Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

Past employment does not prove that a parent had the ability to support a child during subsection (g)(1)’s relevant four-month period.

In Re: Nevaeh N. · filed 2018-12-21(g)(1)

Given the nature of Father’s condition, evidence that Father was able to work at some point in the past is simply not evidence that Father was able to work during the four-month period. Rather, Father’s undisputed disability appears to provide a justifiable excuse for his lack of employment.

Abandonment by failure to support is not proven without evidence of the parent’s income, expenses, and available resources showing capacity to pay during the relevant four months.

In Re Maddox G. · filed 2019-02-25(g)(1)

Here, the record contains insufficient evidence of Father’s income, expenses, or available resources during the relevant time period. Without this information, we are unable to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether Father had the capacity to provide support.

Willful failure to support is not proven where the record lacks evidence of the parent’s income, expenses, and living situation and credits evidence that an abusive partner prevented the parent from working.

In Re: Jaxx M. · filed 2019-04-17(g)(1)

Because the sparse record does not contain any evidence about Mother’s income, expenses, or living situation during the four-month period, and the trial court credited Mother’s testimony that she was dependent on an abusive boyfriend for transportation and that he refused to allow her to work, we find the evidence less than clear and convincing as to the issue of willful failure to pay child support during the four months preceding the filing of the petition. We reverse the trial court’s finding as to this ground.

Employment obtained after a termination petition is filed does not prove that a parent was capable of paying support during the preceding four-month statutory period.

In Re Kingston A. B. · filed 2019-08-21(g)(1)

As such, this employment is simply not relevant to the question of whether Mother’s failure to pay support during the relevant period preceding the filing of the termination petition was willful.

A parent’s employment throughout the statutory period, admission of money available for support, and lack of justification establish willful failure to support under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Channing M. · filed 2019-10-23(g)(1)

Here, Father testified that, at all times during the relevant statutory period, he was working at a Walmart Distribution Center. Additionally, when pressed by the trial court as to whether he had money to pay child support, Father admitted that he did. Accordingly, Father has the “capacity to pay support, did not do so, and had no justification for not doing so.”

Support payments cannot be deemed token without sufficient evidence to assess their significance in light of the parent’s means.

In Re Temperance A. · filed 2024-06-10(g)(1)

The evidence related to Mother’s means in the present case is extremely limited. In the present case, the record simply contains insufficient evidence to allow for a conclusion, by the required clear and convincing standard, that two hundred dollars of support was merely token in light of Mother’s means. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred by finding that the Petitioners established by clear and convincing evidence the termination ground of abandonment by failure to support.

A suitable home requires not only physical housing but also the parent’s demonstrated ability to supervise children with serious behavioral needs and prevent them from harming themselves or others.

In re Dakota H. · filed 2016-10-12(g)(1)

In summary, Father has had more than five years to (1) come to terms with and understand the issues facing Dakota H. and the other Children, (2) avail himself of the services offered by DCS in order to obtain and maintain suitable housing, and (3) demonstrate that he possesses the skills and ability to effectively parent all three Children ... and prevent them from harming themselves or others. Despite significant efforts on the part of DCS, Father has simply failed to demonstrate that he can provide a suitable home for the Children, and he has not made reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home.

Abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home is inapplicable when the parent was incarcerated throughout the four months following removal and thus unable to make reasonable housing efforts while DCS was likewise constrained from assisting.

In Re Aaliyah E · filed 2016-01-26(g)(1)

It is undisputed that Mother was not released from incarceration until May 2014. We agree with the parties that during the determinative time period, Mother was unable to make reasonable efforts toward establishing a suitable home and DCS personnel were constrained in their efforts to assist her.

Wanton disregard may rest on a parent’s criminal conduct from any time before incarceration and need not be directly connected to the children’s removal.

In re K.F.R.T. · filed 2016-03-10(g)(1)

Contrary to the trial court‟s statement, Audrey teaches that father‟s D.U.I.s can certainly be considered in this case on the issue of wanton disregard.

For abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, a suitable home requires more than physical shelter and must be free of drugs.

In Re Roger T. · filed 2015-04-27(g)(1)

As we have previously pointed out, a suitable home requires more than a “physical space.” ... It also “requires that the home be free of drugs[.]”

The suitable-home form of abandonment is established when parents minimally cooperate with DCS, refuse evaluations and services, fail to correct hazardous home conditions, and thereby show they cannot provide a suitable home in the foreseeable future.

State Department of Children's Services v. M.P. · filed 2005-02-17(g)(1)

The only conclusion to be drawn from the testimony was that the parents demonstrated such a lack of concern for the child that they would be unable to provide the child with a suitable home in the foreseeable future. Thus, we find that the record contains clear and convincing evidence of abandonment of the child by both parents.

Abandonment based on failure to establish a suitable home after removal is confined to the four months following removal, so later DCS efforts and parental conduct cannot prove that particular ground.

In Re C.L.M., M.M.M., and S.D.M. · filed 2005-08-25(g)(1)

The difficulty in a fact-intensive inquiry when applied to this case and to “abandonment” under the statutory definition lies in the timing of reasonable efforts on the part of both DCS and the parent.

A suitable home requires more than an adequate physical location; continuing drug abuse and domestic violence may establish failure to provide a suitable home and abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. C.W. and J.C.W., In the Matter ofL C.W.(DOB 04/21/99) and J.W. · filed 2007-11-29(g)(1)

There was clear and convincing proof that the parents had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, that they had failed to provide a suitable home, constituting abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-102 and Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-102(1)(A)(ii). As the petitioner points out, a suitable home requires more than a proper physical living location, and these parents have not provided a suitable home for these children due to the drug and domestic violence issues that have plagued them for years, and continue to do so, as demonstrated at trial. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment in finding that clear and convincing evidence existed as to all the grounds relied upon in terminating the parents’ parental rights.

Repeated pre-incarceration criminal conduct and admitted drug addiction can establish abandonment by wanton disregard for the child.

State Dept. of Children's Services v. VN · filed 2008-10-27(g)(1)

that given [Mother’s] lifestyle and conduct prior to her most recent incarceration, that she exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, given the fact she’s had nineteen prior incarcerations prior to the most recent one. Furthermore, that she had a drug addiction, which she has admitted to the psychological examiner, which is a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, and she admitted that her mother was essentially taking care and raising her child. ... The evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1).

For abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, physical adequacy alone is insufficient; the parent must also be able to provide a safe, clean, and nurturing environment.

In Re: Pauline M., Stephen M., and Rachael M. · filed 2010-11-10(g)(1)

A suitable home requires more than a proper physical location. ... Neither parent demonstrated the effort or ability to provide, at a bare minimum, a home that was safe, clean, and nurturing to these children.

A parent's mere attendance in offered parenting programs does not constitute reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home when the parent does not demonstrate the ability to provide the children's required care consistently.

In Re Noah D. and Kevin D. · filed 2012-01-20(g)(1)

In contrast, the efforts required of Jessica went beyond mere attendance at visitation and attending parenting sessions and included demonstrating, on a consistent and continual basis, her competence as a parent.

Using methamphetamine throughout pregnancy and relapsing while on probation can establish an incarcerated parent's pre-incarceration wanton disregard for the child's welfare.

In Re: Roni M.H. · filed 2012-04-30(g)(1)

The evidence in the record is overwhelming that Mother had a drug abuse problem prior to incarceration. Mother herself admitted that she was “hooked” on methamphetamine at the time of the birth of the Child. Mother later was arrested for testing positive for drugs at the adjudicatory hearing concerning the Child. ... The Juvenile Court did not err in finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence was introduced such that grounds were proven to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(iv).

A sustained pattern of drug, violence, theft, driving, and probation offenses causing repeated incarceration establishes an incarcerated parent's wanton disregard for the children.

In Re: Kyler R.C.H. · filed 2012-05-08(g)(1)

From 2005, when the first child was born, and continuing up until the time of his current incarceration, the father’s charge history shows that he incurred approximately 40 separate charges, including multiple drug offenses, multiple assault and domestic violence charges, theft charges, criminal trespassing, evading/resisting arrest, multiple charges of driving on a revoked license, multiple violations of probation, etc. ... The arguments regarding the other grounds are pretermitted, as the ground of abandonment was clearly established.

