Statute Annotations › Tennessee › Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104

Personal tort actions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Tennessee
Case notes
641
Cited in passing
186
Citing cases indexed
981
Case dates
1981–2026
Screened through
2026-06-22
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-20
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

827 citing cases reviewed of 981 in the citation index: 641 interpreted the section (annotated below), 186 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-22 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1991-01-01 1990 Public Chapter 1056 removed criminal conversation and seduction from § 28-3-104 and abolished those torts for later causes of action; Hanover v. Ruch held that the act did not extinguish a pending criminal conversation claim. Source
  • 2004-05-03 Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. held that § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 Civil Rights Act have the federal four-year period under 28 U.S.C. § 1658, instead of Tennessee's borrowed personal injury period; Anthony v. BTR Auto Sealing Systems had applied that distinction in the Sixth Circuit in 2003. Source
  • 2014-07-01 Public Chapter 618 added subsection (c), which places a five-year outer limit on attorney and accountant malpractice claims arising from later acts or omissions, subject to fraudulent concealment. Source
  • 2015-07-01 Public Chapter 388 added a conditional two-year period for a personal injury claim arising from conduct charged in a timely criminal prosecution, when the injured person sues the charged party; it applies to claims accruing from this date. Source
  • 2017-07-01 Public Chapter 234 added a discovery-based one-year period and a five-year outer limit for claims against real estate appraisers. Source

One-year limitation for federal civil rights damages actions

Section 28-3-104(a) requires civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages under federal civil rights statutes to be filed within one year after accrual.

Mullins v. Macmahan · filed 1981-02-13(a)

The complaint on its face, shows that the claims herein of the plaintiff are barred by the one-year period of limitation of T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a),* formerly T.C.A. § 28-304.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on personal tort actions, including this claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Harvey v. Rogers T. Martin and American Postal Workers Union · filed 1983-08-12(a)

The district court also was correct in holding that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is governed by the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a): 28-3-104. Personal tort actions. — (a) Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, criminal conversation, seduction, breach of marriage promise, actions and suits against attorneys for malpractice whether said actions are grounded or based in contract or tort, civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes, and actions for statutory penalties shall be commenced within one (1) year after cause of action accrued.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires federal civil rights actions seeking compensatory or punitive damages to be filed within one year after accrual.

Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education · filed 1985-08-14

In Tennessee, actions for compensatory and/or punitive damages brought under the federal civil rights statutes must be commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies the personal injury limitations period for federal civil rights claims under §§ 1983 and 1985, subject to ordinary tolling doctrines.

Craft v. Vanderbilt University · filed 1996-08-26

With respect to Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Court concludes that Tennessee’s personal injury statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. ... Tennessee courts have determined that the most analogous state action to a claim of federal civil rights law violation is a civil action for compensatory or punitive damages brought under the federal civil rights statute as described in T.C.A. § 28-3-104, Tennessee’s personal injury statute. ... Hence the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims is Tennessee’s personal injury statute, not the medical malpractice statute. Accordingly, the standard tolling doctrines apply to this action and these claims are not, as a matter of law, barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) gives civil rights claims arising in Tennessee a one-year limitations period.

Craven v. Bi-Lo, Inc. · filed 1996-09-27(a)

The one-year statute of limitations period found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a) applies to civil rights claims arising in Tennessee.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Tennessee’s personal injury limitations period applies to federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, subject to ordinary tolling doctrines.

Craft v. Vanderbilt University · filed 1998-08-19

Hence the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims is Tennessee’s personal injury statute, not the medical malpractice statute. Accordingly, the standard tolling doctrines apply to this action and these claims are not, as a matter of law, barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (May 3, 2004) limits this one-year rule to § 1981 claims available before the 1991 Civil Rights Act; claims made possible by that Act have the federal four-year period.

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) imposes a one-year limitations period on damages claims under federal civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.

Lindsey v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1999-01-13(a)(3)

Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 constitute civil actions brought under federal civil right statutes and are therefore subject to the one-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) imposes a one-year limitations period on civil actions for damages brought under federal civil rights statutes.

Davis v. Weatherford · filed 1999-10-26(a)(3)

Thus, Davis’ claims are subject to the one year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires personal injury actions, including wrongful death actions, to be commenced within one year after accrual.

Terry Sullivan Ex Rel. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Sullivan v. Chattanooga Medical Investors, LP · filed 2007-04-24(a)(1)

The statute of limitations for personal injuries, including wrongful death actions, is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated 28-3-104(a)(l), which provides that the action shall be commenced within one year after it has accrued.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) supplies the one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Montgomery v. Whidbee · filed 2020-03-18(a)(1)(B)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is the one-year period under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B). ... Any claim arising from the alleged failure to deliver registration and ballot forms in 2016 accrued years prior to the filing of the complaint and is therefore subject to dismissal as untimely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) provides a one-year limitations period for Fifth Amendment takings claims brought under § 1983 in Tennessee.

Thomas v. State of Tennesee · filed 2020-03-31(a)(3)

The statute of limitations for Fifth Amendment takings claims is one year.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) gives § 1983 claims in Tennessee a one-year limitations period.

Stephens v. Union County Tennessee (PSLC1) · filed 2020-04-22(a)(3)

Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. ... Thus, these claims are clearly time barred, and the Court will not allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint to assert them.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period that applies to § 1983 claims arising in Tennessee.

Dawson v. Guy · filed 2020-04-24

In Tennessee, that period is one year. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Tennessee.

Taylor v. Bunch · filed 2020-04-30

Federal district courts apply the State’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions in proceedings arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Tennessee, that period is one year. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Moore v. Potter, 47 F. App’x 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The appropriate statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the federal civil rights statutes is one year.”); Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in Tennessee, including claims brought by utility districts.

Milcrofton Utility District of Williamson County, Tennessee v. City of Brentwood, Tennessee · filed 2020-04-30(a)(3)

In Tennessee, Section 1983 claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitation.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Tennessee.

Dowling v. US Corrections LLC · filed 2020-05-18(a)(3)

Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Wallace v. Coffee County, Tennessee · filed 2020-06-03

Although § 1983 has no statute of limitations on its own, the applicable limitations period is the same period that “state law provides for personal injury torts, which is one year in Tennessee.” Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104). ... Here, that means that only the events in Plaintiff’s complaint that occurred on or after April 25, 2017, are timely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Montgomery v. Hall · filed 2020-07-15(a)

Concerning the remaining Defendants, the statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 in Tennessee is one year. Jordan v. Blount Cty., 885 F.3d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)). ... Applying the one-year statute of limitations, any Section 1983 claim that accrued prior to November 30, 2018, is time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Stephens v. Knox County (PSLC1) · filed 2020-09-17(a)(3)

Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Irvin v. The City of Clarksville · filed 2020-09-25(a)

The statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 in Tennessee is one year.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies the one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Russell v. Martin · filed 2020-10-19(a)(3)

In Tennessee, that period is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee.

Stevens v. Chumley · filed 2020-10-26(a)(1)(B)

The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) supplies a one-year limitations period for ADA and Rehabilitation Act Section 504 claims in Tennessee.

Trivette v. Tennessee Department of Correction · filed 2020-11-12(a)(1)(B)

The Sixth Circuit, applying that rule, has held that ADA claims in Tennessee are governed by the state’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Straser v. City of Athens, Tenn., 951 F.3d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B); Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000)). The same is true for Section 504 claims. ... The court, therefore, will not dismiss his claims as untimely at this juncture.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) supplies a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Brown v. Lee · filed 2020-12-30(a)

The statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 in Tennessee is one year. Jordan v. Blount Cnty., 885 F.3d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)). ... Here, because the Complaint was filed on October 23, 2020, Brown may pursue only Section 1983 claims that accrued on or after October 22, 2019.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims; the court tolled that period while the prisoner pursued administrative remedies.

Haithcote v. Hutchinson · filed 2021-01-25(a)(1)(B)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) (setting forth one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims). However, documents filed with Plaintiff’s complaint establish that Plaintiff was pursuing jail administrative remedies related to this incident until at least April 7, 2020. (Id. at 24.) Thus, the statute of limitations for this claim was tolled during this time.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee.

Smith v. Hardin County, TN · filed 2021-02-08(a)(1)(B)

The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee.

McAlister v. State of Tennessee · filed 2021-02-09(a)(1)(B)

The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims brought under § 1983 in Tennessee.

Whitt v. Thornton · filed 2020-04-22

Federal district courts apply the State’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions in proceedings arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In Tennessee, that period is one year.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Berchard v. QCHC Staff · filed 2020-09-29

As §1983 has no statute of limitations, federal courts rely on the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions when addressing complaints for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007). In Tennessee, that period is one year. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Tennessee.

Franklin v. McCormick · filed 2020-06-04(a)(3)

Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) provides a one-year limitations period for Bivens actions brought in Tennessee.

Sullivan v. Carrington · filed 2020-06-12(a)

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a), a one-year statute of limitations period is applicable to Bivens actions brought in Tennessee.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) sets a one-year limitations period for federal civil rights actions arising in Tennessee, including Bivens actions.

Gray v. Prince · filed 2021-08-23(a)(1)(B)

Tennessee law requires a plaintiff to bring a civil action under a federal civil rights statute “within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.”14 Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Tennessee.

Gordon v. Clinton Police Department · filed 2021-04-15(a)(1)

Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) sets a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Dean v. Greene County Detention Center · filed 2021-05-10(a)(1)(B)

First, the Court applies Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in this action. ... Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) (setting forth one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in federal court in Tennessee.

Sykes v. Flynn · filed 2021-06-29

First, a § 1983 action brought in a federal court in Tennessee is subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (holding federal courts apply state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions in § 1983 proceedings); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Jackson v. Rausch · filed 2021-09-21(a)(1)(B)

It is well settled that in Tennessee claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B); ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s retroactive due process argument is time-barred by the statute of limitations and will GRANT Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment [Doc. 55] as to Count 5.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) sets a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Lacy v. Carter County Sheriffs Office · filed 2021-09-28(a)(1)(B)

First, the Court applies Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in this action. Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir. 2005) (federal district courts apply a state’s statute of limitations to § 1983 claims); Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that Tennessee provides one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) (setting forth one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims). The incidents in Plaintiff’s complaint regarding his grandfather occurred in February 2020, which is more than a year before he put his complaint in the hands of prison officials for mailing on September 20, 2021 [Doc. 2-1 p. 12]. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for relief under § 1983 arising out of incidents involving his grandfather are untimely and therefore fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) sets a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Anderson v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2021-12-03(a)(1)(B)

Also, Plaintiff’s claims arising out of acts that occurred more than a year prior to him filing the complaint are time-barred, as the Court applies Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations to such claims in this action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims involving denial of medical treatment.

Hempstead v. Parker (PSLC2) · filed 2021-12-17

Plaintiff presents the Court with no information from which it should infer that Plaintiff’s wrist remained broken four years after his transfer to TDOC custody, and any claim related to the denial of surgery and/or treatment for Plaintiff’s wrist is barred by Tennessee’s one year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) provides a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Villagrana v. Loving · filed 2022-02-10(a)(1)(B)

Plaintiff cannot recover for harms suffered during the first time period, in 2018. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is the one-year period under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee.

Porterfield v. Shelby County Jail · filed 2022-03-17(a)(1)(B)

The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) gives plaintiffs one year to bring actions under federal civil rights statutes.

Accord v. Anderson Cnty., Tenn. · filed 2022-11-08(a)(1)(B)

Tennessee law provides a one-year time limit for actions brought under federal civil rights statutes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies the one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in Tennessee.

Blankenship v. Parris · filed 2022-06-30

In Tennessee, that period is one year. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-104 in a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) supplies a one-year limitations period for Bivens actions arising in Tennessee.

Keyes v. Childress · filed 2024-07-09(a)(1)(B)

The limitations period for civil actions brought under federal law in Tennessee is one year.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) gives claims brought under federal civil rights statutes, including § 1983 claims, a one-year limitations period.

Johnson for Estate of Debra Johnson v. Fitz · filed 2025-06-10(a)(1)(B)

And under Tennessee law, “civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes” must commence “within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) sets a one-year limitations period for damages claims under federal civil rights statutes, including § 1983 claims arising in Tennessee.

Jordan v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services · filed 2025-06-18(a)(1)(B)

Second, it is well established that state law supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims and that claims under § 1983 arising in Tennessee are governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B), which provides a one-year statute of limitations for “[c]ivil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) gives plaintiffs one year to bring a § 1983 action in Tennessee; after that period, they cannot amend the complaint to name a previously unknown defendant.

Glenn v. Lawson · filed 2025-05-21(a)(3)

As more than a year has passed since the incidents underlying the Complaint, it is too late for Plaintiff to amend her complaint to add the name of the Unknown Nurse Supervisor.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) supplies a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Anderson · filed 2026-03-13(a)(1)

Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations applies to Anderson’s Section 1983 claims. See Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir. 2005); Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Page · filed 2026-03-19

This is because Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions is applicable to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) provides a one-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Nelson v. State of Tennessee · filed 2026-04-14(a)(1)

Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations applies to Nelson’s Section 1983 claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

One-year statute of limitations

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for specified personal tort actions, civil rights damages actions, and statutory penalties.

Stevens v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 1981-04-14(a)

We are constrained to agree with defendant’s contention that the applicable statute is Section 28-3-104 quoted above. ... We do not believe that the Erwin case can be distinguished from the present case and, accordingly, we hold that the applicable statute of limitations is one year and that plaintiff’s cause of action is time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires a personal injury action to be filed within one year after the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Patton v. Aerojet Ordnance Co. · filed 1985-09-17

Having made this determination, for the reasons discussed above, plaintiff is collaterally estopped to deny that he discovered his disease and attributed it to his employment on May 31, 1981. Since Mr. Patton believed his disease was caused by the conditions present at TNS more than one year before the institution of this suit, his action (now the action of his estate) is barred by the statute of limitations. T.C.A. § 28-3-104.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 bars a products liability suit when the plaintiff fails to exercise due diligence and files outside the one-year limitations period.

Gibson v. Lockwood Products Division of J.L. Underwood · filed 1986-10-29

In this case the plaintiff has failed to exercise due diligence in discovering the identity of the manufacturer and of the installer and his suit is barred. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 imposes a one-year limitations period on actions for injury to the person.

MacKey v. Judy's Foods, Inc. · filed 1987-02-10

Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is properly characterized as an action for injury to the person and thus subject to the one-year period specified in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) requires actions for injuries to the person to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Heideman v. PFL, Inc. · filed 1989-04-11(a)

Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious persecution ... shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued. ... For the reasons set forth below, we find and conclude that plaintiffs’ Count IV and Count V both are time-barred by the Missouri borrowing statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) requires personal injury actions to be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Richmond v. McElyea · filed 1990-04-12(a)

The statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions in Tennessee is provided at T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a) and requires that such an action be brought within one year after the ... cause of action accrues.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) sets a one-year statute of limitations for covered tort claims.

Leo HEIDEMAN and Shirley Heideman, Appellants, v. PFL, INC., Appellee · filed 1990-07-31(a)

We agree with the District Court that Missouri's borrowing statute, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.190, brings these counts within the province of Tennessee law and thus subjects them to a one-year statute of limitations. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a) (Repl.1980).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) imposes a one-year limitations period that barred claims first brought against defendants after that period expired.

Jenkins v. Carruth · filed 1982-09-16(a)

Additional contested issues of law herein are whether the defendant county and the defendant sheriff have waived their right to rely on the statute of limitations defense and, if not, whether the plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a). ... The answer to the first such issue is “no”, and the answer to the second^is “yes”.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 imposes a one-year limitations period on damages claims under § 1983.

Chaudhuri v. State of Tenn. · filed 1991-07-24

All defendants argue alternatively that the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims — Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (1990) — bars all claims for monetary and prospective relief based upon incidents allegedly occurring more than one year prior to the filing of this action — January 31, 1991. ... The Court holds that, although plaintiff’s claim for money damages against the four defendants in their individual capacities is not subject to dismissal at this stage, he may not recover for any incident occurring before January 31, 1990.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires THRCA age discrimination claims to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Easter v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. · filed 1991-10-29

It is well settled that claims of age discrimination brought pursuant to the THRCA must be filed within the time period provided for in T.C.A. § 28-3-104. ... T.C.A. § 28-3-104 requires the action to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrued.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including injuries resulting from civil conspiracy.

Braswell v. Carothers · filed 1993-04-26

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims is one year. T.C.A. § 28-3-104. This includes personal injuries resulting from the tort of civil conspiracy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Soper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1996-04-23

As to the applicable Tennessee statute of limitations, the general statute is Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104 which has a one year limitations period for personal injury claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (a)(3) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including federal civil rights claims, that applies to Bivens actions.

Stefanovic v. University of Tennessee · filed 1996-07-08(a)(3)

Hence, any cause of action plaintiff might have had directly under the Fourteenth Amendment is now barred by the one-year limitation period of T.C.A § 28—3—104(a)(3) (Supp.1995).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for Tennessee tort claims and § 1983 claims arising from the same injury.

Force v. City of Memphis · filed 1996-11-14(a)(1), (3)

This case arose from the wrongful arrest of Mr. Force, which occurred on February 25, 1993, and the plaintiff's claims under § 1983, as well as his pendent state tort claims, are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1), (3) (Supp.1996). The plaintiff concedes that his amended complaint was filed outside the applicable limitations period. Thus, unless the amended complaint relates back to the original, timely-filed complaint, the plaintiff's action is time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) gives federal civil rights personal tort actions a one-year filing period that ends on the same calendar date the following year.

Merriweather v. City of Memphis · filed 1997-02-20(a)(3)

The applicable statute of limitations for all the claims is that stated in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3) (Supp.1996), which governs personal tort actions brought under the federal civil rights statutes.1 ... In this case, the statute of limitations began to run on October 19,1994; even though that day is excluded from the computation, the one-year period ended on the 365th day and the same calendar date, October 19, 1995.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) gives plaintiffs one year to file personal injury claims, including outrageous conduct and invasion of privacy by intrusion.

Scarborough v. Brown Group, Inc. · filed 1997-03-11(a)(1)

Each of the Plaintiffs has asserted a claim against Spellings for outrageous eonduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress. Gracie Myrick also has a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion. Each of these claims is an action for personal injury governed by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(l).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) sets a one-year limitations period for the constitutional-rights claim against McDougle.

Garrett v. McDougle · filed 1997-03-12(a)(3)

Plaintiff’s claim against defendant, McDougle for violation of constitutional rights is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(3). Any action by McDougle which might have amounted to denial of due process occurred on or before March 14, 1994. This suit was filed on March 17, 1995.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 sets a one-year limitations period for personal tort claims, including assault, battery, and false imprisonment.

Seaton v. Seaton · filed 1997-07-01

The one-year statute of limitations for tort actions in Tennessee applies to “[a]ctions for libel, for injuries to the person, [and] false imprisonment....” Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104. Thus, plaintiffs claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment must be dismissed as time-barred, with the exception of any allegations included regarding the final altercation between the parties.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104’s one-year limitations period does not bar a claim filed within a year of the challenged warrant and bond.

Johnson v. Turner · filed 1997-09-08(a)(1), (3)

Because Johnson was served with a warrant and subjected to a bond pursuant to the statutes he seeks to challenge, within a year of bringing this suit, we conclude that his claim is not time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations applicable in Tennessee.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) requires claims for injuries to the person to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

W.J. Gray v. State of TN · filed 1997-09-15(a)

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires personal tort actions in Tennessee to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Dodson v. State Farm General Insurance Co. · filed 1998-04-28

Under Tennessee law, personal tort actions must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrued. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires an action for bodily injury to be filed within one year of the injury.

Long, et. ux. v. Landmark Television of TN · filed 1998-06-16

T.C.A. § 28-3-104 limits actions for injury to the persons to one year after the injury. In view of the sworn admission of Mr. Long that the last touching of his body occurred more than one year before his suit was filed, plaintiffs’ claims for bodily injury require no further discussion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for ADA claims based on personal injury.

Hedgepeth v. Tennessee · filed 1998-12-29

Tennessee’s personal injury statute provides that a civil action brought under the federal civil rights statutes shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104. Accordingly, this court finds that any of plaintiffs’ claims that stem from purchasing placards more than one year before plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 12, 1997 are barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires personal injury actions to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Kinsler v. State · filed 1999-06-25

The applicable statute of limitations is T.C.A. § 28-3-104, which requires actions for personal linjuries to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 bars a personal injury action filed in Tennessee after its one-year limitations period when an earlier filing in another state's court does not save the claim.

Reque v. Monteagle Truck Plaza · filed 1999-09-17

Because plaintiffs did not commence a cause of action in a Tennessee or federal court until October 2, 1998 when suit was brought in the Circuit Court for Franklin County, Tennessee, the statutory bar under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 controls.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 gives one year to file retaliatory discharge and employment discrimination tort claims; the period begins when the employee receives notice of termination.

Fahrner v. SW Manufacturing · filed 2000-01-10

In this case, the statute of limitations for a retaliatory discharge and termination case is limited to one year. Both claims are tort actions governed by the general tort statute of limitations which requires that a lawsuit be "commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued...." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (1980 Repl. and Supp.1996); Headrick v. Union Carbide Corp., 825 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. Ct. App.1991); Van Cleave v. McKee Baking Co., 712 S.W.2d 94 (Tenn. 1986).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) gives a plaintiff one year to bring a civil rights claim.

Timothy v. Bowling v. Lori Goff, Becky West, and the Johnson City Police Department · filed 2000-03-30(a)(3)

T h e p l a i n t i f f h a d o n e y e a r wi t h i n wh i c h t o p u r s u e t h e c l a i ms p r e s e n t l y b e f o r e u s . S e e T. C. A. § 28- 3- 104(a )( 3).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104's one-year limitations period bars a claim filed more than a year after the plaintiff knew of counsel's alleged deficiencies.

Allen v. Roberts · filed 2000-05-19

Thus, the plaintiff was clearly aware of the alleged deficiencies in the performance by his post-conviction attorney in November 1996 but did not even file his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint until November 30, 1998. The one year statute of limitations provided by T.C.A. § 28-3-104 had long since expired before the original complaint was filed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Hughes v. Vanderbilt University · filed 2000-06-07(a)(1)

Following this rule, the applicable limitations period in Tennessee is one year. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). ... Hughes filed her complaint on August 24, 1998, long after the one-year period in which to file her cause of action had ended. As such, her suit is untimely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires negligence claims to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Heatherly v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co. · filed 2000-11-15(a)(1)

Private Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims and negligence claims must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (Supp. 1999) (time limitations on actions for injuries to the person); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-110 (1995) (limitations on private consumer protection actions).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires a negligence claim to be filed within one year after it accrues.

Heatherly v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2000-11-15(a)(1)

Private Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims and negligence claims must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(l) (Supp.1999) (time limitations on actions for injuries to the person); Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-18-110 (1995) (limitations on private consumer protection actions). ... Accordingly, the negligence and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims against Mutual and Professional in the Heatherlys’ March 27, 1997 complaint were time-barred and were subject to being dismissed either on a Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) or 56 motion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Zahreddine v. Choi · filed 2001-01-24(a)(1)

The statute of limitations applicable to this case required the Zahreddines to commence their action within one year after their cause of action accrued. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (2000). Because their cause of action accrued on May 1, 1997, the Zahreddines’ were required to commence their action on or before May 1, 1998.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for federal civil rights claims arising from personal injuries in Tennessee.

Bibbs v. Parkridge Hospital, Inc. · filed 2001-02-06(a)(3)

The appropriate statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the federal civil rights statutes is one year.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Personal injury actions have a one-year limitations period.

Breeding v. Edwards · filed 2001-06-22(a)(1)

The applicable statute of limitations for personal injuries is one year.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) provides a one-year limitations period for civil rights claims arising from a prisoner's confinement in Tennessee.

Dellis v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2001-07-18(a)(3)

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed as frivolous Plaintiff's claims arising out of his incarceration at HCCF inasmuch as any such claim is barred the by the applicable statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff was transferred from HCCF to WCF on July 25, 1998, and filed this action on August 2, 1999. Thus any claim he had accrued more than one year before he filed suit.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) sets a one-year limitations period for civil actions brought under federal civil rights statutes, including Title VI claims.

Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Board · filed 2001-07-30(a)(3)

Similarly, the race discrimination claim under Title VI is governed by the one-year limitations period set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28 — 3—104(a)(3) for civil actions brought under federal civil rights statutes.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) sets a one-year deadline for personal injury actions; the uninsured motorist procedures do not extend it when the identified driver is insured.

Estate of Kirk Ex Rel. Kirk v. Lowe · filed 2001-08-30(a)(1)

The provisions of section 56-7-1201 et seq. therefore do not apply to this fact situation to extend the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions as codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). ... Therefore, as a matter of law, this claim is time- barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for a § 1983 claim arising from an allegedly unlawful arrest.

Rowsey v. Police Department, Metropolitan Nashville · filed 2001-11-08(a)(3)

Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations, Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3), bars Rowsey’s suit.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) provides a one-year limitations period for these civil rights claims.

Alston v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2002-01-28(a)(3)

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Alston’s complaint as barred by Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir.1997).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions.

Makoka v. Cook · filed 2002-02-22

Thus, the complaint was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 198 3 actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 gives a plaintiff one year from the arrest to bring claims arising from that arrest for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or deprivation of civil rights.

Simmons v. Gath Baptist Church · filed 2002-07-30(a)(1) and (3)

Insofar as his claims arose from the alleged wrongfulness of his arrest, he was required to file suit within one year of that date to preserve any right of action grounded in false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or deprivation of civil rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) and (3). Mr. Simmons did not file his initial pleading until June 22, 2001.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for Tennessee personal injury actions, which federal courts apply to §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims arising in Tennessee.

