment (Laws 2022, ch. 267, eff. 2022-09-24) that broadened scope to all constitutional rights; the former companion section, § 12-752, no longer carries independent anti-SLAPP text on the official code site | Broad since the 2022 rewrite: any legal action involving a person's lawful exercise of the right of petition, the right of speech, the freedom of the press, the right to freely associate, or the right to peaceably assemble under the U.S. or Arizona Constitution (§ 12-751(A)); before 2022, coverage was limited to the right of petition alone | 'Motion to dismiss or quash' within 60 days of service, or later at the court's discretion (§ 12-751(D)); a distinctive two-step trigger -- the movant must first establish 'prima facie proof' that the SUIT ITSELF was substantially motivated by a desire to deter, retaliate against, or prevent protected activity before the responding party even has to answer the motion, and before discovery is stayed (§ 12-751(B), (E)) | The movant's threshold showing is unusually demanding: prima facie proof the entire legal action was 'substantially motivated by a desire to deter, retaliate against or prevent' the lawful exercise of a constitutional right -- not merely that the claim touches protected activity. Once shown, a non-state-actor responding party must show the action is justified by existing law or a reasonable argument to extend it; a state-actor responding party faces a higher bar of clearly established law plus proof it did not act to deter or retaliate (§ 12-751(B)(1)-(2)) | Discretionary for a prevailing movant -- the court 'may' award costs and fees, changed from mandatory in the 2022 rewrite; mandatory against a losing movant only if the court finds the motion frivolous or solely intended to delay (§ 12-751(F)) | An order granting OR denying the motion is appealable, but only if the trial court found the movant established the prima facie proof required by § 12-751(B) -- if the court never reaches that finding, there is no appeal right under this provision (§ 12-751(H), applied through § 12-2101(A)(5)(e)); the court of appeals must expedite such an appeal absent good cause or a contrary court rule | No standalone exemptions list like UPEPA states have. Instead, a state actor or an intervenor is barred from FILING the motion at all (§ 12-751(A)); separately, § 12-751(I) clarifies the statute creates no new privileges or immunities, doesn't limit any other remedy the movant has, and doesn't limit a legislative or executive body's own power to enforce its internal procedural rules |
| Arkansas verified 2026-07-05 | Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-63-501 to 16-63-508, the Citizen Participation in Government Act, enacted 2005 (Acts 2005, No. 1843) and unamended since — every section still carries only that single enacting act in its history | Narrower and government-proceeding-anchored, an older-generation pattern: (1) a 'privileged communication' — a communication in, to, or about an issue of public concern related to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding (or other government-authorized proceeding), made in the proper discharge of an official duty, a fair and true report of such a proceeding, an expression of opinion or criticism about such a proceeding, or any criticism of a public officer's official acts — as long as it isn't made with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, its falsity; and (2) an 'act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government,' meaning a statement made before, to, or in connection with an issue under consideration by such a proceeding or body — there is no separate general 'public forum on a matter of public concern' catch-all the way broader UPEPA-style states have | No statutory filing deadline for the defendant's motion; instead, the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney must file a sworn verification contemporaneously with the pleading asserting the claim, certifying (among other things) that the claim isn't based on a privileged communication and wasn't filed for an improper purpose (§ 16-63-505); if the verification is missing, the claim must be stricken unless verified within 10 days after the omission is brought to the party's attention (§ 16-63-506(a)); filing a motion to dismiss or motion to strike under § 16-63-506 stays discovery and any pending hearings or motions, with a hearing required within 30 days of service absent an emergency (§ 16-63-507) | Structured around the sworn verification rather than a movant/plaintiff two-step test: § 16-63-504 makes a privileged communication or protected act immune from civil liability as long as it wasn't made with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, its falsity; a defendant who believes the plaintiff's § 16-63-505 verification is false or missing can move under § 16-63-506, putting the truthfulness of that certification — and so the privileged-or-protected status of the underlying communication — before the court | Discretionary, not mandatory: if a claim is verified in violation of § 16-63-505, the court 'shall impose' an appropriate sanction on the person who signed the verification, a represented party, or both, which 'may include' dismissal and an order to pay the other side's reasonable expenses and attorney's fees (§ 16-63-506(b)(1)); a prevailing defendant can also recover other compensatory damages, but only on a further showing the suit was brought to harass, intimidate, punish, or maliciously inhibit protected activity (§ 16-63-506(b)(2)) | None provided by the statute — §§ 16-63-501 to 508 contain no interlocutory-appeal provision of any kind, unlike most other states' anti-SLAPP laws; a party would have to rely on Arkansas's ordinary, generally available appellate mechanisms rather than any right created by this Act | None — the Act has no separate exemptions or carve-outs section; its only built-in limit is the truthfulness condition inside §§ 16-63-503 and 16-63-504 themselves (a communication made with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, its falsity is never a 'privileged communication' or protected act to begin with) |
| California verified 2026-07-05 | Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 425.16-425.18; original 1992 anti-SLAPP law, last substantively amended 2011 | Broad: any act furthering the right of petition or free speech on a public issue (§ 425.16(e)(1)-(4)), construed broadly by the statute's own terms | Special motion to strike within 60 days of service (§ 425.16(f)); hearing set within 30 days; discovery automatically stayed on filing (§ 425.16(g)) | Two-step: movant shows claim arises from protected activity, then plaintiff must show a 'probability of prevailing' on the pleadings and affidavits (§ 425.16(b)) | Mandatory fees/costs to a prevailing defendant (§ 425.16(c)(1)); a separate 'SLAPPback' malicious-prosecution suit is available against the original plaintiff (§ 425.18) | Grant or denial immediately appealable (§ 425.16(i)); EXCEPTION — a denial based on a § 425.17 exemption is not appealable (§ 425.17(e)) | Public-interest actions meeting a 3-part test (§ 425.17(b)) and certain commercial-speech/seller statements (§ 425.17(c)), with carve-backs protecting media and expressive works (§ 425.17(d)) |
| Colorado verified 2026-07-05 | Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-1101 (Title 13, Art. 20, Part 11); enacted 2019 (HB 19-1324, eff. 7/1/2019), no substantive amendment since | Broad, California-modeled: statements before an official proceeding, statements on an issue under review by an official body, public-forum statements on a matter of public interest, and a catch-all for other conduct furthering petition/free-speech rights on a public issue or an issue of public interest (§ 13-20-1101(2)(a)) | Special motion to dismiss within 63 days of service, or later at the court's discretion (§ 13-20-1101(5)); hearing set within 28 days of service of the motion; discovery automatically stayed until the court rules, though a judge may allow specified discovery for good cause (§ 13-20-1101(6)) | Two-step: movant shows the claim arises from an act in furtherance of petition or free-speech rights on a public issue, then the plaintiff must show 'a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim' from the pleadings and affidavits (§ 13-20-1101(3)) | Mandatory fees/costs to a prevailing defendant, with a carve-out for actions under the Open Meetings Law or Colorado Open Records Act; mandatory fees to the plaintiff if the motion is found frivolous or solely intended to delay (§ 13-20-1101(4)) | Grant or denial immediately appealable to the Colorado Court of Appeals (§ 13-20-1101(7)); EXCEPTION — a denial resting on a § 13-20-1101(8) exemption isn't appealable (§ 13-20-1101(9)); a county court's final judgment on the motion can't go to the Court of Appeals at all under the state constitution, only to district court (Hinds v. Foreman, 2026 CO 9) | Government-enforcement actions, a 3-part public-interest-lawsuit test, and a commercial-speech carve-out for sellers'/lessors' factual representations to buyers, with carve-backs protecting journalists and works of dramatic, literary, or artistic expression (§ 13-20-1101(8)) |
| Connecticut verified 2026-07-05 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-196a (Title 52, Ch. 900), enacted 2017 (P.A. 17-71, eff. 1/1/2018); amended 2019 (P.A. 19-64, technical 'return date' phrasing) and substantially amended 2025 (P.A. 25-77, eff. 10/1/2025, already in force — repealed and replaced the whole section, broadening protected free speech and adding a hearing-deadline exception); the official code site's own 'current' compiled text had not yet folded in the 2025 amendment as of this verification, so this cell is grounded directly in the enacted Public Act text | Exercise of the right of free speech (communicating, or conduct furthering communication, in a public forum on a matter of public concern; OR, since 10/1/2025, a good-faith written communication about an alleged crime; OR a good-faith written communication about a 'discriminatory practice' under § 46a-51 — neither new category requires a 'public forum'), the right to petition the government (communication to, or reasonably likely to encourage review by, a governmental body, or reasonably likely to enlist public participation), or the right of association, under the U.S. or Connecticut Constitution, in connection with a matter of public concern (§ 52-196a(a)-(b)) | Special motion to dismiss no later than 30 days after the return date of the complaint or the filing of the counterclaim/cross claim, extendable for good cause (§ 52-196a(c)); all discovery automatically stayed on filing through any interlocutory appeal, with limited discovery allowed on good cause (§ 52-196a(d)); expedited hearing within 60 days of filing, extendable for court-ordered discovery, party agreement, good cause, or — added by the 2025 amendment — a pending related criminal proceeding or Commission on Human Rights discriminatory-practice complaint, in which case the hearing is held within 60 days after that proceeding concludes (§ 52-196a(e)(1)) | Movant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim is based on the movant's exercise of a protected right; the court must then grant the motion UNLESS the party who brought the claim sets forth with particularity the circumstances giving rise to it and demonstrates 'probable cause, considering all valid defenses,' that the party will prevail on the merits (§ 52-196a(e)(3)) — a distinctive 'probable cause' standard, not 'clear and specific evidence' or a bare prima facie case | Mandatory costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the moving party if the motion is granted (§ 52-196a(f)(1)); mandatory costs and fees to the opposing party only if the court denies the motion AND finds it was frivolous and solely intended to cause unnecessary delay — both conditions required, not either alone (§ 52-196a(f)(2)) | The statute's own text doesn't expressly create an appeal right, but its discovery stay is worded to continue through 'any interlocutory appeal thereof' (§ 52-196a(d)); the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that denial of a special motion premised on a 'colorable claim' of protected activity is an immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27 (1983) (Pryor v. Brignole, 346 Conn. 534 (2023), and its companion cases) | Doesn't apply to an enforcement action brought in the state's name by the Attorney General; doesn't limit a court's other authority to award sanctions, costs, or fees; doesn't affect any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege, or the substantive law of the claim; creates no private right of action; and doesn't apply to a common-law or statutory bodily-injury or wrongful-death claim — except that exclusion doesn't reach an emotional-distress claim unrelated to bodily injury/wrongful death, or a defamation, libel, or slander claim; a bodily-injury/wrongful-death plaintiff can still file a special motion against a counterclaim (§ 52-196a(h)) |
| Delaware verified 2026-07-05 | 10 Del. C. §§ 6001-6014, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted by 2025 Senate Bill 80 (85 Del. Laws, c. 217), signed by the Governor 9/15/2025 with an immediate effective date, applying to any civil action filed or cause of action asserted on or after that date. Replaced the older, narrower former §§ 8136-8138 (limited to 'public applicant or permittee' zoning/permit disputes, no special motion or fee-shifting), which remains applicable only to pre-9/15/2025 causes of action (§ 6014) | Standard broad UPEPA scope (§ 6002(b)): a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under review in such a proceeding, or the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern | A 'special motion for expedited relief to dismiss' (§ 6003), filed within 60 days of service (or later for good cause). Filing automatically stays discovery and nearly all other proceedings (§ 6004(a)); the stay continues through any appeal (§ 6004(c)); limited court-permitted discovery is available on a showing of specific necessity (§ 6004(d)); the court must hold a hearing within 60 days of filing and rule within 60 days of the hearing (§§ 6005, 6008) | Codified two-step test (§ 6007(a)): the court must dismiss with prejudice if the moving party establishes the chapter applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption applies, AND either the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its claim, or the moving party separately shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Decided on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 6006) | Mandatory to a prevailing moving party ('the court shall award' costs, attorneys' fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, § 6010(a)(1)). Reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 6010(a)(2)). Beyond the base UPEPA model, Delaware ALSO makes punitive damages mandatory for a prevailing movant if the court finds the underlying suit was commenced or continued to harass, intimidate, punish, or maliciously inhibit the movant's speech/petition/association rights (§ 6010(b)) | Express statutory right: the moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, but within just 10 days of entry of the order (§ 6009) — notably shorter than most other UPEPA states' windows (compare Idaho's 42 days, Hawaii's 30 days); a widely-cited secondary source (RCFP) incorrectly states 30 days, but the official code and enrolled bill both say 10 | Five carve-outs (§ 6002(c)): claims against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting in an official capacity; claims by a governmental unit or employee, in an official capacity, to enforce any law, regulation, or ordinance (broader than the typical 'imminent threat to public health or safety' framing); claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a sale/lease-related communication; common law fraud claims; and claims under Delaware's Deceptive Trade Practices Act (6 Del. C. ch. 25, subch. II or III). But § 6002(d) claws the LAST THREE exemptions back into coverage when the claim involves consumer opinions, commentary, complaint evaluations, or reviews/ratings of businesses — online-review speech stays protected even against a commercial defendant |
| District of Columbia verified 2026-07-05 | D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010, D.C. Code §§ 16-5501 to -5505, effective March 31, 2011. Amended by the Anti-SLAPP Amendment Act of 2021 (D.C. Bill 24-493) to add a District-government exemption, applied retroactively to March 31, 2011 | Broad: any statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body or other official proceeding; any statement in a place open to the public or a public forum on an issue of public interest; and other expressive conduct petitioning the government or communicating views to the public on an issue of public interest. 'Issue of public interest' covers health/safety, environmental/economic/community well-being, the District government, a public figure, or a good/product/service in the marketplace — but excludes statements aimed primarily at protecting the speaker's own commercial interest | Special motion to dismiss (§ 16-5502) filed within 45 days of service of the claim; court must hold an expedited hearing and rule as soon as practicable; a grant is with prejudice. A companion special motion to quash (§ 16-5503) lets a person whose personal identifying information is sought via discovery quash that request on the same standard. The statute's automatic discovery stay was held invalid by the D.C. Court of Appeals in 2023 (conflicts with the Home Rule Act's requirement that D.C. courts follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), so ordinary FRCP discovery practice now applies while a motion is pending | Two-step: the movant makes a prima facie showing the claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on an issue of public interest; the motion is then granted unless the responding party demonstrates the claim is 'likely to succeed on the merits' (§ 16-5502(b)). The D.C. Court of Appeals has held this does not mean a literal >50% probability — the real test is whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably find for the claimant on the evidence presented, applying any heightened constitutional fault standards (like actual malice) that govern the underlying claim | Discretionary, not automatic: a court 'may' award costs and fees to a prevailing movant (§ 16-5504(a)), but the D.C. Court of Appeals has held a successful movant is presumptively entitled to reasonable fees absent special circumstances making an award unjust. A reciprocal fee award to the responding party is available only if the court finds the special motion itself frivolous or solely intended to delay (§ 16-5504(b)) | The statute is silent on appealability, but the D.C. Court of Appeals has held it has jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to hear an immediate interlocutory appeal of an order denying a special motion to dismiss | Two carve-outs (§ 16-5505): (1) claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, where the challenged statement is a factual representation made to promote or complete a sale, lease, or commercial transaction and is aimed at an actual or potential buyer or customer; and (2) any claim brought by the District government, including D.C. public charter schools — added by the 2021 amendment, applied retroactively to 2011 and to claims pending as of November 8, 2021 |
| Florida verified 2026-07-05 | Fla. Stat. § 768.295 (general anti-SLAPP, enacted 2000, expanded 2015); narrower parallel statutes cover HOA (§ 720.304(4)) and condominium (§ 718.1224) disputes | Free speech in connection with public issues (statements before a governmental entity on a matter under its review, or in/connected with a play, movie, book, article, or similar work), plus the rights to peaceably assemble, instruct representatives, and petition for redress of grievances | Motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment; no statutory filing deadline and no automatic discovery stay, but the court must hold a hearing 'at the earliest possible time' after the response is filed | The statute's text does not set out a formal burden-shifting standard; it bars a suit filed 'without merit and primarily because' the defendant exercised a protected right, and the movant's motion must establish a violation of that standard | The court shall award the prevailing party (whichever side wins the motion) reasonable attorney's fees and costs (§ 768.295(4)); actual damages are available against a governmental-entity plaintiff, subject to the sovereign-immunity damages cap in § 768.28 | Not addressed in § 768.295 itself; as of a March 27, 2025 Florida Supreme Court rule amendment (Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(J)), a denial is now immediately appealable as of right, and certiorari review of a denial is unavailable (Vericker v. Powell) | None listed by name in § 768.295; the statute's own limiting principle is that it only reaches a suit that is 'without merit and primarily because' of the protected activity, rather than naming excluded categories of claims |
| Georgia verified 2026-07-05 | O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1; enacted 1996 (Ga. L. 1996, p. 260), rewritten wholesale in 2016 to track Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (Ga. L. 2016, p. 341, Act 420, eff. 7-1-2016); unamended since | Broad, four categories (§ 9-11-11.1(c)(1)-(4)): statements before an official proceeding; statements on an issue under consideration/review by a governmental body; statements in a place open to the public or a public forum on an issue of public interest; and a catch-all for other conduct furthering petition/free-speech rights on a public issue — expanded from a narrow, official-proceedings-only scope (the pre-2016 rule) by the 2016 revision | Motion to strike or dismiss; the statute itself sets NO fixed filing deadline (unusual among anti-SLAPP states); filing automatically stays all discovery and any pending hearings or motions (§ 9-11-11.1(d)); the motion must be heard within 30 days of service unless emergency matters require a later hearing | Two-step: movant shows the claim could 'reasonably be construed' as an act furthering the right of petition or free speech on an issue of public interest or concern (§ 9-11-11.1(b)(1)); the nonmoving party must then establish a 'probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim'; a public-figure plaintiff gets limited discovery on the sole issue of actual malice (§ 9-11-11.1(b)(2)) | Mandatory fees and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant, amount set by the court on the facts of the case (§ 9-11-11.1(b.1)); mandatory reciprocal fees to a prevailing nonmoving party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or solely intended to cause delay; a fee motion must be filed within 45 days of the action's final disposition (§ 9-11-11.1(h)) | Both a grant AND a denial of the motion are subject to direct appeal as of right, under the state's general direct-appeal statute (§ 9-11-11.1(e), incorporating § 5-6-34(a)) — broader than states that specially treat only denials | One named carve-out: actions brought by the Attorney General, a prosecuting attorney, or a city attorney acting as a prosecutor to enforce laws aimed at public protection (§ 9-11-11.1(g)); no commercial-speech or consumer-claim exemption exists |
| Hawaii verified 2026-07-05 | Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 634G-1 to 634G-10, the Hawaii Public Expression Protection Act (HPEPA), enacted 2022 as Act 96 (S.B. 3329 CD1, 2022 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 96), effective 6/17/2022 and applying only to actions filed on or after that date. Replaced a much narrower 2002 law (former ch. 634F, the 'Citizen Participation in Government Act') that covered only 'testimony submitted or provided to a governmental body during the course of a governmental proceeding.' No pending amendment found for the 2026 session | Broad, standard UPEPA scope (§ 634G-2(a)): a communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; a communication on an issue under consideration or review in such a proceeding; or the exercise of the right of free speech, free press, assembly, petition, or association guaranteed by the U.S. or Hawaii constitution, on a matter of public concern — considerably broader than the old law's 'testimony' -only trigger | A 'special motion to dismiss' (§ 634G-3(a)), filed no later than 60 days after being served with the pleading (or later on a showing of good cause). Filing automatically stays all other proceedings between the parties, including discovery and any pending hearing or motion (§ 634G-3(b)(1)); limited exceptions let the court hear unrelated motions or public-health-and-safety injunction requests, and still allow a party to voluntarily dismiss a claim (§ 634G-3(g)-(h)). The court may allow limited discovery only on a showing that specific information is necessary to the motion and not otherwise reasonably available (§ 634G-3(e)). The court must hold a hearing within 60 days of filing (§ 634G-4) and rule within 60 days of that hearing (§ 634G-7) | Two-step, evaluated on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 634G-5, titled 'Evidence': pleadings, the motion, any replies and responses, and admissible evidence). Step one: the movant must show the Act applies (§ 634G-2(a)) and the responding party must fail to show an exemption applies (§ 634G-2(b)). Step two: the court must dismiss with prejudice if EITHER the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claim, OR the movant separately shows the claim fails to state a cause of action or there's no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (§ 634G-6(a)) | Mandatory both ways, limited to costs and expenses 'related to the motion': the court SHALL award court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable litigation expenses to the moving party if it prevails on the motion, or to the responding party if it prevails AND the court finds the motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay the proceeding (§ 634G-9) | The moving party may appeal as of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, within 30 days of the order (§ 634G-8) — a shorter window than some other UPEPA states use (e.g. Idaho's 42 days), so don't assume a uniform appeal deadline across UPEPA states. Filing an appeal automatically stays all proceedings between ALL parties in the case until the appeal concludes (§ 634G-3(d)) | Three exemptions under § 634G-2(b): (1) a claim against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting or purporting to act in an official capacity; (2) a claim BROUGHT BY a governmental unit or its employee/agent, acting in an official capacity, to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and (3) a claim against a person 'primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services' if the claim arises from a communication related to that person's own sale or lease of goods or services |
| Idaho verified 2026-07-05 | Idaho Code §§ 6-3901 to 6-3911, the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (added 2025 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 17 [S.B. 1001], signed 3/10/2025, effective 1/1/2026 — already in force). Idaho had no prior anti-SLAPP statute; an earlier attempt (2024 S. 1352) was rejected 20-15 in the Senate. No pending amendments found for the 2026 session | Broad, standard UPEPA scope (§ 6-3902(2)): a communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; a communication on an issue under consideration or review in such a proceeding; or the exercise of the right of free speech, free press, assembly, petition, or association guaranteed by the U.S. or Idaho constitution, on a matter of public concern | A 'special motion for expedited relief' (§ 6-3903), filed no later than 60 days after being served with the pleading asserting the covered claim (or later on a showing of good cause). Filing automatically stays all other proceedings between the parties, including discovery and any pending hearing or motion (§ 6-3904(1)); limited exceptions let the court hear unrelated motions or public-health-and-safety injunction requests, and let a party still voluntarily dismiss a claim (§ 6-3904(6)-(7)). The court may allow limited discovery only on a showing that specific information is necessary to the motion and not otherwise reasonably available (§ 6-3904(4)). The court must hold a hearing within 60 days of filing (§ 6-3905(1)) and rule within 60 days of that hearing (§ 6-3908) | Two-step, evaluated on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 6-3906: pleadings, the motion, any response, and admissible evidence). Step one: the movant must show the Act applies (§ 6-3902(2)) and the responding party must fail to show an exemption applies (§ 6-3902(3)). Step two: the court must dismiss with prejudice if EITHER the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claim, OR the movant separately shows the claim fails to state a cause of action or there's no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (§ 6-3907(1)) | Mandatory both ways, limited to costs and expenses 'related to the motion': the court SHALL award court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable litigation expenses to the moving party if it prevails on the motion, or to the responding party if the responding party prevails AND the court finds the motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay the proceeding (§ 6-3910) | The moving party may appeal as of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, within 42 days of the order (§ 6-3909) — longer than the 30-day window some other UPEPA states use, so don't assume a uniform deadline across states. Filing an appeal automatically stays all proceedings between ALL parties in the case until the appeal concludes (§ 6-3904(3)) | Three exemptions under § 6-3902(3): (1) a claim against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting or purporting to act in an official capacity; (2) a claim BROUGHT BY a governmental unit or its employee/agent, acting in an official capacity, to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and (3) a claim against a person 'primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services' if the claim arises from a communication related to that person's own sale or lease of goods or services |
| Illinois verified 2026-07-05 | 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq., Citizen Participation Act; enacted 2007 (P.A. 95-506), substantially amended 2025 (P.A. 104-431, eff. 8-21-2025); not a UPEPA state | Narrow, government-participation focused: acts furthering the right of petition, speech, association, or otherwise participating in government, including freedom of the press (§ 15); protection turns on whether the act is 'genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome' | No fixed filing deadline in the statute itself; the motion (a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or to strike, § 10) must get a hearing and decision within 90 days of notice (§ 20(a)); a 2025 addition (§ 17) automatically stays ALL other proceedings, not just discovery, but only for actions commenced on or after 2026-01-01 (§ 32) | One-step immunity test: the moving party's act must fall within § 15's protected categories; the claim is then dismissed unless the responding party produces 'clear and convincing evidence' that the acts are not immunized, i.e. not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action (§ 15, § 20(c)) | Mandatory fees/costs to a prevailing moving party (§ 25); a 2025 addition makes fees mandatory for a prevailing responding party too, but only if the motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay, and only for actions commenced on or after 2026-01-01 (§ 25, § 32) | Denial of the motion, or the trial court's failure to rule within 90 days, must be expedited on appeal or writ, interlocutory or not (§ 20(a)); the Act has no separate appeal provision for a grant, which is a final order under ordinary appellate procedure | No exemptions section in the Act — no commercial-speech, consumer, or public-enforcement carve-out is named anywhere in 735 ILCS 110 |
| Indiana verified 2026-07-05 | Ind. Code §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10, enacted 1998 (P.L.114-1998, SEC.7); no amendment since enactment; applies only to acts occurring after June 30, 1998 | Narrower than most states: only acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech (no right-of-association category) 'in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest' (§§ 34-7-7-1(a), -2); the statute gives no illustrative list of public-issue categories, leaving the scope to case law | Motion to dismiss, statutorily treated as a motion for summary judgment (§ 34-7-7-9(a)(1)); no fixed filing deadline tied to days from service in the statute itself; once filed, discovery on issues unrelated to the motion is stayed (§ 34-7-7-6); court must set an expedited schedule and rule within 180 days of filing (§ 34-7-7-9(a)(2)) | One-sided, movant-only burden — it never shifts to the plaintiff: the movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged act is a lawful act in furtherance of petition/free-speech rights on a public issue (§ 34-7-7-9(d)), which in turn requires the underlying act to have been taken 'in good faith and with a reasonable basis in law and fact' (§ 34-7-7-5(2)) | Mandatory to a prevailing defendant: reasonable attorney's fees and costs (§ 34-7-7-7); reciprocal fees to the plaintiff only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to cause unnecessary delay (§ 34-7-7-8) | No general right to appeal a denial. The chapter's only appeal trigger is narrow: if the court fails to rule on the motion within 30 days after the close of the expedited evidence-submission period, the movant may appeal based on that failure to rule (§ 34-7-7-9(e)-(f)) | Does not apply to a government enforcement action brought in the state's name by the attorney general, a prosecuting attorney, or another attorney acting as a public prosecutor (§ 34-7-7-1(b)) |
| Iowa verified 2026-07-05 | Iowa Code ch. 652, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2025 (House File 472, 2025 Acts ch. 93), applying to a civil action filed on or after 7/1/2025; Iowa had no anti-SLAPP statute before this chapter | Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding, communication on an issue under consideration or review in one, or exercise of the right of free speech, press, assembly/petition, or association guaranteed by the U.S. or Iowa Constitution, on a matter of public concern (§ 652.2(2)); the 'goods or services' term used in the commercial-speech exemption excludes creative, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic work (§ 652.2(1)(a)) | Special motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service of the pleading asserting the claim, or later on a showing of good cause (§ 652.3); hearing within 60 days of filing, extendable 60 more days if limited discovery is allowed (§ 652.5); ruling within 60 days of the hearing (§ 652.8); filing the motion automatically stays all other proceedings between the parties, including discovery, with limited discovery allowed on a showing of necessity (§ 652.4) | Court considers the pleadings, the motion, any response, and evidence admissible on summary judgment (§ 652.6); dismissal with prejudice is required if the movant shows the Act applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption, and either the responding party fails a prima facie case on each element or the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (§ 652.7(1)) | Mandatory court costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; the same mandatory award goes to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay the proceeding (§ 652.10) | Only the moving party may appeal as of right, and only from an order denying the motion in whole or in part; the appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order (§ 652.9) — the statute itself sets this deadline, unlike some other UPEPA states that leave timing to a separate appellate rule | Claims against a governmental unit or an official acting in an official capacity; government enforcement actions protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and claims against a person primarily engaged in selling or leasing goods or services where the claim arises from a communication related to that sale or lease (§ 652.2(3)) — the last exemption doesn't reach creative, journalistic, or artistic work, which is excluded from the 'goods or services' definition itself |
| Kansas verified 2026-07-05 | K.S.A. 60-5320, the Public Speech Protection Act, enacted 2016 (L. 2016, ch. 58, § 1, eff. 7/1/2016) and unamended since — a single comprehensive section (not a multi-section chapter like the newer UPEPA states), modeled on the Texas Citizens Participation Act rather than the Uniform Law Commission's newer model act | Broad: exercise of the right of free speech (any communication made in connection with a 'public issue or issue of public interest' — defined to include health/safety, environmental/economic/community well-being, government, a public official or public figure, or a good/product/service in the marketplace); exercise of the right to petition (a lengthy list covering communications in or about judicial, legislative, executive, or other official/governmental proceedings, public meetings, and communications reasonably likely to encourage or enlist review of an issue by such a body); and exercise of the right of association (a communication among individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests) (§ 60-5320(c)) | Motion to strike, filed within 60 days of service of the most recent complaint or later at the court's discretion; a hearing must be held within 30 days of the motion being served (§ 60-5320(d)); filing the motion stays all discovery, motions, and other pending hearings until the court rules, except the court may allow specified, limited discovery relevant to the motion on a showing of good cause (§ 60-5320(e)) | Two-step: the movant has the initial burden of a prima facie case showing the challenged claim concerns the movant's exercise of free speech, petition, or association rights; if met, the burden shifts to the responding party to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the claim by presenting substantial competent evidence supporting a prima facie case, or the court must deny the motion (§ 60-5320(d)) — a finding that the responding party met this burden can't be used as evidence later in the case or change the burden of proof going forward | Mandatory costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing movant, plus any additional relief — including sanctions on the responding party and its counsel — the court finds necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by others; if the court instead finds the motion to strike was frivolous or filed solely to cause delay, it must award the responding party reasonable attorney fees and costs related to the motion (§ 60-5320(g)) | An express statutory right, not left to general appellate rules: the movant may petition for a writ of mandamus if the trial court fails to rule on the motion in an expedited fashion, or file an interlocutory appeal from an order denying the motion, with notice of appeal due within just 14 days of the order — a shorter window than most other states' anti-SLAPP appeal deadlines; further trial-court proceedings are stayed while either kind of appeal is pending (§ 60-5320(f)) | Doesn't apply to: an enforcement action brought in the state's name by the attorney general or a district or county attorney; a claim against a person primarily engaged in selling or leasing goods or services where the statement or conduct arises from that sale, lease, or a related insurance product or commercial transaction aimed at an actual or potential buyer; or a claim brought under the Kansas insurance code or arising from an insurance contract (§ 60-5320(h)) — but the commercial-speech exemption doesn't reach a claim based on creating, disseminating, or promoting a dramatic, literary, musical, political, or artistic work, including a movie, TV program, or newspaper or magazine article (§ 60-5320(i)); a government contractor found in violation also triggers a mandatory notice to the head of the relevant government entity (§ 60-5320(j)) |
| Kentucky verified 2026-07-05 | KRS 454.460-454.478, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2022 (2022 Ky. Acts ch. 233, HB 222), effective 7/14/2022; no amendment since enactment, though a 2026 bill would narrow fee-shifting (see pending legislation) | Broad UPEPA scope: communication in a governmental proceeding, communication on an issue under review by one, or exercise of free speech, press, assembly/petition, or association rights on a 'matter of public concern' (KRS 454.462(1)); cut back by a long exemptions list in KRS 454.462(2) | Special motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service, or later on a showing of good cause (KRS 454.464); hearing within 60 days of filing (KRS 454.468); ruling within 60 days of the hearing (KRS 454.474); all proceedings between the parties, including discovery, automatically stayed until the ruling and through any appeal, with limited discovery allowed on a showing of necessity (KRS 454.466) | Movant shows the Act applies under KRS 454.462(1); responding party fails to show an exemption under KRS 454.462(2) applies; and either the responding party fails to make a prima facie case for each element, or the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (KRS 454.472) — a summary-judgment-style screen, not a 'probability of prevailing' standard | Mandatory costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; the same mandatory award goes to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion was brought without good cause (KRS 454.478) | Either party may appeal as a matter of right from an order granting or denying the motion, in whole or in part (KRS 454.476) — broader than most UPEPA states, which limit the statutory appeal right to a losing movant | Government-actor claims (with a health/safety enforcement carve-back), goods/services sale communications, real-property disputes, personal injury/wrongful death, insurance, common-law fraud, domestic relations (KRS Ch. 401-407), employment/whistleblower statutes, and Kentucky Consumer Protection Act claims — but newsgathering/artistic-work activity and consumer reviews of a business stay covered even inside those carve-outs (KRS 454.462(2)) |
| Louisiana verified 2026-07-05 | La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 971; enacted 1999 (Acts 1999, No. 734), amended 2004 (Acts 2004, No. 232, making fee-shifting mandatory) and 2012 (Acts 2012, No. 449), no substantive amendment since 2012 | Broad, California-modeled: statements before an official proceeding, statements on an issue under official review, public-forum statements on a matter of public interest, and a catch-all for other conduct furthering petition/free-speech rights on a public issue or an issue of public interest (art. 971(F)(1)); courts have read this broadly enough to cover non-verbal expressive conduct like photographing a public official in a public place | Special motion to strike within 90 days of service, or later at the court's discretion (art. 971(C)(1)); notice of hearing set not more than 30 days after service unless docket conditions require otherwise (art. 971(C)(3)); discovery automatically stayed on filing until the ruling, though the court can allow specified discovery for good cause (art. 971(D)) | Two-step: movant shows the claim arises from an act in furtherance of petition or free-speech rights on a public issue, then the plaintiff must show 'a probability of success on the claim' from the pleadings and affidavits (art. 971(A)); Louisiana courts (and the 5th Circuit applying Louisiana law) treat the plaintiff's burden as comparable to a summary-judgment showing, not a credibility-weighing mini-trial | Mandatory: 'a prevailing party on a special motion to strike shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs' (art. 971(B)) — broader wording than most states' movant-only rule, though in practice this has meant a successful defendant-movant; the article contains no separate 'frivolous motion' fee-shift back to the plaintiff | No special interlocutory appeal right in the statute itself. An order GRANTING the motion is a final, appealable judgment because it dismisses the claim; an order DENYING it is ordinarily interlocutory, reviewable only by a discretionary supervisory writ or by having the trial court certify it as an appealable partial judgment | One exemption: the article does not apply to an enforcement action brought on behalf of the state by the attorney general, a district attorney, or a city attorney acting as a public prosecutor (art. 971(E)) |
| Maine verified 2026-07-05 | 14 M.R.S. §§ 731-742, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2024 by PL 2023, c. 626 (effective 1/1/2025, applies to actions filed on or after that date); amended by PL 2025, c. 403 (effective 2025). Replaced the older, narrower 1995 statute (former § 556), repealed by the same 2023 act | Broad UPEPA scope (§ 733(2)): a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under review by such a proceeding, or the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern; PLUS two Maine-specific additions covering statements made in a Maine Human Rights Act or Title IX discrimination complaint, and (added 2025) good-faith communications about an experienced sexual assault, sexual harassment, sexual misconduct, cyberbullying, or discrimination incident, whether or not a complaint was ever filed | A 'special motion for expedited relief to dismiss' (§ 734), filed within 60 days of being served (or later for good cause). Filing automatically stays discovery and nearly all other proceedings between the parties (§ 735(1)); the stay continues through any appeal (§ 735(3)); the court may allow narrow, specifically-justified discovery during the stay (§ 735(4)); the action may be advanced on the docket for priority handling (§ 736) | Codified two-step test (§ 738(1)): the court must dismiss with prejudice if the moving party establishes the Act applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption applies, AND either the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its claim, or the moving party separately shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Decided on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 737) | Mandatory to a prevailing moving party ('the court shall award' costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, § 740(1)) — a strengthening from the old law's discretionary 'may award' standard. Reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 740(2)) | Express statutory right: the moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part (§ 739). This replaces a line of Law Court decisions that had to infer an interlocutory-appeal right under the old, appeal-silent 1995 statute (Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59; Morse Bros. v. Webster, 2001 ME 70) | Three carve-outs (§ 733(3)): claims against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting in an official capacity; claims BY a governmental unit or employee, in an official capacity, to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a communication tied to that person's own sale or lease — this last exemption does not reach dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic works |
| Maryland verified 2026-07-05 | Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807, enacted 2004 (Acts 2004, cc. 279 & 280), amended 2010 (Acts 2010, cc. 368 & 369); current through the 2026 session — repeated legislative attempts to replace it with a broader Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (2020, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026 sessions, most recently HB 650/SB 251) have each died in committee without a floor vote | Broad on its face — covers communicating with any federal, state, or local government body OR the public at large to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge, oppose, or otherwise exercise First Amendment or Md. Declaration of Rights Art. 10/13/40 rights, on any matter within a government body's authority or any issue of public concern (§ 5-807(b)(1), (c)) — but narrowed by two extra elements the suit itself must be shown to have: 'brought in bad faith' and 'intended to inhibit or inhibits' those rights (§ 5-807(b)(1), (3)). Maryland's Court of Special Appeals has held 'bad faith' here carries the same meaning as under Md. Rule 1-341 — litigation pursued vexatiously, for harassment, unreasonable delay, or other improper reasons (MCB Woodberry Developer, LLC v. Council of Unit Owners of the Millrace Condominium, Inc., 253 Md. App. 279, 2021) | A defendant may move to dismiss the alleged SLAPP suit — the court must hold a hearing 'as soon as practicable' (§ 5-807(d)(1)) — or move to stay all proceedings until the matter the defendant communicated about is resolved (§ 5-807(d)(2)); the statute sets no fixed filing deadline and does not make discovery stop automatically on filing — the only stay available is the separate, discretionary motion in (d)(2) | The statute sets no burden-shifting test for the plaintiff — instead the defendant must show the suit meets all three of the statute's own SLAPP-suit elements (bad faith, materially related to the communication, and intent to inhibit, § 5-807(b)) to win dismissal or a stay; Maryland courts have held bad faith can be decided on this preliminary motion from the complaint's own allegations plus facts eligible for judicial notice (MCB Woodberry, 253 Md. App. 279) | Not addressed by this statute at all — § 5-807 contains no attorney's-fees or costs provision for either side | Not addressed by this statute at all — § 5-807 contains no interlocutory-appeal provision; a denial is ordinarily not immediately appealable absent a separate, generally-available exception like the collateral-order doctrine | None named in the statute's own text. § 5-807(e) instead states the section applies 'notwithstanding any other law or rule' and doesn't diminish any other equitable or legal right or remedy a defendant already has |
| Massachusetts verified 2026-07-05 | G.L. c. 231, § 59H, 'Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation; Special Motion to Dismiss'; enacted 1994, last textually amended 2022 (St.2022, c.127, § 35, eff. 2022-07-29, adding a narrow carve-out); the statute's own words haven't changed the underlying two-step test since 1994, but the Supreme Judicial Court has repeatedly reinterpreted how that test operates, most recently overruling a 2017-2019 framework in Bristol Asphalt Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Products, Inc., 493 Mass. 539 (2024) | Narrow, right-of-petition-only -- the classic older-generation model, unlike California's or most UPEPA states' broad public-concern catch-all: any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body or other governmental proceeding; a statement connected to an issue under consideration or review by one; a statement reasonably likely to encourage such consideration or enlist public participation toward it; or any other statement within the constitutional right to petition (§ 59H) | 'Special motion to dismiss' within 60 days of service, or later at the court's discretion; the court must advance the motion to be heard 'as expeditiously as possible'; discovery is automatically stayed on filing, with specified discovery allowed only on motion, hearing, and good cause shown | A two-step test the SJC has revised twice without any change to the statute's text: the movant first shows the claims are 'based on' petitioning activity ALONE, with no substantial basis in addition to it (Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156 (1998)); if so, the motion must be granted unless the plaintiff shows the petitioning 'was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law' and caused actual injury (the statute's own words). A 2017-2019 gloss (Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141 (2017) and 483 Mass. 200 (2019)) let courts parse mixed claims and added an alternative multifactor path for plaintiffs; the SJC overruled both features in Bristol Asphalt (2024), restoring the simpler Duracraft framework | Mandatory costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including for the special motion and any related discovery matters, to a prevailing movant (§ 59H); the statute has no fee-shifting provision running the other way against a losing movant | Not addressed anywhere in the statute's text. The SJC created the right entirely through case law: a denial of the special motion is immediately appealable under the 'doctrine of present execution' (Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 (2002)), and Bristol Asphalt (2024) clarified that appellate review of a special-motion ruling is de novo, not for abuse of discretion; a grant of the motion is already a final, appealable dismissal under ordinary rules | No general exemptions list. A single narrow carve-out added in 2022: the special motion is unavailable in a case brought under G.L. c. 12, § 11I½ -- the state's civil action for 'abusive litigation' that interferes with reproductive or gender-affirming health care access (§ 59H's opening clause) |
| Michigan verified 2026-07-05 | MCL §§ 691.1851-691.1863, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA); enacted 2025 (2025 PA 52 / House Bill 4045, signed 2025-12-23), eff. 2026-03-24 for causes of action asserted on or after that date; Michigan's first anti-SLAPP statute | Broad: an 'eligible cause of action' based on a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under consideration or review in one, or the exercise of free speech/press/assembly/petition/association rights on a matter of public concern (MCL 691.1852(1)(d)) | 'Special motion for expedited relief' within 60 days of service, extendable for good cause (MCL 691.1853); filing automatically stays all other proceedings, including discovery (MCL 691.1854(1)); hearing within 60 days of filing (MCL 691.1855(1)); ruling within 60 days of the hearing (MCL 691.1858) | Movant shows the cause of action is 'eligible'; responding party must then show it is not eligible, that an exemption applies, or defeat the movant's showing that the claim fails under a 12(b)(6)-style or summary-judgment-style standard (MCL 691.1857); the court considers pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence, not just the complaint (MCL 691.1856) | Mandatory court costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; mandatory fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (MCL 691.1860) | The moving party may appeal a denial (in whole or in part) as a matter of right, within 21 days of the order (MCL 691.1859); the Act has no separate provision for a grant, which is already a final, appealable dismissal with prejudice | Two categories (MCL 691.1852(2)): commercial-speech actions against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a sale/lease-related communication; and claims under an 11-statute list covering Michigan and federal civil-rights, disability, whistleblower, workers'-compensation, and employment law (Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Worker's Disability Compensation Act, FOIA, Title VII, Title IX, ADEA, ADA, FMLA, FLSA) -- an unusually broad, employment-focused exemption list |
| Minnesota verified 2026-07-05 | Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07-554.19, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2024 (Laws 2024, ch. 123, art. 18, eff. 5/25/2024), replacing a 1994 statute held unconstitutional in 2017; no amendment since enactment | Broad UPEPA scope: communications in a governmental proceeding, communications on an issue under review by one, and the exercise of speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern (§ 554.08(b)); cut back by an unusually long exemptions list in § 554.08(c) | Special motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service, or later on a showing of good cause (§ 554.09); hearing within 60 days of filing (§ 554.11); ruling within 60 days of the hearing (§ 554.14); all proceedings between the parties, including discovery, automatically stayed until the ruling and through any appeal, with limited discovery allowed on a showing of necessity (§ 554.10) | Movant shows the Act applies under § 554.08(b); responding party fails to show an exemption under § 554.08(c) applies; and either the responding party fails to make a prima facie case for each element, or the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (§ 554.13) — a summary-judgment-style screen, not a 'probability of prevailing' standard | Mandatory costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; the same mandatory award goes to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 554.16) | Only the moving party has a statutory right to an immediate appeal, and only from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, filed within 30 days (§ 554.15); the statute creates no matching interlocutory appeal for a responding party challenging a grant | An unusually long list: government-actor claims, crime-victim suits, real-property title disputes, bodily-injury/wrongful-death claims (unless reputational), insurance and common-law-fraud claims, family-law and employment-law actions, consumer-protection claims, and any federal-law claim — with a carve-back restoring coverage for journalistic/artistic works and consumer reviews even within the goods/services, fraud, and consumer-protection exemptions (§ 554.08(c)-(d)) |
| Mississippi verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. A 2022 bill, S.B. 2628, would have created a 'Public Speech Protection Act' modeled on anti-SLAPP statutes elsewhere; it died in the Senate Judiciary Committee that session and was never reintroduced. No anti-SLAPP bill is currently pending in the Mississippi Legislature | N/A — no statutory scope exists. Mississippi courts have not developed a separate constitutional or common-law petitioning-immunity doctrine for SLAPP-type suits either; a defendant sued over speech relies on ordinary Mississippi defamation-law defenses (truth, non-defamatory opinion, and the actual-malice standard for a public-official or public-figure plaintiff) | N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary pleading-sufficiency standard for a motion to dismiss, and the ordinary genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard for summary judgment, apply instead. Under the general Litigation Accountability Act, a party seeking fees must instead show the other side's action, claim, or defense was 'without substantial justification' — defined as frivolous, groundless in fact or law, or vexatious (§ 11-55-3(a)) | N/A as a SLAPP-specific matter, but two general tools remain available in any civil case: M.R.C.P. 11(b) lets a court order a party or attorney who files a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or one intended to harass or delay, to pay the opposing side's reasonable expenses and attorney's fees; the Litigation Accountability Act, Miss. Code § 11-55-5(1), separately requires a court to award fees and costs against a party or attorney who brings an action or claim without substantial justification or for delay or harassment, weighed against the eleven factors in § 11-55-7 | N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary Mississippi rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply instead | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Missouri verified 2026-07-05 | Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.528, enacted 2004 (2004 S.B. 807, as § 537.800), renumbered and amended 2012 (2012 S.B. 628); a full replacement (Missouri's version of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, 2026 S.B. 1067) has passed the legislature and awaits the Governor's action — see pending legislation | Narrow: only conduct or speech 'undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting, in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body' of the state or a political subdivision (§ 537.528.1, .4); Missouri courts require the underlying claim to seek money damages, not declaratory or injunctive relief (Moschenross v. St. Louis County, 188 S.W.3d 13, Mo. Ct. App. 2006) — no general 'public issue' catch-all like most other states' statutes | Special motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment, considered on 'a priority or expedited basis' (§ 537.528.1); the statute names no filing-deadline day-count in subsection 1 itself, though the fee-shifting subsection ties a mandatory fee award to a motion filed within 90 days of the moving party's answer (§ 537.528.2); discovery is completely suspended on filing and stays suspended not just until the trial court rules but through 'the exhaustion of all appeals regarding the special motion' (§ 537.528.1) | The statute's own text sets no special evidentiary standard and never shifts any burden to the plaintiff — it only accelerates whichever ordinary motion is filed (motion to dismiss, judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment) under Missouri's regular civil rules. Missouri case law layers on an unwritten requirement that the underlying suit be shown to be retaliatory before the motion succeeds (Moschenross v. St. Louis County, 188 S.W.3d 13, 25, Mo. Ct. App. 2006) | Mandatory to a prevailing movant, but only if the motion was filed within 90 days of the moving party's answer (§ 537.528.2) — miss that window and the fee award isn't available even on an otherwise-winning motion; reciprocal fees to the plaintiff only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to cause unnecessary delay (§ 537.528.2) | Either party has a right to an expedited appeal from a trial court's order on the motion, or from its failure to rule on an expedited basis (§ 537.528.3); Missouri appellate case law holds this doesn't create a right to an interlocutory appeal from a motion DENIAL before final judgment — the expedited-appeal right applies once there's an appealable order, not to reach a denial early | The statute's own text names no exemptions or carve-outs; its narrow built-in scope — limited to conduct/speech connected to a public hearing or meeting — already excludes most other speech-related claims rather than exempting them from a broader rule. § 537.528.5 separately preserves every other remedy, defense, or cause of action a party has under other law, including defamation actions |
| Montana verified 2026-07-05 | Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-34-101 to -112, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted by 2025 House Bill 292 (Ch. 250, Laws of 2025), signed by the Governor 5/1/2025 with an immediate effective date. Montana had no anti-SLAPP statute of any kind before this enactment; no amendments since | Standard broad UPEPA scope (§ 27-34-102(1)): a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under review in such a proceeding, or the exercise of the right of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association guaranteed by the U.S. or Montana constitution, on a matter of public concern | A 'special motion for expedited relief to dismiss' (§ 27-34-103), filed within 60 days of service (or later for good cause). Filing automatically stays discovery and nearly all other proceedings (§ 27-34-104(1)); the stay continues through any appeal (§ 27-34-104(3)); limited court-permitted discovery is available on a showing of specific necessity (§ 27-34-104(4)); the court must hold a hearing within 60 days of filing and rule within 60 days of the hearing (§§ 27-34-105, -108) | Codified two-step test (§ 27-34-107(1)): the court must dismiss with prejudice if the moving party establishes the chapter applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption applies, AND either the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its claim, or the moving party separately shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Decided on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 27-34-106) | Mandatory to a prevailing moving party ('the court shall award' court costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, § 27-34-110(1)). Reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 27-34-110(2)) | Express statutory right: the moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, within 30 days of entry of the order in a private-party case (60 days if a government entity is a party) (§ 27-34-109). A pending Montana Supreme Court appeal, Cohodes v. Cohodes (No. DA 26-0161), is the first significant test of this provision, not yet decided as of this cell's last_verified date | Three carve-outs (§ 27-34-102(2)): claims against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting in an official capacity; claims BY a governmental unit or employee, in an official capacity, to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a communication tied to that person's own sale or lease — this exemption does not reach dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic works (§ 27-34-102(3)(a)). A separate carve-out exempts protection-order proceedings under Title 40, chapter 15 from the entire chapter (§ 27-34-104(8)) |
| Nebraska verified 2026-07-05 | Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,241 to 25-21,246 (Laws 1994, LB 665, § 1, all six sections; unamended since); a narrow, home-grown 'public petition and participation' statute, not a version of UPEPA. A 2025 bill (LB 493) that would have repealed it and adopted UPEPA instead was indefinitely postponed 4/17/2026 | Narrow and one-directional: applies only to 'an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim for damages' brought BY a 'public applicant or permittee' (someone who applied for or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate, or other government entitlement, or someone materially connected to that person) that is 'materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge, or oppose the application or permission' (§ 25-21,242(1), (4)); doesn't reach general public-interest speech, consumer reviews, or media commentary unconnected to a pending permit or license dispute | No separate special motion exists. A defendant instead files an ordinary motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (§ 25-21,245) or motion for summary judgment (§ 25-21,246); the statute requires the court to 'expedite and grant preference in the hearing' of either motion, but doesn't stay discovery automatically or by its own terms | Once the movant shows the suit is 'an action involving public petition and participation,' the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment SHALL be granted UNLESS the plaintiff shows the claim 'has a substantial basis in law' or 'is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law' (§§ 25-21,245, 25-21,246) — a legal-sufficiency test, not a probability-of-prevailing evidentiary showing. Separately, to recover damages on the underlying claim at all, the plaintiff must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that any material communication was made with 'knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false' (§ 25-21,244(1)) | Not automatic on winning the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment itself — those sections say nothing about fees. Fee-shifting instead runs through a separate damages action: a defendant 'may maintain an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim' against the plaintiff to recover costs and attorney's fees, conditioned on showing the suit 'was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law' and could not be supported by a substantial argument for changing existing law; further compensatory damages require an ADDITIONAL showing the suit was meant to harass, intimidate, punish, or maliciously inhibit petition, speech, or association rights (§ 25-21,243(1)) | No express interlocutory or immediate appeal right anywhere in §§ 25-21,241 to 25-21,246 — confirmed directly from the current text of all six sections, which never mention an appeal. A denial follows Nebraska's ordinary final-judgment appeal rules | No dedicated exemptions section. The statute's narrowness is built into its scope definition rather than a separate carve-out list: it only ever reaches damages suits by a 'public applicant or permittee' targeting comment on their own permit/license application. Two savings clauses preserve other rights: § 25-21,243(3) says nothing in that section affects a party's other common-law, statutory, rule, or regulatory recovery rights, and § 25-21,244(2) says nothing in that section limits a defendant's other constitutional, statutory, or common-law protections |
| Nevada verified 2026-07-05 | NRS 41.635 to 41.670, enacted 1993, broadened in 2013 (S.B. 286) to cover public-forum/public-interest speech generally (not just speech directed at government), and last substantively amended in 2015 (S.B. 444), which added a new legislative-findings section (§ 41.665) and changed the plaintiff's burden under § 41.660 to prima facie evidence; a home-grown California-influenced scheme, not a version of the newer Uniform Public Expression Protection Act | A 'good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern' (§ 41.637): communication aimed at procuring governmental or electoral action; a complaint to a government official about a matter of concern to that entity; a statement made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative, executive, or judicial body or other official proceeding; or a communication in direct connection with an issue of public interest made in a public forum — but only if the communication 'is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood,' a truthfulness gate built into the scope test itself, not just a later defense | Special motion to dismiss within 60 days of service of the complaint, extendable by the court for good cause (§ 41.660(2)); no separate hearing deadline — the court must rule on the motion within 20 judicial days after it is served on the plaintiff (§ 41.660(3)(f)); discovery is stayed pending the ruling and the disposition of any appeal (§ 41.660(3)(e)), with limited discovery allowed only on a showing that needed information is held by another party and isn't reasonably available otherwise (§ 41.660(4)) | Two-step: the movant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based on a good faith communication under § 41.637 (§ 41.660(3)(a)); if met, the plaintiff must then demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 41.660(3)(b)) — § 41.665 directs courts to apply this second-step burden the same way California courts applied California's anti-SLAPP burden as of June 8, 2015 | Mandatory reasonable costs and attorney's fees to a prevailing movant, plus a discretionary additional award of up to $10,000 (§ 41.670(1)(a)-(b)); a prevailing movant may also bring a separate action for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the fees/costs of that separate action (§ 41.670(1)(c)) — a built-in SLAPPback right; if the motion is denied and found frivolous or vexatious, the prevailing responding party gets mandatory fees plus a possible additional award up to $10,000 and other deterrent relief (§ 41.670(2)-(3)) | If the court denies the special motion to dismiss, an interlocutory appeal lies directly to the Nevada Supreme Court (§ 41.670(4)); the statute creates no matching express right to appeal a grant, and dismissal under a granted motion operates as an adjudication upon the merits (§ 41.660(5)) | None — NRS 41.635 to 41.670 has no statutory exemptions or carve-outs section of the kind UPEPA states use for government-enforcement or commercial-speech claims; the closest limiting feature is the truthfulness requirement built into the § 41.637 definition itself, which keeps the motion from ever reaching a communication the movant cannot show was truthful or made without knowledge of its falsity |
| New Hampshire verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted, and the state's highest court has flagged a real constitutional obstacle to enacting one. In 1994, responding to the state Senate's request for an advisory opinion on proposed SB 661 (which would have created a special motion to strike), the New Hampshire Supreme Court's justices concluded the procedure would violate the state constitutional right to a jury trial (Opinion of the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure), 138 N.H. 445, 641 A.2d 1012 (1994)). Legislators have tried again since without success: a 2024 bill (HB 1475) and a 2025 bill (HB 391) were both voted 'Inexpedient to Legislate' by the House. No anti-SLAPP bill is currently pending | N/A — no statutory scope exists, and no separate common-law petitioning-immunity doctrine fills the gap. A defendant sued over speech relies on ordinary New Hampshire defamation-law defenses: truth, non-defamatory opinion, and, where a public official, public figure, or a matter of public concern is involved, the requirement that the plaintiff prove actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) | N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery. New Hampshire courts have shown a practical willingness to resolve speech-protective defenses — like non-actionable opinion, or a public figure's failure to plead actual malice — on an ordinary motion to dismiss, and to limit any resulting discovery narrowly, but this is ordinary motion practice on the ordinary timeline, not a distinct, guaranteed procedural vehicle | N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; ordinary pleading-sufficiency and summary-judgment standards apply. Where a public-official, public-figure, or public-concern plaintiff is involved, New Hampshire's ordinary defamation law requires that plaintiff to prove actual malice — but that is a substantive element of the underlying claim, proven or pleaded like any other, not a distinct anti-SLAPP threshold test decided on an early special motion | N/A as a SLAPP-specific matter, but a general tool exists in any contract or tort case: RSA 507:15 lets a court, on a party's motion or its own, order summary judgment against a party whose action or defense 'clearly appears... frivolous or intended to harass or intimidate the prevailing party,' and award the prevailing party's costs and attorney's fees plus $1,000 — not automatic, and not tailored to speech-based cases | N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a speech-based case. Ordinary New Hampshire rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| New Jersey verified 2026-07-05 | N.J.S.A. §§ 2A:53A-49 to -61, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA); enacted 2023 (P.L.2023, c.155, signed 2023-09-07, eff. 2023-10-07); New Jersey's first anti-SLAPP statute, unamended since enactment | Broad: a cause of action based on a communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; a communication on an issue under consideration or review in one; or the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-50(b)) | Not called a 'special motion' -- an 'application for an order to show cause' filed within 60 days of service (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-51); unlike most UPEPA states the resulting stay is NOT automatic: the court 'may order' a stay, but 'there shall be a presumption that such a stay shall be granted' (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-52) | Movant shows the Act applies; responding party must then show an exemption applies or establish 'a prima facie case as to each essential element' of the claim, or else the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-55); the court may consider anything admissible on summary judgment, not just the pleadings (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-54) | Mandatory court costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; mandatory fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the order to show cause was frivolous or filed solely to delay (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-58); a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal WITH prejudice counts as the movant prevailing for fee purposes (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-55(c)) | The moving party may appeal a denial (in whole or in part) as a matter of right, within 20 days of the order (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-57); no separate appeal provision for a grant, since a dismissal with prejudice is already a final order | Three categories (N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-50(c)): actions against a governmental unit or an official acting in an official capacity; actions BY a governmental unit to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and commercial-speech actions against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a related communication |
| New Mexico verified 2026-07-05 | NMSA 1978 §§ 38-2-9.1 and 38-2-9.2, enacted 2001 (Laws 2001, ch. 218, §§ 1-2, eff. 6/15/2001) and unamended since; a narrow, quasi-judicial-proceeding-only statute, not a version of UPEPA or the Texas/California model | Narrow: applies only to an action seeking money damages for conduct or speech made in connection with a 'public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any political subdivision of the state' (§ 38-2-9.1(A)); the statute's own definition (§ 38-2-9.1(D)) lists meetings or presentations before state, city, town, or village councils, planning commissions, or review boards or commissions — courts have read this to reach comparable state-agency disciplinary proceedings (e.g., a state racing commission's board of stewards) but not general public-forum speech or a private business dispute | No statutory filing deadline for the motion itself; a defendant instead uses an ordinary motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment, which the court must consider 'on a priority or expedited basis' (§ 38-2-9.1(A)); no automatic stay of discovery — the statute is silent on staying proceedings while the motion is pending | No special evidentiary or burden-shifting test — unlike most other states' anti-SLAPP statutes, § 38-2-9.1 doesn't create its own standard for deciding the motion; it only directs that the ordinary motion to dismiss, judgment-on-the-pleadings, or summary-judgment standard be applied on an expedited timetable, so whichever ordinary standard governs the motion type chosen controls | Conditionally mandatory: if the § 38-2-9.1 defense is raised and the court grants a motion to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment that was filed within 90 days of the moving party's answer, the court must award the moving party reasonable attorney fees and costs; separately, if the court finds a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment was frivolous or filed solely to cause unnecessary delay, it must award fees and costs to the party who prevailed on the motion (§ 38-2-9.1(B)) | An express statutory right for any party — not left to case law or a general discretionary appeal procedure — to an expedited appeal from a trial court's order on the motion, or from the trial court's failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis (§ 38-2-9.1(C)); the New Mexico Court of Appeals has held this expedited-appeal jurisdiction reaches only speech-based defenses raised under this statute (or the related Noerr-Pennington doctrine), not other grounds for dismissal argued in the same motion | No exemptions section exists to carve activity out of the statute's narrow scope. Instead, § 38-2-9.1(E) is a savings clause: nothing in the section limits or prohibits a party's other constitutional, statutory, common-law, or administrative rights or remedies, including a civil action for defamation or malicious abuse of process |
| New York verified 2026-07-05 | N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a and CPLR 3211(g)/3212(h); the 1992 original covered only suits over government permits/approvals, broadened significantly by a 2020 amendment (ch. 250, Laws of 2020) to any communication on an issue of public interest | Any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest (defined broadly as 'any subject other than a purely private matter'), or other lawful conduct furthering the right of free speech or petition on such an issue | No separate 'special motion' — the heightened standard attaches to an ordinary CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss or a CPLR 3212 summary judgment motion once the movant shows the suit involves public petition and participation; the court must give the motion a scheduling preference, and all discovery, pending hearings, and motions are stayed on filing (CPLR 3211(g)(3)) | The motion 'shall be granted' unless the responding party shows the claim 'has a substantial basis in law and fact' or is supported by 'a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law' — a legal-sufficiency standard, not an evidentiary probability-of-prevailing test | Costs and attorney's fees shall be recovered once the movant establishes, via a 3211(g)/3212(h) adjudication, that the suit lacked a substantial basis in fact and law; compensatory damages additionally require clear and convincing evidence the suit was brought to harass, intimidate, punish, or maliciously inhibit protected rights, and punitive damages require that same showing plus a sole-purpose finding | No SLAPP-specific interlocutory appeal provision; an order deciding the motion is generally appealable as of right to the Appellate Division under ordinary CPLR 5701(a)(2) practice because it affects a substantial right, but there is no automatic stay of the case, and no accelerated appellate calendar, built into the anti-SLAPP statute itself | None are named in Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a/76-a or CPLR 3211(g)/3212(h); the scope is instead limited entirely by the 'action involving public petition and participation' definition itself |
| North Carolina verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. A 2023 bill to adopt the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (H.B. 144, 2023-2024 Session) was reported favorably out of committee but died, unvoted, when the biennium ended on 2024-12-13; no successor bill has been filed | N/A -- no statutory scope exists. North Carolina courts have recognized only a narrow, case-by-case common-law/constitutional Petition Clause immunity for statements aimed at influencing government action, not a codified public-interest test | N/A -- no special motion to strike or dismiss exists; a defendant must use an ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A -- no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary standards for a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment under the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure apply instead | N/A -- no SLAPP-specific fee award exists; only North Carolina's general sanctions rules for frivolous filings (e.g., Rule 11) are available, on the same terms as in any other civil case | N/A -- no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary North Carolina rules on final judgments and interlocutory appeals apply | N/A -- there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| North Dakota verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP statute exists in the North Dakota Century Code, and none has ever existed. No anti-SLAPP bill has been introduced in any recent legislative session, including the 2025 regular session (North Dakota's legislature meets only in odd years) — not even in response to the March 2025 Energy Transfer v. Greenpeace verdict. No bill is currently pending; 2026 has no regular session, and the next one convenes in 2027 | N/A — no statutory scope exists. The North Dakota Supreme Court has expressly confirmed the state recognizes no SLAPP or anti-SLAPP cause of action or defense at all, in Energy Transfer LP v. Gion, 2026 ND 93 (2026), litigation arising from the same Energy Transfer v. Greenpeace case. A defendant sued over speech instead relies only on ordinary First Amendment/defamation doctrine, such as the actual-malice standard for statements about public officials or limited-purpose public figures and qualified privilege for fair reports of official proceedings | N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; ordinary pleading-sufficiency and summary-judgment standards apply. Where ordinary defamation doctrine treats the plaintiff as a public figure or the speech as privileged, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving actual malice or overcoming the privilege as a substantive element of the underlying claim — not as a threshold showing on an early special motion | N/A as a SLAPP-specific matter, but a general tool remains available in any civil case: N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2) requires a court to award reasonable actual and statutory costs, including attorney's fees, to the prevailing party upon a finding that a claim for relief was frivolous — defined as having 'such a complete absence of actual facts or law that a reasonable person could not have thought a court would render judgment' in the claimant's favor — but only if the prevailing party raised the frivolousness argument in a responsive pleading, and only as a post-hoc finding, not an early motion | N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a speech-based case. Ordinary North Dakota rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Ohio verified 2026-07-05 | Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2747.01-.06, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA); enacted 2025 (S.B. 237, 135th General Assembly), eff. 2025-04-09; Ohio's first anti-SLAPP statute, no prior law or amendments since | Broad: a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under consideration or review in one, or the exercise of speech/press/assembly/petition/association rights on a matter of public concern (§ 2747.01(B)); the Act confers substantive immunity from suit, not just from liability (§ 2747.01(E)) | 'Motion for expedited relief' within 60 days of service of the pleading asserting the claim, extendable for good cause (§ 2747.02); filing automatically stays ALL other proceedings, including discovery and any pending hearing or motion (§ 2747.03(A)); hearing within 60 days of filing, ruling within 60 days of the hearing (§ 2747.04(A), (D)) | Two-step: movant shows the claim is based on § 2747.01(B) conduct; responding party must then show an exemption applies, or establish a prima facie case for each element, or defeat the movant's showing that the claim fails under the Civ. R. 12(B)(6)/summary-judgment standard (§ 2747.04(C)) — a heightened dismissal test, not a bare 'probability of prevailing' | Mandatory fees, court costs, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant, regardless of a pro bono or contingent fee arrangement (§ 2747.05(A)); mandatory reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the motion is denied AND found 'frivolous conduct' under § 2323.51 (§ 2747.05(B)) | Denial of the motion is a final order carrying an interlocutory right of appeal, notice due within 30 days (§ 2747.05(C)); the Act has no separate provision for a grant, which already ends the claim as an ordinary final, appealable dismissal | Four categories in § 2747.01(C): actions against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting officially; a governmental enforcement action against an imminent threat to public health or safety; actions against a person primarily in the business of selling/leasing goods or services arising from a sale/lease-related communication; and survivorship or bodily-injury/wrongful-death actions |
| Oklahoma verified 2026-07-05 | 12 O.S. §§ 1430-1440 (Ch. 24A of Title 12), the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA), enacted 2014 (Laws 2014, c. 107, eff. 11/1/2014), modeled on Texas's TCPA; exemptions section (§ 1439) amended 2022 (insurance carve-out, Laws 2022 c. 321) and again 2025 (officer-director/employment carve-out, Laws 2025 c. 180, eff. 11/1/2025, already in force) | Exercise of the right of free speech (a communication on a matter of public concern), the right to petition (a communication in or pertaining to a governmental proceeding), or the right of association (a communication between individuals collectively pursuing common interests) (§ 1431); 'matter of public concern' is broadly defined to include health/safety, environmental/economic/community well-being, government, public officials/figures, or a good/product/service in the marketplace (§ 1431(7)) | Motion to dismiss within 60 days of service of the legal action, extendable for good cause (§ 1432(B)); hearing set within 60 days of service of the motion, extendable to 90 days for docket conditions/good cause/party agreement, or to 120 days if the court allows limited discovery (§§ 1433(A)-(C)); all discovery automatically suspended on filing until the court rules, with limited discovery allowed on a good-cause showing (§§ 1432(C), 1435(B)) | Movant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the action is based on, relates to, or responds to the movant's exercise of a protected right (§ 1434(B)); burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish by 'clear and specific evidence' a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim (§ 1434(C)) — a heightened, TCPA-style evidentiary standard, not mere notice pleading; even if the plaintiff meets that burden, the court must still dismiss if the movant proves each essential element of a valid defense by a preponderance of the evidence (§ 1434(D)) | Mandatory court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and other expenses 'as justice and equity may require,' plus court-ordered sanctions sufficient to deter similar suits, to a prevailing movant (§ 1438(A)) — Oklahoma courts have held the fee award itself is mandatory, with only the 'other expenses' component discretionary (Thacker v. Walton, 2021 OK Civ. App. 5); discretionary fees to a prevailing plaintiff only if the court finds the motion frivolous or solely intended to delay (§ 1438(B)) | A ruling on the motion (grant or denial) is expedited-appealable, interlocutory or not; if the court doesn't rule within the time prescribed for its decision, the motion is deemed denied by operation of law and the movant may appeal that deemed denial (§ 1437) | Enforcement actions brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney in the state's name; claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods/services/insurance arising from a commercial communication to an actual or potential buyer; bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival claims; claims under the Oklahoma Insurance Code or an insurance contract; and (added 2025) an officer-director/employee-employer/independent-contractor claim seeking recovery for trade-secret or corporate-opportunity misappropriation, or seeking to enforce a non-disparagement agreement, non-compete, NDA, or confidentiality agreement (§ 1439) |
| Oregon verified 2026-07-05 | ORS 31.150-31.155, enacted 2001 (originally numbered ORS 30.142/30.144/30.146), most recently amended 2025 (SB 180, 2025 c.275, eff. 1/1/2026, adding a sexual-assault-disclosure defamation category); prior substantive amendment 2023 (SB 305, 2023 c.71, eff. 1/1/2024, codifying the appeal right and voluntary-dismissal fee rules) — a home-grown statute, NOT an enactment of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) despite some secondary sources describing it as UPEPA-aligned | A statement or document submitted in a government proceeding or on an issue under review by one; a statement in a place open to the public or a public forum on an issue of public interest; or other conduct furthering speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights connected to a public issue (ORS 31.150(2)(a)); a narrower 2025-added category also covers a good-faith, objectively-reasonable-belief statement about an incident of sexual assault (ORS 31.150(2)(b)) | Special motion to strike within 60 days of service (or later, court's discretion) (ORS 31.152(1)); hearing within 30 days of filing unless docket conditions require later; treated procedurally as an ORCP 21 A motion to dismiss but not subject to ORCP 21 F's bar on successive motions (ORS 31.150(1)); all discovery automatically stayed on filing until entry of judgment, with limited discovery allowed on a good-cause motion (ORS 31.152(2)) | Defendant makes a prima facie showing the claim arises out of protected conduct under ORS 31.150(2); burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a 'probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim' by 'substantial evidence' supporting a prima facie case (ORS 31.150(4)) — a lighter, non-evidence-weighing screen, not the clear-and-convincing standard some other states use; for a defamation claim tied to the 2025 sexual-assault category, the plaintiff must also show a probability the defendant acted with malice (ORS 31.150(5)) | Mandatory reasonable attorney fees and costs to a prevailing defendant on the motion; the same mandatory award goes to a prevailing plaintiff only if the court finds the motion frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay (ORS 31.152(3)) | Only the moving party has a statutory right to an immediate appeal, and only from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, under ORS 19.205 (ORS 31.152(5)); a GRANT results in a judgment of dismissal without prejudice, which is a final judgment appealable in the ordinary way rather than an interlocutory one | Claims against a person primarily engaged in selling or leasing goods or services, where the claim arises from a communication related to that sale or lease (ORS 31.150(3)); actions brought by the Attorney General, a district attorney, county counsel, or a city attorney acting in an official capacity are entirely outside the statute (ORS 31.155(1)); the statute is expressly procedural only and doesn't change the substantive law of the underlying claim (ORS 31.155(2)) |
| Pennsylvania verified 2026-07-05 | 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8320.1, 8340.11-8340.18 (Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Act 72 of 2024); a narrower, still-separate 1990s-era immunity for environmental-participation speech remains at 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 7707, 8301-8305 and was left untouched by Act 72 | A communication in, or on an issue under review in, a legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative proceeding, or the exercise on a matter of public concern of speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights under the First Amendment or Article I, §§ 7 or 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution | SPLIT STATUS: the § 8340.16 special motion (60-day filing deadline, automatic stay of the whole case) is written into the statute but does NOT yet take effect -- it activates only once the PA Supreme Court promulgates a conforming procedural rule and the Legislative Reference Bureau publishes notice; as of early 2026 that rule was still a proposal (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034.1) out for public comment. Until it takes effect, immunity is asserted through ordinary preliminary objections or a summary judgment motion instead | Immunity applies unless the party asserting the claim (1) states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, (2) establishes a prima facie case on each essential element, and (3) shows a genuine issue of material fact defeating judgment as a matter of law -- ordinary demurrer/summary-judgment standards rather than a distinct SLAPP-specific evidentiary test | The court shall award court costs, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses -- jointly and severally against each party who asserted the claim -- to a party who establishes immunity, including when the plaintiff voluntarily discontinues after immunity is asserted; the opposing party recovers its fees instead if the immunity assertion itself was frivolous or made solely to delay | Any order granting, denying, or otherwise determining immunity is immediately appealable under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 702; because immunity can already be raised through ordinary motions, this appeal right is currently usable even though the separate § 8340.16 special-motion procedure is not yet in effect | Ten exclusions in § 8340.14(b): claims against or by a government unit, claims against a seller/lessor over statements tied to selling their own goods or services, most bodily-injury/wrongful-death claims (unless they sound in defamation, privacy, or emotional distress, or arise solely from public-concern speech), protection-from-abuse and sexual-violence-victim claims, insurance-contract claims, trade-secret/corporate-opportunity misappropriation claims, enforcement of a non-disparagement or non-compete agreement, and internal business-entity governance or manager-liability disputes |
| Rhode Island verified 2026-07-05 | R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4, 'Limits on Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation,' enacted 1993 (P.L. 1993, ch. 354 & ch. 448), substantively amended 1995 (P.L. 1995, ch. 386, § 1, removing the original special-motion mechanism). No amendment since (a 1997 change to § 9-33-4 was a technical cross-reference fix only). Rhode Island has not adopted UPEPA and has no pending UPEPA bill | Hybrid (§ 9-33-2(e)): a written or oral statement made before or submitted to a government body or proceeding, a statement on an issue under consideration by such a body, OR — the broad, untethered third category — 'any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue of public concern,' which extends beyond government-directed speech to things like newspaper letters and public criticism | No distinct statutory special motion. The 1995 amendment deleted the original special-motion-to-dismiss mechanism; the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in Hometown Properties v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996), that the immunity is now asserted through an ordinary motion for summary judgment under the standard Rules of Civil Procedure — no statutory filing deadline. Discovery is automatically stayed on filing, subject to a good-cause exception for specified discovery (§ 9-33-2(b)) | The statute itself sets NO burden-shifting or prima facie standard — a notable gap compared to UPEPA and most modern anti-SLAPP statutes. Because the vehicle is an ordinary summary-judgment motion (per Hometown Properties), the ordinary Rule 56 standard governs: the movant must show no genuine issue of material fact that the speech was not a 'sham,' and if it does, the burden effectively shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence creating a genuine factual dispute | Mandatory to a prevailing movant: 'the court shall award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney's fees,' triggered by winning the motion or by ultimately prevailing at trial (§ 9-33-2(d)). The same subsection also makes compensatory damages MANDATORY, and punitive damages discretionary, if the prevailing party additionally shows the underlying claim was frivolous or intended to harass — a one-way remedy with no reciprocal fee-shifting against a losing movant | None created by statute — § 9-33-2 has no appeal provision at all. Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010), shows the practical consequence directly: when a defendant's anti-SLAPP summary-judgment motion was denied, he had no interlocutory appeal as of right and instead petitioned for a discretionary writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied, and the case then proceeded through six more years of litigation before reaching final judgment | Only one carve-out exists, built into the immunity itself rather than a separate exemptions list: the conjunctive 'sham' test (§ 9-33-2(a)(1)-(2)) — speech loses immunity only if it is BOTH objectively baseless (no reasonable person could expect success) AND subjectively baseless (an attempt to use the governmental process for its own direct effects, not its outcome). No general statutory list of exempted claim types exists beyond this test |
| South Carolina verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. Two competing 2025-2026 session bills are pending: H.3305/S.43, a UPEPA-style 'South Carolina Public Expression Protection Act' (passed the House 112-0 on 2025-03-25, amended and read second time in the Senate 2025-05-01, no further action since), and H.5420, a rival, Texas-TCPA-style 'South Carolina Citizens Participation Act' (introduced 2026-03-25, still in House Judiciary Committee) | N/A — no statutory scope exists. H.3305 would use the UPEPA definition (communications in or about a governmental proceeding, or the exercise of speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern). H.5420 would instead use an older, longer TCPA-style definition of the rights of free speech, petition, and association, with a detailed taxonomy of what counts as an 'official proceeding' and a 'matter of public concern' | N/A — no special motion exists. H.3305: special motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service, hearing within 60 days, ruling within 30 days, automatic discovery stay. H.5420: motion to dismiss within 60 days of service, hearing within 60-90 days (up to 120 if discovery is allowed), ruling within 30 days of the hearing, discovery suspended until the ruling | N/A — no statutory test exists. H.3305 uses a summary-judgment-style screen (movant shows the article applies; the claim is dismissed unless the responding party shows a triable claim or the movant wins as a matter of law). H.5420 instead borrows the older, first-generation 'clear and specific evidence' prima facie standard used in Texas's TCPA | N/A — no SLAPP-specific fee award exists today; the state's general Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (§ 15-36-10) remains available on ordinary terms. Both pending bills would make fees mandatory for a prevailing movant (H.5420 adds discretionary deterrence sanctions); both would award fees to a responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay | N/A — no special appeal right exists. H.3305 would give only the moving party a right to appeal a denial, filed within 30 days. H.5420 would go further, also letting a court's failure to rule within its deadline count as a denial by operation of law that the moving party can immediately, expeditedly appeal | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from. H.3305's exemptions are narrow (government-actor defendants only). H.5420's list is much longer — 13 named carve-outs including commercial-speech, insurance, employment, family-law, eviction, and attorney-discipline actions — with journalism and consumer-review carve-backs restored inside three of them |
| South Dakota verified 2026-07-05 | SDCL Chapter 15-40, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted by 2026 Senate Bill 137 (SL 2026, ch. 91), signed by the Governor March 16, 2026, effective July 1, 2026 (South Dakota's standard default effective date for acts without an emergency clause). South Dakota had NO prior anti-SLAPP statute of any kind; this is a wholly new chapter, not a replacement or amendment | Standard broad UPEPA scope (§ 15-40-1): a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under review in such a proceeding, or the exercise of the right of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association guaranteed by the U.S. or South Dakota constitution, on a matter of public concern | A 'special motion for expedited relief to dismiss' (§ 15-40-3), filed within 60 days of service (or later for good cause). Filing automatically stays discovery and nearly all other proceedings (§ 15-40-4); the stay continues through any appeal; limited court-ordered discovery is available on a showing of specific necessity; the court must hold a hearing within 60 days of filing and rule within 60 days of the hearing (§§ 15-40-7, -10) | Codified two-step test (§ 15-40-9): the court must dismiss with prejudice if the moving party establishes the chapter applies, the responding party fails to show an exemption applies, AND either the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its claim, or the moving party separately shows failure to state a claim or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Decided on a summary-judgment-type record (§ 15-40-8) | Mandatory to a prevailing moving party ('the court shall award' court costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, § 15-40-12(1)). Reciprocal fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 15-40-12(2)) | Express statutory right: the moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, within 30 days of entry of the order (§ 15-40-11). Only the moving party gets this express interlocutory right; the statute does not create a parallel express right for a responding party to immediately appeal a grant | Three carve-outs (§ 15-40-2): claims against a governmental unit or its employee/agent acting in an official capacity; claims BY a governmental unit or employee, in an official capacity, to enforce a law, rule, regulation, or ordinance protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety; and claims against a person primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, arising from a communication (or lack of communication) related to that person's own sale or lease — this exemption does not reach the advertisement, creation, dissemination, or exhibition of an artistic, dramatic, journalistic, literary, musical, or political work |
| Tennessee verified 2026-07-05 | Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110, Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), enacted 2019 (2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 185); no substantive amendment since | Exercise of the right of free speech (a communication on a matter of public concern or religious expression), right to petition (a communication urging government review of an issue), or right of association (collective action on a matter of public concern) — each must fall within U.S. or Tennessee constitutional protection; 'matter of public concern' is defined with 7 named categories plus a catch-all for anything else a court deems to qualify (§ 20-17-103) | Petition to dismiss within 60 calendar days of service of the legal action, or later at the court's discretion (§ 20-17-104(b)); opposing response due at least 5 days before the hearing; all discovery automatically stayed on filing until the petition is ruled on, though a court can allow specified, limited discovery for good cause (§ 20-17-104(d)) | Three steps (§ 20-17-105): (1) petitioner makes a prima facie case the action is based on, relates to, or responds to protected activity; (2) if met, the court shall dismiss unless the responding party establishes a prima facie case for each essential element of its claim; (3) even then, the court shall still dismiss if the petitioner establishes a valid defense | Mandatory for a prevailing petitioner: court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, discretionary costs, and other expenses, plus any additional relief (including sanctions) the court finds necessary to deter repetition (§ 20-17-107(a)); reciprocal fees to the responding party only if the court makes specific written findings that the petition was frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 20-17-107(b)) | An order granting or denying the petition is immediately appealable as a matter of right to the Tennessee Court of Appeals (§ 20-17-106) | Does not apply to a government enforcement action brought in the state's name by the attorney general, a district attorney general, or a county or municipal attorney (§ 20-17-108(1)); the chapter also creates no private right of action, doesn't limit any other available remedy or defense, and doesn't change the substantive law governing the underlying claim (§ 20-17-108) |
| Texas verified 2026-07-05 | Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 27 (Texas Citizens Participation Act); enacted 2011, substantially narrowed by 2019 H.B. 2730 | Action based on/in response to the exercise of free speech, petition, or association on a 'matter of public concern,' narrowed in 2019, or conduct described in § 27.010(b) (media/artistic works, consumer reviews) | Motion to dismiss within 60 days of service (§ 27.003(b)); hearing set within 60-90 days, up to 120 if limited discovery is allowed; all discovery automatically suspended on filing (§ 27.003(c)) | Movant shows the action is based on/in response to protected exercise (§ 27.005(b)); nonmovant must then rebut with 'clear and specific evidence' of a prima facie case on every element (§ 27.005(c)) | Mandatory court costs and attorney's fees to a prevailing movant (§ 27.009(a)(1)); discretionary deterrent sanctions (§ 27.009(a)(2)); reciprocal fees if a compulsory-counterclaim dismissal motion is frivolous (§ 27.009(c)) | A motion not ruled on in time is denied by operation of law and is appealable; appellate courts must expedite any interlocutory or other appeal from a ruling or a failure to rule (§ 27.008) | 12 categories exempted by § 27.010(a) (government enforcement, commercial-speech/seller statements, bodily injury/wrongful death, insurance, employment trade-secret/non-compete claims, family-law and protective-order actions, DTPA claims, certain healthcare peer-review defenses, evictions, attorney discipline, whistleblower claims, common-law fraud); media/journalism and consumer-review activity is carved back IN under § 27.010(b); § 27.010(c) preserves coverage for communications involving family/dating-violence or certain crime victims |
| Utah verified 2026-07-05 | Utah Code §§ 78B-25-101 to 78B-25-115, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), enacted 2023 (Ch. 488, 2023 General Session, eff. 5/3/2023), replacing a narrower 2008 'Citizen Participation in Government Act' that applies only to pre-5/3/2023 causes of action (§§ 78B-25-113, -114); no substantive amendment since 2023 (a 2025 bill to narrow the Act, S.B. 301, died in the Senate) | Communication in a governmental proceeding, communication on an issue under review by one, or exercise of free speech, press, assembly/petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern (§ 78B-25-102(2)); 'goods or services' expressly excludes creative, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic works, so those stay covered even near the commercial-speech exemption (§ 78B-25-102(1)(a)) | Special motion for expedited relief within 60 days of service, or later on a showing of good cause (§ 78B-25-103); hearing within 60 days of filing (§ 78B-25-105); ruling within 60 days of the hearing (§ 78B-25-108); all proceedings between the parties, including discovery, automatically stayed until the ruling and through any appeal, with limited discovery allowed on a showing of necessity (§ 78B-25-104) | Movant shows the Act applies under § 78B-25-102(2); responding party fails to show an exemption under § 78B-25-102(3) applies; and either the responding party fails to make a prima facie case for each element, or the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (§ 78B-25-107) — a summary-judgment-style screen, not a 'clear and convincing evidence' standard | Mandatory costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant; the same mandatory award goes to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion frivolous or filed solely to delay (§ 78B-25-110) | Only the moving party has a statutory right to an immediate appeal, and only from an order denying the motion in whole or in part, under Utah R. App. P. 4 (§ 78B-25-109) — the statute creates no matching right for a responding party to immediately appeal a grant | Claims against a governmental unit or an official acting in an official capacity; government enforcement actions protecting against an imminent health or safety threat; and claims against a person primarily engaged in selling or leasing goods or services, where the claim arises from a communication related to that sale or lease (§ 78B-25-102(3)) — but that last exemption doesn't reach creative, journalistic, or artistic works, which are carved out of the 'goods or services' definition itself |
| Vermont verified 2026-07-05 | 12 V.S.A. § 1041; enacted 2005 (No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 2), last amended 2023 (No. 14, § 2, eff. May 10, 2023) to add the legally-protected-health-care exemption | Broad, four categories (§ 1041(i)): (1) statements before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding or other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) statements in connection with an issue under consideration or review by such a body; (3) statements on an issue of public interest made in a public forum or place open to the public; and (4) other conduct or statements on a public issue or issue of public interest that furthers the exercise of free speech or petition rights | Special motion to strike filed and served within 60 days of the complaint's filing (§ 1041(b)); a response is due within 15 days of service of the motion; the court may extend either deadline for good cause. Filing automatically stays all discovery until the motion is decided (§ 1041(c)(1)), though the court may allow limited discovery on a good-cause showing (§ 1041(c)(2)). The court must hold a hearing within 30 days of service of the motion absent good cause for an extension (§ 1041(d)) | Plaintiff-unfriendly two-part conjunctive test: the court SHALL grant the motion unless the plaintiff shows BOTH that the defendant's exercise of speech or petition rights 'was devoid of any reasonable factual support and any arguable basis in law' AND that the defendant's acts caused the plaintiff actual injury (§ 1041(e)(1)). Requiring both elements makes this a harder standard for a plaintiff to overcome than a single 'probability of prevailing' test | Mandatory both directions: if the motion is granted, the court SHALL award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the defendant; if the motion is denied AND found frivolous or intended solely to delay, the court SHALL award costs and fees to the plaintiff (§ 1041(f)(1)) | An order granting or denying a special motion to strike is appealable in the same manner as an interlocutory order under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 (§ 1041(g)) — available to either side | Two carve-outs (§ 1041(h)): (1) any enforcement action or criminal proceeding brought by the State of Vermont or a political subdivision; and (2) a case involving tortious interference with legally protected health care under 12 V.S.A. § 7302 — a 2023 addition tied to Vermont's reproductive- and gender-affirming-care shield law, which gives its own separate cause of action instead |
| Virginia verified 2026-07-05 | Va. Code § 8.01-223.2, 'Immunity of persons for statements made at public hearing or communicated to third party'; enacted 2007 (c.798), most recently amended 2025 (c.641, adding a Title IX-hearing category and an employee-retaliation category); referred to by Virginia courts as the state's anti-SLAPP statute, but not a UPEPA-style special-motion act | Narrower and more itemized than most states: (i) statements on a matter of public concern that would be protected under the First Amendment, communicated to a third party; (ii) statements made at, or otherwise communicated to, a local government body's public hearing on a matter properly before it; (iii) statements made at a Title IX hearing before a higher-education tribunal; or (iv) an employee's statements against an employer where retaliation is barred by § 40.1-27.3 (§ 8.01-223.2(A)) | No standalone special motion or statutory filing deadline. Immunity is ordinarily raised through a plea in bar (Virginia's Supreme Court has noted a demurrer tests only the complaint's legal sufficiency, not an affirmative defense like this one); no statutory stay of discovery | No probability-of-prevailing test. Immunity attaches to the listed categories of statements unless the plaintiff shows the declarant knew or should have known the statement was false, or made it with reckless disregard for its truth (§ 8.01-223.2(B)); courts resolve this at the plea-in-bar or demurrer stage by asking whether the complaint's well-pleaded allegations, taken as true, are enough to overcome the immunity | Discretionary, not mandatory: a person whose suit is dismissed, whose subpoena is quashed, or who otherwise prevails based on the immunity 'may be awarded' reasonable attorney fees and costs (§ 8.01-223.2(C)); no reciprocal fee award against a losing movant | Not addressed in § 8.01-223.2 itself. Since a 2023 recodification, a circuit court order granting or denying a plea of 'sovereign, absolute, or qualified immunity' is immediately appealable to the Supreme Court of Virginia by petition within 15 days (§ 8.01-670.2); the Court exercised that jurisdiction over a denial that included § 8.01-223.2 statutory immunity in Brooks-Buck v. Wahlstrom (Va. Oct. 16, 2025) | No separate exemptions section naming carve-outs like commercial speech or government enforcement. The only statutory limit is subsection B's exception for statements made with actual or constructive knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth |
| Washington verified 2026-07-05 | RCW ch. 4.105, Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA); enacted 2021 (ch. 259, Laws of 2021), eff. 2021-07-25; Washington was the first state in the nation to adopt UPEPA, replacing a 2010 anti-SLAPP statute (former RCW 4.24.525) the state supreme court struck down in 2015 as unconstitutional (Davis v. Cox) | Broad: a cause of action based on a communication in a governmental proceeding, a communication on an issue under consideration or review in one, or the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition, or association rights on a matter of public concern (RCW 4.105.010(2)) | 'Special motion for expedited relief' within 60 days of service (RCW 4.105.020(2)); a distinctive 14-day pre-filing notice requirement -- skipping it doesn't forfeit the motion but does forfeit the movant's right to fees (RCW 4.105.020(1)); the automatic stay starts at the EARLIER of that notice or the filing itself, covering all proceedings including discovery (RCW 4.105.030(1)) | Movant shows the chapter applies; responding party must then show an exemption applies or establish 'a prima facie case as to each essential element,' or else the movant shows failure to state a claim or no genuine issue of material fact (RCW 4.105.060(1)); the court considers the pleadings, the motion, any reply or response, and anything admissible on summary judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 (RCW 4.105.050) | Mandatory court costs, fees, and litigation expenses to a prevailing movant -- unless the movant skipped the 14-day pre-filing notice; mandatory fees to a prevailing responding party only if the court finds the motion 'was not substantially justified or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding' (RCW 4.105.090) | The moving party may appeal a denial (in whole or in part) as a matter of right, within 21 days of the order (RCW 4.105.080); the stay of all proceedings continues through that appeal (RCW 4.105.030(3)) | The longest exemptions list of any UPEPA state surveyed so far -- 12 categories (RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)), including the standard government-actor and commercial-speech carve-outs plus crime-victim suits, real-property title disputes, bodily-injury/wrongful-death claims (unless they involve reputational damage), insurance disputes, common-law fraud, domestic-relations/protective-order proceedings, Title 49 employment and whistleblower claims (unless they involve reputational damage), the state Consumer Protection Act, and any federal-law claim; a carve-back-in restores the Act for the commercial-speech, fraud, and consumer-protection-act exemptions specifically when the suit targets journalism or consumer reviews/ratings (RCW 4.105.010(3)(b)) |
| West Virginia verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP statute exists in the West Virginia Code. At least seven UPEPA-style bills have been introduced and died in committee since 2020 (HB 4726 and HB 4782 in 2020; HB 2485 and HB 2716 in 2021, reintroduced 2022; SB 469 and HB 4912 in 2024; HB 2756 in 2025; HB 4866 in 2026), none reported out of committee. The most recent, 2026's HB 4866 ('West Virginia Public Participation Protection Act'), was referred to House Judiciary 1/28/2026 and died when the legislature adjourned sine die 3/14/2026 without a vote. No bill is currently pending; the next regular session convenes January 2027 | N/A — no statutory scope exists. West Virginia case law provides a real but much narrower substitute: the West Virginia Supreme Court has held the state constitutional right to petition the government (W. Va. Const. art. III, § 16) is 'protected by the actual malice standard' of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (Harris v. Adkins, 189 W.Va. 465, 432 S.E.2d 549, Syl. pt. 1 (1993)) — reaching a statement connected to petitioning a government body (the case itself involved a statement at a public city council meeting), not the broader public-forum or public-interest speech most anti-SLAPP statutes cover | N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment under the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists; ordinary pleading-sufficiency and summary-judgment standards apply. For petition-clause speech specifically, Harris v. Adkins requires the PLAINTIFF to prove actual malice — that the defendant made the statement with 'knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth' — to win the underlying case at all, but this is a substantive element proven over the life of the case, not a threshold showing decided on an early special motion | N/A as a SLAPP-specific matter, but a general tool remains available in any civil case: W. Va. R. Civ. P. 11(c) lets a court, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, sanction an attorney, law firm, or party who violated Rule 11(b)'s certification requirements (presenting a filing for an improper purpose, or asserting claims unwarranted by existing law); a sanction 'may include... an order directing payment... of part or all of the reasonable expenses and attorney fees directly resulting from the violation,' but it's discretionary and not tailored to speech-based cases | N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a speech-based case. Ordinary West Virginia rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals apply | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Wisconsin verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. A 2025-2026 session bill adopting the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (2025 Assembly Bill 701, with an identical companion, Senate Bill 666) passed the Assembly 2026-02-17 on a voice vote after a unanimous 8-0 committee report, but both bills' final recorded action is 'Failed to concur/pass pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 1' on 2026-03-23 -- the Senate ran out of its scheduled floor time before voting. No anti-SLAPP statute is in force | N/A -- no statutory scope exists. Unlike some no-statute states, Wisconsin courts also have not developed a separate petitioning-immunity common-law doctrine for SLAPP-type suits; a defendant sued over speech relies on ordinary defamation-law defenses under general Wisconsin tort law (truth, non-defamatory opinion, and the actual-malice standard for public-figure plaintiffs) | N/A -- no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant must use an ordinary motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6.) or a Wis. Stat. § 802.08 motion for summary judgment, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A -- no statutory burden-shifting test exists; the ordinary pleading-sufficiency standard for a motion to dismiss, and the ordinary genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard for summary judgment, apply instead | N/A -- no SLAPP-specific fee award exists; Wisconsin's general sanctions rule for improper pleadings and motions, Wis. Stat. § 802.05, remains available on the same terms as in any other civil case, but it isn't tailored to speech-based claims | N/A -- no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a SLAPP-type motion; ordinary Wisconsin rules on final judgments and interlocutory appeals (Wis. Stat. § 808.03) apply | N/A -- there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
| Wyoming verified 2026-07-05 | None enacted. No anti-SLAPP statute exists in the Wyoming Statutes. The Wyoming First Amendment Protection Act (2026 HB 103), a UPEPA-style bill, passed the House but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 2, 2026 without a vote. The Legislature's Joint Judiciary Committee has approved a 2026 interim topic to study anti-SLAPP legislation and draft a Wyoming-specific bill for a future session | N/A — no statutory scope exists. Wyoming courts instead apply the ordinary First Amendment actual-malice doctrine: a public official or public figure cannot recover for a defamatory statement on a matter of public concern unless the statement was made with actual malice | N/A — no special motion to strike or dismiss exists. A defendant sued over speech must use an ordinary motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56, with no statutory automatic stay of discovery | N/A — no statutory burden-shifting test exists. Where the actual-malice rule applies to a defamation claim by a public official or public figure, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving actual malice as a substantive element of the claim, litigated on the normal case timeline rather than on an early special motion | N/A — no SLAPP-specific or general frivolous-litigation fee-shifting statute exists. Wyoming follows the American Rule: each side bears its own attorney's fees unless a specific statute, contract, or rule independently authorizes an award. W.S. § 1-14-126(b) lets a court exercise discretion over the AMOUNT of a fee award only in actions where a fee award is 'authorized' by some other law — it does not itself create a right to fee-shifting in an ordinary defamation or tort case | N/A — no special interlocutory appeal right exists for a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a speech-based case. Ordinary Wyoming rules on final judgments and permissive interlocutory appeals under the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure apply | N/A — there is no statute to carve exemptions from |
All 51 jurisdictions verified. Each state page shows the statute text and verification date behind its row.