A parent's refusal to acknowledge a child's sexual abuse may demonstrate failure to establish a suitable home because it shows inability to protect the child from further abuse.

In Re Frankie v. · filed 2012-05-25(g)(1)

Father’s refusal to acknowledge his daughters’ abuse coupled with the fact that he had previously allowed Ricky to sleep unsupervised in the same room as Jenny and Penny caused concern that he would be unable to protect them from further abuse, especially because Ricky was expected to return to Mother and Father’s home upon his release from DCS custody. ... In sum, the facts, as found by the trial court and as supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish that Father abandoned his children within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1).

Prenatal and continuing drug abuse, repeated violation of a child-protection safety agreement, and criminal conduct causing incarceration together establish pre-incarceration wanton disregard.

In The Matter of: Jai'Shaundria D.L.R. · filed 2012-06-15(g)(1)

In sum, during the approximately twelve months between Jai’Shaundria’s birth and Mother’s incarceration, Mother engaged in serious criminal behavior, most prominently by abusing illegal drugs, consistently failing to comply with the DCS Safety Agreement which was in place for Jai’Shaundria’s protection, and generally failing to provide a safe environment or appropriate supervision for Jai’Shaundria. ... This evidence clearly and convincingly establishes Mother engaged in conduct prior to her incarceration that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child.

The wanton-disregard form of abandonment under subsection (g)(1) is not limited to four months, but incarceration must occur at or near the filing of the termination petition.

In Re William S. · filed 2012-07-20(g)(1)

The statute referencing actions constituting wanton disregard is not limited by the four-month requirement at the beginning of the section. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The language of the “wanton disregard” provision does, however, require incarceration “at or near the time of the filing of the termination petition.”

Probation violations, repeated incarceration, criminal behavior, drug abuse, and failure to support or supervise may collectively constitute wanton disregard under subsection (g)(1).

In the Matter of: Steven P.D. (D.O.B. 02/24/2007 and Dalton D. (D.O.B. 05/19/2008), Children Under Eighteen (18) Years o · filed 2012-07-25(g)(1)

As this Court has frequently held, “probation violations, repeated incarceration, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and failure to provide adequate support or supervision for a child can, alone, or in combination, constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of a child.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 867-68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). In the case at bar, Mother and Father admitted, and numerous drug screens proved, that they abused drugs while their children were in the custody of DCS. Moreover, Mother and Father were repeatedly incarcerated, at times for violating probation, and both failed to provide adequate support for their children. In light of the totality of the circumstances, we find that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the trial court’s termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by incarcerated parents for wanton disregard.

Repeated arrests, incarceration, and drug use that leave a parent unable to care for a child constitute wanton disregard supporting abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In Re: Weston T. R. · filed 2012-08-31(g)(1)

The unrefuted evidence presented in this case together with the case law precedent regarding proof necessary to support a finding of abandonment under section 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) leads us to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned Weston and engaged in conduct prior to his incarcerations in September 2010 and January 2011 that exhibited a wanton disregard for Weston’s welfare.

A parent exhibits wanton disregard under subsection (g)(1) by deliberately violating probation and engaging in conduct that foreseeably returns him to prison and leaves him unable to care for the child.

In Re: Chyna L.M.D. · filed 2012-08-31(g)(1)

The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child when he behaved in a manner during a court hearing that caused him to lose his acceptance into CAPP and resulted in his being sent back to prison. The evidence in the record on appeal shows that Father was out on probation prior to the birth of the Child. The evidence also shows that Father violated his probation, but was offered an alternative to being sent back to prison, which would have allowed Father to remain in the community where he could participate in the Child’s life. The record further reveals that Father’s own actions taken while Father knew that the Child’s mother was pregnant with his baby insured that the offer of enhanced probation would be withdrawn and that Father would be sent back to prison. Such behavior exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv).

Selling drugs in a school zone, combined with drug use while caring for children and failure to supervise against sexual abuse, constitutes pre-incarceration wanton disregard.

In Re Daysia D. · filed 2012-09-28(g)(1)

Mother’s failure to provide adequate supervision for her children, her drug use, and her criminal behavior prior to incarceration constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for her children’s welfare.

Abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home cannot be established after DCS relinquishes custody to a private custodian when the record does not show what efforts DCS made while it retained custody.

In Re: Jarrel X.W. · filed 2012-12-18(g)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by relying on this statutory ground in its termination of Father’s parental rights.

Pre-incarceration criminal conduct, drug use, and repeated inability to parent may constitute wanton disregard and abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In Re: Dacia S. · filed 2013-02-26(g)(1)

The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against these findings made by the Trial Court by clear and convincing evidence. We, therefore, find no error in the Trial Court’s holding that grounds had been proven to terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).

A parent's criminal conduct and drug abuse may clearly and convincingly establish pre-incarceration wanton disregard for the child's welfare.

In Re Logan M. S. · filed 2013-04-25(g)(1)

The facts in the record clearly and convincingly demonstrate a wanton disregard for Logan’s welfare.

Repeated criminal behavior, probation violations, incarceration, and failure to support or supervise children may collectively establish pre-incarceration wanton disregard.

In Re: Cadince N.S. · filed 2013-04-26(g)(1)

A careful and thorough review of the record on appeal reveals that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).

Pre-incarceration wanton disregard may be established by the cumulative effect of conduct even when no individual fact would alone prove abandonment.

In Re: James C.E. · filed 2013-05-06(g)(1)

Each fact, when considered alone, would not support an allegation of abandonment. When considered as a whole, Father’s actions provide clear and convincing evidence to establish that he engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare.

A parent's brief confinement for six or seven hours on one day does not place the parent within the class of incarcerated or recently incarcerated parents subject to abandonment based on pre-incarceration wanton disregard.

In Re: Courtney N. · filed 2013-05-31(g)(1)

On our considered review, we conclude that this does not place Mother within the class of “incarcerated or recently incarcerated parents”

Section 36-1-113(g)(1) permits courts assessing abandonment by an incarcerated parent to consider any relevant pre-incarceration conduct, without limiting review to the four months immediately preceding incarceration.

In Re: Lavanie L.L. · filed 2013-10-31(g)(1)

Moreover, the statute instructs courts to consider a parent’s conduct prior to his incarceration. Under this ground of abandonment, the parent’s incarceration “serves only as a triggering mechanism that allows the court to take a closer look at the child’s situation to determine whether the parental behavior that resulted in incarceration is part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders the parent unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 866 (emphasis added). The court may consider any relevant conduct that occurred prior to incarceration and is not limited to reviewing the four months immediately preceding the incarceration. Id. at 870-71.

A parent’s pattern of criminal conduct resulting in incarceration may constitute wanton disregard and support abandonment under § 36-1-113(g)(1).

In Re: Caylee R.M.F. · filed 2014-01-22(g)(1)

The testimony of Father established a pattern of criminal behavior resulting in his recent incarceration. Such behavior has been found to “constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard” for a child’s welfare. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 868. Accordingly, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the termination ground alleged.

Pre-incarceration conduct may establish wanton disregard when a parent drives intoxicated with the children, causes a fatal crash witnessed by them, and also fails to obtain necessary medical care for a child's diabetes.

In Re T.F.H. · filed 2014-02-28(g)(1)

This act of bad judgment not only resulted in Mother’s death, but was psychologically traumatic for the Children.

A court assessing pre-incarceration wanton disregard may consider any relevant conduct before incarceration and is not confined to the immediately preceding four months.

In Re Kaylyn M.R. · filed 2014-03-19(g)(1)

The court may consider any relevant conduct that occurred prior to incarceration and is not limited to reviewing the four months immediately preceding the incarceration.

A physically adequate home obtained after the determinative four-month period does not defeat abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, particularly when unresolved mental-health and household concerns continue to make the home unsuitable for raising children.

In Re Gabriel B. · filed 2014-03-28(g)(1)

The trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights based upon this statutory ground.

A sole custodian's violent crime and ensuing incarceration, coupled with failure to arrange for the child's safety and stability, supported abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re Grayson H. · filed 2014-04-14(g)(1)

The undisputed facts of this case support the trial court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father abandoned the Child by showing wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare when Father committed acts that led to his incarceration and when he subsequently failed to provide for the Child’s safety and stability during that incarceration.

Pre-incarceration conduct may show wanton disregard for a newborn even before paternity is conclusively established when the father already has reason to believe the child is his.

In Re Zoey F. · filed 2014-05-30(g)(1)

While Father did not learn conclusively that he was the Child’s father for another year, he certainly had more than an inkling that he might well be the Child’s father. We hold that the August 2009 incident may properly be considered for the purposes of the ground of wanton disregard.

Drug use and renewed criminal conduct while caring for an infant can establish abandonment by wanton disregard when the parent knows the other parent is not an appropriate custodian.

In Re Hayden L.E.B. · filed 2014-08-29(g)(1)

Father also testified that Mother was not an appropriate custodian for the Child. Yet, despite knowing that Mother was not an appropriate custodian for the Child, Father began to commit crimes again when the Child was only eight months old and in Father’s custody. Father testified that he was stealing to support “[m]y child and my habit, yes, ma’am.” These actions exhibit a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child especially given the fact that the Child was so young at the time and that Father knew that Mother was not an appropriate custodian for the Child.

Continued drug use and criminal conduct, an untruthful mental-health assessment, failure to complete treatment and domestic-violence classes, and repeated violations of a no-contact order can establish abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home despite reasonable assistance from DCS.

In Re Glory A.W. · filed 2014-10-21(g)(1)

Without reiterating the Juvenile Court’s detailed findings as quoted above, we note that the Juvenile Court found by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, the Child was found to be dependent and neglected, that DCS made reasonable efforts to assist Father, and that Father continued to test positive for drugs and engage in criminal behavior despite the reasonable efforts made by DCS to assist Father. The Juvenile Court also found by clear and convincing evidence that Father was not truthful during his mental health assessment, that Father failed to comply with the recommended mental health treatment, that Father failed to complete domestic violence classes, and that on multiple occasions Father violated the no contact order entered as part of an order of protection by having contact with Mother. The Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence existed that Father had demonstrated a lack of concern for the Child to such a degree that it appears unlikely that Father will be able to provide a suitable home for the Child at an early date. The evidence in the record on appeal, as discussed more fully above, does not preponderate against these findings made by the Juvenile Court by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error in the Juvenile Court’s finding that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child for abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii).

Subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated incarceration-based abandonment ground requires incarceration at or near the filing of the petition plus either a willful failure to visit or support before incarceration or pre-incarceration conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for the child.

In Re: Cidney L. · filed 2014-11-18(g)(1)

In order to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on this section, two distinct requirements must be met. First, Mother must have been incarcerated either on the date that the termination petition was filed or during all or part of the four months immediately preceding its filing. Second, Mother must have either willfully failed to visit, support, or make child support payments for four months preceding her incarceration or must have engaged in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child.

A suitable home under subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated abandonment definition must be more than an adequate physical space; it must be safe, clean, and nurturing.

In Re Chelsea B. · filed 2014-11-25(g)(1)

A “suitable home” requires more than simply a proper physical space; a suitable home should be, “at a bare minimum, a home that [is] safe, clean, and nurturing to these children.”

Subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated incarceration-based abandonment tests apply only when the parent is incarcerated at or near the filing of the termination petition.

In Re Chelsia J. · filed 2014-12-16(g)(1)

The “two distinct tests” for abandonment contained in this definition “apply only if the parent is incarcerated at or near the time of the filing of the termination petition.”

Substance abuse alone may constitute wanton disregard under subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated incarceration-based abandonment ground.

In Re Jaden W. · filed 2014-12-26(g)(1)

Substance abuse alone may constitute wanton disregard for a child’s welfare. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 867-68. We affirm the trial court’s holding on this ground as to Father.

An incarcerated parent’s drug-related criminal conduct, prolonged absence, and failure to support may together establish abandonment by wanton disregard for the child’s welfare.

In Re S.C.M. · filed 2015-03-02(g)(1)

We agree. In doing so, we note that neither the restrictions of probation nor a desire to be a responsible parent was enough to lead Father to address his drug habit and cease his drug-related activities. Father has basically been absent for all but the first few months of the Children’s lives. Moreover, in the four months before his date of incarceration, he worked but paid nothing for the support of the Children. In our view, these factors display a clear lack of regard for the Children’s well being. In summary, clear and convincing evidence exists to terminate Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Children.

Wanton-disregard abandonment does not require proof that substance abuse placed the child at immediate risk when the conduct leading to incarceration forms a broader pattern rendering the parent unfit.

In Re Kayden H. · filed 2015-06-23(g)(1)

Under the circumstances of this case, it is not necessary for Grandparents to prove that the Child was in immediate risk of substantial harm due to Mother’s substance abuse in order to prevail on this statutory ground. It is sufficient that Mother’s conduct that resulted in her incarceration rendered her an unfit parent.

Conduct cannot establish wanton-disregard abandonment under subsection (g)(1) unless the parent knew of the child when the conduct occurred.

In Re Brittany D. · filed 2015-09-10(g)(1)

Because there is no evidence as to when Mother‟s probation violation occurred, we cannot conclude that Mother‟s decision to continue to engage in criminal behavior reflects a wanton disregard for the Child‟s welfare. See id. (noting that the “wanton disregard language . . . must be construed to require that the [parent] has knowledge of the child at the time [his or her] actions constituting wanton disregard are taken”).

Repeated criminal conduct and drug abuse before incarceration may establish wanton-disregard abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In re Malina W. · filed 2015-09-29(g)(1)

Father engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, which constitutes a ground for terminating Father‟s parental rights.

Criminal conduct, an almost immediate probation violation, and domestic violence against a pregnant spouse may together establish abandonment by wanton disregard for the children’s welfare.

In re Lilly C. · filed 2016-02-25(g)(1)

Despite Father contending there was no clear and convincing evidence that his pre-incarceration conduct displayed a wanton disregard for the welfare of his children, we hold that his involvement in criminal behavior, almost immediate probation violation, and domestic violence against a pregnant wife, provided evidence of a wanton disregard for the welfare of his children. He claimed to be unaware of the inadequate living situation of his children and his wife‟s substance abuse. In our view, the evidence supports the determination of the court to terminate Father‟s parental rights on this ground.

A lengthy history of drug abuse and criminal activity can clearly and convincingly establish abandonment by pre-incarceration wanton disregard.

In re Aniston M. · filed 2016-05-05(g)(1)

The record on appeal more than amply supports the Juvenile Court‘s findings. Indeed, Father‘s own testimony at trial reflects his lengthy history of drug abuse and criminal activity. The evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court‘s findings pertaining to wanton disregard. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of wanton disregard has been proven against Father by the standard of clear and convincing evidence.

Criminal behavior, probation violations, incarceration, and substance abuse that expose children to violence and drug transactions can establish pre-incarceration wanton disregard.

In Re Jayden L. · filed 2016-05-31(g)(1)

The testimony presented at trial indicated that the children were exposed to violence and witnessed drug transactions while in Mother’s care. Based on the foregoing evidence of criminal behavior, probation violations, incarcerations, and substance abuse, we find clear and convincing evidence that Mother demonstrated a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, such that grounds exist for termination of her parental rights.

Extensive criminal activity before incarceration can alone establish wanton disregard under subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated abandonment ground, and documented substance abuse may reinforce that finding.

In re M.B.R. · filed 2016-06-23(g)(1)

This criminal activity alone would be sufficient for us to find wanton disregard by the Father. However, Father’s multiple convictions are compounded by his substance abuse documented in the record. Accordingly, we hold that, as a matter of law, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates Father’s wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child.

Subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated suitable-home ground was established where the parents made no marked improvement in persistent unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions despite assistance.

In re Derrick J. · filed 2016-07-08(g)(1)

The fact that there has been no marked improvement in the Appellants’ living conditions during the entire pendency of this matter demonstrates a lack of concern for the Children to such a degree that it appears unlikely that Appellants’ will be able to provide a suitable home for the Children at any near date. Accordingly, we affirm this ground for termination of their parental rights.

Subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated wanton-disregard ground applies only if the parent was incarcerated when the petition was filed or during part of the preceding four months.

In Re Keith W., Jr. · filed 2016-08-03(g)(1)

Specifically, the statute only applies where the parent “is incarcerated at the time of the institution of an action” or “has been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) months immediately preceding the institution of such action.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). Here, Father was released from incarceration in October 2014, and the petition to terminate was not filed until June 2015. Father was not incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition or during the four months immediately preceding the institution of the action. Under these circumstances, it was not appropriate for the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), to serve as a basis for terminating Father’s parental rights.

Failure to provide a suitable home is not established without sufficient evidence about the home during the four months immediately following removal.

In re Eddie F. · filed 2016-12-02(g)(1)

The record does not contain sufficient information regarding the state of Mother‟s home in the relevant four months in order to affirm termination on that basis. Accordingly, we must reverse the termination on this ground.

The suitable-home form of abandonment under subsection (g)(1) is not proven without clear and convincing evidence that DCS made housing-related efforts during the relevant period.

In re Yariel S. · filed 2017-01-06(g)(1)

The record is devoid of any evidence that DCS made any efforts related to housing during the relevant time period. Accordingly, we conclude that the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence to establish that Mother abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home.

Wanton-disregard abandonment under subsection (g)(1) is not confined to conduct in the four months before incarceration and may rest on conduct occurring before the child's birth.

In Re A. B. · filed 2017-01-24(g)(1)

Unlike the other forms of abandonment included (but not quoted above) in this subsection, abandonment by wanton disregard is not limited to the four months immediately preceding the parent’s incarceration. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 871. In fact, “the conduct may occur before the birth of the child whose welfare is thereby put at risk.”

Repeated incarceration and criminal conduct, coupled with failure to complete required substance-abuse treatment, can establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re: Hailey O. · filed 2017-03-23(g)(1)

The record shows that between 2003 and 2014 Father was in and out of jail nine times, representing a clear pattern of criminal behavior. In 2013, Father was released on the condition that he complete a substance abuse program; he failed to comply with that condition. The evidence is clear and convincing that Father engaged in conduct demonstrating a wanton disregard for the welfare of his children.

A sustained pattern of criminal conduct, substance abuse, incarceration, and resulting inability to form a stable parent-child relationship can establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In re Casyn B. · filed 2017-05-26(g)(1)

The record is clear and convincing that, throughout these children’s lives, Father has engaged in criminal conduct, substance abuse, and other reckless behavior; he was incarcerated from February 2014 to September 2015 and from February 2016 through the time of trial; and that because of his conduct and behavior, he has been unable to establish a stable father-child relationship with his children. We affirm the holding that Father has engaged in conduct prior to his incarceration in February 2016 that evidenced a wanton disregard for the welfare of Casyn and Cayden.

Suitable-home abandonment fails when DCS does not prove reasonable efforts to assist the parent in obtaining suitable housing.

In re Rylan G. · filed 2017-06-28(g)(1)

Because Appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, did not meet its burden to show that it exercised reasonable efforts to assist Mother in obtaining suitable housing, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home.

Wanton disregard may support termination even when willful visitation and permanency-plan grounds fail.

In Re Kenya H. · filed 2017-07-05(g)(1)

We reverse the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and willful failure to visit, but affirm the ground of wanton disregard.

Wanton disregard can support termination even when persistent conditions and substantial noncompliance are not proven.

In Re: Zane W. · filed 2017-07-06(g)(1)

We, however, affirm the remaining ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

Continuing illicit drug use despite arrests, incarceration, and loss of child custody may establish wanton-disregard abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Seth B. · filed 2017-09-14(g)(1)

Her addiction has caused great detriment. She has been arrested, incarcerated, and has lost custody of her Children, yet her drug use persists. The record clearly establishes that Mother has engaged in conduct prior to her incarceration and throughout these proceedings that evinces a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Children.

Wanton-disregard abandonment under subsection (g)(1) does not require the misconduct to occur in the child's presence and may arise during pregnancy if the parent knows of the child.

In Re Isabella G. · filed 2017-10-03(g)(1)

On several occasions, we have held that a parent can engage in conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for the welfare of the child even during pregnancy so long as the parent knows of the child’s existence.

Criminal conduct, probation violations, continuing substance abuse, and failure to support may combine to establish an incarcerated parent’s wanton disregard for the children.

In Re Addison E. · filed 2018-01-17(g)(1)

There was also proof that Father never financially supported the Children. As this Court has elucidated, “probation violations, repeated incarceration, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and the failure to provide adequate support for a child can, alone or in combination, constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of a child.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 867-68. We conclude that the evidence regarding Father’s behavior prior to his incarceration supports the trial court’s finding that the statutory ground of wanton disregard was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Conduct cannot establish wanton disregard for a child unless the parent knew of the child’s existence when the conduct occurred.

In Re Michael O. · filed 2018-01-26(g)(1)

In order for a parent to disregard or show indifference to a child, the parent must know of the child’s existence.

Abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home is not proven when DCS merely supplies resource lists and discussions but does not address known mental-health issues contributing to unstable housing.

In Re: Skylar P. · filed 2017-06-21(g)(1)

Despite knowing Mother had mental health issues, however, DCS continued to accept “her word for it” and offered no assistance beyond providing a list of resources and discussions. Thus, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that DCS expended reasonable efforts to assist Mother in establishing suitable housing during the statutory period. We, therefore, hold that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home.

Section 36-1-113(g)(1) supported termination for failure to provide a suitable home when the factual findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and established the ground by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Amarria L. · filed 2018-03-20(g)(1)

We conclude that a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings as to Mother’s abandonment of the Child by failure to provide a suitable home and that clear and convincing evidence established this statutory ground. We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination regarding this ground for termination of parental rights.

Section 36-1-113(g)(1)'s wanton-disregard ground was established by felony offenses committed after a father learned of the pregnancy and before his incarceration.

In Re Bentley D. · filed 2018-03-21(g)(1)

We must, therefore, determine whether the relevant evidence supports a finding of termination by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 546. ... We have concluded that, in the present case, Father’s string of criminal behavior constitutes clear and convincing evidence of wanton disregard for the welfare of his child.

Section 36-1-113(g)(1) supported termination for an incarcerated parent's wanton disregard when her pre-incarceration criminal conduct and response to her child's life-threatening injury showed disregard for his welfare.

In Re: Tegan W. · filed 2018-04-09(g)(1)

Mother’s bad choices and criminal activity demonstrate that she is unfit for her role as a parent to Tegan W. Having carefully reviewed the record, we have concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for Tegan W.’s welfare.

The wanton-disregard form of abandonment was not established by clear and convincing evidence when a parent's failure to update her probation address, even combined with her other conduct, did not rise to wanton disregard for the child.

In Re: Kyle F. · filed 2018-04-25(g)(1)

Similarly, in this case, Mother’s action of failing to provide her probation officer with her updated address, without more, does not rise to the level of wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. As in In re E.C., we determine that Mother’s failure to provide an updated address to her probation officer that resulted in her probation violations, in combination with her other conduct, do not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the Child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child.

A sustained pattern of voluntary crimes, probation violations, substance abuse, and resulting inability to care for children establishes incarcerated-parent wanton disregard.

In Re: Arianna Y. · filed 2018-07-02(g)(1)

Before and after the birth of his children Father repeatedly committed felonies and misdemeanors, and used alcohol and drugs of his own volition and without regard for his children’s welfare; this resulted in his incarceration and resulting inability to take care of the children when they were removed from their mother’s custody and placed in foster care. The behavior also included disciplinary infractions and resulted in, among other things, his ineligibility for enhanced probation. The pattern of his conduct prior to incarceration clearly exhibited disregard for the consequences and for the effect that the conduct might have on the children and his relationship with them. The evidence is clear and convincing that Father has exhibited wanton disregard for the children within the meaning and intent of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).

A parent’s violent sexual assault of the other parent while the children are present can alone establish wanton disregard for the children’s welfare.

In Re: R.S. · filed 2018-07-24(g)(1)

While Father’s rape of mother would be sufficient to conclude that he exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Children prior to his incarceration, the record reveals that Father also perpetrated physical abuse against mother by choking her and threatening her with baseball bats and other weapons.

Pending criminal charges may support wanton disregard when the underlying conduct is proven and shows a broader pattern posing substantial risk, even if the parent has not yet been convicted.

In Re: Ava H. · filed 2018-08-20(g)(1)

While Father ultimately may be found not guilty on his pending charges, there is no question but that he engaged in conduct that carried a risk of incarceration. ... Although Father has not yet been convicted of his pending charges, and those charges could ultimately be dismissed, Father’s conduct that led to these pending charges, along with other instances of Father’s conduct proven at trial, show a pattern of conduct that poses a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the Child.

An incarcerated parent’s probation-violating conduct during the relevant period may establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re Sophie O. · filed 2018-09-04(g)(1)

The record now before us on appeal reveals that Father was incarcerated when the petition to terminate his parental rights was filed and that Father engaged in behavior during the relevant time period that violated his probation resulting in Father again being incarcerated. We find no error in the Trial Court’s determination that grounds were proven to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children for abandonment by wanton disregard.

A parent’s failure to cooperate with DCS may be considered in deciding whether the parent made reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home without shifting the petitioner’s burden of proof.

In Re T.R. · filed 2018-09-17(g)(1)

We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to mother merely by taking into account her perpetual unavailability.

For abandonment under subsection (g)(1), a suitable home must be free from drugs and domestic violence, not merely provide adequate physical space.

In Re Karisah N. · filed 2018-11-27(g)(1)

A suitable home also requires that the home be free from drugs and domestic violence.

A probation violation based solely on failure to report and update an address, where the parent visited before incarceration, does not establish wanton disregard under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Jeromia W. · filed 2018-11-29(g)(1)

However, the record reflects that Father attended visitation prior to his incarceration and that his probation was violated solely based upon his failure to report and inform his officer of his current address, conduct that is not particularly egregious or indicative of extensive criminal behavior. While we do not condone his behavior, we do not believe that the conduct at issue rises to the level of wanton disregard.

Abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home is not proven when DCS offers no evidence of reasonable efforts to help the parent obtain housing during the relevant four-month period.

In Re Julian J. · filed 2019-02-26(g)(1)

On appeal, DCS concedes that its proof of reasonable efforts was insufficient. We agree. At trial, the FSW was unaware of any efforts by DCS to assist Mother with housing during the relevant four-month period.

Persistent criminal conduct and drug abuse may establish an incarcerated parent’s wanton disregard for the welfare of the children.

In Re: O.M. · filed 2019-04-26(g)(1)

Father’s persistent criminal conduct and drug abuse evinces a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. We hold, as a matter of law, that the evidence found by the trial court amounts to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1).

Failure to make even minimal efforts to improve the home and personal circumstances despite reasonable DCS assistance, including accommodations for special needs, supports abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home.

In Re: Kaden W. · filed 2019-05-13(g)(1)

Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home.

Pre-incarceration probation violations, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and failure to provide properly for children may collectively establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re Trey S. · filed 2019-06-20(g)(1)

We find the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Mother abandoned the children by engaging in conduct prior to her incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for her children’s welfare. As this Court has said, probation violations, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and the failure to provide properly for the children constitute the sort of conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare.

A parent’s lifestyle, drug abuse, and involvement with the criminal justice system may clearly and convincingly establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re Joshua S. · filed 2019-07-08(g)(1)

We agree with the Juvenile Court when it found by clear and convincing that Father’s “lifestyle, drug abuse, and involvement with the criminal justice system” demonstrate Father’s wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. We therefore affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding that the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard was established by clear and convincing evidence.

Drug use during pregnancy, probation violations, repeated incarceration, and the resulting inability to supervise a child may collectively establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re Jayda S. · filed 2019-08-26(g)(1)

Mother’s drug use, probation violations, and resulting inability to supervise the child constitute clear and convincing evidence of abandonment through wanton disregard. The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding that Mother’s rights could be terminated by abandonment through wanton disregard.

The wanton-disregard inquiry may consider theft, aggravated assault, driving under the influence, and probation violations committed before the incarceration that triggers the statutory ground.

In Re Khloe B. · filed 2019-08-26(g)(1)

We find, as did the Trial Court, that Mother’s actions prior to her July 2016 incarceration exhibited wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s finding that the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard was established by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent’s new criminal conduct while serving a community-corrections sentence and authorization of unsupervised visitation with a parent known to be unable to care for the children may collectively establish wanton disregard.

In Re Matasia R. · filed 2019-08-30(g)(1)

We agree with the trial court that the totality of the circumstances presented in this case support a finding of wanton disregard for the welfare of the Children. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s finding of abandonment.

For abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, subsection (g)(1) requires clear proof of DCS’s efforts during the relevant four months and does not permit courts to disregard that period.

In Re Adrian M.-M. · filed 2019-10-30(g)(1)

However, the findings made by the Trial Court do not, in our judgment, track specifically enough to DCS’s efforts in the relevant four months. Certainly, Mother has not been diligent in preparing a suitable home for the Children at any point, but we cannot just ignore the statutory period for examining DCS’s efforts.

A parent exhibits wanton disregard under subsection (g)(1) by repeatedly fleeing justice and avoiding DCS contact to protect personal freedom instead of parenting the child.

In Re Jaydin A. · filed 2019-12-12(g)(1)

Thus, Father put his desire to escape justice for his crimes ahead of his duty to parent his child. This situation presents a textbook example of a wanton disregard for a child.

Under the pre-2018 suitable-home abandonment definition, the removal-from-home element is child-specific and is not met for a hospitalized child who spent almost no time in the parent’s home.

In Re Ronon G. · filed 2020-01-16(g)(1)

We are constrained by the plain language of the applicable version of the statute to only apply this ground where the child was removed from the parent’s “home.”

A suitable home requires not only adequate physical shelter but also freedom from illegal drug use, including drug use by visitors whom the parent allows into the home.

In Re Jadarian C. · filed 2020-02-27(g)(1)

Despite these efforts, Mother has failed to establish a suitable home for the children. In the months following the removal of her children, Mother was living in an apartment. Although this apartment was sometimes appropriate for the children, home visits showed that Mother at the very least allowed people visiting her to use marijuana in the home, despite knowing that her children were removed in part due to drug issues. This drug use occurred even months after the termination petition was filed, as late as May 15, 2019. A suitable home requires more than a safe physical structure, but also must be free from illegal drug use.

Repeated criminal conduct and incarceration may establish wanton disregard when they severely compromise the parent’s ability to perform parental duties.

In Re: Tucker H. · filed 2020-04-24(g)(1)

Mother’s long list of crimes and incarcerations clearly demonstrates a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Children in that Mother’s incarcerations have “severely compromise[d] [her] ability to perform . . . her parental duties.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 866. From the totality of the circumstances, there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare.

An incarcerated parent’s criminal conduct exhibits wanton disregard under subsection (g)(1) when it forms part of a broader pattern that renders the parent unfit or risks substantial harm to the children.

In Re Jessica v. · filed 2020-06-12(g)(1)

The behavior that caused Appellant to be incarcerated and awaiting trial on aggravated burglary charges at the time of the parental termination hearing “is part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders [him] unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child[ren].” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 866. ... We conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Appellant’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, abandonment by willful failure to support, and abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children.

Incarceration alone does not establish abandonment by wanton disregard; the trial court must identify additional pre-incarceration conduct showing wanton disregard for the child's welfare.

In Re Trinity H. · filed 2020-08-28(g)(1)

Here, as opposed to the situation in In re Chyna L.M.D., the Juvenile Court’s findings as to wanton disregard are based solely and exclusively on Father’s incarceration, without any additional finding. Tennessee law requires more to sustain the ground of wanton disregard than just incarceration.

For abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, suitability requires more than a proper physical location; it also requires appropriate care and attention and a home free of drugs and domestic violence.

In Re Cheyenne S. · filed 2020-09-24(g)(1)

A “suitable home” means something “more than a proper physical living location.” ... A suitable home requires “[a]ppropriate care and attention . . . to the child.” ... The home must also “be free of drugs and domestic violence.”

Abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home is established when DCS’s efforts exceed the parent’s efforts and it appears unlikely the parent can provide a suitable home at an early date.

In Re Meghan M.R. · filed 2020-10-16(g)(1)

Mother was unable to point to any efforts she made towards providing Meghan with a suitable home, and we find that the efforts by DCS exceeded any efforts by Mother to achieve this goal. See id. Finally, the evidence demonstrated that “it appear[ed] unlikely that [Mother] [would] be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an early date.” Id. We conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that DCS established each element of the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home by clear and convincing evidence.

For suitable-home abandonment, DCS must actively use its expertise to assist the parent even when the parent does not ask for assistance.

In Re Edward R. · filed 2020-11-06(g)(1)

As noted above, the employees of DCS “must use their superior insight and training to assist parents with the problems the Department has identified in the permanency plan, whether the parents ask for assistance or not.”

Repeated arrests and incarceration throughout a child’s life can establish abandonment by wanton disregard when they form a broader pattern rendering the parent unfit or posing substantial harm.

In Re Haskel S. · filed 2020-11-18(g)(1)

The record clearly and convincingly shows that Father has engaged in “behavior that resulted in incarceration[, which] is part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders [Father] unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 866. As such, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard.

Conduct exhibiting wanton disregard need not occur in the child's physical presence.

In Re Hadley R. · filed 2021-02-19(g)(1)

Although Petitioner’s attorney acknowledged during oral arguments that the Child was not present for any of Mother’s criminal behavior, we note that this Court has previously held that it is not a requirement that the Child be physically present for a parent’s behavior exhibiting wanton disregard for the child’s welfare.

For abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, DCS may prove its reasonable efforts during any four-month period following the child's removal.

In re River L. · filed 2021-03-04(g)(1)

Regarding the statute’s third requirement, we have previously stated that DCS “may establish this ground by offering proof of reasonable efforts during any four-month period following a child’s removal.”

Abandonment by wanton disregard requires that the parent knew of the child's existence when the conduct showing disregard occurred.

In Re Sylvia H. · filed 2021-03-23(g)(1)

Thus, the wanton disregard provisions “must be construed to require that the father has knowledge of the child at the time his actions constituting wanton disregard are taken.”

Pre-birth conduct may establish wanton disregard when the parent knew of the child's existence in utero.

In Re: Malachi M. · filed 2021-03-25(g)(1)

We note that a parent’s conduct prior to the child’s birth can constitute wanton disregard for the child’s welfare so long as that parent was aware of the child’s existence in utero.

Suitable-home abandonment is established when DCS makes reasonable efforts exceeding the parent’s efforts and the parent’s instability and failure to cooperate show that a suitable home is unlikely at an early date.

In Re Kaylene J. · filed 2021-05-26(g)(1)

We find that DCS made reasonable efforts to help Mother establish a suitable home for the children and that its efforts exceeded those made by Mother. We affirm the trial court’s finding that there is clear and convincing evidence to show that Mother has abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and -102(1)(A)(ii).

For incarcerated-parent abandonment under subsection (g)(1), the particular offense causing incarceration is not dispositive; the court examines whether it forms part of a broader pre-incarceration pattern of wanton disregard.

In Re Payton G. · filed 2021-08-16(g)(1)

At issue is not whether the particular offense for which Mother was incarcerated is itself one that shows wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare, but, rather, whether her pre-incarceration conduct exhibited such wanton disregard. See id. at 866; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2019). The incarceration itself—or the reason for it—is not dispositive of the issue; instead, it is “a triggering mechanism that allows the court to take a closer look at the child’s situation to determine whether the parental behavior that resulted in incarceration is part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders the parent unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 866 (emphasis added).

Abandonment by pre-incarceration wanton disregard requires proof that the parent knew of the child's existence when the conduct occurred.

In Re Elijah H. · filed 2021-10-06(g)(1)

In the absence of establishing at what point Father became aware of Mother’s pregnancy with the Child, we cannot conclude that Father exhibited wanton disregard for the Child at the time of his alleged offenses and arrest.

A physically adequate residence may still be an unsuitable home when a parent's untreated mental-health issues create barriers to safe parenting and reunification.

In Re William B. · filed 2021-10-22(g)(1)

In this case, there is no dispute that Mother’s physical home is suitable for a child. Instead, the trial court relied again on Mother’s unaddressed mental health concerns as the basis for this ground, citing “Mother’s failure to participate in individual counseling, sig[n] releases and complete a more in-depth psychological evaluation[.]” ... We agree.

Abandonment by wanton disregard may be established by pre-incarceration criminal activity, continued substance abuse, no effort to visit, and no effort to support the child.

In Re Riley S. · filed 2022-01-14(g)(1)

Based on a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard was established by clear and convincing evidence as to Father.

A parent’s ongoing maintenance of a drug-riddled home that massively exposes a child to dangerous drugs can establish wanton disregard without proof of repeated separate exposures.

In Re Cora W. · filed 2022-02-02(g)(1)

It was not necessary that Father massively expose the Child to dangerous drugs in the manner he did multiple times in order for the ground of wanton disregard to become applicable; the Child’s one wholly unjustified brush with severe injury or death at the hands of Father was enough. While Father argues he did not intend to forego his parenting responsibilities by massively exposing the Child to dangerous drugs, it was imminently foreseeable that in so doing he risked severely injuring or killing the Child.

Pre-incarceration criminal conduct may establish wanton disregard when its severity and frequency endanger the child and remove the parent from the child’s life.

In Re Harley K. · filed 2022-04-19(g)(1)

Here, Father’s incarceration at the time of the petition was the result of his decision to engage in criminal conduct by evading police while both on probation and while driving on a revoked license. Father admitted that had he pulled over when instructed to by police, he likely would have received only a simple ticket. Instead, Father’s choice to evade not only put the child’s life in danger, as he was in the car with father during the police chase, but also resulted in the removal of Father from the child’s life for half of the child’s life due to Father’s status as a career criminal.

A residence is not a suitable home under subsection (g)(1) when the parent remains dependent on another person and the living circumstances pose substantial, unacceptable risks to the child.

In Re Lily C. · filed 2022-06-27(g)(1)

Based on our review of the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court’s determination that Mother has made decisions that place her in a position of near-total dependency upon her fiancé and that her living circumstances would pose substantial and unacceptable risks to Child if she were to live there. ... We affirm the trial court’s decision terminating Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home.

The failure-to-provide-a-suitable-home ground under subsection (g)(1) does not apply to a private action in which the child was never placed with DCS or a licensed child-placing agency.

In Re Connor B. · filed 2022-07-06(g)(1)

Here, Connor was never in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. Petitioners asked that Connor be determined dependent and neglected. And he has been in their custody since his removal from Mother. ... We conclude that the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home was not applicable.

A physically appropriate residence is not a suitable home when unresolved domestic violence makes the environment unsafe for the child.

In Re Joseph D. · filed 2022-11-10(g)(1)

While Mother had an appropriate “physical living location,” the environment of her home remained unsuitable for Joseph. ... A suitable home “requires that the home be free of drugs and domestic violence.”

Proof of DCS’s suitable-home efforts may come from any four-month period after removal and need not be confined to the first four months or another particular period.

In Re: Edward C. · filed 2023-10-31(g)(1)

This Court has previously affirmed trial courts that consider DCS’s efforts during any four-month period. See In re Jakob O., No. M2016-00391-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 7243674, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016) (“According to an ordinary reading of the statute, however, the proof necessary to support termination under this ground need not be limited to any particular four-month period after removal.”); State, Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. V.E.F., No. M2008-01514-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 605146, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009) (“The evidence in the record convincingly establishes that for a period of far in excess of the statutory four months following the children’s removal from Mother’s custody . . . .”).

Under the operative incarcerated-parent abandonment standard in subsection (g)(1), wanton disregard must be assessed from conduct before the triggering incarceration, not later conduct.

In Re Aubria H. · filed 2023-12-08(g)(1)

Inasmuch as the trial court did not cabin its wanton disregard analysis to the pre-incarceration period dictated by the controlling statutory language, we determine that its conclusion under this ground should be vacated.

Wanton-disregard analysis may consider conduct throughout the child's life, including conduct while the child is in utero, so long as the parent knew of the child's existence.

In Re Ciara B. · filed 2024-05-16(g)(1)

Additionally, in considering whether the parent’s behavior exhibited wanton disregard for the child’s welfare, we may look beyond the four months immediately preceding incarceration, so long as the parent knew of the child’s existence. ... To be sure, “Tennessee courts may consider the parent’s behavior throughout the child’s life, even when the child is in utero.”

A long criminal record, illegal drug use during every pregnancy, and exposing children to violent criminal activity may establish abandonment by wanton disregard.

In Re Remington C. · filed 2024-06-25(g)(1)

Having considered the record, we find that it supports the trial court’s ruling that Petitioners have proven the ground of wanton disregard by clear and convincing evidence because it clearly shows that Mother has a long record of criminal activity, that she used illegal drugs while pregnant with not one but all four of her children, and that she exposed the Children to criminal activity, including witnessing a man being shot during a drug deal.

Repeated criminal activity, substance abuse, inadequate supervision, and non-support may together constitute wanton-disregard abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Zaidyn B. · filed 2024-09-27(g)(1)

Upon careful review, we determine that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Children by exhibiting wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare prior to his incarceration.

For wanton disregard, incarceration triggers examination of whether the conduct producing incarceration forms part of a broader pattern of unfitness or substantial risk to the child.

In Re Santana M. · filed 2024-12-09(g)(1)

Although incarceration itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights, it prompts the court to consider “‘whether the parental behavior that resulted in incarceration is part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders the parent unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to the child.’”

Suitable-home abandonment is established when DCS’s housing efforts exceed a parent’s effectively nonexistent efforts and the parent never proves the residence is physically safe and drug-free.

In Re Gabriel T. · filed 2025-03-13(g)(1)

This is key because, in addition to failing to obtain a suitable residence in physical terms, Mother failed to show that she had a suitable home in terms of it being safe and drug-free. This situation ensued for four months following the Child’s removal and beyond. Mother simply did next to nothing in this case. By trial, Mother lived in a shed behind Father’s grandmother’s house, the suitability of which is unknown. DCS’s efforts to help Mother obtain suitable housing exceeded Mother’s efforts, which effectively were nil.

A home is not suitable when the parent permits other household members to use illegal drugs there, even if the parent is personally abstinent.

IN RE ZANIYAH C. · filed 2025-12-02(g)(1)

Even to the extent Mother is not using drugs, she is allowing individuals in her home to do so. Thus, the home is not suitable either way. Given the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that DCS proved abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent’s continued denial of methamphetamine use may hinder DCS’s efforts and support suitable-home abandonment when drug exposure remains unresolved.

In Re Arlo L. · filed 2025-12-16(g)(1)

DCS asserted, and we agree, that its efforts were hindered by Father’s failure to acknowledge his drug use. With these considerations in mind, we hold that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home.

Section 36-1-113(g)(1) permits termination for abandonment by wanton disregard when parents are incarcerated at the time of the petition and their conduct before incarceration shows wanton disregard for the child’s welfare.

In Re: Alexis C. · filed 2014-06-25(g)(1)

We find no error in the Juvenile Court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard.

When a parent is incarcerated during the four months before the termination petition, abandonment under subsection (g)(1) is measured during the four months preceding incarceration.

Dept of Children's Srvcs v. TLC · filed 2002-09-16(g)(1)

Counsel misinterprets the statute which merely defines “abandonment” for the purposes of the adoption statute. The statute does not create a cause of action, since TLC was incarcerated during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, subsection (iv) is applicable as the relative time period.

DCS may not terminate parental rights for abandonment under subsection (g)(1) without satisfying the statutory requirement to notify the parent of the conduct and consequences constituting abandonment or proving a specified substitute for notice.

In Re: D.D.K., D.M.M., and T.J.M., Jr. · filed 2003-12-30(g)(1)

Thus, DCS was not authorized to proceed on the ground of abandonment unless it could show (1) Father was given the required notice by a permanency plan containing the notice and signed by Father or that Father refused to sign such a plan presented to him, (2) in the absence of those documents, some court record showing an explanation by the court of the consequences of abandonment, or (3) an affidavit of diligent efforts by DCS to provide such notice prior to the filing of the termination petition. Our review of the record before us contains none of these alternative methods of showing notice.

Willfulness under subsection (g)(1) means intentional or voluntary conduct by a free agent who knows and intends what he or she is doing; it does not require malevolence or ill will.

In Re: Adoption of T.A.M. · filed 2004-05-12(g)(1)

The concept of “willfulness” is at the core of the statutory definition of abandonment. “Willfully” is a word of many meanings, and so each use of the word must be interpreted with reference to the statutory context in which it appears. United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549, 552-53 (11th Cir. 1996); GEORGE W. PATON , A TEXTBOOK ON JURISPRUDENCE 313 n.2 (4th ed. 1972) (suggesting that use of the word should be avoided because of its ambiguities). “Willfulness” does not require the same standard of culpability required by the penal code. G.T. v. Adoption of A.E.T., 725 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Nor does it require malevolence or ill will. In re Adoption of a Minor, 178 N.E.2d 264, 267 (Mass. 1961). Willful conduct consists of acts or failures to act that are intentional or voluntary rather than accidental or inadvertent. In re Mazzeo, 131 F.3d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1576 (11th Cir. 1994); In re Adoption of Earhart, 190 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). Conduct is “willful” if it is the product of free will rather than coercion. Thus, a person acts “willfully” if he or she is a free agent, knows what he or she is doing, and intends to do what he or she is doing.

A trial court may not terminate parental rights on abandonment theories that DCS expressly withdrew at trial, even if those theories were pleaded.

In Re: Christian B., Nathaniel B., Stepan B., Reanne B., & Dolton B. · filed 2006-01-20(g)(1)

Counsel for DCS stated in both opening statement and closing argument that it was no longer pursuing the pleaded grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and failure to support, going so far as to admit that the parties had paid some child support and that they had visited their children. Since DCS specifically and expressly abandoned these grounds, it was error for the trial court to base the termination of the parties’ parental rights on them. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s findings with respect to these two grounds.

Failure to provide the required statutory notice of abandonment warrants reversal of subsection (g)(1) grounds, but does not invalidate separately proved grounds for substantial noncompliance, persistent conditions, or severe child abuse.

In RE: M.M.M. (d/o/b 10/13/2007), A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age · filed 2009-12-04(g)(1)

We therefore reverse the ruling of the juvenile court to the extent it relied on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home. We find no reversible error as to the remaining grounds of substantial noncompliance, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. See State, Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. K.W.C., No. E2007-00307-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 2198593, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2007) (holding that the notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-2-403 apply only to the ground of abandonment) (no perm. app. filed).

Clear and convincing evidence of both willful failure to visit and willful failure to support during the statutory period establishes abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Natasha A. · filed 2013-02-27(g)(1)

We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s findings that the Department proved the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support Natasha.

Visitation begun after a termination petition is filed cannot cure abandonment by failure to visit during the preceding four-month statutory period.

In Re JACOBE M.J. · filed 2013-12-05(g)(1)

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-1-102(1)(F) clearly states that: “Abandonment may not be repented of by resuming visitation or support subsequent to the filing of any petition seeking to terminate parental or guardianship rights or seeking the adoption of a child.” Accordingly, Father’s visitation after the filing of the petition cannot cure his failure to visit in the four month period prior to the filing date.

Failure to visit or support alone does not establish abandonment under § 36-1-113(g)(1); clear and convincing evidence must establish that the failure was willful.

In Re: Kierra B. · filed 2014-01-14(g)(1)

It is not enough that a parent failed to visit or support in this context. Rather, there must be clear and convincing evidence revealing willful conduct. We are of the view that, in Father’s case, the limited evidence does not prove the requisite intent for the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support or visit. Therefore, we reverse the Juvenile Court on these grounds.

For abandonment by willful failure to support, the four-month period includes the four months preceding the filing day but excludes the day the termination petition is filed.

In Re: Jacob C.H. and Lillianna J.H. · filed 2014-02-20(g)(1)

In our view, a more reasonable construction is that the applicable four month window for determining whether child support has been paid in the context of the ground of willful failure to support includes the four months preceding the day the petition to terminate parental rights is filed but excludes the day the petition is filed.

When a parent was incarcerated during the four months before filing, abandonment by failure to visit or support must be evaluated during the first four-month period of non-incarceration preceding filing, not simply the four months before the petition.

In Re Karma S.C. · filed 2014-03-05(g)(1)

If so, it should then ascertain the first four-month period of non-incarceration preceding the filing of the Petition, and it should prepare findings regarding whether Mother willfully failed to visit and/or support the child during this period.

DCS cannot establish abandonment when a father who did not participate before the termination petition received neither the statutory abandonment criteria through a signed plan or in court nor the required affidavit documenting diligent notice efforts.

In Re: Aiden W. · filed 2014-04-28(g)(1)

We find that in this case, DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory notice requirements were met regarding its efforts to notify Father.

Section 36-1-113(g)(1)'s abandonment ground was established where the father willfully failed to visit and support his child during the four months preceding the petition.

In Re Taya K. · filed 2018-02-06(g)(1)

We affirm the findings by the trial court that Father willfully failed to visit and support his child during the four-month period preceding the filing of this petition; therefore the ground of abandonment for failure to visit and failure to support under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) has been established.

When deciding whether failure to visit or support was willful, the trial court must consider evidence that rehabilitation expenses impaired support and that the parent’s attempts at remote visitation were denied.

In Re Abagail D. · filed 2018-09-13(g)(1)

Mother also alleged in her response to the termination petition that her attempts to visit via Skype were denied. The record reflects that the court failed to consider the aforementioned facts in making its termination decision, instead focusing upon the fact that support was not remitted and overnight visitation had not occurred. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s finding of abandonment and remand for findings of fact concerning the willfulness of the alleged abandonment.

Abandonment by failure to support is not proven without clear and convincing evidence that the parent had the capacity to pay, and failure to visit is not willful when another person significantly obstructs visitation.

In Re Mattie L. · filed 2020-04-14(g)(1)

On this record, we cannot conclude that the evidence was clear and convincing that Father’s failure to support was willful. Mother and Stepfather failed to establish that Father had the capacity to pay child support during the relevant four-month period. ... Considering the entire record, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Father’s failure to visit was willful.

A parent cannot cure abandonment by resuming visitation or support after the termination petition is filed.

In Re Jason S. · filed 2021-04-22(g)(1)

It is well established that any efforts made to visit a child after the filing of a termination petition do not negate or repent abandonment.

The statutory absence-of-willfulness defense to abandonment is waived if the parent does not plead or raise it in the trial court.

In Re Brylan S. · filed 2022-11-03(g)(1)

Father did not raise willfulness as a defense in his Answer and, in fact, did not raise this defense at any time in the trial court. As a result, he has waived this issue.

The absence-of-willfulness defense to failure to support is waived when neither the parent nor counsel raises it in a pleading or at trial.

In Re: Matthew D. · filed 2024-04-16(g)(1)

Neither Mother acting pro se nor Mother’s attorney raised the affirmative defense to this ground either in a filing or at trial. We accordingly find Mother’s argument that she did not willfully fail to provide support to be waived and affirm the Trial Court’s finding of this ground.

Section 36-1-113(g)(1) permits termination for abandonment when a parent willfully fails to visit during the four months before incarceration.

Shipley v. Shipley · filed 1997-09-29(g)(1)

Those findings show, clearly and convincingly, that there was an “abandonment” of the subject children by a failure to visit, such as to justify termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and T.C.A. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv).

Abandonment is a ground for termination, and when it is established, the court need not address alternative grounds.

DHS v. Darr · filed 1998-03-24(g)(1)

Because “abandonment” under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) has been clearly shown in this case, we do not find it necessary to address the trial court’s alternative bases for termination under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and (3)(A)(i)-(iii).

Section 36-1-113(g)(1) allows termination of parental rights when a parent has abandoned the child as defined by statute.

DHS v. Epps · filed 1998-04-30(g)(1)

We concur in the trial court's finding that the mother has "willfully abandoned" her children, as that term is defined statutorily.

Abandonment as defined in § 36-1-102 is a ground for terminating parental rights.

In re: Brittany Swanson, a minor · filed 1998-05-14(g)(1)

Under the plain language of the statute, a natural parent’s willful failure to support or make reasonable payments toward the support of their child for a four month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate is an abandonment of that child and a ground for termination of that person’s parental rights.

Section 36-1-113(g)(1) permits termination of parental rights for abandonment when clear and convincing evidence establishes token visitation.

Damon Alan Kratochvil a Minor by James L. Coone and Sonja Coone v. Kratochvil · filed 1998-10-02(g)(1)

We find that the record is replete with clear and convincing evidence that the respondent has abandoned his son, as that term is statutorily defined. It is clear that respondent engaged in mere perfunctory and token visitation with Damon during the nine months prior to the filing of the Coones' petition.

A trial court’s failure to enter a termination order within thirty days does not entitle a parent to relief when the eventual written order contains appropriate and sufficient findings and conclusions.

In re Rainee M. · filed 2015-12-30(k)

Although the trial court failed to comply with the statute by entering a written order within thirty days of the hearing, we do not find that Father is entitled to relief due to such delay.

An appellate court must review the trial court’s findings on every termination ground and on best interest even when the parent does not challenge each finding on appeal.

In Re Carrington H. · filed 2016-01-29(c)

Finally, our holding in this appeal makes clear that appellate courts must review the trial court‘s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child‘s best interests.

A termination order satisfies the specific-findings requirement when it adequately states the basis of the decision, even if more detailed findings would be preferable.

In re Alleyanna S. · filed 2016-02-19(k)

We have determined the court‟s final order meets the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k). While we would prefer findings to be as detailed as possible, the court adequately stated the basis of its decision.

A termination order must contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, including a determination of willfulness when abandonment by failure to support is alleged.

In Re K.M.K. · filed 2015-02-27(k)

[c]ourts terminating parental rights are explicitly required to “enter an order which makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k).

A termination petition that omits a recitation of supporting facts may remain effective when its allegations sufficiently advise the parent of the claim and it properly seeks termination and adoption.

In Re Jarett M. · filed 2015-04-13(d)(2)(D)

While the original petition in this case lacked a recitation of the facts that alleged the basis for termination, it contained allegations sufficient to advise Father of the claim. Moreover, the complaint sufficiently set forth that Mother and Stepfather sought adoption of the child.

An unpleaded abandonment theory may support termination when the parent fully understands that the theory is being tried and impliedly consents to its trial.

In re Dallas H.B. · filed 2015-04-23(g)(1)

In our view, the trial record reflects that Mother “fully understood that this particular unpled ground for termination was being tried and that [she] impliedly consented to the trial of that ground even though it had not been pled.” Eimile A.M., 2013 WL 6844096 at *5.

The thirty-day deadline for entering a termination order does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, and a late order does not require remand when it already contains sufficient findings and conclusions.

In re: Autumn L. · filed 2015-05-26(k)

We, therefore, hold that, while the Juvenile Court did not comply with statute in the timeliness of entering its order, there is no specified remedy such as remand required. We do, however, admonish trial courts and parties to adhere to the statutes enacted by our General Assembly.