Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

The best-interest requirement supports termination when the child needs family stability and the parent has not resolved the conditions that caused removal.

In the Matter of: A.M.B., D.O.B. 6-13-95, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age · filed 2001-06-01(c)(2), (i)

Having crossed that barrier we think the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interest of the child will be served by terminating R.B.’s parental rights. He has now been in State custody for four years, and he is at a critical stage, the early part of his education. He needs the stability that only a family can provide. If R.B. has been unable to come to terms with her role in the events that led to the child’s removal, there is no future in sight for the child as long as she has a parental role.

Any one statutory ground under subsection (g), if supported by clear and convincing evidence, is sufficient to sustain termination.

Services v. C.S.M. And L.M.M. · filed 2002-02-13(g)

This Court has recognized that the existence of any one of these statutory bases will support a termination of parental rights. See In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). In the present case, therefore, we must affirm the Juvenile Court's judgment terminating Mother’s and Father's parental rights if the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support even one of the bases found by the Juvenile Court. Id. at 474.

A court may reach the best-interest analysis only after a statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re DLB · filed 2003-10-20(c)

Because grounds for terminating the parental rights of Mr. Moore have not been established, we do not reach the best interest of the child analysis. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c) (2001) (requiring first a “finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been ... established” and then a finding that the “termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child”).

Termination is proper when the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting any one statutory ground found by the trial court.

RDM v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, In the Matter of: AGM · filed 2003-11-12(g)

Termination of parental rights is appropriate if the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support any of the bases found by the trial court for termination. See: In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), and O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Parental rights cannot be terminated without clear and convincing evidence of both a statutory ground and the child’s best interests; a biological-father dispute alone supplies no ground under section 36-1-113.

In Re L.C.B · filed 2005-02-04(c), (g)

The record in this case is devoid of any basis for terminating the parental rights of M.B. on any grounds provided by Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113. Even if such grounds exist, parental rights cannot be terminated except upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that such termination is in the best interest of the child. In re H.E.J. 124 S.W.3d 110,115 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003). Facing a clear and convincing evidence burden on this issue, P.D. offers no evidence at all.

Under subsection (j), termination courts may consider only evidence properly admitted under the Rules of Evidence and Juvenile Procedure; filing documents with the clerk does not make them evidence.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. D.W.J. · filed 2005-06-29(j)

The trial court judge based his decision on documents filed with the court clerk, but never admitted into evidence. The transcript of the proceedings in the trial court does not reflect that any documents were filed as exhibits during the trial of this case. Tenn. R. Juv. P. 28 (c) provides that in adjudicatory hearings the court shall consider only evidence which has been formally admitted. “Formally admitted” does not mean filed with the court clerk. Tenn. Code Ann.§ 36-1-113(j) provides that in termination cases the courts shall admit evidence as permitted under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure.

Termination requires clear and convincing proof of at least one statutory ground and clear and convincing proof that termination serves the child's best interests; one proven ground is sufficient.

In the Matter of : Elizabeth N. M. · filed 2011-10-19(c), (g)

As noted above, a court may terminate a person’s parental rights if the existence of at least one statutory ground is proven and it is proven that termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child.

After a termination ground is established, the petitioner must separately prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest under the relevant statutory factors.

In Re Christopher L. B. · filed 2012-09-27(c)(2), (i)

Mother appeals the finding that termination of her parental rights to her son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of her rights.

Failure to support, substantial noncompliance, and persistent conditions may each support termination when proven clearly and convincingly together with best interests.

In re: Kaitlyn B. S. · filed 2013-08-21(g)(1)-(3)

The Bedford County Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of the mother of two children on the grounds of failure to support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions, and upon the determination that termination of mother’s rights was in the best interests of the children. ... Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

Multiple statutory grounds support termination when each is proven clearly and convincingly and termination is also in the children's best interest.

In Re: Allison N.A. · filed 2013-09-05(g)

After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its finding that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Both findings were said to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

Abandonment, substantial noncompliance, and persistent conditions each support termination when the evidence clearly and convincingly proves them and the children's best interests.

In Re: Jamontez S., Timothy S., Janiya S., Montique S., Ann'Dreona S. K., and Shacariah S. K. · filed 2013-09-17(g)(1)-(3)

Mother of six children appeals termination of her parental rights, contending that the evidence does not support the court’s holding that she abandoned the children within the meaning of the applicable statute, that she failed to comply with the requirements of permanency plans, that the conditions which led to the removal of the children from her custody persisted, and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Abandonment and persistent conditions may jointly support termination when clear and convincing evidence also establishes that termination serves the child’s best interest.

In Re: Trevor M.K.W. · filed 2013-09-18(g)(1), (g)(3)

The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights to Son on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions, and upon its finding that termination is in Son’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to Son.

Willful nonvisitation, substantial noncompliance, and persistent conditions may each support termination when clearly and convincingly proven with best interests.

In Re: Mary E. P. · filed 2013-10-04(g)(1)-(3)

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by failure to visit, and upon the determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

A parent's refusal to cooperate or participate in termination proceedings does not relieve the State of its burden to prove at least one statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence.

In the Matter of: Waylon R. D. · filed 2013-07-30(c)(1)

This court has previously held that a parent’s refusal to cooperate or participate in a termination proceeding does not relieve the State from affirmatively proving at least one ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

Failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance, and persistent conditions may each support termination when proven clearly and convincingly along with best interests.

In Re Hannah H. · filed 2014-06-10(g)(1)-(3)

Following a hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the parental rights of both the mother and the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment based on failure to provide a suitable home, failure to substantially fulfill the requirements of the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. ... Finding no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions support termination when clearly and convincingly proven, even if nonsupport and suitable-home grounds fail.

In Re Aaliyah R. · filed 2014-06-17(g)(2)-(3)

We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported two of the grounds, that of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We have also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Willful nonvisitation, willful nonsupport, and persistent conditions may support termination when clearly and convincingly proven together with the children's best interests.

In Re: Adoption of Joshua M. M. and Zachary M. · filed 2014-07-28(g)(1), (g)(3)

After a trial, the trial court held that the petitioners had established three grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit, (2) abandonment for failure to support, and (3) persistent conditions. It also found that termination of parental rights would be in the children’s best interest, and so terminated the parental rights of both biological parents. The parents now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Subsection (k) requires specific findings of fact and conclusions of law for each termination ground and for the best-interest determination.

In Re: Kaiden T. · filed 2014-12-15(k)

Thus, specific findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning each ground for termination and whether termination is in the child’s best interest are required.

When a final order lacks subsection (k)'s required findings about the parent's obligation and ability to support, the reviewing court cannot determine willfulness and must vacate that termination ground.

In re Jaylah W. · filed 2015-10-07(k)

In the absence of appropriate findings and conclusions under Section 36-1-113(k) regarding Mother’s payment of support, we cannot determine whether Mother’s failure to support the children was willful. Such a determination typically involves consideration of whether a parent was able to be employed, whether the parent was employed, what other expenses the parent was required to pay, and any other relevant considerations. The trial court’s order fails to address any of these considerations. The trial court’s “failure to comply with [Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(k)] fatally undermines the validity of” the trial court’s order with respect to this ground. See In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support.

An appellate court must independently review each termination ground and may affirm some while reversing others.

In Re: Quintin S. · filed 2017-07-13(g)

We affirm the termination of the parental rights of all three parents on multiple grounds, but reverse as to some of the grounds found by the trial court.

A parent’s nonopposition or stipulation does not relieve the petitioner of proving both a statutory ground and the child’s best interest by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re: Brianna T. · filed 2017-12-22(c)

Thus, the party seeking termination of parental rights is not relieved of its statutory burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence both the ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest simply because a parent does not oppose the termination.

A stipulation that the evidence satisfies a termination ground or the best-interest requirement is a nullity because those determinations are conclusions of law.

In Re: Brianna T. · filed 2017-12-22(c)

And a “trial court’s ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524. A stipulation that evidence satisfied a statutory ground for termination or that termination of parental rights was in a child’s best interest would be a nullity.

A parent's stipulation to termination grounds does not relieve the petitioner of proving a statutory ground and best interests by clear and convincing evidence, because whether a ground is proven is a question of law not subject to stipulation.

In Re Layton W. · filed 2020-10-06(c)

Father’s stipulation to certain grounds for termination of his parental rights does not discharge this Court’s obligation to review those grounds. ... Moreover, whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence is a question of law, and “questions of law are not subject to stipulation by the parties of a lawsuit and . . . a stipulation purporting to state a proposition of law is a nullity.”

Section 36-1-113(c)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence to establish grounds for terminating parental rights.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Louise Lela Tolbert and Danny Taylor In the Matter of L.T. · filed 2009-02-20(c)(1)

Because Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(c)(1) requires a heightened burden of proof in parental termination cases, we must also “determine whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the elements required to terminate a biological parent’s parental rights.”

Section 36-1-113(c) requires clear and convincing evidence of the elements needed to terminate parental rights.

Belcher v. Christy C. · filed 2010-11-22(c)

Therefore, the elements required for termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

A termination order must make findings on every element of subsection (g)(3), including whether continuing the relationship diminishes the children’s chance of early integration into a permanent home.

In Re Alexis F. · filed 2025-07-30(g)(3)

However, absent from the court’s order are specific findings addressing the requirement found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(iii). ... We, therefore, vacate the juvenile court’s findings on the ground of persistence of conditions.

Subsection (k) is not satisfied by mere legal conclusions that abandonment occurred; the order must contain the underlying facts and identify the applicable statutory ground.

In Re Khloe O. · filed 2022-06-16(k)

The final order also failed to cite any specific statutory section for any ground for termination and then created ambiguity by referring to the failure to “manifest an ability and willingness to parent the child.” The findings of fact did state that Aunt and Uncle had established the ground of abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. However, we have “decline[d] to conclude that mere legal conclusions fulfill the trial court’s obligations or are sufficient to satisfy the directive of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(k).” In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 594 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).

An order that merely mirrors the statutory language contains legal conclusions rather than the factual findings required by subsection (k).

In Re Skylar M. · filed 2022-08-04(k)

These determinations, however, merely mirror the statutory language and constitute conclusions of law without respective supporting findings of fact. This Court has previously concluded that purported findings of fact that merely reiterate the statutory language and conclude that the parent has abandoned the child do not constitute findings of fact but rather conclusions of law.

An order that lacks sufficient factual findings and legal conclusions under subsection (k) must be vacated and remanded because meaningful appellate review is impossible.

In Re: Ayanna B. · filed 2020-12-18(k)

For the reasons stated, this Court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of any portion of the trial court’s order. In the absence of a written order that makes sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for the trial court to properly state its findings of facts and conclusions of law.

A parent’s concession that a termination ground exists does not relieve the petitioner of proof or the trial court of subsection (k)’s duty to make supporting factual findings and legal conclusions.

In Re Maddox F. · filed 2020-12-23(k)

As such, the Trial Court was required to conduct a hearing concerning the grounds for the termination of Father’s parental rights and make sufficient findings of fact concerning such grounds even though Father had conceded that a statutory ground existed. This requirement for a trial court is consistent with and required by the Supreme Court’s direction to the Court of Appeals that we “must review the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W. 3d at 525-26. We cannot comply with the Supreme Court’s specific direction to review the trial court’s findings as to grounds and best interest unless the trial court has made such findings.

Detailed factual findings and complete legal conclusions for each termination ground satisfy subsection (k)’s requirement for a reviewable final order.

In Re Kayden A. · filed 2021-02-05(k)

Upon our review, we find that the final order contains detailed findings of fact and complete conclusions of law for each ground. In that the final order has sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, Mother is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Section 36-1-113(k) requires sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a broad finding that a father failed to establish parentage is insufficient to terminate his rights on that statutory ground.

In Re Haley S. · filed 2018-03-29(k)

The trial court further failed to make any factual findings regarding the ground provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(vi). We conclude that a broad finding by the trial court that Father failed to establish parentage is not sufficient for termination of Father’s parental rights based on this statutory ground. Having determined that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k), we vacate the trial court’s order regarding these two grounds and remand for the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Subsection (k) requires a written order with specific factual findings and legal conclusions sufficient for appellate review of each ground and best interests.

In Re K. O. · filed 2018-06-14(k)

We agree with mother that the trial court erred in failing to perform its statutory duty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k).

A parent's stipulation that statutory grounds exist is ineffective, and subsection (k) requires adequate factual findings supporting termination.

In Re: Dakota M. · filed 2018-06-18(k)

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment terminating Father’s rights and remand the case for entry of an order that complies with section 36-1-113(k).

A termination order must contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that represent the trial court’s independent judgment.

In Re Nakayia S. · filed 2018-09-18(k)

Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court’s judgment on best-interests and remand for the court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) that represent the juvenile court’s independent judgment.

Subsection (k) requires specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, so merely reciting statutory termination grounds is insufficient.

In Re: Ruger N. · filed 2018-11-09(k)

A mere recital of the statutory grounds for termination is insufficient in cases of this nature.

Broad, conclusory statements about termination grounds and best interests do not satisfy subsection (k)’s requirement for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In Re M.N. · filed 2019-06-05(k)

Instead of making specific findings of fact to support the court’s legal conclusions, the court’s order simply made broad, conclusory statements regarding the grounds for termination and the child’s best interests. Because the court failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k), this case is remanded to the court with instructions to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

A bare conclusion that wanton disregard was proven, without identifying supporting facts, does not satisfy subsection (k)’s written-finding requirement.

In Re Aubrie W. · filed 2020-01-21(k)

By comparing Father’s conduct during the relevant period in this case with the above cases, and considering the fact the trial court set forth its conclusion of law that the ground of wanton disregard had been proven without identifying the specific findings of fact upon which the conclusion was based, we conclude that the ground has not been established by the requisite standard. Accordingly, reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard was established.

Subsection (k) is not satisfied when the court adopts counsel’s proposed order without independently determining the relevant abandonment period, ability to support, or best-interest factors.

In Re Nathan C. · filed 2020-02-12(k)

Not only did the trial court fail to remedy these deficiencies on remand, it again failed to independently weigh the best interests factors. Rather than engaging in the required independent analysis, the trial court simply adopted Appellee’s findings and conclusions over Appellants’ objections. Such practice does not satisfy the findings and conclusions requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k) and Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

A termination order must make specific findings on every element of a ground, including the likelihood of early remediation under the persistent-conditions ground.

In Re David S. · filed 2020-03-18(k)

As should be evident, the Juvenile Court failed to make specific findings regarding each of the elements applicable to the persistence of conditions ground. Namely, the “likelihood that [the persistent conditions] will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent . . . in the near future” is wholly unexamined.

An order terminating rights under subsection (g)(14) must make specific findings on both the parent's ability and willingness and the risk of substantial harm; omission of the substantial-harm finding requires vacatur and remand.

In Re Nevaeh B. · filed 2020-08-20(g)(14), (k)

Because the trial court did not make specific findings regarding each of the elements applicable to the failure to manifest ground, we are compelled to vacate the termination order with respect to this ground for termination as to the Father and remand for the preparation of appropriate findings of facts and conclusions of law as is required by the statute.

A termination order must contain subsidiary factual findings sufficient to reveal how the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.

In Re Autumn D. · filed 2020-10-28(k)

We have previously emphasized in the context of parental rights termination cases that “[t]here is no bright-line test by which to assess the sufficiency of factual findings, but the findings of fact must include as much of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose to the reviewing court the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.” In re O.W., No. W2019-01127-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 97727, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2013)).

A termination order must make findings on every element of persistent conditions, including whether continuing the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, permanent home.

In Re Dominic B. · filed 2021-03-01(g)(3), (k)

Because the Juvenile Court did not make findings regarding each of the elements applicable to the persistence of conditions ground, we hereby vacate the termination order with respect to this ground.

When a termination order omits findings on one prong of subsection (g)(14), that ground cannot support termination, but remand is unnecessary if sufficient findings establish other statutory grounds.

In Re Adaleigh M. · filed 2021-03-31(g)(14), (k)

Because four other statutory grounds support termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights, we decline to remand this case for further factual findings on one element of the failure to manifest ground. Instead, we determine that the failure to manifest ground cannot support termination of the parental rights.

A termination order must contain factual findings specific to the best-interest determination and sufficient to show that the statutory factors were considered.