Moore v. Potter · filed 2002-09-18(a)(3)

The appropriate statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the federal civil rights statutes is one year. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir.1997); Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 578 (6th Cir.1992).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) sets a one-year limitations period for federal civil rights claims arising in Tennessee.

Castillo v. Grogan · filed 2002-12-11(a)(3)

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Tennessee and brought under the *752federal civil rights statutes is one year. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir.1997).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The one-year period for claims arising from an allegedly wrongful arrest is not tolled by ignorance of the law or lack of access to a jail law library.

Simmons v. Gath Baptist Church · filed 2003-01-23(a)(1) and (3)

Insofar as his claims arose from the alleged wrongfulness of his arrest, he was required to file suit within one year of that date to preserve any right of action grounded in false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or deprivation of civil rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 gives plaintiffs one year after accrual to bring personal tort claims, including outrageous conduct and negligent supervision.

George v. Aventis Pharmaceutical, Inc. · filed 2003-03-18

In Tennessee, personal tort actions must be brought “within one year after the cause of action accrued.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104. ... Plaintiff did not file his complaint until November 5, 2001, well after the period of limitation closed. ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiffs common law claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(4) sets a one-year limitations period for actions for statutory penalties.

Williams v. State · filed 2003-10-20(a)(4)

In pertinent part, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 provides: “The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued: . . . (4) Actions for statutory penalties. . . .” ... Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations unless it is tolled for some reason.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) gives civil rights damages claims a one-year limitations period.

Henley v. Tullahoma City School System · filed 2003-12-05(a)(3)

The parties agree that this action is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, which provides for a one-year statute of limitations for civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages brought under the federal civil rights statutes. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3). Thus, any claim that accrued more than one year prior to the date they filed their complaint—May 7, 2001—is time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for Tennessee personal injury actions; that period is tolled while a prisoner exhausts available remedies before filing a § 1983 suit.

Waters v. Evans · filed 2004-08-04(a)(3)

The appropriate statute of limitations for personal injury actions arising in Tennessee is one year from the date the cause of action accrues. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3) ... For this reason, the statute of limitations which applied to Waters’s civil rights action was tolled for the period during which his available state remedies were being exhausted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A personal injury claim is time-barred if filed more than one year after the plaintiff knew of the injury, unless the claim relates back to a timely complaint.

White v. Bacon · filed 2006-01-26(a)(1)

The record clearly reflects that White had knowledge of his alleged injuries on March 27, 2002, when he filed a grievance with the SCCF, however, he failed to assert his claim against CMS until June 26, 2003, approximately three months outside the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 imposes a one-year limit on personal injury claims, including damages claims under federal civil rights statutes.

Johnson v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2006-01-31(a)(3)

Mr. Johnson did not specify whether he was bringing his claim as one for simple negligence under state law or as a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the statute of limitations, however, there is no distinction. The personal injury one-year statute of limitations applies to “[c]ivil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Jones v. Professional Motorcycle Escort Service, LLC · filed 2006-05-19(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s claims of negligence arising out of the automobile accident in this case are subject to the one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (2000). Since Plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred on August 10, 2002, the statute of limitations on her claims originally expired on August 10, 2003.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period, measured from accrual, for medical malpractice claims.

Howard v. Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership · filed 2006-08-02

Tennessee’s Medical Malpractice Act includes a one-year statute of limitation, as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104, which is measured from the date on which the cause of action accrued. In addition, the Act includes a three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(1), (3). The Plaintiffs did not file the instant action against Baptist Hospital until more than four years after completion of the Decedent’s treatment at Baptist Hospital, well beyond both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) sets a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions.

Parker v. Henderson County, Tennessee · filed 2006-08-29(a)

Thus, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim against any individual other than those specifically named, he must identify the defendant and file a new lawsuit within the one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims based on negligence or strict liability.

In Re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation · filed 2007-03-22

Tennessee employs a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims premised on theories of negligence and strict liability.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires personal injury actions to be brought within one year of accrual.

Cassandra Rogers v. State of Tennessee · filed 2007-08-02

Here, Ms. Rogers’ claim is for personal injuries, which claim is governed by T.C.A. § 28-3-104. That statute provides that all personal injury actions must be brought within one year from the date of accrual.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 requires TPPA and common law retaliatory discharge claims to be filed within one year of the discriminatory act.

Conley v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 2007-10-09

Claims under the TPPA and common law claims for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy must be filed within one year from the date of the discriminatory act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee.

Moore v. State of Tenn. · filed 2008-03-03(a)(3)

The Tennessee statute of limitations8 relevant to Moore’s claim required her to commence her § 1983 action within one year after the cause of action accrued. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 104(a)(3).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within one year of the injury.

Sims v. ADESA CORP. · filed 2008-03-25(a)(1)

As a general matter, an action for personal injury must be commenced within one year of the date the plaintiff sustained injury.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 gives a plaintiff one year after accrual to bring a personal injury negligence claim, subject to applicable tolling rules.

Doe v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis · filed 2008-09-16(a)(1)

It is undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations is one year, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104, and that Doe’s cause of action accrued when he reached majority in 1987, unless the statute of limitations was tolled under one of the theories asserted by Doe.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Personal injury claims for outrageous conduct and negligent supervision must be commenced within one year of accrual.

C.S. v. The Diocese of Nashville · filed 2008-09-30(a)(1)

Because both of these tort actions involved personal injury to the plaintiff, they required commencement within one year of accrual. T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (2000).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for the tort claims raised in this case.

Lane v. Becker · filed 2009-09-14

Also, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (2000), provides one year as the applicable statute of limitations for the claims raised in this matter. The conduct about which Lane complains – the taking of his deposition and the filing of the verified complaint against him – occurred well over a year prior to the filing of the lawsuit in this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(3) sets a one-year limitations period that bars claims against unidentified officers once that period has expired.

Campbell v. Anderson County · filed 2010-02-08(3)

Campbell’s claims arose on October 3, 2006, and the applicable statute of limitations in this case, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(3), is one year. Thus, even if the court were to dismiss the claims against the unknown officers without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m), Campbell’s claims against them would clearly be time-barred. Consequently, Campbell’s claims against the unknown officers will be dismissed with prejudice.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for the tort claims raised in this case.

Lane v. Becker · filed 2010-02-25

Also, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (2000), provides one year as the applicable statute of limitations for the claims raised in this matter. The conduct about which Lane complains — the taking of his deposition and the filing of the verified complaint against him — occurred well over a year prior to the filing of the lawsuit in this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) gives personal tort claims a one-year limitations period.

Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2010-03-31(a)

Plaintiffs personal tort claims are also subject to a one-year statute of limitations under Tennessee law. ... Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs claims filed on August 29, 2008, are barred by the one-year statute of limitations, and that Whirlpool’s motion should be granted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) requires actions involving injury to a person to be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Jackson v. CVS Corporation · filed 2010-08-26(a)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a) provides that actions involving injury to a person must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. ... We therefore conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the basis that Ms. Jackson’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is time barred under the one-year statute of limitations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A personal injury action must be commenced within one year of accrual; filing a general sessions warrant without the clerk issuing it does not meet that deadline.

Graham v. Caples · filed 2010-10-20(a)(1)

The plaintiff’s claim for personal injuries in the “Amended Civil Warrant” filed on November 13, 2007, was not timely filed within the one- year statute of limitations period and must be dismissed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Barnett v. Mark Luttrell, Jr. · filed 2011-03-10(a)(3)

Barnett’s arguments relating to events in 2002 are time-barred, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3) (one-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Tennessee); Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging the same), and Barnett gives us no reason to exempt his claims here.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 civil-rights claims in Tennessee.

Lyons v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County · filed 2011-03-22(a)(1)

The statute of limitations for an action alleging a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 is the applicable state limitations period governing personal injury claims. Tennessee’s limitations period, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1), is one year.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)’s one-year limit applies to a misrepresentation claim seeking damages from termination of at-will employment because the employee has no property interest in future employment.

Evans v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2011-08-25(a)(1)

Because she seeks damages flowing from the termination of her employment and her employment relationship was not for a definite term and was terminable at will, she had no property interest in future employment. She is seeking damages for injuries to her person, not economic loss. Therefore, she is subject to the one-year statute of limitations for injuries to the person.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 bars a product liability negligence claim against a seller when more than one year passes before the claim is brought, despite the manufacturer's later insolvency.

Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Beaman Dodge Chrysler Jeep · filed 2011-12-15

Because more than one year passed before the suit was reinstated in 2009, the products liability claim based upon the negligence of the seller is barred, notwithstanding the subsequent insolvency of Chrysler.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis · filed 2012-02-27(a)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (2000) provides for a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including federal civil rights claims arising in Tennessee.

Wilhite v. Corrections Corporation of Amer. · filed 2012-09-04

In this case, Tennessee’s one-year limitations period for actions brought under federal civil rights statutes or for personal injuries applies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 gives personal injury claims, including claims for mental anguish and emotional damage, a one-year limitations period.

Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. v. Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick · filed 2012-11-29

The remaining tort actions – for mental anguish and emotional damage – are certainly subject to the limitation period for claimed “injuries to the person” set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The statutes mandates that such actions “shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) provides a one-year period for personal injury and false imprisonment claims; the limitations defense cannot support dismissal when the record does not conclusively show the alleged acts occurred more than one year before filing.

Bostic v. State of Tennessee · filed 2013-01-02(a)(1)

While the State’s motion to dismiss also relies upon the Statute of Limitations, the record before us does not conclusively show that the alleged misdeeds of the four individuals occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the Claimant’s claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for these medical-negligence claims; the complaint was untimely even with a 120-day extension.

Tyrone Spates v. Tracy Howell and Robert Preston · filed 2013-05-16

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104. ... Accordingly, even with an additional 120 days, Mr. Spates’s complaint was not timely. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Ward v. Wilkinson Real Estate Advisors, Inc · filed 2013-11-26(a)(1)

In this case, the parties agree that the amended complaint naming the proper parties was filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (providing that actions for personal injuries must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued). ... We further conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment because the applicable statute of limitations for bringing such actions had passed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) generally gives a personal injury plaintiff one year to file a complaint.

Ferrell v. Robert Miller and Kayla Ivey · filed 2013-11-27(a)(1)

Typically, a personal injury plaintiff has one year in which to file a complaint. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Negligence actions resulting in personal injuries have a one-year statute of limitations.

Morris v. Phillips · filed 2013-12-17

The statute of limitations for negligence actions resulting in personal injuries is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for each claim Doyle asserted.

Doyle v. Town of Oakland · filed 2014-07-28

Ms. Doyle also does not dispute that each claim asserted in her complaint is subject to the one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (2013).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims brought in Tennessee.

Cooper v. Rhea County · filed 2014-08-06

This time period is the same statute of limitations period that the applicable state law provides for personal injury torts, which is one year in Tennessee. See Id.; Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) sets a one-year deadline for filing a personal-injury action in Tennessee.

Cobb ex rel. Mallardi v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 2014-12-01(a)(1)

The statute of limitations for filing a personal-injury action in Tennessee is one year. Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). This case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on December 7, 2011, almost two years before the complaint was filed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Personal injury claims have a one-year limitations period that begins when the injury occurs or is discovered; later discovery of a potential defendant’s identity does not extend it.

Wagner v. International Automotive Components Group North America, Inc. · filed 2015-09-16(a)(1)

As the parties agree, the statute of limitations for filing a personal injury suit in Tennessee is one year.4 Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(l). ... The discovery rule does not extend the statute of limitations in this action merely because Wagner did not discover the identity of MMSS and DRM until after interrogatory responses were served’in this action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 gives a party one year to bring Tennessee claims for negligence, false imprisonment, and assault.

Dunfee v. Finchum · filed 2015-09-21

A party must bring claims for negligence, false imprisonment, and assault under Tennessee law within one year as well. Campbell v. McMinn Cnty., No. 1:10-CV-278, 2011 WL 5921431, at *3 (E.D.Tenn. Nov. 28, 2011); Johnson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 2007 WL 2746952, at *3 (E.D.Tenn. Sept. 20, 2007); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The proposed amended complaint asserts that the actions underlying these claims took place on June 29, 2012 [Doc. 56-1]. Plaintiffs filed the motion to amend more than one year after the date of the alleged injury; thus, unless plaintiffs’ claims against Officers Roberts, Ni-col, and Ford relate back to the date of the original complaint — June 28, 2013 — the Court must deny plaintiffs motion to amend because of futility.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) sets a one-year limitations period for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Goetz v. Autin · filed 2016-02-10(a)(1)

Because IIED claims are analogous to personal injury actions, the one-year statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) applies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) imposes a one-year limitations period for personal-injury suits.

Jones v. City of Franklin · filed 2017-01-27(a)(1)(A)

Tennessee law imposes a one-year statute of limitations for personal- injury suits. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) supplies a one-year limitations period for Title II and § 504 disability-discrimination claims in Tennessee.

I.L. ex rel. Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education · filed 2017-06-15(a)(1)(A)

Under the Tennessee statute, Taylor must have brought I.L.’s claim within one year of when I.L. suffered discrimination.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury claims and damages claims brought under federal civil rights statutes.

Moses v. Shelby County Sheriff Bill Oldham · filed 2017-07-25(a)(1)

Here, Ms. Moses does not dispute that her claims involve personal torts and/or civil rights claims. Accordingly, they are governed by a one-year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (providing a one year statute of limitations for claim involving “injuries to the person” and “civil actions for . . . damages . . . brought under federal civil rights statutes”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) gives a plaintiff one year after a claim accrues to file the listed personal tort and federal civil rights actions.

Olivier v. City of Clarksville · filed 2017-08-17(a)(1)(A)-(B)

A one-year statute of limitations is applicable to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct, false imprisonment, malicious harassment, and civil rights violations. ... We conclude that Mr. Olivier’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct, false imprisonment, malicious harassment, and civil rights violations are barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Personal injury actions must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

Davis v. Grange Mutual Casualty Group · filed 2017-09-28(a)(1)(A)

Under Tennessee law, a personal injury action must be commenced within one year of the date the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Personal injury claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Scales v. H. G. Hill Realty Co., LLC · filed 2018-01-30(a)(1)(A)

Pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations applicable to her personal injury claims, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A), Ms. Scales’ cause of action against the Hill Defendants was still viable when Publix identified the Hill Defendants as comparative tortfeasors on January 8, 2015.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 provides a one-year limitations period for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy claims.

Harris v. Regions Financial Corp. · filed 2018-07-25

While plaintiff did not specifically appeal the application of the statute of limitations to his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy, given that these claims are based on the same factual allegations as his claim for “breach of contract,” and that each are subject to a one year statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, they are necessarily time-barred along with his fraud claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 sets a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Williams v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company · filed 2018-11-20(a)

The statute of limitations for personal injuries in Tennessee is one year from the date of injury.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Personal injury tort claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Taylor v. Miriam's Promise · filed 2019-01-31(a)(1)(A)

Because the remaining claims sound in tort for personal injuries, they are subject to the one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which federal courts apply to § 1983 claims in Tennessee.

Cox v. Burnette · filed 2019-07-11

In Tennessee, that period is one year. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim). ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Burnette and Galagher engaged in wrongdoing of constitutional proportions in May 2016, is barred by the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104 supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 retaliation claims.

Harmer v. Parker · filed 2019-07-18

The Court otherwise notes that Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation occurring before March 19, 2017, are nevertheless barred by Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a) imposes a one-year filing deadline on PEPFA claims.

Boone v. Town of Collierville · filed 2019-08-08(a)

Although PEPFA does not “include[]” a statute of limitations, it “is subject to” the statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) provides a one-year limitations period for actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986.

Hastings v. State of Tennessee · filed 2019-08-12(a)(1)(B)

Similarly, the limitations period for actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1) provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee.

Gauldin v. Dyersburg City Police Department · filed 2019-08-15(a)(1)

To the extent Gauldin seeks relief for the events that allegedly occurred in March 2007, his claims are well beyond the one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1); Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(3) provides a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Tennessee.

Lane v. Knox Co Sheriff's Department · filed 2019-08-21(a)(3)

Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions. Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 104(a)(3).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) supplies a one-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee.

Pittman v. City of Jackson · filed 2019-09-03(a)(1)(B)

The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 3-104(a)(1)(B).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 641, oldest cases first.

186 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court cites § 28-3-104 only as the general personal injury statute of limitations that the minors’ savings statute excepts. opinion →
Prescott v. Adams, the court cites a prior decision under this section to explain when a property damage claim accrues under § 28-3-105. opinion →
Malone ex rel. Alexander v. Jackson, the court mentions the Tennessee one-year limitations statute only as the alternative to the Missouri limitation it applies. opinion →
Colonial Refrigerated TransPortation, Inc. v. Worsham, the court cites the section as the limitations statute Occidental invoked but declines to address the contention because the defense was not raised below. opinion →
Marilyn Duncan, Et Vir, A.Y. Duncan v. H.M. Leeds, M.D. And Roy McDonald M.D., the court cites § 28-3-104 as the source of the one-year period while deciding whether the fraudulent-concealment exception in the medical malpractice statute could apply. opinion →
Cannon v. Miller, the court cites the section only in a footnote identifying a one-year limitation period for criminal conversation. opinion →
Baxter v. Vandenheovel, the court mentions the section only to identify the one-year statute of limitations involved in filing the suits. opinion →
Misco, Inc., Mid-South Aluminum Company, and Everett W. Fielder, Jr. v. United States Steel Corporation and Alside, Inco, the court declined to decide whether § 28-3-104 applied because the claim was barred under either possible limitations period. opinion →
Wiersema v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the court cites the section only as the most closely analogous Tennessee statute while discussing a possible fallback limitations period. opinion →
Van Cleave v. McKee Baking Co., the court cites the section only as the basis for the chancellor’s dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim. opinion →
Poling v. Goins, the court mentions the section only to note that it codifies a one-year statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions. opinion →
Lazarov v. Lazarov, the court mentions the section only while recounting the plaintiff’s statute of limitations argument and noting that the limitations period had not run. opinion →
Quality Technology Co. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Co., the court mentions § 28-3-104 only as the limitations period QTC argued should apply to its trade disparagement claim, without adopting that argument. opinion →
Carr v. Borchers, the court mentions the section only as the basis for the defendant’s summary judgment motion and decides tolling under other statutes. opinion →
Carruthers Ready-Mix, Inc. v. Cement Masons Local Union No. 520, the court applies § 28-3-105 to the federal claim and does not discuss § 28-3-104. opinion →
Elliott Crane Service, Inc. v. H.G. Hill Stores, Inc., the court mentions the section only as a limitations defense pleaded by the defendant. opinion →
Adamson v. City of Provo, Utah, the court cites the section as a comparison while deciding whether to apply a Utah limitations statute. opinion →
Moon v. White, the court reports White’s reliance on the section for the emotional-distress claim but decides the summary judgment motion on accrual and tolling grounds. opinion →
Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., the court cites § 28-3-104 to contrast the libel deadline with the slander deadline it decides under § 28-3-103. opinion →
Arnold v. Duchesne County, Merv Taylor, Jerry Foote, and Clair Poulson, the court mentions Tennessee’s statute as a comparison while deciding which limitations period applies to § 1983 actions in Utah. opinion →
Williams v. Williamson County Board of Education, the court declined to consider the limitations defense because the defendants had not raised it in the lower court. opinion →
Wood v. Parker, the court reports the trial court’s limitations ruling but resolves the remaining claim as moot without deciding the section’s application. opinion →
Smith v. Grumman-Olsen Corp., the court cited § 28-3-104 for the one-year limit but decided whether the separate disability-tolling statute allowed the suit to proceed. opinion →
Halstead v. Niles-Bolton Associates, Derek Barton Company, Inc., D/B/A Derek Barton Tennis Courts, the court cites the section as background before deciding whether the separate complaint met the deadline under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119. opinion →
Purisch v. Tennessee Technological University, the court declined to decide whether the section barred the claims and resolved them on their merits. opinion →
Harper v. United States, the court cites the section as the limitations law applied in an earlier case while deciding whether that case’s accrual ruling precludes relitigation of a federal claim. opinion →
Stefanovic v. University of Tennessee, the court mentions the section as a presumed limitations period but postpones deciding the limitations defense. opinion →
Stevens v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the court considered § 28-3-104(a) as a proposed limitations period for a federal veterans’ reemployment claim, then held that laches governed the claim. opinion →
Canada v. Ace, the court cites the section to identify the applicable limitations period, then dismisses the appeal for failure to serve the notice of appeal on the appellate court clerk. opinion →
Jacobs v. Baylor School, the court cites the section for the one-year personal injury period while analyzing tolling under § 28-1-106. opinion →
Robert and Sally Raitz v. Sparks, the court mentions the section in a footnote but applies the parties’ agreed three-year limitations period under § 28-3-105. opinion →
Berger v. Ratner, the court cites the section while recounting the dismissal of the malpractice claim; this appeal decides only Rule 11 sanctions. opinion →
Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., the court cites the section for the one-year libel deadline but dismisses the defamation claim because the complaint lacks supporting allegations. opinion →
McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church, the court cites the section as the basis for the church’s limitations defense and decides whether the amended complaint relates back under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. opinion →
DeLoach v. Alfred, the court identifies the section as Tennessee’s one-year limit for tort actions but applies Arizona’s limitations period under its choice-of-law rule. opinion →
Lambert v. Invacare Corp., the court mentions § 28-3-104(a)(1) while distinguishing Turner and applies the limitations period in § 50-6-112(d) instead. opinion →
Haynes v. Conley, the court identifies the section as a statute of limitations cited in the complaint but does not apply it. opinion →
Lewis v. Otis Campbell & Robert Dinwiddie, the court cites the section while describing the defendants’ limitations motions, then decides the medical malpractice claim under § 29-26-116. opinion →
Kelly v. Wooten, the court cites the section’s one-year deadline while deciding whether the savings statute and Rule 3 preserve the refiled suit. opinion →
Goley v. Broyles, the court cites the section while describing State Farm’s limitations argument and decides the service issue under § 56-7-1206(a). opinion →
Scroggins v. Goss, the court cites the section for the one-year limitations period and decides whether service by publication preserved the filing date under the civil procedure rules. opinion →
Johnny J. Crass, Jr. v. State of Tn Bd. of Claims, the court noted the State’s limitations defense under the section but held that the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the claim was timely. opinion →
Lansing v. Memphis, the court cites the section while reporting the district court's ruling that the 1995 and 1996 claims were time-barred. opinion →
Lansing v. City of Memphis Memphis Park Commission, Memphis in May International Festival, Inc., the court mentions the section while recounting the district court’s ruling that earlier claims were time-barred. opinion →
Holiday v. Shoney's South, Inc., the court cites the section while recounting an unappealed dismissal and decides only whether to set aside a voluntary non-suit under Rule 60.02. opinion →
Miller v. Campbell, the court cites the section in a footnote while advising the plaintiff about the deadline for a possible future lawsuit against identified prison officials. opinion →
Larry Parish v. Marquis, the court cites the section while recounting a trial court ruling in an earlier lawsuit and decides this appeal on venue. opinion →
Whitehat v. College of Eastern Utah, the court mentions the Tennessee section while distinguishing a Sixth Circuit decision and applies Utah's limitations statute instead. opinion →
Tullis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the court cites the section only while describing Georgia-Pacific’s argument that Tennessee’s one-year limit barred the suit. opinion →
Lynn v. City of Jackson, the court mentions the section’s general one-year period for wrongful death actions while deciding whether the TGTLA’s separate filing period could be tolled. opinion →
Edwards v. Campbell, the court cites the section as an applicable limitations statute after deciding that the plaintiffs failed to preserve their claims under Rule 3. opinion →
Connie Harris and Danny Harris v. Marriott, Inc., & Fibercare, Inc., the court cites the section for the one-year personal injury limit and decides under Rule 3 whether the complaint tolled that limit. opinion →
Marchesani v. Pellerin-Milnor Corp., the court cites the section only to note that Tennessee and Louisiana have the same limitations period for tort claims. opinion →
Stempa v. Walgreen Co., the court applies Rules 3 and 4.01 to decide whether filing the complaint tolled the applicable statute of limitations, without addressing § 28-3-104. opinion →
Jordan v. Marchetti, the court mentions the section as a limitations period raised below, then applies the seven-year period in § 28-2-103. opinion →
Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center, P.C., the court cites the section as a personal tort limitations provision while deciding whether the plaintiff complied with the rules governing service and voluntary dismissal. opinion →
Crawford v. Beatt, the court cites the section as a cross-reference while applying the medical malpractice limitations period in § 29-26-116. opinion →
McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., the court mentions the one-year limitations period as background to the wrongful death filing without deciding a dispute about the section. opinion →
Mccurry v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., the court cited the section as background when describing the timing of the original wrongful death suit. opinion →
Parrish v. Marquis, the court mentions the section while recounting the limitations ruling in Christian, then decides whether the earlier suit ended favorably for the present malicious prosecution claim. opinion →
Crafton v. John Van Den Bosch, Jr., the court mentions the section while recounting the defendant’s limitations argument, then affirms the denial of summary judgment because material facts remain disputed. opinion →
Rose v. Rick Welch, the court cites the section’s one-year limitations period while describing an earlier decision, but decides no limitations issue in this case. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court affirmed dismissal based on the Claims Commission’s notice requirements; the section’s one-year period appeared only in the State’s argument. opinion →
Rose v. Welch, the court mentions the section’s limitations period while discussing an earlier case, then decides whether expert testimony was required in this case. opinion →
Green v. Moore, the court cites the section while recounting the trial court's dismissal of tort claims; its own decision concerns the deadline to appeal. opinion →
Anthony v. BTR Auto Sealing, the court cites the section as the previously borrowed limitations period for § 1981 claims while deciding whether a federal four-year period applies. opinion →
Lawrence E. Anthony, Jr. v. Btr Automotive Sealing Systems, Inc., the court cites the section as the previously borrowed limitations period for Tennessee § 1981 claims while deciding when a federal four-year period applies. opinion →
Tate v. United Services Associates, Inc., the court rejects Tate’s request to apply the Tennessee limitations period because Title VII supplies its own filing deadline. opinion →
The Estate of Alonzo Donald Tucker v. Lee M., the court applied Rule 15.03 to decide whether the amended complaint could relate back despite the one-year limitations period. opinion →
Kinamore v. EPB Electric Utility, the court cites the section only while recounting the district court’s limitations ruling. opinion →
Author R. Turner v. State of Tennessee, the court cites the section for the one-year filing period but decides the claim’s timeliness under the transfer rule in § 9-8-307(i). opinion →
Sanford v. Shea, the court mentions the section only to explain that the plaintiff had not invoked it when rejecting her new intentional misrepresentation claim. opinion →
Webb v. Werner, the court cites the section when describing Allstate’s limitations argument, but decides the service issue under Tenn.R.Civ.P. 3. opinion →
Glass v. George Underwood, Jr., the court notes that the defendant raised § 28-3-104 as a limitations defense but does not address it on appeal. opinion →
Henderson v. David Mills, Warden, the court mentions the section only as part of the inmate’s complaint and decides his retaliation claim without interpreting it. opinion →
Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, the court cites the section as Tennessee’s one-year personal injury deadline while deciding that the federal limitations period governs. opinion →
Brenda Woods, Tawana Polk, Jonathan Joy, and Clifton Polk v. Cathy N. Jones, Administrator of Elections, Hardeman County Election Commission, the court cites another case's treatment of the section while deciding the filing deadline for an election contest. opinion →
Temlock v. McGinnis, the court mentions the section as a ground for the trial court’s dismissal but declines to decide whether the limitations period ran. opinion →
Ha'min v. Lewis, the magistrate judge cites the section while applying an earlier limitations ruling in a report and recommendation. opinion →
Markowitz v. Harper, the court cites the section for the parties’ agreed one-year limitations period while deciding whether Tennessee’s savings statute preserves the suit. opinion →
Abels Ex Rel. Hunt v. Genie Industries, Inc., the court identifies this section as the applicable limitations period but decides the tolling rule under the separate legal disability statute. opinion →
Feild v. GRAFFAGNINO, after dismissing the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court discussed § 28-3-104 as a conditional ground for dismissal. opinion →
Webb v. Lane, the court observes that the complaint was filed beyond the section’s one-year period but does not decide the limitations defense because the appellee did not raise it on appeal. opinion →
Eidson v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the court used the section as the agreed source of the one-year period and decided when the § 1983 claims accrued under federal law. opinion →
Central Sales and Services, Inc., Edward J. Kehrer and Ralph A. Deavers v. Berg, the court cites the section as the potential time limit for a wrongful termination claim but does not decide whether defendant brought that claim. opinion →
Montgomery v. Wyeth, the court cites the section’s accrual language to support its finding that the injury occurred in Tennessee for choice-of-law purposes. opinion →
Willis v. Shelby County, Tennessee, the court cites the section for the underlying one-year deadline while deciding whether Tennessee’s savings statute made the refiled claims timely. opinion →
Montgomery v. Wyeth, the court cites the section while recounting the district court’s choice-of-law analysis, but decides the case under Tennessee’s separate products liability statute of repose. opinion →
Caldwell v. PBM PROPERTIES, the court mentions § 28-3-104 as a statute pleaded in an earlier case while deciding whether § 28-3-202 bars this action. opinion →
ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Medical, LLC, the court assumed the section’s one-year limitations period might apply, without deciding whether it did. opinion →
Chook v. Tashawn N. Pirela Jones and Kenneth Jones, the court cites the section while recounting a defendant’s limitations argument, then dismisses the appeal because the order was not final. opinion →
Shawn Howell, Individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Jesse Franklin Browning, Jr. v. Claiborne and Hughes H, the court cites the section as a one-year limitations period while deciding whether the Savings Statute applies. opinion →
Trent v. Anderson, the court assumed the parties’ agreed one-year limitations period and decided that the continuing violation doctrine did not save the federal claims. opinion →
Evans v. Evans, the court cites the section while describing the defendant’s motion, then decides whether counsel’s conduct warranted Rule 11 sanctions. opinion →
Bryson v. City of Chattanooga, the opinion reports the trial court’s limitations ruling and the parties’ arguments, but contains no appellate decision about this section. opinion →
Weaver v. Pardue, the court quotes the trial court’s limitations ruling, but the appeal concerns only the later claim. opinion →
Sherrill v. Souder, the court cites the section as the source of the one-year period while analyzing the medical malpractice discovery rule under § 29-26-116. opinion →
Moore v. Coffee County, TN, the court cites the section while describing Moore’s limitations concern, then decides whether dismissal and denial of his Rule 59(e) motion were proper. opinion →
Jane Doe and John Doe v. Walgreens Company, the court mentions the section as part of the defendants’ statute of limitations defense and says no limitations issue is on appeal. opinion →
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr., and wife, Linda Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., the court cites § 28-3-104 for the one-year personal injury deadline while deciding how § 20-1-119 extends the time to add defendants. opinion →
Davey Mann, and wife, Teresa Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, the court treated the one-year personal injury limit as expired and decided whether section 20-1-119 extended the time to sue these defendants. opinion →
Walton Cunningham & Phyllis Cunningham ex rel. Phillip Walton Cunningham v. Williamson County Hospital District, the court cites the section to identify the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions while deciding whether a different statute extends the filing deadline. opinion →
Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Beaman Dodge Chrysler Jeep- Concurring, the concurrence proposes applying the section’s injury-date accrual rule, which the majority did not adopt for this claim. opinion →
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr. v. Fulmarque, Inc., the court cites the section for the one-year personal injury deadline while deciding whether section 20-1-119 allows successive ninety-day periods to add defendants. opinion →
Vaughn v. Morton, the court quotes the trial court's citation to the one-year personal-injury deadline while deciding whether an amendment relates back under Rule 15.03. opinion →
Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, the court treats the one-year limit as undisputed and decides whether section 20-1-119 permits the amended complaint. opinion →
Ramsay v. Custer, the court mentioned the one-year limit for personal injury claims in a footnote but declined to review the dismissal as time barred. opinion →
Bone v. Taco Bell of America, LLC, the court cites the one-year limitations period to assess whether the timing of the plaintiff’s filing indicated bad faith for judicial estoppel. opinion →
Rodney v. Johnson v. Trane U.S., Inc., the court cites the section while recounting Trane’s limitations argument, then decides whether the amended complaint was timely under other provisions. opinion →
Parker v. Robertson, the court cites the section while recounting Parker’s concession that some claims were time-barred, but does not decide whether the statute applies. opinion →
Coggins v. Holston Valley Medical Center, the opinion quotes the trial court’s use of the section’s one-year limitation period, while the appellate court decides whether a separate statute extends the filing deadline. opinion →
Walker v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., the court cited the section for Tennessee’s one-year period while deciding under Ohio law where Walker’s claim accrued. opinion →
Sumner v. Campbell Clinic, PC, the court mentions the section in a party’s limitations issue but resolves the appeal under the Claims Commission Act without deciding that issue. opinion →
HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tennessee, Inc., the court cites § 28-3-104 only as an example of a statute of limitations while interpreting § 56-7-110(b). opinion →
Hunley v. Detroit Diesel Corp., the court cites the section as the underlying personal injury limitations period while deciding whether a separate savings statute applies. opinion →
Sprunger v. Cumberland County, TN Sheriff's Office, the court reported the trial court’s application of the section and held that the County waived its challenge to that ruling on appeal. opinion →
Jordan v. Blount Cty., the court cites the section for the one-year limitations period but decides when the federal § 1983 claim accrued. opinion →
Riley v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis, the court cites the section to state the one-year limitations period while addressing whether the plaintiffs’ pre-suit notice extended it. opinion →
Tiffinne Wendalyn Gail Runions v. Jackson -Madison County General Hospital District, the court cites § 28-3-104(a)(1) as background for the one-year limitations period while deciding the pre-suit notice requirements of § 29-26-121. opinion →
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Memphis Light, Gas, and Water, the court cites the section as one example of differing limitation periods while interpreting the comparative fault statute. opinion →
Barefoot v. Rule, the court cites the section for Tennessee’s one-year filing period while deciding whether a Tennessee voluntary dismissal affects a later North Carolina suit. opinion →
Annette v. Haslam, the magistrate judge applies the section’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation that the district judge has not adopted. opinion →
Villalba v. McCown, the court cites the section for the general one-year personal injury deadline while deciding whether service and the savings statute made the second complaint timely. opinion →
Williams v. Shelby County Board of Education, the court cited the section as one possible limitations period but found the suit timely under every potentially applicable period. opinion →
Lewis v. Cumberland County Sheriff's Department, the magistrate judge cited the section in recommending dismissal on limitations grounds, but the district court had not adopted the recommendation. opinion →
Hensley v. Stokely Hospitality Properties, Inc., the court cites the section for the undisputed one-year limitations period and decides whether the amended complaint relates back under Rule 15.03. opinion →
Turner v. Shelby County Jail, the court cites the section’s one-year period as a possible bar to Turner’s claims but does not decide whether the claims are time-barred. opinion →
Kelly v. Tennessee, State of, the court mentioned the section’s one-year limit only in a conditional discussion of claims against a proper defendant. opinion →
Townsend v. TN Dept of Corrections, the court cites the section's one-year period but only says the damages claim appears time barred before dismissing it on other grounds. opinion →
Pethtel v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services (TV2), the court cites the section to illustrate the prejudice caused by delay in adding defendants, without deciding a limitations issue. opinion →
Clark v. Clawson, the magistrate judge discussed the section’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation that the district judge had not yet adopted. opinion →
Pryor v. Evans, the court cited the section’s one-year limitations period but only said the claim was likely time-barred before rejecting it on the merits. opinion →
Prewitt v. Saint Thomas Health, the court declined to review the trial court’s ruling under this section because the plaintiff waived her challenge to an independent ground for dismissal. opinion →
Mahone v. Manning, the court mentioned the one-year limitations period as guidance for amendment but dismissed the complaint for inadequate pleading without deciding whether any claim was untimely. opinion →
Jones v. State of Tennessee Department of Correction, the magistrate judge cited the section’s one-year period in a recommendation that the district court had not yet adopted. opinion →
Hammock v. Mount Pleasant Police Department, the court cited the section in a footnote about a conditional timeliness issue while dismissing the claims under the Heck doctrine. opinion →
Wright v. Donaghy, the court cited the section’s one-year limitations period but assumed the claims were timely and dismissed them for failure to state a § 1983 claim. opinion →
Kampmeyer v. State of Tennessee, the court cites the section to identify the applicable one-year limitations period while deciding whether the claimants gave notice as required by section 9-8-402(a)(1). opinion →
Peterson v. Carey, the court identified the section’s possible two-year limitations period and remanded for the trial court to decide whether it applied. opinion →
Keller v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the court mentions the section’s one-year limitations period but leaves the limitations issue undecided because the defendants did not seek dismissal on that ground. opinion →
John Doe 1 v. Woodland Presbyterian, the court cites the section while describing the plaintiffs’ argument that their claims were timely. opinion →
Hicks v. City of Millersville, the magistrate judge cites the section for Tennessee’s one-year limitations period while recommending dismissal of the false-arrest claims. opinion →
Avery v. Blackburn, the court cites the section in a hypothetical limitations discussion after concluding that the pleading stated no tort claim. opinion →
Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., the court cited the section for the parties’ agreed one-year limitations period for federal claims and resolved the appeal on other grounds. opinion →
Hamer v. United States, the court cited the section for Tennessee’s one-year limitations period but did not decide whether any claim arose before the cutoff date. opinion →
Stinson v. Fowlkes, the court cites the section for a one-year limitations period but does not determine that any identified claim arose outside that period. opinion →
Stinson v. Williams, the court gives a conditional time bar for claims arising before August 31, 2021, without finding that any claim arose before that date. opinion →
Galaz v. Warren County, Tennessee, the court cites the section as the source of the one-year limitations period but denies dismissal based on an extension under § 29-26-121. opinion →
Tulis v. Orange, the magistrate judge applied the section’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation that the district judge had not yet adopted. opinion →
Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corporation (Dissent), the court cites the section for the one-year limitations period while addressing a common-law exception to vicarious liability. opinion →
Valentine v. Gay, the court recounts the limitations defense under this section but dismisses the case on sovereign immunity grounds without deciding the limitations issue. opinion →
Allen v. PSI Services LLC, the court cited the section’s one-year period for libel but declined to decide which limitations period applied. opinion →
Scholz v. American Select Insurance Company, the court cites Tennessee’s one-year personal injury deadline while deciding whether it bars a claim under a Kentucky uninsured motorist policy. opinion →
Dominion Real Estate, LLC v. The Wise Group, Inc., the court cites the section while recounting a limitations dismissal that it lacked jurisdiction to review. opinion →
Gray v. Strattman, the court cited the section as a possible time bar but expressly declined to dismiss the complaint on that ground. opinion →
Johnson v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, the magistrate judge cited the section while considering whether dismissal for lack of service might time-bar Johnson’s claim, but did not decide whether the limitation period had run. opinion →
Whyte v. Hazley, the magistrate judge cited the section’s one-year period in a report recommending dismissal of the § 1983 claims as untimely. opinion →
Giro v. Wilburn, the court states the one-year limitations period as background and vacates the judgment because the trial court relied on a memorandum opinion it could not cite. opinion →
Gil v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc., the court assumed the proposed limitations analysis without deciding it and rejected dismissal because the defendants had not established the facts their argument required. opinion →
Postell v. Serrett, the magistrate judge cited the section for Tennessee’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation the district court had not yet adopted. opinion →
Mallinger v. Hard Rock Cafe International (STP), Inc., the court treats the one-year personal injury deadline as undisputed and decides whether a separate comparative-fault grace period permits the claim. opinion →
Vargo v. Graves, the magistrate judge cites the section for Tennessee’s one-year limitations period while recommending dismissal for lack of service; the district judge has not adopted the recommendation. opinion →
Brooks v. Wilson, the magistrate judge recommended applying the section’s one-year limitations period, but the district judge had not adopted the recommendation. opinion →
Bowles v. Tennessee Department of Correctional - CCA, the magistrate judge cites the section when considering whether dismissal for failure to serve might time-bar Bowles’s claims, but only recommends a ruling to the district court. opinion →
Arnold v. Centurion of Tennessee, LLC, the court cited the section’s one-year limitations period but only ordered the plaintiff to show cause why his claims should not be dismissed as time-barred. opinion →
Miller v. State of Tennessee, the court cites the section for a limitations bar that it says would appear to apply, while dismissing the claim on other grounds. opinion →
Pitt v. Quality Carriers Inc, the court cites the section while weighing whether to extend the federal service deadline and does not decide when the libel claim accrued. opinion →
Peterson v. Stillwagon, the magistrate judge cited the section in a limitations footnote while recommending a stay; the district judge had not adopted the recommendation. opinion →
Hudson v. City of Memphis, the magistrate judge cited the section’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation that the district judge had not yet adopted. opinion →
Jordan v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the magistrate judge cited the section’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation that the district judge had not adopted. opinion →
Turley v. Mendez, the court mentions the section only in the title of Mr. Turley’s complaint and dismisses the appeal for briefing deficiencies. opinion →
Johnson v. Lampley, the magistrate judge applied the section’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation that the district court had not adopted. opinion →
Davis v. Bonner, the court cites the section only to warn potential plaintiffs about the limitations period; it does not decide a limitations issue. opinion →
Hicks v. City of Millersville, the magistrate judge cites the section for Tennessee’s one-year limitations period in a recommendation the district court has not adopted. opinion →
Williams v. Walmart Inc., the court cites the section while discussing a limitations argument that it expressly declines to decide. opinion →
Kremer v. Unilever, PLC, the court noted that the plaintiff copied the section into an objection, but found the limitations period irrelevant because the action was timely filed. opinion →
Rumsey v. Regions Morgan Keegan Trust, the court recounts the trial court’s application of the section to the loss-of-consortium claim, then dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. opinion →
Crouch v. Hayward, the magistrate judge cited the section for Tennessee’s one-year personal-injury period while recommending dismissal of an untimely § 1983 claim. opinion →
Dahl v. Tennessee Technological University, the magistrate judge cited the section’s one-year limitations period while recommending dismissal, but the district judge had not adopted the recommendation. opinion →
Mattson, the court cited the section only to note that some claims might be time barred when deciding to transfer the case. opinion →
Johnson v. Airtight Resources Inc., the court cites the one-year personal injury deadline as background while deciding whether the plaintiff could add a defendant under § 20-1-119 and Rule 15.01. opinion →
Larson v. Snow College, the court cites Tennessee’s provision only to compare it with a Utah statute while deciding the period for Utah civil rights claims. opinion →
Larson v. Snow College, the court uses the Tennessee statute as a comparison while deciding which Utah limitations period applies to Larson’s federal claims. opinion →
JRS Partners, GP v. Leech Tishman Fuscaldo & Lampl, LLC, the court resolved vicarious liability after the parties did not dispute that the underlying malpractice claim was already time-barred. opinion →
Gardner v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (Dissent), this separate opinion is a dissent; the majority did not adopt its analysis of the limitations period. opinion →
Dowlen v. The City of Springfield, Tennessee, the parties agreed on a one-year period, and the court decided whether an amended pleading met a separate ninety-day rule. opinion →

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace