District of Columbia: Anti-SLAPP Laws

The short answer

The District of Columbia has one of the country's more established
anti-SLAPP laws. The Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010, effective March 31, 2011,
lets a defendant sued over an act "in furtherance of the right of
advocacy on issues of public interest" file a special motion to dismiss
within 45 days of being served. If the defendant makes a threshold
showing that the claim targets that kind of activity, the plaintiff must
show the claim is "likely to succeed on the merits" — a standard D.C.
courts have interpreted as a legal-sufficiency test, not literally a
better-than-50% prediction — or the case is dismissed with prejudice. A
successful defendant is presumptively entitled to attorney's fees, and a
denial can be appealed right away. One important asterisk: in 2023 the
D.C. Court of Appeals struck down the law's automatic discovery stay as
conflicting with the district's Home Rule Act, so discovery now proceeds
under the ordinary Federal Rules of Civil Procedure while a motion is
pending, not the statute's original stay.

Requirements one by one

Governing law

D.C.'s Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010 lives at D.C. Code §§ 16-5501 through
-5505 and took effect March 31, 2011. The Council amended it in 2021 to
add an exemption for lawsuits brought by the District government itself
(including public charter schools), and made that exemption apply
retroactively back to the Act's original 2011 effective date, plus to
any claim still pending as of November 8, 2021.

What speech or conduct is protected

The Act protects an "act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on
issues of public interest," defined broadly: any statement made in
connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body or other official proceeding; any statement
made in a public forum on an issue of public interest; and other
expressive conduct that petitions the government or communicates views
to the public on such an issue. "Issue of public interest" itself is
defined broadly — health or safety, environmental or economic or
community well-being, the District government, a public figure, or a
good, product, or service in the marketplace — but the statute expressly
excludes statements aimed primarily at protecting the speaker's own
commercial interest rather than informing the public.

The special motion to dismiss

A defendant must file the special motion to dismiss within 45 days of
being served with the claim. The court must hold an expedited hearing
and rule as soon as practicable afterward; a grant is with prejudice, so
the plaintiff can't refile. A related tool, the special motion to quash,
lets someone whose personal identifying information is sought through
discovery (for example, an anonymous online commenter facing a subpoena
to unmask them) fight that discovery request using the same standard.
The statute originally stayed all discovery automatically once a special
motion was filed, but the D.C. Court of Appeals held in 2023, in Banks
v. Hoffman, that this discovery-limiting piece conflicts with the
district's Home Rule Act — because D.C.'s Superior Court must follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it adopts its own rule change
through a formal process the Council never completed for this law. As a
result, ordinary FRCP discovery practice now governs while a special
motion is pending, not an automatic stay.

Burden of proof

The Act uses a two-step test. First, the movant must make a prima facie
showing that the claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of
advocacy on an issue of public interest. If that showing is made, the
motion is granted unless the responding party demonstrates the claim is
"likely to succeed on the merits." The D.C. Court of Appeals has held
that this phrase doesn't mean a literal better-than-even chance — the
real question is whether a jury, properly instructed on the law
(including any heightened constitutional standard that applies to the
underlying claim, like the actual-malice rule in a public-figure
defamation case), could reasonably find for the plaintiff based on the
evidence actually produced, not just the allegations in the complaint.

Attorney's fees

The statute says a court "may" award costs and fees to a prevailing
movant — discretionary language on its face. But the D.C. Court of
Appeals has interpreted that language to mean a successful movant is
presumptively entitled to reasonable fees, unless special circumstances
would make an award unjust, in a case addressing the special motion to
quash that the court said largely applies to special motions to dismiss
too. Fees can flow the other way only if the court separately finds the
special motion itself was frivolous or filed solely to cause delay.

Right to appeal

The statute doesn't say anything about appeals. The D.C. Court of
Appeals filled that gap itself, holding that it has jurisdiction under
the collateral-order doctrine to hear an immediate interlocutory appeal
when a trial court denies a special motion to dismiss — without waiting
for the rest of the case to finish.

Exemptions

Two categories of claim fall outside the Act. First, a claim against
someone primarily in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services is exempt if the challenged statement is a factual
representation made to promote or complete a sale, lease, or commercial
transaction, and the audience was an actual or potential buyer or
customer. Second, any claim brought by the District government itself,
including its public charter schools, is exempt — a 2021 amendment that
applies retroactively to the Act's 2011 effective date and to any claim
that was still pending as of November 8, 2021.

What trips people up

The discovery stay you may have read about doesn't currently apply.
Older summaries of D.C.'s law describe an automatic discovery freeze
once the special motion is filed. That provision was invalidated by the
D.C. Court of Appeals in 2023; discovery now proceeds under the ordinary
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead, unless and until the Superior
Court adopts its own local rule restoring some version of the stay.

"Likely to succeed on the merits" is not a plain-English probability
test. Courts apply it as a test of whether the evidence produced (not
just the complaint's allegations) could legally support a jury verdict
for the plaintiff under whatever fault standard governs the claim — a
more technical inquiry than the phrase suggests on its face.

A "may" fee-shifting statute can still function like a "shall." The
text gives the court discretion, but case law establishes a strong
presumption in favor of awarding fees to a prevailing movant, so
budgeting for a fee award if the motion succeeds is reasonable.

Government plaintiffs are exempt, retroactively. If the claim was
brought by the District government or a D.C. public charter school, the
special motion isn't available at all, even for a claim filed years
before the 2021 amendment that added this exemption.

Common questions

How fast do I have to move after being sued? You have 45 days from
being served with the claim to file the special motion to dismiss — a
shorter window than some other states' anti-SLAPP deadlines.

Does filing the motion stop discovery while it's pending? Not
automatically anymore. The Act's discovery stay was struck down in 2023,
so ordinary federal discovery rules apply unless a court separately
limits discovery in your case.

If I win, do I automatically get my legal fees paid? Not
automatically under the statute's text, but D.C. courts have held that a
winning movant is presumptively entitled to reasonable fees unless the
circumstances make that unjust — so in practice, a fee award is the
expected outcome.

Statutes and sources

• D.C. Code § 16-5501(1), (3) — "'Act in furtherance of the right of
  advocacy on issues of public interest' means: (A) Any written or oral
  statement made: (i) In connection with an issue under consideration or
  review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
  official proceeding authorized by law; or (ii) In a place open to the
  public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
  interest; or (B) Any other expression or expressive conduct that
  involves petitioning the government or communicating views to members
  of the public in connection with an issue of public interest. ...
  'Issue of public interest' means an issue related to health or safety;
  environmental, economic, or community well-being; the District
  government; a public figure; or a good, product, or service in the
  market place. The term 'issue of public interest' shall not be
  construed to include private interests, such as statements directed
  primarily toward protecting the speaker's commercial interests rather
  than toward commenting on or sharing information about a matter of
  public significance." Source:
  https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/16-5501
  (accessed 2026-07-05).
• D.C. Code § 16-5502 — "(a) A party may file a special motion to
  dismiss any claim arising from an act in furtherance of the right of
  advocacy on issues of public interest within 45 days after service of
  the claim. (b) If a party filing a special motion to dismiss under
  this section makes a prima facie showing that the claim at issue
  arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues
  of public interest, then the motion shall be granted unless the
  responding party demonstrates that the claim is likely to succeed on
  the merits, in which case the motion shall be denied. (c)(1) Except as
  provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, upon the filing of a
  special motion to dismiss, discovery proceedings on the claim shall be
  stayed until the motion has been disposed of. ... (d) The court shall
  hold an expedited hearing on the special motion to dismiss, and issue
  a ruling as soon as practicable after the hearing. If the special
  motion to dismiss is granted, dismissal shall be with prejudice."
  Source: https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/16-5502
  (accessed 2026-07-05).
• D.C. Code § 16-5504 — "(a) The court may award a moving party who
  prevails, in whole or in part, on a motion brought under § 16-5502 or
  § 16-5503 the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees.
  (b) The court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the
  responding party only if the court finds that a motion brought under §
  16-5502 or § 16-5503 is frivolous or is solely intended to cause
  unnecessary delay." Source:
  https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/16-5504
  (accessed 2026-07-05).
• D.C. Code § 16-5505 — "This chapter shall not apply to: (1) Any
  claim for relief brought against a person primarily engaged in the
  business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the statement or
  conduct from which the claim arises is: (A) A representation of fact
  made for the purpose of promoting, securing, or completing sales or
  leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person's goods or
  services; and (B) The intended audience is an actual or potential
  buyer or customer; and (2) Any claim brought by the District
  government, including District public charter schools. (b) Subsection
  (a)(2) of this section shall apply: (1) As of March 31, 2011; and (2)
  To any claims pending as of November 8, 2021." Source:
  https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/16-5505
  (accessed 2026-07-05).
• Banks v. Hoffman, No. 20-CV-0318 (D.C. Sept. 7, 2023) — "we agree
  that the Home Rule Act, and in particular its preservation of Title 11
  of the D.C. Code, precluded the Superior Court from giving effect to
  the discovery-limiting aspects of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act's
  special-motion-to-dismiss provisions." Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9425025/banks-v-hoffman/
  (accessed 2026-07-05).
• Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213 (D.C.
  2016) — "As a preliminary matter, we hold that we have jurisdiction
  under the collateral order doctrine to hear appellants' interlocutory
  appeals of the trial court's denial of their special motions to
  dismiss filed under the Anti-SLAPP Act. ... The precise question the
  court must ask, therefore, is whether a jury properly instructed on
  the law, including any applicable heightened fault and proof
  requirements, could reasonably find for the claimant on the evidence
  presented." Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4332698/competitive-enterprise-institute-and-rand-simberg-v-michael-e-mann/
  (accessed 2026-07-05).
• Doe v. Burke, 133 A.3d 569 (D.C. 2016) — "We now read D.C. Code §
  16-5504(a) in similar fashion: it entitles the moving party who
  prevails on a special motion to quash to a presumptive award of
  reasonable attorney's fees on request, 'unless special circumstances
  would render such an award unjust.'" Source:
  https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3184301/john-doe-no-1-v-susan-l-burke/
  (accessed 2026-07-05).