Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101

Section 36-5-101(e)(5) permits a court to consider a child's available financial resources when determining how much child support is needed.

Campanali v. Campanali · filed 1985-05-08(e)(5)

Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(5) permits the court to consider the financial resources available to a child when it is determining how much child support is needed.

Section 36-5-101 permits retrospective and prospective modification of periodic alimony.

Deatherage v. Wallace (In Re Deatherage) · filed 1985-11-25

Consistent with these fundamental considerations, periodic alimony remains subject to both retrospective and prospective modification. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (Supp.1985).

Section 36-5-101 permits retroactive modification of alimony only upon specific written findings that the obligor could not pay through no intentional fault and that retroactivity is needed to meet the ends of justice.

Threadgill v. Threadgill · filed 1987-07-16(a)(1)

The legislature has seen fit to allow a modification of alimony to be made retroactively only upon a specific written finding of an inability to pay through no intentional fault of the obligor and that retroactive modification be made in order to meet the ends of justice.

Periodic alimony must be set at a definite amount; an uncertain percentage of the paying spouse’s bonus is improper.

Franklin v. Franklin · filed 1987-12-04(a)(2)

An award of periodic alimony should be fixed in “some definite amount or amounts to be paid in monthly, semi-monthly, or weekly installments, or otherwise_” Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(2).

Section 36-5-101(a) permits modification of alimony upon a showing of a material, unanticipated change of relevant circumstances.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1989-10-11(a)

While the testimony of the parties did reveal some changed circumstances, the record does not support the trial court’s finding that the change in circumstances was substantial enough to warrant a reduction in alimony. Pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a), an award of alimony may be modified upon the showing of “a material, unanticipated change of relevant circumstances.”

Section 36-5-101(d) favors rehabilitative, temporary support, but a long-term support award based on unlikely rehabilitation may be nonmodifiable upon a change of circumstances alone.

Amos v. Amos · filed 1994-02-25(d)

Now in a chapter of the code entitled “Alimony and Child Support”, the substantive provisions refer almost exclusively to “support and maintenance” rather than alimony, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101, and establish a preference for rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance rather than long-term support and maintenance. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d). ... From that premise it is logical to conclude that the award would not be subject to modification except on the happening of one of the three events mentioned in the order itself. We, therefore, find that the order is not modifiable upon a showing of a change of circumstances alone.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires a substantial and material change of circumstances to modify alimony.

Barnett v. Robert McAlister Barnett, III - Concurring · filed 1999-02-01(a)(1)

A modification of alimony requires "a substantial and material change of circumstances." Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).

Section 36-5-101 supports periodic alimony when a spouse is economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible; an interim in solido award may be paid from the other spouse's marital estate during unemployment.

George Weatherby Sickler, III v. Sickler · filed 1999-05-05(d)(1)

By its award of periodic alimony, the trial court made the determination that as between these parties "there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible." Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (Supp. 1998). ... These circumstances indicate that an award of periodic alimony was appropriate and accordingly we affirm the trial court's decision that the Wife needs periodic alimony. ... In light of the finding that periodic alimony is appropriate, we find that the Wife should have been given an in solido award out of the Husband's marital estate during the period that the Husband was unemployed.

A party seeking to modify alimony under § 36-5-101(a)(1) must show a substantial and material change in circumstances.

Miglin v. Miglin · filed 1999-06-18(a)(1)

If Father in this proceeding appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to modify or terminate alimony, the standard for modification of alimony is set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(a)(1) which states, in part, “the court may decree an increase or decrease of such allowance only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances . . . .”

The authority to modify alimony in futuro ends when a contingency terminates the award.

Waddey v. Ira Clinton Waddey, Jr. · filed 1999-09-06

We hold that a trial court's ability to modify an award of alimony in futuro terminates upon the occurrence of a contingency when the award ceases to exist.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification of agreed or court-ordered spousal support only upon a substantial and material change in circumstances.

Stone v. Stone · filed 1998-06-23(a)(1)

Spousal support provisions, whether agreed to by the parties or fashioned by a court, are not subject to revision for just any reason. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) states that they can be modified “only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances.”

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification or termination of spousal support only after a substantial, material change in circumstances since the previous support decree.

Sannella v. Sannella · filed 1999-01-27(a)(1)

Courts cannot modify or terminate a spousal support award unless there has been a substantial, material change in circumstances since the entry of the previous support decree.

Section 36-5-101(a)(2)(B) supports stating in an alimony in futuro decree that payments end when the recipient dies or remarries.

Yong Mun Chong Meadows v. Tommy C. Meadows · filed 1998-11-05(a)(2)(B)

We believe that it would be helpful to modify the trial court’s decree to declare that the alimony it awarded is indeed alimony in futuro, and that it will terminate upon the death or remarriage of the recipient.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits a change in alimony only upon a substantial and material change in circumstances; changes anticipated at the time of divorce do not qualify.

Cathy Lee Barnes Williams v. Rodney Lee Williams. · filed 2000-06-27(a)(1)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101 (a)(1) provides that a court may increase or decrease the amount of alimony awarded in a divorce “only upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.” ... Consequently, we find that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances, justifying a decrease in alimony.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification of alimony orders upon a substantial and material change in circumstances, but does not permit modification of marital property distributions.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2001-02-23(a)(1)

While court orders directing payment of alimony may be modified upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(l) (2000 Supp.), court orders distributing marital property are not subject to modification.

Section 36-5-101(d) does not require modification of spousal support merely because circumstances have materially changed; the court considers the relevant statutory factors in deciding whether and how much to modify the award.

Bogan v. Bogan · filed 2001-11-08(d)

However, a mere finding of such a change in circumstances does not require modification of the support award, and the trial court should carefully consider the relevant factors of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(d) in deciding by what amount, if any, the award should be modified.

Spousal support may be modified only after a substantial and material change in circumstances since the support decree.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2001-12-28(a)(1)

It is well settled that spousal support awards may not be modified unless the court finds a substantial and material change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the support decree. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101 (a)(1) (Supp. 2000).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification of alimony in futuro upon a substantial and material change in circumstances that justifies changing the payment.

Gamble v. Alex Grady Gamble, Iii · filed 2002-05-14(a)(1)

Alimony in futuro can be modified upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying a change in the payment.

Alimony in futuro may be modified for a substantial and material change in circumstances only if the change was not anticipated or factored into the original decree.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2002-12-31(a)(1)

It appears to us, however, that no one’s life is static, that everyone undergoes changes over time, and that only those changes which were not anticipated by the court and were not factored into its original decree can justify a change in that decree.

Relevant factors in § 36-5-101(d) must be considered when deciding whether changed circumstances warrant modifying alimony.

Hasty v. Bobbie Hasty · filed 2003-07-10(d)

The factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d), applicable to the initial grant of spousal support and maintenance, where relevant, must be taken into consideration in determining whether there has been a change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the alimony obligation.

An objectively reasonable decision to leave employment when continued work requires added duties or inconveniences can be a substantial and material change of circumstances permitting modification of alimony, unless the decision is motivated by a desire to reduce or terminate alimony.

Lamberson v. Lamberson · filed 2004-01-27(a)(1)

Just as an objectively reasonable decision to retire constitutes a substantial and material change of circumstances, so a decision to reject involuntary servitude under circumstances where continued employment is conditional upon added duties, responsibilities and inconveniences should constitute a substantial and material change in circumstance. Fatal to both retirement and change of employment is a determination that, in fact, the decision to retire or to change employment is motivated by a desire to reduce or terminate alimony.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification or termination of spousal support upon a substantial and material change in circumstances.

Betty Lonora McMillin Whalen v. Whalen · filed 2004-12-17(a)(1)

We find no evidence in the record which shows with certainty when Husband will retire or that his retirement is imminent. Accordingly, Husband’s argument that the trial court should have taken the fact of his retirement into account in setting the amount of his support obligation is without merit. If and when Husband does retire, Husband may seek a modification of alimony pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(a)(1) which provides that a spousal support award may be modified or terminated upon a finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances.

Section 36-5-101 permits modification of alimony only upon a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support order.

Byrd v. Byrd · filed 2005-07-06(a)(1)

Modifications of alimony may be granted only upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances since entry of the original support order. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(l).

Section 36-5-101(d)(2) permits modification of alimony in futuro or rehabilitative alimony upon a substantial and material change in circumstances; an award with an uncertain total because payments end upon remarriage is alimony in futuro.

Raymond T. Schmidt, Jr. v. Schmidt · filed 2005-09-15(d)(2)

For both in futuro and rehabilitative alimony, the amount and duration of the award may be modified where necessary to meet the equities of the case, upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(2) (Supp. 2004); see also Waddey, 6 S.W.3d at 233; Self, 861 S.W.2d at 363. ... Therefore, the alimony award is subject to modification, and the trial court’s holding to the contrary must be reversed.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) permits an increase or decrease in alimony only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances.

Richards v. Joy Wood Richards · filed 2005-02-17(a)(1)(A)

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) provides that a court may decree an increase or decrease of an allowance for spousal support “only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances.”

Section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) keeps spousal-support provisions under the issuing court’s control, so a petition to modify that support must be brought in that court.

Roberts v. Todd · filed 2004-12-21(a)(1)(A)

It is true that section 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) of the Tennessee Code provides that, where a divorce decree includes provisions for spousal support, the decree shall “remain in the court’s control.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2004). Therefore, any petition to modify spousal support must be brought in the court that originally issues the divorce.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(i) measures a spouse’s ability to pay support by earning capacity rather than actual income.

Lesley LaPointe Walker v. Walker · filed 2005-01-28(d)(1)(E)(i)

This strategy usually fails because a spouse’s support obligation is not measured by his or her actual income but rather by his or her earning capacity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(i) (spousal support); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 1240-2-4-.03(3)(d) (Dec. 2003) (child support).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification of alimony only upon a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support order.

Morris v. Morris · filed 2010-07-20(a)(1)

Modifications of alimony may be granted only upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances since the entry of the original support order. Byrd v. Byrd, 184 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1)).2 A change is considered substantial when it significantly affects either the obligor's ability to pay or obligee's need for support. Id. A change is considered material if the change occurred since the original support decree's entry. Id.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires a party seeking to modify alimony in futuro to show a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support decree.

Bordes v. Bordes · filed 2011-09-30(a)(1)

A party seeking a modification of alimony in futuro must satisfy two requirements. First, the petitioner must establish that there has been a change in circumstances that is substantial and material since the entry of the original support decree. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d at 727–28 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1)). ... The decrease in Husband’s income constituted a substantial change of circumstance because it impaired Husband’s ability to pay the amount of alimony set at the time of the divorce.

A party seeking to modify alimony in futuro must establish a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original support decree.

Wilhoit v. Wilhoit · filed 2014-06-09(a)(1)

First, the petitioner must establish that a substantial and material change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the original support decree.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) requires a sufficient change in circumstances before a court may modify or terminate spousal support.

Renee Pembroke (Cooley) v. Cooley · filed 2016-01-29(a)(1)

A court may not modify or terminate a spousal support award until it first finds that a sufficient change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the original support decree.

Section 36-5-101(d) supplies factors for setting alimony, including the recipient’s need, the obligor’s fault, and the obligor’s ability to pay.

Luna v. Luna · filed 1986-08-13(d)

Among the factors contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) and in the court decisions affecting the amount of an alimony award, the most common factors are the need of the innocent spouse, the fault of obligor spouse, and the obligor spouse’s ability to provide support and maintenance.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) calls for consideration of statutory factors when awarding alimony in solido.

Dellinger v. Dellinger · filed 1997-05-27(d)(1)

A similar list of factors is considered in making an award of alimony, including alimony in solido. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(l) (1996).

Section 36-5-101(d)(7) permits courts to consider how the marital estate was divided when deciding whether to award periodic alimony.

Bull v. Bull · filed 1987-03-04(d)(7)

Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(7) specifically permits the trial court to consider the manner in which the marital estate has been divided when determining whether periodic alimony should be awarded.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance statutory factors when setting the amount and duration of spousal support.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1994-12-07(d)(1)

These determinations are factually driven and require a balancing of the factors contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp.1994).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts deciding spousal support to balance the statutory factors in light of the facts of each case.

Curtis v. Curtis · filed 1997-07-16(d)(1)

Decisions concerning spousal support depend on the unique facts of each case and require a thoughtful balancing of many factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d) favors temporary or rehabilitative alimony when possible, while allowing permanent alimony after consideration of the relevant factors, particularly one spouse’s need and the other’s ability to pay.

Wright v. Quillen · filed 1995-03-29(d)

The terms “temporary” and “rehabilitative” are from the statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d), which says that alimony awards should comply with those restrictions whenever possible. ... The courts have consistently said that the two most important factors are the need of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to meet that need. ... Taking all these factors into account, we think the chancellor was justified in making the alimony award to Mr. Quillen.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) calls for an alimony award based on the statutory factors, including the recipient’s needs and the payor’s ability to provide support.

Whisenhunt v. Whisenhunt · filed 1997-06-09(d)(1)

Moreover, applying the statutory factors, the alimony award of $350 per week is not excessive under the circumstances of this case. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (1996).

In setting the amount of alimony, courts consider all statutory factors, with need and ability to pay carrying the most weight.

Bryant v. Bryant · filed 1998-03-18(d)(1)

While all statutory factors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) are important and will be considered by the trial court, need and the ability to pay are the critical factors in setting the amount of an alimony award.

Section 36-5-101 sets out factors for alimony awards that courts apply to the parties’ economic circumstances.

Miglin v. Daniel Walter Miglin - Concurring · filed 1998-08-05

Examining the economic circumstances of the parties in light of the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion, and we affirm the alimony award.

Section 36-5-101(d) permits consideration of relative fault in setting alimony, but fault cannot override the other statutory factors or make the award punitive.

Hausmann v. Hausmann · filed 1997-10-29(d)

While Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) permits the trial court to consider the relative fault of the parties in setting an alimony award, spousal support awards are not intended to be punitive, nor is fault permitted to override the other factors the court is directed to consider by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) makes the amount and duration of alimony factual determinations based on statutory factors, including earning capacity.

Siegel v. Siegel · filed 1999-03-05(d)(1)

The trial court is afforded wide discretion concerning the award of alimony because the determination of the amount and duration is a factual issue based on the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance the statutory factors when setting the amount and duration of spousal support.

Crocker v. Patricia L. Taylor Crocker - Concurring · filed 1999-04-28(d)(1)

These determinations are factually driven and require a balancing of the factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(d).

An award of permanent alimony must account for the paying spouse's ability to pay.

Sturdivant v. Sturdivant · filed 1999-03-25(d)

We hold that based upon the record as it appears before this court the Husband, on February 28, 1998, simply did not have the ability to pay the $2,000 per month in permanent alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts setting alimony to consider all statutory factors, including the recipient’s need and the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

Goodman v. Goodman · filed 1999-08-09(d)(1)

A court must examine all the factors of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) in determining the proper alimony award. While the real need of the spouse seeking the support is the single most important factor, courts should also consider the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support.

A spouse’s lack of present need can support denying alimony, and reserving alimony for a later decision is a remedy used sparingly in unique circumstances.

Jennitia Jane Blanton Isbell v. Isbell · filed 1999-07-02(d)(1)

As of the time of trial, Wife had no need for alimony. Reserving the issue of alimony in the final judgment is a remedy that is sparingly used in cases involving unique circumstances. While Wife has reason to be concerned about the status of her job, we find that her circumstances are not as compelling as those in Lawson, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award alimony or in failing to reserve the issue of alimony in the final judgment.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when setting alimony, with need and ability to pay critical to the amount.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 2000-11-17(d)(1)

While all relevant factors must be considered, need and the ability to pay are the critical factors in setting the amount of an alimony award.

Section 36-5-101(d) calls for courts to weigh the statutory factors when deciding the amount and type of spousal support, with need and ability to pay carrying the greatest weight.

Stoner v. Stoner · filed 2000-11-21(d)

In the past, this court has determined that “[t]he most significant factors are need and the ability to pay.” Watters, 959 S.W.2d at 593. Examining all of the factors set forth under the statute and giving due weight to the most significant, we find that the trial court did not incorrectly determine the amount and type of support for Mrs. Stoner.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts considering spousal support to determine first whether one spouse is economically disadvantaged relative to the other.

Reel v. George C. Reel, Jr. · filed 2000-04-13(d)(1)

In determining whether to award spousal support, the type of support, and the amount and duration thereof, courts must consider a number of factors. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (listing the factors to consider). The initial determination must be whether one spouse is economically disadvantaged relative to the other. Id. ... We agree with the trial court’s findings. Because we have already adjusted the property division to provide for needed repairs Wife’s house, we can find no basis for a finding that Wife is economically disadvantaged.

Spousal support decisions require a case-specific balancing of the statutory factors.

McKee v. McKee · filed 2000-05-23(d)(1)

Spousal support decisions hinge on the unique facts of the case and require a careful balancing of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance the statutory factors when deciding spousal support.

Jarvis v. Jarvis · filed 2000-11-09(d)(1)

Spousal support decisions hinge on the unique facts of the case and require a careful balancing of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits modification of spousal support only after a substantial, material change in circumstances.

Kennedy v. Kennedy · filed 2000-11-30(a)(1)

A court cannot modify a spousal support award unless there has been a substantial, material change in circumstances since the entry of the previous support decree.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(A) uses earning capacity rather than actual earnings to determine alimony, allowing prior earnings to show capacity after voluntary early retirement.

Erwin v. Erwin · filed 2000-06-26(d)(1)(A)

As noted above, the statute governing alimony refers to the parties’ relative “earning capacity,” not their actual earnings. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(A). The trial court found that Husband’s earning capacity was evidenced by the amount he earned prior to voluntarily electing to retire, rather than the amount of pension he actually received.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to consider the statutory factors when deciding whether alimony is appropriate; economic disadvantage and the other spouse’s ability to pay can support an award.

Henderson v. Henderson · filed 2000-09-14(d)(1)

With regard to alimony, courts are required to apply the factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 to determine whether alimony is necessary or appropriate. The Trial Court found this was not a proper case for the award of alimony, but there were no specific reasons stated. We find the trial court should have awarded alimony.

The division of marital property is a factor in determining an alimony award.

Cunningham v. Cunningham · filed 2000-09-20(d)(1)(H)

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(H) of the Tennessee Code lists the division of marital property as a factor to be considered by the trial court when it determines an alimony award.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) makes need and ability to pay critical to the amount of alimony, while requiring consideration of all relevant factors.

Sharon Faye Brown Hartman v. Hartman · filed 2001-07-20(d)(1)

While need and the ability to pay are the critical factors when setting the amount of an alimony award, all relevant factors must be considered.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) gives trial courts broad discretion over the amount and duration of alimony, guided by findings on the statutory factors.

Arnold v. Arnold · filed 2001-12-12(d)(1)

On this issue, the Trial Court has “wide discretion” regarding an award of alimony, since the amount and duration are determined by the Court’s findings of fact in consideration of the statutory factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts deciding alimony to consider factors including the marriage’s duration, the parties’ separate assets and relative financial circumstances, and fault.

Deneau v. Deneau · filed 2001-02-23(d)(1)

In reviewing the propriety of an alimony award, we must consider a number of factors, including the duration of the marriage; the separate assets of the parties; the relative earning capacity, obligations, needs and financial resources of the parties; and the relative fault of the parties. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(A)-(L) (listing the factors to be considered). ... Upon reviewing the record, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to award alimony to Wife.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) makes the recipient’s need and the paying spouse’s ability to pay the most important factors in an alimony award.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2001-07-10(d)(1)

We also agree that “the need of the disadvantaged spouse” and “the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support” are the most important factors of the alimony statute.

In setting the amount of alimony under § 36-5-101(d)(1), need and ability to pay are the critical factors, although all statutory factors matter.

Allen v. John Fox Allen, Jr. · filed 2001-04-30(d)(1)

Although all statutory factors listed in section 36-5-101(d)(1) are important and are considered by the trial court, need and the ability to pay are the critical factors in setting the amount of an alimony award.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(K) permits a court to consider the parties’ relative fault when deciding whether to award alimony.

Mary Louise Goodman Case v. Case · filed 2001-06-08(d)(1)(K)

In deciding whether to award alimony, the trial court can consider the parties’ relative fault. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(K) (Supp. 2000); Watters, 959 S.W.2d at 593. In this case, the trial court considered Husband’s fault, as well as the likelihood that Husband would receive disability benefits. Under all of these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that Husband was not entitled to alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance its enumerated factors when deciding spousal support issues.

Lowenkron v. Lowenkron · filed 2001-12-11(d)(1)

Courts are strictly abjured to balance the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d)(1) relative to a determination of spousal support issues.

Section 36-5-101(d) assesses a spouse’s economic disadvantage by earning capacity rather than reported earnings.

Yount v. Yount · filed 2002-02-20(d)

The statute does not speak of earnings, however, but of earning capacity.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires trial courts to consider all relevant factors when deciding whether an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated.

Robertson v. Robertson · filed 2002-04-04(d)(1)

We hold that a trial court must consider all relevant factors in § 36 — 5—101(d)(1) to determine whether an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to weigh statutory factors when deciding whether to award alimony and setting its terms.

Sullivan v. Sullivan · filed 2002-09-05(d)(1)

In making its determination of an alimony award, the court must balance several statutory factors including those enumerated in section 36 — 5—101 (d)(1) of the Tennessee Code.

Section 36-5-101 makes marital standard of living one factor in determining alimony and the feasibility of rehabilitation, rather than the sole factor.

Bratton v. Bratton · filed 2002-12-13(d)(1)

The Supreme Court in Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337 (Tenn. 2002) explained that marital standard of living is but one factor to be considered pursuant to the statute, but should not be the sole factor for determining the feasibility of rehabilitation. This is precisely what the Trial Court did, i.e., considered marital standard of living as one factor, not the only factor.

Alimony is set under the statutory factors, with need and ability to pay the most important considerations.

Elsea v. Elsea · filed 2003-02-11

Alimony is to be set based upon the factors ... enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101, with the most important considerations being need and ability to pay. ... The need and ability to pay were established.

Section 36-5-101(d) directs courts to consider earning capacity, rather than earnings alone, when assessing alimony.

Yount v. Yount · filed 2002-05-16(d)

The statute does not speak of earnings, however, but of earning capacity.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to consider the statutory factors when deciding whether to award spousal support and setting its terms.

Seals v. Seals · filed 2002-11-26(d)(1)

We find no evidence in the record to suggest the Trial Court did not consider the purposes of alimony, nor do we find evidence the Trial Court failed to consider the factors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d). We hold the Trial Court’s award of alimony in solido was not an abuse of discretion, and affirm on this issue.

Section 36-5-101 directs courts deciding alimony to consider the factors in subsection (d)(1), including the requesting spouse’s need and the other spouse’s ability to pay.

Buchanan v. Buchanan · filed 2003-02-10(d)(1)

In making an alimony determination, a court should be guided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101, particularly the provisions of subsections (d)(1)(A)-(L).

In setting alimony, the court must consider income available from the recipient’s share of marital property and how that property reduces the recipient’s needs.

Heideman v. Heideman · filed 2002-11-27(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(H)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-101(d)(1)(A) instructs that “income from . . . all other sources” be considered in setting the amount of alimony and Section 36-5- 101(d)(1)(H) requires a court to consider the division of marital assets when making this same determination. We find that an analysis under the factors listed above, including section (A) and section (H) requires a modification of the amount of alimony Wife is to receive because the marital property division will provide her with additional income that should be used to decrease her “real needs.”

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) directs courts to consider all relevant factors when deciding whether to award spousal support and setting its form, amount, and duration.

Cooke v. Cooke · filed 2003-06-17(d)(1)

In determining whether to award support and the nature, amount and length of such support, the court is to consider all relevant factors, including those enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d)(1). ... Based upon all the relevant factors, including the economic factors outlined above and the contributions of each party to the marriage, we conclude that the trial court acted within the broad discretion given to it.

Trial courts must apply the statutory spousal support factors, with need for support and ability to pay as the critical factors.

Frankie Maples v. Maples · filed 2003-10-15(d)(1)

Trial courts are to apply the factors outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) when determining spousal support, and the need for support and the ability to pay are the critical factors.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to consider the relevant spousal support factors, with greatest weight given to the recipient’s need and the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

Stinson v. Stinson · filed 2004-10-25(d)(1)

While a trial court should consider each of the above factors relevant under the circumstances, the two most important factors to be considered in awarding spousal support are need of the disadvantaged spouse and the obligor spouse’s ability to pay.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) requires courts deciding spousal support to balance its factors in light of the facts of each case.

Broadbent v. Shari Katherine Langhi Broadbent · filed 2004-08-24(d)(1)(E)

Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(xii) permits a court to consider a couple’s continuous relationship, including time they lived together while divorced, when weighing the equities of an alimony award.

Jeanette Brooks v. Brooks · filed 2003-07-18(d)(1)(E)(xii)

This long relationship together is an appropriate factor to be considered in this case in weighing “the equities between the parties,” as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d)(1)(E)(xii).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires relative economic disadvantage before a spouse may receive alimony.

Cunningham v. Cunningham · filed 2003-12-22(d)(1)

The legislature has authorized the award of spousal support to an economically disadvantaged spouse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d)(1); Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003). Thus, relative economic disadvantage is a threshold requirement for an award of alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when setting alimony; a short marriage alone does not preclude a five-year award.

Bacigalupo v. Mary Darlene Raines Blacknall Bacigalupo · filed 2004-10-04(d)(1)

Again, Husband ignores the other factors which favor the amount and duration of alimony payments awarded to Wife. ... Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it awarded Wife alimony of $1,000 per month for a period of five years.

Section 36-5-101(E) makes the recipient spouse’s need the most important factor in deciding alimony, followed by the paying spouse’s ability to pay.

Glanzman v. Glanzman · filed 2004-12-02(E)

While the statute sets forth many factors, the two most important factors are (1) the need of the recipient spouse and (2) the obligor spouse’s ability to pay, with the single most important factor being the recipient spouse’s need for support.

Section 36-5-101(E) makes the recipient spouse’s need for support the most important factor in an alimony determination, followed by the obligor spouse’s ability to pay.

Reed v. Reed · filed 2004-12-30(E)

While the statute sets forth many factors, the two most important factors are (1) the need of the recipient spouse and (2) the obligor spouse’s ability to pay, with the single most important factor being the recipient spouse’s need for support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) requires courts to balance the relevant factors when deciding whether to award spousal support and determining its amount and duration.

Otis Lawrence Stitt, III v. Stitt · filed 2005-02-11(d)(1)(E)

Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(i) directs courts setting spousal support to consider the outstanding obligations of both spouses.

Woods v. Woods · filed 2005-07-12(d)(1)(E)(i)

When courts are setting spousal support, they should take into consideration the outstanding obligations of both the recipient spouse and the paying spouse.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts deciding spousal support to balance its factors in light of the case’s circumstances.

Bilyeu v. Bilyeu · filed 2005-11-28(d)(1)

Alimony decisions require a careful balancing of the factors in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) and typically hinge on the unique facts and circumstances of the case.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(E) requires courts to consider its listed factors when deciding whether to award alimony and setting its type and amount.

Deborah Kay Parker Hoxit Ohme v. Frderick Herman Ohme, IV · filed 2005-02-28(d)(1)(E)

In determining the propriety, nature, and amount of an alimony award, courts are to consider the statutory factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(i)-(xii).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts deciding alimony to consider the relevant statutory factors, including each spouse’s finances, the marital property division, the marital standard of living, and the spouses’ contributions.

Goodman v. Judy Lynn McMurray Goodman · filed 2006-01-09(d)(1)

In determining the appropriateness of an award of alimony, courts must consider the statutory factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) (Supp. 2004).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance relevant factors when deciding alimony, including separate property, financial need, and relative fault.

Schuett v. Egon Horst Schuett, Jr. · filed 2006-12-04(d)(1)

In reviewing this issue, we are mindful that determinations of alimony are factually driven and require the trial court to balance the various factors contained in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Section 36-5-101(d) directs courts to consider the relevant alimony factors, with the spouse’s need and the other spouse’s ability to pay carrying the most weight.

Nesbitt v. Nesbitt · filed 2008-02-04(d)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) (2005). Each of the factors should be considered, if relevant to the facts, but the most important determinations should rest upon the demonstrated need and the obligor spouse’s ability to pay.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)(B) calls for courts to reduce, as far as practical, the adverse economic impact of divorce on a spouse who sacrificed career opportunities for the family.

Gordon E. Morrow, Jr. v. Tammy Lynn (Pugh) Morrow · filed 2005-07-14(d)(1)(B)

We interpret the legislature’s goal to mean the courts should attempt to equalize, as much as is practical, the adverse economic impact of divorce on the parties.

Section 36-5-101(d) makes the spouse’s need for support and the other spouse’s ability to pay the most important factors in deciding alimony.

Tait v. Tait · filed 2006-05-18(d)

In applying section 36-5-101(d), Tennessee courts consider the most important factors to be the need of the spouse seeking support and the ability of the other spouse to pay.

Section 36-5-101 permits a court awarding alimony to consider a spouse’s responsibility for the loss of the other spouse’s separate assets, even when that responsibility is expressed in percentages of comparative fault.

Broadbent v. Broadbent · filed 2006-10-19(d)(1)(K), (L)

Finally, the trial court may consider the relative fault of a spouse and “such other factors ... as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties” in making a spousal support award. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(l)(K), (L) (2001). ... We conclude that it was proper for the trial court to consider Mr. Broadbent’s participation in the loss of Ms. Langhf s separate assets in awarding alimony. Moreover, the trial court’s allocation of responsibility for this loss, although expressed in percentages of “comparative fault” rather than relative fault, was not error.

Section 36-5-101(d) directs courts to make alimony rehabilitative and temporary whenever possible and to consider eleven factors when awarding periodic alimony.

Wallace v. Wallace · filed 1987-04-22(d)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) clearly states that alimony awards should be “rehabilitative” and “temporary” whenever possible. The statute also lists eleven factors for courts to consider when they are asked to award periodic alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative spousal support when rehabilitation is possible and guides the amount and duration of support.

Wilson v. Moore · filed 1996-05-03(d)(1)

The current statutes governing spousal support reflect a preference for temporary rehabilitative support as opposed to long-term support. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (economically disadvantaged spouses should be rehabilitated whenever possible). The facts of this case support the trial court’s decision to provide Ms. Moore with some rehabilitative support, but they also militate against the length of support awarded by the trial court.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative spousal support when feasible but permits other forms of support when appropriate.

Turner v. Turner · filed 1997-03-27(d)(1)

The current support statutes reflect a preference for temporary, rehabilitative support as opposed to long-term support. Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d at 375; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (stating the legislative intent that economically disadvantaged spouses should be rehabilitated whenever possible). This preference does not, however, displace other traditional types of spousal support.

Section 36-5-101(d) permits long-term spousal support until the recipient spouse’s death or remarriage when rehabilitation is not feasible.

Cranford v. Cranford · filed 1989-02-17(d)

Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d) provides that the courts may still award long-term support and maintenance until the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse where “rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors.”

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony but permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is not feasible.

Aaron v. Aaron · filed 1995-11-06(d)(1)

In Tennessee there is a preference for rehabilitative alimony. However, where rehabilitation is not feasible, a court may grant alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits long-term alimony when rehabilitation is infeasible after consideration of the relevant statutory factors.

Dudenhoeffer v. Dudenhoeffer · filed 1997-07-02(d)(1)

In the present case, upon consideration of Wife’s age, limited earning capacity, physical condition, the infeasibility of Wife’s rehabilitation, the forty-one year duration of the marriage, the tangible and intangible contributions Wife made during the marriage, and the relative fault of Husband in precipitating this action for separate maintenance, we hold that the trial court did not err in awarding Wife alimony in futuro in the aforementioned amounts.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation of a disadvantaged spouse is not feasible.

Long v. Long · filed 1997-07-09(d)(1)

The record clearly shows that the wife is a disadvantaged spouse and that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible because of her lack of work experience and her medical problems.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) provides for rehabilitative alimony when possible for a spouse who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse.

Adams v. Adams · filed 1997-01-08(d)(1)

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the trial court should award Wife rehabilitative alimony for a period of five years at the rate of $500.00 per month.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) provides for rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated.

Marcus v. Marcus · filed 1998-01-28(d)(1)

The intent of alimony is for “a spouse who is economically disadvantaged, relative to the other spouse, be rehabilitated whenever possible by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) ( Supp. 1997). ... The evidence supports the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony for three years as a reasonable determination.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) provides for time-limited rehabilitative support for an economically disadvantaged spouse; the recipient’s need and the obligor’s ability to pay are key factors.

Mullinax v. Mullinax · filed 1999-04-23(d)(1)

Rehabilitative support is designed to accomplish a stated result, to rehabilitate an economically disadvantaged spouse, within a limited time whereas alimony in futuro continues the support that was incident to the marriage relationship.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when feasible; the award depends on factors including earning capacity, ability to pay, marriage duration, standard of living, and fault.

Burlew v. Burlew · filed 1999-07-23(d)(1)

The statute reflects a policy in favor of rehabilitative alimony. ... Therefore, based on Wife’s limited earning capacity because of the parties’ decision that she stay home to raise Geoff, Husband’s ability to pay alimony, the long duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, and the relative fault of Husband in bringing about the divorce, we conclude that an award of rehabilitative alimony in an amount not less than $1,000 per month is warranted, beginning no later than three years after the date of the original decree, in addition to the award of alimony in solido by the trial court.

Subsection (d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative support but permits long-term support when the circumstances warrant it.

Cheatham v. Cheatham · filed 1997-11-25(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative support, as opposed to long-term support. ... This preference does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant longer term or more open-ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative spousal support to help a recipient spouse become more self-supporting.

Demontbreun v. Demontbreun · filed 1997-12-12(d)(1)

Tennessee’s spousal support statute expresses a strong preference for rehabilitative spousal support. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp. 1997).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative spousal support over long-term support.

Anderton v. Anderton · filed 1998-07-01(d)(1)

Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(l) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) prefers rehabilitative spousal support but permits long-term support when the circumstances warrant it.

Kinard v. Kinard · filed 1998-08-05(d)(1)

The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long-term or more open-ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative spousal support but permits long-term support when the circumstances warrant it.

Kinard v. Kinard · filed 1998-08-24(d)(1)

Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(l) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support. ... The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long-term or more open-ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative support while allowing other forms of spousal support when appropriate.

Joni Smart Holt v. Jack Sanders Holt · filed 1997-12-05(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative support, as opposed to long-term support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony but permits long-term alimony when rehabilitation is not feasible.

Kizer v. Kizer · filed 1998-02-27(d)(1)

We must also consider the legislative preference for rehabilitative alimony, see Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5- 101(d)(1), but this preference does not preclude awarding long-term alimony when rehabilitation is not feasible.

Subsection (d)'s alimony factors support rehabilitative alimony when the recipient's health limits her ability to work and she plans to pursue education.

Eldridge v. Eldridge · filed 1999-09-29(d)

However, in recent years Wife had several surgeries and has been unable to work on a full-time basis since 1995. Wife testified that she planned to enroll in college and obtain a degree. Wife stated that she attempted to obtain health insurance and was denied by three insurance companies. Based on the record in this cause, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s award of $100 per week in rehabilitative alimony for a period of twenty-four months was an abuse of discretion.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when rehabilitation is feasible and requires a finding that it is not feasible before awarding alimony in futuro.

Catignani v. Catignani · filed 1999-10-28(d)(1)

A finding that rehabilitation is "not feasible" is required before an award of alimony in futuro is appropriate. ... Accordingly, we find it appropriate to modify the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to an award of rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse needs support.

Kincaid v. Kincaid · filed 1999-12-30(d)(1)

As noted above, we think that this amount is properly characterized as rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. In Tennessee, there is a statutory preference for temporary, rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse is in need of support.

Section 36-5-101 prefers rehabilitative alimony but permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is not feasible.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2000-03-15

Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101 makes clear that there is a pref erence fo r rehabilitative a limony, but the c ourts may gra nt alimony in futuro where rehabili tation is n ot feasi ble.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse needs support, but allows alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is infeasible.

Willis v. Willis · filed 2000-05-03(d)(1)

In Tennessee, there is a statutory preference for temporary, rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse is in need of support. ... Under these circumstances, we believe that rehabilitation on the part of Ms. Wright is infeasible and that, consequently, the trial court was correct in awarding Ms. Wright alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits rehabilitative alimony when a spouse is economically disadvantaged, needs support while becoming self-sufficient, and the other spouse can pay.

Terry v. Terry · filed 2000-06-29(d)(1)

These figures leave no doubt that Mother met the economic inequality requirement on which any alimony award must be predicated and clearly establish her need for support while she attempts to become self-sufficient. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). Further, with an income of $79,200, Father clearly has the ability to pay the alimony ordered. The trial court based its award on the parties’ financial situation at the time of the divorce, and we find no error in the award.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative spousal support over long-term support.

Russo v. Russo · filed 2000-07-13(d)(1)

Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when a disadvantaged spouse can feasibly improve earning capacity to a reasonable level.

Dempsey v. Dempsey · filed 2000-07-21(d)(1)

Based upon the statutory preference for rehabilitative alimony and the manner in which the Supreme Court applied that preference in Crabtree, we are of the opinion that an award of rehabilitative alimony, rather than alimony in futuro is appropriate in this case. We cannot presume that it is not feasible that Wife, with training and/or work experience, can improve her earning capacity to a “reasonable level.”

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse needs support.

Phillips v. Phillips · filed 2000-07-27(d)(1)

In Tennessee, there is a statutory preference for temporary, rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse is in need of support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts awarding rehabilitative alimony to consider the parties’ financial resources, earning capacity, education, separate assets, age, mental condition, and fault when appropriate.

Cates v. Cates · filed 2000-09-18(d)(1)

In awarding rehabilitative alimony, a trial court must consider, inter alia, the relative earning capacity, financial resources, education, separate assets, fault of the parties when the court deems appropriate, and age and mental condition of the parties.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony but permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is not feasible.

Hutcheson v. Hutcheson · filed 2000-10-31(d)(1)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects that the legislature prefers rehabilitative alimony to be awarded, alimony in futuro may be awarded in cases where the award of rehabilitative alimony is not feasible.

Section 36-5-101(d)(2) favors rehabilitative alimony when possible and permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is not feasible.

Hulshof v. Hulshof · filed 1999-09-29(d)(2)

Our law favors rehabilitative alimony whenever possible and requires a finding that rehabilitation is "not feasible" before an award of alimony in futuro is appropriate.

Section 36-5-101(a)(1) permits a nominal award of alimony in futuro that may be modified after a substantial and material change in circumstances.

Katheryn Griffin v. Griffin · filed 1999-10-30(a)(1)

Under such circumstances, we think Wife is entitled to at least a nominal award of alimony in futuro which, in the event of a substantial and material change of circumstances such as the recurrence of Wife’s cancer, may be modified to reflect the changed positions of the parties.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when one spouse is relatively economically disadvantaged and rehabilitation is not feasible.

Moore v. Moore · filed 2000-06-01(d)(1)

Under the statute, alimony in futuro is appropriate where there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation of the disadvantaged party is not feasible.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when the recipient spouse is economically disadvantaged and cannot be rehabilitated.

Lassiter v. Lassiter · filed 2000-09-28(d)(1)

The trial court's findings that Wife is economically disadvantaged and is not capable of rehabilitation establish the prerequisites for an award of alimony, including alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to consider relevant factors when deciding spousal support; alimony in futuro is appropriate when economic rehabilitation is not feasible.

Jill Michelle Kaufmann Rabuck v. Rabuck · filed 2000-12-12(d)(1)

Applying these familiar principles of law, we find that economic rehabilitation is not feasible in this case, and therefore, the Trial Court properly awarded Wife alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative spousal support over long-term support.

Earls v. Earls · filed 2000-05-31(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp. 1999) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary, rehabilitative spousal support over long-term support.

Hunt v. Hunt · filed 2000-07-27(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1)'s preference for rehabilitative alimony does not bar an award of alimony in solido.

Fillmore v. Fillmore · filed 2000-09-14(d)(1)

The preference the legislature has expressed for rehabilitative alimony does not bar the award of other types of support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in solido and rehabilitative alimony to be awarded together when the circumstances warrant.

Burlew v. Burlew · filed 2000-11-14(d)(1)

Both in terms of logic and the purposes of alimony, we think it clear that alimony in solido is not inconsistent with a concurrent award of rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101(d)’s alimony factors guide both the amount and duration of rehabilitative support.

Fontenot v. Fontenot · filed 2000-12-13(d)

The next question we must address, then, is how long the rehabilitative support should be paid. The same factors we considered in arriving at the proper amount of support are to be considered here. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d).

A disparity in income or earning potential does not establish that economic rehabilitation is infeasible under § 36-5-101(d)(1).

Avery v. Avery · filed 2001-01-29(d)(1)

Because the Supreme Court determined that economic rehabilitation of the wife was feasible, based on these facts, and that five years of rehabilitative alimony would ease her transition into full time employment, we conclude that the Court did not consider disparity in income or earning potential to be an appropriate standard for determining the feasibility of economic rehabilitation.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits a percentage of a spouse’s variable bonus to be awarded as rehabilitative alimony when its support factors justify the award.

Page v. Lucille Page · filed 2001-02-20(d)(1)

However, in light of the factors listed in section 36-5-101(d)(1) of the Tennessee Code, we find that the award to Wife of a percentage of Husband’s bonus check is correct. As such, we hereby modify this award and find that Wife should be awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of Husband’s bonus check as part of her rehabilitative alimony.

Section 36-5-101 requires a spouse seeking rehabilitative alimony to be economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse and capable of economic rehabilitation.

Rouse v. Rouse · filed 2001-06-19

An award of rehabilitative alimony must be predicated upon a finding that the recipient spouse can be economically rehabilitated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (1999). A court does not reach the issue of rehabilitation, however, unless the recipient spouse is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse. See Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2000 WL 33191364, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2000). ... Based upon the facts in the record, we find that Ms. Rouse is not economically disadvantaged relative to Mr. Rouse. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony to Ms. Rouse.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) sets factors for alimony awards and expresses a preference for rehabilitative alimony where feasible.

Musick v. Musick · filed 2001-10-16(d)(1)

The Trial Court determined the husband’s earnings were approximately $2,100.00 per month, and considering the statutory factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(d)(1), we find the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s award. Moreover, the statute clearly expresses there is a preference for rehabilitative alimony, where alimony is feasible.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony for an economically disadvantaged spouse when support is needed to become self-sufficient.

Mays v. Mays · filed 2001-11-27(d)(1)

Our statutes express a preference for an award of rehabilitative alimony to rehabilitate a spouse who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative alimony when rehabilitation is feasible and requires the court to consider statutory factors when setting alimony.

Silvey v. Silvey · filed 2002-02-12(d)(1)

The Trial Court has “wide discretion” regarding an award of alimony, since the amount and duration are determined by the court’s findings of fact in consideration of the statutory factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(d)(1). The statute clearly expresses a preference for rehabilitative alimony, where rehabilitation is feasible.

Section 36-5-101(b) favors rehabilitative alimony for an economically disadvantaged spouse when rehabilitation is possible.

Mullins v. Mullins · filed 2001-09-19(b)

As to the issue of alimony, there is a preference for rehabilitative alimony for an ... economically disadvantaged spouse, to enable the spouse to become more self-sufficient, if possible.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative spousal support but permits long-term support when the circumstances warrant it.

Brenneman v. Margaret Ann Redd Brenneman · filed 2001-01-31(d)(1)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support. ... The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long term or more open-ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors rehabilitative spousal support but permits long-term support when the facts warrant it.

Justice v. Justice · filed 2001-02-23(d)(1)

The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long-term or more open-ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) prefers rehabilitative spousal support but permits long-term support when the facts warrant it.

Roth v. Roth · filed 2001-03-20(d)(1)

The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long term or more open-ended support.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitative support is not feasible after considering the relevant factors.

Glenna Fink v. Fink · filed 2001-03-19(d)(1)

The statute also provides that it is the intent of the general assembly that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated whenever possible with the payment of temporary support and maintenance. When this is not feasible after considering all relevant factors, then the court may award support and maintenance on a long term basis, or alimony in futuro. ... When all of the relevant factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) are considered, we find no error by the Trial Court in awarding $450.00 per month in alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation is not feasible; a finding that the spouse cannot easily be rehabilitated can satisfy that requirement.

Vaughan v. Vaughan · filed 2001-08-13(d)(1)

Considering all of the applicable factors, the trial court concluded that Wife “cannot easily be rehabilitated.” While the language used by the trial court could have been more precise, this statement amounts to a finding that rehabilitation is not feasible. The evidence does not preponderate against this conclusion. We affirm the trial court’s decision to award Wife alimony in futuro of $750 per month until her death or remarriage.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits alimony in futuro when rehabilitation of an economically disadvantaged spouse is not feasible after considering the relevant factors.

Lightfoot v. Lightfoot · filed 2001-08-28(d)(1)

The statute also provides that it is the intent of the general assembly that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated, whenever possible, with the payment of temporary support and maintenance. When this is not feasible after considering all relevant factors, then the court may award support and maintenance on a long term basis, or alimony in futuro.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance the statutory factors when setting the amount and duration of rehabilitative alimony.

Fulbright v. Fulbright · filed 2001-07-25(d)(1)

Nevertheless, after taking into account the facts of this case as contained in the record and after “careful[ly] balanc[ing] . . . the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1),” we hold that the Trial Court’s award of rehabilitative alimony should be reduced from $4,000.00 to $2,500.00 per month.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires courts to balance its factors when setting the amount of rehabilitative alimony.

Cantrell v. James Michael Cantrell, Jr. · filed 2001-10-16(d)(1)

After taking into account the facts of this case as contained in the record and after “careful[ly] balanc[ing] . . . the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1),” we hold that the Trial Court’s award of rehabilitative alimony is reduced from $768.65 to $400.00 per month for 12 months.

Rehabilitative alimony should last no longer than the time reasonably needed for the recipient to become self-sufficient, considering the recipient’s assets and earning ability.

Mueller v. Mueller · filed 2001-11-30(d)(1)

In light of the assets awarded to Denise Mueller in the property division, her ability to earn a reasonable income without additional training or education, and the relatively brief duration of the marriage, it appears inequitable to require Ray Mueller to pay rehabilitative alimony for a period in excess of the time it should take her to become self-sufficient. We therefore reduce the duration of the award to three years.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) favors temporary rehabilitative support for an economically disadvantaged spouse and gives the trial court broad discretion to weigh the statutory factors.

Barrett v. Barrett · filed 2001-10-12(d)(1)

When parties divorce, the legislature has stated the public policy of this state to favor the payment of “rehabilitative temporary support and maintenance” to the spouse that is “economically disadvantaged, relative to the other spouse.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). ... The trial court has broad discretion in awarding temporary support because the decision is factually driven and requires the balancing of the many factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d).

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) permits rehabilitative alimony when an economically disadvantaged spouse can become self-sufficient with temporary support.

Bowser v. Bowser · filed 2002-03-20(d)(1)

Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate where the spouse is economically disadvantaged, but where rehabilitation is possible by the grant of “rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). ... Consequently, we hold that Ms. Bowser should be awarded rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $500 per month for five years, or sixty months, from the date of the divorce.

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) requires a court considering rehabilitative alimony to determine whether the requesting spouse is economically disadvantaged and whether rehabilitation is feasible in light of the relevant factors.

Rinner v. Rinner · filed 2002-07-10(d)(1)

The court must first determine if the spouse requesting alimony is economically disadvantaged, then consider all relevant factors enumerated in section 36-5-101(d)(1)(A)-(L), and any other pertinent facts, to determine if rehabilitation of the disadvantaged spouse is feasible.