Georgia: Anti-SLAPP Laws

The short answer

Georgia first added an anti-SLAPP provision to its Civil Practice Act in
1996, but the General Assembly rewrote it wholesale in 2016 (effective July
1, 2016) to closely track California's anti-SLAPP law. If you're sued over
an act that could reasonably be construed as furthering your right of
petition or free speech on an issue of public interest or concern, you can
move to strike or dismiss the claim. The motion automatically stays
discovery and must be heard within 30 days of service; the plaintiff then
has to show a probability of prevailing, or the claim is struck and you
recover your fees.

Requirements one by one

Governing law

Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute is O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, originally enacted in
1996 (Ga. L. 1996, p. 260). In 2016, the General Assembly rewrote it
wholesale (Ga. L. 2016, p. 341, Act 420, effective July 1, 2016) to
"substantially track" California's anti-SLAPP procedure, Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § 425.16 — closely enough that Georgia courts look to California case
law for guidance in applying it. The statute has not been amended since
2016; a 2025 comprehensive tort-reform act (S.B. 68, Act 9) touched other
parts of the Civil Practice Act but left § 9-11-11.1 untouched.

What speech or conduct is protected

The 2016 rewrite expanded the statute's scope from a narrow rule covering
only statements connected to official government proceedings — the reading
the Georgia Supreme Court gave the old law in Berryhill v. Georgia
Community Support & Solutions — to four broad categories: statements
before a legislative, executive, judicial, or other official proceeding;
statements on an issue under consideration or review by such a body;
statements made in a place open to the public or a public forum on an issue
of public interest or concern; and a catch-all covering any other conduct
furthering the right of petition or free speech on a public issue. That
last category is what lets the statute reach online reviews, social media
posts, and neighborhood petitions that have nothing to do with a formal
government proceeding.

The special motion

Georgia's statute doesn't set its own filing deadline for the motion the
way California (60 days) or Ohio (60 days) do — an unusual gap among
anti-SLAPP states, so don't assume a specific deadline exists just because
other states have one. Once filed, the motion automatically stays "all
discovery and any pending hearings or motions in the action" until a final
decision, and the court must hear the motion itself within 30 days of
service unless emergency matters require a later date. A court can allow
specified discovery to proceed anyway on a noticed motion and a showing of
good cause.

Burden of proof

The analysis is two steps. First, the moving party must show the claim
arises from an act that "could reasonably be construed" as furthering the
right of petition or free speech on an issue of public interest or
concern — a relatively easy threshold to clear. If that showing is made, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party (usually the plaintiff) to establish
"a probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim," judged
from the pleadings and any supporting or opposing affidavits. If the
plaintiff is arguing the defendant is a public figure, the plaintiff gets
limited discovery on the sole issue of actual malice when that issue
matters to the court's ruling.

Attorney's fees

A prevailing movant recovers attorney's fees and litigation expenses, with
the amount left to the court's judgment based on the facts of the case —
mandatory in principle, but not a fixed formula. If the motion is denied,
the nonmoving party (usually the plaintiff) only recovers fees if the court
separately finds the motion was frivolous or filed solely to cause delay.
Any fee request must be made by motion no later than 45 days after the
action's final disposition.

Right to appeal

Unlike states that give special interlocutory-appeal treatment only to a
denial, Georgia's statute makes an order granting or denying the motion
directly appealable as of right, incorporating the state's general
direct-appeal statute. Neither side has to wait for the rest of the case to
finish before appealing the ruling on the motion.

Exemptions

The statute names only one exemption: it doesn't apply to an action brought
by the Attorney General, a prosecuting attorney, or a city attorney acting
as a prosecutor to enforce laws aimed at protecting the public. There's no
carve-out for commercial speech, consumer claims, or products-liability
suits of the kind several other states' statutes include.

What trips people up

There's no statutory filing-deadline clock to watch. Practitioners used
to California's 60-day window or Ohio's 60-day window sometimes assume
Georgia has something similar — it doesn't. The only fixed deadlines in the
statute are the 30-day hearing requirement and the 45-day fee-motion window
after final disposition.

"Could reasonably be construed" is a deliberately easy bar for the
movant. The Georgia Supreme Court has made clear this first step doesn't
require weighing evidence — a defendant clears it by showing the claim
fits one of the four categories in subsection (c), even if the underlying
facts are disputed. The real fight is almost always at the second step,
where the plaintiff must show a probability of prevailing.

Georgia looks to California case law to fill gaps. Because the 2016
rewrite tracks California's statute so closely, Georgia courts have said
they'll look to California decisions interpreting Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 425.16 for guidance on questions the Georgia courts haven't yet answered
themselves.

Common questions

Does filing the motion stop the whole case, or just discovery? The
statute stays "all discovery and any pending hearings or motions" once the
motion is filed — broader than a discovery-only stay, though it doesn't
formally dismiss anything until the court rules.

How fast do I need to file the motion after being served? The statute
doesn't say. Because there's no statutory deadline, timing is governed by
ordinary civil-procedure practice and any scheduling order in the case —
file promptly, since delay can undercut the argument that the suit is
genuinely chilling protected speech.

What if I lose the motion — do I owe the other side's fees? Only if the
court separately finds your motion was frivolous or filed solely to delay
the case. An ordinary loss on the merits of the motion doesn't by itself
create a fee obligation.

Statutes and sources

• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1) — "A claim for relief against a person or
  entity arising from any act of such person or entity which could
  reasonably be construed as an act in furtherance of the person's or
  entity's right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of the
  United States or the Constitution of the State of Georgia in connection
  with an issue of public interest or concern shall be subject to a motion
  to strike unless the court determines that the nonmoving party has
  established that there is a probability that the nonmoving party will
  prevail on the claim." Quoted in the Georgia Court of Appeals' opinion in
  Unified Government of Cusseta-Chattahoochee County v. Hoyte / Haymond v.
  Hoyte (Oct. 1, 2025). Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10686665/ (accessed 2026-07-05).
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(a) — quoted in the Georgia Supreme Court's
  opinion in Wilkes & McHugh, P.A. v. LTC Consulting, L.P., 306 Ga. 252
  (2019): "it is in the public interest to encourage participation by the
  citizens of Georgia in matters of public significance and public interest
  through the exercise of their constitutional rights of petition and
  freedom of speech," and "the valid exercise of the constitutional rights
  of petition and freedom of speech should not be chilled through abuse of
  the judicial process," with the section to "be construed broadly." Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7479869/ (accessed 2026-07-05).
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c)(1)-(4) — the four protected-activity
  categories, quoted in full in Wilkes & McHugh. Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7479869/ (accessed 2026-07-05).
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d) — the discovery-stay and 30-day hearing rule,
  quoted in full in Wilkes & McHugh. Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7479869/ (accessed 2026-07-05).
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b.1) — the fee-shifting subsection, described and
  partly quoted in Wilkes & McHugh. Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7479869/ (accessed 2026-07-05).
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(e) — the direct-appeal subsection, described and
  partly quoted in Wilkes & McHugh. Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7479869/ (accessed 2026-07-05).
• O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(g) — "This Code section shall not apply to any
  action brought by the Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney, or a
  city attorney acting as a prosecutor, to enforce laws aimed at public
  protection." Georgia's official code portal could not be fetched directly
  (see verified_via); this subsection is cross-checked against multiple
  independent, word-for-word identical secondary mirrors. Source:
  https://www.courtrules.net/georgia/ga-civil-practice/section-9-11-11.1
  (accessed 2026-07-05).