In re Ashlynn H. · filed 2021-05-28(k)

But the court’s order, which incorporated by reference a transcript of findings made in open court, includes no factual findings specific to its best interest determination. The order also makes no reference to the statutory best interest factors. So we cannot discern whether all of the statutory factors were considered. Under the circumstances, we find it necessary to remand the case to the trial court to make appropriate findings relative to the child’s best interest.

A termination court must apply the proper statutory standard in specific written findings; it may not substitute permanency-plan goals for the parent’s statement of responsibilities or cure inadequate findings by incorporating an oral ruling.

In Re Jayden L. · filed 2021-06-03(k)

The court’s consideration of “goals” is of concern because the question of substantial noncompliance does not turn on whether the parent achieved a permanency plan’s desired outcomes. In re J.D.L., No. M2009-00574-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 4407786, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2009). Rather, as noted above, “[t]he question of substantial noncompliance turns on whether the parent complied with a plan’s statement of responsibilities.” Id.

A ground discussed orally but omitted from the termination court’s written order is not part of the final order and cannot serve as a basis for termination.

In Re Aayden C. · filed 2021-06-14(k)

Likewise, this Court has explained: The role of this Court is an error-correcting court, and our review is limited to the trial court’s written findings and conclusions. This is especially true in light of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(k)’s requirement that trial courts enter written orders containing specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in termination cases.

A termination order that evaluates whether a parent substantially complied, rather than whether the parent was substantially noncompliant, applies the wrong statutory standard and requires vacatur of the permanency-plan ground.

In Re K.W. · filed 2021-12-07(g)(2), (k)

The relevant issue is not Father’s substantial compliance with regard to the permanency plan. Instead, the appropriate standard is whether there has been “substantial noncompliance.” ... Inasmuch as the trial court’s reliance on this ground is a product of its written application of a standard not in accordance with the statute, we are compelled to vacate this ground for termination.

A termination judgment lacking specific factual findings and legal conclusions must be vacated and remanded for a subsection (k)-compliant order.

In Re Kenneth D. · filed 2022-02-24(k)

Because of a lack of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we vacate the judgment terminating Father’s parental rights. The case is remanded for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) and such other proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this opinion.

A termination order must make specific findings on whether continuing the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, permanent home.

In Re Ralph M. · filed 2022-09-01(g)(3), (k)

We vacate the ground of persistent conditions as a ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights due to insufficient findings of fact concerning Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(iii) as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k).

An internally contradictory termination order is construed in the parent's favor when the written judgment both finds and dismisses the same ground and the trial court did not incorporate its oral ruling.

In Re Rufus C. · filed 2022-09-12(g)(1)

We are unwilling to try to infer how the Juvenile Court intended to rule as to the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. Therefore, in light of the ambiguity in the Juvenile Court’s amended order, we find that the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home was not proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 36-1-113(k)'s written findings requirement applies both when a termination petition is granted and when it is dismissed.

In Re Isaiah D. · filed 2022-11-09(k)

In other words, this requirement applies not only to cases where a trial court terminates a parent’s parental rights but also to cases where a trial court declines to terminate a parent’s parental rights.

A bare conclusion that returning the child would pose substantial harm does not satisfy subsection (g)(14); the order must state subsidiary facts supporting that conclusion.

In Re Elijah F. · filed 2022-11-10(g)(14), (k)

The court merely concluded that placing the Child back in Mother’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to him but failed to provide specific findings of fact in support of this legal conclusion.

A bare legal conclusion on substantial harm is insufficient; the termination order must make specific factual findings addressing subsection (g)(14)’s second prong.

In Re Cayson C. · filed 2022-11-28(g)(14)

Given the Juvenile Court’s failure to make specific findings regarding the second prong of this ground, we vacate the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody.

A persistent-conditions order must identify the conditions being evaluated and explain how they persist and endanger the child; conclusory findings do not permit appellate review.

In Re Kaitlyn D. · filed 2024-03-11(g)(3), (k)

The trial court’s order does not identify what conditions are being evaluated or explain that these conditions persisted or how they posed a danger to Kaitlyn’s safety. ... We conclude that Tennessee’s parental termination statute requires more thoroughness.

Merely reciting both elements of subsection (g)(14) is insufficient; the termination order must include specific supporting facts.

In Re Nickolas K. · filed 2024-03-12(g)(14), (k)

Respectfully, although the trial court’s order specifically addresses each element of the ground, it does so in a purely conclusory manner, without any specific findings of fact.

An order cannot sustain abandonment by wanton disregard when it conflates the incarcerated-parent grounds and omits specific findings that the parent's conduct exhibited wanton disregard.

In Re Neveah W. · filed 2024-04-25(g)(1), (k)

Therefore, because the trial court did not include specific findings of fact to support a legal conclusion that Mother exhibited wanton disregard for the Child prior to Mother’s incarceration, we are compelled to reverse the court’s judgment with respect to abandonment through wanton disregard.

A termination court must make findings on a properly raised lack-of-willfulness defense rather than asking the appellate court to decide the defense in the first instance.

In Re Royalty Y. · filed 2024-05-08(g)(1), (k)

Although we could conduct our own independent review of the evidence to determine where the preponderance lies concerning lack of willfulness, we conclude that such review would be inappropriate given the trial court’s erroneous statements concerning willfulness and our resultant inability to discern whether the trial court considered this statutory affirmative defense to the abandonment grounds.

A termination order must contain factual findings addressing subsection (g)(14)’s substantial-harm element; omission of that element requires vacating the ground.

In Re Silva F. · filed 2024-07-22(g)(14)

Because the trial court failed to address one of the two required statutory elements of the failure to manifest ground, we vacate the trial court’s ruling with regard to this ground for termination.

An abandonment order must resolve conflicting visitation testimony and identify the frequency, duration, and quality of visits before concluding they were token.

In Re Austynn F. · filed 2025-01-07(g)(1), (k)

But without knowing the frequency, duration, or quality of the visits that the court found to have occurred, review of whether the visitation was token “under the circumstances” here is impossible.

Failure to make explicit factual findings on how returning the child would create substantial harm requires vacating subsection (g)(14).

In Re Connor A. · filed 2025-02-07(g)(14)

Here, while the trial court recognized that there were two separate prongs of this test, the trial court failed to make any explicit findings as to how placing Connor in Mother’s custody would pose a substantial risk of harm to him under the second prong. This Court has previously held that a trial court’s failure to make findings in support of the second element of the willingness and ability prong mandates that we vacate that ground.

A termination order must identify every applicable best-interest factor considered and support each with specific written factual findings; a generalized best-interest conclusion is insufficient.

IN RE STEELE M · filed 2025-10-06(i)(3)

Importantly, “[a]ll factors considered by the court to be applicable to a particular case must be identified and supported by specific findings of fact in the court’s written order.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(3). ... This statement does not satisfy the “specific findings of fact” requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i)(3).

A termination order must explain the facts establishing each element and cannot leave an appellate court to make missing factual findings.

IN RE HARPER A. · filed 2026-01-13(k)

Here, the trial court has not explained what facts led it to determine that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of, or financial responsibility for, the children. Likewise, the order does not explain what factual findings demonstrate that the children would be at risk of suffering substantial harm if placed back in Mother’s custody. “It is not the role of this Court . . . to make factual findings where the trial court fails to do so.” Id. at 594. Therefore, we must vacate the portion of the trial court’s order related to this ground for termination.

Conclusory restatements of statutory elements, without supporting factual findings, are insufficient for appellate review and require vacatur and remand.

IN RE GIAVANNA K. · filed 2026-01-15(k)

Unfortunately, the trial court’s findings in this case are insufficient. The relevant portion of the trial court’s order consists mostly of conclusory restatements of the statutory elements for termination due to failure to manifest. See In re Bentley E., 703 S.W.3d at 304 (vacating the trial court’s best interest determination as “not supported by factual findings” and “conclusory statements”). While the trial court’s finding that the child is bonded to the foster parents is relevant, the trial court made no specific findings to support a determination that either of the statutory prongs has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 36-1-113(c) requires clear and convincing evidence of a ground for termination and a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.

In the Matter of: M.C.G. · filed 1999-05-26(c)

In order to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, the trial court must make two findings. The court first must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the asserted grounds for termination has been established. T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c)(1) (Supp. 1997). Once the court has made this finding, the court additionally must find that termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interests. T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c)(2) (Supp. 1997).

Section 36-1-113(k) requires a termination order to include specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In Re: Adoption of L.L.C., Aaron Michael Darnell v. Cook · filed 2005-12-09(k)

It is obvious from the final decree that it concerns termination of parental rights, but there are no specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by the statute.

Abandonment under subsection (g)(1) requires clear and convincing proof that a failure to visit or support was intentional under the applicable prior-law definition.

K.S.O.H. v. J.W.B., Jr. In Re: Adoption of a Male Child · filed 2001-10-04(g)(1)

Applying the prior statutory definition of the term “abandonment” found in the 1994 version of the statute, we hold that the Juvenile Court did not err in determining that Father had not abandoned the Child for failure to visit or failure to support the Child.

Intentional abandonment is not established by clear and convincing evidence when transportation barriers, cancelled visits, and participation in inpatient drug treatment undermine an inference that failure to visit was intentional.

In Re ADA · filed 2002-01-24(g)(1)

We are satisfied that Mother's attempt to address her drug addiction during at least part of the four month period immediately preceding the State's petition undermines a finding of intent as to her lack of visitation with A.D.A. Read as a whole, including the testimony of the guardian ad litem, who stated that Mother has done a lot "for her," considering her condition and situation, the record in this case does not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence of intentional abandonment under Tenn.Code Ann § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) for the purposes of forever terminating Mother's parental rights. We therefore reverse the trial court's finding on this issue.

Abandonment is not proved when support was fully paid with family assistance and the parent’s failure to visit was not willful because others interfered with visitation.

Means v. Ashby · filed 2003-02-10(g)(1)

The Means alleged that Mr. Ashby had willfully failed to support his child by allowing his parents to assist him in paying his child support payments. We find no merit to this argument. All child support payments have been made through the date of trial in this matter, and it is no business of the Means as to where Mr. Ashby obtained the funds. ... With regard to his failure to visit M.A. for approximately five years prior to the Means filing their Petition to terminate his parental rights, we agree with the trial court that there is no clear and convincing evidence that this failure to visit was willful.

Eight visits over approximately twenty-eight months can constitute token visitation supporting abandonment when they are merely perfunctory, infrequent, and establish only minimal or insubstantial contact.

State Dept of Children's Srvcs v. D.D.B. · filed 2003-03-28(g)(1), (g)(3)(A)

Her eight visits over a period of some two years and four months (February 1999, upon release from jail, to June 2001, when the termination petition was filed by DCS), constitute token visitation as defined by § 36-1-102(1)(C) and are nothing more than perfunctory visitation of such an infrequent nature as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child.

Willful abandonment may be established by a long failure to visit despite available transportation, and a parent's support duty is not conditioned on the existence of a support order.

Dept of Children's Srvcs. v. L.F. · filed 2003-04-30(g)(1)

“the support of one’s children should not be conditioned upon whether one has been placed under a court order to do so.”

Termination requires clear and convincing proof of both a statutory ground and the child’s best interests, and an abandonment theory fails when willful nonsupport or nonvisitation is not proven.

Means v. Ashby · filed 2003-10-06(c)

Based on the facts of this case, we agree with the trial court that there was no clear and convincing evidence of a willful failure to visit or willful failure to support the child by either parent.

Visitation may be “token” under subsection (g)(1) when it is infrequent and perfunctory, even if the parent asserts additional uncorroborated visits.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Sandra Lilly, in the Matter of K.M. · filed 2004-04-30(g)(1)

Mother’s self-serving statements do not warrant a reversal of the trial court’s finding that DCS proved abandonment by failing to visit for four consecutive months. Even assuming, arguendo, that Mother did visit on more than three occasions, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination that Mother’s visitation can be classified as “token” because of its infrequent and perfunctory nature.

Three visits during the four-month lookback period may constitute token visitation under subsection (g)(1) when they are infrequent or perfunctory and the child has no attachment to the parent.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Atkison · filed 2004-04-30(g)(1)

Though it is true that there is undisputed testimony that Mother visited Child on three occasions in the four months preceding DCS’s filing of the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the record supports the trial court’s determination that such visitation was “token” as defined in the statute. The petition to terminate parental rights was filed by DCS on October 24, 2002. In this case, DCS lost contact with Mother from April 2002 to August 2002, despite DCS’s efforts to contact Mother. Mother then visited Child on September 3, October 1, and October 15, 2002. Mother provided no explanation for this period of absence or lack of contact. There is no evidence in the record that establishes an inability to visit Child for lack of transportation, and, in fact, members of DCS testified they had offered to drive Mother to the scheduled visits. In addition, the visits with Child were arranged to be in Jackson, Tennessee, for Mother’s convenience. The evidence was also undisputed that, when Mother did visit Child, there was a lack of attachment between Mother and Child to the point that Child did not realize that Mother was his natural mother. Finally, there is evidence that Mother was advised that such conduct could be grounds for the termination of her parental rights. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err when it determined that Mother had abandoned her child by engaging in no more than token visitation, whether classified as perfunctory or infrequent, in the four consecutive months prior to DCS filing its petition to terminate parental rights.

For incarcerated parents, the abandonment-by-failure-to-visit period is the four months immediately preceding incarceration, and the failure must still be proved willful by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re: T.A.R. and D.F.R. · filed 2004-09-20(g)(1)

Mother was incarcerated in May of 2003; consequently, the time period applicable to her failure to visit is the four months preceding that incarceration. Father was incarcerated from January through part of April, 2003; therefore, the four month period applicable to him is September through December, 2002.

A parent does not defeat willful abandonment merely by claiming the custodian was unwelcoming when the parent made almost no effort to visit, support, call, inquire about, or write to the child and identifies no attempted visit that was denied.

In Re: S.B.D.W., a minor child born, January 14, 1999 · filed 2004-12-01(g)(1)

Although Father contends that P.B. stated that he was not welcome on her property, Father does not assert that he attempted to visit S.B.D.W. and was denied the opportunity.

A failure to visit is willful abandonment when the parent knows how to contact the child and obtain visitation, is not prevented or incapacitated, and merely wishes to avoid becoming a troublemaker.

In Re F.R.R., III · filed 2005-03-01(g)(1)

F.R.R. knew at all times how to contact M.A.G., he was not incarcerated or disabled, he owned a car, and he knew how to obtain court-ordered visitation even without the assistance of a lawyer. While F.R.R.’s desire not to become a troublemaker to M.A.G. and her husband is admirable, it does not provide an excuse for his failure to make good faith efforts to establish a relationship with his child.

A parent willfully fails to visit when the parent chooses not to complete or reschedule a drug-and-alcohol assessment that is the sole precondition to renewed visitation.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. J.A.H., Jr. · filed 2005-12-28(g)(1)

The trial court found that Father chose not to submit to the testing that was a precondition to further visitation, and Father presents no evidence that preponderates against this finding. Father’s choice in refusing to cooperate in this regard constituted a willful decision to discontinue visiting his son. The record supports the conclusion that Father abandoned James under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).

A failure to visit is willful abandonment when the parent was not denied or prevented from visiting and made no contact effort merely to avoid being a troublemaker or disrupting the family’s life.

In Re Frr, III · filed 2006-05-08(g)(1)

The evidence supports a finding that Father’s failure to visit was willful. Father testified that Mother never denied him visitation and that his reason for failing to pursue visitation with his child was that he did not want to be “a trouble maker” or “disrupt their lives.” The record shows that during the four months preceding the petition to terminate his parental rights, Father made no effort to contact Mother regarding visitation with F.R.R. In addition, the record contains no assertion that Mother or Gomes prevented him from visiting F.R.R. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence supports the ... conclusion reached by the juvenile court and intermediate appellate court that abandonment for failure to visit has been established.

An incarcerated parent abandons a child under subsection (g)(1) when he receives notice yet fails to participate, support, or visit during the statutory period and his conduct before and during incarceration shows wanton disregard.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Stinson · filed 2006-10-30(g)(1)

Nevertheless, reunification of a family is a two-way street, and the law does not require DCS to carry the entire burden of this goal. The record indicates that Mr. Henry received notification concerning these proceedings and that he had the opportunity to participate. Within the confines of its own resources and the specific circumstances of this case (i.e. Mr. Henry’s incarceration), it is the opinion of this Court that DCS has made reasonable efforts in this case. Unfortunately, Mr. Henry, by virtue of his incarceration and other circumstances, has been unable to reciprocate in the process of reunification. From the record before us, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Mr. Henry’s parental rights to C.S.L.S. should be terminated on the grounds of abandonment for willful failure to support and willful failure to visit during the statutory period. Furthermore, there is ample evidence in the record to support a finding that Mr. Henry’s activities before incarceration, during incarceration, and during probation demonstrate a wanton disregard for his own welfare much less that of the child.

Two visits during the four months preceding the termination petition can constitute token visitation and support abandonment when the parent could have visited but failed to maintain contact with DCS.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES v. K.B. · filed 2008-03-03(g)(1)

The mother gave no excuse for failing to visit the child, and there was no proof that she was incarcerated for any length of time, or otherwise prevented from doing visitation. Accordingly, abandonment for willful failure to visit was established by clear and convincing evidence. We have previously held that visiting a child no more than once or twice during the requisite four month period is only token visitation.

A single visit during the relevant period may constitute token visitation supporting abandonment when the parent makes no other contact.

In Re: G.N.S., d/o/b 10/09/03 · filed 2008-07-31(g)(1)

We find that the record clearly supports the termination of Mother’s rights based on abandonment by failure to visit. We also agree with the trial court that Mother’s sole visit was only token.

Visitation limited to one hour per month may be token under the circumstances and support abandonment when the parents had greater visitation opportunities but used them sporadically.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. J.C. · filed 2008-08-14(g)(1)

The evidence does not preponderate against the findings made by the Juvenile Court that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1).

A parent cannot defeat abandonment by resuming visitation only after the termination petition is filed.

In Re S.R.M. · filed 2009-03-27(g)(1)

The statute precludes consideration of Father’s “after-the-fact” efforts to thwart termination of his parental rights. ... Given all the evidence of record that Father willfully failed to visit with S.R.M. in the four months before DCS filed the termination petition, we find that clear and convincing evidence supported the Juvenile Court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights to S.R.M. pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(1).

Willful failure to visit does not require the parent to know the legal consequences that nonvisitation may produce.

In Matter of MLP · filed 2009-03-27(g)(1)

We decline to hold that a parent must be aware of the consequences of his failure to visit for such a failure to be willful. The plain language of the statute requires that the failure to visit be “willful,” not that the parent be fully apprised of every consequence the failure to visit might produce.

Willful failure to visit does not require awareness of its legal consequences, and another person's conduct excuses nonvisitation only if it actually prevents or significantly restrains visitation.

In re M.L.P. · filed 2009-03-27(g)(1)

We decline to hold that a parent must be aware of the consequences of his failure to visit for such a failure to be willful. The plain language of the statute requires that the failure to visit be “willful,” not that the parent be fully apprised of every consequence the failure to visit might produce. ... A parent’s failure to visit may be excused by the acts of another only if those acts actually prevent the parent from visiting the child or constitute a significant restraint or interference with the parent’s attempts to visit the child.

Food, clothing, shelter, and similar expenditures during visitation do not substitute for the monetary support required to avoid abandonment by willful nonsupport.

In Re: April P-C, Jennifer P-C, and Kenneth P-C · filed 2010-08-26(g)(1)

This type of expenditure, however, is not a substitute for the monetary support required by the statute. Furthermore, this court has previously held that providing meals and like activities do not constitute support, but rather only serve the purpose of facilitating visitation.

Failure to visit is willful when custodians offer to pay for supervised visits and transportation, the parent refuses the help, and she makes no other effort to contact the children or arrange visitation.

In Re: Maysoon M.A.A.K., and Falasteen M.A.A.K., Muhammad I.S. and Tessa D. S. v. Sonya G. · filed 2010-11-03(g)(1)

The mother admitted that she was offered assistance by petitioners but refused it. She admitted that she did not contact DCS or the Court to try and set up visitation with her children. ... Further undisputed proof revealed that she did nothing and contacted no one to try to re-establish visitation with her children for more than four months preceding the filing of the petition. The Trial Court did not err in finding the mother could have visited the children if she had tried, and that she had willfully failed to do so.

One visit during the relevant four months may be token visitation, and more regular visitation begun only after the termination petition cannot cure the earlier abandonment.

In Re Elijah B. · filed 2010-12-29(g)(1)

The proof at trial showed that Father visited only once during this four-month period – on December 31, 2008. Father’s last visit before then was over a year earlier. The case manager characterized this single visit as “token” in nature; we agree. ... Father also emphasizes that since the filing of the petition, he began exercising his right to visit the children more regularly. While commendable, this does not change the fact of his earlier abandonment of the children.

A parent willfully fails to visit when he makes only a few calls and does not actively pursue visitation through the court after paternity is established, even if custodians stop returning calls.

In Re: Navaeh L. · filed 2011-02-03(g)(1)

After his paternity was established, Father never returned to court to pursue visitation. ... In the present case, Father’s contention that Aunt and Uncle or the trial court somehow prevented him from visiting the Child is unavailing. ... In summary, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence establishing Father’s willful failure to visit the Child.

A parent willfully fails to visit under subsection (g)(1) when the parent sends one attorney letter but does not pursue visitation through the courts or personally despite having the means and opportunity to travel.

In Re Carlie G. C. · filed 2011-03-30(g)(1)

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Again, it is undisputed that Father did not visit the Child during the relevant four months; in fact, the Child was nearly six years old at trial and when Father last saw her she was a month-old newborn. Accordingly, the issue boiled down to a question of whether Father’s failure to visit was willful. On our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly resolved this issue against Father. The evidence showed that the extent of Father’s efforts to visit the Child was retaining an attorney in 2009 to urge Mother to arrange visitation. As the trial court found, when Mother did not reply to the letter, Father did not carry through with his “threat” to pursue visitation through the courts or on his own. In this regard, the extent of Mother’s “alienation” of the Child from Father, as Father described it, was to deny Father phone conversations with the then four-year-old Child until Father had made a plan to visit and spend time with her in person. In our view, Mother did not thereby thwart, but actually encouraged, even required, that Father visit and spend time with the Child rather than leaving Mother without answers to the questions that would naturally follow after a man that the Child had no memory of “introduced” himself as her father over the phone. Father did not explain his failure to take advantage of his access to discounted airfare to come to Tennessee other than testifying to his baseless claim that Mother could have him incarcerated if he had tried to visit the Child. In short, the evidence clearly and convincingly established Father’s willful failure to visit the Child. The juvenile court did not err in terminating his rights on this ground.

A parent willfully fails to visit under subsection (g)(1) when he is often near the child and capable of visiting but chooses not to do so.

In Re T.C.E. · filed 2011-06-28(g)(1)

We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence that Father’s failure to visit T.C.E. was willful. Even if he did work in Georgia, the evidence is clear and convincing that he was, at most, “in and out” of Georgia. The proof is clear that he was often in Tennessee in fairly close proximity to T.C.E. and could have visited with T.C.E. He willfully chose not to visit with her.

Two visits in four months do not establish a significant, meaningful pattern of contact and may support abandonment for willful failure to visit under subsection (g)(1).

In Re: Baron H.S.M. · filed 2011-08-19(g)(1)

On our review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that Mother willfully failed to visit the Child during the relevant time period. In short, even giving Mother “credit” for the Thanksgiving visit, which Peggy disputed, two visits in four months does not establish a significant, meaningful pattern of spending time with one’s child.

A parent's fear of deportation and losing other children does not legally excuse failure to visit; immigration status is not itself a termination ground but does not eliminate parental obligations.

In Re: Angelica S. · filed 2011-10-04(g)(1)

Certainly, Father’s status as an illegal immigrant is not a ground for terminating his rights to his Child. Neither, however, does it legally excuse him from meeting his parental obligation to spend time with the Child.

Abandonment must occur during the four months preceding the termination petition, and a guardian's substantial interference with the parent's efforts to visit or support may make the failure nonwillful.

In the Matter of: Alex B.T. · filed 2011-11-15(g)(1)

However, the law is clear that, in order to terminate parental rights, the abandonment must occur in the four months preceding the filing of the petition.

Courts may consider events before the statutory four-month period when deciding whether nonvisitation during that period was willful, because earlier interference may illuminate the parent's motives and opportunities.

In Re: The Adoption of Destiny R. D. · filed 2012-03-27(g)(1)

The trial court examined the question of Father’s willfulness or lack thereof within the context of the totality of the circumstances of this case. Those circumstances include numerous acts and omissions by Mother and by Mother’s mother that had the effect of limiting or discouraging contact between Father and his child.

Nonvisitation is willful when DCS offers out-of-state parents gas cards, lodging, and bus transportation but they decline the assistance and do not visit.

In Re Cera B., Kellie B., and Donald B. · filed 2012-05-25(g)(1)

The foregoing evidence shows clearly and convincingly that neither Mother nor Father had a justifiable excuse for failing to visit the children within the four months preceding the filing of the petition; resources were made available to them to visit and they failed to do so. The court correctly held that the parents’ failure to visit the children was wilful.

A parent's difficult circumstances do not negate willful abandonment when she retains the capacity to visit or support but does neither.

In the Matter of Jacob A. C. H. · filed 2013-01-16(g)(1)

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother to her child, finding that she wilfully failed to visit or support the child. Mother appeals, contending that she lacked the capacity to visit or pay support. Upon our de novo review we determine that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that Mother abandoned the child and that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest.

A parent's claimed lack of money and transportation does not defeat willful failure to visit when the evidence clearly and convincingly shows she could have maintained contact.

In Re: Tiashaun C. · filed 2013-02-22(g)(1)

Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had willfully failed to visit the Children. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm.

A parent willfully fails to visit under subsection (g)(1) when, despite ample opportunity, she does not visit and no meaningful relationship with the child exists.

In the Matter of: Deon S. · filed 2013-04-17(g)(1)

As discussed above, although given ample opportunity, Mother has failed to visit the child. There is no evidence that Mother and Deon have any meaningful relationship; there is, however, evidence in the record to suggest that Deon has bonded with his foster family, and they with him. The foster family has indicated a desire to adopt Deon. Mother’s lack of participation in these proceedings, her failure to visit, and her general lack of concern for the child is proof of her inability and lack of desire to parent Deon. Furthermore, Mother’s failure to participate in this case has resulted in a dearth of evidence concerning Mother’s housing, current employment status, and arrest record. Accordingly, it would not be in the child’s best interest to delay his integration into a safe and stable environment in the hope that Mother will improve her condition and undertake her parental responsibilities. To do so would be nothing more than speculation on the part of the Court. From the record as it exists, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Deon’s best interest. VI. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court, terminating Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit.

Willful failure to visit during the four months before filing establishes abandonment when the parent's failure is intentional rather than caused by substantial interference or inability.

Jamie and Frankye T. v. Crystal G. · filed 2013-04-29(g)(1)

Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment terminating her parental rights.

Infrequent visitation is not willful abandonment under subsection (g)(1) when the parent tried to communicate and visit more often but the custodial parent thwarted those efforts.

In Re: The Adoption of a male child Z.J.D. · filed 2013-03-07(g)(1)

We affirm the trial court’s finding that Stepfather had not established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had willfully failed to visit in the four months preceding the filing of the petition.

Two visits during the four-month period may constitute token visitation and willful abandonment under subsection (g)(1) when the parent could have arranged supervised visits or sought court relief.

In Re: Taliah L.B. · filed 2013-04-02(g)(1)

Mother could have arranged for supervised visitation or sought relief through the court system. Mother and Grandmother testified that they consulted with the juvenile court on three occasions; however, the record reflects that Mother filed one petition after the termination petition had been filed. With these considerations in mind, we conclude that Mother’s two visits during the requisite time period amounted to nothing more than token visitation because the visitation was of such an infrequent nature. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(C). Accordingly, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that Mother willfully failed to visit the Child during the relevant time period. Thus, a second statutory ground existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

A parent who knows visitation may be reinstated upon a showing of sobriety but never petitions for reinstatement may be found to have willfully failed to visit.

In Re: Erykah C. · filed 2013-05-06(g)(1)

We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment based on willful failure to visit.

A parent willfully fails to visit when he knows he can seek reinstatement upon proving sobriety but takes no action throughout the child's extended custody placement.

In Re: Mya E. · filed 2013-05-13(g)(1)

Father testified that he knew he could have asked the trial court to reinstate his visitation upon a showing of sobriety, but he failed to do so at any time during the eighteen months the Children were in the custody of Olivia E. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to visit the Children.

Failure to visit is not excused by another person's conduct unless that conduct actually prevents visitation or significantly restrains the parent's efforts.

In Re: Hope A.A. · filed 2013-05-10(g)(1)

Failure to visit is not excused by another person’s conduct unless the conduct actually prevents the person with the obligation from performing his or her duty or constitutes a significant restraint of or interference with the parent’s efforts to support or develop a relationship with the child.

Willful failure both to support and to visit during the statutory period establishes abandonment when proven by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re: Mark A. L. · filed 2013-10-04(g)(1)

The Coffee County Chancery Court terminated the parental rights of the father on two grounds: 1) abandonment by willful failure to support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and 2) abandonment by willful failure to visit the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); and upon the determination that termination of the father’s rights was in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

A parent’s voluntary decisions not to visit or support a child, without a justifiable excuse, establish willful abandonment under § 36-1-113(g)(1).

In Re: Kayla N.A. · filed 2013-10-31(g)(1)

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother willfully failed to visit and support the Children. The trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s rights on the ground of abandonment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i).

A visit during the four-month statutory period may still be token when it is insubstantial and does not establish a meaningful relationship or bond with the child.

In Re: Brandon J. G. · filed 2014-02-25(g)(1)

We have reviewed the record and although Chris D.’s last visit falls within the preceding four months of the Department’s petition to terminate his parental rights, we find the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the conclusion that Chris D. only engaged in token visitation during the relevant period and the visitation did not produce a meaningful visit to establish a meaningful relationship or bond between the parent and the child.

Willful failure to visit may establish abandonment despite limited earlier summer visits when the parent schedules no parenting time during the statutory four-month period.

In Re: Adoption of Marissa O. R. · filed 2014-05-30(g)(1)

In sum, we hold that clear and convincing evidence in the record establishes the ground of abandonment by failure to visit, and that terminating Father’s parental rights is in Daughter’s best interest. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption.

A parent abandons a child by willfully failing both to visit and to provide financial support during the four months preceding the termination petition.

In re: Kiara C. · filed 2014-06-30(g)(1)

We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination that Father willfully failed to visit the Child for four consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition for termination of his parental rights. The trial court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights based upon this ground.

A no-contact order does not prevent a finding of willful failure to visit under subsection (g)(1) when the parent knows the conditions for resuming visitation but elects not to satisfy them.

In Re: Donald C. · filed 2014-12-30(g)(1)

In this case, Mother knew what she had to do in order to be permitted to visit her children. Despite being provided with information about free parenting classes, Mother elected not to take advantage of the services offered. In addition, Mother elected not to submit to the necessary drug tests to prove she was no longer taking illegal drugs. We conclude that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother willfully abandoned her children by failing to visit them in the four months immediately before DCS filed the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

Abandonment by willful failure to visit is established when a parent has the capacity to visit but makes no attempt and has no justifiable excuse for failing to do so.

In Re Noah B.B. · filed 2015-03-12(g)(1)

The record before us contains clear and convincing evidence that Mother had the capacity to visit Noah, she made no attempt to do so, and she had no justifiable excuse for not doing so. See In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d at 640. We therefore affirm the trial court‟s finding that grounds existed for terminating Mother‟s parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to visit Noah for a period of four consecutive months preceding the filing of the termination petition.

A single, unpursued request for contact does not negate willful failure to visit when the custodian did not actively prevent visitation and the parent otherwise made no effort during the statutory period.

In Re E.G.H. · filed 2015-04-14(g)(1)

In our view, such testimony, even if true, does not excuse Mother’s failure to visit, nor, on the other hand, does it amount to an active effort by Petitioners to prevent Mother from seeing the Children. Stated another way, we think that something more than a single text exchange was required to establish a lack of willfulness in this case.

A failure to visit is not willful when the parent actively seeks contact but custodians ignore those efforts and wait out the statutory four-month period before petitioning to terminate.

In Re Braydon C. · filed 2015-05-29(g)(1)

In this case, Mother actively attempted to maintain contact with Braydon. In her letters, including one addressed to Father and Stepmother, Mother wrote, “I ask you please, I beg you for just a picture and a letter.” Mother included her telephone number but received no reply. ... We agree with the trial court that Appellants failed to carry their high burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, willful abandonment for failure to visit.

Restrictions at a sober-living facility do not excuse failure to visit when the parent can request passes or seek visitation through the other parent or the court but does neither.

In re Gavin G. · filed 2015-06-23(g)(1)

Although the facility limited Father‟s options for visiting Gavin, we conclude Father had no justifiable excuse for his failure to visit Gavin. Father had the ability to request passes to visit others, and he was able to request visitation with Gavin through Mother or the court. Father did neither.

Merely filing a visitation petition does not negate willful failure to visit under subsection (g)(1) when the parent does not advance the petition and otherwise does not visit during the statutory period.

In re B.C. · filed 2015-12-11(g)(1)

The same is true in the instant case, where Appellant filed a petition seeking visitation, but failed to advance the petition. Other than the petition filed in the Juvenile Court, which, for the reasons stated supra, is not sufficient to negate the willfulness element of the abandonment ground, it is undisputed that Appellant failed to visit during the four month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate her rights and for adoption. Accordingly, we conclude that the record clearly and convincingly supports termination of Appellant‟s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit.

A custodian’s isolated refusal to allow direct delivery of gifts does not significantly restrain visitation or defeat willfulness when the parent otherwise makes no meaningful effort to maintain a relationship.

In re Makendra E. · filed 2016-01-27(g)(1)

Moreover, even if we were to accept Mother‘s testimony, Appellees‘ conduct falls far short of constituting a ―significant restraint of or interference‖ with Mother‘s efforts to develop a relationship with the child. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Mother has never made a meaningful effort to consistently visit or form a relationship with the child.

A no-contact order does not defeat willful failure to visit when the court expressly invites the parent to seek restored contact and the parent takes no affirmative step to do so during the statutory period.

In Re: Riley C. · filed 2016-02-12(g)(1)

Here, Father failed to take any affirmative steps to regain contact with his child during the relevant statutory period. Therefore, we conclude that Father‟s conduct was willful. ... Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Father abandoned his child by failing to visit.

Whether visitation is merely token requires examining its frequency, duration, and quality during the statutory period.

In Re: Jayvien O. · filed 2016-06-07(g)(1)

Determining whether Mother‟s visitation amounted only to token visitation “requires that we examine the frequency, duration, and quality of the visits that occurred.” In re Keri C., 384 S.W.3d 731, 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).

Willful failure to visit under subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated abandonment ground was not proven where both the custodian and visitation provider contributed to the cessation of court-ordered visits.

In Re Jaiden C. · filed 2016-08-18(g)(1)

However, from the foregoing testimony and the totality of the circumstances, it is apparent that both Connie M. and Parent Place had some role in dropping the proverbial ball concerning the ordered visitation. This is especially so in light of the plain language of the juvenile court’s July 7, 2011 order, which places some burden on Connie M. to provide the child for visits, and places some burden on Parent Place to ensure that visitation comports with its internal policies. From the record as a whole, we agree with the trial court that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly support a finding that Appellee’s failure to visit was willful in this case.

A parent’s claim that a guardian refused visitation does not defeat willfulness when the parent never reports the refusal and later engages in only token visitation after DCS resumes custody.

In Re: Kenneth G. · filed 2016-09-15(g)(1)

While Father may have been unable to hire an attorney, he never attempted to contact DCS to report Bonnie‟s refusal to schedule visitation. The Child‟s prolonged abuse and neglect could have been resolved at a much earlier date had he initiated such contact. Moreover, the record reflects that DCS pursued him to schedule visitation once the Child returned to DCS custody. However, Father only engaged in token visitation with the Child on two occasions during the relevant time period. With these considerations in mind, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that Father abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit during the relevant time period and that a statutory ground existed for termination of his parental rights.

A school visit made only to leave papers for the custodial parent, unsupported claims of consulting lawyers, and no legal action to secure visitation did not defeat willful failure to visit.

In Re: Colby L. · filed 2017-05-24(g)(1)

While she argues in her brief that her visit to his school in March 2015 was an effort to visit with him, she testified at trial that the purpose of her visit was to leave “divorce papers and the custody papers, my name and number at the school for [the school] to give them to [Father].” ... Mother’s other testimony pertinent to this issue is related to events prior to the four month period. Significantly, while Mother testified that she met with several lawyers to attempt to secure court-ordered visitation, she had no evidence or proof of any such consultations and no action was taken in this regard. Again, the court’s adverse credibility determination weighs against Mother’s argument. On the record before us, there is clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned Colby by failing to visit with him in the period of time from December 22, 2014 to April 22, 2015.

A parent’s filing to enforce visitation during the relevant period can defeat clear and convincing proof of willful failure to visit.

In Re: Bryson F. · filed 2017-07-17(g)(1)

With these considerations in mind, we conclude that there was not clear and convincing evidence to establish that Father willfully failed to visit during the relevant time period.

A parent's failure to actively pursue available custody or visitation remedies may support willful-failure-to-visit abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In Re: Savanna C. · filed 2017-08-31(g)(1)

Upon careful review, we determine that Father was not actively pursuing custody or visitation with the Child.

Weekly telephone contact may be more than token visitation under subsection (g)(1)'s incorporated abandonment standard when distance and lack of assistance make in-person visits difficult.

In Re Billy T.W. · filed 2017-09-27(g)(1)

As in In re Caira D., under the circumstances of this case, including Father’s distance from the children and the Department’s failure to offer assistance with visits when Father was in Louisiana, we cannot conclude that weekly phone calls with the children constituted merely token visits. See In re Caira D., 2014 WL 6680696, at *7. We hold that the Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s failure to visit the children in person was willful.

Whether visitation is token depends on the quality and circumstances of the parent’s contact, including phone contact and understandable missed visits, not merely the number of in-person visits.

In Re Raeshad B. · filed 2019-05-20(g)(1)

Considering Mother’s visits, her testimony concerning phone contact, and the circumstances surrounding the scheduled February 4, 2017 visit, Mother did not have merely minimal or insubstantial contact during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition to terminate. So we respectfully disagree that Mother engaged in token visitation during the applicable time period.

A single visit during the relevant four-month period is token visitation when the parent made no other effort to schedule visits or contact the child and had no apparent reason for failing to visit.

In Re Keagan P. · filed 2019-08-05(g)(1)

We conclude, based on the circumstances, that Father’s single visit in March 2018 constituted merely “token visitation,” as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(C), and we affirm the trial court’s determination that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned Keagan by willfully failing to visit him during the relevant four-month period, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (2018).

Abandonment for failure to visit under subsection (g)(1) must be determined from the precise statutory four-month window, without relying on missed visits before or after it.

In Re Malik G. · filed 2019-11-21(g)(1)

The four month window is statutory and precise. For purposes of this ground, we are not interested in Mother’s failures to visit before or after the four month window. These extraneous dates serve only to muddle the issue as to this ground, an issue concerning Mother’s fundamental right as a parent.

A parent’s unsuccessful visitation litigation years earlier does not negate willfulness when the parent later quit trying and made no effort during the statutory four-month period.

In Re: Kelsea L. · filed 2020-01-27(g)(1)

The trial court found that Father had taken legal action in years past to assert his parenting rights and was familiar with the process for accessing the courts for that purpose, yet he took no action to do so at any time near the four-month period. Simply put, the trial court found that Father had “quit trying” to visit Kelsea. The record supports the trial court’s conclusions with respect to this issue.

A parent proves lack of willfulness when repeated requests to visit during the statutory period are ignored or thwarted by the custodial parent.

In Re Archer R. · filed 2020-02-19(g)(1)

This is not a case in which a parent has abandoned his child by failing to visit within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). Rather, this is a case in which the custodial parent has interfered with and thwarted the noncustodial parent’s ability to visit with the child and develop a relationship. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 863-64.

Five minimally engaged visits during the relevant period can constitute token visitation and willful abandonment when the parent could have visited but made no reasonable effort to build a meaningful relationship.

In Re Daisy A. · filed 2020-04-17(g)(1)

Mother’s behavior was willful within the meaning of section 36-1- 102(1)(A)(i), and we agree with the trial court that the evidence that Mother’s visits amount to token visitation and that she did not make a reasonable attempt to establish a meaningful relationship with Daisy is clear and convincing; we affirm the holding that Mother has abandoned Daisy by willfully failing to visit her.

A parent who makes no attempt to establish visitation for years despite knowing how to contact the child’s family fails to prove that abandonment by failure to visit was not willful under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Jaxon W. H. · filed 2020-07-02(g)(1)

Unfortunately, Father allowed these conditions to continue for several years, and Jaxon no longer knows Father. We agree with the trial court’s finding that Father failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to visit Jaxon was not willful. Father made no attempt to establish visitation with Jaxon for over two years despite knowing how to contact the maternal grandmother. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit.

A parent’s pursuit of visitation and child support through the courts during the statutory period, coupled with the other parent’s interference, is inconsistent with willful abandonment under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Ne'Khiya M. · filed 2020-07-20(g)(1)

Overall, Mother was aware that Father was taking steps in order to develop a relationship with the Child. However, by her own testimony, she believed that allowing Father to develop a relationship with the Child “was just something that . . . he shouldn’t have control over anymore[.]” ... Accordingly, we conclude that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully abandoned the Child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1).

A protective order, the custodian’s opposition to visitation, and a parent’s sustained efforts through the legal system may establish that failure to visit was not willful under subsection (g)(1).

In Re John A. · filed 2021-01-04(g)(1)

However, the order of protection, granted by the juvenile court at a time when Mother was incarcerated, is relevant to our assessment of the reasonableness of Mother’s belief that, as she testified, she thought Petitioner would have her arrested if she contacted Petitioner about visitation. For Petitioner’s part, she testified that she was opposed to any visitation by Mother, and “it’s fair to say she didn’t want [Mother] to have contact with her child.” Considering the totality of the particular circumstances in this case, we hold that Mother established by a preponderance of the evidence that her failure to visit was not willful. We reverse the judgment of the trial court finding that this ground was proven.

A parent’s minimal and eventually abandoned efforts to arrange visitation can establish willful failure to visit under subsection (g)(1) when visitation remained available.

IN RE ELLA H. · filed 2021-01-13(g)(1)

Although Father argues that Mother thwarted his visitation efforts, it is clear from the record that Father’s efforts to visit were at first minimal and eventually ceased entirely. Mother repeatedly explained to Father that she wanted him to have visitation with the Child and asked only that he establish a consistent visitation schedule. It is clear, however, that Father would not commit to this reasonable request, and there is no explanation in the record as to why Father failed to pursue visitation with the Child despite ample opportunity to do so. As such, there is sufficient evidence to show that Father’s failure to visit the Child during the four months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate his parental rights was due solely to his own unwillingness to pursue the opportunity. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Appellants met their burden to prove the ground of abandonment by failure to visit.

Temporary COVID restrictions did not establish lack of willfulness under subsection (g)(1) when the parent failed to use available means of contact or visit at unrestricted times.

In Re Evan M. · filed 2021-08-10(g)(1)

While the Child’s COVID positive test certainly excused Father from visiting in its aftermath, Father failed to make full use of the means of contact that were still available to him. Furthermore, that excuse does not justify Father’s failure to visit at other times when COVID restrictions did not prevent him from doing so.

When a termination petition is filed after July 1, 2018, the parent bears the burden to prove by a preponderance that failure to visit was not willful under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Zoey L. · filed 2021-08-11(g)(1)

Because the petition to terminate Mother’s rights was filed after July 1, 2018, Mother bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her failure to visit was not willful. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (“The parent . . . shall bear the burden of proof that the failure to visit . . . was not willful. Such defense must be established by a preponderance of evidence.”).

A single four-hour visit during the relevant four-month period may be token visitation when the parent knowingly moved away and abandoned regular visitation opportunities.

In Re Caroline R. · filed 2022-03-09(g)(1)

We hold that Father’s single visit during the relevant four-month period is token visitation under the circumstances of this case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(C).

When phone calls are the only available visitation, DCS must present unequivocal evidence of their frequency to prove abandonment by failure to visit.

In Re Analesia Q. · filed 2022-05-10(g)(1)

In this particular case, once a week phone calls were the only available mode of communication between Father and the Child. Consequently, unequivocal evidence regarding the number of phone calls made was imperative here.

A parent’s lack of a cellular telephone or reliable internet does not excuse total failure to visit under subsection (g)(1) when other means to arrange in-person visits remain available.

In Re Bonnie E. · filed 2022-05-19(g)(1)

Notwithstanding Mother’s claims regarding her lack of ability to participate in video or telephone calls, such circumstances cannot and do not excuse the fact that she did not visit the Child at all during the Determinative Period. ... Therefore, Mother cannot rely on her lack of a cellular telephone or reliable internet service to excuse her failure to maintain contact or visit with the Child during the Determinative Period.

A parent who takes no action to exercise court-approved visitation over the statutory period may be found to have willfully failed to visit under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Morgan R. · filed 2022-06-02(g)(1)

Indeed, taking the evidence in the record before us, we can only conclude that Mother has willfully failed to visit Child during the relevant time period.

A parent waives lack of willfulness as a defense to abandonment by neither pleading it nor trying it by express or implied consent.

In Re: Glenn B. · filed 2023-12-04(g)(1)

Mother did not plead the absence of willfulness. Where an affirmative defense has not been pleaded, that failure to plead generally results in waiver of the affirmative defense. ... Mother does not contend that this issue was tried by consent. Nor does the record reflect that the affirmative defense of willfulness was tried by either express or implied consent.

Frequent, lengthy FaceTime visits may constitute more than token visitation, and the termination order must make findings on such evidence before finding abandonment by failure to visit.

In Re Aubrianna O. · filed 2024-05-28(g)(1), (k)

Upon a careful review of the trial court’s order and the record, we conclude that Mother’s testimony respecting her FaceTime visits with the Child could potentially demonstrate more than token visitation, such that evidence of these visits may indeed preponderate against the trial court’s finding of abandonment by failure to visit the Child.

A parent does not prove inability to afford visitation when employed, possessing multiple income sources, able to use shorter paid visits, and permitted free video visits.

In Re Ezra C. · filed 2024-07-12(g)(1)

The record further reflects that Father and Stepmother were employed during the time period and had various streams of income. We, like the trial court, find his testimony unconvincing that he was unable to afford visitation. Father also did not request a visit when he was already present in Tennessee for court proceedings on two separate days in August 2021. Moreover, Father was also permitted to visit via FaceTime, an avenue of visitation he only exercised once during the pertinent time period.

Financial difficulty does not prove lack of willfulness when the parent makes no in-person visits and fails to use inexpensive alternative contact such as telephone or video calls.

In Re Violet R. · filed 2024-07-30(g)(1)

Like the trial court, we conclude that the evidence is clear and convincing that Father abandoned his child by failing to visit. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Father failed to establish that his conduct was not willful.

A parent’s failure to complete court-ordered prerequisites for restoring suspended visitation supports abandonment by failure to visit under subsection (g)(1).

In Re Derek S. · filed 2024-08-14(g)(1)

The failure of a parent to complete the required steps to regain visitation rights after a court order suspended such rights supports a finding of abandonment. In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 642 (Tenn. 2013). Under these circumstances, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the Children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i).

Merely filing a petition to restore visitation does not establish lack of willfulness under subsection (g)(1) when the parent takes no further action to pursue visitation.

In Re Leilani G. · filed 2024-09-26(g)(1)

Merely filing her “petition for re-establishing a parenting plan” was insufficient, especially in light of evidence that Mother would have tested positive for marijuana around that time.

Brief incidental appearances during family video chats may constitute only token visitation when the calls were not intended to facilitate parent-child contact.

In Re Princeton W. · filed 2024-11-21(g)(1)

In light of the testimony in this record, we agree with the trial court that Mother’s brief interactions with Child during the relevant time period were no more than token visitation, at best, and we conclude that this ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence.